By Desmond Dinan (George Mason University) and Sophia Russack (Centre for European Policy Studies)
The reappointment of Ursula von der Leyen in 2024 was more than just continuity at the top of the EU executive. It revealed how power is distributed in Brussels, between the European Council and European Parliament (EP), between national governments and the Commission, and increasingly between the Commission President and the rest of the College. In particular, the process by which the second von der Leyen Commission came into being illustrates two long-term shifts: the presidentialisation of the Commission and the growing, if contested, politicisation of its appointment.
Presidential power and party politics
Von der Leyen consolidated the trend, begun under José Emanuel Barroso and intensified under Jean-Claude Juncker, of centralising power in the hands of the President. She abolished the Vice-President tier, designed diffuse and overlapping portfolios, and ensured that no other “heavyweight” rivals sat at the table. These choices made her the ultimate arbiter within the College.
At the same time, party politics shaped the process more than ever before. Although von der Leyen formally ran as a Spitzenkandidat (the lead candidate of a European political party), her nomination owed more to package-deal bargaining among national leaders. Being a Spitzenkandidat gave her political cover, but the real driver was intergovernmental pragmatism and political party negotiating, especially between the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and centre-left Party of European Socialists. Von der Leyen’s re-election in the EP was smoother than in 2019, but also more transactional. Her speech to MEPs emphasised competitiveness, defence, and migration, while downplaying the once-flagship Green Deal. Symbolically, the Spitzenkandidaten model survived. Substantively, its impact was limited.
Constructing the College
National governments still nominate Commissioners, but von der Leyen exerted clear influence. She informally vetted candidates and, in a striking move, forced out France’s Thierry Breton, a vocal critic. This highlighted the President’s capacity to shape the team, though in practice the decision also reflected personal and political tensions.
The new College was younger and more male-dominated than her first. Party-political calculations were evident: the European People’s Party was over-represented, while the Socialists and liberals held key portfolios as part of a fragile balance. Von der Leyen also created three new portfolios, defence industry, housing, and the Mediterranean, both to reflect pressing EU challenges and to appease national governments and MEPs.
The design of the College reinforced her leadership style: overlapping responsibilities, blurred mandates, and a lack of heavyweight figures all strengthened her own central role.
Accountability under strain
The EP’s confirmation hearings offered another insight. Long a forum for scrutiny, in 2024 they became largely symbolic. All candidates were approved, including those facing strong criticism, thanks to a pre-arranged deal between the main party groups. The hearings looked more like the politics of performance than an exercise in accountability.
The final confirmation vote passed with the lowest share of support ever for a new Commission. That outcome reflected both the EP’s fragmentation and its reluctance to challenge the process head-on.
Why it matters
The making of von der Leyen’s second Commission highlights the maturing of a presidentialised executive in Brussels. The Spitzenkandidaten process remains part of the story, but as a political ritual rather than a binding rule. National leaders in the European Council still control the decisive steps. Parliament’s role is visible, but limited.
In a more fragmented and polarised EU, executive power has concentrated further in the Commission President’s hands. Von der Leyen’s second term shows how this dynamic works in practice: national bargaining determines the President, presidential control shapes the College, and parliamentary oversight struggles to keep pace. What looks like continuity at the top is in fact a window into how EU governance is evolving—more presidential, more politicised, but not necessarily more accountable. Opaque working practices, such as vaccine procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic, paired with the frequent sidelining of key stakeholders and formalised procedures in her first term, fuelled doubts about the level of accountability in decision-making.
Sophia Russack is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, one of Europe’s leading think tanks on EU affairs. She holds a PhD from Maastricht University. Her academic and professional work has positioned her as a prominent expert in the field of EU institutions and EU democracy.
Desmond Dinan is a professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Virginia, USA. He teaches and writes on EU history, institutions, and governance. His latest book is A Concise History of the European Union (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2025).
The post The Making of Ursula von der Leyen’s Second Commission: Politicisation and the Limits of Parliamentarisation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.