The National Interest

Robert Farley

Security,

The U.S.-Canadian border would have constituted the central front of the War of 1921.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Tokyo, rather than London or Washington, would have stood as the biggest winner, hegemonic in its own sphere of influence and fully capable of managing international access to China.

The end of a war only rarely settles the central questions that started the conflict. Indeed, many wars do not “end” in the traditional sense; World War II, for example, stretched on for years in parts of Eastern Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

Even as the guns fell silent along the Western Front in 1918, the United States and the United Kingdom began jockeying for position. Washington and London bitterly disagreed on the nature of the settlements in Europe and Asia, as well as the shape of the postwar naval balance. In late 1920 and early 1921, these tensions reached panic levels in Washington, London and especially Ottawa.

The general exhaustion of war, combined with the Washington Naval Treaty, succeeded in quelling these questions and setting the foundation for the great Anglo-American partnership of the twentieth century. But what if that hadn’t happened? What if the United States and United Kingdom had instead gone to war in the spring of 1921?

The Liberation of Canada

The U.S.-Canadian border would have constituted the central front of the War of 1921. Although Washington maintained good relations with Ottawa, war plans in both the United States and the United Kingdom expected a multipronged invasion into America’s northern neighbor, designed to quickly occupy the country before British (or Japanese) reinforcement could arrive. Canadian declarations of neutrality would have had minimal impact on this process. Plans for initial attacks included the seizure of Vancouver, Winnipeg, the Niagara Falls area and most of Ontario.

Given the overwhelming disparity between available U.S. and Canadian military forces, most of these offensives would probably have succeeded in short order. The major battle would have revolved around British and Canadian efforts to hold Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and especially the port of Halifax, which would have served both as the primary portal for British troops and as the main local base for the Royal Navy. U.S. military planners understood that Halifax was the key to winning the war quickly, and investigated several options (including poison gas and an amphibious assault) for taking the port.

Assuming they held the line, could British and Canadian forces have prevented the severing of supply lines between Halifax and the main cities of Quebec and the Great Lakes region? Unlikely. The U.S. Army would have had major advantages in numbers, logistics, and mobility. Ottawa and Toronto might each have proven too big to swallow and digest quickly, but severing their connection to the Atlantic would have made the question of their eventual surrender only a matter of time.

And what about Quebec? The nationalism of the early twentieth century did not look kindly on large enclaves of ethno-linguistic minorities. Moreover, the United States had no constitutional mechanisms through which it could offer unique concessions to the French speaking majority of the province. In this context, Quebecois leaders might have sought an accord with Washington that resulted in Quebec’s independence in exchange for support for the American war effort, and Washington might plausibly have accepted such an offer. An accord of this nature might also have forestalled French support from their erstwhile British allies. If not, the U.S. Army planned to seize Quebec City through an overland offensive through Vermont.

Operations in the Atlantic

British war planning considered the prospect of simply abandoning Canada in favor of operations in the Caribbean. However, public pressure might have forced the Royal Navy to establish and maintain transatlantic supply lines against a committed U.S. Navy. While it might have struggled to do this over the long term, the RN still had a sufficient margin of superiority over the USN to make a game of it.

The eight “standard-type” super-dreadnought battleships of the USN flatly outclassed any British warship on any metric other than speed. The USN also possessed ten older dreadnoughts, plus a substantial fleet of pre-dreadnoughts that would have undertaken coastal defense duties. The United States did not operate a submarine arm comparable to that of Imperial Germany, and what boats it had lacked experience in either fleet actions or commerce raiding.

For its part, the Royal Navy had at its disposal nine dreadnoughts, twenty-three super-dreadnoughts and nine battle cruisers. The British ships were generally older, less well armored and less heavily armed than their American counterparts. Nevertheless, the Royal Navy had the benefit of years of experience in both war and peace that the USN lacked. Moreover, the RN had a huge advantage in cruisers and destroyers, as well as a smaller advantage in naval aviation.

But how would the RN have deployed its ships? Blockading the U.S. East Coast is a far more difficult task than blockading Germany, and the USN (like the High Seas Fleet) would only have offered battle in advantageous circumstances. While the RN might have considered a sortie against Boston, Long Island or other northern coastal regions, most of its operations would have concentrated on supporting British and Canadian ground forces in the Maritimes.

Operations in the Pacific

Both the United States and the United Kingdom expected Japan to join any conflict on the British side. The connections between the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy ran back to the Meiji Restoration, and Tokyo remained hungry for territory in the Pacific. In the First World War, Japan had opportunistically gobbled up most of the German Pacific possessions, before deploying a portion of its navy in support of Entente operations in the Mediterranean. In the case of a U.S.-UK war, the IJN would likely have undertaken similar efforts against American territories. These included many of the islands that Japan invaded in 1941 and 1942, although the invasions would have moved forward without the benefit of years of careful preparation.

Given the strength of the IJN (four battle cruisers, five super-dreadnoughts, two dreadnoughts) and the necessary commitment to an “Atlantic first” strategy, the United States probably could not have held the Philippines, Guam, Wake, Midway or most of the other Pacific islands. Hawaii might have proven a bit too far and too big, and it is deeply unlikely that the Japanese would have risked a land deployment to western Canada (although U.S. planners feared such an eventuality), but the war would have overturned the balance of power in the Western Pacific.

Would It Work?

The British Army and the Royal Navy could, possibly, have erected a credible defense of Nova Scotia, preventing the United States from completely rolling up Canada. London could also have offered support for resistance forces in the Canadian wilderness, although even supplying guerilla operations in the far north would have tested British logistics and resolve.

In the end, however, the United States would have occupied the vast bulk of Canada, at the cost of most of its Pacific possessions. And the Canadians, having finally been “liberated” by their brothers to the south? Eventually, the conquest and occupation of Canada would have resulted in statehood for some configuration of provinces, although not likely along the same lines as existed in 1920 (offering five full states likely would have resulted in an undesirable amount of formerly Canadian representation in the U.S. Senate). The process of political rehabilitation might have resembled the Reconstruction of the American South, without the racial element.

The new map, then, might have included a United States that extended to the Arctic, an independent Quebec, a rump Canada consisting mostly of the Maritimes and Japanese control of the entirety of the Western Pacific. Tokyo, rather than London or Washington, would have stood as the biggest winner, hegemonic in its own sphere of influence and fully capable of managing international access to China.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to the National Interest, is author of The Battleship Book. This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: Flickr.

Salvatore Babones

Security,

Aircraft carriers aren’t leaving anytime soon.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Despite its name, the purpose of the carrier strike group isn't really to strike. It's to seize and hold a million square miles of the Earth's surface against all but the best armed and most determined opponents.

In the fourth week of October, 1944, the United States Navy sank the Japanese fleet. Nearly all of it. Japan lost twenty-eight major surface combatants and more than 300 aircraft in the four-day Battle of Leyte Gulf, fought off the east coast of the Philippines. Leyte Gulf was the final throw of the dice for the Imperial Japanese Navy, which never recovered from the loss.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf is well-remembered as the swan song of the battleship, with radar-guided American gunnery scoring dozens of hits on Japanese targets. Less well-known is the fact that it also marked the end of the carrier duel. Leyte Gulf was the last time that opposing fleets launched large numbers of carrier-based aircraft to seek out and destroy their opponents on the high seas.

If the dreadnought battleship era lasted less than forty years, the carrier duel era lasted less than four. The first major carrier-launched naval engagement in history was the November 1940 Battle of Taranto, when British aircraft from the HMS Illustrious struck the Italian fleet at anchor in a miniature Pearl Harbor. The last was Leyte Gulf.

Since the end of World War Two, the aircraft carrier has reigned supreme over the world's oceans, undefeated but also untested. With China developing anti-ship ballistic missiles with ranges up to 2500 miles or more and Iran boasting of its readiness to do just about anything to score the prestige victory of hitting a carrier, the continued reign of the carrier as the king of the ocean may seem far from assured. But that is to mistake the method for the mission.

The aircraft carrier played an indispensable role in the Allies' victory in the Pacific in World War Two. But it is a commonplace bordering on a cliche to warn that strategists are perpetually preparing to fight yesterday's wars. What about tomorrow's wars? If the aircraft carrier hasn't had to fight for naval supremacy for the last 75 years, why should we expect it to do so in the future?

We shouldn't. The battle for naval supremacy in the Pacific was yesterday's war, and the aircraft carrier is very much tomorrow's ship. Neither China nor anyone else is ever again going to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor while landing troops in the Philippines and Malaysia in a bid to conquer the entire Indo-Pacific region. Satellite monitoring and nuclear-powered attack submarines have made major naval operations like these obsolete.

The real mission of the twenty-first-century carrier is to establish an extraterritorial zone of control overseas. An American aircraft carrier sits at the center of a circle with a radius of 500 miles in which the United States calls all the shots -- figuratively and literally.

The only limitation is that the center of the circle has to float on water, but even that's not as much of a limitation as it seems. Most of the world's population and economic activity are concentrated on its coasts. What's more, most of what connects a country to the outside world travels on, over, or under the world's oceans. China's Belt & Road Initiative has spectacularly failed to change that.

Of course, the Navy has to prepare for all contingencies, and so it has to be ready to fight a sea battle that will never come. That's why every American carrier goes to sea with a whole contingent of powerful auxiliary ships. But despite its name, the purpose of the carrier strike group isn't really to strike. It's to seize and hold a million square miles of the Earth's surface against all but the best armed and most determined opponents.

China and Russia can prevent the President of the United States from seizing and holding control of their coastlines, but the rest of the world is at his disposal.

Obviously, the United States doesn't actually "need" aircraft carriers. These days, an aircraft carrier is a foreign policy tool, not a defense necessity. No one is going to attack the United States, and if they were, land-based aircraft and submarines would provide the best defense. As for patrolling the world's shipping lanes, frigates can do that. You don't do search and rescue with an F/A-18.

The aircraft carrier is a weapon of choice for discretionary missions, not a weapon of necessity for essential ones. As long as the United States wants the option to project power overseas, the aircraft carrier will have a mission. China's aircraft carrier program should be seen in the same light. Carriers will give China the ability to establish a limited zone of control in a territory far from its borders -- that is, as long as the United States doesn't want to own the same piece of real estate.

Many defense analysts openly question the continuing military relevance of the aircraft carrier in an era of precision missiles and armed drones. Others warn that the consequences of losing one of these 7000-person cities of the seas are so scary that presidents and their advisors may prove reluctant to actually risk them in battle.

These skeptics are missing the big policy point: America's aircraft carriers are no longer intended for use in naval warfare. They're designed to give the President the power to take control of a substantial chunk of the surface of the Earth and put it to use in the national interest of the United States, or at least deny its use to anyone else. Whether or not that ability is worth the price is open to question. But no other policy tool can do the work more flexibly, or more effectively.

Salvatore Babones is the author of The New Authoritarianism: Trump, Populism, and the Tyranny of Experts. This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: Flickr.

Michael Peck

Syria, Middle East

The Kremlin has denounced Israeli strikes in Syria as “illegitimate.”

Here's What You Need to Know: The IDF is neither boastful nor belligerent about its capabilities versus Russia.

(This article first appeared in 2019.)

Could Israeli air strikes in Syria trigger war between Israel and Russia?

Israel remains determined to continue pounding Iranian forces in Syria in a bid to keep Tehran’s forces away from Israel’s northern border. At the same time, Russia has thousands of troops in Syria that could be caught in the crossfire—or even become belligerents if Moscow tires of its Syrian ally being pummeled.

And if Israel and Russia come to blows, would Israel’s big brother—the United States—feel compelled to intervene?

Not that Jerusalem or Moscow are eager for such a fight. “Neither of us desire a military confrontation,” a senior Israel Defense Forces (IDF) official told me during a recent interview in Jerusalem. “It would be detrimental to both sides.”

Yet Israel’s policy boils down to this: it will do whatever it sees as necessary to eject Iranian forces from Syria. And if Russia doesn’t like it, then that’s just the price of ensuring that Syria doesn’t become another Iranian rocket base on Israel’s border.

Relations between Jerusalem and Moscow are far warmer than during the Cold War. The result is a strange embrace reminiscent of the U.S.-Soviet detente of the 1970s. On the surface, a certain friendliness and desire for cooperation.  Yet beneath the smiles is wariness, suspicion and a clash of fundamental interests.

“No one in Israel is confused about who the Russians are and who they are aligned with,” said the IDF official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The Russians are not our allies, to put it mildly. We have one ally, and that is the United States. The Russians are here for totally different objectives. They are supporting a regime [Syria] that has an outspoken goal of annihilating Israel if it only could. They are also part of a coalition that supports Iran.”

Just how easily Israeli military operations can trigger an incident became evident during a September 2018 strike on ammunition depots in western Syria. Anti-aircraft missiles launched by Syrian gunners accidentally shot down a Russian Il-20 surveillance aircraft, killing fifteen people. Israel denies Russian accusations that it deliberately used the Russian plane as cover, or failed to give Moscow sufficient warning of the raid. Yet Russia still blamed Israel for the mishap and retaliated by supplying advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Syria.

Nonetheless, Israel sees value in Russia as a potential restraint on Iran, and a possible lever to get Iranian forces out of Syria. After a February meeting between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Vladimir Putin to mend fences after the Il-20 incident, Israeli officials claimed Putin had agreed that foreign forces should withdraw from Syria. For Moscow, friendly relations with Israel offer more influence in the Middle East even as America may be scaling down its presence in the region.

Still, the Kremlin has denounced Israeli strikes in Syria as “illegitimate.” Syria has been a Russian ally for more than fifty years, and it was Russian air strikes—along with Iranian and Hezbollah troops—that saved Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s faltering regime from ISIS and other rebel groups. At least 63,000 Russian troops have served in Syria since 2015. Though Putin has promised since 2016 that Russian forces would withdraw, Russia currently retains more than 5,000 troops and private military contractors in Syria, backed by several dozen aircraft and helicopters.

And Russia is in Syria to stay. The Syrian port of Tartus is Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean: in 2016, Moscow and Damascus signed a forty-nine-year agreement that allows nuclear-powered Russian warships to operate from there. In addition, Russian aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, including the long-range S-400 air defense system, operate from at least two air bases in western Syria.

Israel can live with the Russians next door—but not the Iranians. Israeli officials warn of Tehran’s plan to station 100,000 Iranian and allied troops in Syria. Hezbollah, with its estimated arsenal of 130,000-plus rockets, already menaces Israel’s Lebanon frontier. Syria joining Lebanon as a second Iranian rocket base is the stuff of Israeli nightmares.

“We can – and we intend to – make it as difficult as possible and inflict a price tag that the Iranians aren’t willing to pay,” the IDF official said. And the Israeli Air Force has been just doing that, attacking “Iranian and Hezbollah targets hundreds of times,” Netanyahu announced after a devastating attack on Iranian arms depots near Damascus International Airport in January.

“We continue to implement our plans,” the IDF official replied when asked if Russia would deter Israeli raids into Syria. “Our activities suggest that, despite everything, we enjoy significant freedom of action.”

But more telling was his one-word response when asked how willing is Israel to fight for that freedom of action.

“Willing.”

Which leaves the question: Can Israel target Iran in Syria without triggering a clash with Russia?

There are deconfliction mechanisms in place, including a hotline between the Israeli and Russian militaries. “We are very strict about informing the Russians about our activities and that their operational picture is up to date,” said the IDF official. Yet those procedures were not sufficient to avoid a downing of a Russian plane.

Perhaps that ill-fated Il-20 was just at the wrong place at the wrong time. Still, it is not hard to imagine a multiplicity of equally fatal scenarios. Russian advisers or technicians caught in an Israeli raid on an Iranian or Syrian installation. An errant Israeli smart bomb that hits a Russian base, or a Russian pilot or anti-aircraft battery spooked by a nearby Israeli raid into opening fire. Or, perhaps Russia will just feel obligated to support the prestige of its Syrian ally and its shaky government. Just how incendiary Syrian skies are for everyone became evident in December 2017, when U.S. F-22 fighters fired flares to warn off two Russian Su-25 attack jets that breached a no-go zone in eastern Syria.

To be clear, the IDF is neither boastful nor belligerent about its capabilities versus Russia, a former superpower with the largest nuclear arsenal on the planet. The IDF official likened Israel to “The Mouse that Roared,” the classic novel of a tiny nation that challenges the United States.

But if Israel resembles any mouse, it’s Mighty Mouse: small, powerful and not afraid to use its fists. In fact, what makes a potential Israel-Russia battle so dangerous is that it is not hypothetical. After the 1967 Six-Day War, Soviet fighters were sent to Egypt. This led to a notorious July 1970 incident when in a well-planned aerial ambush over the Suez Canal, Israeli fighters shot down five Soviet-piloted MiG-21 jets in three minutes.

On the other hand, Russia doesn’t need to fight Israel to hurt Israel. Indeed, the IDF official seemed less concerned about a physical clash between Israeli and Russian forces, and more concerned that Russia could choose to supply advanced weapons—such as anti-aircraft missiles—to Israeli enemies such as Syria and Iran. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union supplied numerous air defense missiles and guns to Egypt and Syria, which inflicted heavy losses on Israeli planes in the 1973 October War. If it wants to, Russia can make Israeli air operations very expensive.

As always with the Arab-Israeli (or Iranian-Israeli) conflict, the real danger isn’t the regional conflict, but how it might escalate. In the 1973 war, the Soviets threatened to send troops to Egypt unless Israel agreed to a cease-fire. The United States responded by going on nuclear alert.

Were the Israelis and Russians to come to blows, or if Moscow were to seriously threaten military force against Israel, could the United States risk a grave loss of prestige by not intervening to back its longtime ally? Could Russia—whose Syrian intervention is a proud symbol of its reborn military muscle and great power status—not retaliate for another downed Russian plane or a dead Russian soldier?

Which leads to the ultimate question: could tensions between Israel and Russia lead to a clash between American and Russian troops?

In the end, somebody will have to back down. But Iran isn’t about to give up its outpost on Israel’s border, and Russia probably can’t force them to. Then there is Israel, which is grimly determined to stop Iran.

As the IDF official said, “We have proven over more than 70 years as a sovereign state that you don’t push us around.”

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: Reuters

David Axe

Chinese Submarines,

China's navy is getting strong, and they have America's aircraft carriers in their sights. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: Beijing’s ability to target carriers from below the sea depends on two related capabilities. First, China needs modern and reliable submarines. Second, these subs need some way of finding the flattops.

In 1995 and 1996, Taiwanese politicians signaled greater support for declaring their island country officially independent of China. Beijing’s response was swift, forceful … and ultimately an embarrassment to China. The Chinese fired several missiles toward small, Taiwanese-held islands.

That’s when the United States intervened in a big way, sending two entire aircraft carrier battle groups into the waters around Taiwan — and even sailing one carrier through the Taiwan Strait.

The Chinese military was powerless against this show of force. Beijing couldn’t even reliably track the American warships, and had no forces of its own capable of threatening the powerful U.S. vessels.

The Chinese backed down.

Years later, the situation has changed.

According to the California think tank RAND, if the same crises occurred today, Chinese submarines could target a U.S. flattop several times during a weeklong campaign. “China has rapidly improved its ability to reliably locate and to attack U.S. carrier strike groups at distances of up to 2,000 kilometers from its coast,” RAND warned.

Beijing’s ability to target carriers from below the sea depends on two related capabilities. First, China needs modern and reliable submarines. Second, these subs need some way of finding the flattops.

As far as its sub fleet goes, China has made great progress in the two decades since the 1996 crisis. “In 1996, China had taken delivery of only two submarines that could be described, by any reasonable definition, as modern,” RAND explained. “The remainder of its fleet consisted of legacy boats based on 1950s technology, lacking teardrop shaped hulls and armed only with torpedoes.”

By 2017, China will possess a smaller but more capable undersea fleet with 49 modern subs. “China’s recent submarine classes are armed with both sophisticated cruise missiles and torpedoes, greatly increasing the range from which they can attack,” according to the think tank. “Although most Chinese boats are diesel-powered and none is not up to U.S. standards, they could nevertheless threaten U.S. surface ships.”

Just how much Beijing’s subs could attack a single American carrier during a seven-day campaign depends on what RAND called “cueing.” In other words, the ability of Chinese satellites, drones, spy planes, land-based radars and other so-called “intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance” systems, or ISR, to detect the carrier and pass along the flattop’s location to the subs.

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“Improvements to Chinese ISR have improved the chances that Chinese submarines will receive such information,” RAND reported.

In 1996, Chinese subs had basically zero chances to take a shot at a U.S. carrier, with or without cueing. By 2010 that was no longer the case. Without cueing, Beijing’s subs were still pretty much blind, but with help from ISR the undersea vessels would have gotten two or three chances to attack a carrier with missiles or torpedoes.

RAND projected that, in 2017, Chinese subs with no cueing probably still won’t be able to attack a carrier. But with cueing in the same timeframe, the undersea warships could get three, four or even five chances to attack.

Of course, a chance to attack doesn’t guarantee a successful attack. And the U.S. Navy isn’t exactly standing still as Chinese forces improve, RAND pointed out. “The United States will look to counter this growing threat by developing ways to degrade Chinese intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and by improving its own anti-missile, anti-submarine and defensive counterair capabilities.”

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This piece was published several years ago and is being republished due to reader interest.​

Image: Reuters.

Sebastien Roblin

Security,

Air Force’s B-1 Lancer strategic bombers circle over battlefields in Syria and Afghanistan like angels of death dispensing GPS-guided bombs from on high

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Bones brought to the table their huge payload—and their ability to pickle dozens of inexpensive GPS=guided two-thousand-pound JDAM bombs precisely onto targets designated by ground forces. The B-1 thus became a form of flying artillery orbiting overhead, on-call as ground troops ferreted out enemy positions and marked them for destruction.

Huge yet surprisingly sleek and agile, the U.S. Air Force’s B-1 Lancer strategic bombers—popularly dubbed “Bones” for B-ONE—circle over battlefields in Syria and Afghanistan like angels of death dispensing GPS-guided bombs from on high. Yet the B-1 started out as an over-priced nuclear bomber that was arguably obsolete by the time it entered service. Thus, a bomber designed to dodge Soviet surface-to-air missiles and interceptors found its niche battling Taliban and ISIS insurgents.

During the 1940s and 1950s, the U.S. military sought to push its bombers to ever higher altitudes and faster speeds to protect them from flak guns and fighter planes—pushing new performance envelopes with the pressurized B-29, and later the B-47 and B-52 Stratofortress strategic jet bombers.

But by the early 1960s, the shootdown of high-flying U-2 spy planes over China and Russia by surface-to-air missiles made it clear that altitude no longer offered dependable protection. The Air Force tried developing the huge XB-70 Valkyrie bomber to sustain speeds over three times the speed of sound, but the Soviets countered with the Mach 3-capable MiG-25 Foxbat interceptor. The Pentagon gave up on the Valkyrie in 1962 and began investing more in ground and submarine-launched ballistic missiles to provide nuclear deterrence.

This didn’t sit well with the Air Force, which proposed a new low-altitude penetration doctrine in which supersonic bombers skimmed close to the ground at high speed using new-fangled Terrain Following Systems, making them very difficult to track with radar due to intervening terrain faced by ground-based radars, and the ‘ground clutter’ experienced by airborne radars scanning low-flying aircraft.

The Air Force at first adopted the supersonic F-111 Aardvark to perform this mission, but wanted a larger, longer-range workhorse. The Nixon administration authorized development of a Northrop Rockwell B-1 design which saw its first flight in 1974.

The costly new bomber featured swing wings which could sweep forward to a 15-degree angle to maximize lift during takeoff or landing, allowing the 44.5-meter long plane to operate from shorter forward airbases. To minimize drag for supersonic flight, the wings could tuck inwards to a 67.5 degree angle. At high altitude the four B-1A prototypes could achieve up to 2.2 times the speed of sound-assisted by two flexible vanes situated under the nose that help stabilize airflow.

However, by the mid-1970s the Pentagon was aware of the Soviet Union’s development of new MiG-31 Foxhound interceptors equipped with Zaslon Doppler radars that could sift out ground clutter—making low altitude penetration highly risky. Meanwhile, U.S. B-52s were receiving nuclear-tipped AGM-86 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) that could be launched from well beyond the range of Soviet air defenses.

Advised that the ALCMs were adequate and that the B-1’s concept was outdated, President Jimmy Carter canceled the expensive B-1 in 1977—believing it more sensible to invest in the top-secret B-2 stealth bomber instead. Four years later, a newly-elected Reagan, who had blasted Carter for canceling the B-1, revived the Bones with an order for one hundred aircraft.

This time, the Air Force sought a cheaper, revised B-1B model which could fly further (6,000 miles!) with heavier payloads but at a reduced high-altitude speed of Mach 1.2 (830 miles per hour) or Mach .95 at low altitude. This was because the aircraft’s four F101 afterburning turbofans nestled into the wing roots were no longer designed to swing back with the wings. There was no longer any pretense that the B-1 would outrun fighters and air defense missiles.

Instead, the B-1B’s aluminum and titanium skin surfaces were reshaped and coated with radar-absorbent materials to reduce radar cross-section to just 2.5 meter, roughly that of a small F-16 fighter. Though far from being a “stealth” plane, the B-1 would not be susceptible to detection and targeting at very long range like a B-52 would be.

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The crew of four included a pilot, copilot, weapons officer and a defensive systems officer who operated a suite including powerful radar jammers and oversized flares for decoying heat-seeking missiles. An APQ-164 passive electronically scanned array multi-mode radar designed for low-probability of intercept could snoop out the positions of enemy fighters and radars as well as scan the ground for specific targets.

The B-1B had three internal bomb bays allowing it to carry up to twenty-four B61 or 1.2-megaton B83 nuclear gravity bombs between them—each many times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Japan. Alternately, the B-1 could lug up to eighty-four Mark 82 five-hundred-pound gravity bombs, or the equivalent weight in larger bombs. A theoretical maximum bomb load of 125,000 pounds was never implemented operationally.

The first of one hundred B-1Bs built were rushed service in 1987 at the eyewatering price of $250 million each. However, the Lancer suffered a string of early mishaps, ranging from engine fires to the defensive countermeasures jamming the B-1’s own radar. These kept the bomber out of action during the 1991 Gulf War. When the Soviet Union collapsed the same year, the nuclear bomber’s raison d’etre seemed to go with it.

However, the Air Force upgraded the Bones with GPS and the ability to use JDAM precision-guided bombs, and tow ALE-50 decoys to divert hostile radar-guided missiles. Today, the B-1 can also mount up to twenty-four JSOW glide bombs or JASSM stealth cruise missiles with ranges measured in the dozens and hundreds of miles respectively. Meanwhile, the B-1’s nuclear-delivery capabilities were removed entirely in 2011 due to the New START treaty.

The B-1 remains well-liked by pilots for its unusual maneuverability and responsiveness for an aircraft of its size, as you can see in this video. In the early 2000s, Boeing even floated a concept for Mach 2-capable B-1R model using the F-119 turbofans of the F-22 Raptor and armed with air-to-air missiles.

The Bones finally saw action striking targets in Iraq in 1998, then flew out of England to hit Serbian targets during the Kosovo War—delivering one-fifth of all bombs dropped despite flying only two percent of the missions. The B-1’s towed decoys also proved effective, ‘catching’ two deadly 2K12 Kub missiles.

However, the Bones fully came into its own during the U.S. campaign to overthrow the Afghan Taliban in 2001. Afghanistan was simply too far for the Pentagon’s land-based fighters to fly without lots of aerial refueling—but B-1s based in the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia could fly over Afghan airspace and loiter overhead for hours at a time.

The Bones brought to the table their huge payload—and their ability to pickle dozens of inexpensive GPS=guided two-thousand-pound JDAM bombs precisely onto targets designated by ground forces. The B-1 thus became a form of flying artillery orbiting overhead, on-call as ground troops ferreted out enemy positions and marked them for destruction. In 2008 B-1s were outfitted with Sniper-XR targeting pods under their noses so they too could designate their own targets.

Bones went on to deliver huge bomb loads in conflicts in Iraq, Libya and Syria. For example, B-1s played an instrumental role in preventing the fall of the besieged Kurdish enclave in Kobane, Syria in 2014, dropping 660 bombs that killed an estimated thousand ISIS fighters. Four years later, Lancers were used to launch nineteen JASSM cruise missiles as part of a punitive strike against Bashar al-Assad.

As of 2017, sixty-two B-1s remain in service with the 7th and 28th Bombardment Wings based in Texas and South Dakota respectively, though aircraft are often operationally deployed to Diego Garcia and Al Udeid air base in Qatar.

Ironically, the B-1s is basically good at the same things the B-52 remains useful for: carrying lots of bombs and missiles over long distances and launching them at adversaries that can’t shoot back. The Bone is faster than the B-52, can carry heavier payloads, has more modern avionics, and is less conspicuous on radar. However, these advantages only marginally improve its survivability versus modern SAMs and fighter. Practically, the Air Force planners want to keep B-1s as far away from these threats as possibly.

The Air Force plans on retiring the B-1 bomber by 2036, while the B-52 is slated to remain active well into the 2040s and possibly beyond. While the B-1 is slightly cheaper to operate at $63,000 per flight hour, the B-1 reportedly is more difficult to maintain (seventy-four man hours of maintenance for every flight hour!) and thus suffers from lower readiness rates of 50 percent. The B-52 comes out to sixty-two hours and 80 percent in these metrics.

Therefore, the Bone may be retired after a respectable half-century of service. Until then, the huge swing-wing bombers will continue to receive upgrades and may yet again be adapted to fit the Pentagon’s evolving warfighting needs—such as potentially hunting ships with long-range missiles.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: Wikipedia.

Sebastien Roblin

Security,

What purpose do these cruise-missile-launching behemoths serve?

Here's What You Need to Remember: The conventional land-attack role will be taken up by the large fleet of Virginia-class attack submarines, which can be equipped with the Virginia Payload Module to launch up to forty Tomahawks each. While this means it will take four Virginia-class submarines to equal the firepower of a single Ohio-class, it will distribute that firepower more widely across the fleet and will likely prove adequate in most scenarios—short of World War III.

The Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) was built to destroy cities and military installations in the event of a nuclear war—or more precisely, to deter adversaries from ever starting one. However, following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy determined that it didn’t need all eighteen of its underwater horsemen of the apocalypse for the nuclear deterrence mission.

The Navy first intended to scrap the four oldest of the massive submarines, but instead opted to overhaul and convert them to launch Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles (TLAM) at a cost of $700–900 million each. These vessels were redesignated Ohio-class guided-missile submarines (SSGN) and intended to deliver conventional attacks on targets on land. The Ohio and Florida began the nuclear refueling, overhaul and armament upgrade in 2003 and were back in service by 2006, while the Michigan and Florida followed in 2008.

The Ohio-class SSGN bristles with more conventional firepower than any comparable vessel because its twenty-four missile tubes (eighty-eight-inch diameter) were originally designed to carry enormous Trident ballistic missiles. Twenty-two of them were refitted with Tomahawk launch canisters with seven missiles each, for a total of 154 Tomahawks missiles, all of which can be ripple-fired from underwater in the space of six minutes. This is likely to be a heavier cruise-missile armament than an entire surface task force.

The Tomahawks, which each cost over $1.5 million, are capable of delivering a thousand-pound warhead to land targets as far as a thousand miles away, guided via GPS. This, incidentally, means that Ohio SSGNs are carting well over $200 million in missiles when fully loaded.

The Ohio SSGN is also a multimission craft. The remaining two launch tubes have been converted into special undersea locks for deploying more than sixty Navy SEALs on special operations. The tubes can also launch underwater unmanned vehicles (UUV), SEAL delivery vehicle (SDV) midget submarines, sonar buoys and other aquatic sensors.

The nuclear-powered submarines were soon performing more conspicuous operations than their Trident-armed cousins. In 2010, Ohio, Florida and Michigan all participated in a show of force in reaction to a Chinese missile test, surfacing separately off of Diego Garcia, the Philippines and South Korea at roughly the same time. In 2011, the USS Florida launched ninety-three missiles targeted at Libyan air defenses in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn, all but three of which hit. The missiles helped clear the way for the warplanes of the anti-Qaddafi coalition to begin operations over Libyan airspace. This marked the first occasion in which an Ohio-class submarine fired in anger.

What purpose do these cruise-missile-launching behemoths serve? Why not use surface warships to launch the long-range Tomahawk, or even dispatch carrier strike planes using much cheaper precision-guided munitions? Quite simply, the stealthy SSGNs can get closer to enemy coastlines without being detected, enabling them to hit targets further inland and to deliver a massive missile strike, while exposing themselves far less than a surface ship or aerial strike package.

Deadly new long-range anti-shipping missiles, such as the Russian Kalibr cruise missile, which can be fired from land, air or sea platforms, make littoral waters perilous for large surface ships like aircraft carriers and missile cruisers. Even carrier-based aircraft would require the carrier to sail within eight hundred miles of a hostile coastline, within striking distance of a variety of carrier-killing weapons. By contrast, nuclear-powered submarines are extremely difficult to detect and track thanks to the very limited noise produced by their nuclear reactors and their ability to remain submerged for the duration of an entire long-range mission. An adversary would have difficulty detecting an Ohio SSGN before it launched its missiles—and after doing so, the submarine could dive deep and run silent to evade retaliation.

In fact, TNI contributor Ben Ho Wan Beng has already described how Ohio-class SSGNs could be used to “kick down the door” by suppressing anti-aircraft and anti-shipping missiles in a first strike, paving the way for aircraft and surface ships to exploit the resulting gap in an adversary’s defenses—a role the USS Florida played in the Libya intervention.

The Ohio SSGNs’ awesome firepower, however, will only remain in the U.S. Navy for around another decade or so, at which time the entire fleet of Ohio-class submarines will be gradually replaced with the new Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines. The conventional land-attack role will be taken up by the large fleet of Virginia-class attack submarines, which can be equipped with the Virginia Payload Module to launch up to forty Tomahawks each. While this means it will take four Virginia-class submarines to equal the firepower of a single Ohio-class, it will distribute that firepower more widely across the fleet and will likely prove adequate in most scenarios—short of World War III.

But until then, the four Ohio SSGNs will remain the most heavily armed cruise-missile submarines in the world and will provide a devastating potential tool for circumventing and countering adversaries relying on anti-access/area-denial strategies.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

This first appeared in 2017 and is being reposted due to reader interest. 

Image: Flickr.

Michael Peck

Weapons, World

A U.S. State Department report examined global military spending for 2007 to 2017.

Here's What You Need to Know: While global military spending has risen, the amount of money spent per soldier has risen even more.

The world is spending almost $3 trillion a year on arms.

That’s the estimate of the U.S. government. The State Department’s World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) report examined global military spending for 2007 to 2017.

“From 2007 through 2017, in constant 2017 U.S. dollar terms, the annual value of world military expenditures appears to have risen about 11 percent to 33 percent, from about $1.51 trillion to $2.15 trillion in 2007 to about $1.77 trillion to $2.88 trillion in 2017, and to have averaged between $1.72 trillion and $2.61 trillion for the 11-year period,” according to the State Department’s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, which compiled the report.

The huge gap between the high and low range of each number is because converting foreign military spending into U.S. dollars is a difficult process. The study used five different methods to make the conversion. Nonetheless, overall global military spending appears to have risen sharply since 2007.

On the other hand, fewer people are serving in the military, no surprise given that drones and automation are increasingly replacing human soldiers. “The number of people serving in the world’s armed forces appears to have fallen about 3 percent in absolute terms, from about 21.0 million in 2007 to about 20.4 million in 2017, peaking at about 21.3 million in 2008,” the study found. “From 2007 to 2017, the world total of armed forces personnel appears to have fallen about 13 percent in per capita terms, from about 0.32 percent to about 0.28 percent of total population. It appears to have fallen by about 13 percent as a proportion of the labor force, from about 0.69 percent to about 0.60 percent.”

Interestingly, while global military spending has risen, the amount of money spent per soldier has risen even more, again pointing to the trend of replacing people with drones, robots and highly automated platforms such as warships designed to require fewer sailors. “From 2007 through 2017, world military expenditures per armed forces member - an indicator of the capital-intensivity of the military - appear to have risen by 15 percent to 38 percent despite rising more slowly after 2009,” noted the study.

Curiously, there were two exceptions where spending per soldier did not rise: North America and East Africa.

Ironically, rich, democratic nations – which like to think of themselves as being the most peaceful – also accounted for a bulk of a global arms trade averaging $181 billion annually. “Countries in the most democratic quintile of world population appear to have accounted for about 92 percent of world arms exports and 50 percent of world arms imports,” the study found.

The United States accounted for 79 percent of the global arms trade, or an average of $143 billion per year, followed by the European Union at 10 percent, Russia at 5 percent and China at less than 2 percent

Arms exports actually had a significant effect on America’s balance of payments. “Over the period, the arms trade surplus of the United States may have offset as much as 24 percent of its total trade deficit,” the study concluded.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in January 2020.

Image: Reuters

Robert Farley

Security,

The Su-27 survived the end of the Cold War to become one of the world’s premier export fighters.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Su-27 was the last of the major fourth-generation fighters to enter service, and has proven an exceedingly successful design. Big enough and powerful enough to sustain a number of modifications and improvements, the Flanker should continue to see service (and even production) for quite some time.

To the West, most of the legendary Soviet aircraft of the Cold War came from the design bureau Mikoyan Gurevitch, which spawned such aircraft as the MiG-15 “Fagot,” MiG-21 “Fishbed,” MiG-25 “Foxbat” and MiG-29 “Fulcrum.” The single best Soviet fighter of the Cold War, however, was Sukhoi’s Su-27 “Flanker.” Intended both to defeat U.S. fighters over central Europe in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict and to patrol the airspace of the Soviet Union against U.S. bomber incursions, the Su-27 survived the end of the Cold War to become one of the world’s premier export fighters.

Origins

The Flanker emerged as part of the high part of the high-low fighter mix that both the United States and the Soviet Union adopted in the 1970s and 1980s. In the U.S. Air Force this manifested in the F-15 and F-16; in the U.S. Navy, the F-14 and F/A-18. The MiG-29 “Fulcrum” played the light role in the Soviet partnership.

(This first appeared in 2016.)

Sukhoi designed the Flanker with the capabilities of the F-15 Eagle firmly in mind, and the aircraft that emerged resembles the fast, heavily armed, long-ranged Eagle in many ways. Whereas the Eagle looks healthy and well-fed, the Flanker has a gaunt, hungry appearance. Although designed as an air superiority aircraft, the Su-27 (much like the Eagle) has proven flexible enough to adapt to interceptor and ground strike roles. Sukhoi has also developed a wide family of variants, specialized for particular missions but retaining overall multirole capabilities.

The Su-27 entered service more slowly than its fourth-generation counterparts in the United States (or the MiG-29, for that matter). A series of disastrous tests bedeviled the program’s early years, with several pilots dying in early versions of the Flanker. As it entered service in the mid-1980s, production problems slowed its transition to front-line status. And of course, the end of the Cold War curtailed the overall production run of the aircraft.

The Su-27’s capabilities are formidable. The Flanker can reach Mach 2.35 with a thrust-to-weight ratio above one (depending on fuel load). It can carry up to eight air-to-air missiles (generally of short to medium range; other variants specialize in Beyond Visual Range combat) or an array of bombs and missiles. In the hands of an experienced pilot, the Su-27 can carry out a bewildering array of maneuvers, many of which have delighted air show audiences across Russia and Europe.

The basic Su-27 frame has proven remarkably flexible. The Russian Air Force has modified most of its existing Flanker fleet with a variety of advanced avionics, improving its air-to-air capacity and also giving it an effective ground attack capability. Several Flanker variants have acquired their own designations, especially on the export side.

Export

The original version of the Flanker has enjoyed tremendous export success, and still flies in eleven air forces around the world. The bulk of aircraft fly in Russian (359) and Chinese (fifty-nine) service. In some smoldering conflicts (Russia-Ukraine, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Vietnam-China) both sides fly Su-27s. Overall, 809 Flankers have entered service, plus large production orders for several variants.

The transfer of Su-27s to China caused a surprising amount of friction between Moscow and Beijing. China purchased some Flankers off the shelf, agreed to coproduce another batch, and acquired a license for production of additional aircraft. However, Russia soon accused China of violating the terms of the agreement by installing its own avionics on the J-11 (as the Chinese designated their own Flankers), appropriating Russian intellectual property and developing a carrier variant (eventually the J-16). The dispute cooled Russian enthusiasm for arms exports to China, a situation that persists today.

Combat

For such a remarkable aircraft, the Su-27 has seen relatively little combat. It has flown combat missions in several theaters across the world, although it has yet to serve in a sustained air superiority campaign. Flankers flew in some of the wars that characterized the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and have constituted the core of Russian airpower in the Wars of Russian Reconsolidation. Indeed, Su-27s have flown on both sides of the spasmodic conflict in Ukraine. Su-27s in Russian service also currently fly in Syria. In foreign service, the Su-27 has flown in the Angolan Civil War and the Ethiopia-Eritrea War, scoring its only air-to-air victories (over Eritrean MiG-29s) in the latter.

The Su-27 was the last of the major fourth-generation fighters to enter service, and has proven an exceedingly successful design. Big enough and powerful enough to sustain a number of modifications and improvements, the Flanker should continue to see service (and even production) for quite some time. This is especially true given the uncertainty associated with the future of the PAK FA, the fifth-generation stealth fighter intended to replace both the MiG-29 and the Su-27.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: Wikipedia.

Charlie Gao

Security, Europe

Rocket artillery is one of the most destructive weapons on the modern battlefield.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Firing massive 300mm rockets, the T-300 is one of the longest ranged rocket artillery systems in the NATO arsenal, with the rockets capable of reaching out to 100 km. This is significantly longer than the 70 km that the M270 can reach with M30/M31 GMLRS rockets, although rockets in development may extend the M270’s range out to 150 km.

Rocket artillery is one of the most destructive weapons on the modern battlefield. Designed to pump out a high volume of fire within a short period, rocket artillery systems are particularly dangerous in their ability to obliterate a position before units have a chance to take cover.

This capability, while less relevant in Western counterinsurgency doctrine, has proven useful in recent conflicts in Ukraine and Syria. However, most rocket artillery systems used in those conflicts are Russian or Soviet. What does NATO have to compare?

Here are what could be considered the best rocket artillery systems NATO has to offer:

1. M270 MLRS

In the 1980s, the United States developed the M270 MLRS, the most common rocket artillery system in NATO. It is fielded by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey.

It shoots 227mm rockets, twelve of which are held in two six-rocket pods. During the Cold War, the standard rocket was the M26 cluster rocket, which held 644 dual-purpose submunitions. Nowadays, due to treaties on cluster munitions, a new rocket with a unitary high explosive warhead is being fielded.

The system is designed to be quickly reloaded via swapping the pods. The MLRS is also designed to fire the ATACMS tactical guided missile, which can be set in place of one rocket pod.

2. M142 HIMARS

The HIMARS in some ways can be considered the MLRS’ smaller cousin. Featuring more modern fire control (which is being retrofitted to the M270 in the M270A1 variant), the HIMARS only can mount one six-rocket pod to the MLRS’ two.

The system is significantly more strategically mobile compared to the M270, as it is C-130 transportable. It is also cheaper to maintain than the M270 since it is mounted on a truck chassis. However, this limits its tactical mobility.

The system has seen recent interest with NATO nations, with Poland buying twenty launchers in late 2018. Romania also bought the HIMARS in early 2018.

3. RM-70

Although designed for Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War, RM-70 launchers continue to serve in NATO arsenals in Central Europe.

Based on the proven Tatra truck chassis, RM-70 launchers can even serve as a budget alternative to the HIMARS, as Slovak companies have offered to convert RM-70s to be able to mount a NATO-standard 6-round 227mm rocket pack.

However, even with the original 122mm rockets (the same as on the Soviet BM-21 Grad), the RM-70 is a formidable launcher. Unlike the Grad, the long 8x8 truck chassis allows for the carriage of a single full 40-rocket reload in front of the launcher.

4. LAROM

In addition to the HIMARS, Romania also fields a lighter Grad-alike rocket system. The LAROM is a version of Israel’s LAR-160 rocket launcher mounted on a simple truck chassis. The ability to use Israeli 160mm rockets provides a significant increase of capability over a regular Grad launcher.

The Israeli rockets have cluster munition warheads and are mounted on pods to allow for fast reloading in the field. In contrast, a regular Grad launcher like those found on the BM-21 or RM-70 has to be loaded tube by tube by a crew. However, a podded reload requires a crane on an ammunition support vehicle.

The LAROM can use both a standard Grad array as well as Israeli pods depending on its configuration.

5. T-300 Kasirga

The Turkish T-300 Kasirga is perhaps the only NATO rocket artillery system that could truly be considered a “heavy” system like the Russian/Soviet BM-30 Smerch.

Firing massive 300mm rockets, the T-300 is one of the longest ranged rocket artillery systems in the NATO arsenal, with the rockets capable of reaching out to 100 km. This is significantly longer than the 70 km that the M270 can reach with M30/M31 GMLRS rockets, although rockets in development may extend the M270’s range out to 150 km.

The T-300 also has one of the largest warheads of an artillery rocket in NATO inventory. The M31 has a unitary warhead weight of 90 kg. This is far less than the T-300’s 150 kg warhead or the Smerch’s massive 243 kg.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. This first appeared in January 2019.

Image: Wikipedia.

Michael Peck

Iran, Middle East

The answer depends on the circumstances.

Here's What You Need to Know: The Iranian navy is a large hodgepodge of Russian, North Korean and indigenous designs, as well as old Western vessels from the 1960s and 1970s.

“A comparison of the UK and Iran’s military strength shows Britain falling behind when it comes to manpower, land and naval strength and petroleum resources,” the newspaper proclaimed after Iran seized a British tanker in the Persian Gulf, in retaliation for Britain seizing an Iranian tanker at Gibraltar.

The Daily Express article was based on GlobalFirepower.com, which features both statistics on the armed forces of 137 nations, and ranks those nations using a proprietary formula that apparently includes a nation’s population and military manpower, geographical size, financial strength, oil reserves, transportation infrastructure, and quantity of military hardware.

Britain ranks eighth on the “Global Firepower Index,” while Iran comes in not far behind in 14th place (the U.S. comes in first place, Israel 17th). Indeed, GlobalFirepower.com lists Iran as being stronger than Britain in several categories: 873,000 military personnel to Britain’s 233,000, 1,634 Iranian tanks to 331 British vehicles and 386 Iranian naval vessels to 76 British (Britain is credited with more airpower, with 811 military aircraft to 509 Iranian). Iran has more oil, but weaker finances.

All of which proves how much statistics can be misleading. Britain and Iran are not in the same league at all.

First and foremost, while Iran may or may not be developing nuclear weapons, Britain most certainly has them. And not some jury-rigged “physics package” assembled in an underground bunker, but four Vanguard-class nuclear submarines, each armed with 16 Trident thermonuclear-armed ballistic missiles. That’s enough atomic firepower to send Russia and China back to the Middle Ages, let alone Iran.

However, Britain wouldn’t use nukes against Iran for political reasons, and Iran would be committing suicide to use them against Britain or anyone else. Which leaves the more immediate prospect of a limited conflict in the Persian Gulf, most likely a reprise of the 1980s “Tanker War,” in which Iran will attack or seize oil tankers in retaliation for economic sanctions, while Britain (and the U.S., and possibly Europe) will attempt to stop them.

In which case, how many tanks Iran and Britain have doesn’t matter. Never mind that Britain’s Challenger 2 tanks are world-class vehicles that leave behind Iran’s larger but motley fleet of Russian, 1970s American and British, and indigenously manufactured tanks. But that’s not the point: Britain isn’t sending an armored division to invade Iran. And if it did, it would certainly be part of a multinational (mostly American) force.

Which leaves naval and air power as the key factors. Like its tank fleet, the Iranian navy is a large hodgepodge of Russian, North Korean and indigenous designs, as well as old Western vessels from the 1960s and 1970s. But it does have dozens of missile and torpedo boats, as well as small craft equipped with rocket launchers and machine guns that could potentially overwhelm a larger but lone warship. Britain has a more conventional navy of high-tech destroyers, frigates and even a new aircraft carrier – but at 76 ships, the Royal Navy is but a shadow of its former glory. Currently, Britain is only sending a single destroyer and a frigate as convoy escorts in the Persian Gulf.

Ditto in the air, where Iran’s museum mix of a handful of old American-made F-14 and F-4 fighters, Russian-made aircraft that fled from Iraq to Iran and were interned, and Iranian designs such as the Saeqeh, which looks remarkably like the F-5 fighters the U.S. sold to Iran in the 1970s. Britain has the advanced Eurofighter Typhoon, has now received its first F-35 stealth fighters, and can support its combat aircraft with an array of tankers, electronic warfare planes, and drones.

But here is where numerical comparisons of military strength really fail. If Iran were to invade Britain, there would be no question of which party is stronger. However, in the Persian Gulf, British forces are operating 3,000 miles from the UK. Even with access to bases belonging to Iran’s hostile Arab neighbors, the British would still be operating in Iran’s home waters, where all the tools of coastal guerrilla warfare – mines, small boat attacks – would be available to Tehran.

So is Britain or Iran stronger? It depends on the circumstances.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: Reuters

David Axe

Security,

The Russians are building submarines again. It’s important for Western experts to understand why.

Here's What You Need to Remember: With its tenfold spending advantage, the U.S. Navy aims to maintain a fleet of around 50 attack submarines, roughly the same number the Russians possess. The cash-gap underscores the importance of submarines to Russian defense planning.

It’s no secret that the Russian navy is investing heavily in new classes of submarines, even while overall Russian military spending flatlines amid a wide economic crisis. But it’s less clear exactly what the Russians intend to do with potentially dozens of modern submarines in the event of war.

Western analysts should think creatively in order to suss out the Kremlin’s undersea intentions, Norman Polmar, a leading American naval analyst, wrote in Proceedings, the professional journal of the U.S. Naval Institute.

“Submarines appear to have a high priority in Russia’s current efforts to rebuild its armed forces,” Polmar wrote in the October 2019 edition of Proceedings. “How will the submarines most likely be employed? The answer must be determined by thinking outside the box.”

Where the Russian navy is all but abandoning the production of new aircraft carriers, cruisers and other “blue-water” surface warships, it has recommitted to sustaining a large fleet of big, long-range submarines.

“Although the navy is mainly made up of Soviet-era surface ships and submarines, an extensive modernization program is underway, focusing first on the submarine force,” the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency reported in 2017. “Progress in submarine modernization is underway.

As recently as 2017, the Russian fleet operated 61 submarines. “Historically the backbone of the Russian navy, 75 percent of the 61 operational submarines are over 20 years old and are slowly being replaced,” the DIA explained.

Three new classes account for the bulk of new production. The Borei- or Dolgorukiy-class, nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine, the Yasen-class, a nuclear-powered attack submarine and an improved version of the Kilo-class diesel-electric attack submarine.

“Russia will continue production of its fourth-generation Dolgorukiy-class submarines through 2020,” the DIA reported. “There are currently three in service, with an additional eight scheduled to enter service in the coming years.”

The first of up to 10 Yasens was delivered to the navy in 2014, “but the program has encountered delays,” the DIA noted. “The flagship of the class (hull one) required 16 years to complete; hull two should soon be completed after seven years.”

The improved Kilos, by contrast, have speeded through production “without significant delays,” according to the DIA. “The initial order of six was expanded to 12 in early 2016. The first three Kilos were delivered to the Black Sea Fleet in 2014 to 2015.”

Assuming budgets remain at their current level, in the 2020s the Russian submarine fleet could include the 11 Boreis, 10 Yasens and 12 improved Kilos plus a couple dozen older submarines including early-model Kilos, the one-off experimental diesel boat Petersburg plus upgraded Akula, Oscar and Sierra attack submarines, for a grand total of probably fewer than 50 vessels.

It costs Russia around a billion dollars to build a new nuclear submarine. An American sub, by contrast, costs around $2 billion. But the Russian military budget is around $70 billion annually. The U.S. defense budget tops out at around $700 billion.

With its tenfold spending advantage, the U.S. Navy aims to maintain a fleet of around 50 attack submarines, roughly the same number the Russians possess. The cash-gap underscores the importance of submarines to Russian defense planning.

But Western analysts risk understanding exactly why the Russian subs matter. After all, they’ve erred before, Polmar explained. “In the past, Western intelligence often got it wrong with respect to Soviet submarines,” he wrote.

The massive Soviet submarine force peaked at almost 400 units during the Cold War, and throughout those 45 years the West feared those undersea craft would be employed to sever the sea lines of communication connecting the United States and Western Europe.

Thus, as intelligence sources detected the Soviet Union producing hundreds of submarines—obviously to fight the “Third Battle of the Atlantic”—the U.S. Navy and other NATO navies responded with massive investments to protect the ocean convoys that would carry troops, weapons, bombs, bullets and fuel from North America to Western Europe.

Germany in 1939 had begun World War II with just 57 U-boats and had threatened to sever the oceanic ties to Britain; the Soviet order of battle—according to U.S. intelligence—could begin a war with hundreds of undersea craft.

But the Soviets never actually planned to carry out large-scale attacks on merchant shipping, Polmar explained. Instead, Soviet doctrine called for submarines to focus on nuclear deterrence and attacks on NATO submarines and aircraft carriers.

That mission-focus became evident in the late 1970s when new intelligence sources became available. The CIA in 1978 circulated a top-secret report, “The Role of Interdiction at Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations,” which revised downward the threat Soviet subs posed to NATO shipping.

“The number of merchant ships likely to be sunk over an extended period—four months—indicates that the Soviets have only a limited capability to impair the flow of shipping across the Atlantic, even if they were to reorder their priorities and allocate large forces to interdiction,” the CIA noted.

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The Russians are building submarines again. It’s important for Western experts to understand why. But if analysts misread Soviet intentions during the Cold War, they risk misreading Russian intentions now, Polmar warned. “The men and women who collect, analyze and provide that intelligence must be more efficient than those dedicated personnel who, in the Cold War, got it wrong with respect to the Soviet navy.”

David Axe was Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels  War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article first appeared in 2016.

Image: Reuters.

Warfare History Network

World War II,

These subs were nothing to sneeze at to say the least. The I-400 series submarines were capable of traveling around the world 1.5 without refueling and could remain on patrol for four months. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: Japan's surrender precluded further bloodshed.

Lieutenant Commander Stephen L. Johnson had a problem on his hands; a very large problem. His Balao-class submarine, the Segundo, had just picked up a large radar contact on the surface about 100 miles off Honshu, one of Japan’s home islands, heading south toward Tokyo.  World War II in the Pacific had just ended, and the ensuing cease fire was in its 14th day. The official peace documents would not be signed for several more days, on September 2, 1945, aboard the battleship USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

As Johnson closed on the other vessel, he realized it was a gigantic submarine, so large in fact that it first looked like a surface ship in the darkness. The Americans had nothing that size, so he realized that it had to be a Japanese submarine.

This was the first command for the lanky 29-year-old commander. He and his crew faced the largest and perhaps the most advanced submarine in the world. The Japanese I-401 was longer than a football field and had a surface displacement of 5,233 tons, more than three times the Segundo’s displacement. More troubling though was the sub’s bristling weaponry that included a 5.5-inch gun on her aft deck, three triple-barreled 25mm antiaircraft guns, a single 25mm gun mounted on the bridge, and eight large torpedo tubes in her bow.

The large sub displayed the mandatory black surrender flag, but when the Segundo edged forward, the Japanese vessel moved rapidly into the night. The movement and the continuing display of the Rising Sun flag caused concern.  Johnson’s vessel pursued the craft that eventually slowed down as dawn approached. He brought his bow torpedo tubes to bear on the craft as the two vessels settled into a Mexican standoff.

Johnson and his crew had received permission by now to sink the reluctant Japanese vessel if necessary, but he realized he had a career-boosting and perhaps a technologically promising prize in his sights. Much depended on this untried American submarine captain and his wily opponent in the seas off Japan.

Little did Johnson know that the Japanese submarine was a part of the I-400 squadron, basically underwater aircraft carriers, and that the I-401 carried Commander Tatsunosuke Ariizumi, developer of the top-secret subs initially designed to strike the U.S. homeland in a series of surprise attacks. Ariizumi was considered the “father of the I-400 series” and a loyal follower of the emperor with years of experience in the Japanese Navy, so surrender was a disgrace he could not endure.

Johnson also had to contend with Lt. Cmdr. Nobukiyo Nambu, skipper of the I-401, who traced his combat experience back to Pearl Harbor. He now commanded the world’s largest submarine designed to carry three state-of-the-art attack planes in a specially built hanger located atop the vessel. These secret Aichi M6A1 planes were initially designed for “a second Pearl Harbor” or another surprise attack, possibly even against New York City or Washington, D.C. The I-400 series submarines were themselves full of technological surprises.  They were capable of traveling around the world one and a half times without refueling, had a top surface speed of 19 knots (or nearly 22 miles per hour), and could remain on patrol for four months, twice as long as the Segundo.

Neither Nambu nor Commander Ariizumi readily accepted the emperor’s surrender statement when it was broadcast on August 15. The subsequent communiqués from Tokyo were exceptionally confusing, especially Order 114, which confirmed that peace had been declared but that all submarines were to “execute predetermined missions and attack the enemy if discovered.”

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The I-400: Weapon For a Second Pearl Harbor: 

It was Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of Japan’s Combined Fleet and developer of the Pearl Harbor attack, who called for the construction of the I-400 series some three weeks after Pearl Harbor. The insightful Yamamoto, who was later killed when his aircraft was shot down by U.S. fighter planes, had toured the United States years before and had warned against a prolonged war with the highly industrialized United States.

However, once Japan was committed to war, he believed that submarine aircraft carriers dropping bombs “like rain” over major U.S. cities would surely cause the American people to “lose their will to fight.” A second surprise attack with even more to come would prove psychologically devastating to the Americans, Yamamoto believed, and perhaps would be the best way to get the Americans to sue for peace.

The Japanese had previous experience with plane-carrying submarines, but these were float planes used largely for reconnaissance. The float planes could be easily shot out of the sky by American fighters, and each submarine carried only one plane, hardly enough to prod the Americans to the negotiating table. Yamamoto always thought big, and he called for a submarine that could travel 40,000 nautical miles without refueling, or nearly four times the range of a Balao-class submarine like the Segundo.

In addition, the I-400 series submarines would carry 1,750 tons of fuel, food for four months at sea for its crew of 147 to 157 men, and two attack planes with a speed of 220 miles per hour and a range of some 600 miles. The hangar atop the sub would need to be at least 100 feet long to initially accommodate two aircraft and be strong enough to withstand the pressure of the deep and a possible attack from enemy planes when surfaced.

Yamamoto’s I-400-class submarines would displace some 6,560 tons submerged, about three times the displacement of the largest U.S. subs, and would be slightly more than 400 feet long, making them about the size of a small cruiser. Because one of the submarines was larger than a destroyer, it “wasn’t an exaggeration, then, to say that Yamamoto was asking for something akin to a small underwater aircraft carrier,” noted one observer.

Yamamoto called for the construction of 18 of the massive submarines carrying a total of 36 attack planes. The plan was rushed through the traditionally slow-moving Japanese naval bureaucracy by June 1942, with construction of the first five subs to begin in January 1943. The name of the special submarine class was abbreviated to Sen-toku.

The attack planes had to be designed from scratch. The need for speed, range and a decent sized bomb payload required tradeoffs. The wings had to be foldable to fit inside the tube, or hangar, atop the submarine. The design work, testing, and building of the plane was outsourced to the Aichi Aircraft Company.

To maximize range and speed, floats were removed from the planes. The crew would circle back after an attack, ditch the plane, and be picked up by the sub. Each plane had a pilot/bombardier in front and a radioman/navigator/tail gunner in the back. Initial plans called for a fixed, front-facing 7.7mm machine gun and a rear-facing 13mm Type 2 gun that was belt fed and handled 300 rounds.

The I-400 program did have its detractors in the heavily bureaucratic Imperial Japanese Navy. After the defeat at Midway in early June 1942, Japan became more focused on defending the homeland and far less on possible attacks on the U.S. mainland using the large submarines. The death of Yamamoto in mid-April 1943, just weeks after his 59th birthday, played further into the hands of conservative Japanese commanders. Cutbacks were ordered in the number of submarines to be built, although the I-400s’ striking ability was to be increased by adding a third attack bomber to the large vessels and adding a second plane to two smaller submarines, the I-13 and I-14.

Equally important, Japanese naval officials realized that with the loss of Guadalcanal, the nation’s defensive perimeter was at dire risk. New York and Washington were dropped as targets for the underwater aircraft carriers in favor of attacking the Panama Canal. A successful attack on the canal would choke the American war machine in the Pacific and buy time for the Japanese to regroup and strengthen the nation’s defensive perimeter.

“Storm From a Clear Sky”

The first test flight of the Aichi attack plane occurred on November 8, 1943. The plane, called Seiran or “storm from a clear sky,” reportedly handled fairly well as the world’s first sub-borne attack bomber. The Japanese began compiling limited available information on the heavily fortified Panama Canal. Their analysis showed that destroying the gate opening onto Gatun Lake would create a massive outpouring of water, destroying the other gates in its path while rushing toward the Caribbean Sea.

The United States had an estimated 40,000 troops defending the canal. The approaches were heavily mined, and there were major fortifications at Colon, Margarita Island, Toro Point, and Fort Sherman. The latter had 16-inch cannon with a range of some 25 miles. Antiaircraft batteries, radar stations, searchlights, nine aircraft bases, and 30 aircraft warning stations rounded out the canal’s defenses.

After weeks of planning, the Japanese came up with a strategy to attack the Gatun locks at dawn when the gates were closed and presumably the defenses were lax. The attack would occur during the dry season because it would take Gatun Lake longer to refill and would be carried out with a combination of bombs and torpedoes. Initially, it was not to be a suicide attack; the pilots would circle back to the submarines and be picked up after ditching their planes.

The planners had nearly a full year to formulate the attack for early 1945. But there were problems ahead because none of the submarines were complete and the planes were not yet in the production stage. Thanks to the virtual blockade thrown around Japan by the U.S. Navy, steel was in particularly short supply in Japan, causing officials to cut back the scheduled production of I-400 subs to five plus the two smaller I-13 and I-14 submarines.

Despite the problems, planning went ahead, revealing how strongly the Japanese believed in the plan to knock out the Panama Canal and thereby stop the increasing flow of American men and war matériel toward Japan. The loss of the Panama Canal might prompt the Allies to modify their demand for unconditional surrender.

Biological Weapons Considered For the Sen-toku Squadron

The Japanese labored on, and by the end of 1944 the I-400 and the smaller I-13 were completed and turned over to the Navy. In early January 1945, the I-401 was commissioned  and the I-14, the last of the underwater aircraft carriers, was put into service by mid-March 1945.

The Seiran airplanes were still undergoing testing in late 1944, with the manpower shortage so severe that many of the aircraft workers were 12- to 15-year-old schoolgirls. The Japanese pressed ahead despite problems with the plane’s engines, two earthquakes, and numerous American air raids that slowed production.

As an important aside, it should be noted that while preparations for the attack on the Panama Canal went forward, Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, vice-chief of the Naval General Staff, floated another idea for the use of the Sen-toku submarines. He suggested arming the Seiran planes with biological weapons to be unleashed against a populated area on the West Coast of the United States.

Dr. Shiro Ishii, Japan’s top virus expert and head of the Army’s notorious 731 unit in Manchuria, was consulted. He recommended that the planes drop plague-inflected fleas, something he had tested with success in China, on the United States with San Francisco, Los Angeles, or San Diego suggested as targets. The plan was discarded in late March by the head of the Army’s general staff who called it  “unpardonable on humanitarian grounds.”

In effect, the Japanese Army, which had led the development of biological weapons and had tested them on Chinese and American captives, nixed the idea of using the weapons late in the war on American civilians, perhaps in the belief that the war was already lost.

Training For the Raid

The relentless American onslaught had taken a toll. By early 1945, the Japanese Navy had only 20 modern submarines left, including those in the Sen-toku squadron. Problems arose as the two available I-400 subs began test launching their Sieran planes. Each submarine was required to surface and get its three planes unlimbered and aloft within 30 minutes, but actual training showed that it took some 45 minutes. Those additional 15 minutes exposed on the surface could mean the difference between life or death to the pilots and the crews. They also encountered operational problems in getting the aircraft to sputter to life in a timely fashion. Fuel for the submarines and the Sierans was also in short supply. The presence of mines made matters increasingly difficult for the Japanese commanders.

Because of an increasing sense of urgency, the Japanese further modified their plans. A torpedo attack was ruled out because the pilots had not yet acquired the requisite skills. It was decided that each of the 10 planes designated for the Panama Canal mission would carry one 1,760-pound bomb, the largest in the Navy’s arsenal and similar to the one that sank the battleship USS Arizona at Pearl Harbor.  In essence, the pilots would now also be on a suicide run because they were to crash their low-flying planes against the locks, thereby ensuring the success of the mission. The pilots quietly accepted the decision.

The departure date was set for mid-June.  With continued training, the crews of the larger subs were able to catapult the first two planes off in about four minutes each. With a bit of a struggle, the third plane could be launched in 20 minutes, bringing the total launch time to just under half an hour, which constituted nearly a lifetime when surfaced and bobbing about in heavily patrolled enemy waters.

The Seiran pilots made practice bombing runs in Nanao Bay against a full-sized replica of the Gatun gates. The pilots by now knew what was a stake because the real attack would entail flying in low and fast without floats and with live bombs firmly attached to their planes. Debugging the planes was proving difficult, with nine men killed in crashes and another lost in a nonflying mishap. Training aboard the I-14 proved particularly difficult because it was the last of the four Sen-toku subs to be commissioned and the crew had the least training time.

The Submarines at War’s End

The fall of Iwo Jima in March 1945 and the American attack on Okinawa increased the angst among the Japanese planners as the Americans closed in on the home islands. The war had leaped ahead of the planners, and the slated attack on the Panama Canal was canceled. As noted, there were discussions about possibly using the planes in a surprise attack on San Francisco or Los Angles, but those, too, were put aside in favor of a plan to attack enemy carriers at Ulithi, a large staging area near the island of Truk in the Carolines that was used by the Americans.

The two large subs were to proceed toward Ulithi independently for safety and then rendezvous near the target and launch the attack in mid-August. The I-14 and the I-13 were to reach Japanese-held Truk, get their planes into the air, and report on conditions at Ulithi to ensure that the American carriers were present. The I-13 never made it to Truk and was correctly presumed lost. The I-14 arrived at Truk on August 4, and its planes flew over Ulithi the following day.

Shortly thereafter word reached the submarines that an atomic bomb had destroyed Hiroshima, and on August 15 the Japanese seamen heard the broadcast from the emperor asking his warriors to lay down their arms. Subsequent orders from the homeland were confusing, with one commanding all submarine captains to execute their predetermined missions. On August 16, the underwater aircraft carriers received explicit orders that their planned attack on Ulithi had been canceled just hours before the I-401 was to launch its planes. The subs were ordered to Kure, and the I-401 turned course toward its fateful encounter with Lt. Cmdr. Johnson and the Segundo.

Strategic Successor to the Ballistic Submarine

The Japanese eventually surrendered the I-401 and the other two remaining underwater aircraft carriers. Commander Ariizumi, the developer of the top secret subs, took his own life aboard the I-401 and was quietly buried at sea by the crew. Before encountering the Americans, Nambu had meticusouly followed orders from Japan to raise the black flag of surrender and dispose of the vessel’s weapons, including the planes that were catapulted into the sea. Logbooks, codebooks, and the like were loaded into weighted sacks and tossed overboard. The torpedoes were jettisoned, with one causing alarm as it circled back toward the large submarine before disappearing harmlessly into the depths.

The three submarines drew considerable attention when they made it back to Tokyo Bay.  Many Americans initially believed the large hangars atop the subs had been designed to haul supplies to troops on distant islands despite the clearly observed catapults. The Americans did receive some assistance from the Japanese crews as they tried to comprehend the purpose of the extraordinary submarines, and by the end of September the Americans had taken the submarines out for cruises. However, none was taken underwater.

The submarines were then taken to Hawaii for further study. The U.S. Navy gleaned what it could from them, and then all three were deliberately sunk by early June 1946 to keep them away from the prying eyes of the inquisitive Soviets.

One of the Seirans did make it to the United States after the war and was eventually restored at an estimated cost of $1 million. It is now on display at the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum. Although the U.S. Navy was somewhat dismissive of the massive submarines, it did take a keen interest in the sound-protective coatings used on the vessels.

There is little doubt that the I-400s were the strategic predecessors to today’s ballistic submarines, especially to the Regulus missile program begun about a decade after World War II that carried nuclear warheads inside waterproof deck hangars. In short, Yamamoto’s plan lived on with “new and improved” versions that helped the United States win the Cold War.

This first appeared on the Warfare History Network site here. Phil Zimmer, who authored the piece, is a former newspaper reporter and a U.S. Army veteran. He writes on World War II topics from Jamestown, New York.

This article first appeared last year.

Image: Wikipedia.

Ethen Kim Lieser

Stimulus,

If you already did receive your stimulus check and the amount seemed too much—which could potentially occur if divorced parents both receive payments for the same dependents—the IRS says that you will likely not have to pay the money back.

It appears that the Internal Revenue Service is making great headway in providing much-needed cash to millions of financially struggling Americans.

As of Thursday, the agency has confirmed that one hundred twenty-seven million coronavirus relief checks—totaling roughly $750 billion—already have been sent out under President Joe Biden’s American Rescue Plan.

However, in the rush to get the stimulus money quickly out to those most affected by the ongoing pandemic, there are bound to be inaccuracies in the check amount—sometimes being too generous.

If you already did receive your stimulus check and the amount seemed too much—which could potentially occur if divorced parents both receive payments for the same dependents—the IRS says that you will likely not have to pay the money back.

Per the agency’s guidance, there is “no provision in the law that would require individuals who qualify for a payment based on their 2018 or 2019 tax returns, to pay back all or part of the payment, if based on the information reported on their 2020 tax returns, they no longer qualify for that amount.”

There is, however, nothing stopping you from choosing to write “void” in the endorsement section on the back of the check and then mailing it to an appropriate IRS location. If you decide on this route, just write a brief explanation stating the reason for returning the check. Then you would have to contact the agency to see if you can receive a new check with the correct amount.

As for taxpayers eligible for stimulus payments who have recently died but were still sent checks, the IRS says that spouses or relatives should return the funds to the agency.

If you have yet to receive your check, take note that fewer Americans will receive stimulus payments this time around, so make sure to confirm if you even qualify. Individuals who earn as much as $75,000 in adjusted gross income (AGI), or couples making $150,000—in addition to their children or adult dependents—qualify for the full $1,400 per individual.

Single parents with at least one dependent who earn $112,500 or less also get the full amount. Families in which some members have different citizenship and immigration classifications are eligible for a payment, if at least one person has a Social Security number. The payments, however, phase out much more quickly than in previous rounds—an individual with an income of $80,000, or a couple with $160,000, will receive nothing.

If you are indeed eligible to receive a stimulus check based on your AGI, then you should also make sure how much you and your family can expect. According to the details of the American Rescue Plan, the maximum payout all depends on how many dependents you have.

Let’s say you qualify for the maximum amount based on your AGI, and that you’re a family of two adult joint filers with one dependent. In this scenario, you would be eligible to receive a total of $4,200. With two dependents, the check would rise to $5,600, with three dependents $7,000, and so on.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Annika Seppälä

Environment, World

The power of the sun really does help heat the planet and keep the Earth warm.

When the Sun ejects solar particles into space, how does this affect the Earth and climate? Are clouds affected by these particles?

When we consider the Sun’s influence on Earth and our climate, we tend to think about solar radiation. We are acutely aware of the skin-burning dangers of ultraviolet, or UV, radiation.

But the Sun is an active star. It also continuously releases what is known as “solar wind”, made up of charged particles, largely protons and electrons, that travel at speeds of hundreds of kilometres per hour.

Some of these particles that reach Earth are guided into the polar atmosphere by our magnetic field. As a result, we can see the southern lights, aurora australis, in the southern hemisphere, and the northern equivalent, aurora borealis.

Aurora australis observed above southern New Zealand. Shutterstock/Fotos593

This visible manifestation of solar particles entering Earth’s atmosphere is a constant reminder there is more to the Sun than sunlight. But the particles have other effects as well.

Read more: Why is the sun's atmosphere so hot? Spacecraft starts to unravel our star's mysteries

Solar particles and ozone

When solar particles enter the atmosphere, their high energies ionise neutral atmospheric nitrogen and oxygen molecules, which make up 99% of the atmosphere. This “energetic particle precipitation”, named because it’s like a rain of particles from space, is a major source of ionisation in the polar atmosphere above 30km altitude — and it sets off a chain of reactions that produces chemicals that facilitate the destruction of ozone.

The impact of solar particles on atmospheric ozone was first observed in 1969. Since the early 2000s, thanks to new kinds of satellite observations, we have seen growing evidence that solar particles play an important part in influencing polar ozone. During particularly active times, when the Sun releases large amounts of particles into space, up to 60% of ozone at altitudes above 50km can be depleted. The effect can last for weeks.

Lower down in the atmosphere, below 50km, solar particles are important contributors to the year-to-year variability in polar ozone levels, often through indirect pathways. Here, solar particles again contribute to ozone loss, but a recent discovery showed they also help curb some of the depletion in the Antarctic ozone hole.

How ozone affects the climate

Most of the ozone in the atmosphere resides in a thin layer at altitudes of 20-25km — the “ozone layer”.

But ozone is everywhere in the atmosphere, from the Earth’s surface to altitudes above 100km. It is a greenhouse gas and plays a key role in heating and cooling the atmosphere, which makes it critical for climate.

In the southern hemisphere, changes in polar ozone are known to influence regional climate conditions.

Solar particles ionise nitrogen and oxygen molecules in the atmosphere, which leads to other chemical reactions that contribute to ozone destruction. Shutterstock/PunyaFamily

Its depletion above Antarctica had a cooling effect, which in turn pulled the westerly wind jet that circles the continent closer. As the Antarctic hole recovers, this wind belt can meander further north and affect rainfall patterns, sea-surface temperatures and ocean currents. The Southern Annular Mode describes this north-south movement of the wind belt that circles the southern polar region.

Ozone is important for future climate predictions, not only in the thin ozone layer, but throughout the atmosphere. It is crucial we understand the factors that influence ozone variability, be it man-made or natural like the Sun.

The Sun’s direct influence

The link between solar particles and ozone is reasonably well established, but what about any direct effects solar particles may have on the climate?

We have observational evidence that solar activity influences regional climate variability at both poles. Climate models also suggest such polar effects link to larger climate patterns (such as the Northern and Southern Annular Modes) and influence conditions in mid-latitudes.

The details are not yet well understood, but for the first time the influence of solar particles on the climate system will be included in climate simulations used for the upcoming Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment.

Read more: Solar weather has real, material effects on Earth

Through solar radiation and particles, the Sun provides a key energy input to our climate system. While these do vary with the Sun’s 11-year cycle of magnetic activity, they can not explain the recent rapid increase in global temperatures due to climate change.

We know rising levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are pushing up Earth’s surface temperature (the physics have been known since the 1800s). We also know human activities have greatly increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Together these two factors explain the observed rise in global temperatures.

What about clouds?

Clouds are much lower in the atmosphere than where most solar particles penetrate. Particles know as galactic cosmic rays (coming from the centre of our galaxy rather than the Sun) may be linked to cloud formation.

It has been suggested cosmic rays could influence the formation of condensation nuclei, which act as “seeds” for clouds. But recent research at the CERN nuclear research facility suggests the effects are insignificant.

This doesn’t rule out some other mechanisms for cosmic rays to affect cloud formation, but thus far there is little supporting evidence.

Annika Seppälä, Senior Lecturer in Geophysics, University of Otago

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Image: Reuters.

Stephen Silver

MQ-9, Americas

Marine Lt. Gen. Eric Smith, commanding general of Marine Corps Combat Development Command, had testified before Congress last week that the Marines were looking to procure sixteen more of the MQ-9A drones.

The Marine Corps has plans to deliver new drones to Hawaii, in order to deal with threats from China. That’s according to a new "Unmanned Campaign Framework” released this week by the Marines and Navy, as cited by United Press International.

The Marines will place eighteen MQ-9A Reaper unmanned aerial drones in the Pacific, including eight of them in Hawaii, the framework said. Those drones have wingspans of sixty-six feet and can weigh as much as 10,500 pounds, according to United Press International. 

Marine Lt. Gen. Eric Smith, commanding general of Marine Corps Combat Development Command, had testified before Congress last week that the Marines were looking to procure sixteen more of the MQ-9A drones, of which there were previously only two, according to United Press International. 

The MQ-9A Reaper drones can now carry eight Hellfire missiles, compared with the previous four. 

“Previous to this software, the MQ-9 was limited to four AGM-114s across two stations. The new software allows flexibility to load the Hellfire on stations that previously were reserved for 500-pound class bombs or fuel tanks,” an Air Force report said last fall. 

That forty-page Unmanned Campaign Framework was released March 15, meant to lay out the strategy for how to best use drones and other unmanned weapons. 

"The Department of the Navy is moving with purpose to innovate and adapt new technology to build a more lethal and distributed naval force for the future,” Thomas W. Harker, the acting secretary of the Navy, wrote in his introduction to the report 

“To compete and win in an era of great power competition, the Department is committed to investing in advanced autonomy, robust networks, and unmanned systems to create true integrated human-machine teaming that is ubiquitous across the fleet . . . to ensure success, the Navy and Marine Corps are tightly coupling our requirements, resources, and acquisition policies to develop, build, integrate and deploy effective unmanned systems faster.”

The introduction to the report discusses the different advantages of autonomous systems for warfighting, including the ability to take on additional risk, to “increase lethality, capacity, survivability, operational tempo, deterrence, and operational readiness, and to adapt to changes. 

The Navy report also sets up a “Human Dependence” matrix, from “Human Operated” to “Remote Operated” to “Human Supervised” to “Human-Machine Teaming” to “Near-Independent Autonomy.” 

In addition, the report includes a section on “legal, policy, and ethical considerations.” 

“The overarching task for the DON is to develop, procure, field, and employ increasingly sophisticated unmanned systems that maximize warfighting effectiveness through their incorporation of autonomy and artificial intelligence, while remaining consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict, DOD policy, and AI ethical principles.” 

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for the National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Michael Peck

U.S. Army, Americas

Here are some areas where American weapons shine – or don't.

Here's What You Need to Know: No one seems to have a huge advantage.

How good are U.S. Army weapons compared to their overseas counterparts? Quite good in many areas, but foreign weapons have some capabilities that American weapons don't, according to a new study.

The study, prepared by think-tank RAND Corp. on behalf of the U.S. Army, examined major ground combat systems. Note that it is mostly based on open-source data rather than classified information. Nonetheless, here are some areas where American weapons shined – or didn't:

Tanks and Infantry Fighting Vehicles:

"The U.S. Army’s armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) compare well with their foreign counterparts, particularly the M1A2's Abrams main battle tank, which is widely regarded as the world’s best tank in terms of protection and anti-armor firepower," RAND concludes. Russians, Israelis, and others may disagree with that assessment, but after comparing the Abrams with Russia's T-90, Germany's Leopard and Israel's Merkava, the study praised the Abrams' depleted-uranium armor and antitank ammunition. What the Abrams does lack is a high-explosive fragmentation round, which is found in foreign tanks (though the U.S. Marine Corps uses German-made HE shells).

Foreign tanks also have various capabilities that American vehicles don't, such as active protection systems on Israeli and Russian models, and appliqué top armor on the Leopard.

The U.S. Army's Bradley infantry fighting vehicle also rates favorably against the competition, though the Bradley fitted with the Bradley Urban Survival Kit III (BUSK III) armor kit will have much lower power-to-weight then vehicles like the German Puma, Russian BMP-3, and the Israeli Namer. The Bradley is well-armed with a 25-millimeter cannon and TOW missiles, but the Puma has antitank missile jammers, while the Namer has heavy armor (because it's an actual tank converted to a personnel carrier). As for the BMP-3, "protection is secondary to mobility and cost-effectiveness, which provides insight into Russia’s strategic decisions regarding what qualities are more important for an IFV—protecting the crew is less important compared with vehicle mobility and firepower."

RAND suggests a few options for the Bradley and Stryker, including a bigger gun like the 30-millimeter cannon on the British Warrior, as well as better sensors. "There is no denying that when compared with its foreign counterparts, the main version of Stryker (the infantry carrier) is very lightly armed," the study noted. With the U.S. Army now examining air-droppable armor,  the study also noted that Russia has air-droppable BMD vehicles, while China is developing such vehicles.

Artillery:

The U.S. Paladin self-propelled howitzer comes off second-best to the German PzH 2000, because the German howitzer is much more automated. "A quick comparison of the ability of a platoon of four Paladins and four PzH 2000s to deliver fires over a three-minute period shows the limitation of the U.S. system compared with the leader among the world’s self-propelled howitzers," the study says. "While a Paladin platoon could deliver 48 shells in an intense three-minute fire mission, the German platoon could deliver 120 shells—and could do so at distances up to 50 percent greater than Paladin’s maximum range."

In terms of rocket artillery, the American GMLRS is capable, but may soon outranged by Russian and Chinese weapons. "The entrance of the Chinese and their greater emphasis on much heavier, longer-range rockets that begin to bridge the gap between rocket artillery and short-range ballistic missiles could have a significant effect over time in extending the trend toward longer-range strike systems."

Helicopters:

Again, U.S. helicopters are rated as quite capable, with significant advantages in their capacity for manned-unmanned teaming with drones, as well as their third-generation forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensors. The Eurocopter Tiger carries fewer Hellfire missiles and has less advanced FLIR sensors, the Russian Mi-28 is currently flying without radar and defensive countermeasures, and the Chinese Z-10 still has teething problems. However, non-U.S. helicopters do have the advantage of being cheaper.

What's most interesting about the RAND study is that there doesn't seem to be a huge difference between the capabilities of U.S. Army equipment, and those of its allies and potential enemies. America excels in many areas, other nations excel in a few, but no one really seems to have a huge advantage.

Michael Peck, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a defense and historical writer based in Oregon. His work has appeared in Foreign Policy, WarIsBoring and many other fine publications. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in 2015.

Image: U.S. Army photo by Spc. Angel Ruszkiewicz

Michael Peck

J-15, Asia

With a barely disguised touch of schadenfreude, Sputnik News delved into the woes of the J-15.

Here's What You Need to Know: The J-15 is an unlicensed copy of Russia's Su-33 carrier jet, which is a 1980s derivative of the Su-27K land-based fighter.

Remember that Russian carrier-based jet that China copied without permission? Those airplanes are crashing, and Russia doesn't seem too broken up about it.

Though Russia and China are now friends, even holding joint exercises, Russia's Sputnik News recently trotted out an article titled "Chinese Navy Short on Carrier-Based Fighters, Only Has Problem-Ridden J-15."

The J-15 is an unlicensed copy of Russia's Su-33 carrier jet, which is a 1980s derivative of the Su-27K land-based fighter. China had acquired a T-10K-3, an Su-33 prototype, from Ukraine and then reverse-engineered it.

With a barely disguised touch of schadenfreude, Sputnik News delved into the woes of the J-15. "Love for the fourth-generation J-15 jet is seldom shown in Chinese circles," said the Russian news site. "The Asia Times noted that Chinese media has disparaged the plane in numerous ways, including referring to it as a 'flopping fish' for its inability to operate effectively from the Chinese carriers, which launch fixed-wing aircraft under their own power from an inclined ramp on the bow of the ship. The J-15's engines and heavy weight severely limit its ability to operate effectively: at 17.5 tons empty weight, it tops the scales for carrier-based fighters. The US Navy's F-18 workhorse, by comparison, is only 14.5 tons."

Many shoppers on eBay and Amazon can attest to what happens when you buy "unlicensed" products, though one can ask how many of these problems began with the original Russian design. In any event, so many J-15s have crashed and burned that China is developing a new carrier jet, the J-31.

After dissecting the J-15's flaws, Sputnik News then trotted out Russian military expert Vasily Kashin, who proceeded to explain why you shouldn't copy other nation's aircraft without permission.

"Years ago the Chinese decided to save some money and, instead of buying several Su-33s from Russia for their subsequent license production in China, they opted for a Su-33 prototype in Ukraine," Kashin said.

"The development of the J-15 took more time and more money than expected, and the first planes proved less than reliable," said Kashin. "By spending some more time and money, the Chinese will apparently solve the problems they now have and will get a fairly reliable and powerful carrier-based fighter."

At this point, it is worth noting that the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia also had a habit of "acquiring" Western technology without the consent of the owners, for everything from the atomic bomb, to the Space Shuttle and video games. It's actually a dubious accomplishment, an admission that a nation lacks the capacity to really innovate its own technology.

Considering that China has the same habit, there is a poetic justice here.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in September 2018.

Image: Reuters

Michael Peck

Il-22PP, Eurasia

Turning off a satellite could be construed as an act of war.

Here's What You Need to Know: Electronic-warfare aircraft have become a fixture of aerial warfare since World War II.

Russia says it is developing a new aircraft that can disable the electronics on U.S. satellites.

Could this new development trigger a nuclear war?

The electronic warfare aircraft “will be capable of turning off the electronics installed on military satellites,” according to Russia’s Sputnik News. The conceptual work has been completed and design and development will begin soon.

“The work is currently underway to develop an aircraft equipped with jamming systems that will replace Il-22PP Porubshchik [electronic warfare aircraft], which are currently being delivered to the Russian Aerospace Forces,” an unnamed Russian defense industry source told Sputnik News. “This machine will receive a fundamentally new on-board equipment, which will allow to conduct electronic suppression of any targets—ground, air, sea—and disable enemy satellites that provide navigation and radio communication on the ground.”

Russia currently operates three electronic warfare aircraft based on the Ilyushin Il-22, according to Sputnik News. The Il-22PP versions are variants of the Il-22 (NATO code name Coot B) airborne command post, which is itself derived from the Il-18 airliner, which first flew in the 1950s.

The Il-22PP was first flown publicly in 2016. The aircraft, described as an “escort jammer” to support other aircraft, was intended to disrupt radars, surface-to-air and cruise-missile guidance systems, and tactical data networks such as Link 16.

“The problem of Porubshchik 1 is in the aircraft platform itself, as Russia has about 10 Il-22 planes and this machine cannot be reproduced,” the defense industry source told Sputnik News.

“The new aircraft will be named Porubshchik 2, but most likely, this machine will join the Aerospace Forces under a different name,” the source added. “There definitely will be a new air-frame. There is a possibility of developing such an aircraft on the basis of Tu-214 or Il-76 plane.”

None of this is particularly noteworthy. Electronic-warfare aircraft, such as the EA-18G, have become a fixture of aerial warfare since World War II. Jamming radars, missile-guidance systems and communications networks has become par for the course. For that matter, the Pentagon worries about Russian and Chinese capabilities to jam or spoof GPS links that are key to accurate navigation and targeting.

But disabling the electronics on satellites? This would seem to be a different challenge, and how Russia plans to tackle it is unclear. For example, what does it mean to “turn off” a military satellite? Convince the satellite to shut down its systems, perhaps by spoofing a command signal from ground control? Or does it mean hitting the satellite with some kind of powerful beam that fries its electronics or disrupt its systems? And how powerful a system could be mounted on what is essentially a medium-sized airliner?

However, the most interesting question isn’t about aircraft or satellites. It’s about who is willing to risk nuclear war. The Trump administration’s draft Nuclear Posture Review, released in January, suggests that America could respond with nuclear weapons to a kinetic or cyberattack on U.S. satellites. “The President will have an expanding range of limited and graduated options to credibly deter Russian nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attacks, which could now include attacks against U.S. NC3 [nuclear command, control and communications], in space and cyber space,” states the NPR.

If Russia can in fact disable the electronics on American satellites, and the NPR does reflect U.S. policy, then turning off a satellite could be construed as an act of war sufficient to justify a nuclear response. Whether a U.S. president would in fact risk thermonuclear war over a disabled satellite is another matter. Nonetheless, Russia’s new toy could have dangerous implications.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article appeared earlier in 2020.

Image: Reuters

Michael Peck

Tanks, Eurasia

“Tank trousers” and “tank carousels” are among the new tactics that Russian tank crews are using, according to Russian media.

Here's What You Need to Know: What’s interesting here isn’t the tactics themselves, but rather that Russia is trumpeting them as innovative.

“Tank trousers” and “tank carousels” are among the new tactics that Russian tank crews are using, according to Russian media.

In an era of localized conflicts without clear front lines, jihad-mobiles equipped with anti-tank guns and IEDs, the idea of large tank armies facing off along vast fronts has become a thing of the past,” writes Sputnik News, which described the visit of a  journalist from the Rossiya Segodnya news agency to witness exercises of T-72 tanks of the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army.

“It allows us to fire over an unlimited time period,” said Captain Roman Schegolev, a Russian tank company commander. “There can be three, six, nine or more machines. They move uninterrupted in a circular motion, one pummeling the enemy, the other moving to the rear and reloading, the third preparing to enter firing position, and so on. Non-stop shooting. Just make sure to feed the shells.”

Russian tanks will blanket the enemy by firing eight to ten rounds a minute, which they believe will eventually force to return fire and reveal their position. “Imagine tanks shooting for ten, twenty, thirty minutes at a time without a break,” Schegolev said. “On the other side they will break down and open return fire, revealing their armament. Then our disguised sniper tanks with specially trained crews step into action. They quickly and efficiently strike the identified targets.”

Schegolev added the carousel tactic is possible because the T-72 has an autoloader, which gives it an advantage over a manually-loaded M-1 Abrams.

“The tank carousel has been a particularly effective tactic during the Syrian Army’s operations in the country’s geographic conditions of earthen and sand parapets,” according to Sputnik News.

Here, tanks can move along the parapet and, when they reach an opening, shoot, quickly concealing themselves back behind the embankment. So long as they remain in constant motion, it becomes almost impossible to aim at or hit them. Furthermore, to deceive the enemy, the commander can choose which opening to fire from at random, giving the impression there are more tanks deployed than in reality. Openings can be created using engineering equipment, and if necessary, by the crew itself.”

Another Russian tactic is called “tank trousers.” This involves “tanks alternating fire between two trenches, without staying in one position for more than a few seconds,” according to Sputnik News. “The tank enters the trench, fires, kicks into reverse and moves to the next. Enemy anti-tank weapons don’t have time to react.”

Sputnik News also described other tactics, such as using tanks for shoot-and-scoot indirect fire: the vehicles fire their cannon like howitzers at targets they can’t see, and then quickly move to a new firing position before enemy fire can target their position. “Russian tankmen have honed the skill of their plunging fire considerably; at a distance of 8 kilometers, high explosive shells hit within 15 to 20 meters of their target,” Sputnik News said.

This isn’t the first time that Russia has claimed to devised innovative armor tactics. Earlier this year, Sputnik News ran a piece on how Russian tanks will pretend to be artillery pieces. The idea is to lure the enemy artillery into shelling them, but leave the area before the shells arrive, while Russian artillery blasts the enemy guns that have foolishly revealed their position.

What’s interesting here isn’t the tactics themselves, but rather that Russia is trumpeting them as innovative. Rotating tanks in and out of the firing line, rapid fire shooting and switching between alternate firing positions have been standard practice since World War II (the Russians would have learned this the hard way at the hands of the Germans). These are tactics that American, British, Israeli and other tank crews would be familiar with.

Tanks may differ between nations. But often tactics are the same.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in July 2018.

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

Security,

"One B-2 can deliver the punch of an entire aircraft carrier air wing at several orders of magnitude less in operating cost and personnel."

Here's What You Need To Remember: The B-2 Bomber is one of the most well-designed and cost-effective aircraft ever built for military use.

When B-2 stealth bombers attacked Serbia on the opening night of Operation Allied Force in 1999, destroyed Iraqi air defenses during 2003’s “Shock and Awe” and eliminated the Libyan fighter force in 2011 -- the attacks were all guided by highly-specialized pilots trained in stealth attack tactics.

Given the dangers of these kinds of missions, such as flying into heavy enemy ground fire from air defenses, confronting the prospect of air attacks and preparing for electronic warfare over hostile territory, B-2 pilots need to be ready. For this reason, the Air Force is working to ensure that pilots are prepared to fully leverage upgraded digital targeting technology.

“We prepare and train every single day in case we get called up tomorrow,” Lt. Col. Nicola Polidor, Commander of Detachment 5 of the 29th Training Systems Squadron, told Warrior in an interview.

While performing missions, B-2 pilots need to maintain the correct flight path, align with specific targeting intelligence, and load and prepare weapons, all while manning a digital cockpit to control a wide range of additional variables at one time. Polidor, who trains future B-2 pilots at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, says Air Force pilot trainees have adjusted well to learning a seemingly overwhelming amount of new information.

“The biggest challenge for pilots is being able to manage flying for long periods of time at the same time as managing a communications suite and robust weapons package,” Polidor said.

Polidor is only the 10th female B-2 pilot in history.

Training is broken down into an academic phase and a flight phase, with classroom training as the first step. Trainees, Polidor explained, typically spend about two months working on a simulator, before taking their first flight.

“The instructor is in one seat, teaching the trainee how to operate in flight in the other seat. You can fly from either seat and control all facets of the aircraft. Both seats have a glass screen cockpit in front of them and both seats have the stick in front of them,” Polidor said.

Control of the aircraft is carefully managed by both crew members. To change pilot operations from one to another, the crew follows specific protocol. The pilot receiving control says “I have the aircraft,” and the pilot passing over control says “roger.you have the aircraft.”

“At anytime it is understood who is at the controls. The instructor pilot will have hands on the controls, without moving anything….in case the trainee has a problem,” Polidor said.

Part of the glass cockpit in front of the pilot is one of eight displays called the Digital Entry Panel which enables pilots to check hydraulics, electronics, flight controls, environmental conditions, weapons suite.

“It is like a flying computer. You enter text into the computer. We can input the pressure, airspeed or target for a weapon from that panel and send it,” Polidor said. “We have autopilot just like a commercial airliner. We are able to maintain altitude without our having to input into the computer system."​

Despite flying more than 40-hour missions, pilots have no bed and no refrigerator, just two seats in a small cockpit and a small area behind them about the same width as the seat. Pilot’s food, Polidor said, needs to be non-perishable items.

“Sometimes we can bring a little blow-up mattress, put in on the floor and take a nap,” she said. “It’s about big enough for someone who is 5 ft ‘8 but not big enough for taller people.

Most of all, B-2 pilots focus on “being ready,” as they are often the first to strike in high-intensity conflict. An interesting study from the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, called “Building the Future Bomber Force America Needs; The Bomber Re-Vector,” points to a recent B-2 attack on ISIS terrorists in Libya.

“On January 19, 2017 two B-2s flying from Whiteman AFB, Missouri released dozens of precision munitions on an Islamic State training camp in Libya. This 33-hour mission again showcased the responsiveness, range, and flexibility of the bomber force,” the study, written by Lt. Gen. David Deptula (Ret.) and Douglas Birkey, states.

Deptula, who was involved in planning and preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom, talked to Warrior about the warzone importance of the B-2.

“The B-2 is one of the most game-changing aircraft ever built…and one of the most cost-effective. One B-2 can deliver the punch of an entire aircraft carrier air wing at several orders of magnitude less in operating cost and personnel,” Deptula said.

Kris Osborn is a Non-Resident Fellow at The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army - Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.