European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Lieve Van Woensel and Mihalis Kritikos with Sara Suna Lipp,

Sequencing and analysis of the human genome – all the genetic information stored in our DNA – provide us with understanding about a person’s ancestry, health and other traits. Thanks to DNA sequencing, medicine and the life sciences are able to predict and cure diseases. As DNA sequencing technologies continuously improve and become less costly, what if we all soon possessed our personal, smart DNA sequencers and apps to analyse our DNA?

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The genetic ‘alphabet’ contains four ‘letters’ or, in other words, four chemical codes for the information stored in DNA, representing a sequence that, if unwrapped, can stretch up to two metres and fill a book of one million pages. DNA contains complete hereditary information about a person, from their eye and hair colour to their sex, some personality traits and disease vulnerability. DNA sequencing is a method that determines the precise order of the ‘letters’ within DNA, allowing us to ‘read’ the information in a genome. While deciphering the human genome for the benefit of scientific research, medical applications and public health, DNA sequencing of other species is also important: to verify biodiversity, to gain knowledge of crops and farmed animals, and to learn about the origin of emerging pathogens. In the case of a public health crisis, such as the Covid‑19 pandemic, genomic sequencing of SARS-CoV-2, the virus causing Covid‑19, facilitates the design of treatments and vaccines. It also aids in mapping the spread of the virus as it evolves and helps monitor containment measure effectiveness.

The Human Genome Project, which aimed to decipher the complete human genome, was completed in 2003. With the aid of international research, this took about three years and cost approximately three billion euros. However, the cost of and time needed for genomic sequencing are falling. Currently, it takes only about an hour and less than a thousand euros to sequence a complete genome. This technological progress has paved the way for the commercialisation of genome sequencing. Dozens of personal genomics companies, such as 23andMe or Ancestry, offer direct-to-consumer DNA testing, that can be bought online for less than fifty euros, offering to provide a range of information. As advanced genomics becomes more accessible and increasingly affects our daily lives, ethical concerns such as identifiability, consent, data privacy and security rise. It is therefore desirable to have regulation in place that keeps up with developments in technology before we all own our personal DNA sequencers, which could provide more than ancestry and disease risk information.

Potential impacts and developments

The decreasing cost and increasing speed of DNA sequencing techniques make genomics more accessible. Increasingly important worldwide, genomics offers more effective healthcare solutions. For example, if genomics analysis indicates a person’s genetic predisposition for type‑II diabetes, modifications in lifestyle, such as exercise and a healthy diet, could delay or prevent the onset of the disease. Genomics facilitates a more precise characterisation of medical conditions – such as cancers, some rare diseases and infectious diseases – and, accordingly, the choice of medication to target the disease. It can provide better diagnostics for disease prevention and has the potential to move personalised medicine and therapies forward. Prenatal genomic sequencing for every embryo may become a standard protocol, serving as a life-long health reference. Besides the benefit of assisting individuals to make decisions about their health, gathering information about genetic traits and diseases within populations, the field of public health genomics, could offer strategies for improving public health. This not only helps to access and monitor health problems, but also to frame public policy options.

DNA sequencing technologies can be used to scan and detect pathogens in real time and provide a surveillance system to prevent epidemic outbreaks. Portable DNA sequencers, smaller than a smartphone, such as MinION, which is the first of its kind, were used during the Zika virus epidemic in 2016 and the 2014‑2016 Ebola virus outbreak, to help identify and track the viruses. Farmers in Tanzania have benefited from portable DNA sequencing for the timely diagnosis of sick plants infected with viruses. IDseq, an open-source cloud-based platform defining itself as ‘infectious disease detectives’, launched a service where users can upload sequencing data for a free analysis. IDseq is also being used for molecular diagnostics to tackle Covid‑19. Genomic sequencing of SARS‑CoV‑2 is key to understanding the evolution and trajectory of the virus, assists containment measures, and has provided evidence that the virus is not a bioweapon. Recent research has even claimed that an on-the-spot DNA test integrated into smartphones could make real-time monitoring of diseases and pathogens possible.

The technology for pocket-size, portable, smartphone-integrated DNA sequencing is already available. This, together with improved mobile genome analysis applications, which enable the exploration of desirable genetic data, are opening an era of great possibility and risk. It is only a matter of time before personal DNA sequencers are commercialised and used to detect pathogens, food contamination or information about ourselves and others. In future, sequencers may be found in public spaces, such as hospitals or bathrooms, cars, or integrated into a fridge in our kitchens, to monitor genomes in real time. However, the interpretation of all this genomic information is not as easy as it may appear.

While genomics holds invaluable information for scientists, doctors and others, it also provides much more information about who we are, how and even where we live, where we go and with whom we interact. In a human sample (e.g. saliva), genomics can also detect genomic sequences of the microbiome, microbes residing in the human body, which can reveal a lot about an individual. As data analysis advances, there will be much more to uncover in genomic data, and consumer genomics may possibly enable a person to be identified from anonymous DNA databases. We also know that investigation of the genomic information of a part of a population facilitates the inference of the DNA make-up of the rest of that population. All this information can be commercially relevant. The question of who owns the DNA sequencing data and who else has access to it after one has given consent over the data are therefore crucial. The consumer genomics business faces challenges regarding privacy, data ownership and sharing, as well as data security. Genomic databases have already been hacked. DNA testing services can be cracked, sometimes revealing email addresses alone, whereas, in 2020, hackers accessed an online DNA database used by police for criminal searches.

Anticipatory policy-making

Genomic sequencing unveils very rich data and raises considerable legal, security and private as well as societal and ethical issues, touching upon basic human rights. As genomic technologies are evolving rapidly, it is desirable that regulation match this pace and that adequate safeguards are put in place. It is also important to raise societal awareness about this technology, capable of revealing people’s identities, and as such open to misuse. The declaration on genomics cooperation, signed by 13 European countries in 2018, on cooperation in sharing their genomic information, aims at sequencing ‘1+ million genomes’ in the European Union (EU) by 2022, thereby linking genomic databases to create a secure health data infrastructure across Europe, while ensuring that ethical and legal aspects are covered and that Member States are aware of the opportunities and challenges of genomics. A 2018 JRC report provides a comparative overview of Member States’ legislation on genomics.

Direct-to-consumer genetic testing is not currently harmonised at EU level. The legislative framework is fragmented and ranges from an absolute ban on these tests (France), to a complete lack of any legislative reference to this form of testing. At EU level, the revision of the In-Vitro Diagnostics Medical Devices Regulation that will come into force on 26 May 2022, will touch upon their clinical validity, meaning that EU Member States will continue to regulate medical supervision, genetic advice and monitoring and informed consent issues at the local and/or national level. In a future where personal DNA sequencers may be as common as smartphones, vigilance could be required on both legal and ethical issues. Genomic information is difficult to protect; we leave traces of our DNA, such as hair and fingerprints, wherever we go. Therefore, attention should be paid to data security, data ownership and sharing. Blockchain technologies may help to address some of these issues. Ethical issues such as individual autonomy and equality of access, as well as anti-discrimination laws and compensation for people affected by data abuse should also be considered.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if consumers could use devices to sequence DNA?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to Science and Technology podcast ‘What if consumers could use devices to sequence DNA?’ on YouTube.

Written by David de Groot,

© Lisa F. Young / Fotolia

The prohibition of discrimination and the protection of human rights are important elements of the EU legal order. Nevertheless, discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people persists throughout the EU and takes various forms, including verbal abuse and physical violence.

Sexual orientation is now recognised in EU law as grounds of discrimination. However, the scope of the provisions dealing with this issue is limited and does not cover social protection, health care, education or access to goods and services, leaving LGBTI people particularly vulnerable in these areas.

Moreover, EU competence does not extend to recognition of marital or family status. In this area, national regulations vary, with some Member States offering same-sex couples the right to marry, others allowing alternative forms of registration, and yet others not providing any legal status for same-sex couples. Same-sex couples may or may not have the right to adopt children and to access assisted reproduction. These divergent legal statuses have implications, for instance, for partners from two Member States with different standards who want to formalise/legalise their relationship, or for same-sex couples and their families wishing to move to another Member State.

Combating discrimination has become part of EU internal and external policies, and is the subject of numerous resolutions of the European Parliament. However, action in this area remains problematic when it touches on issues pertaining to areas traditionally the preserve of Member States, such as marital status and family law.

This is a further updated version of a briefing originally drafted by Piotr Bakowski. The previous edition, from November 2020, was by Rosamund Shreeves.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The rights of LGBTI people in the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

See our video on ‘The road to LGBTI equality‘ on YouTube.

Written by David de Groot,

© Lisa F. Young / Fotolia

The prohibition of discrimination and the protection of human rights are important elements of the EU legal order. Nevertheless, discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people persists throughout the EU and takes various forms, including verbal abuse and physical violence.

Sexual orientation is now recognised in EU law as grounds of discrimination. However, the scope of the provisions dealing with this issue is limited and does not cover social protection, health care, education or access to goods and services, leaving LGBTI people particularly vulnerable in these areas.

Moreover, EU competence does not extend to recognition of marital or family status. In this area, national regulations vary, with some Member States offering same-sex couples the right to marry, others allowing alternative forms of registration, and yet others not providing any legal status for same-sex couples. Same-sex couples may or may not have the right to adopt children and to access assisted reproduction. These divergent legal statuses have implications, for instance, for partners from two Member States with different standards who want to formalise/legalise their relationship, or for same-sex couples and their families wishing to move to another Member State.

Combating discrimination has become part of EU internal and external policies, and is the subject of numerous resolutions of the European Parliament. However, action in this area remains problematic when it touches on issues pertaining to areas traditionally the preserve of Member States, such as marital status and family law.

This is a further updated version of a briefing originally drafted by Piotr Bakowski. The previous edition, from November 2020, was by Rosamund Shreeves.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The rights of LGBTI people in the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

See our video on ‘The road to LGBTI equality‘ on YouTube.

Written by Velina Lilyanova,

On 4 May 2021, EPRS held a second online policy roundtable dedicated to the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021‑2027. While the first event focused on lessons learned from the negotiations, this time the focus was on the outcome and the challenges of implementation, as the title ‘Delivering the 2021-27 MFF and NGEU: How to, match strategy, resources and expectations?’ suggests.

Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members Research Service, opened the event with a keynote speech by Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium), Chair of Parliament’s Committee on Budgets. Fabia Jones, Head of the EPRS’ Budgetary Policies Unit, moderated the roundtable discussion featuring Hanna Jahns, Deputy Head of the cabinet of the Commissioner for Budget; Jorge Nuñez Ferrer, Senior Research Fellow at CEPS; Eulalia Rubio, Senior Research Fellow at the Jacques Delors Institute, as well as Alessandro D’Alfonso and Alina Dobreva, EPRS policy analysts.

Johan Van Overtveldt shared his view that the ultimate goal of the MFF negotiations was to ensure an EU budget optimally aligned with policies providing the highest added value for citizens. Ambitious plans go hand in hand with ensuring the necessary means to fulfil them. Should the means remain unchanged, the EU needs to rethink the direction in which they flow, he underlined. The need for an even more modern EU budget is evident; one area where Europe is lagging behind is investing in technologies of the future, for example. Johan Van Overtveldt assessed the way strategy, resources and expectations have been matched in the Next Generation EU (NGEU), and its main part, the Resilience and Recovery Facility (RRF) more positively, however. His key message was that the EU must deliver results for the resources invested. Thorough scrutiny, avoiding fraud and taking responsibility – at both the EU and national level – are key ingredients to ensuring a successful EU recovery.

Hanna Jahns detailed how the EU’s new financial package responds to current priorities. She outlined the stages of the negotiations from the initial proposal to the final deal, and assessed the MFF, together with the NGEU, as offering a solid basis to match the strategies with resources and expectations. However, in answer to the question the title of the event posed, Hanna Jahns noted that time is needed, as many of the sectoral programmes are still being prepared. She noted the example of the EU’s Covid‑19 response, for which the EU’s entire resources and resourcefulness have been mustered to support citizens. The pandemic has underlined that the EU budget is the best tool to combine with national measures to support a crisis.

Jorge Nuñez Ferrer flagged some of the challenges of implementing the recovery package. While conceived as an emergency fund, the RRF is essentially a redirection fund, meant to create systemic change in the way the economy works, and bring additionality to MFF funding. Acknowledging its broad scope, Jorge Nuñez Ferrer considers targeting financing to those areas most in need to be crucial, in particular to compensate for the difficulties incurred in structural reforms. He highlighted the need to build a good framework for a dynamic future economy and an asymmetric recovery process; transform the labour market, social policy and education with a longer term focus in view; to accentuate the additionally of the RRF projects and counter the risk of a renationalised recovery and a diminished European dimension.

Eulalia Rubio focused on innovation, research and digital policy in the new MFF, and reflected on the main qualitative changes and the new EU industrial strategy. Speaking of Horizon, Digital Europe, and InvestEU, she shared three main conclusions: a need to rescale the EU resources allocated to the later stages of innovation, i.e. deployment and commercialisation; focusing innovation and research, and coordination and alignment with the national level to boost synergies and compensate for the lack of sufficient resources at the EU level.

Alessandro D’Alfonso explained how the MFF package addresses challenges in the field of climate and border management and migration, the topic of his latest briefing. The fight against climate change is a major challenge of our times and citizens increasingly see green transition as a core EU mission. This calls for significant investment, which the new MFF and NGEU indeed offer: 30 % of their resources are targeted at climate related objectives. Moreover, at the Parliament’s initiative, a Just Transition Fund was created to finance decarbonisation efforts in the regions most exposed to the cost of transition, to ensure inclusive and sustainable recovery. Alessandro suggested introducing new own resources, linked to climate action as a potential solution to maintain the level of climate funding in the future. Migration and border management was also identified as an area in need of more resources and joint action, and as a result, resources have almost doubled.

Alina Dobreva concluded the discussion by linking it with public opinion research. While too early to say how citizens evaluate the new MFF, she presented some key trends identified in her recent in-depth analysis. Alina Dobreva highlighted a positive trend of citizens increasingly supporting greater means for the EU budget (with considerable differences between Member States). According to Eurobarometer, citizens consistently want more EU funds to be spent on employment, social affairs and health, and increasingly on climate change. Just as consistent, however, is the misperception that the EU spends excessively on administration and ‘overspends’ in general, which calls for improved communication on the EU budget.

The whole discussion, followed by a lively Q&A session, is available on our YouTube channel. Those interested in the MFF negotiations can also watch the video of the 14 April debate hosted by EPRS’s European Council Oversight Unit and launched by President Sassoli.

Written by Velina Lilyanova,

On 4 May 2021, EPRS held a second online policy roundtable dedicated to the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021‑2027. While the first event focused on lessons learned from the negotiations, this time the focus was on the outcome and the challenges of implementation, as the title ‘Delivering the 2021-27 MFF and NGEU: How to, match strategy, resources and expectations?’ suggests.

Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members Research Service, opened the event with a keynote speech by Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium), Chair of Parliament’s Committee on Budgets. Fabia Jones, Head of the EPRS’ Budgetary Policies Unit, moderated the roundtable discussion featuring Hanna Jahns, Deputy Head of the cabinet of the Commissioner for Budget; Jorge Nuñez Ferrer, Senior Research Fellow at CEPS; Eulalia Rubio, Senior Research Fellow at the Jacques Delors Institute, as well as Alessandro D’Alfonso and Alina Dobreva, EPRS policy analysts.

Johan Van Overtveldt shared his view that the ultimate goal of the MFF negotiations was to ensure an EU budget optimally aligned with policies providing the highest added value for citizens. Ambitious plans go hand in hand with ensuring the necessary means to fulfil them. Should the means remain unchanged, the EU needs to rethink the direction in which they flow, he underlined. The need for an even more modern EU budget is evident; one area where Europe is lagging behind is investing in technologies of the future, for example. Johan Van Overtveldt assessed the way strategy, resources and expectations have been matched in the Next Generation EU (NGEU), and its main part, the Resilience and Recovery Facility (RRF) more positively, however. His key message was that the EU must deliver results for the resources invested. Thorough scrutiny, avoiding fraud and taking responsibility – at both the EU and national level – are key ingredients to ensuring a successful EU recovery.

Hanna Jahns detailed how the EU’s new financial package responds to current priorities. She outlined the stages of the negotiations from the initial proposal to the final deal, and assessed the MFF, together with the NGEU, as offering a solid basis to match the strategies with resources and expectations. However, in answer to the question the title of the event posed, Hanna Jahns noted that time is needed, as many of the sectoral programmes are still being prepared. She noted the example of the EU’s Covid‑19 response, for which the EU’s entire resources and resourcefulness have been mustered to support citizens. The pandemic has underlined that the EU budget is the best tool to combine with national measures to support a crisis.

Jorge Nuñez Ferrer flagged some of the challenges of implementing the recovery package. While conceived as an emergency fund, the RRF is essentially a redirection fund, meant to create systemic change in the way the economy works, and bring additionality to MFF funding. Acknowledging its broad scope, Jorge Nuñez Ferrer considers targeting financing to those areas most in need to be crucial, in particular to compensate for the difficulties incurred in structural reforms. He highlighted the need to build a good framework for a dynamic future economy and an asymmetric recovery process; transform the labour market, social policy and education with a longer term focus in view; to accentuate the additionally of the RRF projects and counter the risk of a renationalised recovery and a diminished European dimension.

Eulalia Rubio focused on innovation, research and digital policy in the new MFF, and reflected on the main qualitative changes and the new EU industrial strategy. Speaking of Horizon, Digital Europe, and InvestEU, she shared three main conclusions: a need to rescale the EU resources allocated to the later stages of innovation, i.e. deployment and commercialisation; focusing innovation and research, and coordination and alignment with the national level to boost synergies and compensate for the lack of sufficient resources at the EU level.

Alessandro D’Alfonso explained how the MFF package addresses challenges in the field of climate and border management and migration, the topic of his latest briefing. The fight against climate change is a major challenge of our times and citizens increasingly see green transition as a core EU mission. This calls for significant investment, which the new MFF and NGEU indeed offer: 30 % of their resources are targeted at climate related objectives. Moreover, at the Parliament’s initiative, a Just Transition Fund was created to finance decarbonisation efforts in the regions most exposed to the cost of transition, to ensure inclusive and sustainable recovery. Alessandro suggested introducing new own resources, linked to climate action as a potential solution to maintain the level of climate funding in the future. Migration and border management was also identified as an area in need of more resources and joint action, and as a result, resources have almost doubled.

Alina Dobreva concluded the discussion by linking it with public opinion research. While too early to say how citizens evaluate the new MFF, she presented some key trends identified in her recent in-depth analysis. Alina Dobreva highlighted a positive trend of citizens increasingly supporting greater means for the EU budget (with considerable differences between Member States). According to Eurobarometer, citizens consistently want more EU funds to be spent on employment, social affairs and health, and increasingly on climate change. Just as consistent, however, is the misperception that the EU spends excessively on administration and ‘overspends’ in general, which calls for improved communication on the EU budget.

The whole discussion, followed by a lively Q&A session, is available on our YouTube channel. Those interested in the MFF negotiations can also watch the video of the 14 April debate hosted by EPRS’s European Council Oversight Unit and launched by President Sassoli.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© European Union 2021, EPRS

The Own Resources Decision (ORD) establishes how the EU budget is financed. Its entry into force requires approval by all EU Member States according to their constitutional requirements. In a majority of Member States, national parliaments are responsible for ratifying the decision. In the others, the government alone decides on the approval. Completion of the ratification procedure by all Member States has generally required more than two years. However, there is a greater sense of urgency for the ORD adopted by the Council in December 2020, since its entry into force is a pre-condition for the launch of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument. The objective is to complete the ratification procedure before summer 2021, with a view to ensuring the timely launch of NGEU. As of 5 May, 19 Member States have ratified the ORD. The ratification procedure is still ongoing in Austria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania.

EU own resources: A ‘quasi-Treaty’ procedure

The Own Resources Decision (ORD) sets the financing system of the EU budget. It is one of the most complex pieces of legislation for the EU to adopt and modify, on account of the special legislative procedure set out in Article 311 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Council unanimously adopts the decision after consulting the European Parliament. Before entering into force, the decision has to be approved by each Member State in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. National ratifications must then be notified to the Council.

In a majority of Member States, based on their constitutions, the responsibility for ratifying the Own Resources Decision lies with the national parliament. This approach is usually linked to parliaments’ budgetary powers and/or their role in approving agreements or treaties that have implications for public finances.

In a number of Member States, however, parliamentary approval is not required. In such cases, the government decides on the ratification of the decision; the parliament is informed, and it may hold a non-binding vote (in plenary or in a committee) on the Own Resources Decision.

Given the complexity of the procedure, EU own resources are deemed to have a quasi-Treaty status. Their reform, strongly advocated by the European Parliament, has proved difficult, leading to only minor changes being introduced in the system over more than 30 years.

Unlike the multiannual financial framework (MFF) that sets the maximum allocation of resources for each major area of EU spending over a period of at least five years, the Own Resources Decision has no end date. Its provisions, except those on time-limited corrections to some Member States’ national contributions, continue to apply indefinitely until all Member States have ratified a new Council Decision. This prevents the EU budget from being afflicted by a lack of financing. Once in force, the new decision applies retroactively from the start date of the new MFF, in order for the financing system to be aligned with the financial years of the MFF.

Historically, the ratification procedure has proved lengthy. The entry into force of the last three decisions (2000 ORD, 2007 ORD and 2014 ORD) always took place more than two years after the start of the corresponding MFF, but these time lags did not jeopardise the functioning of the EU budgetary system for the reasons detailed above. However, there is a greater sense of urgency for the Own Resources Decision adopted by the Council in December 2020 (2020 ORD), given that its ratification is a pre-condition for the launch of Next Generation EU (NGEU), the recovery instrument agreed by the EU to counter the severe socio-economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic.

Read the complete briefing on ‘National ratification of the Own Resources Decision: State of play on 5 May 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© European Union 2021, EPRS

The Own Resources Decision (ORD) establishes how the EU budget is financed. Its entry into force requires approval by all EU Member States according to their constitutional requirements. In a majority of Member States, national parliaments are responsible for ratifying the decision. In the others, the government alone decides on the approval. Completion of the ratification procedure by all Member States has generally required more than two years. However, there is a greater sense of urgency for the ORD adopted by the Council in December 2020, since its entry into force is a pre-condition for the launch of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument. The objective is to complete the ratification procedure before summer 2021, with a view to ensuring the timely launch of NGEU. As of 5 May, 19 Member States have ratified the ORD. The ratification procedure is still ongoing in Austria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania.

EU own resources: A ‘quasi-Treaty’ procedure

The Own Resources Decision (ORD) sets the financing system of the EU budget. It is one of the most complex pieces of legislation for the EU to adopt and modify, on account of the special legislative procedure set out in Article 311 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Council unanimously adopts the decision after consulting the European Parliament. Before entering into force, the decision has to be approved by each Member State in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. National ratifications must then be notified to the Council.

In a majority of Member States, based on their constitutions, the responsibility for ratifying the Own Resources Decision lies with the national parliament. This approach is usually linked to parliaments’ budgetary powers and/or their role in approving agreements or treaties that have implications for public finances.

In a number of Member States, however, parliamentary approval is not required. In such cases, the government decides on the ratification of the decision; the parliament is informed, and it may hold a non-binding vote (in plenary or in a committee) on the Own Resources Decision.

Given the complexity of the procedure, EU own resources are deemed to have a quasi-Treaty status. Their reform, strongly advocated by the European Parliament, has proved difficult, leading to only minor changes being introduced in the system over more than 30 years.

Unlike the multiannual financial framework (MFF) that sets the maximum allocation of resources for each major area of EU spending over a period of at least five years, the Own Resources Decision has no end date. Its provisions, except those on time-limited corrections to some Member States’ national contributions, continue to apply indefinitely until all Member States have ratified a new Council Decision. This prevents the EU budget from being afflicted by a lack of financing. Once in force, the new decision applies retroactively from the start date of the new MFF, in order for the financing system to be aligned with the financial years of the MFF.

Historically, the ratification procedure has proved lengthy. The entry into force of the last three decisions (2000 ORD, 2007 ORD and 2014 ORD) always took place more than two years after the start of the corresponding MFF, but these time lags did not jeopardise the functioning of the EU budgetary system for the reasons detailed above. However, there is a greater sense of urgency for the Own Resources Decision adopted by the Council in December 2020 (2020 ORD), given that its ratification is a pre-condition for the launch of Next Generation EU (NGEU), the recovery instrument agreed by the EU to counter the severe socio-economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic.

Read the complete briefing on ‘National ratification of the Own Resources Decision: State of play on 5 May 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nora Milotay,

© pogonici / Adobe Stock

The proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (social pillar) by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council in November 2017 was the fourth major attempt to strengthen the social dimension of the European Union since its inception.

The social pillar is to be the fifth pillar of the economic and monetary union. It is to serve as a compass for updating the EU’s welfare states and labour markets to the new realities of life and work in the 21st century. Its holistic approach puts upward social convergence at its centre and can help to put economic and social considerations and rights across EU policies on a more equal footing. Its implementation has mainly been the task of the Member States in strong collaboration with the social partners and with the support of the European Union. The social pillar’s very broad interpretation of the social dimension, pointing beyond social and employment policies, means that it has been regarded by some simply as the starting point for new initiatives in a number of policy fields, and by others as a potential game-changer that can bring about a genuinely new policy dynamic around the EU’s social dimension.

The new action plan on the further implementation of the social pillar’s principles continues along this complex path. It also proposes three new headline targets and the redesign of the social scoreboard to make monitoring of the implementation process more detailed and accurate. At the Porto Social Summit to be held on 7-8 May 2021 the action plan will be one of the major inputs into discussions on the social aspects of medium- to long-term recovery from the coronavirus crisis, including unemployment, education and training, social protection and poverty. The objectives include clarifying issues around: the enforceability of the social pillar’s principles and rights, how to achieve a genuine European social protection floor for all, and governance, monitoring and funding in the context of the EU social dimension.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Pillar of Social Rights: Gothenburg, Porto and beyond‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nora Milotay,

© pogonici / Adobe Stock

The proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (social pillar) by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council in November 2017 was the fourth major attempt to strengthen the social dimension of the European Union since its inception.

The social pillar is to be the fifth pillar of the economic and monetary union. It is to serve as a compass for updating the EU’s welfare states and labour markets to the new realities of life and work in the 21st century. Its holistic approach puts upward social convergence at its centre and can help to put economic and social considerations and rights across EU policies on a more equal footing. Its implementation has mainly been the task of the Member States in strong collaboration with the social partners and with the support of the European Union. The social pillar’s very broad interpretation of the social dimension, pointing beyond social and employment policies, means that it has been regarded by some simply as the starting point for new initiatives in a number of policy fields, and by others as a potential game-changer that can bring about a genuinely new policy dynamic around the EU’s social dimension.

The new action plan on the further implementation of the social pillar’s principles continues along this complex path. It also proposes three new headline targets and the redesign of the social scoreboard to make monitoring of the implementation process more detailed and accurate. At the Porto Social Summit to be held on 7-8 May 2021 the action plan will be one of the major inputs into discussions on the social aspects of medium- to long-term recovery from the coronavirus crisis, including unemployment, education and training, social protection and poverty. The objectives include clarifying issues around: the enforceability of the social pillar’s principles and rights, how to achieve a genuine European social protection floor for all, and governance, monitoring and funding in the context of the EU social dimension.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Pillar of Social Rights: Gothenburg, Porto and beyond‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis,

© iQoncept / Adobe Stock

After many debates and statements of principle in recent years, the time for a more structured discussion on the future of Europe’s development has arrived. The Conference on the Future of Europe, announced by the Commission’s President Ursula von der Leyen in her inaugural address, is set to start after a long period of standstill owing not only to changed priorities brought by the coronavirus pandemic, but also to lengthy negotiations among the institutions.

The aim of the conference is to debate how the EU should develop in the future, identify where it is rising to the challenges of current times, and enhance those areas that need reform or strengthening. A key aspect of this initiative is to bring the public closer to the EU institutions, listen to people’s concerns, involve them directly in the process of the Conference and provide an adequate and meaningful response. In this respect, the ambition is to set up pan-European forums for discussion, for the first time ever, where citizens of all Member States can debate the EU’s priorities and make recommendations, to be taken into account by the political-institutional powers that be and, ideally, translated into practical measures.

The pandemic hit as the preparation of the conference was just beginning and inevitably caused a delay. In March 2021, the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission agreed on a joint declaration, laying down the common rules and principles governing the conference. It was agreed that the leadership of the conference would be shared by the three institutions, with the conference chaired jointly by their three presidents.

The Conference on the Future of Europe has all the prerequisites to be an excellent opportunity to engage in a more structured debate between institutions and citizens, and arrive at concrete proposals to improve the way the EU works, in terms not only of institutional dynamics, but also of policies. Some have cautioned however that the initiative must be conducted with the utmost care, in particular as regards the follow-up, so that it remains a meaningful endeavour.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Conference on the Future of Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis,

© iQoncept / Adobe Stock

After many debates and statements of principle in recent years, the time for a more structured discussion on the future of Europe’s development has arrived. The Conference on the Future of Europe, announced by the Commission’s President Ursula von der Leyen in her inaugural address, is set to start after a long period of standstill owing not only to changed priorities brought by the coronavirus pandemic, but also to lengthy negotiations among the institutions.

The aim of the conference is to debate how the EU should develop in the future, identify where it is rising to the challenges of current times, and enhance those areas that need reform or strengthening. A key aspect of this initiative is to bring the public closer to the EU institutions, listen to people’s concerns, involve them directly in the process of the Conference and provide an adequate and meaningful response. In this respect, the ambition is to set up pan-European forums for discussion, for the first time ever, where citizens of all Member States can debate the EU’s priorities and make recommendations, to be taken into account by the political-institutional powers that be and, ideally, translated into practical measures.

The pandemic hit as the preparation of the conference was just beginning and inevitably caused a delay. In March 2021, the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission agreed on a joint declaration, laying down the common rules and principles governing the conference. It was agreed that the leadership of the conference would be shared by the three institutions, with the conference chaired jointly by their three presidents.

The Conference on the Future of Europe has all the prerequisites to be an excellent opportunity to engage in a more structured debate between institutions and citizens, and arrive at concrete proposals to improve the way the EU works, in terms not only of institutional dynamics, but also of policies. Some have cautioned however that the initiative must be conducted with the utmost care, in particular as regards the follow-up, so that it remains a meaningful endeavour.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Conference on the Future of Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tambiama Madiega (1st edition),

© Sashkin / Adobe Stock

In December 2020, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector, otherwise referred to as the digital markets act (DMA). The proposed legislation lays down harmonised rules aimed at regulating the behaviour of digital platforms acting as gatekeepers between business users and their customers in the European Union (EU). This approach entails a shift from ex-post anti-trust intervention to ex-ante regulation, and would enshrine within EU law a set of ex-ante rules that would radically change how large digital platforms are allowed to operate in the EU. While there seems to be strong support for this approach in the EU, a number of issues regarding the designation of gatekeepers, the design of ex-ante obligations and prohibitions, and enforcement mechanisms have already been raised. As the EU lawmakers, Parliament and Council will now assess whether the Commission’s proposal is an appropriate response to the challenges identified and work towards defining their positions on the proposal.

Versions

• Digital markets act (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act) Committee responsible: Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) COM(2020) 842
15.12.2020 Rapporteur:

Andreas Schwab (EPP, Germany)

2020/0374 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Evelyne Gebhardt, (S&D, Germany)
Andrus Ansip (Renew, Estonia)
Virginie Joron (ID, France)
Marcel Kolaja (Greens/EFA, Czechia)
Adam Bielan (ECR, Poland)
Martin Schirdewan (The Left, Germany) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Timeline

Written by Etienne Deschamps,

© L’hymne européen. Disque produit par la Commission européenne et par le Conseil de l’Europe, 1995. Dessin de Jean-Michel Folon © Union européenne

In the inter-war years, advocates of European unity began pondering the choice of an anthem that would convey the feeling of sharing a common destiny and common values. The creation of the Council of Europe in 1949 spurred further calls to this end. Proposals for scores and lyrics for an anthem for Europe began appearing spontaneously. It was not until 1972, however, that the Council of Europe formally adopted the prelude of Ode to Joy from Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony as the European anthem.

For their part, the institutions representing what would become the European Union chose the debates on a citizens’ Europe held in the mid-1980s to adopt Ode to Joy as their anthem too. On 29 May 1986, the European flag and the European anthem were officially adopted at a ceremony held in Brussels. Although the version of the anthem chosen had no lyrics, it has come to symbolise the European Union. It is played at official ceremonies attended by the representatives and/or leaders of the European Union, and more generally at many events with a European theme.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Story of the European Anthem‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alina Dobreva,

© calvste / Adobe Stock

This paper presents the issues related to communicating the EU budget, outlining its importance for the perception of democratic legitimacy of the EU and the challenges involved in presenting it to citizens in clear, comprehensible terms. The EU budget is a financial translation of the objectives and strategy of the EU and the means to execute its policies. Therefore, the EU budget has a key role in framing and building the image and perception of each EU policy and the EU as a whole. Given the difficulties associated with communicating the EU budget, it is ever more important to put emphasis and efforts on presenting it to the public in the best possible way.

Part 1 analyses the main features of the EU budget from the point of view of communication opportunities and challenges. It furthermore addresses some of the most popular myths regarding the EU budget and answers questions such as whether its size is justified and who decides on it.

The extension of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to seven years has had a positive impact on the predictability and stability of EU spending. However, it has also led to misalignment with the electoral cycles, which makes it harder to communicate the link between Europeans’ political choices and the political priorities of the EU budget. The introduction of new genuine own resources has the potential, on the one hand, to make Europeans see a clearer link between their own money and the EU budget, and, on the other, to weaken the strongest point associated with presenting the budget to citizens – the net balance of Member States.

While the expenditure side of the EU budget is what citizens are most familiar with, it is also the subject of misperceptions, among other things, as to who actually manages it. The language and structure of EU budget expenditure is a message in its own right and has an impact on citizens’ perception of EU spending. Each of the following institutions – the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, as well as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and the new European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) – has a role in communication addressed at citizens as regards the EU budget. It is paramount to ensure that this communication delivers what it promises to do. The performance of the EU budget and, even more importantly, the information that citizens have about it, play a key role in how people perceive and evaluate the EU budget. Therefore, the current emphasis on performance budgeting has strong potential to alter citizens’ views of the EU budget.

Part 2 presents the current outcomes of the process linked to communicating the EU budget, based on Eurobarometer data. It analyses two key questions – do Europeans support a bigger EU budget, and what is the picture of the EU budget drawn by citizens – as a perceived and as a desired EU budget. In 2020, support for attributing greater financial means to the EU stood at 48 %, at its highest since 2005, when Eurobarometer surveys on this topic began. It varied between 69 % in Portugal and 16 % in Denmark. The data show that public opinion does not strictly follow the dominant narrative of beneficiaries and contributors. Citizens of beneficiary countries such as Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia consistently offer much weaker support for increasing the EU budget than the EU average. At the other end is Italy – a contributor Member State, whose citizens consistently voice stronger support for increased funding than the EU average.

Citizens have been asked what they think the EU budget is spent on and what they would like it to be spent on. The pictures drawn by their perceptions and their desires are very different. Citizens considered employment, social affairs and public health as the top priority areas of EU spending in 2020. It had been an overwhelming priority for them for the entire period covered by the surveys and was the unanimous choice as a top priority for citizens in all EU Member States in 2015. Citizens’ preference for EU spending on climate change has grown, and demonstrates potential for an even stronger preference for financial backing in the future.

The difference between citizens’ perceptions of what the EU budget is spent on and their desired EU spending priorities creates two types of gaps. One is the ‘underspending perception gap’ – the share of people who perceive a certain policy to be an EU spending priority is lower than the share of people who express a desire for that policy to be an EU spending priority. The largest underspending perception gap is in the area of employment, social affairs and public health. The ‘overspending perception gap’ is when a bigger share of citizens perceive a policy to be an EU spending priority than the share of people who want it to be such a priority. Here, the largest one is as regards administrative and personnel costs.

Despite some fluctuations over time, Europeans have very stable perceptions about what the EU’s spending priorities are. The biggest increase in the share of people perceiving a category to be an EU spending priority is related to immigration issues, and the biggest decrease is related to assistance to EU neighbours, including candidate countries. In both cases, perceptions shift with some delay relative to the actual events linked to the change in EU spending on the respective policy areas. It would be fair to say that the shift in citizens’ perceptions of EU spending is rather slow even in the case of sudden events related to an actual change in EU spending.

The priorities of EU budget spending, as perceived by the citizens, are also very different from the real EU budget priorities, which accounts for a significant ‘reality gap’ between citizens’ perceptions of EU spending and real EU spending. For example, data show that the perception of an overgrown EU administration is rather strong and stable over time. Citizens’ perceptions and desires regarding EU spending on three policy areas – administrative and personnel costs and buildings, employment, social affairs and public health, and agriculture and rural development, is examined in detail in this paper. These categories present examples of very diverse patterns of preferences and perceptions about EU budget spending.

Knowledge and perceptions about the elements that make up the EU budget are shaped through various channels, many of them dependent on the national, rather than the European, public sphere and portrayal of the EU budget debate. However, differences in the way the EU budget is perceived cannot be explained only by national factors. Further research is needed on the personal-level determinants of these perceptions to account for the growing influence of the European public sphere and cross-border communications, as well as to bring messages closer to citizens by fine-tuning them to their interests and concerns. The build-up of communication challenges related to the EU budget outlined in this paper has contributed to the misconceptions of citizens and the gaps between their perceptions and the reality of EU budgetary affairs. Some of the misconceptions could be addressed through a dedicated and well-targeted communication strategy. Other reasons, irrespective of their political and/or financial justification, create communication complexities that will continue to be beyond the reach of the public. These can only be addressed through the concerted efforts of policy-makers in bringing the EU budget closer to EU citizens in communication terms. Significant steps in this direction are the growing focus on results in budgetary reporting and the reform of the own resources system, both of which have the potential to contribute positively to communication on the EU budget and make it more comprehensible to citizens.

Read this complete in-depth analysis on ‘Communicating and perceiving the EU budget: Challenges and outcomes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Etienne Bassot,

© European Union 2021 – Eric Vidal/EP

When Ursula von der Leyen took office as President of the European Commission on 1 December 2019, she and her fellow Commissioners did so on the basis of certain key political priorities which she had set out in statements to the European Parliament in July and November 2019, first as candidate for Commission President and then as President-elect. Her six priorities were to pursue ‘A European Green Deal’, ‘A Europe fit for the digital age’, ‘An economy that works for people’, ‘A stronger Europe in the world’, ‘Promoting the European way of life’ and ‘A new push for European democracy’.

During the new European Commission’s first one hundred days in office, however, the European Union, and indeed the whole world, were to be profoundly affected by the sudden outbreak of the coronavirus crisis, with the developing pandemic soon evolving into a multi‑faceted global crisis. This crisis has inevitably had an impact on the Commission’s six priorities and its practical capacity to pursue them over its five-year term (2019-24), but the interesting feature is that the Commission has not chosen to abandon or significantly change these priorities – simply adding a de facto seventh priority to its existing portfolio, namely action to contain the coronavirus crisis and promote economic recovery from it – nor has it significantly reconfigured the portfolios of members of the College, in response to the crisis, as some might have expected. (For example, there was no move to give greater responsibilities to the Commissioner for Health and Food Safety).

The European Commission has made it clear that it sees the coronavirus crisis as reconfirming the relevance of its existing priorities, rather than eclipsing or recasting them. It also sees the crisis as offering an opportunity to move further and faster in certain fields, talking about ‘the great acceleration of change’ which the crisis has unleashed and ‘the great opportunity it [has] paradoxically presented’. This attitude is notably the case with the two most ambitious of the six priorities – ‘A European Green Deal’ and ‘A Europe fit for the digital age’ – where the Commission has sought to use the momentum of events surrounding the crisis not only to assert the increased relevance of these priorities – suggesting that radical changes in human behaviour are possible and that these are likely to be driven in large measure by digital innovation – but to operationalise them further through the €750 billion ‘Next Generation EU’ (NGEU) recovery fund, which itself helps carry forward the third priority, ‘An economy that works for people’. Defined percentages of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the key element of NGEU, are to be used for investment in initiatives that will advance Europe’s move to climate-neutrality as a continent by 2050 and in digital modernisation of various kinds (37 and 20 per cent respectively).

The Commission has also sought to use the climate and digital agendas as a means to assert its fourth priority, ‘A stronger Europe in the world’. They offer an opportunity for the Commission to try to lead opinion on two major areas of policy where it has a global agenda for change – even if the geo-political setting was largely inhospitable until the replacement of Donald Trump by Joe Biden as US President, and still remains complex and challenging. With the spotlight on the causal link between the loss of biodiversity and the pandemic, the Commission President has set Europe the objective of leading the world at the conference on the Convention on Biological Diversity, scheduled for October 2021 in China.

Under the fifth priority, ‘Promoting our European way of life’, which includes migration and health, the impact of the crisis has been paradoxical: although it delayed several initiatives planned for 2020, it has greatly increased the likelihood of the Commission achieving the ambition of building a ‘European health union’. Here it has outlined pro-active initiatives to strengthen the EU’s crisis-preparedness and management of cross-border health threats, and to reinforce the mandates of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).

The Commission’s sixth priority – ‘A new push for European democracy’ – was initially set back by the coronavirus crisis, with the Conference of the Future of Europe stalled for some time. However, even here, the relevance of the Conference now appears to have been enhanced by debates about whether Europe is adequately equipped to address new global challenges (such as health pandemics) where expectations of common European action can be high. Delayed due to lack of agreement among the three main EU institutions on a series of procedural issues, a joint declaration between them was finally signed on 10 March 2021 – captured in the photograph on the front cover of this publication – paving the way to the official launch event of the Conference on 9 May 2021.

The successive annual Commission work programmes for 2020 – published in January 2020 and updated in May 2020 – and for 2021 – published on 19 October 2021 under the title ‘A Union of vitality in a world of fragility’ – show a surprising degree of continuity. Even if some legislative proposals (notably in the digital field) have been introduced later than originally anticipated – there were delays on 12 of the proposals originally flagged up in January 2020 – very little has fallen by the wayside and some new, ambitious elements have been added, most notably the introduction of a more stringent climate target (55 per cent reduction in greenhouse gases by 2030) and the launch of NGEU.

The von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities: Legislative delivery to 31 March 2021

Our assessment is that of the nearly 400 initiatives foreshadowed by the von der Leyen Commission on taking office or since (397), almost half have already been submitted (192). Among these, one in five has already been adopted (43), while the great majority of the remainder are either proceeding normally in the legislative process (97) or are close to adoption (26). Conversely, a certain number are proceeding very slowly or are currently blocked (26). While the Commission’s first priority, the European Green Deal, ranks highest in the number of initiatives announced (87), the third priority, ‘An economy that works for people’, has the greatest number so far actually adopted (15). It is worth noting that almost one in six of the Commission’s initiatives are non-legislative in character, such as strategies, action plans and other communications. (All figures here relate to the situation as of 31 March 2021).

This paper forms part of a series that monitors the stay of play on the achievement of Commission priorities and which is published, in principle, once every six months. There has been a significant increase in the number of initiatives submitted by the Commission under each of its six priorities, compared with only six months ago – an increase of one-third overall, compared with early September 2020. This confirms that the Commission has now entered the very active phase, in the early middle part of the five-year EU political cycle, during which the executive keeps coming forward with a large number of proposals, whilst simultaneously the twin branches of the legislature (the European Parliament and the Council of the EU) are fully engaged in considering and (very often) amending them.

One underlying condition for the success of the von der Leyen Commission’s priorities is, of course, having the financial means to implement the various initiatives tabled. In December 2020, the adoption of an unprecedented budgetary package for the years 2021 to 2027 brought new momentum to the financial front. The new Own Resources Decision will introduce important changes to the system and significantly increase resources for the next seven years. However, it still needs to be ratified by all the Member States, and completing that process is the next major challenge that the European Union faces in spring to summer 2021.

The following sections of this paper analyse, for each of the Commission’s six priorities, the state of play on its initiatives, reporting progress made, delays suffered, and any specific impact as a result of the coronavirus crisis. The infographic featured on the next page illustrates, in condensed form, on one page, the degree of progress so far made – both overall and under each of the six priorities. It is based on a proposal-by-proposal assessment which is available on the European Parliament’s ‘Legislative Train Schedule’ website, also developed by EPRS and available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/

The next edition of this paper will be published in September 2021, in advance of President von der
Leyen’s annual State of the Union address to the European Parliament.

Read this complete in-depth analysis on ‘The six policy priorities of the von der Leyen Commission: State of play in spring 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka,

© European Union 2021 – Source : EP / Jan VAN DE VEL

The April 2021 plenary session featured a debate on the outcome of EU-UK negotiations and the vote on the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Members also debated the conclusions of the 25 and 26 March 2021 European Council meeting and the outcome of the 6 April 2021 high-level EU-Turkey meeting. Members debated ways to save the summer tourism season and provide EU support to the hospitality sector, and underlined the need for affordable Covid‑19 testing. Parliament also debated statements by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borell, on Russia, Alexei Navalny, the military build-up on Ukraine’s border and the Russian attack on an arms depot in Czechia, on Chinese counter-sanctions, and on the fifth anniversary of the Peace Agreement in Colombia. Parliament also voted on a mandatory transparency register for outside interests meeting with the three institutions.

EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement

Parliament debated and approved, by a very large majority (660 votes to 5 with 32 abstentions), a decision to grant consent to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed by the EU with the United Kingdom and adopted a resolution on the subject. The Council completed the final adoption of the agreement on 29 April 2021, bringing the Brexit process to an end.

EU Covid-19 certificates

Parliament debated and adopted a mandate under the urgent legislative procedure to begin negotiations with the Council on the proposed digital green certificate. Parliament agrees with the Council and Commission that the proposed ‘certificate’ should facilitate free movement for Europeans when safe to do so. To avoid confusion, Parliament proposes to rename the initiative the ‘EU Covid‑19 certificate’.

2019 EU budget discharge

An important tool used by Parliament to ensure correct use of EU funding, Members debated and granted discharge for the European Commission and other agencies’ implementation of the 2019 budget. Parliament also granted discharge for the EU institutions other than the European Commission, except for the European Council and the Council, due to Council’s continued lack of cooperation. Finally, Parliament granted discharge for 31 of the 32 decentralised EU agencies subject to discharge. A decision to postpone discharge for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), until financial and human resource management issues are clarified, was adopted by an overwhelming majority.

Rail passengers’ rights and obligations

Parliament adopted at second reading the legislation on rail passengers’ rights and obligations, which strengthens passenger rights while reducing burdens on rail companies.

Dissemination of terrorist content online

As existing self-regulatory measures appear to have failed, Members debated and approved an early second-reading agreement on a new regulation addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online. The ambitious proposal seeks quick and smooth removal of content that seeks to radicalise, recruit or incite to violence. However, Parliament has also insisted on the need to protect freedom of speech.

Joint debate on research and innovation

Members held a joint debate on research and innovation in the EU. They approved the new Horizon Europe programme, which will allocate €95.5 billion to research and innovation that addresses the Union’s key challenges, including climate change and digitalisation. Members voted on the agreed text of the programme itself as well as on the specific implementing programme, which sets out more detailed provisions. Members also voted on the final text of two proposals concerning the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) in Budapest, a key part of Horizon Europe.

European Defence Fund

Parliament adopted at second reading the proposal to establish the European Defence Fund. This first-ever multiannual financial programme supporting defence research and technology will aim at reducing costly duplication of military procurement, with a budget of €7 billion.

Digital Europe programme

Members approved (without a vote) the early second-reading agreement on a proposal aimed at ensuring that the EU does not fall behind in the crucial strategic area of digital capacity. The Digital Europe programme will now fund investment in large-scale digital capacities in five key areas (advanced computing and data, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and advanced digital skills), with a focus on technology such as supercomputers that would otherwise be too expensive for single Member States.

Union anti-fraud programme

Reinforcing efficient protection of the EU budget, Members adopted an early second-reading agreement on the Union anti-fraud programme, for which Parliament negotiated a budget of €181.2 million.

LIFE programme

Members approved an early second-reading agreement (without a vote) on the new LIFE programme. Although, given the EU’s current ‘green’ priorities, Parliament initially called for €7 billion, the final proposal nevertheless allocates €5.45 billion for environmental initiatives.

Union Civil Protection Mechanism

Parliament debated and approved a final agreement on the financing for the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, ensuring that civil protection, prevention, preparedness and disaster response are prioritised.

Justice and citizens, equality, rights and values programmes

Parliament debated and approved funding for a new justice programme, aimed at upholding EU values. Parliament is a keen defender of core EU values and has fought hard for adequate funding, set at €305 million, for the measures. These include further development of a European area of justice based on the rule of law, mutual recognition and mutual trust, promoting justice for all and in particular gender equality and LGBTQI rights – issues that have not met with universal approval among the Member States. Members also approved an agreement on a new citizens, equality, rights and values programme, within the justice programme and aimed at funding the fight against inequality and discrimination in the EU.

European Globalisation Adjustment Fund

Parliament approved (without a vote) an early second-reading agreement on a proposal widening eligibility for European Globalisation Adjustment Fund intervention to include victims of restructuring and the Covid‑19 crisis and speeding up allocation of funds. With a maximum annual allocation of €186 million (outside the MFF), the fund will be renamed the European Fund for Transition.

Single market, competitiveness of enterprises and European statistics programme

Members approved (without a vote) an early second-reading agreement on the proposed single market, competitiveness of enterprises and European statistics programme, aimed at tackling existing and new barriers to competition and boosting consumer protection. The programme allocates a €4.2 billion budget to improvements to EU law, market surveillance, sustainability and access to quality European statistics.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed the mandate for negotiations from the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee on the proposal for amending Directive 2004/37/EC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – April 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Zsolt G. Pataki with Katerina Mavrona,

© Adobe Stock

‘Hybrid threats’, i.e. actions aimed at harming their targets through overt or covert military or non-military means, are increasingly used by state or non-state actors seeking to undermine democratic societies, in pursuit of strategic aims, without the necessity of financing the real costs of a classical military aggression. Hybrid tactics threaten citizens’ trust in democratic institutions, exacerbate political polarisation, sow confusion through stealth and through concealment of attackers’ identities, and do so using tools that are widely available and therefore cost-effective (e.g. information distortion and its amplification through digital communication technologies). In this way, perpetrators, foreign governments or domestic affiliates, profit from turning civil liberties, such as the freedom of expression, into vulnerabilities to manipulate and attack. However, just as online platforms and social media help launch disinformation campaigns at scale, so can communication and digital technologies act as barriers to online subversion.

Ways to achieve this are the subject of the ‘Strategic communications as a key factor in countering hybrid threats’ study by Iclaves and commissioned by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA), following a request from the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE). Targeting audiences via online platforms is one of many instruments available in the hybrid threat toolbox. The study presents complementary tactics, including the funding of political parties and cultural organisations, employment of strategic leaks and cyber weapons, use of religious influence or the fuelling of concerns about migration. At the centre of these, however, the study discerns an all-pervasive ingredient: the informational component. Information manipulation can ultimately transform, exacerbate and distort people’s beliefs, attitudes or emotions. Yet, for the same reason, the authors highlight that information can redeem the impact of hybrid tactics and help counter disruptive narratives.

Disinformation campaigns begin with the manipulation of content, usually addressing real facts from a distorted perspective, rather than presenting audiences with entirely fabricated stories. While this strategy lends some credibility to promulgated narratives, it also requires that the message bypasses traditional ‘gatekeepers’: journalists, editorial desks or fact-checkers. Online platforms offer fertile terrain for successful manipulation: they act as technological enablers – perpetrators deploying bot accounts by the thousands to amplify narratives is routine practice today – as long as questions on platform responsibility for content moderation remain unsettled.

How can the cycle be broken? The taxonomy of responses comprises sequential stages of prevention, detection and response. Across these, the study examines different response actions, ranging from intelligence, legal, diplomatic or even military action to informational measures and initiatives. As the name implies, ‘strategic communications’ come into play with a twist, as they are not about disjointed responses to unsolicited adversarial activity, but are executed according to predetermined and systematic plans and are designed to advance distinct policy goals. As such, they demand high levels of coordination among stakeholders. What is more, strategic communications planners anticipate that audiences may find themselves in conflictual environments and subject to a constant ‘information buzz’ made up of distorted or blatantly false messages.

What do strategic communications entail for the EU and its Member States? While democracies face an asymmetric fight against actors with no reservations about deploying illegitimate methods or illegal tools, the response resides in adherence to the very principles under attack. Truthfulness and credibility, the understanding of cultures, ideas and identities, reliance on and practice of mutual comprehension are the themes upon which strategic communications are structured. To present and assess these ideas, the study explores seven case studies extensively, where hybrid tactics with informational components were deployed and concomitant strategic-communications-based responses were used (e.g., external financing of religious extremism in the Netherlands, foreign influence by Russia and China through academia and think tanks, the Russian intervention in Ukraine, disinformation campaigns against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Lithuania). The study derives a number of challenges to effective strategic communications campaigns from these case studies, followed by targeted policy options.

Likely digital solutions to disinformation include the deployment of artificial intelligence for detection, the use of hyperconnectivity – afforded by the upcoming 5G rollout – for conducting mass fact-checking campaigns, or investment in blockchain security to improve traceability and ensure the integrity and veracity of stored and disseminated information. In the study conclusions, the reader can find a comprehensive table listing the risks emerging technologies pose in the context of hybrid aggression, as well as the advantages they offer for defenders and policy-makers. To successfully incorporate technological options to strategic communication responses, however, a comprehensive policy approach is required, and this is reflected in the study’s policy options.

The proposed policy options extend from the regulatory domain to investment policy: the authors mention further EU legal framework harmonisation to specifically target hybrid threats, disinformation and foreign interference, arguing for example in favour of adaptations to the EU sanctions regime, and for streamlining upcoming regulation on artificial intelligence. They also make explicit reference to strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation, signatories to which are major online platforms. In the case of investment policy, greater use of financial instruments for innovation to close the technological gap between the EU and its global competitors is proposed. Finally, emphasis is also placed on EU initiatives for improving coordination across the hybrid-threat stakeholder ecosystem, both internally (in the EU) and with external actors and organisations, including NATO.

The STOA Options Brief linked to the study contains an overview of various policy options. Read the full report to find out more, and let us know what you think via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Issam Hallak,

© niroworld / Adobe Stock

The level playing-field (LPF) provisions of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) constitute a key part of the agreement, and became a major source of divergence between the negotiators. LPF provisions establish rules to safeguard fair competition between the parties’ businesses. A notable component are the rules on social provisions, labour, environment and climate change, often referred to as the ‘trade and sustainable development’ (TSD) chapters in other free trade agreements (FTAs).

The trading relationship between the EU and the UK is fundamentally different from that with other non-EU countries since, on the one hand, EU laws were applicable to the UK until the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020 and, on the other, these two economies neighbour each other and are strongly interconnected. The TCA is therefore designed to maintain sufficiently ‘convergent’ standards to safeguard fair competition, while providing each party with the freedom to implement its own approach to social and environmental protection.

To this end, the TCA requires that parties do not weaken or reduce their levels of social, labour and environmental standards as of the end of 2020 (non-regression); the EU commitments on climate change, in particular on climate neutrality by 2050, will also remain for both parties. In addition, the TCA introduces rebalancing provisions creating a mechanism whereby a party can take ‘proportionate measures’ in order to offset any (adverse) ‘material impacts on trade or investment’ resulting from ‘significant divergences’ between parties. It also allows either party to request a review with a view to amending the agreement, and either party can opt to terminate the trade chapters if the amendment is not satisfactory.

Although the TCA LPF provisions on labour and environment are in many respects similar to those in the EU’s new generation FTAs, they strengthen the enforcement of non-regression provisions by allowing for remedial measures, and also reinforce the precautionary approach. The TCA also represents a notable innovation with its rebalancing and review provisions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The level playing-field for labour and environment in EU-UK relations‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Parliament (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

Members of the European Parliament certainly have their work cut out for them this month with a very full agenda, featuring budgetary discharge in respect of EU financial management in 2019, spending plans for a number of EU programmes in 2021‑2027, and a number of other legislative proposals, including on the proposed digital green certificate. The session will kick off with European Council and Commission statements on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 25 and 26 March 2021 and on the outcome of the high-level meeting between the EU and Turkey on 7 April 2021, overshadowed by protocol issues. A key point on the agenda will be the vote on Parliament’s consent to the Council decision concluding the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (which has been provisionally applied since 1 January, and could thus come fully into force on 1 May). Members will also debate a number of foreign affairs topics with the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, in particular the latest developments with Russia, not least the build-up of troops on the border with Ukraine. Members will then debate recommendations on EU-India relations, ahead of the May EU-India summit.

In a joint debate scheduled for Tuesday afternoon, Members will consider granting discharge for the 2019 EU budget. This annual exercise is carried out through 52 separate discharge decisions. The first batch concerns the European Commission, executive agencies and the European Development Funds, where Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommends discharge is granted. However, not without sounding the alarm regarding a deteriorating level of errors in spending and increasing incidences of fraud, particularly in agriculture and cohesion funding. The second set concerns EU institutions other than the European Commission, where, as every year since 2009, the CONT committee proposes to postpone the decision for the European Council and the Council, due to Council’s continued lack of cooperation. The committee recommends granting discharge for the expenditure of all other institutions, including the European Economic and Social Committee – although for the latter, observations are made regarding past cases of harassment. Finally, while various shortcomings are noted, the CONT committee recommends discharge is granted for a total of 31 of the 32 decentralised EU agencies subject to discharge. The committee proposes to postpone the decision in respect of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), due to issues with financial management and recruitment, as well as allegations of violations of fundamental rights.

Moving on to a number of proposals for EU funding for programmes in the 2021‑2027 financial period, Parliament is due to vote on the proposed regulation to tackle such fraud against EU finances on Thursday morning. The Union anti-fraud programme would build on the Hercules III programme. Parliament has negotiated a rise in the overall budget to €181.2 million, as well as to set the maximum rates for co-financing for grants at 80 % of the eligible costs.

On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament will debate and vote on funding for a new justice programme, specifically aimed at upholding EU values. Parliament is naturally a keen defender of citizens’ rights and core EU values and has fought hard for adequate funding for the measures. These include further development of a European area of justice based on the rule of law, mutual recognition and mutual trust, promoting justice for all and gender equality and LGBTQI rights in particular – issues that are not the subject of universal accord among the Member States. Members are also expected to vote on an agreement on a new citizens, equality, rights and values programme on Tuesday afternoon, complementing the justice programme and specifically aimed at funding the fight against inequality and discrimination in the EU.

Parliament is expected to debate and vote on the final agreement on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism on Monday evening. Here, Covid‑19 has highlighted the limits of what Member States can do alone, especially in situations that cross borders, and consequently the need for better EU preparedness to tackle natural and manmade disasters. Parliament has ensured that, of the €3.319 billion allocated, civil protection, prevention, preparedness and response to disaster measures are prioritised. The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund intervenes when employees are made redundant, often due to companies relocating their operations outside Europe. With such emergency solidarity funding likely to be under pressure due to the pandemic, Parliament is expected to vote on Tuesday afternoon on formal adoption of a proposal widening eligibility to include victims of restructuring and the Covid‑19 crisis and speeding up allocation of funds. With a maximum annual allocation of €186 million (outside the MFF), the fund will be renamed the European Fund for Transition.

The crisis has also galvanised moves towards greater strategic autonomy. On Thursday afternoon, Members are due to vote on Parliament’s second-reading position on a proposal aimed at ensuring that the EU is not left behind by big players, such as the United States and China, in the crucial strategic area of digital capacity. The proposed digital Europe programme is intended to fund investment in large-scale digital capacities in five key areas (advanced computing and data, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and advanced digital skills), with a focus on technology such as supercomputers that would otherwise be too expensive for single Member States. Regulation of the digital space has been somewhat overshadowed by the coronavirus pandemic recently, however posting of hate, violence and terrorist propaganda online has nonetheless continued. As existing self-regulatory measures appear to have failed, Members are expected to vote on an agreement for a new regulation addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online on Wednesday evening. The ambitious proposal seeks to remove content that seeks to radicalise, recruit or incite to violence within one hour of it appearing online. However, Parliament has insisted on striking a balance between removing such content and the need to protect fundamental rights, including the freedom of speech.

On Thursday afternoon, Members are expected to vote on a proposed new regulation on the LIFE programme, dedicated to environmental and climate objectives. Although, given the EU’s current ‘green’ priorities, Parliament initially called for €7 billion, the final proposal nevertheless allocates €5.45 billion for environmental initiatives, including a high number of biodiversity and ecosystem protection projects. Meanwhile, for anyone wishing to improve their personal carbon footprint by travelling long distance by train instead of by air, the issue of missed connections has proved a deterrent. This should improve with changes to the legislation on rail passengers’ rights and obligations. Parliament is due to vote on an agreement on Wednesday evening that strengthens passenger rights while reducing the burden on rail companies.

On Monday afternoon, Members will hold a joint debate on research and innovation in the EU. The Horizon Europe programme will have a budget of over €95.5 billion for the seven years, to support research and innovation addressing the Union’s key challenges such as climate change and digitalisation. Members are to vote on the agreed texts of the programme itself and on the specific implementing programme, which sets out more detailed provisions on the programme’s planned elements. They are then expected to vote on the final text of two proposals concerning the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) in Budapest, a key part of Horizon Europe. The proposals for a revised EIT regulation and a decision on the EIT strategic innovation agenda (SIA) reflect new funding priorities and the increased need to encourage economic growth and job creation through the EIT-led knowledge innovation communities. While Parliament proposed a €4.8 billion budget, protracted MFF negotiations led to a more constrained overall Horizon Europe budget, with a lower share for EIT of only €2.965 billion.

On Thursday morning, Parliament will vote on its second-reading position on establishment of the European Defence Fund. The proposals aim at reducing costly duplication of military procurement and research and technology activities. Tested under the previous EU financial framework, if the Fund is approved, €7 billion will be allocated to the first-ever multiannual financial programme supporting EU defence research and development.

Finally, on Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to vote on a proposal to improve competitiveness. The single market, competitiveness of enterprises and European statistics programme aims at tackling existing and new barriers to competition and boosting consumer protection. The programme will allocate a budget of €4.2 billion according to six specific objectives, including improvements to EU law, market surveillance, sustainability and product safety, all underpinned by the availability of high-quality European statistics.

Written by Miroslava Karaboytcheva (1st edition),

© Visual Generation / Adobe stock

On 18 June 2018, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation establishing a Customs programme for cooperation in the field of customs over the 2021-2027 MFF period, a successor to Customs 2020. The programme’s main objective is to fund actions aimed at strengthening the customs union.

On 15 December 2020, the co-legislators reached agreement in trilogue. The Council adopted its first-reading position on 1 March 2021. On 8 March 2021, IMCO – the committee responsible for the file in the European Parliament – adopted its recommendation for second reading of the Customs programme by the Parliament.

The Parliament voted to adopt the first-reading position without amendments on 10 March 2021, and the final act was signed the following day. The regulation was published in the Official Journal on 15 March 2021 and entered into force immediately, and with retroactive application as of 1 January 2021.

Versions

• Customs programme: Supporting cooperation to strengthen the customs union (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the ‘Customs’ programme for cooperation in the field of customs Committee responsible: Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) COM(2018) 442
18.06.2018 Rapporteur:

Maria Grapini (S&D, Romania)

2018/0232 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Ivan Štefanec (EPP, Slovakia)
Morten Løkkegaard (Renew, Denmark)
Alessandra BASSO (ID, Italy)
Anna Cavazzini (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Adam Bielan (ECR, Poland)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Procedure completed. Regulation (EU) 2021/444
OJ L 87, 15.3.2021, pp. 1–16