The National Interest

Peter Suciu

Firearms, Americas

This kind of weapon and bullet are among the best and are also cultural icons.

Key point: Good weapons for self-defense are important and so are bullets with enough stopping power. Here is what the .44 Magun can do.

Few firearms are as famous as the Smith & Wesson Model 29, chambered in .44 Magnum—which the fictional Dirty Harry Callahan, played perfectly by Clint Eastwood, described as being the “most powerful handgun in the world.” In fairness, it wasn’t really the oversized hand cannon that Harry was holding but the cartridge.

“Introduced in 1950, the .44 Magnum had both the energy and speed gun owners wanted. It delivered 767-foot pounds of energy against targets, and at 1,200 feet per second achieved supersonic speed. The result was an excellent round for hunting sidearm, capable of defending a hunter from a charging boar, bear” or some other type of dangerous animal, according to Kyle Mizokami.

This article first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

What the Model 29 was able to do is to truly harness that power. Weighing in at nearly three pounds loaded—double a modern Glock 9-millimeter pistol—the Model 29 needed that weight to absorb the hefty recoil. While perhaps a police detective might not mind having the solid chunk of metal holstered all day this probably isn’t something CCW holders would ever consider for everyday carry.  

However, the .44 Magnum has remained a popular choice for sport shooters, which explains why the Model 629—a stainless steel version of the iconic Model 29—has been one of the top-selling revolvers according to the National Shooting Sport Foundation for 2020.

Moreover, this version of the Smith & Wesson classic is actually less powerful than the company’s Model 500, which is chambered for the even heftier .500 Magnum. This suggests that a nearly fifty-year-old movie has remained the best salesman for the Model 29/629. Branding is everything, and the .44 Magnum is as powerful a “brand” as it is a caliber.

It is also easy to see why the Model 629, which was first introduced in 1979, has remained such a popular choice for handgun buyers. Its stainless steel construction means it is easy to clean and more resistant to rust than carbon steel, and, unlike blued revolvers, this one will certainly be noticed.  

As a double-action revolver, the single-action trigger is light and crisp for precise shooting, while the double-action pull can cycle the cylinder smoothly for rapid-fire. The large, aggressively checkered exposed hammer will provide a solid non-slip surface that allows shooters to cock the hammer under inclement conditions.  

The Model 629’s red-ramp front sight is pinned into an integral sight ramp, and the rear sight has a white outline and is adjustable for windage and elevation. The synthetic rubber grip provides a sure hold in any weather and helps to absorb recoil. This is a handgun that is capable of taking large game while also being there to make a huge statement as a home defense weapon.  

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Caleb Larson

Nuclear Energy, World

The idea has been tried before.

Here's What You Need to Know: Aircraft powered by nuclear reactors could, in theory, remain in the sky for weeks or possibly months.

The 1950s and 1960s were the United States’ and Soviet Union’s nuclear heyday. Unlocking the power of the atom was supposed to usher in a new era in human achievement. In many ways, it did—harnessing nuclear power offered nearly unlimited energy to countries in the exclusive nuclear club.

But could the nuclear age transform aviation as well? The United States and USSR certainly thought so. Meet the Tu-95LAL and the Convair NB-36H— both of which carried onboard nuclear reactors.

Unlimited Range, Limited Exposure

In the early days of the Cold War before ICBMs and nuclear-powered submarines, American and Soviet nuclear preparedness was extremely high. Both countries had nuclear-armed bombers in the sky around the clock, waiting to deliver their payloads on Moscow and Washington. Keeping bombers constantly in-air required lots of support infrastructure and forward planning—and lots of refueling, which limited bomber’s range and endurance.

Aircraft powered by nuclear reactors could, in theory, remain in the sky for weeks or possibly months without needing to refuel. Their only limitations would be food, water, and pilot endurance. The idea was seemingly straightforward: use existing aircraft designs and modify them to be powered not by conventional means, but by nuclear power.

American and Soviet engineers faced several complex design problems. First, how exactly would nuclear propulsion work? Surprisingly similar to any other kind of aircraft. Of crucial importance would be the massive amount of thermal energy a nuclear reactor creates.

First, a simplified explanation of jet engines: during normal flight, air enters a jet engine, where it is compressed, injected with fuel, and ignited. This creates a controlled explosion that is forced rearward, creating thrust and pushing the aircraft forward.

A nuclear-powered airplane would operate in much the same way—air is taken in and compressed, and pushed out the back of the engine, creating thrust and pushing the aircraft forward. However, after entering the engine, compressed air would act as a reactor coolant, flowing around either the reactor itself, or a heating element from the reactor. This super-hot and compressed air would then squirt out the back of the engine, creating thrust and pushing the aircraft forward. Importantly, air would not flow through the reactor core itself, as this would contaminate the exhaust with radiation that would be ejected into the air.

The Workhorses

The United States and USSR both needed huge aircraft that could transport prodigious payloads, capable of housing heavy reactors within their bomb bays.

In 1961, Soviet aircraft designers decided on their platform of choice, a modified Tupolev Tu-95. The Tu-95’s first flight was ten years previous, in 1951. The strategic nuclear bomber is enormous and continues to fly today, roughly analogous to the United States’ venerable B-52 strategic bomber.

The Tu-95 has extreme endurance and can carry a large bomb load, perfect for hauling a nuclear reactor. It has several design features not often seen on other aircraft. Not only is it propeller-driven, but the four engines each have a set of contra-rotating propellers.

In the United States, nuclear-powered aviation testing began earlier in 1955. Their test platform was a modified Convair B-36. The B-36 was truly a beast—the B-36 had the longest wingspan of any operational military aircraft ever built.

The B-36 sported a whopping six engines, arranged in a pusher configuration with the propellers located behind the wings. The hollow wing roots were over seven feet thick to provide additional space for fuel for transcontinental flight. Some of the later B-36D models were even fitted with two sets of side-by-side jet engines for short bursts of higher performance, which brought the engine count to ten.

No Risk, No Fun

Design challenges were prodigious, but not insurmountable. The biggest design consideration was Acute Radiation Syndrome—radiation poisoning that the crew would need protection from.

The Americans installed a four-ton lead disk in the middle of the B-36 fuselage to reduce the crew’s radiation exposure. The 5-man flight crew were stationed in the plane’s cockpit, which was encased in lead. The cockpit windows were switched out for foot-thick lead glass as an extra precaution. The modified Tu-95 also had similar shielding installed.

During their lifespans, both the American and Soviet experiments left the drawing board, but were rather unimpressive in the air. Besides the success of flying with a nuclear reactor onboard, the biggest concern was for the safety of the pilots and crew. Therefore most flights were thankfully reactor-off journeys.

For what they were, both programs enjoyed a certain degree of success. Both had installed a functional nuclear reactor into a large bomber, and conducted test flights. The parent platforms were also rather successful. The Tupolev Tu-95 remains in service with Russia to this day. The American B-36 had a shorter run and was replaced by the iconic B-52, also still in service.

Modernity Knocking

Jet engines are part of what did in the nuclear-powered bombers. Early but mature jet fighter designs left drawing boards and entered serial production at roughly the same time as the bomber prototypes. They were much faster than turboprop bombers, and if they crashed or were shot down, there would be no risk of nuclear contamination.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles were also played an outsized role. Why build and maintain a massive aircraft, train pilots, and then risk both to deliver payload when a missile would do the same job faster with no risk to life?

Nuclear-powered submarines that could carry ICBMs also doomed the continued development of nuclear-powered aircraft. They were thought to be safer too, although there have been notable accidents.

Still, the test programs were not totally unproductive. Some of the nuclear data that the B-36 program gathered was used in developing the reactors that power NASA’s deep-space satellites.

Nuclear 2.0

In April, an accident in Russia’s Arkhangelsk region released a detectable level of airborne nuclear material.

Several Russian nuclear monitoring stations that report to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization’s network then went silent and stopped transmitting nuclear detection data. Speculation says that Russia is experimenting again with nuclear propulsion, this time for cruise missiles.

Is nuclear propulsion making a comeback? Hopefully not. 

Caleb Larson holds a Master of Public Policy degree from the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy. He lives in Berlin and writes on U.S. and Russian foreign and defense policy, German politics, and culture.

This article first appeared in September 2019.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Warfare History Network

World War II History,

Capturing the Imperial Japanese island was brutal work, but it created an airfield for damanged Allied bombers to safely land.

Key point: The cost and benefits of any campaign or battle are important to weigh. Here is one factor that is often forgotten when people think about the Battle of Iwo Jima.

On February 19, 1945, thousands of American Marines hit the beaches on the Volcano Islands in the Pacific, starting what we call today the Battle of Iwo Jima. Taking the small island, encompassing only about eight square miles, required the commitment of 70,000 American fighting men and 26,000 casualties, over 6,800 of them killed.

The island itself is situated only 650 nautical miles south of the Japanese capital of Tokyo, and the defenders of this steaming, sulfurous piece of land shaped like a pork chop fought to the death. Nearly 19,000 Japanese troops were killed in action, and only 216 were taken prisoner.

This article appeared earlier and is being republished due to reader interest.

The Focus of the Pacific Theater

This otherwise obscure piece of real estate would ordinarily attract no attention at all. However, by early 1945 Iwo Jima was the focus of the costly war in the Pacific, now in its fourth bloody year. Iwo Jima’s proximity to Japan made it an ideal staging area for American forces that were inching closer to the home islands, anticipating a massive amphibious invasion that would ultimately thwart the territorial ambitions of Imperial Japan.

The Japanese had also constructed three airfields on Iwo Jima, and enemy planes flying from these locations posed a threat to American naval units operating ever closer to Japan proper. The U.S. Navy’s top commanders were already well aware of the hazards posed by the fanatical kamikaze, suicide pilots bent on inflicting damage on American ships and sacrificing their own lives in the process. Once these airfields were captured, the kamikaze menace, at least insofar as it emanated from Iwo Jima, would be eliminated.

Rescuing 2,400 B-29s

Another prime mover in the decision to commit American blood and treasure in the capture of Iwo Jima involved U.S. air power. Long-range Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers were already flying from bases in the Mariana Islands and regularly pounded military targets and cities on the Japanese home islands. To accomplish their strategic bombing missions, these massive aircraft flew through a gauntlet of Japanese fighter planes and antiaircraft fire. Many of them were crippled in the attacks, and a significant number were forced to ditch in the broad expanse of the South Pacific, too damaged to complete the return flight to their bases in the Marianas.

The trained crews of the B-29s were a valuable commodity, and those B-29s that were damaged might be repaired and returned to service. In order to save lives, though, lives had to be lost. It fell to the brave men of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, their attached Navy medical personnel, and the sailors manning the fleet off the coast of Iwo Jima to accomplish the task of wresting the island from the Japanese. They paid a terrible price, and in their heroic sacrifice allowed more than 2,400 B-29s, damaged, low on fuel, and carrying wounded crewmen, to land on Iwo Jima.

Uncommon Valor a Common Virtue

On March 4, 1945, even before the island was declared secure, the B-29 Dinah Might reported that it was critically low on fuel and requested an emergency landing. It is estimated that by the end of World War II more than 27,000 American airmen were saved from an uncertain fate when their planes safely landed on Iwo Jima. A decades long debate has wrestled with the question as to whether the Battle of Iwo Jima was worth the cost. Some American families experienced a devastating loss, while others welcomed home their veteran servicemen.

When it was over, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, stated that on Iwo Jima “uncommon valor was a common virtue.”

Twenty-seven American Marines and Navy personnel were awarded the Medal of Honor on Iwo Jima, and 14 of these were posthumous. Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal captured the iconic image of the flag raising atop Mount Suribachi, and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal noted that the image would ensure the existence of the Marine Corps for the next 500 years.

The battle for Iwo Jima provided one of history’s greatest examples of strong, dedicated men laying down their lives for others. Such devotion to duty is forever worthy of honor and respect.

This article originally appeared on the Warfare History Network. This article appeared earlier and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Kyle Mizokami

Cold War History, Europe

A super power needs super weapons and the Soviet Union had them in spades.

Key point: The Soviet Union set out to build a robust and first-class military. It may not have been as powerful as America in many regard, but Moscow certainly scared Washington.

The Soviet Union was one of the most powerful collections of states that ever existed. Born in the Russian Civil War, the Soviet Union boasted one of the strongest armies on Earth.

It was a repressive regime that killed millions of its own citizens and saw itself as surrounded by ideologically incompatible and hostile states. It maintained a large standing army ostensibly for defensive purposes, but that did not stop it from invading neighboring Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland.

This article appeared earlier and is being republished due to reader interest.

The Soviet Union placed a premium on science, technology and industrial production. As a result, the USSR fielded some of the most advanced weapons of its time, in large numbers, with millions continuing to serve today.

AK-47:

The Avtomat Kalashnikova model 1947 assault rifle, a simple infantry weapon, has almost certainly killed more people than all the nuclear weapons ever used. With its curved banana magazine and rakish profile, the AK-47 is the most recognizable assault rifle of the post–World War II era. Approximately 75 million AK-47s have been built.

The AK-47 took design cues from a number of guns, particularly the German Sturmgewehr StG-44, the world’s first true assault rifle, and the American M-1 Garand rifle. The advantages of the AK-47 were that it combined a newer, lighter 7.26-millimeter bullet with full automatic operation in a durable, dependable package. The weapon was lightweight, easy to disassemble and easy to shoot.

These attributes made the weapon excellent for “wars of national liberation,” and in addition to arming the Red Army and Warsaw Pact countries, the AK-47 was liberally distributed to groups ideologically aligned with the USSR. Millions continue to serve with armies, guerrilla movements and terrorists today.

Typhoon-class Ballistic Missile Submarine:

The largest submarines ever built, the Typhoon-class ballistic missile submarines formed a large part of Russia’s nuclear deterrent at sea. At 574 feet long and displacing 24,000 tons, the massive submarines were three times larger than the American Los Angeles–class attack submarines and nearly ten thousand tons heavier than their counterparts, the Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines.

The Typhoon class of Soviet submarines was an innovative design, stationing twenty SS-N-20 Sturgeon submarine-launched ballistic missiles in front of the sail instead of behind it. Each SS-N-20 was equipped with ten warheads. Six Typhoon-class subs were built and later went on to serve in the Russian Navy. One remains in service as a test ship for the Bulava missile.

The Typhoon class was the inspiration for the submarine Red October, from the novel The Hunt for Red October. Red October differed from the class in being even larger, having twenty-six missile tubes instead of twenty, and incorporating a magnetohydrodynamic propulsion system.

T-55 Main Battle Tank:

Introduced at the end of World War II, the T-54 medium tank was the first of an entirely new line of Soviet main battle tanks. It featured a new hull and suspension system, new turret and was armed with a 100-millimeter main gun. The T-54 was an excellent combination of firepower, protection and mobility.

A series of modifications—including making it capable of fighting on the nuclear battlefield—resulted in the T-55 designation. The T-54/55 series was the mainstay of the Soviet Army from the end of World War II until the introduction of its descendant, the T-62. Indeed, in addition to the T-62, the newer T-64, T-72, T-80 and T-90 tanks are direct descendants of the T-55.

Total production numbers for the T-55 vary wildly, with between 42,000 and 100,000 built by the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact states and China. The T-55 was widely exported to Soviet client states, including the Warsaw Pact countries, North Vietnam, Cuba, Syria, Egypt, Angola and more than a dozen others. Obsolete but cheap and easy to maintain by today’s standards, the T-55 is still in service across Africa.

Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bomber:

Nicknamed the “White Swan,” the Tu-160 was the last strategic bomber built by the Soviet Union. With its swept wing, white paint scheme and beaklike nose, it’s not hard to see why.

The Tu-160 was designed to be a stealthy bomber capable of operating at night and in adverse weather conditions. It was to be a penetrating bomber, like the Tu-22M Backfire before it, capable of using stealth and a low-altitude mission profile to infiltrate NORAD airspace and launch nuclear cruise missiles. After a lengthy development period, the first Tu-160 flew on December 18, 1981.

The Tu-160 can carry twenty-two tons of ordnance in two weapons bays, including the Kh-55/AS-15 “Kent” nuclear cruise missile. Similar to the American Air Launched Cruise Missile, the AS-15 is a small, subsonic cruise missile with pop-out wings that carried a 200-kiloton nuclear warhead. The Tu-160 can carry twelve AS-15 missiles.

M1938 122mm Towed Howitzer:

The Soviet Union relied heavily on artillery during World War II. Towed artillery—particularly mortars—was inexpensive, easy to produce and had a powerful effect on the battlefield. Statistically, artillery is the biggest killer on the battlefield, and so artillery provided the best bang for the buck for Stalin and the Soviet High Command. Thirteen thousand artillery pieces were deployed by the Soviet Union at Stalingrad. During the Battle of Kursk, more than 25,000 guns, mortars and howitzers were amassed to stop the German offensive.

The M1938 122-millimeter towed howitzer was the most common heavy artillery piece in the Soviet Army and is representative of Soviet artillery in general. The M1938 had a range of 11.8 kilometers and could fire a 21-kilogram high explosive shell at five or six rounds per minute. During the war, each Soviet infantry division was assigned up to thirty-two M1938 howitzers, meaning even a lowly division could hurl 4,032 kilograms of HE shells per minute.

Like all Soviet weapons, the M1938 can be used as an anti-tank weapon, depressing its barrel to engage enemy tanks that have achieved a breakthrough. A total of 19,266 M1938s were built, mostly during the war.

Kyle Mizokami is a writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he co-founded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch.

This article appeared earlier and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Warfare History Network

History, Europe

World War II changed the way the Army's combat units were organized and shaped the future of America's armed forces. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: As the course of the war became clearer, a decision was made in early 1943 on the number of Army divisions needed to win the war. It was called the “90-division gamble.” The Philippine Division had surrendered in 1942. The 2nd Cavalry Division was later to be deactivated, reducing the total of Army divisions to 89. The last Army division was activated in August 1943 and deployed at the end of 1944. All 89 Army divisions went overseas. Only two, an infantry division in Hawaii and an airborne division in France, did not see combat.

The definitive combat unit of comparable strength among the forces of the world during the 20th century was the division. Not all divisions, however, have been of the same size. The number of men in Allied and Axis divisions during World War II varied considerably. The number of men in an American division also varied depending on the type of division, for example, infantry, airborne, light, mechanized, armored, or Marine Corps. Manning of American divisions even varied as the war progressed, and reorganizations were made to ensure the most efficient use of manpower and to reflect the tactical deployment in the various theaters of the world. Although a standard division might be desirable, it was not always viable. Tanks, for instance, were suited to the plains of Europe but of less use in the steaming jungles of New Guinea.

A division has been defined as “a major administrative and tactical unit/formation which combines in itself the necessary arms and services for sustained combat, larger than a brigade/regiment and smaller than a corps.” Inherent in such a definition is that a division is a combat unit that contains maneuver elements, infantry, or armor; fire support elements, mainly artillery but also tank or antitank units; and logistical or service support elements. The last includes motor transport, engineer, maintenance, supply, medical, and communications units. These three legs— maneuver, fire support, and logistics—enable a division to conduct sustained combat operations.

The Development of the Modern Army Division

Although the Civil War armies and the army sent to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in 1898 had units called divisions, they were mainly infantry or cavalry and lacked the other organic elements that constitute a modern division. The first real divisions of America’s armed forces were those sent to France in 1917-1918. They numbered more than 28,000 men and were more than twice the size of those of the other Allies or Central Powers. American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) divisions consisted of two infantry brigades of two regiments each; three artillery regiments, two of medium and one of heavier artillery; an engineer regiment; plus the various housekeeping units of supply, transport (some truck but mostly horse-drawn), medical, sanitation, supply, and signal. The rifle companies, of which there were four in a battalion, were more than 250 strong. There were three squads of eight men in each platoon, but the companies had seven platoons apiece. The infantry regiments had three battalions. Due to their composition of four regiments of two brigades, this organization was known as the “square division.”

The square division was the standard Army formation for most of the period between the world wars. Although mostly paper formations and vastly undermanned, the Regular Army (RA), National Guard (NG) and Organized Reserve (OR) divisions were square divisions. The difference between the NG and OR divisions was that the former were multistate units whose regiments were under the governors of their respective states until called to federal service while the latter were cadres of Reserve officers and noncommissioned officers for mobilization. This was consistent with the reforms made by Secretary of War Elihu Root after the difficulties of the Spanish-American War, which then provided for an orderly, expandable Army.

From Squares to Triangles

In the mid-1930s, there was a public reawakening concerning the armed forces. The administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, as a measure to get the Depression-stalled economy going again, decided that deficit spending to fund public works would be a prudent move. Included in such public works were warships for the Navy. The Army also benefited in that installations throughout the country were improved and even some air bases were constructed for the Army Air Corps.

The thinkers in the Army had never been idle, and they welcomed the opportunity to “get their nose under the tent” and share in the renewed interest in the armed forces. Although the Army was still saddled with the weaponry of World War I, a decade and a half had brought technical improvement. The biggest was in motor transport. Infantry could be given greater mobility moving to the battlefield, and units could be supplied more quickly. The reduction in time for movement could be translated into a reduction of manpower to provide the cutting edge. Firepower had been improved to include semiautomatic rifles, mortars, artillery, tanks, and aircraft.

A word about tanks is appropriate. Tanks had been an Allied innovation in World War I to break the stalemate of trench warfare. The AEF had formed a Tank Corps. It was disbanded after the war and what were formerly “tanks” were transferred to the infantry as “combat cars.” Since tanks had a connotation of offense, the euphemism was a way of appeasing a public, which would support an armed force for defense but abhorred any hint of its use offensively.

Army thinkers began to reappraise the tactics of the battlefield and the type of units that would have to fight. In the world war, infantry regiments attacked in a column of battalions in linear waves. Battalions of a regiment would move successively across no man’s land to take the enemy trenches after artillery had neutralized the defenders. The two lead battalions suffered relatively high casualties, but the breakthrough could be exploited by the third, or reserve battalion. A concept of “two up and one back” emerged. It was just a short step to applying this concept at all levels within a division. Thus was born the “triangular division.”

The Factor of Three

The factor of three was applied at all levels in the new, albeit experimental, division. Three squads made up a platoon. Three platoons were a rifle company. Three rifle companies with a weapons and headquarters company made up an infantry battalion. Three infantry battalions with a headquarters and service company were an infantry regiment. The division had three infantry regiments. Field artillery in the division consisted of three light battalions of three four-gun batteries and a medium battalion of four-gun batteries. In the initial artillery regiment of the first triangular division, circa 1936, the light battalions had 75mm howitzers and the medium battalion had 105mm howitzers. By the time war came, the light howitzers were 105mm and the mediums were 155mm.

These were two of the three legs of the triangular division. The third leg was rounded out by a reconnaissance troop, an engineer battalion, a medical battalion, and companies of ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and division headquarters personnel. There was also a military police platoon and a division band. Medical detachments were with the infantry and artillery to provide forward support on the battlefield.

The 1936 triangular division had 13,552 officers and men, of which 7,416 were in the three infantry regiments. After an initial field test, the recommended division in 1938 was reduced to 10,275, of which 6,987 were infantry. In June 1941, the division had risen in strength to 15,245, with 10,020 infantrymen. Fourteen months later, in August 1942, the division had increased to 15,514, but the infantry had been reduced to 9,999. A further reduction was proposed in early 1943, to 13,412 with 8,919 infantrymen.

The organization that fought the war (beginning in August 1943) was one of 14,255 officers and men, with 9,354 in the infantry. During the last year of the war, the standard infantry division had a strength of 14,037, with 9,204 in the infantry regiments. During all the reorganizations and changes, a triangular division was about half the size of the square division it replaced.

In addition to increased mobility there were other reasons for the fine-tuning of the infantry division during the war. The primary one, of course, was combat experience. Weaknesses were determined and remedied. Strengths were evaluated and reinforced. There were mundane reasons as well for tinkering with the size of an infantry division. Reducing the size from 15,514 (August 1942 level) to 14,255 (July 1943 level) meant a savings of 1,259 men. Thus for every 11 divisions, the savings in manpower would generate a 12th. Another reason was the wartime shortage of shipping. Slightly smaller divisions took up fewer “boat spaces.” This was important since the Army had to cross the oceans to fight the enemies. When the forces for D-Day and beyond were being built up in the United Kingdom, the two largest transoceanic liners, Britain’s Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth, could “comfortably” carry a U.S. infantry division every other week. This was no minor factor. Another reason to keep the infantry division to the smallest size consistent with projecting its combat power offensively was the finite manpower pool in the United States.

A Draft for the “Arsenal of Democracy”

While the number of American men of combat age who were physically fit for induction was between 20 and 25 million, there was competition for the pool other than the Army’s infantry. Service troops, such as engineers, supply men, and others were needed to make frontline infantry effective. The Army Air Corps, by then the Army Air Forces, had a large claim on manpower. The Navy and Marine Corps needed men. And, in addition to its fighting forces in the field, the United States was both the “arsenal of democracy” and the breadbasket of the Allies. Although many women labored in the factories and the fields, a large body of men was needed to turn out the weapons for the United States and its Allies.

In late 1942, the government took control of manpower. The draft, which had been instituted in 1940 for one year for selected 21-year-olds and older inductees, was extended to 18-year-olds, and voluntary enlistments for all those over 18 were suspended. All males subject to the draft were inducted and assigned to each service according to the needs at the time. Since the Navy and Marines had been enlisting 17-year-olds long before the war, some found this a way to avoid the draft before their 18th birthday. Last, by completely controlling manpower, the draft boards could defer skilled workers and farmers, often only temporarily. This last point was important because workers could be gainfully employed until the Army was ready to use them in uniform. More than one GI in the last years of the war encountered a truck, tank, or howitzer that he had helped build on the assembly line.

Old Divisions vs New Divisions

In 1917-1918, the AEF sent 43 divisions to France. Eight were RA, 17 were NG, and 18 National Army (NA) or divisions raised from regiments that had not existed before. These were all square divisions, but three NG and three NA divisions were converted into depot divisions for the Services of Supply. Likewise, two NG and one NA division were disbanded to replace casualties. After the war, the RA had three numbered infantry divisions and a cavalry division. There were two unnumbered divisions in the insular possessions: the Hawaiian and Philippine Divisions. The NG units returned to their respective states as regiments. As previously noted, the Tank Corps was disbanded. The Army had a maximum authorized strength, but this was never reached because the real limiting factor was paltry funding.

When war came to Europe in 1939 and the Axis ran wild in 1940, America saw the need to rearm quickly. The Navy was well on its way to building a two-ocean navy after the fall of France in 1940. The Army Air Corps was given similar priority. Both of these were Roosevelt’s darlings. For two decades the Army had been the poor relation.

This was changed. Five more RA infantry divisions were activated during 1939-1941. An additional RA cavalry division was activated. Reorganization revived the Tank Corps as the armored force. The NG was called into federal service, and 17 divisions were activated between September 1940 (when the first draftees also were inducted) and March 1941 as camps were built to quarter them. Four RA armored divisions were activated. The Hawaiian Division was split into a RA division and an additional Army of the United States division (AUS). AUS meant that no previous cadre organization existed as a framework for the new divisions.

As would be expected, the pre-Pearl Harbor divisions were the “old” divisions and those subsequently organized were the “new” divisions. The NG divisions entered active service under the square division organization and were converted to triangular. One of these, the 27th Infantry Division, was deployed to Hawaii before it was converted. The ranks of all the old divisions were brought up to strength by draftees and new recruits finishing basic training. They were “fillers” in Army parlance.

Equipment for the old divisions was a problem. Factories were turning out arms for Britain, which had evacuated its expeditionary force from the European continent at Dunkirk but had abandoned most of its equipment. Roosevelt had assured arms production for Britain with the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941. Hitler’s attack on Russia in June 1941 brought Russia under the Lend-Lease provisions as well. Thus, there developed competition between the Allied forces fighting Hitler and the emerging U.S. Army preparing to fight if necessary. In the meantime, training went on in the United States. Newspaper photographs and newsreels of the time showed GIs in the field with wooden mock-ups labeled “howitzer” or trucks with “tank” emblazoned on their sides.

Raising New Divisions During World War II

In the meantime, the Army planners and logisticians were systematically setting about raising the new divisions. It was methodical and orderly at first.

When a division was designated for activation, the War Department selected its key officers about three months in advance. These included the commanding general, his assistant division commander, and his artillery commander. All were general officer billets, but the selectees did not necessarily have those ranks initially. Promotion came with performance. In addition, key staff officers and commanders were designated shortly after the commanding general was assigned. This enabled him to choose his subordinates from a slate prepared by the War Department. The criterion for the slate of eligibles was based on records of performance.

In addition, the small RA of the interwar years included that intangible known as “service reputation.” Most officers knew most others. The key officers of the division to be formed were assigned special schooling such as the Command and General Staff Course (C&GSC), Advanced Artillery Course, and even condensed courses in automotive maintenance, logistics, and communications.

Just before actual activation, a cadre of key junior and middle-grade officers and noncommissioned officers was assigned. These came from the old division that had been made parent division to the new outfit. This could have been a weak point because of human nature. A commander would be reluctant to give his best people to someone else. Owing to the high state of professionalism of commanders, this did not occur in the raising of the initial new divisions. Commanders of old RA divisions took pride in the cadres they sent. It was not until later in the war that some commanders of the new divisions that in turn had been made parents to newer divisions forming began to send newer castoffs to cadres.

Upon the activation of a division, the key commanders and staff plus the cadre were joined by fillers and new officers mostly from Officer Candidate School (OCS). The division thus began a training cycle that was to last almost a year before it was deemed deployable. There were three distinct phases—individual training, unit training, and combined arms training. Appropriate testing by the Army Ground Forces (AGF) headquarters was conducted at all phases to ensure the division was up to standard. This continued well into mid-1944 when divisions committed in Europe began to take casualties. Then divisions in training in the United States were raided for their infantrymen who had completed individual training to serve as replacements overseas. Fillers had to start the cycle over again. Many of them came from disbanded antiaircraft battalions in the United States and from discontinued programs.

The U.S. Armored Division

There were other types of divisions in the AGF. Some were experimental and either discarded or retained in limited number. One of the two cavalry divisions, still a square division, was sent overseas to fight as infantry. The other was disbanded, reactivated, and deactivated in North Africa, its personnel being made service troops overseas.

The German blitzkrieg of 1940 alerted the U.S. Army to its need for armored formations, mechanized formations, and airborne units. Divisions of all three types were formed. Only two survived as viable units. The mechanized concept, which envisioned infantry riding to battle swiftly in trucks and half-tracks, was abandoned after troop testing. Those divisions reverted to standard infantry divisions. This decision was made for several reasons. The increase in vehicles placed a maintenance burden on the division, which enlarged its size out of proportion to its combat capability. Transportation to combat or the exploitation of a breakthrough could be furnished by mobile units of higher headquarters. Further, the deployment of a special mechanized division overseas took up more shipping than an infantry division. Standard infantry divisions could have all the advantages of mobility when reinforced by vehicles.

The trend moved away from specialized divisions. Exceptions were the armored division and the airborne division. There were to be 16 of the former and five of the latter.  From the organization of the first two armored divisions in July 1940 until September 1943, these were heavily weighted with tanks. A minor modification occurred in January 1945 as a result of combat experience in France.

The initial armored division was 14,620 strong. It had a division headquarters with two subordinate commands capable of forming task forces for tactical employment. These were Combat Commands A and B. The tank component contained 4,848 men in two armored regiments. The regiments had one light and two medium tank battalions, with a total of 232 medium tanks and 158 light tanks. The infantry component was an armored infantry regiment of 2,389 men in three armored infantry battalions of three companies each. The 2,127 artillerymen were in three battalions of three batteries each. The latter served six 105mm self-propelled howitzers.

There were a division headquarters and a division service company, signal company, reconnaissance and engineer battalions, and division train. The last had three battalions—maintenance, supply, and medical plus an MP platoon. The tactical concept that generated this formation was that the armored division, wreaking havoc, would punch through the enemy defenses and speed into the enemy’s rear. Fighting in North Africa as well as British experience in the Eastern Desert showed that tanks unsupported by infantry were vulnerable to antitank ambushes and minefields. Thus, the tactical employment of armored divisions was rethought.

In September 1943, the armored division was reduced to 10,937 men. The two armored regiments were eliminated and replaced by three tank battalions of three medium and one light tank company each. There were now 186 medium and 78 light tanks. The two combat commands were kept, but a headquarters reserve command was added. The infantry component was increased to 3,003, with the regiment eliminated and the three armored infantry battalions each increased to 1,001 men still with three companies. Artillery units remained essentially the same. The concept now was for the armored division to exploit the breakthrough of enemy lines made by the infantry divisions. To this end, separate tank battalions were formed from the tanks saved from the armored divisions. These could be used to reinforce an attacking infantry division as needed.

Specialized Infantry Divisions

The U.S. airborne division was conceived in 1942 as a miniature division of 8,500 men. There was a parachute infantry regiment of 1,958 and two glider regiments of 1,605 men each. The artillery included three battalions of three four-gun batteries of 75mm pack howitzers. The vehicles were mostly jeeps and trailers with approximately 400 jeeps and 200 trailers. The Army Air Corps provided the lift for the paratroopers and towed the gliders.

In December 1944, in response to recommendations from a battle-experienced airborne division commander, the size and composition of the airborne division was beefed up. It had 12,979 men in two parachute regiments and one glider regiment. A battalion of 105mm howitzers replaced the 75s. Supporting units were also increased. Only the 11th Airborne Division in the Pacific remained under the old organization.

Experiments were made in light, jungle, and mountain divisions, but all except the last were discarded when it was determined that the standard infantry division could fill the bill in any theater. The 10th Mountain Division was sent to Italy in December 1944 to let its muleskinners and skiers try their hand.

Preparing for the Invasion of France

Two major concerns remained regarding U.S. Army divisions prior to the invasion of France in 1944. One was the total number of divisions required in the Army to ensure victory.  The second was how to transport the personnel and equipment to Europe when a trained division was ready to deploy.

The first U.S. Army units sent to the European Theater of Operations (ETO) were an NG infantry division in January 1942 and an RA armored division in March. They debarked in Northern Ireland. In April, an Army infantry division replaced a contingent of Marines in Iceland. In October, combat-loaded divisions sailed from the the UK and the United States for Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa. Later, divisions were deployed to North Africa for operations in the Mediterranean theater in 1943. Their equipment had been moved separately.

Meanwhile, the buildup for the return to France was ongoing in the UK. A unique logistics concept solved a myriad of problems. The men of a division sailed for camps in England on a deployment schedule. At the same time, equipment was steadily being moved to the UK and stored in depots. Before leaving camp in the United States for a port of embarkation, a deploying division turned over its equipment to a new division being activated in the camp. On arrival in the UK, a complete equipment outfit of organizations, not individuals, was issued to the division.

The “90-Division Gamble”

The question of the number of divisions was more complicated. There was a minimum of one year of lead time before a division was ready for deployment. After the fall of France there was also a question of Britain and its armed forces being able to hold out. Would the United States have to face the Axis threat alone? Then, when Russia was invaded there was the question of its survivability. If Russia and Britain were knocked out of the war, more U.S. divisions would be needed. As many as 200 divisions were estimated for the worst case scenario.

As the course of the war became clearer, a decision was made in early 1943 on the number of Army divisions needed to win the war. It was called the “90-division gamble.” The Philippine Division had surrendered in 1942. The 2nd Cavalry Division was later to be deactivated, reducing the total of Army divisions to 89. The last Army division was activated in August 1943 and deployed at the end of 1944. All 89 Army divisions went overseas. Only two, an infantry division in Hawaii and an airborne division in France, did not see combat.

In addition to the 89 Army divisions, there were six Marine divisions—all of which fought in the Pacific. Marine divisions used the triangular organization of the Army but had units peculiar to their amphibious mission. These included, eventually, a shore party battalion to organize the supplies coming over the beach and an amphibious tractor battalion. The standard Marine division could be tailored for a specific operation by being reinforced with specific units such as naval construction battalions (SeaBees). A reinforced Marine division could run to about 20,000 men. With the opening of the drive across the Pacific, Marine rifle companies came up with an innovation called the fire team. A fire team was a four-man unit built around the Browning Automatic Rifle. Three fire teams led by a sergeant formed a squad, one of three in a platoon, placing heavy firepower in the assault waves which struck Japanese-held islands.

By the end of the war, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps had deployed 95 divisions around the globe. Ninety-eight percent of these had engaged in combat, and the success of their deployment and combat experience was due in large part to reorganization and preparation efforts by higher-echelon commanders.

This article first appeared on the Warfare History Network. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

James Holmes

Aircraft Carriers, Asia

Fortress China is festooned with airfields and mobile antiship weaponry able to strike hundreds of miles out to sea.

Here's What You Need to Know: The U.S. Navy isn’t without options in naval war.

Ah, yes, the “carrier-killer.” China is forever touting the array of guided missiles its weaponeers have devised to pummel U.S. Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). Most prominent among them are its DF-21D and DF-26 antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made a mainstay of China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) defenses.

Beijing has made believers of important audiences, including the scribes who toil away at the Pentagon producing estimates of Chinese martial might. Indeed, the most recent annual report on Chinese military power states matter-of-factly that the PLA can now use DF-21Ds to “attack ships, including aircraft carriers,” more than nine hundred statute miles from China’s shorelines.

Scary. But the U.S. Navy has carrier-killers of its own. Or, more accurately, it has shipkillers of its own: what can disable or sink a flattop can make short work of lesser warships. And antiship weaponry is multiplying in numbers, range, and lethality as the navy reawakens from its post-Cold War holiday from history. Whose carrier-killer trumps whose will hinge in large part on where a sea fight takes place.

That carrier-killer imagery resonates with Western audiences comes as little surprise. It implies that Chinese rocketeers can send the pride of the U.S. Navy to the bottom from a distance, and sink U.S. efforts to succor Asian allies in the process. Worse, it implies that PLA commanders could pull off such a world-historical feat without deigning to send ships to sea or warplanes into the central blue. Close the firing key on the ASBM launcher, and presto!, it happens.

Well, maybe. Why obsess over technical minutiae like firing range? For one thing, the nine-hundred-mile range cited for the DF-21D far exceeds the reach of carrier-based aircraft. A carrier task force, consequently, could take a heckuva beating just arriving on Asian battlegrounds. And the range mismatch could get worse. Unveiled at the PLA’s military parade through Beijing last fall, the DF-26 will reportedly sport a maximum firing range of 1,800-2,500 miles.

If the technology pans out, PLA ballistic missiles could menace U.S. and allied warships plying the seas anywhere within Asia’s second island chain. The upper figure for DF-26 range, moreover, would extend ASBMs’ reach substantially beyond the island chain.

From an Atlantic perspective, striking a ship east of Guam from coastal China is like smiting a ship cruising east of Greenland from a missile battery in downtown Washington, DC. Reaching Guam would become a hazardous prospect for task forces steaming westward from Hawaii or the American west coast, while shipping based at Guam, Japan, or other Western Pacific outposts would live under the constant shadow of missile attack.

Now, it’s worth noting that the PLA has never tested the DF-21D over water, five-plus years after initially deploying it. Still less has the DF-26 undergone testing under battle conditions. That’s cause to pause and reflect. As the immortal Murphy might counsel, technology not perfected in peacetime tends to disappoint its user in wartime.

Still, an ASBM will be a useful piece of kit if Chinese engineers have made it work. The U.S. military boasts no counterpart to China’s family of ASBMs. Nor is it likely to. The United States is bound by treaty not to develop mid-range ballistic missiles comparable to the DF-21D or DF-26. Even if Washington canceled its treaty commitments today, it would take years if not decades for weapons engineers to design, test, and field a shipkilling ballistic missile from a cold start.

Still, the U.S. Navy isn’t without options in naval war. Far from it. How would American mariners would dispatch an enemy flattop in combat? The answer is the default answer we give in my department in Newport: it depends.

It would depend, that is, on where the encounter took place. A fleet duel involving carriers would take a far different trajectory on the open sea—remote from fire support from Fortress China, the PLA’s unsinkable aircraft carrier—than if it unfolded within range of ASBMs, cruise missiles, or aircraft emplaced along seacoasts or offshore islands.

The former would be a fleet-on-fleet affair: whatever firepower each force totes to the scene of action decides the outcome, seamanship, tactical acumen, and élan being equal. The latter would let PLA commanders hurl land-based weaponry into the fray. But at the same time, the U.S. Navy would probably fight alongside allied navies—from the likes of Japan, South Korea or Australia—in near-shore combat. And, like China, the allies could harness Asia’s congested offshore geography, using land-based armaments to augment their fleets’ innate combat punch.

In short, the two tactical arenas differ starkly from each other. The latter is messier and more prone to chance, uncertainty, and the fog of war—not to mention the derring-do of an enterprising foe.

Submarine warfare would constitute a common denominator in U.S. maritime strategy for oceanic and near-shore combat. Nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) such as U.S. Virginia- or Los Angeles-class boats can raid surface shipping on the high seas. Or they can slip underneath A2/AD defenses to assault enemy vessels, including flattops, in their coastal redoubts.

In short, SSNs are workhorses in U.S. naval operations. That’s why it’s a grave mistake for Congress to let the size of the SSN fleet dwindle from fifty-three today to forty-one in 2029. That’s a 23 percent drop in the number of hulls at a time when China is bulking up its fleet of nuclear- and conventionally propelled subs—to as many as 78 by 2020—and Russia is rejuvenating its silent-running sub force.

American submarines, then, are carrier-killers regardless of the tactical setting. Now, there’s a bit of a futurist feel to talk about battling Chinese carrier groups. At present the PLA Navy has just one flattop, a refitted Soviet vessel dubbed Liaoning. That vessel is and will probably remain a training carrier, grooming aviators and ship crews for the operational carriers—most likely improved versions of Liaoning—that are reportedly undergoing construction.

Let’s suppose Chinese shipyards complete the PLA’s second carrier—China’s first indigenously built carrier—at the same clip that Newport News Shipbuilding completed USS Forrestal, the nation’s first supercarrier and a conventionally propelled vessel with roughly the same dimensions and complexity as Liaoning. It took just over three years to build Forrestal, from the time shipbuilders laid her keel until she was placed in commission.

Let’s further suppose that the PLA Navy has made great strides in learning how to operate carrier task forces at sea. If so, the navy will integrate the new flattop seamlessly and speedily into operations, making it a battleworthy addition to China’s oceangoing fleet. Our hypothetical high-seas clash thus could take place circa 2020.

In 2020, as today, the carrier air wing will remain the surface U.S. Navy’s chief carrier-killer. U.S. CVNs can carry about 85 tactical aircraft. While estimates of the size of a future Chinese flattop’s air wing vary, let’s take a high-end estimate of 50 fixed-wing planes and helicopters. That means, conservatively speaking, that the U.S. CVN’s complement will be 70 percent larger than its PLA Navy opponent’s.

And in all likelihood, the American complement will be superior to the Chinese on a warbird-for-warbird basis. It appears future PLA Navy flattops will, like Liaoning, be outfitted with ski jumps on their bows to vault aircraft into the sky. That limits the weight—and thus the load of fuel and weapons—that a Chinese aircraft can haul while still getting off the flight deck.

U.S. CVNs, meanwhile, slingshot heavy-laden fighter/attack jets off their flight decks using steam or electromagnetic catapults. More armaments translates into a heavier-hitting naval air force, more fuel into greater range and time on station.

For example, F-18E/F Super Hornet fighter/attack jets can operate against targets around 400 nautical miles distant, not counting the additional distance their weapons travel after firing. That’s roughly comparable to the combat radius advertised for Chinese J-15 carrier planes—but again, a U.S. air wing will outnumber its Chinese counterpart while packing more punch per airframe. Advantage: U.S. Navy.

By 2020, moreover, promising antiship weaponry may have matured and joined the U.S. arsenal. At present the surface navy’s main antiship armament is the elderly Harpoon cruise missile, a “bird” of 1970s vintage with a range exceeding 60 miles. That pales in comparison with the latest PLA Navy birds—most notably the YJ-18, which boasts a range of 290 nautical miles.

Weaponeers are working at helter-skelter speed to remedy the U.S. Navy’s range shortfall. Boeing, the Harpoon’s manufacturer, is doubling the bird’s range. The Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office recently repurposed the SM-6 surface-to-air missile for antiship missions, doubling or tripling the surface fleet’s striking range against carrier or surface-action groups. And on it goes. Last year the navy tested an antiship variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile, reinventing a very—very—long-range capability that existed in the late Cold War. A new long-range antiship missile is undergoing development.

How the navy deploys new weaponry as it enters service is nearly as important as fielding the weapons themselves. Under a concept dubbed “distributed lethality,” naval officialdom wants to disperse firepower throughout the fleet while retaining the capacity to concentrate firepower on target. What that means in practical terms is arming more ships with antiship missiles, supplemented by gee-whiz technologies like electromagnetic railguns and shipboard lasers should they fulfill their promise.

The U.S. Navy, then, will deploy no single carrier-killer weapon. It will deploy many. Coupled with submarine warfare and naval aviation, newfangled surface-warfare implements will stand the U.S. Navy in good stead for blue-water engagements by 2020. Trouble is, an open-ocean engagement is the least likely scenario pitting America’s against China’s navy. What would they fight over in, say, the central Pacific? And what would prompt the PLA Navy to venture beyond range of shore fire support—surrendering its difference-maker in sea combat?

No. It’s far more likely any fleet action will take place within reach of PLA anti-access weaponry. The waters shoreward of the island chains are the waters Beijing cares about most. They’re also waters where the United States, the keeper of freedom of the sea and guarantor of Asian allies’ security, is steadfast about remaining the predominant sea power. Conflict is possible in offshore seas and skies should Beijing and Washington deadlock over some quarrel.

And waging it could prove troublesome in the extreme. Talk about distributed lethality! As U.S. forces close in on the Asian mainland, they must traverse an increasingly dense thicket of A2/AD defenses. Carrier-killer ASBMs could cut loose throughout the Western Pacific on day one of a naval war, peppering vessels already in the theater or lumbering westward from U.S. bases. Offshore sentinels—principally missile-armed small craft and diesel attack subs—could disgorge barrages of antiship cruise missiles.

As if that offshore picket line isn’t enough, there’s shore-based antiship weaponry, including not just ASBMs but cruise-missile batteries and missile-armed warplanes stationed along the Chinese seaboard. A nuclear-propelled carrier is a big ship but a small airfield—and it would face off against a host of land-based airfields and missile platforms. All in all, A2/AD poses a wicked tactical and operational problem for U.S. skippers.

The oceangoing PLA Navy fleet could fare far better in a Western Pacific trial of arms than in the open Pacific, the Indian Ocean, or some other faraway expanse. In short, the PLA Navy is a modern-day fortress fleet. Such a fleet shelters safely within range of shore-based defenses—supplementing its own firepower to make the difference in action against a stronger antagonist.

Fortress fleets often meet a grim fate in combat on the open sea, denuded of that protective umbrella. Closer to home—within reach of shore fire support—they can acquit themselves well. China is counting on it.

A quick history lesson in parting. The fortress-fleet concept had humble origins. Sea-power pundit Alfred Thayer Mahan coined it—I think—to describe Russian Navy commanders’ habit of staying within reach of a fort’s gunnery to fend off superior opponents. The fleet was ostensibly the fort’s forward defender against naval assault, but an outgunned fleet could use the fort’s artillery as a protective screen.

Mahan had the guns of Port Arthur, the maritime gateway to the Bohai Sea and thence to China’s capital city, in mind when writing about fortress fleets. The Russian squadron based at Port Arthur stayed mainly under the guns while confronting Admiral Heihachiro Tōgō’s Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) Combined Fleet during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

The Port Arthur squadron was more or less safe so long as it remained within range of Port Arthur’s guns, but it accomplished little. Tōgō & Co. made short work of the fleet when Russian commanders offered battle on the high seas in August 1904. The debacle repeated itself in May 1905, when the Combined Fleet and the Russian Baltic Fleet met in action at Tsushima Strait.

Russian fleets, then, were simply outclassed by their IJN antagonists on a mano-a-mano basis. But imagine what may have transpired had the gunners at Port Arthur been able to rain accurate fire on Japanese ships not just a few but scores or hundreds of miles distant. That would have extended Mahan’s fortress-fleet logic throughout the combat theater. With long-distance backup from the fort, Russian seafarers may have emerged the victors rather than suffering successive cataclysmic defeats. The weak would have won.

That’s a rough analogy to today. Fortress China is festooned with airfields and mobile antiship weaponry able to strike hundreds of miles out to sea. Yes, the U.S. Navy remains stronger than the PLA Navy in open-sea battle. A fleet-on-fleet engagement isolated from shore-based reinforcements would probably go America’s way. But that hypothetical result may not make much difference since the two navies are more likely to join battle in confined Asian waters than on the open ocean.

The U.S. Navy, it seems, is optimized for the blue-water conflagration that’s least likely to occur. Question marks surround who would prevail in the scenarios that are most menacing and most likely to occur. Carrier-killing munitions may make the fortress fleet a going concern at last, long after the age of Mahan. And that suits Beijing fine.

James Holmes is Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over the Pacific. The views voiced here are his alone.

This article first appeared in 2016.

Image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Casey Scoular

Warfare History Network

Security, Americas

Several countries experimented with ways to launch aircraft off naval vessels prior to World War I.

Here's What You Need to Remember: It would be the Langley and the Argus that would take the first significant steps towards improving naval aviation. The interwar period would facilitate a technological arms race over carrier development, setting the stage for carriers as an offensive weapon and their tactical domination in World War II.

In 1898, Samuel P. Langley’s first flying prototype sparked interest from the U.S. Navy, which immediately began looking for military applications. Prior to World War I, various navies were experimenting with different forms of vessels to facilitate airpower, but it would be the British fleet who pushed carrier technology to new heights before the interwar period. Like many weapons that evolved out of the Great War, aircraft carriers with the primary mission of combat sorties was a tactic grasped through combat.

As early as 1910, the United States Navy began testing cruisers with modified wooden ramps for launching planes. In November of that year, Aviator Eugene Ely took off from the USS Birmingham Scott modified cruiser and landed two miles away on the mainland. In January of 1911, Ely would again test aviation from a ship when he landed and later look off from the USS Pennsylvania in San Francisco harbor. His landing made use of a primitive version of the modern day tail hook, attaching multiple sandbags to a line of rope, which was hand-stretched across the deck, to slow down Ely’s 60-mile-per-hour landing. Ely was the first man to land and take off from a ship, but at the time, many did not see a future for naval aviation; it was mainly considered an advanced reconnaissance tool. This attitude would persist within the U.S. Navy throughout World War I, and they would not commission an aircraft carrier of their own until 1922, well after their Allied counterparts.

Seaplane Carriers & Advancements in the British Royal Navy

The British Royal Fleet had also been experimenting with modified cruisers, similar to those of the Americans, with small flight decks built over the gun turrets of existing ships. Their exploration of carrier abilities would progress quicker than that of the Americans, due to their ability to gauge combat effectiveness early in the war. As World War I commenced, the Royal Navy opted to pursue the production of seaplane carriers rather than specialized carriers. Seaplane carriers house three seaplanes used for reconnaissance and submarine spotting, with cranes used for recovering the seaplanes once they landed in the ocean upon return. Though taking off from a seaborne vessel had become possible, it was landing on them that limited combat sorties. As the war progressed and the strategic advantage of an aviation platform at sea became apparent, the need for larger carriers with the ability to launch combat aircraft became a valued priority.

The British Royal Navy began converting more cruisers into modified carriers to facilitate torpedo bombers, but the issue still remained: once a pilot took off, they had to find a land-based airfield to land at, limiting the range of the carriers. In an attempt to mitigate this problem, the Royal Navy ordered their first flush-deck aircraft carrier. The intent was to launch and land torpedo bombers, rather than requiring pilots to land at mainland bases. The William Bearmore Shipyard, which had attempted to sell the Royal Navy on flush-deck carriers from the beginning of the war, took on the project. The HMS Argus became the first ever flush-deck aircraft carrier in naval history.

Delivered in 1916, and commissioned in September 1918, the Argus was not able to complete her initial sea trials in time to be commissioned during the First World War. Despite her lack of action in World War I, the Argus would become the prototype for the modern day aircraft carrier and a platform for continual naval testing. The U.S. Navy followed close behind, commissioning the USS Langley in 1922 as a platform for their own naval aviation testing, ratcheting up the race for carrier development.

It would be the Langley and the Argus that would take the first significant steps towards improving naval aviation. The interwar period would facilitate a technological arms race over carrier development, setting the stage for carriers as an offensive weapon and their tactical domination in World War II.

Originally Published September 28, 2018.

This article originally appeared on the Warfare History Network.

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

Aircraft Carriers,

With its long flight deck and the ability for aircraft to take off and land, it would be easy to think that vessels such as the USS America (LHA-6) are “aircraft carriers.”

Here's What You Need To Remember: However, while these warships are similar – similar doesn't mean the same. There are jobs that only a carrier can do, and there are jobs that the LHA can do. That is why both will likely remain floating runways for the foreseeable future and likely beyond.

With its long flight deck and the ability for aircraft to take off and land, it would be easy to think that vessels such as the USS America (LHA-6) are "aircraft carriers." However, looks can be deceiving and there is far more than meets the eye to these warships. USS America is an amphibious assault ship – concept that dates back to the Second World War, when escort carriers wouldn't "escort" just the larger carriers but rather the landing ships and troop carriers.

The Imperial Japanese Navy's Shinshū Maru was the first to be designated a landing craft carrier and served as a proto-amphibious assault ship. Unlike the modern version of the LHA, the Shinshū Maru could only launch aircraft via a catapult to support an amphibious assault, and aircraft had to (hopefully) land on captured airfields!

During the Cold War, the British Royal Navy was the first to transform a small carrier, the HMS Ocean (R68), into an assault ship. The Colossus­­-class carrier saw service during the Suez Crisis when it was used in the first-ever large-scale helicopter-borne assault.

The United States Navy built on this concept with a special class of ships specifically built to carry up to 20 helicopters. This was the Iwo Jima-class, which bore the hull classification LPH, referred to as "Landing Platform Helicopter. These vessels could transport more than 1,700 fully equipped Marine Assault Troops into combat areas and land them by helicopter at designated inland positions.

The subsequent Tawara-class Landing Helicopter Assault, which is why even today Amphibious Assault Ships are designated LHA and not AAS. Five of the planned nine Tawara-class LHA were built from 1971 and 1980, before it was succeeded by the Wasp-class, which first entered service in the late 1980s. These LHA's have provided the Marine Corps with a means of ship-to-shore movement by helicopter in addition to movement by landing craft. 

All eight of these ships are still active today, along with two of the America-class, and while the primary role is to carry about a battalion's worth of Marines, the LHA is far more versatile. But the LHA has shortcomings. All U.S. Navy Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft are catapult-launched, which the LHA can't perform, and it can't project airpower ashore utilizing organic electronic warfare assets such as the F/A-18G.

The development of vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft such as the AV-8B Harrier II attack aircraft and the F-35B Lightning II have further changed the way these smaller flattops could be used.

The USS America operates with at least five Marine F-35B Lightning II fighters as well as MV-22Bs tiltrotors and CH-53 helicopters as part of a typical Maine air combat element. But it can be reconfigured as needed, carrying 16 of the F-35Bs instead – which would provide an air group on board that is essentially on par with almost any actual aircraft carrier in the world, apart the U.S. Navy's Nimitz­-class and Ford­-class or the French Navy's Charles de Gaulle.

However, while these warships are similar – similar doesn't mean the same. There are jobs that only a carrier can do, and there are jobs that the LHA can do. That is why both will likely remain floating runways for the foreseeable future and likely beyond.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikipedia.

Peter Suciu

Direct Energy, Americas

The current focus of DEWs has been to use the technology in a defensive capability, such as protection of critical infrastructure as well as military vehicles and platforms.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The technology behind DEWs could also be crucial in addressing threats from other advanced weapon systems, notably hypersonic missiles and the aforementioned drones. DEWs could also be used in non-lethal applications such as crowd control or disabling machinery.

The concept of a “directed-energy weapon” is one that was conceived by science fiction writers such as H. G. Wells and Jules Verne, but it was in the 1930s that British Air Ministry considered whether a “death ray”-type weapon could be developed. Work was undertaken by Robert Watson-Watt of the Radio Research Station, and while he and colleague Arnold Wilkins concluded such a project wasn’t feasible it did result in the development of radar.

In recent years, work has continued to develop such a directed-energy weapon based on technologies ready to field now, and this has included high-powered microwaves, while defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin have researched, designed, developed and captured electromagnetic energy and elevated its power to create innovative directed-energy solutions. The use of directed energy would be a serious force multiplier, which is why so much emphasis has been placed on its development.

According to a new report from research firm GlobalData, directed-energy weapons (DEWs) have matured quickly and are now transitioning towards widespread, practical and cost-effective field development. Should these be successfully developed and deployed, DEWs could have an immense potential to be revolutionary in the long-term.

The research firm reported that in just the past two decades, military use of DEWs has also moved from the research laboratory to the operational force, and lasers have become a highly effective instrument for military operations. The study, “Directed Energy Weapons (Defense)—Thematic Research” also stated that the growing investment trend is being witnessed across modern armed forces and will further continue to do over the next decade, which will drive more investment in research and development.

The United States currently leads in the development of DEWs worldwide and has doubled its spending on the technology from fiscal year (FY) 2017 to FY19—from $535 million to $1.1 billion. Other countries including China, India and Russia are also investing in the development of DEWs, but many regional powers have not shown the same level of zeal for the technology. In fact, Israel is also the only Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region that is actively investing in the technology.

The current focus of DEWs has been to use the technology in a defensive capability, such as protection of critical infrastructure as well as military vehicles and platforms, where the technology could be used against missiles, rockets, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—including drone swarms—and boats.

“While DEWs are currently focused on defensive functions, and continue to have huge potential in this area, they could also provide several capabilities and advantages over traditional weapons because of their speed-of-light delivery, precision engagement, controlled/scalable effects, logistical benefits and low-cost per shot,” explained Captain Nurettin Sevi of the Turkish Navy and defense analyst at GlobalData. 

“DEWs have recently started to be used alongside existing kinetic weapons in combat areas,” Sevi added. “They have immense potential to be a game-changer in the near future, as well as revolutionary in the long term. However, armed forces and defense industries still need to address some technical challenges when developing these cutting-edge weapons. For example, laser weapons effectiveness decreases because of atmospheric absorption, scattering, turbulence and thermal blooming.”

The technology behind DEWs could also be crucial in addressing threats from other advanced weapon systems, notably hypersonic missiles and the aforementioned drones. DEWs could also be used in non-lethal applications such as crowd control or disabling machinery. The evidence presented by GlobalData indicates that directed-energy will soon become one of the most powerful technologies for success on the battlefield and will eventually replace many existing forms of weaponry.

“Developing combat-capable DEWs will be a crucial differentiator between military forces in the 2020s,” Sevi said.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Flickr.

Peter Suciu

B-2 Stealth Bomber, Americas

3D printers can create expensive materials for far less.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Instead of a complete redesign of the panel, which could have cost hundreds of thousands of dollars or more, each of the 20 new additively manufactured covers costs just $4,000 and these can be delivered to the fleet by the end of 2020 or in early 2021.

In what might sound like a bit of alphabet soup, the U.S. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center’s (AFLCMC) B-2 Program Office is utilizing 3D printing to keep the stealth bombers flying. Also known as additive manufacturing, the technology has been used to create a protective cover that prevents unintentional activation of the airframe-mounted accessory drive (AMAD) decouple switch.

Each of the 20 B-2 aircraft in service with the Air Force has that four-switch panel AMAD that sits on the left side of the two-person cockpit. After one of the switches was accidentally activated, which resulted in the need for an emergency landing, the B-2 Program Office needed to come up with a solution, reported 3Dprint.com.

Instead of a complete redesign of the panel, which could have cost hundreds of thousands of dollars or more, each of the 20 new additively manufactured covers costs just $4,000 and these can be delivered to the fleet by the end of 2020 or in early 2021. While $4,000 for a simple cover might sound expensive, it should be remembered that at $2.2 billion per aircraft, the B-2 remains one of the most expensive warplanes ever built.

“This part [AMAD cover] is unique, and there was never a commercial equivalent to it, so we had to develop it in-house,” said Roger Tyler, an aerospace engineer with the B-2 Program Office. “Additive manufacturing allowed us to rapidly prototype designs, and through multiple iterations, the optimum design for the pilots and maintainers was created. We have completed the airworthiness determination and are currently in the final stages to get the covers implemented on the B-2 fleet, which will be the first additively manufactured part to be approved and installed on the B-2.”

The development of the covers was further aided by the Additive Manufacturing Design Rule Book, which was created by the AFLCMC Product Support Engineering Division.

“The rule book provides design guidelines and lessons learned in the additive manufacturing field, specifically the use of direct metal laser melting and fuse deposition modeling technologies,” added Jason McDuffie, chief, Air Force Metals Technology Office within the Product Support Engineering Division. “It has been used to help create a variety of important parts for the Air Force.”

Cost-Effective 

As 3Dprint.com also reported, additively manufactured parts are providing the Air Force with a cost-cutting opportunity. 3D printed parts are being used for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and also for the aging B-52.

The Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex (OC-ALC), an Air Force Sustainment Center wing, also produced the first additively manufactured metal component successfully tested on a U.S. Air Force aircraft engine. That has been a significant milestone for future sustainment of aircraft like the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System and the B-52 Stratofortress.

The OC-ALC used additive manufacturing to create an anti-ice gasket for the TF33-P103 engine. That was the result of a collaborative effort between the 76th Propulsion Maintenance Group, the Reverse Engineering and Critical Tooling Lab and the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center Propulsion Sustainment Division. The gasket is a critical part of safe and efficient operation of the TF33 engine, which powers the E-3, the B-52 and the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System.

Compared to the original component sourcing method, the new anti-ice gasket manufacturing process reduced administrative lead time, the amount of time between an initial contract and actual component manufacture, from 120-136 days to 14–21 days.

For the B-2 program 3D printing could prove to be more cost-effective due to the fact that a large number of each item isn't actually required.

“Additive manufacturing is the way of the future,” added AFLCMC’s Tyler. “The B-2 is a low volume fleet. There’s only 20 (B-2 Bombers), so anytime something needs to be done on the aircraft, cost can be an issue. But with additive manufacturing, we can design something and have it printed within a week and keep costs to a minimum.”

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. 

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Robert Farley

Aircraft Carriers, Americas

The vulnerabilities of the big carriers are real, and the U.S. needs to either remedy those problems, or consider an alternative means of delivering ordnance.

Here's What You Need to Know: Plenty of world-beating weapons quickly become obsolete.

The United States has decided to spend many billions of dollars on the CVN-78 (“Ford”) class of aircraft carriers to replace the venerable Nimitz class. The latter has served the U.S. Navy since 1975, with the last ship (USS George H. W.  Bush) entering service in 2009. The Fords could be in service, in one configuration or another, until the end of the 21st century.

Just as the U.S. government has determined to make this investment, numerous analysts have argued that the increasing lethality of anti-access/area denial systems (especially China’s, but also Russia and Iran) has made the aircraft carrier obsolete.  If so, investing in a class of ships intended to serve for 90 years might look like a colossal waste of money.

As with any difficult debate, we should take time to define our terms, and clarify the stakes. The anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems around the world may indeed curb the effectiveness of the Ford class, but the U.S. will still find uses for this ships.

Define Obsolete:

We need to carefully describe how we think about obsolescence. Military analysts often equates obsolescence with uselessness, especially while pursuing dollars for new gadgets, but the two words don’t mean the same thing. In every war, armies, navies, and air forces fight with old, even archaic equipment.  Built for World War II, the A-26 Invader attack aircraft served in the Vietnam War.  The USS New Jersey, declared obsolete at the end of World War II, fought off Korea, Vietnam, and Lebanon.  The A-10 “Warthog,” thought by many to be obsolete before it even flew, continues to fight in America’s wars.  For countries less well-endowed than the United States, the point hold even more strongly; all of the armies currently fighting in Syria and Libya use equipment that the U.S. considered obsolete decades ago.

The point is that even if the ships of the CVN-78 class cannot penetrate advanced A2/AD systems, they can still serve other useful purposes.  Indeed, American carriers since 1945 have entirely earned their keep on these other missions, which include strike in permissive environments, displays of national power and commitment, and relief operations.  “Obsolescence” for one kind of mission does not imply uselessness across the range of maritime military operations.

Carrier vs. A2/AD:

People have predicted the obsolescence of the aircraft carrier since the end of World War II.  The Soviets developed an elaborate system of submarines, sensors, and aircraft designed to strike US aircraft carriers.  The U.S. developed countermeasures, including the F-14 Tomcat, intended to defeat and distract the Soviet systems. As war never happened, we never had the opportunity to test the capabilities of a carrier air wing against a flight of Tu-22M “Backfire” bombers. The Soviets and the Americans worked hard against each other, countering each innovation with an ever-more-sophisticated reply.  Each iteration led to a different constellation of power and vulnerability; the bombers had the upper hand at some points, and the carriers at others.

The next generation of A2/AD capabilities will have a similarly non-linear character. While Chinese missiles might have the range and terminal maneuverability to find U.S. carriers, missile defense and electronic counter-measures might make the missiles ineffective to the point of uselessness.  Similar, improvements in anti-submarine technology could limit or eliminate the vulnerability that carriers face against undersea threats. Carriers that become “obsolete” may not stay that way.

Flexibility:

The utility of a large, flat-decked ship comes primarily from the kinds of aircraft it can carry and launch. The aircraft carrier as a concept has survived, in no small part, because aircraft carriers are good for jobs other than penetrating tightly defended A2/AD systems.  Indeed, no U.S. carrier since World War II has ever needed to directly challenge such a system. Instead (as noted above) aircraft carriers have found themselves jobs in a variety of other conditions.

The U.S. Navy has enjoyed the advantage of nearly unfettered access to enemy airspace over the past twenty-five years, and has structured its air wings accordingly. While the U.S. has been slower than many would have liked to adapt to the new array of anti-access threats, the development of fifth and sixth generation stealth aircraft, as well as the eventual procurement of long range, carrier-based strike zones, can help restore the usefulness of the CVN-78 class, even if anti-access weapons drive the carriers further out to sea.

The Final Salvo:

Plenty of world-beating weapons quickly become obsolete. The fast battleships of World War II went into reserve less than a decade after their commissioning. The early fighters and bombers of the jet age sometimes had even briefer lifespans. Aircraft carriers, in widely variant forms, have enjoyed a good, long run. They survive because aircraft have short ranges, and fixed airfields have significant military and political vulnerabilities. These two factors seem likely to persist.

However, just because flat-decked aircraft carrying ships will likely be with us does not mean that the Ford class, which emphasizes high-intensity, high technology warfare, represents an ideal investment of U.S. defense capital.  The vulnerabilities of the big carriers are real, and the U.S. needs to either remedy those problems, or consider an alternative means of delivering ordnance.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat.

This article first appeared in 2017.

Image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jason Waite

Caleb Larson

Submarine Warfare,

Of particular concern is how Moscow’s increasingly capable Russian submarine force is catching up to the U.S. Navy’s previously unparalleled underwater advantage.

Here's What You Need to Know: In addition to dropping hardware like sonobuoys in anticipated high-traffic locations, Marines pilots could fire anti-submarine torpedoes from the air, or ASW missiles from EABs. Not limited to anti-submarine warfare, Marine EABs could also deploy long-range anti-ship missiles from land to push a Russian presence further out at sea.

In Proceedings, a monthly magazine published by the United States Naval Institute, General David Berger, the Commandant of the Marine Corps outlined what could end up being a new mission for the Corps: anti-submarine warfare (ASW).

Berger cites the expanding Chinese and Russian capabilities underwater as justification for a Marine ASW capability. He argues that the Corps is especially well-positioned to take on underwater assets thanks to their Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABs). More specifically, Gen. Berger explained that ASW is a “campaign of sustained actions over time for undersea advantage,” and that Marine EAB assets, particularly in Europe would provide a “significant contribution to undersea warfare campaigns, including holding Chinese and Russian submarines at risk.”

In particular, Washington is worried about Russian revanchism since the end of the Cold War. Of particular concern is how Moscow’s increasingly capable Russian submarine force is catching up to the U.S. Navy’s previously unparalleled underwater advantage—an advantage that America wants to preserve.

Quoting Vice Admiral James G. Foggo, Commander Sixth Fleet, Gen. Berger described the underwater competition currently underway. “It is now clear that a fourth battle [of the Atlantic] is not looming, but is being waged now, across and underneath the oceans and seas that border Europe. This is not a kinetic fight. It is a struggle between Russian forces that probe for weakness, and U.S. and NATO ASW forces that protect and deter. Just like in the Cold War, the stakes are high.”

If the Navy’s current ASW capabilities were to be disrupted, Russian submarines could more easily transition from the Barents Sea in Russia’s northwest near Finland to the North Atlantic via the Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom gap (GIUK gap). The GIUK gap is a geographic chokepoint that Russia submarines would have to slip through in order to reach the open Atlantic. And so that gap is patrolled by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) navies to prevent Russia from secreting sending a lot of its submarines through it.

The disruptive potential of Russian submarine assets in the Atlantic cannot be overstated. If given free rein in the Atlantic, an incredible number of targets in the United States and Europe could be threatened—and not just cities or other targets close to shore. If near enough to American or European shores, targets hundreds of miles from the coast could also fall victim to Russian submarine-launched cruise missiles.

To keep Russian submarines penned in, the Corps could build EABs in key areas. Norway and Iceland in particular would be prime locations for Marine EABs, as they would be relatively close to Russia, and could help augment existing Navy ASW assets. But what would a Marine Corps EAB do exactly?

The Marines are Coming

In addition to dropping hardware like sonobuoys in anticipated high-traffic locations, Marines pilots could fire anti-submarine torpedoes from the air, or ASW missiles from EABs. Not limited to anti-submarine warfare, Marine EABs could also deploy long-range anti-ship missiles from land to push a Russian presence further out at sea.

There is also an opportunity for Marine Corps EABs in the Pacific. “The same concept could be applied to the First Island Chain in the western Pacific. Without being limited to the Philippines and Japan, EABs could create opportunities from multiple locations beyond the South and East China Seas,” Berger explained. “Close, confined seas may offer more opportunities for Marine EABs to sense and strike Chinese ships and submarines, while supporting fleet and joint ASW efforts.”

Postscript

The Marine Corps has whole-heartedly embraced change in recent years. From divesting all their tank battalions, to getting a new amphibious troop carrier into service, to experimenting with remote-controlled, missile-lobbing trucks, change is rapidly coming to the USMC.

Caleb Larson is a Defense Writer with the National Interest. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture.

This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Flickr.

Peter Suciu

SR-71 Blackbird,

It could cross continents in just a few hours, and at 80,000 feet, the Blackbird could survey 100,000 square miles of the ground below per hour.

Here's What You Need to Remember:

No other U.S. Air Force aircraft could fly faster or higher than the Lockheed SR-71 "Blackbird," and on its final flight, it set a truly impressive record.

The reconnaissance aircraft flew from the west coast of the United States to the east coast – some 2,404 miles – in just 68:17 minutes. During that flight, it traveled from St. Louis, Missouri, and Cincinnati, Ohio, a distance of 311 miles in about eight and a half minutes.

While no Blackbirds were ever flown over Soviet airspace (well, that we know of), the SR-71 played a crucial role in the Cold War and took part in missions over the Middle East, Vietnam, and even North Korea.

It could cross continents in just a few hours, and at 80,000 feet, the Blackbird could survey 100,000 square miles of the ground below per hour. In July 1976, an SR-71 even set two world records – one was an absolute speed record of 2,193.167 mph while the other was an absolute altitude record of 85,068.997 feet. It carried no weapons and speed was its only defense.

She Was Expensive to Fly

But one thing the SR-71 couldn't outrun was the costs to maintain it.

Everything about the aircraft was expensive.

The CIA had to smuggle out Soviet titanium, the best produced at the time, for the aircraft's skin and landing gear, while special aluminum-reinforced tires were developed by BF Goodrich specifically for the Blackbird. The life span of those tires was only about twenty landings.

Estimates were that the aircraft cost around $200,000 an hour to operate, and while more capable than the Lockheed U-2, the costs were seen as a significant problem. In 1989 the Blackbird was retired – and many SR-71s were sent to museums, while a few were kept in reserve.

SR-71, Rebooted

That could have been the end of the story, but in the early 1990s, the SR-71 program was reactivated – in part because a successor had yet to be developed (But the SR-72 might be around the corner). The aircraft was part of a contentious political debate that pitted members of Congress against the Pentagon over America's intelligence policy, where supporters in Congress questioned the Department of Defense's (DoD's) refusal to use the aircraft over Bosnia and other global hotspots of the era.

The Air Force argued the old warbird wasn't integrated with the rest of its modern equipment, and that its cameras took still photos that couldn't be relayed by video to the ground. Instead, the CIA and DoD relied on drones to provide an eye-in-the-sky, along with satellites. Supporters of the SR-71 countered that drones could be (and were) shot down, while foreign militaries could determine when satellites were due to fly overhead.

The SR-71 made its return, in part because the argument was made that the planes were already bought and paid for – while there were a lot of spare parts. Lockheed Martin's "Skunk Works" – which had developed the aircraft – was able to bring the Blackbird out of retirement under a budget of $72 million.

However, the reactivation was met with more resistance than the plane had faced from America's adversaries. It was simply something that Air Force leaders didn't want and required money to be shifted from other programs. The issue was so contentious that when Congress reauthorized funding, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case and ruled that President Bill Clinton's attempted line-item veto to cancel the funding was unconstitutional.

In 1998, the program was finally permanently retired, but NASA was able to operate the final two airworthy Blackbirds until 1999. It was an inauspicious end to an aircraft that could do what no other reconnaissance plane could do. While no SR-71 was ever shot down, it was the political infighting and an issue of funding that finally grounded the speedy Blackbird.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Kyle Mizokami

Russian Submarines, Europe

The Oscars needed to be fast to intercept American nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and that meant they too needed nuclear propulsion.

Here's What You Need to Remember: In the end, the sinking of the Kursk appears to have been caused by a simple, freak accident of chemistry. The tragedy only reinforces how dangerous life aboard a submarine really is, and how important safety is in the underwater realm.

In 2000, a Russian submarine designed to sink aircraft carriers became a victim of its own arsenal. The cruise-missile submarine Kursk suffered a massive explosion and sank after an onboard torpedo accidentally detonated. The accident was the worst naval disaster suffered by post–Cold War Russia.

The Soviet Union’s greatest adversaries at sea were the aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy. With their versatile air wings, American carriers could frustrate the Warsaw Pact’s plans wartime plans, doing everything from escorting convoys across the Atlantic to bombing Soviet Northern Fleet bases above the Arctic Circle. They also carried nuclear weapons, making them exceptionally dangerous to the Soviet coastline.

The Soviets’ solution was the construction of the Oscar-class submarines. Some of the largest submarines ever constructed, they displaced measure 506 feet long with a beam of nearly sixty feet—nearly twice that of the Soviet Union’s Alfa-class attack submarines. At 19,400 tons submerged, they were larger than the American Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines.

They were large for a reason: each Oscar carried two dozen huge P-700 Granit missiles. The P-700 was a large missile designed to kill large ships. The P-700 was thirty-three feet long and nearly three feet wide. Each weighed 15,400 pounds each, most of which was fuel for the ramjet-powered engine which propelled the missile at speeds of Mach 1.6 to a range of 388 miles. The missile packed either a 1,653-pound conventional high explosive warhead, enough to damage an aircraft carrier, or a five-hundred-kiloton nuclear warhead, enough to vaporize a carrier. The missiles would be fed targeting data from the Legenda space surveillance system, which would hunt fast-moving carrier battle groups from orbit.

The missiles were concealed beneath the hull in two rows of twelve, in silos pointed upward at a seventy-degree angle. It was this arsenal that earned them the then-unusual SSGN designation in the West, with the G standing for “guided missile.”

If that weren’t enough, the Oscars had a large complement of torpedoes. Each submarine had four standard-diameter 533-millimeter torpedo tubes that could launch standard homing torpedoes, SS-N-15 “Starfish” antisubmarine missiles or SS-N-16 “Stallion” antiship missiles. It also had two oversized 650-millimeter torpedo tubes for launching Type 65-76A torpedoes against larger ship targets. Together the six tubes were armed with twenty-four torpedoes.

The Oscars needed to be fast to intercept American nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and that meant they too needed nuclear propulsion. Each was powered by two OK-650 nuclear reactors that together provided 97,990 shipboard horsepower. This accelerated the submarines to up to fifteen knots on the surface and a speedy thirty-three knots underwater.

Twenty Oscar-class submarines were planned, but only thirteen were built before the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. K-141, also known as Kursk, was laid down in March 1992 and commissioned into the Russian Northern Fleet in December 1994.

On August 15, 2000, the Kursk was on exercise with major elements of the Russian Northern Fleet, including the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy. Kursk, which was fully loaded with Granit missiles and torpedoes, was scheduled to make a simulated attack on an aircraft carrier. At 11:28 a.m., an underwater explosion was detected followed two minutes later by a second, larger explosion. One Russian account claims that the twenty-eight-thousand-ton battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy shook from the first explosion, and a Norwegian seismic station recorded both explosions.

Kursk had suffered two massive explosions and sank in 354 feet of water at a twenty-degree vertical angle. An explosion had ripped through the front of the hull, tearing a terrible gash along the upper bow. Still, at least twenty-three of the 118 crew had survived the sinking, as a note penned by one of the ship’s senior officers, Lt. Capt. Dmitri Kolesnikov, indicated. The note was dated exactly two hours after the initial explosion. Rescue efforts by Russian—and later British and Norwegian—teams failed to rescue the survivors.

A Russian inquiry into the accident concluded that one of the Kursk’s Type 65-76A torpedoes had exploded. A faulty weld in a torpedo or damage to a torpedo during movement had caused it to leak hydrogen peroxide. Like many torpedoes, the Type 65 used hydrogen peroxide as an underwater fuel. Unfortunately, hydrogen peroxide becomes explosive when it comes into contact with a catalyst, such as organic compounds or fire. A similar accident is thought to have sank HMS Sidon, a Royal Navy submarine, in 1955.

Conspiracy theories regarding the sinking of the Kursk are rife on the Russian Internet. Many allege that nearby American attack submarines sank the Kursk with Mark 48 torpedoes. While technically possible (in absence of the evidence of an internal torpedo explosion) there is no remotely plausible motive for such an attack during a period of good U.S.-Russian relations. Why attack the Kursk? Why was only the Kursk sunk, and not the Kuznetsov and Pyotr Velikiy? Why would the Russian government cover up the attack?

In the end, the sinking of the Kursk appears to have been caused by a simple, freak accident of chemistry. The tragedy only reinforces how dangerous life aboard a submarine really is, and how important safety is in the underwater realm. Finally, the rush to conspiracy is a warning that, had this incident occurred during a genuine crisis, such an accident could cause a dangerous escalation that could lead to war.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This first appeared in November 2016 and is being reposed due to reader interest. 

Image: Wikipedia.

Robert Farley

Russo-Japan War, Asia

Land combat between Russian and Japanese forces in 1904 and 1905 was recognizably modern.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Battle of Yalu River, the Siege of Port Arthur, and the Battle of Sendepu differ from 20th century land combat only in emphasis. Both Japanese and Russian forces suffered enormous casualties in efforts to take prepared defenses. The Battle of Mukden, fought in March 1905, produced a total of nearly 150,000 casualties.

The Russo-Japanese War commenced over 100 years ago, lasting eighteen months before a US-brokered truce mercifully put it to rest. The war killed upwards of 125,000 people, and sharply limited Russian influence in Northeast Asia. Japan gained control of Korea, and gained a long-term foothold for influencing events in Manchuria and China.

Writers have ascribed many legacies to the conflict, some of which we can set aside. Victory against Japan probably would not have prevented the collapse of Imperial Russia and the founding of the Soviet Union; the Revolution happened for other reasons. Moreover, the conflict did not give the Central Powers a “window of opportunity” for defeating Russia in Europe; we now know that Vienna and Berlin over-estimated, rather than under-estimated, Russian power in 1914. Defeat might conceivably have broken Japanese militarism for a time, but the weakness of China and of the European colonial empires would likely have proven too tempting for Tokyo in any case.

Still, the Russo-Japanese War may indeed have been a “regional” conflict, but Northeast Asia is a remarkably important region, home to three of the largest economies of the 21st century. The war set the terms upon which Russia, China, Korea, and Japan would contest control of the region over the course of the 20th century. The conflict also had important legacies for the conduct of war. The power of conscript and rapid fire weapons would prefigure the experience of 20th century land combat, while fighting between “castles of steel,” would lend key lessons for naval planners in both World Wars.

The Politics of Northeast Asia: 

The waning power of the Qing dynasty in the 19th century set the state for Russo-Japanese conflict in Northeast Asia. Although Japanese success at sea was not replicated to the same extent on land, the Japanese victory did place stark limits on the extent of Russian power in the Pacific. Even after the Soviets won a decisive victory over Japan at Khalkin Gol, and crushed the Kwantung Army in the waning days of World War II, circumstances prevented permanent territorial aggrandizement. Had the Russians maintained their position in Asia in 1905, this might have turned out much differently.

With the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, and the ensuing collapse of the Chinese state, China was unable to resist foreign encroachments upon its territory.  Fortunately for China, Russia remained in such disorder that it could not take advantage to its own territorial aggrandizement, and in any case Japanese power held Russia in check.

Japan, however, took advantage of Chinese disorder. In 1931 the Japanese Kwantung Army occupied Manchuria and declared it independent of China, installing the last emperor of the Qing dynasty in what became Manchukuo.  Neither Communist nor Nationalist Chinese forces had the strength the contest this move, but the Soviet invasion of August 1945 quickly annihilated the Kwantung Army. Rather than maintain Manchukuo as a Soviet satellite, the Russians looted in, then used it to bolster the position of the People’s Liberation Army. In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party took control of most of China, including Manchuria but not including either Taiwan or Mongolia.

Had Russia prevailed in 1905, then either Russia or the Soviet Union, instead of Japan, might well have detached Manchuria, just as the Soviets detached Mongolia. Under such circumstances, it’s unlikely that any Chinese government would have been able to recover the territory; the Soviet Union was in no mood for reparations in 1945. Whether incorporated directly into Russia or simply into the Soviet sphere, Manchuria might now remain politically separated from the rest of China.  Conversely, a Korea more capable of playing Russian influence off Japanese might have been able to retain its independence.

Of course, much remains unknowable. A defeated Japan might have taken advantage of the opportunity provided by the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1918 to seize what it could not take in 1904.  Even this, however, might have produced a different configuration of power in Northeast Asia than eventually held.

Decisive Naval Battle: 

Fought in late May, 1905, the Battle of Tsushima remains the great battle of annihilation of the steam age, and possibly the single greatest naval victory of all time. Admiral Heihachiro Togo’s decision to offer battle at Tsushima remains an unremarked-upon curiosity. The Russian fleet was, in numbers, considerably superior to the Japanese, and in the technology of its most advanced ships qualitatively equal.  The first rate Russian battleships were of modern design, and the Russian 12” gun well regarded, even at long ranges.

To be sure, Togo had major advantages. His ships were well drilled, and his sailors in top condition.  The Russian squadron had endured a series of traumatic adventures in its interminable journey around Eurasia, and wasn’t in fighting shape. Nevertheless, offering battle represented a real risk. A single well-placed shot could have destroyed one of Togo’s battleships, probably tipping the result inexorably in the Russian favor.

Moreover, it’s unclear what precisely the Russian fleet could have done to change the verdict of the war. The geographic situation strongly favored Japan, as the Russian fleet could only disrupt communications if it deployed in force; otherwise, Togo could destroy it piecemeal. The Russians could have raided Japan or harassed the Japanese fishing fleet, but without a proximate base could neither have forced battle nor prevented Japan from supplying and augmenting its fielded forces on the mainland.

Nevertheless, Togo forced battle on the exhausted Russian fleet, and used two major advantages to great effect. The speed and coherence of the Japanese line allowed it to conduct what has become known as the “Togo Turn,” a maneuver which crossed the Russian “T” and effectively allowed the Japanese to double up on the lead Russian warships. The most powerful Russian battleships were destroyed in echelon, while the Japanese tracked down most of the escapees the next day.

In addition to its military impact, the victory had a great morale effect, serving as an international signal of Japan’s prowess, and Russia’s decay. The defeated Russian admiral was treated as a hero by opponents of the Czar, who argued that the corrupt, incompetent Russian government had needlessly sent thousands of brave young men to their deaths.

Whatever its effect on the war, Tsushima was enormously influential abroad. In the short term, this accelerated the trend towards fast, all-big-gun battleships. In the longer term, it helped ensconce the idea of a single, decisive battle in the minds of naval theorists and practitioners.  A concentrated Japanese fleet had prevailed over a concentrated Russian fleet through superior tactics and training, completely destroying the latter in the process.  The victory left Russia effectively without maritime recourse, no longer in a position to threaten Japanese communications with the mainland.

This is the victory that Jellicoe and Scheer sought at Jutland, and the victory that the admirals of the IJN wanted to inflict on the battleships of the U.S. Navy in the Second World War. Conversely, it was the defeat that the Italians desperately wanted to avoid in the central Mediterranean, and that the British feared off the Falklands. Tsushima, combined with a bastardized form of Mahanianism, influenced naval thought for generations, and remains important today.

Ground Combat: 

Most historical analysis of the Russo-Japanese War has focused on naval heroics, with the Battle of Tsushima taking a central place. In many ways, however, the legacy of the land war has proven more enduring. The transformative effect of military technology on the land warfare slowly became apparent across the nineteenth century. The Crimean War, the American Civil War, and the Franco-Prussian War were all “transitional” wars, progressive steps from the (graduated) plateau of eighteenth century infantry combat to the plateau of “modern system” combat.

Land combat between Russian and Japanese forces in 1904 and 1905 was recognizably modern. Although the airplane would not have an impact until the next decade, most of the pieces associated with the 20th century “Revolution in Military Affairs” were set in place. Most notably, this included the combination of mass, conscript armies with the advent of modern, rapid-fire weapons that could effectively clear the field, leading to the phenomenon of the “empty battlefield.” Armies have struggled to solve the problem of the empty battlefield since 1905, developing a cascade of innovations, from trenches, to tanks, to sophisticated artillery barrages, to storm troopers, to (in their own way) strategic bombers.

The Battle of Yalu River, the Siege of Port Arthur, and the Battle of Sendepu differ from 20th century land combat only in emphasis. Both Japanese and Russian forces suffered enormous casualties in efforts to take prepared defenses. The Battle of Mukden, fought in March 1905, produced a total of nearly 150,000 casualties.

To be sure, much has changed; the advent of the aircraft and the widespread use of the radio would change the means of land combat within fifteen years of the Russo-Japanese War. Still, the forms of battle are essentially recognizable, in a way that the battles of the American Civil War are not.

Conclusion

World War I and World War II so transformed the maps of both Europe and Asia that discerning the influence of antecedent conflicts like the Russo-Japanese War can be hard. Still, the setback that the Japanese dealt to the Russians in 1904-05 helped shape the contours of Asian politics for a century. Surprisingly, given the relative backwardness of the Russian and Japanese economies in 1905, it also served as the world’s first taste of modern, industrial warfare.

Robert Farley is a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. Follow him on Twitter:@drfarls.

This first appeared in 2014 and is being reposted due to reader interest. 

Image: Wikipedia.

Robert Farley

Security, Asia

If the United States was deeply surprised to find itself at war with the People’s Republic of China, a country that hadn’t even existed the year before, it was even more surprised to find itself losing that war. It happened then and it could happen again.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: In November 1950, China and the United States went to war. Thirty-six thousand Americans died, along with upwards of a quarter-million Chinese, and half a million or more Koreans. If the United States was deeply surprised to find itself at war with the People’s Republic of China, a country that hadn’t even existed the year before, it was even more surprised to find itself losing that war. The opening Chinese offensive, launched from deep within North Korea, took U.S. forces by complete operational surprise. The U.S.-led United Nations offensive into North Korea was thrown back, with the U.S. Army handed its worst defeat since the American Civil War.

The legacies of this war remain deep, complex and underexamined. Memory of the Korean War in the United States is obscured by the looming shadows of World War II and Vietnam. China remembers the conflict differently, but China’s position in the world has changed in deep and fundamental ways since the 1950s. Still, as we consider the potential for future conflict between China and the United States, we should try to wring what lessons we can from the first Sino-American war.

Initiation: 

In early 1950, the politics of the Cold War had not yet solidified around a pair of mutually hostile blocks. Nevertheless, the contours were visible; the Soviets had spent several years consolidating control of Eastern Europe, and the Chinese Communist Party had ridden the victories of the People’s Liberation Army to power in Beijing. The stage was set for a zero-sum interpretation of the global struggle between Communist and non-Communist powers. It was just such an interpretation that dominated Washington’s thinking as North Korean forces escalated the Korean civil war with a massive invasion across the 38th parallel.

Inside the United States, tension over the collapse of Nationalist China remained high. The Nationalist government possessed an extremely effective public-relations machine in the United States, built around the Soong family’s relationship with Henry Luce. This influential domestic lobby helped push the United States towards both intervention and escalation, while at the same time undercutting the advice of experts who offered words of caution about Beijing’s capabilities and interests.

The initial Chinese victories in the late fall of 1950 resulted from a colossal intelligence failure on the part of the United States. These failures ran the gamut from political, to strategic, to operational, to tactical. The politicization of American expertise on China following the establishment of the PRC meant that U.S. policymakers struggled to understand Chinese messages. The United States also misunderstood the complex relationship between Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang, treating the group as a unitary actor without appreciating the serious political differences between the countries.

On an operational level, advancing U.S. forces paid little heed to warnings of Chinese intervention. The United States failed to understand the importance of the North Korean buffer to Beijing, failed to detect Chinese preparations for intervention, failed to detect Chinese soldiers operating in North Korea and failed to understand the overall strength of the Chinese forces. This lack of caution stemmed from several sources. The U.S. military, having had experience with Chinese Nationalist forces during World War II, had little respect for the capabilities of the PLA, especially outside of Chinese borders. Americans overrated the importance of air superiority at the tactical and operational level, not to mention the relevance of nuclear weapons at the strategic level.

Conduct: 

The People’s Liberation Army appreciated the significance of U.S. air superiority over the battlefield, as well as the effectiveness of U.S. armor and artillery. The PLA (or PVA, as the expeditionary force in North Korea was dubbed) attempted to fight with the hybrid insurgent tactics that it had used to prevail in the Chinese Civil War. This involved using light infantry formations, designed to move and attack at night, in order to avoid U.S. airpower and concentrated American firepower. These tactics allowed the PLA to surprise U.S. forces, which were uncertain of the magnitude of Chinese intervention until it was too late to do anything but retreat.

Similarly, the United States fought with the tactics (and often the weapons) that it had used in World War II. Although North Korean armor and artillery had outmatched unprepared U.S. ground forces in the opening weeks of the war, by the time of the Chinese counteroffensive, the United States was fielding mobile, armored forces and employing combined arms tactics. These weapons and tactics allowed the United States to inflict severe losses on Chinese forces, even as it gave up wide swaths of territory.

The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy expected to conduct sea and air operations in what we now refer to as a permissive environment, without significant interference from Communist forces. The Navy was right; the Air Force was wrong. Expecting overwhelming advantages in training and material, the U.S. air forces found cagey Communist forces equipped with the MiG-15 interceptors, which could outfight American piston-engined aircraft and most early jets. Formations of B-29s attempted to conduct daylight precision bombing raids of North Korea, finding that MiG-15s could cut them to pieces. U.S. forces, fresh from the bloody organizational fights that had birthed the U.S. Air Force, also struggled to develop a compatible, cooperative ground-air doctrine. Still, despite the problems, the United States managed to establish and hold air superiority for most of the war, using that freedom to inflict severe damage on Chinese and North Korean forces, infrastructure and logistics.

Lessons and Legacies: 

The most important legacy of the first Sino-American War is the enduring division of the Korean Peninsula. Following the exhaustion of the Chinese counteroffensive, neither side really threatened to throw the other off the peninsula. The relationships between Seoul, Washington, Beijing and Pyongyang have changed mightily over the years, but the conflict remains frozen along the geography established in 1953.

Many of the problems have stayed the same, despite the fundamental transformations that have overtaken global politics. Beijing has grown tired of the antics of its North Korean client, just as South Korea has grown significantly in wealth and power. But North Korea can still threaten the security and prosperity of the Republic of Korea, and threats to the DPRK are still felt in Beijing.

China and the United States remember this conflict much differently. For the United States, the Korean War represents an odd aberration; a war fought for justice but without satisfactory resolution. Americans’ most enduring memory of the conflict came through the television show M.A.S.H., which used the war as a proxy for talking about U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Even this memory has begun to fade, however.

For China, the war represents a remarkable victory over imperialism in the face of overwhelming odds. It introduced the People’s Republic of China to the international system with a (literal) bang. At the same time, the legacy of the war complicated China’s international situation. In part because of the memory of Chinese intervention, but also in combination with China’s domestic politics, the United States managed to keep the PRC isolated from the international system into the 1970s. Today, the PRC poses a quasi-imperial threat to neighbors all along its vast periphery, while at the same time representing one of the three major tent-poles of the growing global economy.

Militarily, the political, social and technological conditions that produced mass infantry warfare in Korea in the 1950s no longer hold. The United States has grown accustomed to fighting opponents who excel in hybrid warfare, but the People’s Liberation Army has been out of that business for decades. The ground forces of the PLA are now transitioning between mechanized and postmechanized warfare, while the air and sea forces are in the process of perfecting the world’s most extensive anti-access/area denial system. If conflict were to happen again, China would challenge U.S. control of the air and seas in a way that it never did during the Korean conflict.

The most interesting, useful lessons may involve botched war termination. The Korean War dragged on for nearly two years after the settlement of the key strategic issues became clear. Nevertheless, poor communication between Washington and Beijing, combined with reputational concerns on both sides, inflated minor issues—such as POW repatriation—and extended the war well beyond its productive limits. That the United States viewed its conflict with China as a proxy war complicated the problem, as American policymakers became obsessed with the message that every action sent to the Soviet Union. In any future conflict, even as political questions associated with escalation and reputation loom large, Beijing can likely count on having Washington’s full, focused attention.      

Conclusion

There was nothing good about the last Sino-American War, not even the “peace” that resulted from it. The experience of this war, now nearly forgotten on both sides, should serve as a grim lesson for policymakers in both Washington and Beijing. The Korean War was anything but accidental, but miscalculation and miscommunication both extended and broadened the war beyond its necessary boundaries.

Robert Farley is a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. Follow him on Twitter:@drfarls.

Image: Reuters

This article was first published in 2014.

Robert Farley

Russia Cold War, Europe

In retrospect, Soviet defeat seems overdetermined.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The United States certainly enjoyed tremendous advantages in 1945, including the world’s most robust economy, an advanced technological base, a well-developed set of internal economic infrastructure, and a relatively appealing sociopolitical model. But few who actively fought the Cold War believed in American invincibility.

Could the Soviets have won the Cold War? In retrospect, Soviet defeat seems overdetermined. The USSR suffered from a backwards economy, an unappealing political system, and unfortunate geography. But even into the 1980s, many Cold Warriors in the West worried that Red Victory was imminent.

We can think of Red Victory in two ways; first, if the fundamental rules of the competition between the United States and the USSR had operated differently, and second if Moscow and Washington had made different strategic decisions along the way.

Changing the Rules

The idea of socio-political “rules” that dictate how the world works runs counter to a lot of work in the social sciences. Still, certain social and political experiments initiated at the start of the Cold War ran aground on the shoals of social and human capacity. If we imagine the loosening of some of these “rules” then the Soviet and American experiments might have performed differently.

It was not obvious that central planning would fail as dismally as it did. Some economists, often working from the experience of World War II, believed that central governments could process information with sufficient speed and accuracy to successfully allocate resources across a society. This included the allocation of capital (human and resource) to technological innovation. In a wartime context, this worked well enough; the state could direct investment away from consumer goods and towards critical military production and innovation. In peacetime, the system worked less well, as workers and consumers demanded better treatment.

As it turned out, of course, state central planning fell short of the various forms of capital allocation found in the West, especially where innovation was concerned. This eventually had an impact on military innovation, as civilian technological contributed to military advances. Eventually, the United States could rely on its productive civilian economy not only to out-produce the Soviets in consumer goods, but also to produce more effective weapon systems.

On the other hand, if the American system had proven less resilient to economic and social pressures, then the United States might have had to give up on the Cold War. During the 1960s, this looked distinctly possible. Although the economy continued to perform well, social conflict over civil rights, and over Vietnam War, threatened to cause serious damage to U.S. democracy. Informed by a version of Marxist orthodoxy, Soviet planners expected that class conflict and economic stagnation would produce precisely this outcome, but in reality it happened for reasons that they could not have predicted. The crisis of the West emerged not from economic dislocation, but from its opposite; the 1950s and 1960s were an economic “golden age” according to Thomas Piketty, who observed that inequality in wealth and income began to accelerate in the 1970s. The social upheaval that threatened to destroy the West in the 1960s stemmed from the decay of systems of social and political inequality, rather than from a stagnating economy.

Related to this, we now think of the U.S. commitment to a certain level of civil liberties as one of its greatest Cold War strengths. The far greater tolerance in the United States (which ran far short of absolute) for political dissent created an altogether stronger and more attractive social system, while also synergizing with the economic system to enable consistent economic growth and technological innovation. At the time, however, many (both in the West and in the USSR) believed that tolerance for civil and political liberties exposed social and political weakness; the repressive Soviet system could better weather internal dissent than the relatively open American system.

Finally, the United States drew a tremendous amount of strength from the international economic system that it created at the end of World War II. This system eventually extended across the developing world, and supplied the West with the labor forces and raw materials necessary to vastly outperforming their Communist counterparts. If revolutionary models had proven more appealing in the postcolonial world, the balance of economic power might have shifted. In reality, while the Soviet political and economic model had some appeal across the developing world, would-be revolutionaries still found themselves embedded within a larger system that pushed them into collaboration with the West.

Strategic Decisions

What about changes that don’t involve breaking the world open and tinkering with the mechanisms? In this case the immense vulnerability of the USSR weighs against success, but there are still some strategies that might have played out more effectively.

If the Soviets had undertaken much more aggressive measures in the first two decades of the Cold War, they might have shattered the NATO alliance and prevented the development of the transatlantic coalition that won the Cold War. A general Red Army offensive into Western Europe in the 1950s or 1960s almost certainly would have enjoyed tremendous short-term success. The problem was twofold; the Americans had a nuclear advantage that could devastate the Soviet homeland, and the Soviets could barely afford to maintain the empire they had, to say nothing of expanding it into Western Europe. But the Soviets appreciated that the first might have been a bluff, and if they had calculated the long-term odds differently, might have gambled on the second. Bringing millions of sullen Germans, Frenchmen, and Italians under the Soviet boot might not have increased Soviet power in the long-run, but it would have dealt a blow to the architecture of the American-led post-war global system.

Another alternative would have involved deliberately retreating from central planning in the 1950s and 1960s, rather than in the late 1980s. China undertook this policy with great success at the end of the 1970s, producing enormous economic growth. Such an effort might not have generated a tremendous amount of foreign direct investment (as it did in China) but would at least have unshackled a moribund economic system. And the Chinese Communist Party has managed, thus far, to hold the lid on political dissent. Undertaking these steps before falling too far behind might have saved the USSR, at least for a time.

What about American decisions? The United States could have decided not to wage the Cold War at all. The Soviets seemed willing to accept the Finlandization of much of Western Europe, and in the absence of a U.S. presence Moscow might have renewed its old ties with Paris. As a result of reduced tension between the United States and the USSR, the Soviets would presumably have dedicated fewer resources to their war machine, reducing pressure on the rest of the economy. Of course, moving off a war footing might have produced social instability and pressure for internal change of repressive Soviet policies.

With its enormous economic resources, the United States had the advantage of making tragic mistakes, as the experience of Vietnam illustrates. It could have been worse; the United States could have decided to bog itself down in an effort to save the Chinese Nationalist regime in the 1940s and 1950s. Such a decision would not only have proven tremendously costly in blood and treasure; it would also have raised dangerous questions about U.S. imperial aims, and about the wisdom of U.S. strategic policymaking. The Soviets could have bled the Americans much more effectively than they did in either Korea or Vietnam, although it’s unclear whether it would have been enough to force the United States to scale down its international commitments.

Final Shots

The United States certainly enjoyed tremendous advantages in 1945, including the world’s most robust economy, an advanced technological base, a well-developed set of internal economic infrastructure, and a relatively appealing sociopolitical model.

But few who actively fought the Cold War believed in American invincibility. Rather, they believed that U.S. victory (or even survival) depended on carefully calibrated investment in particular military technologies, as well as extensive interventions in the domestic politics of foreign countries (with the Korean and Vietnamese Wars representing the most extravagant such interventions). Even in the 1980s, when the signs of Soviet decay became increasingly evident, few believed that the USSR would either collapse or withdraw from the conflict.

In any event, Soviet weakness ran deeper than almost anyone expected. Even to the extent that “new Cold Wars” are developing between the United States and Russia, or the United States and China, few want to replicate Soviet mistakes. But it would also be an error to discount the perceptions of those who waged both sides of the Cold War.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. This article first appeared several years ago.

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

Chinese Military, Asia

These weapons were reversed engineered or else copy technology that was stolen from America or Russia.

Key point: Beijing knows that having a modern military makes a big difference. This is how China went about getting high-end platforms through nearly any means necessary.

As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) emerged from war and revolution in 1949, it became apparent that the Chinese economy lacked the capacity to compete with the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. in the production of advanced military technology.  Transfers from the Soviet Union helped remedy the gap in the 1950s, as did transfers from the United States and Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Still, the Cultural Revolution stifled technology and scientific research, leaving the Chinese even farther behind.

Thus, China has long supplemented legitimate transfers and domestic innovation with industrial espionage.  In short, the PRC has a well-established habit of pilfering weapons technology from Russia and the United States.  As the years have gone by, Beijing’s spies have become ever more skillful and flexible in their approach. Here are five systems that the Chinese have stolen or copied, in whole or in part:

J-7:

In 1961, as tensions between the USSR and the PRC reached a fever pitch, the Soviets transferred blueprints and materials associated with its new MiG-21 interceptor to China. The offering represented an effort to bridge part of the gap, and suggest to China that cooperation between the Communist giants remained possible.

The offering didn’t work. Sino-Soviet tensions continued to increase, nearly to the point of war in the late 1960s. The Chinese worked from the blueprints and other materials, and eventually produced the J-7, a virtual copy of the MiG-21.  The Chinese eventually sold the J-7 (F-7 export variant) in direct competition with the MiGs sold by the Soviets.  Indeed, after the US-PRC rapprochement of the early 1970s, the Chinese sold J-7s directly to the Americans, who used them as part of an aggressor squadron to train US pilots to fight the Soviets.

J-11:

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s heralded a thaw in Russia-China relations.  Russia no longer had strong reasons to withhold its most advanced military technology from the Chinese.  More importantly, the huge Soviet military industrial complex needed customers badly, and the Russian military could no longer afford new equipment. For its part, the PRC needed new sources of high technology military equipment after Europe and the United States imposed arms embargoes in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre.

Accordingly, the 1990s saw several huge arms deals between Moscow and Beijing.  One of the most important involved the sale, licensing, and technology transfer of the Su-27 “Flanker” multirole fighter. The deal gave the Chinese one of the world’s most dangerous air superiority fighters, and gave the Russian aviation industry a lifeline.

But the era of good feelings couldn’t hold.  Details remain murky and disputed, but the Russians claim that the Chinese began violating licensing terms almost immediately, by installing their own avionics on Flankers (J-11, under Chinese designation).  The Chinese also began developing a carrier variant, in direct violation of agreed-to terms.  The appropriation of Russian technology undercut the relationship between Russia and China, making the Russians far more wary of transferring their crown jewels to the Chinese military.

J-31:

Even before the Snowden leaks established extensive Chinese industrial espionage, Americans analysts suspected that China was stealing information associated with the F-35.  The likely reality of this theft became clear when information about the J-31 stealth fighter became available.  The J-31 looks very much like a twin-engine F-35, without the VSTOL capabilities of the F-35B.

The J-31 also presumably lacks much of the advanced avionics that have the potential to make the F-35 a devastating fighter.  Nevertheless, the J-31 may eventually operate from carriers, and could potentially compete with the Joint Strike Fighter on the export market.

UAVs:

In 2010, China lagged woefully behind the United States in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology.  Since that time, the Chinese have caught up, and are now producing drones capable of competing with US models on the international arms market.  How did the Chinese catch up so fast?

According to US intelligence, Chinese hackers appropriated technology from several sources, including the US government and private companies (General Atomics) associated with the production of UAVs. The newest Chinese UAVs closely resemble US aircraft visually and in performance, a remarkable turn-around time for China’s aviation industry.

Night Vision Technology:

After the Vietnam War, the United States military decided that it would invest heavily in an effort to “own the night.”  This led to major advances in night vision technology, including equipment that allowed individual soldiers, armored vehicles, and aircraft to see and fight in the dark. This equipment has given the US a huge advantage in several conflicts since the 1980s.

China is seeking to end this advantage, and has geared some of its espionage efforts towards acquiring and replicating US tech in this area.  This has included some cyber-theft, but also several old-style ops in which Chinese businessmen illegally acquired export-controlled tech from US companies.

The Last Salvo:

The United States has become increasingly aggressive about slowing down or halting China’s industrial espionage efforts. This has included indictments of PLA officers, broad condemnations of Chinese spying, and targeted reprisals against some Chinese firms. But given the extensive commercial contacts between China and the United States, stopping the flow of technology is virtually impossible. Moreover, China has developed a large, innovative technology economy in its own right. Indeed, as Chinese technology catches up with American (and in some cases exceeds Russian) we may see the Chinese run into the same problems with foreign espionage.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to the National Interest, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money, Information Dissemination and the Diplomat. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

World War II History, Europe

Berlin would have loved to have developed the ultimate weapon, but it failed and America beat both the Axis and its fellow Allies to getting the bomb.

Key point: The Nazis won quickly at first with plenty of shock and awe. Yet as the war went on, it turned out that they did not have the time and resources to devote to costly wonder weapons.

In the early years of World War II, it looked as if Germany might have the luxury to spend its time developing a new generation of super-weapons. The Nazis haphazardly pursued the idea of building an atomic bomb, with an eye toward eventual conflict with the United States. However, the immediate demands of war, combined with Western Allied sabotage, undercut the program, leaving it at the basic research stage by war’s end.

But what if the Germans had devoted more attention to the program, or had lucked into more substantial breakthroughs?  What could the Nazis have done with an atomic weapon?

Context for Construction:

The American atomic weapons program cost an enormous amount of money, and took human capital away from other important projects. But the United States, unique among the great powers of World War II, believed that the war would last long enough to justify complex projects. 

Germany did not have this luxury, especially after it became apparent that the Soviet Union would not collapse in 1941. For Germany to seriously consider taking the atomic plunge, it needed favorable war conditions that would allow the development of long-term research projects. In the event, jets, submarines, and rockets took up a greater portion of the Reich’s scarce engineering resources.

The German program faced other obstacles. Western Allied attacks on the German industrial economy took their toll, even if they could not push Germany out of the war. Sabotage, like the attacks on heavy water processing plants in Norway, also curtailed German progress. The nature of the Nazi regime also made scientific progress difficult. Many of the best nuclear scientists disliked the Nazis, and took steps to escape Europe. The Germans could not draw on Europe’s scientific expertise to the same extent as the Americans. Nevertheless, the Nazi regime did make substantial progress on a number of engineering frontiers, and could have developed a weapon in time.

Solving the basic theoretical and engineering problems wouldn’t have suddenly turned Germany into a major nuclear power, however. The German program concentrated on enriched uranium, a simpler project that eliminated some of the more tricky problems faced by the United States.  However, the need for stocks of uranium (some of which had been seized from Belgium), and the extensive industrial complex needed to enrich, would have made it difficult for the Germans to produce a large number of devices.

Delivery:

Even if the Germans had managed to develop an atomic weapon, delivery would have been a problem. For tactical use against ground targets, the Wehrmacht could have engineered a way to deliver the devices, but anything at longer range would have been a struggle.

The Luftwaffe lacked an advanced heavy bomber capable of hitting targets in England or Russia, much less the United States. Designed to fight in support of the Wehrmacht, the German air force had toyed with the idea of heavy bombers in the 1930s, but concentrated on lighter, smaller planes as war approached. Surely, the German could have developed a strategic bomber given enough time; Junkers, Heinkel, and Focke Wulf all worked on large bomber projects during the war. But such aircraft were enormously complex and expensive, with long lead times. The B-29 program reputedly cost more than the atomic bomb itself, and even B-29s required modification in order to carry atomic weapons. The best candidate available to the Luftwaffe would have been the He 177, capable of carrying a device considerably smaller than the “Little Boy” bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

Could submarines have delivered the devices? Conceivably. A nuclear torpedo was probably beyond the means of the Kriegsmarine, but a submarine sufficiently close to its target could probably deliver the warhead in a small boat. But getting into position was no mean task; by 1943, Allied anti-submarine warfare was devastating Germany’s submarine fleet. Only the Type XXI submarines could have approached useful targets with any degree of certainty, and these boats did not appear until late in the war.

The V-2 ballistic missiles represented the most obvious potential delivery vehicles. They could deliver payloads at range, with little chance of interception, and with enough accuracy for an atomic warhead. However, V-2s had a startling launch failure rate, making them a sketchy option for an atomic payload. They also lacked the ability to carry heavy payloads; reducing a warhead to sufficiently small size, and reinforcing it such that it could handle the rigors of launch, flight, and separation, were tasks likely beyond Nazi Germany in any useful timeframe.

Use of the Weapon:

How would the Germans have used the atomic bomb, if they had managed to construct it? It depends, naturally, on Germany’s tactical situation when it developed the weapon, and on the delivery systems it had available.

Obvious strategic targets include London and Moscow, and the Luftwaffe could probably have delivered them successfully with a fair degree of confidence. An attack on either would have proved devastating. In the case of Moscow, a surprise strike that decapitated the Soviet leadership might have caused very serious problems, although the Red Army would undoubtedly have continued to fight. In the West, the V-2 campaign had a serious impact on British morale, and an atomic device would have had an even more devastating impact. It’s worth keeping in mind, however, that the Combined Bomber Offensive was delivering atomic levels of destruction to the Reich from 1943 on, and that this effort failed to force a German surrender. In any case, the center of gravity of the Western Allied war effort had passed to the other side of the Atlantic, and the United States was likely out of reach.

If hard-pressed by the Red Army, Germany could have used its weapons for tactical effect. An atomic weapon could have had a devastating impact on armored columns, staging areas, or command centers, although with a small number of warheads the Germans would have had to take great care in target selection. The Red Army moved on such a massive scale that even an atomic attack might not have upset its grandest offensives.

On the naval side, the Bikini atom bomb tests demonstrated that modern naval units could survive atomic attacks, if imperfectly. As with the war in the East, atomic bombs could have dented the Western Allied naval advantage, but likely not to the extent of severing the trans-Atlantic lifeline. Major amphibious operations, such as the Normandy Invasion, would have proven far juicier targets, although they would have required very judicious decisions on the part of the Germans.

The Final Salvo:

Nazi Germany could have developed nuclear weapons if it had won the war. It could not develop them as war-winning weapons, both because of the demands of the project and the limitations of early atomic devices. Only the United States could combine the economic resources and the long-time horizon necessary to develop the bomb, while at the same time developing a fleet of bombers capable of delivering it.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Matthew Moss

Rifles,

Civilian shooters often innovate when the military doesn’t.

Here's What You Need to Remember: People come in different sizes, and Colt expected shooters to hold the guns at different positions on their arms. But with plans to tuck the tiny rifles inside airplanes, an individual couldn’t properly calibrate it for his or her own shape and size.

Military aircrews always have to train for the possibility of crashing behind enemy lines. In the event of this disaster scenario, the pilots and crews must rely on the kinds of weapons—mainly pistols and knives—they can carry on their persons or stuff into small survival kits.

In the late 1960s, the famous Colt firearms company hoped to give fliers a tiny assault rifle instead. But the final version was awkward, inaccurate and difficult to use.

In 1969, engineers at Colt offered the U.S. Air Force a unique lightweight gun, primarily for bomber crews. Since the unusual-looking rifle had no butt stock, shooters would have had to brace the so-called Individual Multi-Purpose Weapon against their bicep.

“Consideration was … given to what an aircrewman might have with him when he bailed out or what he might find on the ground which could serve as a stock,” stated an official Air Force report. “The only practical solution was the man’s arm.”

Two years before, the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command had outlined a number of basic requirements for this new weapon. At the time, the flying branch still used World War II-era survival rifles.

These crude rifles shot .22-caliber bullets and small shotgun shells. While functional, the guns were only good for killing snakes or hunting small game.

“Capable of killing a man at 100 yards,” was SAC’s first demand for the new firearm, the technical study noted. The old war-era rifle wouldn’t do.

More than lethal, the Air Force wanted its next survival weapon to be extremely compact. The gun couldn’t be any longer than 13 inches, or more than one inch wide.

For a highly practical reason—the weapon needed to fit inside the cramped confines of a cockpit. Crews needed to be able to grab the guns quickly in an emergency, too.

Before coming up with its stock-less survival weapon, Colt toyed around with a tiny M-16 for pilots. The company trimmed down the standard battle rifle’s barrel, stock and even the pistol grip to create the Model 608.

But to meet the Air Force’s space constraints, bomber crews would have had to break the gun in half—making it unusable. As a result, the flying branch’s own weaponeers decided that getting rid of the stock was the only real solution.

“Folding, telescoping, detachable, and wire skeleton stocks were considered,” the report stated. “All of these except the wire skeleton exceeded either weight, volume, or dimensional restrictions.”

A stubby M-16 wouldn’t work, so technicians continued to experiment with various pistols and modified rifles. And the Air Force focused on a new bullet—the .221 Remington.

“The caliber .221 cartridge was chosen for the demonstrator because it produced a weapon midway between the weapons of ultimate interest, a caliber .17 survival rifle and a 5.56-millimeter rifle/submachine gun,” stated the technical overview.

Colt took this basic concept and ran with it. The new semi-automatic gun — known as the IMP-221, meaning Individual Multi-Purpose and .221 caliber — was extremely compact.

The weapon weighed less than four pounds and was only an inch wide. However, the mini-rifle was still more than two inches longer than the Air Force wanted. To shorten the gun down to this length, Colt’s designers put the IMP-221’s trigger right up near the front of the gun. The main firing mechanism sat in the frame’s rear.

The pistol grip swiveled left and right, so the gun and its 30-round magazine could rest neatly on an airman’s forearm. The sights rotated so the shooter could aim straight.

By 1971, Colt had tweaked the design even more. The gun now had special bracket that held—and could lock onto—the shooter’s arm.

“Demonstrations proved the basic concept was not only feasible but exceeded expectations,” the Air Force report declared. “Further efforts will be made to improve … and to modify the design for quantity production.”

Unfortunately, the Air Force evaluators had discovered the weapons were highly inaccurate. As the shooter swiveled around with the rifle locked in place, the motion threw off the gun’s freely-moving sights.

Another problem was adjust for individuals. People come in different sizes, and Colt expected shooters to hold the guns at different positions on their arms. But with plans to tuck the tiny rifles inside airplanes, an individual couldn’t properly calibrate it for his or her own shape and size.

“An effort should be made to improve the sights, either by a simple design breakthrough, or by adding enough hardware to provide adequate sighting for all shooters,” the technical report recommended.

Colt and the Air Force abandoned plans for a .17-caliber version. Instead, Colt modified the guns to shoot standard 5.56-millimeter ammunition.

The final variants—given the official moniker GUU-4/P—incorporated many more parts from existing M-16 rifles, and used the same magazines. Frustrated by continued difficulties, the Air Force eventually scrapped the whole plan.

Former Special Forces soldier Mack Gwinn, Jr. and his company Gwinn Firearms eventually acquired the unique design.

Gwinn went on to sell his own version, the Bushmaster Arm Pistol, to civilian shooters. He also put the gun’s basic parts into a more conventional package to create the Bushmaster Rifle. Today, Gwinn’s old company—now renamed Bushmaster Firearms—makes AR-15 and M-16 variants for private customers, police and soldiers.

But the arm pistols never proved popular with civilians. As one can see from videos across the Internet, they’re more of a novelty than anything else—and no one can agree on how to hold them at the range.

Civilian shooters often innovate when the military doesn’t. But no one has ever figured out the best way to shoot the Air Force’s tiny assault rifle.

This first appeared in WarIsBoring several years ago.

Image: Flickr.