Written by Stefano Spinaci,
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The dramatic consequences of climate change and environmental degradation have brought the need for a more sustainable economy to the top of the agenda. Transforming the EU economy to make it more sustainable requires large investments, especially for enabling a green and low-carbon transition. Given that the public sector alone cannot cover this financial need, solutions have been sought to bring the private sector on board. Green finance involves collecting funds for addressing climate and environmental issues (green financing), on the one hand, and improving the management of financial risk related to climate and the environment (greening finance), on the other. Sustainable finance is an evolution of green finance, as it takes into consideration environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues and risks, with the aim of increasing long-term investments in sustainable economic activities and projects.
The European Union is a global leader in the above domain. In its 2018 action plan on financing sustainable growth, the European Commission set out the EU strategy to connect finance with sustainability. The first deliverables have been three key regulations seeking to create a classification system to determine whether an economic activity is environmentally sustainable (the ‘taxonomy’); to make disclosures relating to sustainable investments and sustainability risks clearer; and to establish low-carbon benchmarks. The Taxonomy Regulation is particularly important for driving the consistent development of future legislation, as advocated, in particular, by the European Parliament. The Commission will release a renewed sustainable finance strategy in 2021, and a legislative proposal on the green bond standard.
The interest in green and sustainable finance is rising very fast among investors worldwide, and several voluntary private initiatives have tried to create some market standards. Policymakers have also been very active in launching numerous regulatory and non-regulatory initiatives at global or local level. To avoid market fragmentation, there is a demand for greater harmonisation among the different measures. There is also a need to increase the standardisation and disclosure of non-financial information published by companies and used to evaluate the risks. Doing so will help to increase data availability, to make data more comparable, and to bring more transparency and clarity to investors. Given that climate change and environmental degradation are global challenges, international cooperation is in the common interest; the European Union is actively promoting this through the International Platform on Sustainable Finance.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Green and sustainable finance‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Listen to policy podcast ‘Green and sustainable finance’ on YouTube.
Written by Denise Chircop,
The European Union is beginning to deploy significant amounts of coronavirus recovery funding and has introduced visionary initiatives such as the New European Bauhaus, a European Green Deal, and a Europe fit for the digital age. In this way, the EU seeks to turn the huge disruptions resulting from the Covid‑19 pandemic into an opportunity to start afresh, with some initiatives to shape the future.
In the field of education, the European Commission proposes to establish a European education area by 2025, and implement a new digital education action plan. The Portuguese Presidency of the European Council has launched discussions on the renewal of the strategic framework for European cooperation on education and training up to 2030. In the latest round of negotiations over the long-term budget of the European Union, the European Parliament fought hard to boost the funding programme dedicated to lifelong learning Erasmus for 2021‑2017, securing additional funds and wider participation to include significantly more people with fewer opportunities.
At a time of new beginnings, our animated infographic on lifelong learning in the EU has been revamped with recent data and greater interactivity. A new section on vocational education and training looks at the distribution of enrolments, the situation of vocational education teachers and instructors, the financing of our vocational systems, and the opportunities vocational education and training opens up, including for mobility. Education is integral to our lives and the sections of the animated infographic span from early childhood to adulthood. Since learning implies an act of curiosity, there are many interesting nuggets waiting to be discovered – just click.
Lifelong learning in the EU is intended to help explain what the EU means when it uses the term lifelong learning and to draw attention to some of the issues by displaying EU financed studies and data. How is learning structured in the EU? Who pays for it? And how much? What are the profiles of the professionals? Who are the beneficiaries? Who is left by the wayside? What is the impact?
Prepared for Members of the European Parliament, we have added a series of infographic briefings that use some elements of the animated infographic as a launch pad to dig deeper into a theme. There are four to date:
See also our video that provides answers to questions such as what is lifelong learning, whether it is equally accessible to everyone and how the European Union contributes towards the promotion of lifelong learning.
Written by Rosamund Shreeves with Nessa Boland,
© pressmaster / Adobe Stock
One hundred years after women won the vote or were first elected to parliament in some EU countries, the data show that women continue to be under-represented in politics and public life, in the European Parliament, national parliaments and governments, and local assemblies.
The arguments for gender balance in politics are numerous, and benefit not only women and female politicians, but also parties themselves and the rest of society. After all, women form half the population and need to be better represented in power structures. However, there is now solid evidence both of obstacles and of the strategies that are effective when it comes to increasing women’s participation and representation. Here, political parties and the media can be both barriers and important enablers. The EU has committed to achieving a gender balance in political representation and participation as a matter of justice, equality and democracy. Concrete recommendations have been made for achieving this goal, including specific action that could be taken by the EU institutions, national governments, political parties, civil society and the media.
The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has shone a spotlight on the issue of women’s leadership and its implications for gender equality.
This is an update of a Briefing from March 2019, drafted by Rosamund Shreeves and Martina Prpic.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in politics in the EU: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Rosamund Shreeves,
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In the midst of the current pandemic, adopting a gender perspective may seem a secondary concern. However, pandemics are known to affect women and men differently, making it essential to recognise these differences in order to understand the impacts on individuals and communities and to respond effectively and equitably.
There is already clear evidence that the ongoing health, social and economic crisis is having gendered impacts. Disaggregated data show that sex and gender are playing a role in exposure to the virus and risks of severe outcomes, and that some groups of women and men are particularly vulnerable. Lockdown measures have led to an increase in violence against women and disrupted access to support services. Access to sexual and reproductive healthcare has also been affected. Successive lockdowns have widened the existing gender divide in unpaid care work that was already keeping more women than men out of the labour market. Greater work-life conflict is one of the factors leading to women’s employment being worse hit than men’s, with potential long-term impacts on women’s employment, pay and career advancement. The pandemic has also brought the issue of women’s participation in decision-making to the fore.
Without a gender-sensitive approach, the pandemic could have far-reaching implications, including a real risk of exacerbating gender inequalities and sending progress into reverse. At the same time, gender mainstreaming tools such as gender impact assessments and gender budgeting exist that could, if used effectively, mitigate the negative consequences and contribute to achieving gender equality.
Internationally and within the European Union (EU), there have been calls for gender-sensitive emergency and long-term responses. In January 2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution setting out recommendations on both aspects.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Covid-19: The need for a gendered response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Sex-disaggregated data on confirmed cases and mortality in the EU
Written by Ralf Drachenberg,
© Adobe Stock
For the tenth time since the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis, the European Council met by video-conference, however this time in two separate sessions. The first, on 25 February, dealing with the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and ways of increasing the EU’s health resilience, is covered in this paper, while the second, the following morning, addressed security and defence as well as the southern neighbourhood, and is covered by a separate paper. Regarding the pandemic, EU leaders called for acceleration in the authorisation, production and distribution of vaccines, reiterated their solidarity with third countries, and acknowledged that non-essential travel still needed to be restricted while ensuring the unhindered flow of goods and services within the single market. To strengthen the EU’s resilience to future health emergencies, EU leaders will seek to improve coordination to ensure better prevention, preparedness and response. However, further EU integration in health policy was excluded, with the conclusions stressing that these actions should be carried out ‘in line with the Union competences under the Treaties’. EU leaders also called on the Commission to draw up a report on the lessons learned from this crisis, to take forward the work on the European health union, and underlined the need for a global approach, including an international treaty on pandemics.
Meeting format and video-conference conclusionsThe Leaders’ Agenda for 2020-21 envisaged a physical European Council meeting in February 2021. However, due to the still serious health situation, it was replaced by video-conferences. Despite the informal nature of the meeting, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, was invited to present Parliament’s view, which is not the case for most video-conferences of the European Council. This was the 14th time the European Council has addressed the coronavirus crisis in a period of just under 12 months, underlining its role as Covid-19 crisis manager. Nine of these exchanges took place by video-conference, but their results have taken different formats, notably, three ‘President’s conclusions‘, three ’President’s remarks’, one ‘oral President’s conclusions’ and, for this meeting, two statements. While the meaning of these different labels is neither obvious nor explained, it suggests a distinction in nature to that of formal conclusions of a physical European Council meeting, which have been qualified as ‘political orientations’.
EU coordination efforts in response to the coronavirus pandemic EU coordination effortsOver the past year, the European Council has met regularly to take stock of the epidemiological situation and to coordinate efforts in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Recent challenges regarding the production and roll-out of vaccines across the EU, have led to criticism of the European Commission. On 10 February, in the European Parliament, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen acknowledged some mistakes in the handing of the vaccine acquisition process, but remained firm that ordering vaccines jointly and sharing them in a spirit of solidarity was the right decision. MEPs addressed some of the mistakes made, but also stressed that the overall strategy – to purchase vaccines jointly – was the right one. EU leaders emphasised their determination to continue working together and coordinate their actions to tackle the pandemic and its consequences, keeping the overall situation under close review.
Vaccine deliveryThe European Council agreed on the need to accelerate the authorisation, production and distribution of vaccines, as well as the vaccination process. Ahead of the meeting, Charles Michel stressed that the ‘main challenge is to speed up #COVID19 vaccine delivery to Member States so they can implement their vaccination campaigns’. EU leaders expressed their support for the Commission’s ‘on-going efforts to accelerate the availability of raw materials, facilitate agreements between manufacturers across supply chains, scope existing facilities so as to help production scale-up in the EU and further the research and development of vaccines to protect against variants’. Prior to the meeting, Belgium, Denmark, Lithuania, Poland and Spain called for the strengthening of vaccine production in the EU. In order to boost production capacity in Europe, the Commission has set-up a task force for industrial scale-up of Covid-19 vaccines, to facilitate a more integrated and strategic public-private partnership with industry. It will also provide operational support for addressing potential bottlenecks in production and supply of raw materials and other essential input required for vaccines manufacturing. Addressing the European Council, President Sassoli stressed ‘it was forward-looking of our governments to give the Commission the mandate to procure vaccines to distribute among all 27 Member States’.
Coronavirus variantsConsidering the possible resistance of future coronavirus variants to existing vaccines, EU leaders called for enhancement of the EU’s surveillance and detection capacity to identify variants as early as possible. To anticipate such developments, the Commission launched a new bio-defence preparedness plan named HERA Incubator. The objective is ‘to access and mobilise all means and resources necessary to prevent, mitigate and respond to the potential impact of [coronavirus] variants’. EU leaders stressed that ‘companies must ensure predictability of their vaccine production and respect contractual delivery deadlines’. On 17 February, the Commission approved a second contract with the pharmaceutical company Moderna, providing an additional 300 million doses. This adds to the contracts already signed with BioNTech/Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Sanofi-GSK, Janssen Pharmaceutica NV, Curevac and Moderna.
The movement of personsCurrently eight Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Portugal and Spain) have set temporary internal border controls due to Covid-19. Seven of them introduced them despite the EU leaders’ statement at their last video-conference meeting, on 21 January 2021, that ‘borders need to stay open to ensure the functioning of the single market, including the flow of essential goods and services. No indiscriminate travel bans should be imposed.’ The latest European Council meeting took a more nuanced approach, acknowledging that ‘for the time being, non-essential travel needs to be restricted’, while stressing that ‘the unhindered flow of goods and services in the single market must continue to be ensured’. It welcomed two new Council recommendations on travel within, and into, the EU, as well as the progress made on a common approach to vaccination certificates, calling for this work to continue.
Covid-19 and third countriesEU leaders reaffirmed their solidarity with third countries, and the aim of improving access to vaccines for priority groups in the neighbourhood and beyond, through COVAX, a global vaccine procurement facility.
Strengthening the EU’s resilience to health threatsEU leaders had a first exchange of views on ways of strengthening the EU’s health resilience in the long term. The Commission was invited to present a report on the lessons learned from the Covid-19 pandemic ahead of the June European Council meeting, which would be followed up in the second half of 2021. Prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, health was a policy issue which received very limited attention from the European Council; and had not previously featured as a separate agenda point at a European Council meeting. Due to the coronavirus pandemic, health has become one of the main concerns for Europeans, as shown by recent Eurobarometer surveys. When asked what the EU should now prioritise in its response to the coronavirus outbreak, citizens prioritised ‘developing financial means to find a treatment or vaccine’; ‘establishing a strategy for facing a similar crisis in the future’; and ‘developing a European health policy’. EP President Sassoli thus underlined that modifying the Treaties to incorporate clearly defined competences for the EU institutions ‘can no longer be a taboo’.
European health unionEU leaders agreed to ‘improve EU coordination, in line with the Union competences under the Treaties, to ensure better prevention, preparedness for and response to future health emergencies’. Priority will be given to the development of safe and effective vaccines and medicines, early investment in production capacity and making best use of big data and digital technologies for medical research and healthcare. EU Heads of State or Government called for the work on the European health union to be taken forward.
Global multilateral cooperation on future health threatsEU leaders committed to advancing global health security, including by strengthening the World Health Organization, and supported President Michel’s idea for an international treaty on pandemics, which could be addressed during the 21 May 2021 G20 Global Health Summit in Rome.
Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the European Council video-conference of 25 February 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Mihalis Kritikos,
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The current EU liability framework is incredibly complex and often inadapted to modern entities. It is therefore difficult for the subjects involved to understand exactly when a given obligation applies to them, and what kind of behaviour is required. This was one of the main conclusions of the study on ‘Liability of online platforms‘, carried out by Professor Andrea Bertolini of the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (Pisa) at the request of the STOA Panel, following a proposal from Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany), First Vice-Chair of the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA).
Online platforms (OPs) have gained significant economic and societal importance in the last decade and the public debate on their responsibilities and liability has reached an unprecedented level. They have penetrated all product and service markets and have changed the way in which goods are sold and purchased, and in which information is exchanged and obtained, allowing a shift from the off-line world to the online environment, where they provide numerous digital services including the mass diffusion of any type of content, both legal and illegal.
As a result of their growing importance, users and policy-makers raise questions about the platforms’ responsibility in the digital domain. The contractual responsibility of online platform operators has been subject to an intensive debate in the recent past, in the frame of the debate on the effective detection and removal of illegal material. While the operators of transaction platforms usually seek a role of mere intermediary, without considerable liability for the proper performance of the main contracts, there is increasing support for extending their responsibility. Moreover, the lack of international legal mechanisms to enforce the removal of abusive material complicates the tracing and prosecution of abusive behaviours online. Self-regulation efforts appear suboptimal, due to the presence of externalities and asymmetric information problems, warranting some form of liability rules.
What are the main legal/regulatory challenges associated with the operation of OPs and the efforts to detect and remove illegal/harmful material, content and/or products? Can we map the whole range of liabilities associated with the operation of online platforms and provide the conceptual clarifications necessary to address them systematically? Is the existing EU legal framework adequate to ensure protection for users and their fundamental rights and freedoms? Does the current liability regime reflect the position of users and platforms alone? Does it adequately address the interests of third parties that are potentially violated by user-generated content?
Against this background, the study identifies and assesses the relevant legal framework at the EU level, discussing the policy issues that deserve consideration, and identifies the possible policy issues and concerns, with respect to the application of the existing legal framework – comprised of both hard- and soft-law initiatives – deserving discussion and, in some cases at least, even regulatory intervention. The review of the main legal/regulatory challenges associated with the operation of OPs involves an analysis of the incentives for OPs, their users and third parties, to detect and remove illegal/harmful material, content and/or products.
One of the most important aspects of the study is the detailed discussion of the notion of OPs and the comprehensive classification it provides on the basis of multiple criteria. In fact, it maps and critically assesses the whole range of OP liabilities, taking hard and soft law, self-regulation, as well as national legislation, into consideration.
In doing so, the study sets out a much-needed conceptual framework by analysing the difference between responsibility and liability, and the different types of liability, distinguishing, on the one hand, between civil, criminal and administrative liability and between strict, semi-strict or fault-based liability on the other hand. It also makes an important distinction between liabilities connected with the activities performed or the content uploaded by OP users and alternative sources of liability, such as OPs’ contractual liability towards users, both businesses and consumers, as well as that deriving from infringements of privacy and data protection law. The proposed classifications demonstrate their plurality, as platforms differ pursuant to the activities and functions they serve, the multiplicity of actors they involve and the various ways in which they interact with them in their operation, their different sources of revenue and associated business models, the way in which they use and exploit data, and the level of control they exercise on users’ activities.
Against the analysis of OPs’ rights, duties and liabilities under the existing EU regulatory framework, the study suggests a set of policy options which could be used to shape this framework regarding the liability of OPs, and especially that relating to the illegal/harmful content or products distributed and/or made available through their infrastructures, such as content that infringes intellectual property rights (IPR), hate speech, terrorist content, content that harms children, counterfeit and unsafe products.
One of the most innovative aspects of the study is that the policy options are assessed against a variety of criteria including cost and benefits, feasibility and effectiveness, sustainability, their coherence with EU objectives, ethical, social and regulatory impacts and the effects on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms, and presented along a scale of increasing interventionism.
This new STOA study provides a timely, in-depth overview of the discussion on the liabilities of OPs that will inform the discussions on the recent European Commission proposal on a Digital Services Acts, which aims to establish a new, comprehensive transparency and accountability regime for OPs. While proposing the maintenance of the liability exemptions for tech companies by not subjecting them to a general monitoring obligation regarding user content, this legislative proposal proposes that, in certain circumstances, platforms could be held liable for third-party content, for instance, when failing to act after being alerted of illegal content. The study is expected to provide EU legislators with a wide range of pragmatic and well-balanced policy options during the discussion of this proposal.
Read the full report and accompanying STOA Options Brief to find out more.
Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.
Written by Ionel Zamfir,
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The crisis of democracy and the rise of authoritarianism across the globe, compounded by the coronavirus pandemic, highlight the importance of taking a more strategic and autonomous approach to supporting democracy worldwide – an objective often balanced against other external policy aims until now.
Since the start of the current parliamentary term, the EU has reviewed its political guidance on democracy and human rights. It has adopted or is about to adopt important measures to strengthen support for democracy (including better monitoring and enforcement of relevant provisions in trade arrangements). The adoption of the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) and of a new development aid instrument bringing together all former external aid instruments provides new opportunities for better implementing EU funding and better exploiting the EU’s leverage as a major provider of development aid. Digital challenges and the narrowing space for civil societies are among the priorities to be addressed. The challenge of engaging more difficult partners, such as China and Russia, has inspired calls to broaden the scope of a values-based agenda to other economic relations, such as investments.
These new measures complement an already broad and complex toolbox integrating various external policies. Using the enhanced powers in external affairs provided by the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has set up extensive political and diplomatic dialogues to enhance partnerships beyond the more asymmetric, specific development assistance and trade leverage going back to the 1990s. While the EU has responded to violations of democratic norms by reducing aid and withdrawing trade preferences, it has consistently sought to build equal partnerships based on constructive and open dialogues, rather than use its economic and commercial traction in a coercive manner.
This is an update of a Briefing from February 2018.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Support for democracy through EU external policy: New tools for growing challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Alex Benjamin Wilson (1st edition),
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On 15 December 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal to revise the 2013 regulation on trans-European networks in energy (TEN-E). The revised TEN-E Regulation is currently under discussion in the European Parliament and the Council, which will prepare their negotiating positions. The 2013 TEN-E Regulation sets out EU guidelines for cross-border energy infrastructure and outlines the process for selecting projects of common interest (PCI). PCIs are infrastructure projects considered essential for delivering on EU objectives in the energy field, including improved interconnection between national markets, greater competitiveness, security of supply, and promotion of renewable energy sources. The list of PCIs is updated every two years. Some PCI projects are eligible for EU financing from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). The revised TEN-E Regulation would align closely with the ambitious climate neutrality objectives of the European Green Deal, primarily by supporting energy infrastructure that consolidates new and existing clean energy technologies, and by ending policy and financial support for fossil fuel projects, which would no longer be included on PCI lists and thus unable to receive CEF funding.
Complete version Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 Committee responsible: Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) COM(2020) 824Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition),
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Given the important role they play in the rollout of zero-emission mobility and the storage of intermittent renewable energy, batteries are a crucial element in the EU’s transition to a climate neutral economy. Global battery demand is expected to increase 14-fold by 2030, making this market an increasingly strategic one. The proposal presented by the European Commission is designed to modernise the EU’s regulatory framework for batteries in order to secure the sustainability and competitiveness of battery value chains. It would introduce mandatory requirements on sustainability (such as carbon footprint rules, minimum recycled content, performance and durability criteria), safety and labelling for the marketing and putting into service of batteries, and requirements for end-of-life management. The proposal also includes due diligence obligations for economic operators as regards the sourcing of raw materials.
The legislative process is in its early stages. In the Council, the proposal is being examined by the Working Party on the Environment. In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, which appointed Antonius Manders as rapporteur.
Complete version Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council concerning batteries and waste batteries, repealing Directive 2006/66/EC and amending Regulation (EU) No 2019/1020 Committee responsible: Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) COM(2020) 798Claudia Gamon (Renew Europe, Austria) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report
© Adobe Stock
Citizens recurrently turn to the European Parliament to comment on various cases of alleged corruption. Furthermore, they request information on how to lodge a complaint and to ask the EU to act in the fight against corruption.
Corruption remains a challenge for society as a whole and is a serious crime that can have a cross-border dimension. Fighting crime is primarily a competence of authorities in EU countries, which remain ultimately responsible for key aspects linked to the fight against corruption: law enforcement, judicial measures taken on the ground, and budgetary resources allocated to policing and the administration of justice.
According to Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the European Union may establish minimum rules to define criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension, such as money laundering, corruption and organised crime.
In February 2014, the European Commission presented an EU Anti-corruption Report. Although intended as the first of a series, in 2017, the Commission decided not to produce any updates. Since its publication, the report has served as the basis for dialogue with national authorities while also informing broader debates across Europe.
European Parliament actionIn a 2016 resolution on the fight against corruption, the European Parliament called inter alia for the adoption of a European action plan to eradicate organised crime, corruption and money laundering, for a stronger legal framework and for better cross-border judicial cooperation. It also recommended that EU countries strive to ensure efficient transparency, monitoring and accountability mechanisms in their use of EU funds.
In September 2020, the European Parliament set up a Subcommittee on tax matters (FISC) to assist the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) on tax-related matters and particularly the fight against tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance. According to a 2016 Eurobarometer survey, 75 % of EU citizens would like the EU to intervene more to tackle tax fraud, making it one of the areas with the strongest support for greater EU involvement.
EU rules against corruptionAmong the legislative initiatives introduced in recent years to combat corruption at EU level, examples include the Directive on the Freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime, the 5th Anti-money laundering Directive, the Public Procurement Directives and the Directive on the Use of financial information to fight certain criminal offences.
In May 2018, the Commission published a legislative proposal aiming to establish an EU anti-fraud programme. The programme is based on Article 325 of the TFEU, which provides for an obligation shared between EU countries and the EU to protect the Union’s financial interests and to counter fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities affecting them.
Fraud against the EU budgetThe European Commission publishes an annual report on the fight against fraud affecting EU financial interests. As the EU prepares to mobilise unprecedented sums to tackle the coronavirus crisis and its consequences, the positive results achieved in recent years provide a solid basis to meet future challenges for European and national authorities in their fight against fraud.
EU mechanisms to fight corruptionIn the framework of the cooperation and verification mechanism for Bulgaria and Romania, the European Commission regularly reports on advancement with judicial reform and the fight against corruption in these countries, inviting them to take action in different areas, in order to develop the effective administrative and judicial systems.
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) is an EU body mandated to investigate fraud against the EU budget, corruption and serious misconduct within the European institutions, and to develop anti-fraud policy for the European Commission. Anyone can contact the office anonymously to report cases of fraud. Once it concludes an investigation, the European Anti-Fraud Office recommends action to the EU institutions and national governments concerned: this usually includes launching criminal investigations, financial recoveries or other disciplinary measures. It then monitors how these recommendations are implemented.
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is a new body responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment crimes against the financial interests of the European Union. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office has a decentralised but hierarchical structure composed of European prosecutors at EU level and European delegated prosecutors in each EU country. Currently, 22 EU countries participate in the enhanced cooperation (so far, Hungary, Poland and Sweden have decided not to join the EPPO, while Denmark and Ireland have an opt-out from the area of freedom, security and justice). As an autonomous body, the EPPO could overcome potential unwillingness on the part of national authorities to investigate certain sensitive corruption cases. Once the European Public Prosecutor’s Office has finalised its administrative set-up, it will be possible to report a criminal offence affecting the EU’s financial interests directly to the EPPO.
Further informationKeep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.
Written by Mar Negreiro (1st edition),
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The Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive is the first piece of EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity, and its specific aim was to achieve a high common level of cybersecurity across the Member States. While it increased the Member States’ cybersecurity capabilities, its implementation proved difficult, resulting in fragmentation at different levels across the internal market.
To respond to the growing threats posed with digitalisation and the surge in cyber-attacks, the Commission has submitted a proposal to replace the NIS Directive and thereby strengthen the security requirements, address the security of supply chains, streamline reporting obligations, and introduce more stringent supervisory measures and stricter enforcement requirements, including harmonised sanctions across the EU. The proposed expansion of the scope covered by the NIS2, by effectively obliging more entities and sectors to take measures, would assist in increasing the level of cybersecurity in Europe in the longer term.
Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy.
Complete version Proposal for a directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union Committee responsible: Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) COM(2020) 823Written by Gregor Erbach and Liselotte Jensen,
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Hydrogen is expected to play a key role in a future climate-neutral economy, enabling emission-free transport, heating and industrial processes as well as inter-seasonal energy storage. Clean hydrogen produced with renewable electricity is a zero-emission energy carrier, but is not yet as cost-competitive as hydrogen produced from natural gas. A number of studies show that an EU energy system having a significant proportion of hydrogen and renewable gases would be more cost-effective than one relying on extensive electrification.
Research and industrial innovation in hydrogen applications is an EU priority and receives substantial EU funding through the research framework programmes. Hydrogen projects are managed by the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH JU), a public-private partnership supported by the European Commission.
The EU hydrogen strategy, adopted in July 2020, aims to accelerate the development of clean hydrogen. The European Clean Hydrogen Alliance, established at the same time, is a forum bringing together industry, public authorities and civil society, to coordinate investment.
Almost all EU Member States recognise the important role of hydrogen in their national energy and climate plans for the 2021-2030 period. About half have explicit hydrogen-related objectives, focussed primarily on transport and industry.
In the European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is preparing an own-initiative report on the EU Hydrogen strategy. The Council adopted conclusions on the EU hydrogen market in December 2020, with a focus on renewable hydrogen for decarbonisation, recovery and competitiveness.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Hydrogen as an energy carrier for a climate-neutral economy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Agnieszka Widuto,
© Stockfotos-MG / Adobe Stock
The New European Bauhaus is a European Commission initiative, which links the sustainability, aesthetics and inclusion dimensions of building design. Announced in September 2020 by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the project has now entered the design phase, which involves exploring ideas, launching the New European Bauhaus prize and opening calls for proposals to bring the new ideas to life through the use of EU funds at national and regional level. EU cohesion policy, through its support for environmental, socio-economic and cultural projects, can make a significant contribution to the New European Bauhaus.
New European Bauhaus initiativeThe New European Bauhaus project was announced by Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union address on 16 September 2020. The name makes reference to the early 20th century Bauhaus architectural movement, which sought to combine art and practicality. In the words of the Commission President, the initiative ‘is about matching sustainability with style, to bring the European Green Deal closer to people’s minds and homes’. The project aims to involve designers, artists, scientists, architects and citizens to co-create these ideas and put them into practice. It will take place in three phases – design, delivery and dissemination (see box below). On the occasion of launching the ‘design phase’ on 18 January 2021, the Commissioner for Cohesion and Reforms, Elisa Ferreira described the project as ‘relevant for all regions and territories’, and confirmed that the Commission is exploring how EU funding tools could be mobilised to support concrete New European Bauhaus actions. The 2020 Commission communication on ‘A Renovation Wave for Europe – greening our buildings, creating jobs, improving lives’ also highlights the role of cohesion policy funding for renovation of buildings, while respecting cultural heritage, sustainability and social inclusion aspects.
Cohesion policyCohesion policy accounts for about one third of the EU budget. It supports a wide range of investments in all EU regions, in areas such as innovation, economic transformation, energy transition, transport and digital networks, social inclusion and sustainable urban development across the EU. In the 2021-2027 budgetary period, cohesion policy will be governed by the Common Provisions Regulation to be adopted in the coming months. The provisional agreement on the proposed regulation establishes five policy objectives for regional funding. These include the financing of environmental, cultural and socio-economic inclusion projects, which could support New European Bauhaus actions.
Support for the environmentThe European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and Cohesion Fund (CF) will offer support in a variety of areas relevant to the New European Bauhaus project, with particular relevance to its ‘sustainability’ strand. The policy objective on ‘a greener Europe’ includes promoting energy efficiency measures, renewable energy, smart energy systems and grids, climate change adaptation, risk prevention and disaster resilience, sustainable water management, circular economy, and reducing pollution. In the 2021-2027 period, Member States will be required to allocate at least 8 % of their ERDF resources to sustainable urban development, while over 30 % of ERDF resources and CF resources must be set aside for climate objectives.
Moreover, the new Just Transition Fund (JTF) aims to address the social, economic and environmental impacts of the transition towards a climate-neutral economy in high-emission regions. The Fund is governed by cohesion policy rules and included in the Common Provisions Regulation. Some activities supported by JTF could be relevant in the context of the New European Bauhaus. These include investments in the deployment of technology and infrastructure for affordable clean energy, in greenhouse gas emission reduction, energy efficiency and renewable energy.
Support for cultureThe Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 also supports interventions in the area of ‘arts, entertainment, creative industries and recreation’, which are important themes in the context of the New European Bauhaus thanks to its focus on aesthetics and culture. One of the five policy objectives (‘a Europe closer to citizens’) also covers cultural heritage. The cultural dimension of the New European Bauhaus may also be supported under the European Social Fund Plus, which is an instrument supporting employment, skills development and social inclusion. The European Regional Development Fund with its support for enterprises, research activities and skills development may also support New European Bauhaus actions encompassing collaborative projects in these areas. The REACT-EU programme (funded from Next Generation EU but delivered under cohesion policy rules) also offers support for those sectors most hit by the coronavirus pandemic, including the cultural sector.
Support for socio-economic projectsThe socio-economic aspects of the New European Bauhaus and its focus on inclusion may be addressed under the policy objective of ‘a smarter Europe’. Aimed at promoting innovative and smart economic transformation, specific supported actions include enhancing research and innovation capacities and the uptake of advanced technologies, boosting digitalisation, supporting enterprises and developing skills for smart specialisation, industrial transition and entrepreneurship. Support relevant to the New European Bauhaus could also be drawn from investments under the policy objective on ‘a more social Europe’. These include, for instance, social innovation and the socioeconomic integration of marginalised communities, migrants and disadvantaged groups, through integrated measures including housing and social services. Moreover, the policy objective on ‘a Europe closer to citizens’ offers support for integrated social, economic and environmental development, including through community-led local development. This again presents opportunities for the New European Bauhaus project in the context of its ‘inclusiveness’ strand.
OutlookCohesion policy in the 2021-2027 period will offer several opportunities to support the New European Bauhaus project. These include energy efficiency measures, renovation of buildings, urban renewal, preserving cultural heritage and ensuring social inclusion. Depending on the final shape the New European Bauhaus project takes, activities such as enhancing research and innovation capacities and the uptake of advanced technologies as well as skills development may also help support it. Cohesion policy is thus likely to complement other possible sources of funding for the New European Bauhaus project under the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework and Next Generation EU, relating to the European Green Deal, Renovation Wave Strategy, InvestEU and other programmes. The final shape of cohesion policy will be known in the coming months, once the Common Provisions Regulation and the sectoral regulations on the individual funds have been adopted by the EU co-legislators.
Next steps for the New European BauhausRead this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Cohesion policy contribution to New European Bauhaus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass,
© Fundació Mies van der Rohe, 2021
The EU Prize for Contemporary Architecture (also known as the EU Mies Award) was launched in recognition of the importance and quality of European architecture. Named after German architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, a figure emblematic of the Bauhaus movement, it aims to promote functionality, simplicity, sustainability and social vision in urban construction.
BackgroundMies van der Rohe was the last director of the Bauhaus school. The official lifespan of the Bauhaus movement in Germany was only fourteen years. It was founded in 1919 as an educational project devoted to all art forms. By 1933, when the Nazi authorities closed the school, it had changed location and director three times. Artists who left continued the work begun in Germany wherever they settled.
Recognition by UnescoThe Bauhaus movement has influenced architecture all over the world. Unesco has recognised the value of its ideas of sober design, functionalism and social reform as embodied in the original buildings, putting some of the movement’s achievements on the World Heritage List. The original buildings located in Weimar (the Former Art School, the Applied Art School and the Haus Am Horn) and Dessau (the Bauhaus Building and the group of seven Masters’ Houses) have featured on the list since 1996. Other buildings were added in 2017.
The list also comprises the White City of Tel-Aviv. German-Jewish architects fleeing Nazism designed many of its buildings, applying the principles of modernist urban design initiated by Bauhaus.
Barcelona Pavilion – Mies van der Rohe FoundationLudwig Mies van der Rohe, the last director of this educational, artistic and experimental school, personified the vitality of Bauhaus. Forced to leave Germany in 1938, he moved to Chicago where, as head of the Illinois Institute of Technology, he helped to develop the ‘second’ Chicago School of Architecture, pushing back the limits of the original Chicago School’s approach to simplified form and ornamentation and the technological achievement of the day – 10-storey skyscrapers.
Not limiting himself to the design of simplified, rectilinear skyscraper buildings, van der Rohe pursued his work on the aesthetics of pavilions, already begun in Europe. Together with Lilly Reich, who was responsible for the interior design, he had created the German Pavilion for the 1929 International Exposition in Barcelona. The building, now known as the Barcelona Pavilion, represented the new aesthetics of simplicity, clarity and open spaces, embodying its architect’s guiding principle – ‘less is more’. The pavilion was dismantled once the exposition ended in 1930, but in 1983, work began to rebuild it on the basis of photographs and original drawings and plans. Barcelona City Hall set up the Fundació Mies van der Rohe to accompany the process. Three years later the pavilion became the foundation’s headquarters.
Mies van der Rohe award and EU prizeIn 1988, two years after reconstruction of the Barcelona Pavilion was completed, the first edition of the biennial Mies van der Rohe Award for European Architecture was launched as a joint initiative of the European Commission and the Mayor of Barcelona. In 2001, the European Commission launched a call for proposals for a ‘European Union Prize for Contemporary Architecture’. It was won by the Fundació Mies van der Rohe, whose vision for the award included the idea to recognise the work of young architects at the beginning of their professional careers.
Since then, the foundation has been co-organiser of the EU Prize for Contemporary Architecture, which is awarded every other year for outstanding architectural works built across Europe (with a main prize of €60 000), and includes an ‘Emerging Architect Special Mention’ (€20 000). The prize is co-funded by the Creative Europe programme, the EU programme supporting culture. Nevertheless, despite recent efforts to popularise it through a dedicated app, and its logo featuring on the websites of winners, finalists, architectural studios and national architectural associations, the prize has a relatively low profile in the EU.
Selection criteria and juryThe award ceremony is held in May in the Barcelona Pavilion, headquarters of the Mies van der Rohe Foundation. A group of independent experts, the member associations of the Architects’ Council of Europe (ACE), other European national architects’ associations and an advisory committee nominate architectural works. The jury then evaluate all the nominations and present a selection of shortlisted and then finalists’ works. The opinions of the users of the architectural works are also taken into consideration.
The selection includes not only private homes and public housing, museums and cultural installations, but also educational, health and sports facilities, as well as large-scale infrastructure projects and transport systems contributing to the construction of European cities. The idea behind the prize is to promote sustainable architectural practice. It reflects the original inspiration of the Bauhaus movement of combining the social, cultural and economic aspects of architecture and the arts.
Recent developmentsRecently the prize has reflected the guiding principle of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe to do more with less. The approach corresponds to sustainability criteria, with a preference for building more with less material, at a lower cost. The overall objective is to improve people’s lives and the way people live together.
Nominated projects and winners – A variety of worksConferences, events and exhibitions are held to promote the ‘technological, constructional, social, economic, cultural and aesthetic achievements’ present in nominated and winning projects.
The examples below bear witness to the recent sustainability requirements and the diverse nature of the projects submitted.
Selected winners of the EU Prize for Contemporary Architecture:
Some of the winners of the Emerging Architect Special Mention:
The selection process for the 2021 edition had to be rescheduled because of Covid-19 restrictions. The 449 nominees were however announced in January 2021. The nominations reflect a huge variety of works and approaches and include: a metro line; a natural enclave with watchtowers in the area of a former gravel pit; a kindergarten; the revitalisation of former dragoon barracks; houses and a riding centre; a church; a hospital; a ballet school, a city cemetery, the transformation of a classical religious room into a new space for other activities, a daycare centre, a transport hub, an airport, timber dwellings, a home for the homeless, a graphic arts centre, an Olympic centre, a housing cooperative, a public pool, a waste-to-energy plant with an urban recreation centre; and, coming full circle, the expansion of the Moholy-Nagy University of Art and Design, named after a famous Hungarian photographer and designer from the Bauhaus movement.
Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘EU Prize for Contemporary Architecture / Mies van der Rohe Award: A tribute to Bauhaus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Marcos Fernández Álvarez,
‘The ambitious reduction targets for plant protection products in the European Green Deal and, hence, the Farm to Fork Strategy must be underpinned by in-depth scientific studies, carefully evaluating the impact not only on sustainability, but also on efficiency and potential offsets. I am convinced that the future of Europe’s sustainable food production lies in the deployment of new scientific and mechanical practices, as outlined in this study. Sound scientific research and innovation must be the basis for our decision-making, to enable a truly successful transformation towards an even more sustainable European food sector.’
Herbert Dorfmann, (EPP, Italy) Member of the European Parliament and STOA Panel member
©WUR-STOA
The European Parliament, together with the European Commission and the Council of the European Union (EU), is shaping the future of agriculture in the EU. In this context, the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) organised a workshop on farming without plant protection products in March 2019. This followed the publication of STOA’s studies on precision agriculture, (2016) and on plant breeding and innovative agriculture (2013).
STOA’s latest foresight study, ‘The future of crop protection in the EU‘, examines the environmental, societal, health and economic impact of deploying new crop protection practices in the EU. The study was presented to the STOA Panel on 4 December 2020, with Herbert Dorfmann as Lead Panel Member.
Plant protection products (PPPs): balancing efficiency and sustainabilityThe world’s population is expected to reach 11 billion by the end of the century. To feed ever growing numbers of people, agricultural production needs to change. Reducing food waste and shifting to more environmentally sustainable diets can make a big difference, but there is still pressure to increase agricultural production.
While PPPs could help increase agricultural production, conventional PPPs are mostly synthetic chemicals, and concerns are often raised about their impact on human health and biodiversity. In 2020, the European Parliament welcomed the EU’s commitment to achieving sustainability in agriculture. There is thus a clear demand for new practices to supplement chemical PPPs.
The dual environmental impact of PPPs is highlighted in a previous STOA publication, linked to the above-mentioned workshop. PPPs damage biodiversity, but to a lesser extent than converting natural ecosystems into farmland. This study argues that new crop protection practices need to be as effective as chemical PPPs. If not, the demand for more farmland could offset any direct environmental benefit.
Crop protection policy: systemic challengesSTOA’s new study on crop protection underlines that effective crop protection policy requires a systems perspective. Crop protection is part of a production process that spans from farms to international supply chains. To avoid undesired side effects, impacts must be weighed up against all common agricultural policy (CAP) and European Green Deal objectives. For example, passing very restrictive policies could decrease the use of chemical PPPs, but also reduce yields and trigger land conversion into farmland.
The potential extra cost of less harmful practices will not be limited to farmers. Farmers choose the most cost-effective methods, and will pass on extra costs to retailers and customers. Besides, policies must ensure a fair income for farmers – one of the objectives of the CAP.
International trade also poses challenges. Phytosanitary policy demands that no living organisms be present in plants or plant-product exports, limiting crop protection options. Environmental and trade regulations must also be balanced, so that EU producers are not disadvantaged. This would violate the CAP objectives, and the EU would merely export this environmental damage.
Anticipatory policy-makingAccording to STOA’s study, retaining the current legislative framework will likely result in little progress. Crop protection will largely rely on current PPPs, and damage to the environment and biodiversity will continue. The competitiveness of EU farmers will decline, as external producers innovate and improve their processes.
However, the EU can act to prevent this scenario. The authors present an overview of novel crop protection practices and their impacts. Precision agriculture, new plant breeding techniques, biocontrol methods, induced resistance, diversified crops, and enhanced mechanical practices are discussed. Ultimately, reducing the use of PPPs may require combining many of these techniques.
Precision agriculture is likely to be a key element of future farming. To make the most of its potential, the EU could invest in training its workforce. Promoting automated data collection on pests, diseases and weeds would allow optimal crop protection strategies – and adequate standards would facilitate data exchanges throughout the food chain.
The EU could remove legislative barriers to new breeding techniques. Lead Panel Member Herbert Dorfmann raised the need to update the GMO Directive. This follows the same direction as the opinion expressed by the EU Commission’s Group of Chief Scientific Advisors in November 2018. The authors agree that adjusting regulations from a process-based to a product-based approach would unleash the potential of innovative breeding techniques in the EU.
At the end of the presentation, Members took the view that further information is required on the costs of the crop protection options. STOA Chair, Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece), emphasised that the cost quantification analysis should account for regional differences in the EU. Look out for the follow-up study and other updates on the STOA blog.
The STOA Options Brief linked to the study contains an overview of various policy options. Read the full report to find out more, and let us know what you think via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.
Written by Martin Russell,
On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar armed forces seized power and imprisoned Aung San Suu Kyi, de facto leader of the country since 2016. The coup threatens to derail Myanmar’s progress towards democracy, which began in 2008 after five decades of brutal military rule. Huge protests have broken out in Myanmar, calling for the restoration of the elected civilian government. The EU is considering additional sanctions against the country.
Myanmar’s 2020 elections lead to a military coup© sezerozger / Adobe Stock
Myanmar’s parliament has a total of 664 seats, of which three-quarters (498) are elected and one quarter (166) allocated to representatives appointed by the armed forces. In the November 2020 elections, the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) won 396 seats, equivalent to 80 % of elected seats and 60 % of all parliamentary seats – an even bigger majority than in the previous (2015) vote. Observers raised several concerns about the conditions under which elections were held – a biased media environment, and the exclusion of several large groups such as the stateless Rohingya – but did not find major irregularities in the conduct of the vote itself. Nevertheless, the military alleged widespread electoral fraud, though without producing convincing evidence to back its claims.
Early in the morning of 1 February, a few hours before the new parliament was due to be sworn in, the armed forces arrested NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, as well as hundreds of NLD parliamentarians and supporters. Based on its unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, the military declared the elections invalid, and vested legislative and executive powers in a State Administrative Council comprising equal numbers of military officers and civilian politicians, chaired by General Min Aung Hlaing, head of the armed forces. Aung San Suu Kyi was charged with illegally importing radio equipment; both she and Win Myint now face criminal charges and are under house arrest. The military declared a one-year state of emergency, after which it says new elections will take place.
1962-2016: 54 years of military rule, then a democratic transitionEver since seizing power in 1962, the Tatmadaw (military) has played a toxic role in a country which is racked by ethnic conflict and has become one of the poorest in Asia, despite its natural resource wealth. After a brutally suppressed uprising in 1988, elections were finally held in 1990, and won overwhelmingly by the NLD, but the army refused to recognise the results, and NLD leader Suu Kyi spent 15 years under house arrest. Both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) adopted economic sanctions and arms embargoes. A return to civilian rule began with the adoption of a new constitution in 2008, leading to elections in 2010. The new government, formed by the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was nominally civilian, but in fact mainly comprised former generals. Nevertheless, political reforms persuaded the EU to lift its economic sanctions in 2013, although the arms embargo remained in place; the US followed suit in 2016. The NLD, which had boycotted the previous vote in 2010, won an overwhelming electoral victory in 2015. Although Suu Kyi was constitutionally barred from the presidency, in 2016 she became the country’s de facto leader, with the title of State Counsellor.
2016-2021: Rights abuses continue under Suu Kyi, but her popularity remains intactFor decades, the Muslim Rohingya minority have endured persecution. Resented by most Burmese as illegal ‘Bengali’ migrants (although many are from families that have lived in the country for hundreds of years), most are denied citizenship, and live in apartheid-like conditions. Attacks on the community culminated in military ‘clearance operations’, killing thousands in 2016 and 2017. Over 700 000 fled to neighbouring Bangladesh, where they live in refugee camps with little prospect of ever returning home. In response, the EU adopted visa bans and asset freezes against 14 military officers, but did not bring back economic sanctions.
The 2008 military-drafted constitution makes it impossible for civilian authorities to hold the armed forces to account for such abuses: the commander-in-chief appoints the defence, home affairs, and border affairs ministers, and soldiers are tried in military courts, guaranteeing them lenient treatment. The constitution can only be changed if over three-quarters of parliamentarians are in favour, giving military representatives a veto on amendments. While Suu Kyi may have been powerless to stop the atrocities, many argue that she could at least have spoken out against them; in fact, she remained silent. Noting her complicity in the violence, the European Parliament, which had awarded Suu Kyi the Sakharov Prize for human rights defenders in 1990, decided to remove her from the list of Sakharov laureates in 2020. Concerns about the plight of the Rohingya are not widely shared in Myanmar itself. Suu Kyi’s defence of military atrocities in December 2019 at the International Court of Justice earned her international condemnation, but the resounding NLD electoral victory in 2020 suggests that, if anything, it consolidated her reputation at home.
Implications of the military coup, and the ensuing protestsGiven that the constitution gives the armed forces enormous political power and shields them from civilian oversight, the motives for the coup are unclear. With the world’s attention distracted by coronavirus and the Biden administration still finding its feet, military leaders may have felt it was a propitious moment to act. General Min Aung Hlaing’s personal ambitions were probably also a factor; he is due to retire from the armed forces in July 2021, and the poor electoral showing of the pro-military USDP party, which lost 8 of its 41 seats in the 2020 elections, made it unlikely that he could secure parliamentary backing to become president.
Protests against the coup initially took the form of people banging pots and pans, followed by doctors and teachers going on strike. The rallies which started on 6 February are the largest since the Saffron Revolution, which was put down by the military in 2007. This time, the military has responded by banning large public gatherings, restricting internet access and declaring martial law in several cities. The police are using increasingly forceful methods to break up protests: water cannon, rubber bullets, and live ammunition fired into the air. So far, 400 have been detained. The outcome is still in the balance; in 1988 and 2007, the armed forces showed that they will stop at nothing to quell discontent, and an equally bloody crackdown cannot be ruled out now. On the other hand, after several years of relative freedom, protestors are more determined than ever. Unlike previous uprisings (mobile phones were practically non-existent in Myanmar before 2011), social media are playing a key part in mobilising the current wave of protests, which show no sign of losing momentum.
International reactionsThe EU, G7 and US were united in immediately condemning the coup, while calling on military leaders to hand back power to civilian authorities, and to release Suu Kyi and other detainees. US sanctions announced on 11 February will block Myanmar government access to US$1 billion of funds held in the US. China, which is a key ally of Myanmar and by far its main trade and investment partner, merely called on all sides to ‘appropriately handle their differences … and safeguard political and social stability’. Japan, India and most other Asian countries have also avoided strong statements. For its part, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which Myanmar belongs to, urged ‘dialogue, reconciliation and the return to normalcy’. A UN Security Council statement issued on 4 February, after China had blocked a more strongly worded text, emphasises the need to ‘uphold democratic institutions and processes’ and release all detainees.
EU foreign ministers are to consider their response at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on 22 February. According to EU High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell in a speech to the European Parliament on 9 February, the three main options on the table are sanctions (in addition to the targeted sanctions adopted in 2018 against military officers for their role in atrocities against the Rohingya), a review of EU development aid to Myanmar (€688 million for 2014-2020), and cancelling the country’s privileged access to European markets under the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) scheme. Benefiting from zero tariffs, Myanmar’s textiles industry is booming, and its exports to Europe have grown 19-fold since 2013. However, Borrell warned that EBA suspension would hurt the general population, in particular the 500 000 employees of garment factories, while having little effect on the military, whose economic interests are mostly in other sectors. He emphasised the importance of continuing dialogue with Myanmar’s leaders.
In its resolution of 11 February 2021 on Myanmar, the European Parliament urges the armed forces to hand power back to the civilian authorities led by Suu Kyi, and to release all detainees. It also calls for constitutional reforms and additional targeted EU sanctions against military leaders.Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Myanmar: The return of the junta‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Velina Lilyanova,
© European Union, 2021
In the face of the changing nature of the geopolitical environment in the past decade and its own internal challenges, the EU has reflected upon and adjusted its vision for its global role. In 2016, the EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy declared the EU’s ambition to play a stronger role in the world. At the start of its mandate, the current European Commission described itself as a ‘geopolitical’ one. The global pandemic raises further questions about the EU’s role globally.
To assert itself at global level and pursue its priorities, the EU needs adequate means. Its external role and impact are defined to a great extent by the scope of its resources, but also by their efficient and coordinated use. With the adoption of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021-2027, the EU has ensured the means and tools for achieving its external action objectives over this period. This paper aims to examine how the EU financed its external action in the 2014-2020 MFF and how it has adapted its approach in this domain. Far from being exhaustive, it seeks to map the main financing instruments, mechanisms and actors involved, an exercise revealing the complexity of the architecture involved, as well as to outline the novelties with their underlying reasons and the main trends for the future financing of EU external action.
Read the complete ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Understanding EU financing for external action‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Miroslava Karaboytcheva (1st edition),
© metamorworks / Adobe Stock
The digitalisation of the economy opens the door to new cross-border economic activities that make it possible to under-report income and under-pay tax. It also presents new challenges for tax administrations, already faced by limited access to information at the national level. Hence, in July 2020 the Commission proposed to amend the provisions on information exchange and administrative cooperation and to include the automatic exchange of data on information declared by digital platform operators in their scope. The goal is to ensure that sellers on digital platforms pay their fair share of taxes, align EU countries to the digital economy, and close the gaps for tax evasion and avoidance. Right now, having secure tax revenues is vital for the provision of support to the people and businesses most in need.
The Parliament’s ECON committee adopted its report on the proposal for an amended Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC7) on 4 February 2021. The report is expected to be voted in plenary in March 2021. On 1 December 2020, the Council reached agreement on the proposal, and will thus be in a position to adopt it once Parliament’s opinion is delivered.
Complete version Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2020) 314 finalWritten by Gianluca Quaglio,
European Union (EU) policy promotes innovation with the aim of triggering an economic dynamism that will increase the competitiveness of the EU as a whole. This entails improving research and innovation (R&I) capacities, addressing territorial inequalities, and improving coordination at all levels. Achieving this requires closer coordination of research, cohesion and education policies at EU level and among Member States.
Besides the Recovery Plan, Horizon Europe and structural funds are the two most important EU funding sources for R&I. Horizon Europe focuses on European R&I excellence, the generation and utilisation of new knowledge, and disruptive, market-creating innovations. Structural funds investments are built around regional innovation eco-systems. They focus on R&I with regional relevance and the diffusion of existing knowledge and technology to places that need it, and then proceed to embed R&I locally via smart specialisation strategies. Supporting synergies in the implementation of Horizon Europe and structural funds may maximise scientific, economic and societal impact, leveraging R&I investments in Europe from all sources.
However, the process of identifying potential synergies and exploiting them is sluggish, due to complex interactions between different innovation actors, as well as rules and time frames that vary between EU-funded programmes. The EU needs to overcome this issue, since combining different funding instruments (and policy frameworks) substantially boosts competitiveness, welfare, and growth in EU regions. To achieve this objective, it is crucial to align strategies and implementation modalities, and to adapt and complement existing and future roadmaps.
All these issues were discussed during the workshop on ‘Exploring synergies between the Horizon Europe and regional policy’, organised in a virtual form on 2 February 2021, by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA). Over 450 people participated in the event, chaired by Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany), Member of the European Parliament and STOA First Vice-Chair.
In his opening remarks, Christian Ehler highlighted that the latest EU legislation created additional opportunities for synergies between Horizon Europe and the structural funds. These synergies are needed even more urgently to face the economic challenges due to the coronavirus pandemic. At the same time, the EU is transitioning towards a greener and increasingly digital future. All European regions need to benefit from Europe’s excellent research and innovation. Effective synergies between Horizon Europe and the structural funds should be able to support this process. Christian Ehler thanked former Member of the European Parliament, Lambert Van Nistelrooij, for his unceasing and extensive work over many years on closing the gap between research and structural funding.
A comprehensive approach to synergies is requiredToo often, synergies are seen in terms of funding mechanisms and procedures, observed Paul Webb, Head of Unit for Horizon Budget and Multiannual Financial Framework Synergies, at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD). These aspects are certainly important, however, the overall objective of synergies must acknowledge that R&I in itself is not sufficient to achieve the transformations we are seeking. Instead, synergies must ensure that R&I priorities and activities are aligned with, and support, EU policies and programmes.
Paul Webb noted that such synergies must also provide the best opportunities for exploiting and deploying R&I results, to facilitate the desired transformations. To do this, a comprehensive approach is necessary, starting with the assessment of what we want to achieve. The Horizon Europe strategic planning process aims to ensure this comprehensive approach and alignment of priorities for the different Union policies and funding programmes. A number of initiatives are underway to enable the best possible opportunity for the deployment of research results and innovative solutions developed under Horizon Europe by other EU funding programmes.
A comprehensive approach to synergies was also advocated by Anna Panagopoulou, Director of the Common Implementation Centre, (DG RTD). This broad approach should be adopted at a political level, with a shared vision and common priorities; at a programming level, with an alignment of strategic priorities and co-creation of funding actions; and at an operational/implementation level, through specific and consistent legal provisions in the different regulatory frameworks. Concerning the rules for implementing synergies, she argued that there is very good progress in the legislative process on facilitating and simplifying the rules at operational level in all relevant regulations (Horizon Europe, Cohesion Policy, and the State Aid General Block Exemption).
Pursuing synergies at several levelsSynergies can be pursued at several levels, e.g. design and strategic planning, project selection, management and exploitation of results, monitoring, and governance. Synergies can be implemented by alternative, integrated or cumulative funding and by the transfer of resources. For example, Horizon Europe proposals with a Seal of Excellence (a quality label awarded to outstanding project proposals submitted to Horizon 2020, to help these proposals find alternative funding), may get support from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund+ (ESF+), or European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). Employment of integrated funding is also possible: under certain conditions, financial contributions from programmes co-financed by structural funds may be seen as a contribution from a Member State towards participation in Horizon Europe partnerships. Many synergies are already apparent in Horizon 2020. The challenge today is to ensure that these are built-in systematically at all stages of the R&I cycle.
Concerning the transfer of resources, a possibility exists for structural fund management authorities to transfer up to 5 % of their structural fund allocation to Horizon Europe to support researchers. Transferred resources must be implemented in accordance with the rules of the fund or the instrument to which the resources are transferred. The new rules also facilitate a cumulative funding process: a single enterprise may receive two separate contributions from two Union funds or programmes, with due regard to the principle of co-financing laid down in the Financial Regulation (cumulative funding cannot exceed 100 % of the eligible costs).
Finally, synergies can also be achieved by the propagation of research results and innovative solutions developed under Horizon Europe, in particular through dissemination and exploitation strategies, transfer of knowledge, complementary and cumulative funding sources, and accompanying policy measures.
The European Institute of Innovation & Technology (EIT), which is integral to Horizon Europe, also represents an opportunity to strengthen the connections between R&I and regional policy. EIT Director, Martin Kern, described how the institute has been catalysing regional innovation through its targeted outreach scheme, the EIT Regional Innovation Scheme (EIT RIS), since 2014. The RIS widens access to EIT activities, creates linkages among regional innovation actors, and offers tailor-made programmes to support countries with moderate innovation performance. The EIT Strategic Innovation Agenda for 2021‑2027 will incorporate more regional support activities in EIT strategic planning and implementation.
A collective effort is neededSo far, operational and project-level synergies have proven useful, but the critical mass that is needed to mobilise large amounts of funding is still lacking. Bringing structural funds and Horizon Europe investments closer together has accelerated with the preparation of the post-2020 period. Peter Berkowitz, Head of Unit for Smart and Sustainable Growth, at the European Commission Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO), argued that this effort will hopefully strengthen the impact of both policies, in particular in less developed and peripheral regions.
Member States and regions are now engaged in developing the next round of structural fund programmes. ERDF/ESF+ managing authorities should be aware of the Horizon Europe priorities and actions when drafting smart specialisation strategies and the related structural funds programmes. In particular, the thematic priorities under Horizon Europe, as well as the missions and partnerships, could be a reference point for synergies. Horizon Europe, in turn, provides many opportunities for regional actors to participate in line with their regional policy priorities.
Franc Bogovič (PPE, Slovakia), Member of Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development (REGI), highlighted the complexity involved in organically connecting the different funds for R&I. The complications increase at the regional level, where demonstrating the possible synergies of the different tools can be more challenging. However, the tasks that the EU faces in the near future require everyone to make a collective effort. Implementing a real transition, he said, requires the development of broad coalitions at all levels, i.e. Member States, regions, cities, European R&I networks, private players, and civil society, to build strategic synergies and increase the impact of local investments.
Given the complexity of these instruments, Christian Ehler concluded by noting that it would be appropriate to organise a new STOA meeting in the near future to debate these challenging issues with the Member States, fully involving them in the discussion.
If you missed out this time, you can watch the webstream.
Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,
© European Union 2021 – Source : EP/DAINA LE LARDIC
The main debates held during the February 2021 plenary session concerned the state of play of the EU’s Covid‑19 vaccination strategy and the de facto abortion ban in Poland. Members also debated democratic scrutiny of social media platforms and the protection of fundamental rights, including the challenges ahead for women’s rights more than 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action The impact of coronavirus on young people and sport, relief measures for the transport sector, homologation and distribution of transparent masks and the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia were also discussed. Members debated statements by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borell, on his visit to Russia in the light of the recent crackdown on protestors and the opposition, on the humanitarian and political situation in Yemen, and on the situation in Myanmar.
Recovery and Resilience FacilityMembers debated a joint report by the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), and voted to adopt the text agreed with the Council in trilogue, thereby giving the green light for the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) to go ahead. The RRF is designed to raise funding to revive the post-coronavirus economy with a major focus on climate action. It is also the main element of the Next Generation EU package. Under the agreement, Member States will be able to submit recovery and resilience plans that earmark at least 37 % of their budget to climate and 20 % to digital measures, with up to 13 % pre-financing available upon approval. Parliament will follow progress closely, through a recovery and resilience scoreboard.
Capital markets recovery packageFollowing a joint debate, Parliament adopted by a narrow majority, provisional agreements on two proposals, resulting from interinstitutional negotiations on the capital markets recovery package (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and EU recovery prospectus). The proposals revise the legal framework on investment services, in a package of targeted amendments to the Prospectus Regulation, MiFID II and securitisation rules. The amendments aim at reducing the administrative burden for experienced investors, while preserving protection for retail investors and maintaining requirements for transparency.
European Central Bank – Annual reportECB President Christine Lagarde was present for the debate on the ECON committee own-initiative report on the European Central Bank’s 2019 annual report, following which Parliament adopted its resolution by a large majority. The ECON report considers ECB monetary policy in the context of the coronavirus crisis, financial stability measures, and actions against climate change. In response to a projected decrease of 7.3 % in real GDP for the euro area, and increased unemployment to 8.0 % in 2020, the ECB has implemented monetary stimulus, non-standard monetary policy measures, and temporary capital and operational relief to increase banks’ lending capacity. The ECON committee report considers that the ECB has acted decisively to mitigate the impact of the crisis. However, it also calls for accompanying reforms to strengthen competitiveness and social cohesion, and underlines the need to tackle climate change-related risks.
New circular economy action planIt is clear that current use of the earth’s resources is unsustainable, leading to biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emissions that threaten the natural world and accelerate climate change. Parliament has already called for an ambitious circular economy action plan to tackle the lack of re-use in the EU (the share of recycled materials in the economy was only 12 % in 2019). Members debated an own-initiative report and adopted a resolution on the European Commission’s proposed new circular economy action plan, by a large majority. The Environment, Public Health & Food Safety (ENVI) Committee report proposes more robust and binding targets for reducing the use of primary raw materials, and highlights the opportunities inherent in optimising the use of products over a longer lifecycle.
Visit of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) to RussiaMembers debated several statements made in plenary by the HR/VP, Josep Borrell. Members’ reactions were mixed regarding the HR/VP’s controversial visit to Russia and his meeting with Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, on Friday 5 February 2021. The meeting took place against the backdrop of the Russian authorities’ crackdown on large-scale demonstrations in response to the arrest and jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny.
EU Association Agreement with UkraineMembers debated and approved by a large majority an own-initiative resolution on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine, which commends the country’s efforts in implementing its commitments under the Agreement. The wide-ranging Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) report recommends that Ukrainian authorities focus on a limited number of priorities and suggests completion of reforms now, to secure the advances made on the rule of law, governance and combating corruption.
Implementation of the Anti-Trafficking DirectiveA grave violation of fundamental rights with a strongly gendered impact, which not only causes long-term harm to its victims (largely women), but also significant economic, social and human costs to society, Parliament debated and voted on an own-initiative resolution on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings. The joint report prepared by the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) committees, recommends several measures to identify victims and improve prevention and prosecution of those who profit from trafficking in human beings.
Democratic scrutiny of social media and the protection of fundamental rightsMembers also debated Council and European Commission statements on democratic scrutiny of social media platforms and protection of fundamental rights, in particular on freedom of expression. Social media platforms have become a major source of information for many people, but also amplify mis- and disinformation. Their role and power in moderating online content has attracted increasing criticism, particularly in light of recent events around the elections in the United States. While the EU has favoured self-regulation to date, in 2020, Parliament stressed that the responsibility for law enforcement in digital services must remain with public authorities in the EU, not with private commercial entities, and called for adequate oversight and judicial redress mechanisms.
25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for ActionMembers adopted a resolution, by a large majority, to mark 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, following a debate with the Council and Commission on their statements on the challenges ahead for women’s rights in the current difficult climate. While the coronavirus pandemic has delayed review of this initiative by a year, it also has a heavy impact on gender equality in a number of areas. Furthermore, the European Institute for Gender Equality reports that substantial gender inequalities persist across all twelve areas of concern identified for action. Parliament has already called for EU Member States to do more to ensure gender equality, and recently adopted three resolutions on the subject.
Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – February 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.