Ideas on Europe Blog

Today on “Ideas on Europe” we are going to Windsor. Not to visit the new King, but to talk about whether this spring’s deal on Northern Ireland means a new start for relations between the EU and the UK. To discuss this further, we welcome back the chair of our partner UACES, Simon Usherwood, professor at the Open University.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

So, is everything happy again between the British and Brussels?

As much as you might hope that was the case, sadly it’s not quite that simple.

You will remember that ever since the EU agreed on the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the organisation at the very start of 2020, the British have been talking about how unhappy they are with the arrangements, contained in the Northern Ireland Protocol.

In essence, those arrangements keep Northern Ireland inside the EU’s single market, as a way of avoiding having to have border controls between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This was something that has been a key part of the settlement of the violence there in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, which has just had its 25th anniversary.

The problem is that not having those so-called North-South controls has meant having controls instead between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK; or East-West checks, as we refer to them.

For London, that was taken as an infringement of British sovereignty and the integrity of the UK, and Boris Johnson, the then Prime Minister, kept on making moves to get out of the Protocol.

Now in the world of international law, not sticking to your treaty obligations is a Bad Thing and so the EU has spent the last three years being deeply concerned about this. Most obviously, it has meant that any other topic of potential cooperation between the two has been made conditional by the Union on resolving this problem.

 

But Johnson has left Number 10 Downing Street. Are things improving now?

If we ignore the brief period with Liz Truss, the current Prime Minister Rishi Sunak saw an opportunity to cut through this impasse, simultaneously reopening options with the EU and demonstrating his ‘can-do’ approach ahead of the next British general election.

The deal reached in February this year provides for some reductions in East-West checks and the application of EU rules in Northern Ireland, but these details are less important than the politics of the situation.

By signing up to this, and by getting broad support from his party at the same time, Sunak has started to repair the damage done to trust in relations and has, in effect, committed the Conservative party to work to honour its commitments under the Protocol.

 

So where does Windsor come into all this?

This was part of the cunning second aspect of the deal: getting Northern Ireland’s government up and running again.

The main unionist party, the DUP, has refused to join any government for the past couple of years, because of the Protocol.

Choosing the name of Windsor Framework for the new deal with the EU was a very calculated attempt to dress up the changes in the rhetoric of unionism: it’s hard to think of other places that are quite so invested in the images and symbols of the United Kingdom.

However, that symbolic push hasn’t worked out and we still don’t have a government in operation in Northern Ireland; something that doesn’t look like it’ll change soon.

 

Has it at least removed some of the tensions between London and Brussels?

It hasn’t been a complete reset, I’m afraid.

On Northern Ireland itself, there are still numerous points of practical implementation that are causing difficulties and where the UK has still to show that it is doing the things it said it would.

In Parliament, we have a couple of pieces of legislation being pushed through that could well break other treaty obligations made by the UK to the EU.

And while we have seen new talks about British participation in various EU activities – like research funding – those haven’t yet produced agreements.

Indeed, the main point we might take from all of this is that while trust is really important as a basic condition for working together, it’s not enough by itself. Things like finances, legal differences and day-to-day party politics also count for a lot too.

 

So should we be cheerful, or pessimistic right now?

Good question! And one that’s very hard to answer at this stage. Maybe the best we can say is that Windsor has been a positive step, but only one step in a long journey to the British finding a relationship with the EU that everyone is comfortable with.

 

Many thanks, for sharing your analysis with us. I recall you are professor at the Open University.

 

Entretien réalisé par Laurence Aubron.

 

 

The post Going to Windsor appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

For our weekly ‘Ideas on Europe’ editorial by UACES, the University Association for European Studies, we have the pleasure to welcome again Dr Başak Alpan, from the Middle East Technical University, in Ankara.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

You spoke to us just before the first round of the elections in Turkey, full of hope for change. What is your analysis after the run-off election won by President Erdoğan?

In my previous commentary, you may remember I referred to a recent ad by one of the biggest Rakı brands in Turkey with the title, ‘When that day comes’…

Well, that day came. And it came with the uttermost anxiety and excitement amongst the voters. As you know, the presidential election went to a run-off after none of the candidates reached the 50% threshold for victory.

In the closely contested second round on 28 May, the opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu secured 47.8% of the votes whereas Recep Tayyip Erdoğan obtained 52.1 % and became, again, president of Turkey. Erdoğan was able to keep the electoral block he had claimed for the last 20 years despite the ongoing hyper-inflation and recent earthquake that could not be handled very efficiently by the state authorities.

Nevertheless, in Ankara and İstanbul, which had already passed their local administration to the Republican Party CHP in 2019, the opposition got the lead, with the majority of votes going to Kılıçdaroğlu and only 46.69% and 46% obtained by Erdoğan respectively. The third biggest city, İzmir, had traditionally voted for the opposition anyway. Besides these major cities, support for Kılıçdaroğlu’s presidential bid emerged solidly from all the Kurdish-majority South-Eastern provinces.

 

And still, it was not enough to make change happen.

It seems that the predominant strategy of the second round, which was nationalism, paid off for Erdoğan. He always had a strong influence on the conservative nationalist electorate, in the traditional Central Anatolian regions in particular, which this time, was accompanied by the opposition’s clearly anti-refugee rhetoric.

Since 2011, when the first Syrian refugee arrived in Turkey, migration has become a game-changer in daily Turkish politics for the first time. The CHP revealed its perspective by clearly propagandizing against the number of refugees. In a video, they claimed, “we will not abandon our homeland to this mentality that has introduced 10 million undocumented migrants among us.” On a similar note, the CHP signed a memorandum of understanding with the ultra-nationalist “Victory Party”, which stipulated that the practice of appointing trustees in place of elected mayors, whose “links with terrorism had been judicially proven” could continue, which clearly pointed at the Kurdish municipalities. This memorandum cost Kılıçdaroğlu a bulk of votes in the second round, especially in South-East Turkey, where citizens had long complained about this anti-democratic practice.

 

Where do you think Turkish politics are heading now?

Erdoğan’s first speech after the election already showed the prospective tone of domestic politics. He taunted his opponent’s defeat with the words “Bye, bye, Kemal” and accused the opposition of being ‘pro-LGBT’. It seems that the political polarisation in Turkish society epitomised by the election results will further increase the level of antagonism in daily politics.

Nevertheless, there is one field that cannot be governed by rhetoric alone, and that is the economy. The Turkish economy has been suffering from high inflation and dramatic slumping of the Turkish lira. The anti-popular austerity measures that would alleviate the inflation are not likely to be implemented by Erdoğan in the short-term since there will be local elections in Ankara and Istanbul in 10 months’ time. Erdoğan has won, but he knows that his job will be even more difficult if he fails to win back the municipalities of two big cities.

Is there any silver lining on the horizon? There is, as always. Merve Dizdar, who won the Best Actress Award at the Cannes Film Festival one day before the election, delivered an emotional speech on the struggle of women in Turkey. She said that for her role as a teacher in a remote town in the movie “About Dry Grasses”, she didn’t need to rehearse because she has known how such women feel “by heart since the day I was born”. I am sure that in the coming years, there will be more momentum for grassroots mobilisation and organisation of LGBTs, Kurds, and the working class which is getting poorer every day. And for women, to whom Merve Dizdar dedicated her award with the words “to all my sisters who do not give up hope no matter what the award is, and to all struggling spirits in Turkey who are waiting to experience the good days they deserve”.

 

Thank you very much for having shared twice your personal views on Turkey at election time. I recall that you are an associate professor at the Middle East Technical University.

 

Interview by Laurence Aubron.

 

 

The post Erdoğan’s Pyrrhic Victory appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Over the last fifteen years, EU leaders have frequently resorted to emergency measures in response to periods of crisis. But while these measures may have helped bring order to unstable situations, have they come at a cost for the EU’s legitimacy? Jonathan White argues that instead of bolstering the EU’s fire-fighting capacity, we would be better served by designing a ‘normal’ regime that is able to handle extreme circumstances.

Charles Michel, President of the European Council at the round table of the European Council Summit of 24 June 2021. Source: European Council.

In today’s volatile world, the ambitions attached to the EU have never been higher. French President Emmanuel Macron calls for the construction of ‘European sovereignty’ as a way to preserve European identity, shape the continent’s destiny, and escape the role of ‘mere witness of the dramatic evolution of this world’. Visions of a more assertive and autonomous EU abound in the European Commission too. But the grander the ambitions, the more important the foundations. Does the EU have the legitimate institutions and habits of rule to support this more activist role?

Critical assessment of the EU often centres on its effectiveness – understandably for an organisation created to solve problems. For their economic measures, border management, vaccine procurement or foreign policy, those acting in the EU’s name are judged on their capacity to act.

The risk of assessing something by its outcomes is that one downplays how these are attained. A hallmark of EU politics over the last decade has been leaders’ willingness to overstep legal and political constraints in the name of getting things done. One sees actions exceeding norms and rules, rationalised as necessary responses to exceptional and urgent threats – the template of emergency politics. Sometimes this empowers executives at the supranational level, in the EU institutions or things like the Troika; sometimes it empowers state representatives, in forums such as the Eurogroup or European Council.

Emergency measures have their logic and can bring order to an unstable situation. But they also raise constitutional issues. Power in such moments comes to be concentrated ever further on executive institutions, political and technocratic, at the expense of parliaments, courts and wider publics. It passes to key figures at the apex, often acting informally, opaquely and fast. Who precisely is in control, and what criteria they apply to decision-making, becomes difficult to discern and contest, while decisions may be hard to revise later.

Two structural features of the EU make it especially vulnerable to exceptionalism. The first is its soft constitutional structure. Processes of coordination are based on conventions of consultation rather than codification. This means there is little to deter executive agents, singly or collectively, should they seek to depart from procedure. A second vulnerability lies in the EU’s historically technocratic orientation. For those imbued with a problem-solving ethos, achieving certain outcomes ‘whatever it takes’ is likely to be the prime concern. Ends will typically trump means.

Emergency scripts

In view of the EU’s reliance on improvised and irregular methods, some argue the need to bolster its fire-fighting capacity. What the EU requires in this view is an agreed set of procedures for handling exceptional situations – a temporary boost in the powers of its institutions to protect public health, settle the economy, or respond to an international crisis. The EU needs an emergency script, allowing its representatives to act quickly and efficiently while also maintaining their accountability.

Yet an exceptional mechanism of this kind could potentially make matters worse. Historically, such arrangements have been predicated on the idea that emergencies are short-lived. The ancient Roman institution of ‘dictatorship’, employed mainly in the context of war, assumed the limited duration of the military campaigning season. Exceptional measures were acceptable because the circumstances they addressed were exceptional.

Today’s emergencies, in the EU and more generally, typically emerge from long-term pathologies of politics, capitalism and climate, giving them a much more extended horizon. If there is no natural boundary between normal and abnormal times, the risk is either of short, superficial responses to deep problems, or of a permanent politics of emergency.

The very existence of emergency powers encourages authorities to leave problems to fester. Knowing they can invoke extra powers when the going gets tough, they have less reason to pursue the hard choices and reforms that get to the heart of things. They have a fallback option to rely on. Emergency politics is always in some sense the legacy of policy failure, and when that failure can be mopped up using exceptional measures it is that bit easier to indulge.

Constitutionalising the EU

Instead of devising an emergency script, the task is to design a ‘normal’ regime that is able to handle extreme circumstances – efficiently but also acceptably. One goal should be a simplified structure of power. Abolish the European Council, Eurogroup and the like, and give the Commission the responsibilities of government. A more integrated transnational executive would be less prone to informality and the ad hoc concentration of power. To the extent that it would still lapse into arbitrary or unresponsive methods, it would be a more visible target of critique.

Couple this with strengthening the European Parliament. Embedding executive power in a parliamentary system gives it a stronger basis in public opinion and debate. One of the lessons of Covid-19 is that countries with strong parliamentary systems tended to respond at least as well as the alternatives. The key principle of governing in extreme circumstances should not be speed but consent. Not only is this more democratic, but it increases the prospects of compliance in the short term and can build public support for the structural change needed to ward off crises to come.

Any such transformation of the EU is likely to meet plenty of resistance. But unlike with a supposedly temporary emergency script, the stakes would be clear at the moment of enactment. It would be approved only to the extent its arrangements are acceptable as permanent features rather than as temporary deviations from normality.

Constitutionalisation in this deeper sense would reflect the reality that the policy challenges of the present amount not to a series of passing emergencies, short-lived and exceptional, but to enduring problems of politics, society, climate and economy that should be engaged on a fundamental and open-ended basis. Recent events suggest an EU that aspires to become more militarised and economically assertive – a sovereign actor in world affairs. It needs a constitutional overhaul to match.

For more information, see the author’s accompanying paper at the Journal of Common Market Studies. 

This post has been previously published by the LSE Blog here. 

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For our weekly ‘Ideas on Europe’ editorial by UACES, the University Association for European Studies, we have the pleasure to welcome Dr Tamás Matura, from Corvinus University in Budapest.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

You are the founder of an institute that conducts research on the relations between Central and Eastern European countries and China.

That’s right. You may have heard that these relations, which were institutionalized in the so-called “17+1” cooperation group, have cooled down a bit over recent years, for various reasons. But contrary to the majority of Central and Eastern European countries, the Hungarian government still seems very keen on maintaining close and friendly relationships with China.

 

What exactly is Victor Orbán’s strategy with regard to China?

The Orbán government has never published an official China Strategy! As a result, one can only speculate about its intentions. But some strategic goals are clear to see.

First, the government hopes that strong ties to the PRC may lead to economic advantages in the form of increased trade and investment relations. Currently, Chinese foreign direct investment in Hungary is between 4 and 6 billion Euros, which is not negligible, and the government argues that bilateral trade has been growing dynamically. Let’s not forget either that thanks to the goodwill of Beijing, Hungary was one of the first countries to roll-out Covid-19 vaccinations to its population, even though vaccine procurement from China has raised many questions regarding the efficacy and price of the doses.

 

And in political terms?

When it comes to domestic politics the pro-China attitude of the government did bear some fruits.

Since 2010, the public praise by the Orbán cabinet of Sino-Hungarian relations and of Chinese investors has shaped a pro-China narrative in governmental communication and in pro-government media outlets. Furthermore, the positive tone about a successful China helps to depict the West as an even less favorable partner, on the brink of collapse. The Covid-19 crisis offered another opportunity to the Hungarian government to paint a pleasant picture of China while it could denounce European ‘incompetence’. Official comments have never blamed Beijing for the outbreak of the pandemic. On the contrary, the government has been emphasizing the massive amounts of medical equipment sent from China to Hungary. The outcome of these governmental communication efforts was a sharp increase in China’s reputation among Fidesz voters, which in turn, has contributed to the popularity of the ruling party and its massive election success in early 2022.

 

What are the diplomatic benefits for Hungary in adopting this attitude?

Well, the perceived or actual support of Beijing may actually improve the bargaining position of Hungary vis-à-vis the European Union and the United States.

Ever since Mr. Orbán announced his intention to turn Hungary into an “illiberal democracy”, he has been trying to form a global alliance of similar regimes with the likes of Bolsonaro, Erdoğan, Netanyahu, Putin, up to Xi Jinping, and even Donald Trump. Part and parcel of this endeavour was the use of Hungarian vetoes in the EU to support not only Chinese but also Russian, Turkish, or Israeli interests.

 

How successful is this strategy? Has it reached its limits?

Mr. Orbán’s foreign policy, based on a loud and aggressive communication strategy, worked surprisingly well in the peace and prosperity of the 2010s. It seems, however, less applicable in recent years as the “illiberal club” proved unstable with the political fall of many of its members, and as Russia’s aggression on Ukraine has made European countries rally around the flags of the EU and NATO in defense of “liberal democracy”.

But despite these fundamental changes in the international landscape, Mr. Orbán apparently tries to double down on his pro-China policy. Indeed, as he has become the very last friend of Beijing in the whole EU, his relative importance may have even grown in the eyes of the Chinese government. The visit of state councillor Wang Yi to Budapest in February 2023 and the subsequent announcement that Mr. Orbán may visit China in the near future both demonstrate the strength of bilateral ties while at the same time, EU-China relations experience serious tensions. Whether this unique position is worth its price of lost reputation in Washington and Brussels, is a question only Mr. Orbán himself could answer.

 

We’re already happy with your own analysis. Many thanks for sharing this insight with us. I recall you are the founder of the Central and Eastern European Center for Asian Studies, and assistant professor at Corvinus University in Budapest.

 

Interview by Laurence Aubron.

The post Mr. Orbán’s Hungary: China’s Last Friend in the EU? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This week’s announcement from the Council on the adoption of three Regulations marks the end of a rapid process of enacting the Windsor Framework.

As discussed earlier this month, while the February photoshoot in leafy Surrey [my local news sources were very adamant about it not being even Berkshire, let alone Windsor] was good for headlines, it wasn’t much more than a set of commitments to enact a bundle of items.

While the Joint Committee‘s meeting within a month permitted much of that content to be moved into the rule books, even with an accelerated procedure the EU has needed a further two months to get these Regulations over the line.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic119

But enactment is not quite the same as application, as we noted before. While I picked out a couple of examples last time, it felt sensible to be more systematic about this, given that we are now on the next stage.

The graphic below sets out the progressive application for the central Joint Committee decision and for the three Regulations: the other elements are effective immediately.

The Joint Committee decision unpacks its provisions, with goods subject to a phased introduction of new measures, conditional upon British implementation. This is similar to the original transitional elements within the Withdrawal Agreement and reflect an intention to allow market operators to adjust over a clear time horizon.

Likewise, the SPS Regulation phases in markings of retail goods, especially on diary and meat where production and distribution chains have been most cross-border pre-withdrawal.

Of course, markings on retail goods is a more general UK headache, with the UKCA mark pushed back to the end of 2024, so producers will need to incorporate this aspect in a more systemic overhaul, which in turn requires a definitive central government position.

Finally, the medicines Regulation will only apply from 2025, again conditional upon several British guarantees.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic120

Recall that all of this comes three years into the notional start of the Protocol. Partly this is the price paid for the breakneck timetable of negotiation and ratification, but it is also a reflection of the British government’s long refusal to accept the Protocol as the baseline for future relations.

Business might be understandably loath to use capital expenditure when policy remains in the air: indeed, even when policy appears relatively clear, misallocation occurs with all its associated opportunity costs.

The take away here is still that implementation will be a long process, rather than an event. Even when we get to the end of this set of transitions, we run directly into the TCA revision in 2025, which might produce further changes. Not to mention the potential effects of a general election.

Relations are thus in semi-permanent flux: the question is how this is managed by the parties and communicated to stakeholders and citizens. Whether that’s easier or harder as we return to the technocratic mode is open to debate, but reflection on that now might seem a prudent course of action.

The post Into full Windsor implementation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

By Theofanis Exadaktylos, University of Surrey and Kennet Lynggaard, Roskilde University

As scholars of politics and international relations we are trained to design our research based on methodological and research design traditions. For those of us working on EU politics, broadly speaking, the way we conceive the EU as a political reality and entity reflects the way we study it and the way we design our research in terms of methods, data and analysis. Are we therefore falling into a trap that predetermines our research findings based on our practices of research design?

In our recent article at JCMS, we took up a meta-analytical exercise to review the literature around EU politics, zooming into the way some of the most influential articles in our field use certain methods, design their empirical research and produce specific types of findings (for similar exercises see Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009 and Exadaktylos and Lynggaard 2016). Our cue was the work by Colin Hay (2002) followed by the reflections of Manners (2011) who suggest that there is a so-called ‘directional dependence’ between the way we understand our object of study, the type of knowledge we produce about it and the way we get to that knowledge. This is a trap we can all fall into when those dependencies become fixed and automatically sneak into our research design choices almost diluting the research problem at hand.

There may be damaging effects when falling into this trap that can constrain the scope of innovation in our field, the type of questions that we ask and the way we analyse EU politics. In our article, we don’t attempt an evaluation of the quality of our field of research; our purpose is to map out those research design practices and explore their consequences for the way we view and understand the actuality of the EU. In plain words, what do we see when we look at EU politics through our preferred research design? More importantly, what questions and dimensions of EU politics are not exposed enough or are even silenced in the process?

There are some strong methodological and research divides in EU studies, for instance between rationalist and constructivist methodologies or between quantitative and qualitative methods and data. While there are some commendable attempts to bridge traditions and break methodological silos, the divisions persist. Building bridges is a difficult ambition requiring a good definition of scholarly positions and can lead to either descriptive exercises or doing methods for methods’ sake.

Recognising favouritisms and negligence in research design practices moves us beyond the principled positions of the past; we understand the richness of topics around EU politics, and we make better sense of their impact in defining and demarcating the scope of our research field. Therefore, does a degree of directional dependency exist in EU studies and how high is it? Are the choices we make automatic, and do they damage our field at an aggregate level?

In our article, we sketch out those choices and describe how deviations can be possible. We suggest two pathways, stemming from our primary choice of studying the effect of EU politics as a cause, or placing the EU as a cause of effects. The figure below shows how the paths operate in terms of the subsequent choices once we embark on our research journey.

Our analysis of the state of the art in the study of the EU confirms an important degree of traditionalism in our research approaches. The lion’s share of EU politics literature we examined exhibits a high degree of directional dependency in the way their research is designed. This is not say that this is problematic, considering that shared paradigms favour aggregation of knowledge and solving puzzles. But innovative research may suffer (see Kuhn 1996 [1962] for a wider discussion) and our portrayal of the EU as a political reality can become static. We lose out on pluralism and multidimensional views of the EU.

Explorative pieces of research are not as prominent in our field in terms of opening up new areas of research or focusing on less prominent aspects of EU politics, but those who manage to break this barrier create vibrant and innovative research agendas (see for example the JCMS special issue on ‘Another Theory is Possible: Dissident Voices in Theorising Europe’). On a similar vein, the majority of the literature adopts rich sets of variables, which of course allow capturing and understanding of the complexity of EU political phenomena. However, research that is more parsimonious may hold the key to new agendas and to making claims about the wider dynamics and implications of EU politics.

Despite the high degree of a directional trap in EU politics literature, there are examples of departing from the beaten track. The pathways are not, and don’t need to be, deterministic. Although rare, studies that take paths least travelled can offer nuances or alternatives to the current state of play (see for example the nuanced typology by Dunlop and Radaelli (2013) on policy learning in the EU). Taking less traditional approaches, such as political economy, deliberative intergovernmental, or narrative approaches, help to actively pursue alternative designs and generate innovative research outcomes (Copelovitch et al 2016 or Puetter 2012 are good examples).

There are multiple reasons as to why the trap exists, frequently starting from the way we are being trained as researchers, our comfort zones, the pressures to publish in specific outlets or to increase our specialisation, and from the publicly acceptable paradigms that are reproduced within our very own research communities. But there are also plenty of reasons why we should reflect and avoid a stasis in the production of knowledge around EU politics and why we should not be afraid to go off the beaten track.

Theofanis Exadaktylos is Professor in European Politics at the University of Surrey. His most recent book is the co-edited volume with Nikolaos Zahariadis, Evangelia Petridou and Jörgen Sparf on Policy Styles and Trust in the Age of Pandemics: Global Threat, National Responses (2022). He is the co-editor of Research Design in European Studies: Establishing Causality in Europeanization (2012) (with Claudio Radaelli). Find his academic profile here.

Follow Theofanis Exadaktylos @EUForeignPolicy // University of Surrey @UniofSurrey // Department @SurreyPolitics

Kennet Lynggaard is Associate Professor in European Politics at Roskilde University. He is the author of Discourse Analysis and European Union Politics (2019) and co-editor of Governments’ Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic in Europe: Navigating the Perfect Storm (2023) (Kluth, M. and Jensen, M.D.) and Research Methods in European Union Studies (2015) (with I. Manners & K. Löfgren). Find his academic profile here.

Follow Kennet Lynggaard on Twitter @KennetLynggaard // Roskilde University @roskildeuni

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On 20 and 21 April 2023, EUHealthGov held a 2-day workshop to discuss research and teaching on EU health policy and law. As part of the latter focus, we undertook an exercise to develop a collaborative, open access teaching resource. 

This blog (also available as a PDF here) presents a series of vignettes describing topics or themes that might be taught as part of a course or programme on EU health governance. They were developed collaboratively at the EUHealthGov teaching workshop, held in Brussels on 21 April 2023, and compiled by the EUHealthGov coordinators. Each vignette includes a short description of the topic or issue to be addressed, ideas for activities, discussion questions or assessments, and one or two suggested readings. They are loosely divided into themes based within the disciplines of public health, law and political science.

The vignettes are presented here as an open and living resource – if you have any additions or suggestions, and would like these added to the resource (with attribution), please email euhealthgov[at]gmail.com. We’re particularly keen to hear from those addressing EU health governance from other disciplines (sociology, economics, geography etc.). 

We are grateful to the following contributors for their inputs:

• Dr Eleanor Brooks (University of Edinburgh)
• Dr Charlotte Godziewski (City, University of London)
• Dr Mary Guy (Liverpool John Moores University)
• Dr João Paulo Magalhães (Portuguese Directorate-General of Health)
• Dr Benjamin Ewert (Fulda University of Applied Sciences)
• Dr Volkan Yilmaz (Dublin City University)
• Germán Andrés Alarcón Garavito (University College London)

Public Health and the EU Healthcare workforce and EU health governance

TOPIC, THEME, ISSUE DESCRIPTION

This session might discuss challenges for healthcare workforce (HCW) planning, retention and fixation between national healthcare systems, and the impacts of the single market and free movement of goods and people in the EU.

IDEAS FOR ACTIVITIES, DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, ASSESSMENTS ETC.

The main activity would involve exploring current policy options and best practices undertaken by national healthcare systems and assessing their effectiveness towards the HCW goals. In what areas of EU law and Commission competences, could the EU act on harmonising HCW planning, retention and fixation between Member-States? Discussion and innovative approaches; do financial instruments and fiscal policy arena have scope to become effective strategies for managing HCW?

ANNOTATED READING LIST

Glinos, I.A. Health professional mobility in the European Union: Exploring the equity and efficiency of free movement. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.08.010.

The author argues that health professional mobility has efficiency and equity implications in the EU. They note that some EU Member States benefit more from health professional mobility, whilst free mobility of health professionals may reinforce intra-EU disparities. Health, Law and the EU The role of law in EU health governance

TOPIC, THEME, ISSUE DESCRIPTION

This session considers the EU law framework regarding issues of health governance in the EU. So it will consider not only the “cross-cutting” nature of EU health law (as a discipline), but also unpack some examples of how law works in this area, and where/how it interacts with policy.

IDEAS FOR ACTIVITIES, DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, ASSESSMENTS ETC.

Case studies / problem scenarios to work through, e.g., concerns about accessing healthcare from the perspective of EU citizenship rules, and considerations emerging in state aid assessments. Recent cases could form the basis for this, e.g.

• Casa Regina Apostolorum (CJEU 2023 judgment), regarding state aid to Italian public hospitals, offers opportunities to examine not only social/economic tensions in EU law as applied in the healthcare sector, but also the Member State – EU-level dynamic regarding healthcare system organisation, and how far the EU institutions may be willing to go in scrutinising national arrangements.
• Case C-247/20, VI v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, (CJEU 2022 judgment) regarding the linking of the NHS with the requirement for comprehensive sickness insurance (CSI) for EU nationals in the UK. This case offers scope to consider how health (via CSI) is an integral part of free movement and citizenship rules, also raising questions of economic/social tensions and EU-level/Member State interaction.

Consideration of Health in All Policies (HiAP) could also be linked to discussions of the EU’s competence in health, and how law might be used to help reinforce policy.

ANNOTATED READING LIST

O. Bartlett and A. Naumann, ‘Reinterpreting the health in all policies obligation in Article 168 TFEU: the first step towards making enforcement a realistic prospect’, (2021) Health Economics, Policy and Law 16(1), 8-22.

• Discusses links between HiAP ‘in law’ (Art. 168(1) TFEU) and in policy.

A. de Ruijter, EU Health Law & Policy (OUP 2019).

• Discusses the EU’s expanding role in public health and healthcare from a values and rights perspective.

Hervey and McHale, European Union Health Law – Themes and Implications (CUP 2015).

• Comprehensive overview of the development and extent of EU health law. Discussed thematically in terms of “internal” EU health law (both individual and systemic perspectives) and “external” EU health law.

Hancher and Sauter, EU Competition and Internal Market Law in the Healthcare Sector (OUP 2012).

• Comprehensive overview of how competition and internal market law have been applied in health cases.

Health, Political Science and the EU The European Health Union

TOPIC, THEME, ISSUE DESCRIPTION

This session addresses the emergence and possible development paths of the European Health Union (EHU), its implications for the status of health policy within the EU institutional architecture, the role/competences of new agencies (e.g. HERA). Key question: to what extent has the pandemic been the ultimate crisis in order to advance the idea of an EHU?

IDEAS FOR ACTIVITIES, DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, ASSESSMENTS ETC.

Activity: Analysing political statements with regard to the creation of a European Health Union (drawn from, for instance, the Commission President, parties within the European Parliament, member state leaders etc.). The task involves differentiating competing visions and driving forces of the EHU, assessing the EHU process through a supranationalism/intergovernmentalism lens; and predicting the possibility of EHU scenarios (e.g. further integration, differentiated integration, status quo).

ANNOTATED READING LIST

Nabbe, M.; Brand, H. The European Health Union: European Union’s Concern about Health for All. Concepts, Definition, and Scenarios. Healthcare 2021, 9, 1741. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/healthcare9121741

• The article identifies five potential scenarios of a European Health Union based on a scoping literature review. The suggested scenario plots, ranging from a full-fledged EHU (scenario 1) to a fragmentation of the EU (scenario 5), are discussed alongside three predetermined  forces (surveillance and monitoring, crisis preparedness, funding) and four unpredictable forces (political will, vision of public health expenditures, population interest and awareness, global health).

Kickbusch, I. and De Ruijter, A. (2021). How a European health union can strengthen global health. Commentary. The Lancet Regional Health Europe. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanepe.2021.100025

• Discusses the implications of the EHU for global health, offering an introduction to the EU’s role in global health and the idea of the EHU.

 

Far-right political parties and health in Europe

TOPIC, THEME, ISSUE DESCRIPTION

This session looks at far right political parties in Europe, their influence at EU and national levels, and their views on / implications for health. It contrasts the rise of such parties, the limits of their success in securing formal governance positions and the dearth of research into their relevance to health.

IDEAS FOR ACTIVITIES, DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, ASSESSMENTS ETC.

Activity: analysing political manifestos. Using manifestos from 2-3 far-right parties in different European countries (language barriers permitting), analyse these parties’ position on health, using a framework that explores reference to individual versus social drivers of health inequalities. Can be done individually or in groups, in-person or online (in breakout rooms, for instance).

ANNOTATED READING LIST

Falkenbach and Greer (eds) (2019) The Populist Radical Right and Health (Springer).

This is an edited volume, the first in-depth analysis of the health policies of populist radical right parties. Its scope is global but more than half of the case study chapters are based in EU member states (and their division by country makes for easy group-reading activities).

 

The EU and global health

TOPIC, THEME, ISSUE DESCRIPTION

This session considers the EU as a global health actor/non-actor, EU soft power through health and health diplomacy, and the EU’s role in global health security.

This session also facilitates debates and reflection on who, how, and why global health is governed. Subthematics include global health leadership, health in global governance, and the interaction of the EU with other global health actors such as the WHO, the World Bank, the Global Fund, and GAVI, among others.

IDEAS FOR ACTIVITIES, DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, ASSESSMENTS ETC.

Task: analyse the role of the EU in global health equity through the COVID vaccine case study. Drawing on selected readings, media reporting and blogs, use the EU’s role in COVID vaccine procurement and distribution to assess its contribution to global health equity. Students may need to be introduced to a health equity framework/lens (or may have used this earlier in the course/other courses).

Furthermore, students are encouraged to analyse EU health agencies’ role and impact on global health activities by interpreting agencies’ functioning data (finances, governance, procurement, and transparency). This will be done by reading selected material, extracting information from agencies’ websites, and contrasting it with multiple sources.

ANNOTATED READING LIST

Bergner (2023) The role of the European Union in global health: The EU’s self-perception(s) within the COVID-19 pandemic, Health Policy, 127, 5-11.

• Analyses the EU’s role in global health, via the COVID pandemic, along the dimensions of self-perception, external perception and performance.

Usher, A.D., (2021). A beautiful idea: how COVAX has fallen short. The Lancet, 397(10292), 2322-2325.

• A shorter article introducing the COVAX facility and the shortfalls in equity during its operation.

Bengtsson, L. & Rhinard, M., 2019. ‘Securitisation across borders: the case of ‘health security’ cooperation in the European Union’, West European Politics, 42(2), 346–368, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1510198.

Bengtsson, L., Borg, S. & Rhinard, M., 2019. ‘Assembling European Health Security: Epidemic intelligence and the hunt for cross-border health threats’, Security Dialogue, 50(2), 115–130, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010618813063.

Sonja Kittelsen (2007) Beyond Bounded Space: Europe, Security, and the Global Circulation of Infectious Disease, European Security, 16:2, 121-142, DOI: 10.1080/09662830701529745

Thibaud Deruelle & Isabelle Engeli (2021) The COVID-19 crisis and the rise of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), West European Politics, 44:5-6, 1376-1400, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2021.1930426.

DIJKSTRA, H., & DE RUIJTER, A. (2017). The Health-Security Nexus and the European Union: Toward a Research Agenda. European Journal of Risk Regulation, 8(4), 613-625. doi:10.1017/err.2017.34.

Dodgson R, Lee K, Drager N. Global Health Governance, A Conceptual Review. Glob Heal. 2018;(1):439–61.

Clinton C, Sridhar DL. Governing global health: who runs the world and why? 2017. 282 p.

Gostin LO, Mok EA. Grand challenges in global health governance [Internet]. Vol. 90, British Medical Bulletin. Oxford Academic; 2009 Available from: https://academic.oup.com/bmb/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/bmb/ldp014.

Andrews M. The good governance agenda: Beyond indicators without theory. Oxford Dev Stud. 2008;36(4).

Besley T, Kudamatsu M, Merlo A, Olken B, Nunn N. Health and democracy. In: American Economic Review. 2006.

Kevany, Sebastian, and Aoife Kirk. Outbreaks, Epidemics, and Health Security: COVID-19 and Ensuring Future Pandemic Preparedness in Ireland and the World. San Diego: Elsevier Science & Technology, 2022. Print.

 

Democratic legitimacy, healthcare and EU health governance

TOPIC, THEME, ISSUE DESCRIPTION

This is a reflective session which focuses on how EU competences affect health. Should the EU have more explicitly health-related competences, or should this remain with Member States? What are the implications of either option?

IDEAS FOR ACTIVITIES, DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, ASSESSMENTS ETC.

Activity: Think about the ‘pros/cons’ of more health competencies, perhaps structured across the ‘three faces’ of EU health policy, or the WHO building blocks of health systems. Ideas could be devised individually, then compare findings in pairs, then create groups of 4 (‘pair up the pairs’) and exchange findings until students have an overview of the implications and issues at stake.

ANNOTATED READING LIST

Greer, S.L.,(2014). The three faces of European Union health policy: Policy, markets, and austerity. Policy and Society, 33(1), 13-24.

• One option to structure the task is to think about the implications of competences across the three faces of health policy.

Greer et al. (2022) Everything you’ve always wanted to know about EU health policy but were afraid to ask, https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/354182.

• A more comprehensive overview/introduction to EU health policies and competences.

Lamping, W., & Steffen, M. (2009). European Union and Health Policy: The “Chaordic” dynamics of integration. Social Science Quarterly, 90(5), 1361– 1379.

• Slightly older source but one that reflects on the limits and value of EU health integration.

 

Public policy and the determinants of health

TOPIC, THEME, ISSUE DESCRIPTION

This session addresses how EU policy affects health even if it is not directly about healthcare/health systems. Potential case studies or focal points include health in all policies (HiAP); Better Regulation; the eurozone crisis, austerity, and health; food safety regulations and health; trade and Health; the CAP and health…

IDEAS FOR ACTIVITIES, DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, ASSESSMENTS ETC.

Activity: Creating maps of how the EU activities can indirectly impact health through other policy areas (such as food, environment, fiscal policy, trade, etc). This can be a really creative exercise, using paper and pens, whiteboard and markers, or online drawing software.

Discussion topic: Using the concept of ‘policy coherence’, students might reflect on their maps and consider the challenge of generating coherence across such a wide range of policy sectors and actors.

ANNOTATED READING LIST

Greer, S. L. (2014a). Three faces of European Union Health Policy: Policy, markets, and austerity. Policy and Society, 33(1), 13–24.

• Offering an initial overview of the three faces of health policy and the range of EU non-health competences and actions that affect health.

Karanikolos, M., Mladovsky, P., Cylus, J., Thomson, S., Basu, S., Stuckler, D., Mackenbach, J. P., McKee, M. (2013). Financial crisis, austerity, and health in Europe. The Lancet, 381(9874), 1323–1331.

• As a case study, this source introduces the impact of austerity on health in Europe following the financial crisis in 2007/8.

Koivusalo M (2010). The state of health in all policies (HiAP) in the European Union: potential and pitfalls. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 64(6):500–3.

Jarman H & Koivusalo M (2017). Trade and health in the European Union, in Hervey TK, Young C & Bishop L (eds). Research Handbook on EU Health Law and Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 429–52.

 

The politics of European Union and health

TOPIC, THEME, ISSUE DESCRIPTION

The European Union (EU) has been engaged in health issues since the Thalidomide tragedy in the 1960s, which led to the introduction of the European pharmaceutical authorisation process. Since then, the EU’s role in health has been diversified and extended. The European Health Union initiative, which emerged as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, is the most recent and ambitious attempt to establish a stronger role for the EU in health. In this context, this session addresses the following question: What should the EU’s role in health be? The session is designed to familiarise students with the normative and political debates on European integration in health, enable them to formulate and articulate their own stances in these debates and create a platform to foster an open dialogue on the appropriate role of the EU in health among students.

IDEAS FOR ACTIVITIES, DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, ASSESSMENTS ETC.

Activity: The proposed activity is to create a platform for students to form a political stance on the European Union’s role in health, consider different political alternatives and elaborate on their stances while interacting with their classmates. It is recommended that the instructor uses live polling methods to spark a debate. For this purpose, the instructor is expected to prepare different statements about the preferred division of responsibility between the European Union and its Member States in different sub-sectors of health (e.g., pharmaceutical reimbursement decision, EU-wide health tax). These statements can include both statements reflecting the current state of affairs and ones that are aspirational. For a one-hour session, 12 statements would be sufficient.

In terms of the session outline, the first step is that the instructor asks students to respond to each of these statements in an “agree and disagree format”. The instructor is advised to use the Vevox app, which allows live polling, and recording of student responses. Once students individually express their opinions on a statement in terms of agree and disagree through the app, it is recommended that the instructor first shows the overall results for the class. Then the instructor is expected to explain whether each statement reflects the current state of affairs. This is followed by a lively discussion on the appropriate role of the EU in the selected areas within health policy. When the discussion reaches saturation, the instructor should then outline the political dimensions of each statement and state that every opinion expressed deserves political respect. The same order can be repeated for each statement. This activity must be completed before delivering a lecture on the European Union’s involvement in health and the contemporary European Health Union initiative.

Discussion topic:

• The European Union should introduce a single European social health insurance plan with the same entitlements for all EU citizens.
• The European Union should levy a Europe-wide sugary drinks tax that will become a new revenue source to the EU budget.

ANNOTATED READING LIST

Bambra, C., Fox, D. and Scott-Samuel, A., 2005. Towards a politics of health. Health Promotion International, 20(2), pp.187-193.

Carpenter, D., 2012. Is health politics different?. Annual Review of Political Science, 15, pp.287-311.

Greer, S.L., Rozenblum, S., Fahy, N., Brooks, E., Jarman, H., de Ruijter, A., Palm, W. and Wismar, M., 2022. Everything you always wanted to know about European Union health policies but were afraid to ask. World Health Organization. Regional Office for Europe.

This event was supported by UACES and the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union.

The post Vignettes on EU health governance: A shared teaching and learning resource from the EUHealthGov network appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Hein Brookhuis

Over the past decades, the European Commission has increasingly aimed to include scientific collaboration explicitly in its political project. With the introduction of the European Research Area in 2000, the Commission hoped to create a “borderless market for research, innovation and technology.”

The origins and dynamics of this European science policy have been widely studied over the past decades, often from the perspective of political science. The ways in which the policies impacted scientists and scientific institutions has been less studied. How did scientists use the new policy instruments to advance their scientific projects? Through the study of one specific project, namely the establishment of a new research reactor in Belgium, my research project aimed to complement existing literature with a more historical approach [Brookhuis 2023].

The Belgian MYRRHA project entails the construction of an accelerator-driven research reactor, which primarily aims to demonstrate the feasibility of reducing the longevity and radiotoxicity of some elements in spent nuclear fuel. Between 1998 and 2010, this project was part of several European research programs. By having access to notes, correspondences, interviews and internal strategic documents, this historical study of European science policy can inform us better on the impact of policy changes on research communities. How did European policies impact collaboration among scientists? How did this effect their projects? In this blog post, I will highlight three interactions between European Science Policy and the Belgian MYRRHA project to reflect on the role of Big Science in the European Research Area.

 

Balancing European and Belgian ambitions

For the purpose of this blog post, I will highlight three moments in which European scientific and political developments intertwined with the MYRRHA project. While the Belgian project initially focused on a small-scale instrument that would primarily focus on (commercial) medical applications, a similar reactor-concept experienced a major political breakthrough in Europe as a potential alternative solution for nuclear waste, propagated by Nobel laureate Carlo Rubbia. Although Rubbia’s plans were often criticized by his peers, he became the chair of a European Technical Working Group on the topic, stimulating efforts in the domain of using so-called Accelerator Driven Systems (ADS) for the transmutation of nuclear waste. [TWG – ADS, 2001].

Engaging in European projects also entailed balancing local interests with the attractiveness of international exposure and funding. Initially, Carlo Rubbia’s success was considered damaging for the credibility of the Belgian project, as his views were not necessarily shared by the rest of the scientific community. There was also some hesitancy to integrate the small project into the European collaboration, as this could increase the technological requirements and thus the complexity, costs and timeframe of the project. On the other hand, expanding the range of applications and obtaining European support could help forward the Belgian project, others believed. From 1998 onwards, the Belgian project increasingly engaged in European projects, while also shifting priorities from (local) institutional to more international interests.

 

Becoming an Integrated Project in the European Research Area

A second noteworthy interaction with European science policies occurred in 2003. That year one of the cornerstones of the European Research Area-proposal, the so-called “Integrated Projects,” was implemented. Integrated Projects (IP) were defined as “projects of substantial size, designed to help build up the ‘critical mass’ in objective-driven research with clearly defined scientific and technological ambitions and aims.” The introduction of this policy instrument can be understood as an expression of discomfort among European policymakers with small-scale projects, often interpreted as fragmentation (Ulnicane, 2020). Indeed, the new policy did not allow similar initiatives to co-exist next to each other, but they had to be integrated in an overarching project. In 2003, the Belgian team was confronted with a situation in which “no European party [was] willing to work for MYRRHA,” as French, German and Italian collaborators preferred a collaboration that excluded the Belgian project.

The role as a European project for MYRRHA was reclaimed after a competing project experienced loss of support on a national level. Meanwhile, the MYRRHA project had to be considered an experimental ADS instrument to demonstrate the technological feasibility of the transmutation of nuclear waste. This way, it could take part in an Integrated Project with the total budget of about 43 million euro [EUROTRANS, Cordis]. While within SCK CEN this orientation was considered of secondary importance by some, it became the main focus throughout the process of European collaboration. The director of SCK CEN had to confess to the Belgian ministry that the project became increasingly complex now that it would be considered a technological demonstration: “this role for MYRRHA has an impact on the design, costs, and timing of the project, but is today unavoidable given the apparent impotence of all possible partners to decide on a big investment decision.”

Impression of the MYRRHA reactor building on the SCK CEN site. Courtesy of SCK CEN.

The diplomatic use of the European Strategy Forum for Research Infrastructure

While the framework programs described so far primarily targeted scientific research projects, the European Commission has also increasingly prioritized the phenomenon of what is called “Research Infrastructures.” [Hallonsten, 2020] Large-scale research infrastructure, including research reactors for nuclear applications, increasingly gained importance in European science policy. One example is the introduction of the European Strategic Forum for Research Infrastructure. Despite the absence of a formal budget, it is considered an important diplomatic tool [Bolliger & Griffiths, 2020]. Among the board of the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre it was believed that “to obtain European financial support, it is necessary to make it to the ESFRI list.”

The Belgian MYRRHA project received its first (small) governmental funding in 2010 and was accepted on the ESFRI list that same year. By then it had thus benefitted from several of the new policy instruments initiated by the European Commission. How effective this will ultimately turn out to be for a Big Science project in a small European nation is not yet to tell. Despite a lack of international commitments at that time, the Belgian government invested 550 million euro in the project in 2018. By 2021, however, projects that had entered the ESFRI list in 2010 reached their 10 years of preparation time, and were reviewed in order to obtain a so-called Landmark status to stay on the list. MYRRHA was the only reviewed project that was rejected this status [ESFRI, 2021]. It appears that despite the introduction of formalized science policies, Big Science is still strongly dependent on national funding opportunities.

 

Hein Brookhuis is a PhD Candidate at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre (SCK CEN) and KU Leuven, Belgium.

 

References

Bolliger, Isabel & Alexandra Griffiths (2020) “The introduction of ESFRI and the rise of national Research Infrastructure roadmaps in Europe,” in Big Science and Research Infrastructures in Europe, edited by Katharina Cramer & Olof Hallonsten, 101 – 127. Edward Elgar Publishing https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839100017.00011

Brookhuis, Hein (2023) Making Belgian Big Science: A History of the MYRRHA Research Reactor (1994—2010), Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 53 (1); 35-70 https://doi.org/10.1525/hsns.2023.53.1.35

ESFRI (2021) Roadmap 2021 – Strategy Report on Research Infrastructures. Link: roadmap2021.esfri.eu

European Technical Working Group on ADS (2001) A European Roadmap for Developing Accelerator Driven Systems (ADS) for Nuclear Waste Incineration, ENEA. Link: https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/32/044/32044945.pdf

Hallonsten, Olof (2020) Research Infrastructures in Europe: The Hype and the Field, European Review 28 (4) 617-635 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798720000095

Ulnicane, Inga (2020) “Ever-changing Big Science and Research Infrastructures: Evolving European Union Policy,” in Big Science and Research Infrastructures in Europe, edited by Katharina Cramer & Olof Hallonsten, 76 – 100. Edward Elgar Publishing https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839100017.00010

 

The post How do small countries establish Big Science in the age of the European Research Area? The case of the Belgian MYRRHA project appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

By Dr Laura Chappell, University of Surrey

This blog post is a longer version based on a podcast published on eu!radio in March.

 

Within the 2022 Strategic Compass, published a year ago, the EU sets out the ambition to create a force of 5000 troops, including pre-identified strategic enablers, built on “substantially modified Battlegroups”. The Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), which was originally called an initial entry force, was proposed by 14 member states and was subsequently discussed at the Foreign Affairs Council on Defence Issues on 6 May 2021. It gained additional traction after the EU member states had to rely on the US to facilitate the evacuation of their citizens from Afghanistan. Finally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has focused minds in Brussels on EU member state military capabilities.

 

However, the question is whether the Rapid Deployment Capacity provides the EU with enhanced rapid reaction capabilities. The EU Battlegroups on which the RDC is based have never been deployed despite being fully operational since 2007. The fundamental issues with the Battlegroups come down to three key elements: funding, composition and political will. Regarding funding, costs lie where they fall, meaning participating member states have to pick up the tab for most of the operation costs. Second, the battlegroups are small in size, around 1500 personnel. This limits what the Battlegroups can do on the ground. Their structure was premised on Operation Artemis, however this type of operation has not materialised again, highlighting the issue with a bottom up as opposed to a top down approach to strategy. Whilst the Battlegroups were discussed in what became EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad/RCA, they were too small for the operation which was eventually sent.

 

Finally, there has been a lack of political will to deploy the Battlegroups. Member states have diverse views on when force should be deployed, including being able to sustain different levels of risk, where force should be deployed, particularly as the primary location for Battlegroup deployments is largely focused on the African continent, which is not in every state’s interests, and with whom force is used which highlights Atlanticist and Europeanist visions for European security. Whilst the latter has not played a core role, it has greater significance today. The lack of political willingness is particularly evident in the Battlegroup rotation. Two Battlegroups were on standby and rotated every six months, although this has just recently increased to a year in line with the RDC requirements. However there are no Battlegroups scheduled for the second half of 2023 for example.

 

However, there are advantages to the Battlegroups as they can facilitate military cooperation and training, the reorganisation of national armed forces, and interoperability. This joins the idea of enhancing the EU’s rapid reaction capability as the underpinning rationale and provides a reason regarding why the Battlegroups continue to exist despite not being used.

 

Turning to the RDC, an extension of common costs, which are funded based on member states GDP, was explicitly stated within the strategic compass, however no agreement has been reached beyond agreeing to include the first live exercise for the RDC this year. Structurally the RDC is larger, however it is still based on two Battlegroups plus strategic enablers, which really questions whether it represents an increase in capability. Importantly however it is modular so the RDC can be tailored to the crisis. Finally, the duration has increased to a year. To ensure that the RDC is relevant, two operational scenarios based on rescue and evacuation with an African focus, and the initial stabilisation phase have been created with further scenarios in the pipeline. This will ensure that the RDC is tailored to the types of tasks that the EU envisages conducting. Finally, for the first time, the EU will host live exercises the first of which will take place in Spain this year and will be run by the Military Planning and Conduct Capability which will when fully operational, be able to act as an OHQ for the RDC. This provides an additional value added for member states.

 

Nonetheless, will this resolve the key sticking point, that of political will? Fundamentally, countries still have different visions for European security. Ukraine is particularly important as some countries’ focus is on deterring Russia rather than contributing to the RDC. NATO has also announced a new force model of 300,000 troops and EU member states only have a single set of forces. This really begs the question as to who is willing to contribute to the RDC, whether in terms of strategic enablers, or in filling up the Battlegroup rota. Fundamentally even if common costs are expanded and a suitable scenario comes up, it will still depend on whose Battlegroups are on standby. Whilst the core idea is to make the RDC more attractive to member states as a rapid reaction tool such that they are less likely to say no to deploying it, fundamental issues remain to be resolved.

The post From the EU Battlegroup Concept to the Rapid Deployment Capacity: A Gear Change in the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capabilities? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

A few months ago, the government updated its retained EU law (REUL) dashboard, its go-to place for monitoring progress in moving away from this foreign imposition on the UK.

As I noted at the time, this wasn’t entirely satisfactory, either in terms of the new discoveries of EU law or the progress towards the nomination deadline of the REUL Bill, wherein anything not explicitly dealt with otherwise by the end of 2023 would be revoked/sunset/sunsat/sunsetted.

It’s been clear from the off that the Bill is a nonsense, given that the government doesn’t know what is on the books and that departments evidently don’t have the capacity to check the impact of revocation.

That the government has finally conceded this point with the decision last week to move an amendment to make revocation an exception rather than a rule is welcome, even if it doesn’t address the other deficiencies of the Bill.

The intention now is that the government will seek to revoke a specified list of REUL by the deadline, with everything else being left for later/kept on the books (depending on how you want to see it).

That list finally came out this week.

Having produced a tracker of progress on REUL since last summer, it felt incumbent that I check out what was on this list and its impact on revocation.

On a first analysis, problems rather leapt out:

Some more analysis of the REUL schedule

tl;dr it's a bit of a mess

1/ https://t.co/bMWlxian3x pic.twitter.com/Hoj9h56d45

— Simon Usherwood (@Usherwood) May 16, 2023

The problems are two-fold.

First up, the schedule includes a lot of items that weren’t previously listed on the dashboard: 171 of the 587 items, or 29% have no obvious match to what was available with last week’s update of the dashboard.

While many of these new items were relatively mundane and inconsequential, the fact that after two major revisions to the list there were still so many items that hadn’t been noted before just underlines the fundamental problem behind the REUL Bill: it’s hard to have confidence in the automatic revocation/sunsetting process when you keep on discovering new items that this affects.

This new discovery falls across a lot of departments in Whitehall, especially in DEFRA, DfT and DESNZ. The outlier is Treasury, mainly because their REUL is parked in a separate process under a new financial services bill.

However, for everyone the impression is that there’s ever more REUL than before (and these graphs are without the new items from the schedule):

record

Which leads to the second issue: record-keeping.

In the course of checking through the schedule it became apparent that there is neither a consistent identification protocol for REUL items nor a check on duplication.

to take two examples from the Excel spreadsheet behind the dashboard, Council Decision 2010/763/EU and Regulation 906/2009 both appear twice. Even if that doesn’t carry through to the dashboard itself, it raises questions about how far there is full oversight of the process in central government bodies.

Overall, while the government’s move on the REUL Bill is welcome it still leaves a number of basic questions unanswered on how practical or viable the process intended might be. The shift to retention until otherwise decided makes even more sense that it already did, but this should not obscure the difficulties involved or the potential for unintended consequences.

The post Even more retained EU law (in every sense) appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

For our weekly ‘Ideas on Europe’ editorial by UACES, the University Association for European Studies, we have the pleasure to welcome Dr Theofanis Exadaktylos, from the University of Surrey, in the UK.

 

 

 

 

1. Why now?

The term in office of the New Democracy government under PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis that started in 2019 would be coming to an end this autumn. Elections were declared slightly earlier for 21 May.

 

2. What is at stake?

The elections are held under the electoral law voted by the previous Syriza-led government (2015-19). In the meantime, yet another one has been voted (see below), but as a safety clause, new electoral laws only apply from the second election following the ratification of the law, rather than the immediate one.

A long-standing promise by Syriza, the new electoral law is replacing the enhanced majority proportionality rules with a simple proportional allocation of seats in parliament. The idea behind this move was the increase of proportionality in parliament and giving grounds for coalition governments. Why was this important? According to public opinion polls, no party is set to muster enough votes to have overall majority in parliament. Therefore, the parliament emerging out of the 21 May election is likely to force big parties into coalition negotiations, with smaller parties gaining a pivotal role as regulators of government policy.

 

3. Who is likely to win?

According to the latest polls, the liberal-conservative New Democracy, under the leadership of current prime minister Mitsotakis, is likely to be the first party in vote share followed by Syriza. Their difference may not be electorally significant, but it will mean that New Democracy will receive a mandate to form a government first. They are likely to approach the once-strong Pasok, which has been reduced to a small political force following the Greek financial crisis back in 2010. The question will be whether New Democracy and Pasok together will be able to secure 151 out of 300 seats for a majority under the new electoral rules or will require a third small party to support them. Following the failure of all possible avenues to form a government, a fresh election will be declared. The twist in this instance, is that this will be conducted under the new electoral law voted by New Democracy in 2020 that reverses Syriza’s simple proportionality and grants the first party in votes bonus seats in parliament for every 0.5% of the vote share above 25% and up to 50 bonus seats.

 

4. Who will enter parliament?

Beyond the two big parties mentioned above, Pasok and the Greek Communist Party, two more parties may be likely to make an entrance but are polling close to the minimum threshold of 3%. These are DiEM25 led by former Syriza finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, and the right-wing Greek Solution – both represented in the current parliament. Their support base is quite volatile and minor events and scandals can drive voters away or towards the more mainstream parties. The considerable percentage of voters who are still undecided are likely to determine the fate of smaller parties depending on the polarisation of the electoral debate in the coming days. These voters may also determine the ability of the first party in votes to form a coalition government. Statements of support or refusal to cooperate with the first party (whichever this may be) have been made by almost all small parties. New Democracy, if declared the winner, is likely to push for a fresh election to benefit from the electoral law it voted on in 2020, rather than force a coalition with unlikely partners.

 

5. What are the issues at hand?

• The economy

 

The economy remains a priority issue considering the after-effect of the Greek financial crisis, the cost-of-living crisis and the energy prices pressures. The Greek economy, despite the post-pandemic booming effects from tourism and other investments, remains on thin ice and requires any government to maintain a path of fiscal discipline and push forward unfinished reforms in public administration and public spending. Suggestions by the DiEM25 leader that they would not be afraid to abandon the euro, close the banks and introduce a new currency, created frictions in the left-wing arena of the Greek party system, cutting out a potential Syriza ally from a future government.

 

• Immigration

 

Still affected by migration flows from the east, Greece has been at the spotlight for pushback processes and for failing to protect human rights of undocumented immigrants who cross the Aegean Sea in search for asylum. Alongside a general fatigue about the inability of the Greek state to accommodate and process immigrants and asylum seekers, migration issues have heightened xenophobic and racist sentiments, polarising the political debate to the benefit of the right-wing side of the political spectrum.

 

• Foreign policy

 

Greek foreign policy is mainly affected by two actors: Russia and Turkey. The war in Ukraine has damaged the previously good relations with Russia both in terms of investment and tourist flows. Greece rightly decided to side with Ukraine following the common declarations by the EU. Some Syriza voices still view Russia favourably and that has been criticised in public debates. Second, the outcome of the concurrent election in Turkey will either see the continuation of an aggressive warmongering narrative if Erdogan wins, or the emergence of unknown parameters in Greek-Turkish relations if any other candidate wins. Both scenarios are damaging as Greek foreign policy actors will need to maintain a high level of alert in the rhetoric coming from Turkey.

 

• The environment

 

Climate change has moved up in the public agenda much like anywhere in the world. For Greece, climate change means extreme heat in the summer with highly likelihood of wildfires erupting and water shortages, especially on tourism-popular islands. The previous election outcome was judged on the failure of the Syriza government to prevent the death of several citizens from a wildfire near Athens due to poor crisis management and services coordination. The impact of wildfires is frequently felt in the wintertime when extreme weather conditions cause severe flooding and potential casualties.

 

• Corruption and public failures

 

A few weeks before the election was due to be announced, a tragic rail accident took place in the valley of Tempi in Central Greece in March. A freight train travelling south collided with a passenger train travelling north at full speed resulting in over 50 people dying and many more seriously injured. Most casualties were people under 25 years of age as the passenger train carried university students back to Thessaloniki following a long weekend holiday. The train accident exposed not only the insufficient infrastructure of the rail network in Greece, but most importantly issues of corruption and public failure both by Syriza and New Democracy to modernise the signalling system and to take advantage of EU funds and investment, the persistent favouritism when hiring staff in the public sector and the absence of solid health and safety standards in public transport. The unjustified death of young students has negatively affected the dominance of New Democracy in public opinion polls pushing the difference with Syriza to shrink and favouring a diffusion of preferences towards smaller parties.

 

6. Who to look out for?

Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis is fighting to secure a second term in office and so far, he has managed to remain untouched by political fires, still featuring as more popular and more fitting as prime minister in the eyes of the public.

Syriza leader, Alexis Tsipras is trying to restore his party’s electoral base following a series of failures during his term in office and to manage his own party officials, who have been engaging in polarising strategies in public.

Pasok leader, Nikos Androulakis is trying to re-establish the party as a deciding force in Greek politics and a threat to single-party governments – if this election round fails to include Pasok as a coalition partner, its percentages are likely to shrink further as voters will align with the two bigger parties.

Former Golden Dawn deputy leader, Ilias Kasidiaris, has led an offensive from prison where he is serving a sentence for forming a criminal organisation and as an accomplish to homicides led by Golden Dawn members. The Supreme Court forbid him from leading his new party Greeks – essentially a recast version of Golden Dawn – in this election and banned the party from running for office. It will be interesting to see where these supporters will find a new home, especially in a scenario that suggests a repeat election.

 

7. Why should Europe care?

Instability in Greece has the potential of affecting the EU as a whole considering two factors: one from an economic point of view, the previous experience with the Eurozone crisis which almost led Greece to bankruptcy is one the EU wants to avoid repeating, so they would like to see some continuity in economic policy and financial discipline; second from a foreign policy point of view, Greece is a key player in maintaining the geopolitical balance in the south-eastern Mediterranean basin and a buffer in the united front against Russia, so preserving a strong ally in the region is key for EU foreign policy.

The post Electoral Law Games in Search for a Majority Government: The Greek Election of 21 May in Seven Questions appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

For our weekly ‘Ideas on Europe’ editorial by UACES, the University Association for European Studies, we have the pleasure to welcome once more Dr Simona Guerra, from the University of Surrey, in the UK.

 

Listen to the podcast on euradio!

 

Very happy to have you back with another untold story of ‘the early women of European integration’. After Käte Strobel last November, and Nilde Lotti in March, who will be in your portrait today?

For my third profile, I have chosen Marguerite De Riemaecker-Legot, born on 9 March 1913 in Oudenaarde, East Flanders, in Belgium.

Between 1931 and 1936 she attends the Law School at the University of Ghent. That is still unusual at the time, although the lawyer profession had opened to women in 1922. It is telling that the diploma certificate was standardised only for men, which meant that in her certificate ‘she’ needed to be handwritten over ‘he’. It was also challenging to find a patron to get started in the profession, but she was helped by her professor and senator Maurice Orban. While working in Brussels for Pierre Nothomb, a Belgian writer and politician, she came into contact with Maria Baers, a senator and advocate for women’s rights. Marguerite left her work to become cabinet secretary to Mrs Baers. In 1938 she got married and had two sons, Xavier and Christian, who has left a book and a few pictures of her extraordinary life.

 

When did she stand for election herself?

Marguerite De Riemaecker-Legot was elected as a Member of the Belgian Parliament in 1946, although it was only in June 1949 that all women could participate in parliamentary elections for the first time at the national level.

In her national parliamentary experience, she started to work on those issues she had herself experienced, as on a bill on ‘granting equal rights to men and women with regard to the exercise of public functions’. In 1947 she submitted a bill on the ‘authorization of women to exercise the office of lawyer at the Court of Cassation’ and one on the ‘admission of women to the magistracy’.

She was the first woman in the Belgian Parliament, the first Belgian woman in the European Parliament in 1958, and the first woman Minister in Belgium in 1965. She submitted fourteen bills, was appointed rapporteur on more than forty bills, and, in Europe, she was appointed as rapporteur for two legislations that followed her interest devoted to women, families, and workers.

 

What did she do exactly for workers’ rights?

In 1956, a record number of 46,000 Italians moved to Belgium, most of them for the coal mines. Until the end of the 20th century, they represented the biggest immigrant group.

On 12 January 1960, Marguerite de Riemaecker took the floor to highlight the difference between ‘residence’ and ‘domicile’, pointing out that Italians in Belgium had definitely changed their residence, but did not benefit from a change of ‘domicile’ and the civic and political rights that went with it. In her words, as rapporteur of the (European) Social Funds, these had to be delivered for the well-being of mobile workers and their opportunity to travel. The institution of Social Funds was perceived among the members of the Social Affairs Committee as a small step, but they were moved by the social and political context of the time. After consulting with the Committee on Economic Affairs, the solutions offered to show the interest and influence of the young Parliament on social policy, something that Mechthild Roos has already spoken about in your programme.

 

That’s right, she called it the “self-empowerment” of the young Parliament.

And Marguerite De Riemaecker-Legot represented exactly this capacity of the Parliament of putting pressure on the other European institutions, and its smart ability of using cooperation and consultation across different members and committees for a role that the Treaties did not even consider.

 

Just like in your previous cases, your research shows that women were active political actors in the early stages of the European integration process.

And yet they have been undocumented, given little or no importance. Recognizing these voices and experiences is crucial, not only for the past but also for the future. The persistent lack of women in some specific positions in the EU has critical policy consequences, as should have the experiences of women during the economic crisis, the pandemic, and the Conference on the Future of Europe.

Recognizing and acknowledging this deficit in European studies can help us teach and learn the history of European integration without transmitting the same old bias. Political socialization is likely to affect descriptive representation in the long term, and familiarizing with the names and work of these women can be a strong symbolic factor. Again: it is time to write about them in the textbooks and to know about them as makers and shapers of the European integration process.

 

I could not agree more. Thank you so much, for sharing the findings of your historical research with us. I recall you are Senior Lecturer at the University of Surrey, in England.

 

This contribution is based on the CAROLINE research project (‘Creating A netwoRk On femaLe pIoNEers’ of European integration). A first research paper was presented in April 2023, at a conference on women in the narrative on European integration organized by Professors François Klein and Elena Danescu at the University of Luxembourg, and has been accepted for publication in the journal Politique Européenne.

 

Interview by Laurence Aubron.

 

 

The post Marguerite De Riemaecker-Legot and Workers’ Rights appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As someone who’s just passed the 8th anniversary of his Brexit-related podcast (do sign up, it’s gripping), I feel I’m well-placed to consider the issue in the longer run of UK-EU relations.

I also feel broadly justified in summing up UK policy on the matter throughout the post-war period as “errrm”.

There’ a lot of reacting, not much proacting [?] and plenty of this:

As such, for a long time now my main question about Brexit has been: “what next?”

It was evident even before the 2016 referendum that it was not really going to be an engaged and thoughtful debate about the UK’s role in the world or the purpose of any particular form of relationship with the EU. It was a bun fight.

The lack of planning by either the government or the Leave campaigners for the eventuality of a Leave win meant 2016-17 was another bun fight over owning that result to advance agendas, most of which had nothing to do with UK-EU relations per se.

The horrors of 2017-19 and the fighting of many battles in Parliament stemmed from the profound lack of consensus (or even majority) in all this.

The runctions over the Northern Ireland Protocol that ran from 2020 have only continued to obscure the wider issue of what to do in the broader sense.

So I’m always on the look-out for people with ideas.

The most satisfying pieces have been those that focus on process. Anton Spisak’s work is a good example of this, as the recent Lords European Affairs Committee report (and not because I get quoted). Such pieces are at least as important as overviews of policy areas, which might set out opportunities, but not logics.

With all this in mind, I’ve been discovering something a bit different again: what we’ll call (because others call it that) the O’Malley Pivot.

For those who know about it, this might be point where you tut and note that the first part of this plan is shutting up about it. To which I’d make the rejoinder that a free Substack feed isn’t the place you put things you actually want to stay secret.

In essence, O’Malley argues that Labour should be left to be quiet about ‘Europe’ until they win the next general election, whereupon they form an independent commission to consider future relations and then sell the result as ‘actually getting Brexit done’, even as you end up much closer to a Norwegian model of relations. Sidestep the politicking, reach across the aisle, assume most people aren’t too bothered, especially if you can rebrand Freedom of Movement of people.

In its defence, it’s not the worst idea I’ve seen, by some distance. There’s no will to power, no heroic assumptions, no breaking of international law.

Certainly, if such a commission where to occur, I’d be happy to try and make a contribution to it.

But still, we come back to the questions of intent and legitimacy.

A commission of the great and the good [insert any punchline you like here] might be able to take a longer view, but any relations with the EU necessarily require a set of understandings about the UK itself and what it wants to achieve.

Maybe that’s about being a global force for good, or a major trading partner, but what if that leads you to seeking EU membership again? You might be able to revisit what Leaving looks like, but to revisit Leaving itself is another matter.

Even if you don’t arrive at a rejoining position, the technocracy of a commission and its attendant obfuscations about terminology are still problematic. Remember that one of the big drivers of euroscepticism across Europe is the sense of a lack of connection with the EU as a system. The assumptions of the permissive consensus don’t stand up any more, as was seen so often during the referendum.

None of which is to say that there isn’t a need to avoid falling into a cul-de-sac of European policy, where no-one is willing to expend the political capital needed to arrive at a policy that is anything other than least-offensive.

So process does matter. It needs all relevant parties to try to treat with each other openly and constructively, trying to take people along with them rather than dropping a little gift on their laps. And it means not prejudging the outcome, but accepting that a fair process is more likely to produce a fair result.

The post Thinking and planning ahead in UK-EU relations appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On May 14th, Turkey will hold a critical vote that will determine the fate of its democracy. The incumbent president and leader of the Justice Development Party (AKP), Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is running against the opposition candidate, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who leads the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The campaign is intense, with Erdogan, who has been in power for 20 years, facing stiff competition from Kilicdaroglu and the Nation Alliance, a coalition of six opposition parties: the True Party (CHP), Good Party (IP), Felicity Party (SP), Democrat Party (DP), Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA), and Future Party (GP). Currently, it appears that Kemal Kilicdaroglu is winning while Erdogan is hardly making new gains.

While opinion polls do support my observation (POLITICO’s Poll of Polls puts the contest on a knife edge, meaning there will probably be a second round in the presidential vote on May 28), I base my assessment primarily on the discourse presented by the People’s Alliance, comprising the AKP, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and other parties like the Great Unity Party (BBP) and the New Welfare Party (YRP). The alliance is facing challenges in offering policies and instead appears to be focusing on attacking the Nation Alliance’s candidate, Kilicdaroglu, in a negative, threatening, and degrading way. Whereas, Kilicdaroglu and his team offers a solid united front with a full-blown democratic agenda. Their platform includes a commitment to bringing wrongdoers to justice, addressing the country’s economic challenges, and developing Turkey’s space industry to support entrepreneurs and scientists. The Kurdish votes could potentially play a significant role in this election, as they have the potential to be a kingmaker. However, the situation for Kurdish politicians remains the same, with many being excluded from mainstream politics and some facing arrest.

The People’s Alliance

The AKP’s strategy of delegitimizing their opponent and pre-emptively dismissing the possibility of a fair election is evident in the rhetoric used by Erdogan and his team at their rallies. Instead of promoting their own platform and highlighting their achievements, they focus on attacking their opponent, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP).

One striking example of this is the statement made by Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu in late April, in which he compared the upcoming general election to the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016. This comparison is particularly significant given the trauma and division that the coup attempt caused in Turkey, and the widespread support that Erdogan and the AKP received in the aftermath. Soylu’s suggestion that the election itself could be another attempt at a coup undermines the very foundation of democracy and suggests that any outcome other than an AKP victory would be illegitimate.

Moreover, by framing the election in terms of a struggle against Western powers, Soylu and the AKP are attempting to rally nationalist sentiment and cast themselves as defenders of Turkish sovereignty. This is a familiar tactic for the AKP, which has consistently sought to portray itself as standing up to foreign interference and protecting Turkey’s interests against external threats. However, this rhetoric also serves to distract from domestic issues and the AKP’s own record in government.

In another example of the AKP’s election strategy, Erdogan used a speech in May to delegitimize Kilicdaroglu’s candidacy by associating him with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group that is recognized as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Specifically, Erdogan claimed that Kilicdaroglu was supported by the Qandil, a mountainous area in the Kurdistan Region near the Iraq-Iran border that served as the PKK’s main headquarters in the 1990s and is currently used as a base camp for Kurdish peshmerga forces.

By linking Kilicdaroglu to the PKK, Erdogan sought to tap into nationalist sentiment and portray his opponent as a threat to Turkey’s security and unity. Additionally, by asserting that the nation would not hand over control of the country to someone who received support from the Qandil, Erdogan effectively suggested that any victory by Kilicdaroglu would be illegitimate.

This strategy of delegitimizing opponents by linking them to terrorism is a familiar tactic for the AKP, which has consistently sought to portray itself as the sole defender of Turkey’s interests and the only party capable of ensuring stability and security. However, by using such divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, the AKP risks further polarizing Turkish society and undermining the democratic process.

The Nation Alliance

The opposition parties in Turkey have formed a strong and dynamic alliance, unlike the Hungarian alliance that was created against Viktor Orban in 2021, ahead of the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections.

Initially, the alliance faced a hurdle when Meral Aksener, the leader of the Good Party, opposed Kilicdaroglu’s candidacy for leadership. However, this disagreement was quickly resolved when it was agreed to introduce two vice-presidential positions to support Kilicdaroglu. This move effectively allowed Aksener to maintain her position as a prominent opposition figure while still supporting the alliance’s leader.

To further bolster their chances of success, the alliance strategically selected two of the CHP’s metropolitan mayors, Ekrem Imamoglu from Istanbul and Mansur Yavas from Ankara, as candidates to support Kilicdaroglu. Both mayors have garnered widespread support and recognition for their effective governance and efforts to promote transparency and accountability in their respective cities.

Since their selection as Kilicdaroglu’s running mates, Imamoglu and Yavas have worked closely with him and other alliance members to create a cohesive and united front against the ruling AKP party. They have also been active in their efforts to engage with voters and spread their message of hope and change across the country.

Overall, the opposition alliance in Turkey represents a significant challenge to the long-standing dominance of the AKP, and the alliance’s ability to overcome its initial disagreements and present a united front bodes well for its chances of success in the upcoming elections.

The Kurds

The Kurds have expressed their support for Kemal Kilicdaroglu for the Presidential elections for three main reasons. Firstly, they hope to get rid of President Erdogan and his ruling clique. Secondly, due to the arrests, detentions and political pressure they have faced, the Kurds could not field their own candidate. And finally, Kilicdaroglu has made some promises that have resonated with the Kurdish community.

However, the Kurds are facing challenges in terms of voters. Their former alliance member, the Turkish Workers Party (TIP), has emerged as a strong contender in the elections. Many people are finding TIP less contentious and with fresh ideas. This could make it difficult for the Kurds to gain significant representation in the elections.

In conclusion, the political pressure and arrests faced by the Kurds have hindered their efforts to achieve greater representation and autonomy, and unfortunately, they may end up being the main losers of this election. They cannot be sure that Kilicdaroglu would keep his promises after the election, since no official proposal was made to the Kurdish representatives.

As the elections are only a week away, the upcoming six days will be crucial for all political parties involved in the electoral campaign. It is expected that the tone of the campaign will become more intense and aggressive among the parties, as they make their final push to secure votes. Meanwhile, the electorate may be cautious and apprehensive about what could happen if the National Alliance wins and Erdogan follows in the footsteps of Donald Trump’s actions in the 2020 US presidential election. The potential consequences of such a scenario have left many voters feeling uneasy and uncertain about the future. If Erdogan were to refuse to concede or make claims of election fraud, it could create a tense and divisive political climate in Turkey. This uncertainty has created an added layer of stress for voters. The upcoming days will be a test of the strength and resilience of Turkey’s democracy, and the eyes of the world will be watching closely.

The post Kilicdaroglu dominates, Erdogan trails, and Kurds left to own devices in Turkish General and Presidential Election (II) appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 20th and 21st April 2023, EUHealthGov headed to Brussels for a 2-day workshop discussing research and teaching connected with EU health policy and law. The overarching theme of “Maastricht at 30” provided a useful starting-point to consider both aspects, with the emergence of EU health law and policy as a discipline in its own right typically being traced across this period.

The workshop brought together a range of academics from across Europe, at different career stages, and across law, political science, social policy and public health. This latter diversity, in itself, highlighted important considerations for how and what we research and teach, which forms the basis for future discussions and collaborations.

The research workshop started with Óscar Fernández presenting “The European Union’s global health actorness: Outlining a post-COVID-19 research agenda”. This focus on the EU’s response to the pandemic and its position in global health was followed by Giulia Gallinella discussing early ideas on “The EU’s Role in the WHO during the COVID-19 pandemic: multilateral power politics?”. João Paulo Magalhães considered “Main non-communicable diseases as cross-border health threats: can a European Health Union live up to the treaty potential?”. This was followed by the EUHealthGov coordinators presenting current work forthcoming in a special issue of the Journal of Health Policy, Politics and Law on Political Determinants of Health and the EU. Charlotte Godziewski presented a paper on HERA’s role in increasing integration in health and the EU’s securitisation response to COVID-19. Mary Guy  presented work on solidarity in connection with EU competition policy, whilst Eleanor Brooks outlined a model for understanding regulatory chill, Better Regulation and EU health policy. 

The teaching workshop was opened by Tamara Hervey, setting the scene for a wide-ranging discussion of how, where, and to whom EU health may be taught, as well as the benefits of student involvement in curriculum design. Inesa Fausch drew on her experience of adopting transdisciplinary approaches in knowledge exchange. Rok Hržič provided insights from the long-established programmes at Maastricht University and experiences of working with problem-based learning in a global classroom. Volkan Yilmaz shared how he incorporated EU health themes into wider public policy and health policy modules, whilst Benjamin Ewert discussed the challenges of teaching EU health themes to students from both within and beyond the EU in an intensive course format. João Paulo Magalhães described his experience as a learner within the context of a public health programme, and Germán Andrés Alarcón Garavito presented the experience of the innovative collaborative Emerging Voices for Global Health Program. As a group, the absence of a comprehensive textbook on EU health governance was a key point of discussion. 

Following on from the teaching workshop, EUHealthGov is developing a shared teaching resource which will be posted on our website in due course. For updates on this, and future events of the network, follow us on Twitter, check out the website and/or join our mailing list.

We are very grateful to UACES for funding the network and enabling this in-person workshop, as well as to Mundo-B for providing us with a welcoming space, and to Les Petits Oignons for an excellent dinner! 

The post Maastricht at 30: Exploring past, present, and future drivers of EU health integration appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

We’re now at a point where it’s possible to say that almost all of the Windsor Framework’s numerous elements are now either fully adopted or (for a handful of pieces of EU legislation) in the process of agreement.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic119

That might make for a nicely-coloured graphic, but what does it actually mean on the ground?

As various people noted when I tweeted this out, having the legal adoption of a text doesn’t immediately mean it comes into effect, something that was being noted by the witnesses at the Lords Protocol Sub-Committee evidence session yesterday.

Partly that’s because of the provisions of the decisions themselves.

Article 23 of Joint Committee Decision 1/2023 (the key document in all this) sets out a number of different dates for entry into force of provisions. The default date is 30 September 2023, with only a handful of elements immediately in force.

It’s also worth noting that that default date only produces an entry into force if the EU is satisfied about access to UK information, EORI paperwork is correctly issued, the UK has guidelines in place on parcels and NI-GB goods export. No satisfaction, no operationalisation of the provisions.

There’s another reason too, namely the lack of UK documentation to clarify process (h/t to @irishagreement for this).

The government’s Border Target Operating Model will be the new standard system for goods movements across the UK’s borders, but this will only fully come into effect at end October 2024. Moreover, it specifically notes the Windsor Framework’s agreement and says new arrangements will be forthcoming ‘later this year’.

In both cases, the focus returns to UK capacity, rather than EU-UK agreement per se.

This was largely obscured during the time of the Johnson administration: the policy of contesting the Withdrawal Agreement’s provision (and status) meant that building effective systems necessarily took a bit of a back seat. This January’s agreement on a basic system of information-sharing can only be partly explained by the technical issues involved.

But IT is only one part of the infrastructure and process involved, as the Border Target Operating Model makes clear. From the EU’s perspective, making sure that this is all in place is understandably important, given the need to protect against any future backsliding by a UK government that doesn’t have a perfect record (and that might be out of office relatively soon).

This would have been the case even without Windsor: last year’s infringement procedures (now suspended) were precisely about such issues.

Even at arm’s length, interaction with the EU comes with obligations, something that will only become more evident as new areas of cooperation are developed.

The post When is a framework actually in operation? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Being located at the intersection of European Studies and Security Studies, my PhD project looks at how counter-terrorism policy, in particular preventive counter-terrorism, has come to be an important area of integration in EU enlargement towards the South East European accession candidate states. I am interested in how preventive counter-terrorism shapes and (re)orders political relations and networks in EU enlargement. My findings demonstrate that although EU enlargement is often depicted as a clear and linear process, it is rather embedded in a complex transnational structure that in turn impacts the content and development of enlargement and its areas of political integration.

A crucial part of a PhD project is not only the empirical research and the writing process but also the dissemination and presentation of its results. Particularly towards the end of a PhD trajectory, it is very important to disseminate and discuss findings and build a network at international conferences. With the Covid-19 pandemic disrupting many opportunities for in-person conferencing and networking, as it was the case for a significant part of my PhD project, such exchanges have become even more relevant now. The UACES Microgrant was a great opportunity and it enabled me to participate in the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Conference held on 15-18 March 2023 in Montréal. The ISA Annual Conference is one of the largest annual gatherings of scholars working in the field of International Relations in which my research is embedded. After having attended some academic conferences in Europe, for example the UACES Annual Conference, the ISA conference was the first conference for me taking place outside of Europe. It was therefore an important occasion for me to present my research in a novel setting and to engage with a wider academic community than I had done before.

With the support of the UACES Microgrant, I was able to fund my attendance at the ISA conference and present my research on the underlying assumptions behind the EU’s approach to preventive counter-terrorism in EU enlargement. At the conference, I received valuable feedback and ideas regarding my research. Attendance at the ISA conference contributed to broadening my perspective on my research findings and to seeing potential ways of improving my argument. The comments and questions that I received as well as the inspiration that I got from attending other panels and discussions including the networking events will feed back into my writing process and will certainly improve my dissertation. I am therefore very grateful to UACES for funding my attendance at the ISA Annual Conference and for giving me the opportunity to connect with the International Relations community at a conference located outside of Europe.

 

 

About the UACES Microgrants scheme:

The UACES Microgrant scheme is aimed at supporting research for our Early-Career and Individual Members.

The microgrants scheme will provide grants of between £100 and £500 to UACES members to assist them to cover the costs of undertaking their research.

The post Engaging with the International Relations Academic Community Beyond Europe – Presenting Research Findings at the ISA Annual Conference in Montréal appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

For our weekly ‘Ideas on Europe’ editorial by UACES, the University Association for European Studies, we have the pleasure to welcome Prof Başak Alpan, from the Middle East Technical University, in Ankara.

 

Listen to the podcast on eu!radio.

 

 

Only two weeks left before the election. What is the mood in the country like?

The mood is perhaps best captured in the recent advertisement by Yeni Rakı (one of the biggest Rakı brands in Turkey). The clip seemingly asks people how they will celebrate the centennial of the Turkish Republic (which is six months away), but is actually implicitly depicting the sheer joy people would feel if the opposition wins in the 14 May elections.

The advert illustrates well how emotionally laden and tense this election campaign is. For the first time in two decades, the incumbent party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) that has been in power since 2002, and its leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, are facing the risk of losing the presidential elections. Most of the pre-election polls predict that the opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu will win the majority of votes in the first round, with Erdoğan coming in second.

 

How has AKP managed to remain so long in power?

AKP came to power in 2002 with the claim that they were not political Islamists but “conservative democrats” who would be the voice of those who had hitherto been oppressed and under-represented by the staunchly secular, Western-minded, and elitist Republic. But AKP radicalised and adopted an authoritarian and religious-oriented positioning, especially after 2010.

The Gezi protests of 2013 and the coup attempt of 15 July 2016 all contributed to the narrative of “fear” cultivated by Erdoğan, which seemed to have attracted voters in all previous elections. This time around, AKP runs under the slogan “once again”.

 

And what opposition is AKP facing?

The main opposition bloc, known as the Nation Alliance, is led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP). It includes five other parties, which explains its popular name “the Table of Six”.

It is campaigning for strengthening the parliamentary system, reversing the democratic backsliding of the country, easing the extremely high inflation, and accomplishing a reset of Turkey’s foreign policy. And of course, it is heavily criticising the government’s response to the devastating earthquake of February. Candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is also supported by the leftist Labour and Freedom Alliance, which is only running for the parliamentary elections (with the highest number of women candidates, by the way).

 

These elections look definitely different…

It is an election of many firsts.

For the first time, the opposition is competing with both Ankara and Istanbul already governed by CHP-aligned mayors. While this might sound irrelevant to a Western European ear, you should bear in mind how politicised Turkish local elections are. The popular Istanbul and Ankara mayors could help the opposition garner the support of especially young voters, who are still undecided.

Also for the first time, strategic voting will be a tool in the parliamentary elections: it’s about ensuring as many opposition MPs winning seats in the Parliament as possible.

Last but not least, democratic consolidation is an important agenda item with very concrete promises like upholding the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) judgments and releasing prominent Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtas and Turkish philanthropist Osman Kavala from prison.

 

And how are you personally experiencing the election?

These elections are crucial for the educated, secular, urban, middle-class voters like myself, who spent the best part of their younger years under the AKP rule.

The erosion of our democracy, the decision to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention, the charges put against the Academics for Peace movement in the past years, and the hyper-inflation that very severely hit the lifestyle of the middle class, are pressing concerns that need to be addressed not only by the new president, but also by a hopefully diverse parliament giving voice to groups like women, Kurds, Alevis, LGBTQs, etc.

I would love to take politics solely as an academic job for some time, rather than the existential struggle directly determining the flow of my life that it has been for the past years.

Perhaps this day will come, just like spring comes. And when that day comes, we will, with Kılıçdaroğlu’s words, perhaps live in “a Turkey that does not hurt each other, that loves and respects those who are different as they are. A Turkey that embraces, not distances. A Turkey with a full stomach and an abundant heart; a Turkey that loves to live.”

 

Thank you very much, for sharing your personal views on the forthcoming election in Turkey. I recall that you are associate professor at the Middle East Technical University. Interview by Sophie Girstmair

 

 

The post “When that Day Comes” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

No graphic for you this time, mainly because the ideas that I’m writing about here are part of an on-going process/struggle for me to generalise into something bigger. But I’m sure you’ll cope.

Blossom: new beginnings, ephemeral

The ‘resolution’ of the Northern Ireland Protocol with the Windsor Framework earlier this year was taken in some quarters as a sign for all manner of new cooperation between the UK and EU to unfurl. Sure, Windsor didn’t actually solve everything (and needs to be implemented), but it gave both sides an opportunity to try giving their post-membership relationship a more regular twist.

Top of that particular to-do list was Horizon, the EU’s main research programme.

The UK had always said it wanted to stay involved in it after it left, but the joys of 2019-20 meant that while there was a mechanism for managing this in the TCA, it got stuck while the Commission pondered some technical questions that had absolutely nothing to do with the Irish impasse.

Result? Two full years of UK non-association to Horizon, which meant no access to several of the funding lines and severely restricting rules for the rest. UK researchers, who had hitherto been both disproportionately active and successful, either wind down their bidding a lot or else moved to other countries that could access the programme (i.e. pretty much anywhere else on the planet).

Windsor undoubtedly unlocked this. Even as Ursula Von Der Leyen proclaimed the Framework’s agreement with Rishi Sunak in the random hotel-that-was-more-Surrey-than-Berkshire, she said work on association could start ‘immediately’.

Of course, starting work ‘immediately’ doesn’t mean agreeing ‘immediately’, and we find ourselves two months later still without a settlement, despite some rounds of detailed talks.

The core issue now is one of money.

The UK argued that since it hadn’t been associated in the first years of the current funding cycle (2021-27), it shouldn’t have to make contributions for the time it missed.

After some pushback by the Commission, that point was conceded, whereupon the government then suggested that this non-participation had a chilling effect on researchers, who wouldn’t be able to return to full capacity in bidding for some time, so a further reduction in contribution would be proportionate.

And here we find ourselves now, a bit stuck.

It’s not clear how this issue will resolve, but confidence still seems high on both sides that a resolution is possible, but it raises a number of reflections about EU-UK cooperation.

Big picture, small steps

Perhaps the central point of this tale is that the calculation for doing work together is now situated in a different context.

Haggling over funding is hardly something that was invented on the day the UK left the EU: a moment’s glance at any budgetary question from the history of European integration will tell you that much.

What is different is the scope for trade-offs.

As a member state, the UK was – like its counterparts – able to balance out costs or disadvantages in one area of cooperation by building up package deals. Everyone gets something they value, enough to justify more localised costs. This was not only in treaties, but also in linkages across secondary legislation, most notably the Single Market programme in the 1980s.

Now however, the UK is a third country, so the EU is able to structure things rather differently. Horizon is not part of a package of topics, but a standalone. Agreeing the Windsor Framework was the entry price to a new negotiation about Horizon association, even though the EU had connected it previously.

The reason the EU is able to do this is two-fold.

Firstly, this is about the UK joining an EU programme. So the EU holds the veto power alone: whatever requirements it decides it has for entry, it can impose on the UK and anyone else. If it were about creating a new joint structure – like the Withdrawal Agreement or the Trade & Cooperation Agreement for example – then both parties would have veto rights, but this takes us to the second reason.

Despite being one of the world’s largest economies and a state with global ambitions, the UK is still relatively small in the grand scheme of things. As a result, its options for alternative lines of action are rather limited, which in turn mean that cleaving to the EU becomes more of a necessity, which takes us back to that first reason.

Research is a good demonstration of this.

Throughout the past few years, the UK government has talked up building alternatives to Horizon that ‘better serve’ UK interests.

Only this month, it published details of a plan for ‘Pioneer’, as a back-up should Horizon association not play out. This would have the same budget envelope as Horizon, so surely it’s just as good, right?

Not really.

The value of Horizon and its predecessors was always much more in the networks of collaboration that it built, rather than the money per se. For example, I’ve just finished a project with partners across Europe, South Africa and Canada which has given me a bunch of new contacts and opportunities for future work that would otherwise have been unavailable.

So Pioneer, like the other Plan B options the government has advanced before, falls far short, precisely because other countries aren’t part of it. Witness the Turing Scheme, designed to make up for exiting ERASMUS+ exchanges, which still has nothing like the breadth and range of international partners.

As any negotiator will tell you, knowing what your alternative to agreement might be is really useful in deciding whether to accepting that agreement. But in this case, that alternative is so clearly inferior (and clearly so to all parties) that it doesn’t really work as an incentive to the EU to flex. No wonder the minister has not gone full-Johnson on ‘no deal’.

All of this is likely to be a pattern that gets repeated again and again in the future. The EU’s relative weight mean it can be pretty confident that the UK will have to bend to its terms, or instead wait until it comes around to that idea.

This isn’t to say that the UK has no options, but rather that it needs to start from a position of understanding this situation more fully. And in coming posts I’ll write some more about what it might do about it all.

The post Over the Horizon appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

One of the most profound but under-appreciated impacts of the Covid pandemic on Early Career Researchers (ECRs) is that we simply have not had the opportunity to find “our people” – the ones who are so integral for socialising us into academia, for accompanying us through the confusing terrain and showing us the hidden rooms. Our people are the kindred spirits who help us find our voice and develop our approach to research and the world.

Years of cancelled and online conferences have meant that we have not had the opportunity to meet other ECRs and established scholars in our field in person. And so, it was with a generous microgrant from UACES, that I packed my bags and headed off to the 2023 International Studies Association (ISA) conference in Montreal where, as fortune would have it, I essentially managed to meet the entire bibliography of my thesis [1].

To give some context, ISA is the largest international studies conference in the world. It is MASSIVE – 5,500 attendees from across the globe (though much more work needs to be done to help those who require visas to attend), present at several hundred panels, organised across three hotels over four days. It is easy for a first timer to get burned out and overwhelmed (I did). I attended innovative insightful talks ranging from migration and borders, through ontological security, to solar geoengineering and patent mapping.

These panels and presentations are, of course, important. But being able to meet these people outside of the confines of a panel and hear more about their work more candidly; to arrange drinks and dinners to sit and bounce around nascent thoughts with people working in similar (and sometimes completely different) areas as me has helped me clarify my ideas, (re)orient myself within my discipline, and move my research forward. Conversations with both established and early career ontological security scholars have helped in my thinking around contingency and temporality in particular and given me renewed focus and engagement with my thesis.

On a more human level (which is all too frequently overlooked in institutional academia), we need these kinds of encounters to develop our support networks. Academia can notoriously be a very lonely place and being able to meet our people is utterly vital in helping ECRs survive and thrive in this world.

Maybe the real ISA is the friends we made along the way.

 

[1] This line was shamelessly stolen from Lauren Rogers (@rogerslkay)

 

 

About the UACES Microgrant:

The UACES Microgrant scheme is aimed at supporting research for our Early-Career and Individual Members.

The microgrants scheme will provide grants of between £100 and £500 to UACES members to assist them to cover the costs of undertaking their research. The grants are designed to recognise the challenges facing researchers at this time.

Next application deadline: 31 July 2023.

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