Diplomacy & Crisis News

As my fellow firearms enthusiasts are all too well aware, ammo is expensive. Gone are the good old days when you could go into Wally World and purchase a Winchester Value Pack 100-round box of 9x19mm 115-grain full metal jacket (FMJ; aka “hardball” or just plain “ball”) practice ammo for roughly $10 (which equates to 10 cents per round); nowadays that same product will cost you around $28.50.

A large part of this is due to inflation, though ammo prices started spiraling since the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. So then, that leaves gun hobbyists with this question: are we going to have to continue to bite the bullet, or are there alternatives? Luckily, there are, thanks to imports from non-Western ammunition manufacturers. Today, we’ll look at two such examples, namely BPS of Turkey and MaxxTech of Bosnia.

BPS Ammo Basics

As per the manufacturer’s official website:

“BPS Balıkesir Patlayıcı Maddeler Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. [Balıkesir Explosives Industry and Trade Inc] established in 2014 to produce small arms ammunitions and shotgun cartridges in Türkiye at international standards, works with all its might to offer reliable, effective and innovative products with the production capabilities, capacities and technologies it has developed over the years.”

The Balıkesir portion of the name is in homage to the city where the company is headquartered. BPS was founded by Mehmet Akif Yavaşca and Müşteba Yavaşc. According to Ammo, BPS products have the pluses of not only being inexpensive—I’m guessing part of this is due to the exchange rate of the Turkish lira (TRY) to the U.S. dollar (USD)—but also “High quality brass [which] is great for reloading.” The minuses are the potential for hard primers and the fact that the brand’s only offerings are 9mm Parabellum and 12-gauge shotgun shells.

I obtained my BPS 9x19mm 124-grain hardball ammo from Royal Tiger Imports (RTI) (from whom, on a separate note, I also obtained really good deals on a 6.5mm Carcano rifle and ammo), headquartered in Melbourne, Florida. Currently, RTI has individual fifty-round boxes of the stuff for $12,99 and 1,000-round cases at $229.99.

MaxxTech Ammo Basics

MaxxTech by GH Ammunition was launched in 2002 and is made by Pobjeda Technology in the city of Gorazde, Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Ammo, this company’s products have a good reputation for accuracy and reliability in addition to being affordable; like with the TRY-USD exchange rate, I imagine the favorable exchange rate of the Bosnian convertible mark (BAM) to the USD is a big help. The downside is the relative lack of variety of calibers (though they’re better than BPS in that regard), the lack of more self-defense-appropriate bullet configurations such as jacketed hollowpoints (JHPs), and complaints from some shooters of MaxxTech ammo being too dirty.

I bought my boxes of MaxxTech 9x18mm Makarov 92-grain FMJ at The Nations’ Gun Show in Dulles, Virginia. Truth be told, I don’t remember exactly what I paid for the stuff, but I do remember being quite pleasantly surprised with the price. For what it’s worth, GunMag Warehouse is currently advertising fifty-round boxes at $19.99, whilst Ammo To Go is selling 1,000-round bulk rate cases for $339.95 (averaging out to 34 cents per round).

Range Report and Shooting Impressions

I’m quite happy with the performance of both of these ammo brands through my personally owned handguns: in the case of the MaxxTech 9x18mm, we’re talking about my Bulgarian-made Pistolet Makarova (PM; Makarov Pistol), and in the case of the BPS 9x19mm (AKA 9mm Luger, 9mm Parabellum), I test-fired the round through my beloved Beretta 92FS, CZ-75B, Glock 26, and P-35 Browning Hi-Power (BHP).

All gave me sufficient accuracy for headshots at 25 yards and torso shots at 50 yards. The only hiccups from a reliability standpoint were one stovepipe (it felt and sounded like a squib load) and one extraction failure with the BHP; but then again, my BHP (which is of 1967 vintage) has been acting rather quirky as of late, so maybe I need to have a gunsmith look her over.

About the Author: Christian D. Orr

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

Image: Shutterstock.

From India’s relations with rivals to Sri Lanka’s democratic shift, here’s what to keep an eye on this year.

Fareed Zakaria plays the annual predictions game on FP Live.

Le 21 novembre, la Cour pénale internationale a délivré des mandats d'arrêt pour crimes de guerre et crimes contre l'humanité à l'encontre de MM. Benyamin Netanyahou et Yoav Galant. Dès janvier 2024, la Cour internationale de justice demandait aux responsables israéliens de prendre des mesures (...) / Génocide, Justice internationale, Crime de guerre, Bosnie-Herzégovine - 2025/01

Foreign Policy’s columnists share what’s on their radar this year.

As Trump returns to office, the question is whether change will come at the negotiating table or on the battlefield.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib has emerged as a voice of unique clarity in the zero-sum debate over Israel-Palestine.

The United States Strategic Command has yet to make it official, but the organizers of the 136th Tournament of Roses Parade, which is held in advance of the annual Rose Bowl college football match-up on New Year's Day, have included a flyover of a U.S. Air Force Northrop B-2 Spirit bomber in the upcoming program.

It isn't a holiday surprise, however.

The flying wing aircraft, which are operated by the U.S. Air Force's 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, have been a staple at the annual parade since 2005—with only a break in 2023 due to a safety stop following a crash weeks earlier. That resulted in a pair of Rockwell B-1B Lancer bombers from Dyess AFB, Texas, filling in before the B-2s returned this past January.

It would seem unlikely—barring another unfortunate incident—that the Air Force's B-2s would sit out what has become a fan-favorite tradition. It provides a rare opportunity for many to see the famed bomber in the skies overhead.

"We have enjoyed a long relationship with the city of Pasadena and are honored to bring the B-2 back to demonstrate Team Whiteman’s commitment to the American people," Col. Keith J. Butler, 509th Bomb Wing commander at Whiteman Air Force Base, said in a statement last year when announcing the Spirit's return to the famed parade.

Not a New Tradition

Today, it is common at large sporting events for U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine, and U.S. Navy aircraft to take part in a flyover. It is now expected—along with the National Anthem—at such events as the Rose Bowl, the Super Bowl, NASCAR races, and Major League Baseball's World Series.

Flyovers are not a new tradition.

It was more than ninety years before the B-2 began making its appearance at the parade that the first flyover at a sporting event occurred. According to Blue Sky News, it took place on September 15, 1918, during World War I—while the country was also dealing with the global influenza pandemic.

"60 military aircraft flew over Game 1 of the World Series at Comiskey Park in Chicago," Blue Sky News explained. "Nearly 20,000 fans looked in awe at the plane-filled sky, then watched with considerably less pleasure as the legendary Babe Ruth, pitching for the Boston Red Sox against the Chicago Cubs, threw a complete game shutout en route to Boston's fourth World Series win in six years."

No doubt the sight of so many aircraft fewer than twenty years after the first manned flight might have been even more memorable for many in the stands than seeing Ruth at the mound! In the century to come, the U.S. military has only served to offer even more impressive flyovers.

As Simple Flying reported, the impressive displays "represent the culmination of months of hard work by hundreds of dedicated individuals."

Planning takes months and involves coordination with the Department of Defense, the Federal Aviation Administration, and local authorities. But it can result in something truly special.

Such was the case in January 2021's Super Bowl LV in Tampa, Florida, which featured all three bombers that are currently in service: the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer, and B-2 Spirit. It was the first such flyover of all three aircraft in such an event. The aircraft, from three different bases, rarely operate together but for the big game flew just 250 feet apart at 280 mph!

A year later, it wasn't bombers—but to mark the Air Force's 75th anniversary in 2022, Super Bowl LVI saw a P-51D Mustang, A-10 Thunderbolt II, F-16 Fighting Falcon, F-22 Raptor, and F-35 Lightning II conduct an impressive flyover!

Such displays—which require military precision that only the military can deliver—don't come cheap, but the Defense Department has a workaround.

"Since DODI 5410.19 also prohibits military aircraft from being hired or paid for an aerial display, most flyover hours come from the supporting unit's annual flight training budget. Their approval requires a healthy balance between the cost of operating the aircraft, the benefit of community engagement, and the training value associated with the event," Simple Flying explained.

Thus, while it can cost more than $100,000 per flight hour for the B-2 Spirit to take part in the Rose Parade and do a flyover of the stadium, the result is a truly priceless moment.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Matthew Munsell / Shutterstock.com

From the Vault

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Balancing partnerships in the Middle East is never easy, especially when it involves the sale of advanced military hardware. When it involves the most advanced stealth fighter, complicated doesn’t begin to describe the situation.

During President-elect Donald Trump’s first term, the White House sought to sell the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after the Middle Eastern nation formalized relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords.

Israel had previously opposed the Arab nation’s acquisition of the fifth-generation stealth fighter but later withdrew its objections. The Jewish state’s security doctrine has long prioritized qualitative superiority over neighbors and possible rivals. Israel has sought out the most advanced military technology from the United States—or developed it domestically with some programs, such as its Merkava main battle tanks (MBTs)—while the Israel Defense Force (IDF) also would like to deny the same technology to adversaries (and potential adversaries). As a nation surrounded by hostility, Israel must acknowledge that today’s friends could be tomorrow’s enemies (Iran is such an example).

However, the deal was never closed, and the Biden administration didn’t move forward. That had seemed to be the end of it.

Then, last fall, there were reports that the UAE hoped to revive the multi-billion dollar deal if Trump won the 2024 presidential election—which he did, making the greatest political comeback in modern history. That could result in a significant reverse course yet again, as Abu Dhabi had this past spring indicated it could adopt the Chinese-made Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon, arguably the most successful fifth-gen fighter program after the F-35.

Beijing and Abu Dhabi have sought to expand cooperation through investments in the Pacific islands and Africa. The Gulf state is also considering increasing the use of China’s currency, the yuan, which offers China a low-risk gateway into the region. Washington may use the F-35 to earn renewed favor with the UAE.

Saudi Arabia Is Going With Turkey

NATO member Turkey was infamously expelled from the F-35 program for its adoption of the Russian-made S-400 Triumf air defense system. Options have been floated that could see Ankara return to the proverbial F-35 fold, but whether that occurs after Trump returns to the White House remains an unknown.

In the meantime, Turkey has sought to develop the domestically-built next-generation TF Kaan stealth fighter. To help fund its development, Ankara has sought foreign buyers—and among the countries that have expressed interest is Saudi Arabia.

As the F-35 was likely off the table for many of the reasons already stated, Riyadh has explored other options. The selection of the Turkish-made fighter would likely be met with more approval from Washington than alternatives from China (the J-20 Mighty Dragon) or, worse, Russia’s Sukhoi Su-57 (NATO reporting name Felon).

“A deal for 100 TF Kaans would similarly come without precedent and could give Turkey some much-needed investment in the ambitious aircraft project. Additionally, such a large Saudi order could help bring down the price per aircraft, which could, in turn, help Turkey win some additional foreign customers who would otherwise hesitate over the price tag,” Paul Iddon wrote for Forbes.

As Iddon also noted, the TF Kaan may not be a true “fifth-gen” fighter, but rather a “4.75-generation,” and “a notch above the Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon but below truly fifth-generation stealth aircraft like the F-35 and F-22 Raptor.”

Such would be good news for Israel, which would maintain an edge even as the two countries inch closer to some formal recognition. At the same time, it would ensure Saudi Arabia could acquire the capabilities needed to deter Iran in a regional conflict.

Morocco And The F-35

In late November, reports first circulated that Morocco could be on track to become the first Arab and African nation to acquire the F-35. Rabat’s desire to operate the F-35 comes as its regional rival Algeria has sought the Russian Su-57.

The Algerian Air Force currently operates various Soviet-designed aircraft, including the Mikoyan MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-24 from the late Cold War. In 2022, it ordered around a dozen Sukhoi Su-30sMKA. Moreover, Moscow has maintained close ties with Algiers since the Cold War, when the Soviet Union provided military, technical, and material support to Algeria during its war for independence from France.

In November, Morocco also reasserted ties with the Jewish state for the first time since the Gaza war began. Morocco is the sixth Arab League nation that has normalized relations with Israel.

Morocco’s acquisition of the F-35 could help bolster ties with the United States and Israel while maintaining a balance of power in North Africa. But like every other aspect of the F-35 in the Arab world, it will likely be complicated!

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites, with over 3,200 published pieces and over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: WoodysPhotos / Shutterstock.com. 

The incident closes a year that has seen an uptick in high-profile cyberattacks on the United States.

Surprised and bloodied, the Israelis found themselves significantly on the backfoot following Hamas’ terrorist attacks on October 7, 2023. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) was tasked with hitting back against the terrorists—hard. Its responses were brutal but effective.

While the Israelis failed to get back most of the hostages that Hamas took on that fateful day, they sapped Hamas’ capacity to wage war.

A key reason why the IDF was so brutally effective in breaking the martial prowess of Hamas was due to the deployment of radical, dare I say even exotic, technologies. One of those rare weapons the IDF used with such effectiveness was the Israeli Maoz (aka, Spike Firefly) kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

A Sky Monster

This sky monster is described as a “coaxial rotor loitering munition drone” that was specifically designed for urban warfare. If I saw this thing at night or sundown, it might be easy to believe that little gray men from Zeta Reticuli were attacking rather than the IDF—that’s how bizarre this vertical, twin-bladed sky machine looks.

When the Israelis chose to move in force into the Gaza Strip, the overpopulated southern strip of territory along the Eastern Mediterranean Sea between the Sinai Peninsula and southern Israel, they ran smack dab into the dread of most modern militaries: urban warfare.

Built up and overflowing with people in varying states of poverty (and anger toward Israel), the IDF risked kicking over a veritable hornet’s nest going in there. But the Israelis persevered. And that was in large part due to the innovative tactics and technologies that the IDF employed against Hamas.

There is some dispute as to whether the Israelis did, in fact, deploy the Spike Firefly loitering munitions drone in Gaza. Although, one can assume that the system was used in the horrible fighting against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. What is known is that the drone has been spotted engaging in operations in another terrorist hotspot where Israel is often conducting military operations, the West Bank city of Jenin.

Israel’s Spike Firefly drone is part of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems’ SPIKE family of precision-guided munitions. With their Spike Firefly, the Israelis are again offering the world a masterclass in what the next round of major wars will look like.

Indeed, the Spike Firefly is a model for the kind of network-centric warfare that will undoubtedly define the next great power conflict. That’s because the Spike Firefly shares real-time intelligence it gathers with other IDF elements, giving greater situational awareness to those advancing IDF elements.

The Specs

Spike Firefly carries a SPIKE NLOS (non-line-of-sight) missile and has a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capability. In terms of surveillance capacity, it offers its users “beyond-line-of-sight” (BLOS) attack modes. In other words, this thing can kill you up close or far away. Spike Firefly can get you by seeing you or simply detecting you with sensors. What’s more, it is a semi-autonomous system. Spike Firefly can operate on its own or with a human operator in control.

As for some of its more advanced surveillance systems, it has dual infrared and electro-optical (EO) sensors. Again, its unique shape and relatively small size allow for it to not just loiter above buildings—the drone can pursue an enemy target into a building. This is the stuff of nightmares. Think of the opening scene from the original Terminator film, when the hero fighting the machines in the future is chased by a tiny flying machine that is utterly relentless in its quest to end his life.

Weighing in at 6.6 pounds and built for silent killing, there is a compartment that can carry a .77-pound bomb or an extra battery. In fact, that’s the only likely weakness of this drone: It has a limited battery life of around fifteen minutes. But the extra battery can be used to extend operational life to around thirty minutes (for reconnaissance missions).

Rafael says that the Spike Firefly has a topflight speed of 37 miles per hour and a diving speed of 43 mph, meaning this thing can come up on you fast. Further, its small size and silent running means you would be unlikely to even know it was over you until it was too late.

Israel has been at the forefront of understanding the often-radical changes in warfare over the last thirty years. The Spike Firefly drone is a testament to this. It is one of the most promising systems in the world and should be embraced not only more widely by the IDF but also by the United States and its allies. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock. 

As a new administration settles into Washington, the global chessboard is being reset. While Central Asia may not be occupying the top squares of that board, it remains a strategically vital region. For the incoming administration, the key to effectively engaging with this complex region isn’t a sudden spotlight or grand pronouncements but rather a commitment to consistent and well-defined engagement. Central Asia doesn’t need to be a top priority; it needs consistent attention.

No one expects Central Asia to be the administration’s immediate focus. Crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as the ongoing challenges posed by China, will understandably dominate the headlines and agendas. However, the very fact that Central Asia is not likely to erupt into a major conflict demanding immediate military or diplomatic intervention is precisely why a steady, long-term approach is so crucial. The five nations of the region—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—have a long history of navigating complex geopolitical landscapes and are unlikely to be swayed by fleeting attention or pronouncements that lack follow-through. They prioritize reliability over rhetoric.

The previous Trump administration deserves credit for recognizing this and formalizing a new United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019–2025. This strategy aimed to bolster the region’s independence, sovereignty, and resilience while emphasizing economic connectivity and reforms. However, the implementation of this strategy was often hampered by inconsistencies and a lack of sustained engagement. While the blueprint existed, the practical execution fell short. For instance, while the strategy highlighted the importance of trade diversification, few concrete initiatives were launched to facilitate U.S. business engagement beyond existing limited partnerships. 

Furthermore, outdated restrictions were sometimes used as political leverage, creating unnecessary complications. A prime example is the persistence of the Jackson-Vanik amendment for Kazakhstan, which prevents normal trade relations with the United States. Originally intended to target the USSR for restricting Jewish emigration, this legacy legislation continues to apply to post-Soviet states. Despite bipartisan agreement on its obsolescence, a recent CRS report highlights its continued use as potential leverage for promoting democratic governance. This demonstrates how upholding superficial limitations, ostensibly for values-based reasons, can undermine interest-based policy.

The C5+US summit on September 21, 2023, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York offered a glimmer of hope for renewed engagement. The dialogue was positive, and commitments were made on various fronts, from regional security to economic cooperation. However, the follow-up has been underwhelming. Where are the tangible investment plans spurred by the summit? Where are the concrete joint projects addressing water scarcity or border security that were discussed? The Critical Minerals Dialogue, established in February 2024 to address the critical issue of the region’s rare-earth reserves and the American need for secure supply chains, has yet to yield any publicly announced initiatives or agreements. This is despite the increasing urgency of the situation, with China becoming more willing to impose bans and restrictions on critical mineral exports. This gap between pronouncements and practical action is precisely what breeds skepticism in a region accustomed to navigating the long game.

What Central Asia truly needs from the United States is a competent, clearly articulated strategy that is consistently implemented at the ground level. The leaders of the regional states are pragmatic actors. They prioritize tangible, long-term cooperation that contributes to their economic development, strengthens their security, and respects their sovereignty without imposing undue conditions or forcing them to choose sides. This pragmatic approach aligns directly with crucial U.S. interests. Economically, Central Asia represents a significant, yet largely untapped, treasure trove of resources, including rare earth elements vital for both high-tech industries and the green energy transition. 

A prime example of this untapped potential, and a clear illustration of the current dynamic, is Kazakhstan. While possessing significant reserves, the country has seen a 3.8-fold increase in its rare earth mineral (REM) exports since 2020, in real terms. Kazakhstan is also among the few nations capable of producing gallium and indium, rare earth elements on which China currently holds a near-monopoly. Yet, China was the sole importer of these Kazakhstani REMs in 2023. For Washington to capitalize on this potential, the region requires targeted and strategic investments, technology transfer, personnel education, and comprehensive high-level exploratory work to map deposits effectively. Equally important are long-term commitments to import these products. This represents a mutually beneficial scenario: the United States gains a diversified supply chain, gaining a crucial edge in future geopolitical competition, while regional states benefit from new workplaces, increased budget revenue, and the ability to build their market share. 

Beyond economics, a consistent U.S. policy towards the region is crucial for fostering regional stability. Central Asian states have long played a constructive role as mediators in regional disputes, offering platforms for dialogue. The increasing connectivity facilitated by projects like the Middle Corridor creates economic interdependence, fostering a shared interest in peace and stability. The ongoing, albeit fragile, peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan are indirectly influenced by the growing importance of transit routes that benefit both nations, highlighting the power of economic incentives in promoting peace.

Shifting to another pressing challenge, Afghanistan presents a painful issue where Central Asian engagement can be particularly valuable. While direct engagement with the Taliban poses significant obstacles for the United States, it is evident to the countries of the region that ignoring the reality on the ground will not make the challenges disappear. In 2024, there have been significant efforts to normalize relations and engage in pragmatic dialogue with the Taliban, for example, in delivering humanitarian aid and ensuring border security. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has taken a leading role, consistently advocating at the UN for the establishment of the UN Regional Sustainable Development Goals Center for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty, an idea that was realized this summer. As a follow-up, Kazakhstan removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations and accredited a Chargé d’affaires from Afghanistan. Discussions are now underway to expand trans-Afghan railways further, opening trade routes for other nations in South and Central Asia, as well as the Middle East. By supporting these regional actors, the United States can contribute to preventing Afghanistan from becoming a breeding ground for instability and terrorism without necessarily endorsing the Taliban regime.

The new administration should understand that a consistent, well-defined, and diligently implemented strategy is the most effective path to engaging with Central Asia. It is crucial not to think about the region arena for winning a zero-sum game against Russia or China but rather as a space to build mutually beneficial partnerships that advance U.S. interests while respecting the sovereignty and agency of the Central Asian nations. By focusing on concrete, ground-level cooperation in areas like trade diversification, infrastructure development, and regional stability, the United States can cultivate lasting relationships that yield far greater dividends than sporadic bursts of high-level attention. A steady hand, guided by a consistent strategy, will secure America’s long-term interests in this region.

Miras Zhiyenbayev is the Head of the Foreign Policy Analysis and International Studies Program at MIND, the Maqsut Narikbayev Institute for Networking and Development, a university-based think tank at Maqsut Narikbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan.

Image: Vladimir Tretyakov / Shutterstock.com.

In recent weeks, I have penned multiple articles on U.S. Armed Forces’ elite Special Operations units, from the Army’s Delta Force and Special Forces (SF, AKA “Green Berets”), to the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, to the Marine Raiders, and even the Air Force Pararescue Jumpers (PJs) and Combat Controllers (CCTs).

So now, in the interest of diversifying my special operations coverage, I am expanding my scope to some foreign elite units. Famous units like the British Special Air Service (SAS), French Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale (GIGN; affectionately nicknamed “Gigene”), and German Grenzschutzgruppe Neun (GSG-9) might seem like the obvious choices. However, as my instructors at both USAF Officer Training School (OTS) and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) exhorted my fellow trainees and me to “think outside the box,” I will now write about an elite foreign military unit that most of my fellow American’s have probably never heard of: South Africa’s Parachute Battalion, nicknamed the “Parabats.”

Job/Mission Description and Early History

1 Parachute Battalion was founded on April 1, 1966, under the command of Lt Col (later Lt Gen) Willem Louw SSA SM; other noteworthy commanders of the unit included Brigadier M.J. du Plessis and Colonel Jan Breytenbach. Today, it is the only full-time paratroop unit in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF); during the infamous apartheid era—which officially ended in 1994—it was simply known as the South African Defence Force, and is currently commanded by Lt. Col. D. Mziki. The battalion’s proud motto is “Ex alto vincimus (We conquer from Above).”

Operational History In Brief: Noteworthy Parabat Combat Missions

The Parabats were first “blooded” in combat in 1966 during a counterinsurgency war in South West Africa (known nowadays as Namibia); indeed, these troops carried out the very first combat action of that war, whereupon they participated in a heliborne assault on an insurgent base. From there, the Battalion was embroiled in operations in SWA/Namibia, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and elsewhere on an almost constant basis for over twenty years.

In the post-apartheid era, the Parabats’ best-known combat ops were:

-The Battle for Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR) in March 2012, whereupon the unit—which was attached to a South African military assistance operation in the CAR—suffered thirteen killed in action via an ambush conducted by Seleka rebels; the following year, it was announced that 1 Parachute Battalion would receive Battle Honours for their sacrifice.

-In support of the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2013, a single Parabat company under the command of Major Vic Vrolik fought a series of engagements.

Perspective From My Former Colleagues

I’ve been unable to get ahold of any Parabat veterans to garner their firsthand perspectives on life in that unit. So, I did the next best thing by pinging a couple of friends who were members of other SADF/SANDF units (and served on that same Iraq contract as I did) and, though they didn’t serve with the Parachute Battalion, they spent enough time working with them to provide me some useful information.

First, there’s my friend John Dovey, RD (Reserve Distinction), a South African army veteran with thirty-five years of service:

“To the foreign observer, the Parabats appear to be simple parachute qualified infantry. This is far from the case. The best comparison would be to [U.S. Army] Ranger Battalion or [USMC] Force Recon. Jump qualification is simply the initial barrier to entry and the selection is harsh and fierce. There are Green Berets I know who have said it’s a tougher selection than that to get into the Q course. The ‘Bats pride themselves on being tough for a simple reason; they are!”

From there, Dovey adds:

“The ‘PT Course’ is a grueling, vicious physical and mental event, initially running for two weeks, then changed to run for a full 72 hours without interruption. Those who make it through that initial test know that their comrades are some of the physically and mentally toughest soldiers it’s possible to have. That certainty is the beginning of the brotherhood that all ‘Bats share. The fierce pride of the Parabats is reflected in the reverence they accord to the earning and wearing of their ‘Maroon Beret.’ Touch a Parabat’s beret at your own peril.”

Then there’s my friend “Grunt,” to whom I’m assigning a pseudonym out of respect for his request for anonymity; “Grunt” served as an Olifant tank crewman, rising up the conscript ranks to troop sergeant before ascending to the commissioned officer ranks, ultimately leaving the service with the rank of “Lieutenant qualified to Major.” “Grunt’s” Parabat tidbit isn’t as detailed as John’s, but it is a good bit more comical:

“Armor and Para Bats had a strong rivalry. They used to try to steal our black berets. We used to have many fights in the streets of Bloemfontein where MPs [Military Police] would arrest everyone. I remember a huge fight in one of the night clubs where I came across an armour man lying in the toilet, beaten by Bats. We caught them in the streets and chased them into an alleyway, but just then the police released a K9 and the Bats were locked up.”

Baie dankie (“Thank you very much”), John and “Grunt!” As the title and opening line of South Africa’s national anthem says, “Nkosi Sikelele Afrika (God Bless Africa)!”

About the Author: Christian D. Orr

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

This article was inspired by my friend and former Iraq contracting comrade-in-arms , Craig de Villiers, a former Para Bat. Sadly, a few months ago, Craig lost his battle with lung cancer, and ergo I dedicate this writeup to him.

Image: Johan Nicolaas van Vuren / Shutterstock.com

During the holidays, gamers spend no shortage of time "gaming," but in recent years, some hardcore video game enthusiasts have also been too quick to spill military secrets. Just before the Christmas holiday, military secrets related to the Eurofighter Typhoon were shared on the forums for the popular free-to-play War Thunder simulation.

As in past incidents, the leaked documents came about after multiple gamers disputed key systems and the accuracy of the digital recreation in the War Thunder game. This time the spilled secrets involved the Eurofighter Typhoon, the 4+ generation multirole aircraft currently in service with the air forces of the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

Hungary-based Gaijin Entertainment, the game's publisher, has repeatedly asked fans of the game not to leak military secrets on the forums.

"[We] will take this opportunity to again remind everyone here, please do not, under any circumstances, try to post, share any sources unless you are 100% certain they are legally declassified and publicly safe for use. We will never handle or use them, and all it does is actively harm any possible future changes being possible by trying to use them. Do not do it. No good will ever come from it for you or the vehicle you are trying to post for," the company said in a statement, as first reported by PC Gamer.

Secrets Revealed

The National Interest will not publish what content was posted online but will note that the gamer debate—which turned heated—had resulted over the reported scanning capabilities of the CAPTOR radar system. According to Simple Flying, around 600 aircraft are fitted with the CAPTOR-E, an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which operates on the X-band.

"Discussions centred on comparisons between its mechanically scanning (CAPTOR-M) and electronically scanning (CAPTOR-E) variants, particularly the latter’s ability to reduce scanning times significantly. Players disagreed over the exact technical capabilities, prompting the ill-advised sharing of restricted data," the UK Defence Journal explained.

Popular Game—Popular With Leaks

War Thunder was first released in 2013 and is widely considered to be the most "realistic" combat simulation currently available to the general public. It simulates more than 1,900 vehicles, and according to the company, has a base of around 60,000 active players from around the world.

The most serious players are known to spend thousands of dollars on advanced controls that better simulate the flying experience, while some gamers have also gone to great lengths to create an immersive experience for tanks and other vehicles. The hardcore following the game has received has in turn resulted in very heated arguments over "classified" details.

In the past few years, gamers have shared secrets related to the McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle and General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon. The leak for the F-15E had come from Operational Flight Program (OFP) software manuals, including those for flight controls, navigation, targeting, and even weapons systems. However, the documents had apparently been published between 1998 and 2000 and pertained to OFP suite 3, which has been upgraded numerous times in the past two decades. The other posted information was from the F-16's flight manual, detailing the use of the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM).

Other classified information has been posted to the War Thunder forums involving the British Army's Challenger 2 main battle tank (MBT), and the French military's Leclerc Serie 2 MBT. In June 2022, a gamer from China shared data on the DTC10-125, an anti-tank round fielded by modern Chinese tanks. Though many of the details were already well known, it still marked the first time that any authenticating documentation had been seen outside of China.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image:  VanderWolf Images / Shutterstock.com

From a brewing trade war to opportunities on the global stage, here’s what we’re watching in the new year.

As an island vulnerable to frequent blackouts, Puerto Rico deserves a resilient and reliable power grid. Building such a grid starts with guaranteeing energy security for critical infrastructure, such as hospitals and storm shelters. Natural gas (NG) can help alleviate the island’s power grid challenges by providing backup redundancy, fuel diversification, and the other critical services (so-called ancillary services) that are required to maintain a reliable grid. If implemented successfully, NG distribution by trucks or storm-resilient pipeline networks would serve as a bridge to a stable grid and set the stage for the 100 percent renewable goal described in the Department of Energy’s PR100 report.

Puerto Rico needs additional power generation today to enable critical planned unit maintenance before another major storm devastates the island or grid failures cause irreparable harm to the local economy. Distributed NG generation is well-positioned to provide this rapid and effective support to both critical infrastructure and the grid at large through both backup and ancillary services. While large NG generators require extensive and expensive bidding and design processes, smaller generators are much easier to acquire and faster to install. They can also be combined to perform similar services at scale. NG generators are also better suited than diesel to operate when air quality is a concern.

Additionally, if done strategically, new NG generation is well suited to address Puerto Rico's net-zero energy goals. Onsite renewables and batteries can supplement energy generation. At the same time, a transition plan from NG to hydrogen, biogas, or green methanol would ensure a clear pathway to continue leveraging all generation assets in a net-zero future.

To maximize the utility of NG, the Puerto Rican government should task the Puerto Rico Energy Bureau (PREB) with establishing and overseeing the construction of a natural gas distribution network as a bridge to a resilient and reliable energy future. This strategy should lay out a plan for distributing NG from liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals to critical nodes, starting with critical infrastructure and expanding out to other regions that chronically experience generation shortages. There are examples of critical infrastructure—such as hospitals and other energy-sensitive industries—that are installing NG distribution and generation. PREB should also establish contracts for the NG generators to provide ancillary services when required by the power grid. Also, PREB should assess and plan for the necessary transition from NG to a carbon-neutral gas alternative.

Until such a transition plan is implemented, using the two existing LNG terminals in Puerto Rico will provide immediate benefits, as these terminals already have the capacity to provide cleaner fuel than the current fleet of emergency diesel generators. On the mainland United States, many utilities include rapidly deployable generation resources as an integral part of their 2050 net zero transition plans—for example, Xcel in Minnesota and Florida’s Duke Energy.

While PR100’s net zero by 2050 remains a worthy goal, and renewable power initiatives should continue, Puerto Rico can and must address more immediate needs. With NG, it can do that while also better positioning itself for the future. Natural gas will enable the island to increase its resilience, enable necessary grid repairs, and pave the way for a net zero-emission future.

Ismael Arciniegas Rueda is a senior economist at the RAND Corporation.

Andrew Star is an engineer at RAND. 

Frank Andujar Lugo is a technical analyst at RAND. 

Robert Jolly is a SkillBridge Research Fellow at RAND.

Image: Fahroni / Shutterstock.com. 

The country’s inaction in Syria has dealt a blow to confidence in its regional power.

The rapid collapse of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’athist government is the culmination of a thirteen-year civil war. Key global trends fed into Syria’s suffering: ethnic and religious hostilities, migration, terrorism, militant Islam, and the return of great power politics, as meddling and interventions by Türkiye, Russia, and Iran only made matters worse. 

The United States, Europe, Türkiye, and moderate Arab nations must ensure that Syria does not revert to being a Russian and Iranian stronghold in the Eastern Mediterranean again. They must also guarantee that Syria will not serve as a base for future jihadist expansion led by ISIS and that reconstruction efforts include measures to secure equality for women and all ethnic groups, particularly the Kurds, who are American allies, allowing them to coexist peacefully. This will not be an easy task.

With the fall of the Assad regime (supported by Russian president Vladimir Putin and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), the geopolitical balance of power in the Levant has shifted. The borders of Syria, initially drawn by the British Empire and France in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, may no longer exist. Türkiye and, to a lesser extent, Qatar emerged as clear winners.

For everyone else, the impact of recent events is more ambiguous. The Syrian people, the United States, and Israel will find out whether a transitional administration led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is to their benefit. The U.S. State Department still designates this rebel coalition as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). Nevertheless, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced direct contact between Washington and HTS on December 15. A U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East Barbara Leaf met with Ahmad al-Sharaa, the HTS Syrian leader, and the White House is reportedly contemplating lifting the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation from HTS.

To send a message to the new rulers in Damascus, Israel moved to secure a narrow buffer zone on the Golan Heights. In what may be a favor to the rest of the Middle East and the world, it also proceeded to methodically destroy Assad’s surface-to-surface missiles, chemical weapons, and other heavy weapons stored throughout Syria. With ISIS still active in the area, one never knows who could use these arms in the future or to whom HTS might sell them.

Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gambled on supporting multiple rebel groups after Assad rebuffed his efforts to restore relations between Türkiye and Syria. Ankara deployed the Syrian National Army (SNA) to destroy the Syrian Kurdish-led, U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Northern Syria, and Turkey controls two large buffer zones there. Reports of executions of the wounded in hospitals and rape and kidnapping of Kurdish women by these Turkish proxies have shocked the world. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Türkiye has never exerted as much military and diplomatic power in the Middle East as it does now. Qatar also supported anti-Assad forces in Syria, and there is no doubt that officials in Doha are more pleased with current events than officials in other Gulf monarchies that were more conciliatory toward Assad (e.g., UAE, Oman).

The Shift In The Balance of Power

Assad’s defeat weakens the geopolitical standing of both Tehran and Moscow. Russia spent tens of billions of dollars to keep the Syrian regime in power. For years, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah served as Iran’s leading force supporting Assad. Successful Israeli strikes against Hezbollah’s leadership this fall deprived the Syrian government of a vital ally. Russia may lose its naval port in Tartus, a Mediterranean city in northwestern Syria, and an air base in Khmeimim.

If calm ensues, reconstruction will be key. EU and American sanctions against the Assad regime targeted the dictatorship and the businesses and institutions aligned with it. Many Assad opponents now hope that Western countries can fully lift those sanctions. However, much will depend on whether and how much common ground can be found with the post-Assad regime. 

A continuous civil war or the creation of a Sharia-based terrorist state is unlikely to receive aid, much less investment. If there is chronic violence, or if the rights of women and ethnic minorities are not protected, the hundreds of billions of dollars necessary to rebuild the country and allow millions of Syrian refugees from the Middle East and Europe to come home may not materialize. 

Assad’s exile is worthy of celebration, but American leaders should not yet lift the FTO designation from HTS. In a diverse, war-torn country like Syria, post-revolutionary hatred runs deep. Ethnic and sectarian hostilities, especially fears among the Kurdish and Alawite minorities, are already mounting. The HTS-led government needs to prove that they will abandon jihad and are ready to fight ISIS. 

The defeat of Russian and Iranian forces in Syria presents an opportunity to re-establish American preeminence in the Middle East, particularly in preparation for confronting the Iranian nuclear threat. To achieve this, the United States and its allies must “get Syria right.” There is a lengthy to-do list. Washington must ensure that Russia withdraws its troops and closes its air and naval bases. HTS, the U.S., and Israel need to make sure that no Iranian resupplies reach Hezbollah via Syria.

The Perilous Path Ahead

The new Syrian leader, al-Sharaa, is projecting a pragmatic image and may be threatened by murderous radicals bent on removing the competition. He announced that it may take up to four years to hold elections in the country. This would be more than enough time to establish a Sharia-based regime. Despite the pro-Sharia regime statements by regime spokespeople, in particular, Ayshe al-Debs, the HTS Women Affairs Minister, in support of Hamas, jihad, and in favor of the limitations on women’s rights, Washington, along with our moderate Arab and European allies, must clearly communicate to HTS that a harsh, Sharia-based political system that discriminates against women, forces “conversion” on the Druze and Alawites to an extremist form of Sunni Islam, or reduces Christians to “Dhimmis” is entirely unacceptable; any attempt to do so will result in a cessation of all aid and isolation. In fact, the U.S. State Department did that, but not decisively. Thus, removing HTS’ FTO status may be premature.

For Syria to build a democratic, pluralistic, and peaceful nation dedicated to the return of its refugees, their safety and prosperity through economic development increasingly seems like a dream. Despite the immense suffering of the Syrian people, without the wisdom, patience, and tolerance of the factional leaders, there is a tragic possibility that a further phase of the war—and possibly more massacres—may still lie ahead.

Dr. Ariel Cohen is the Managing Director of the Energy, Growth, and Security program at the International Tax and Investment Center and a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on X: @Dr_Ariel_Cohen.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

M. Bachar Al-Assad n'avait pas encore déserté son palais que Tel-Aviv fourbissait déjà ses armes. Pendant que les islamistes font leurs premiers pas à la tête de la Syrie, l'armée israélienne détruit méthodiquement les capacités militaires de son voisin et s'immisce sur son territoire. En violation (...) / Syrie, Israël, Conflit israélo-arabe - 2025/01

The Russian military has a serious issue with advanced munitions.

The demands of the war, coupled with chronic production issues, have left the Russian military without enough advanced munitions to sustain the necessary rate of fire for a large-scale conflict like the one in Ukraine.

Advanced Munitions Issues

Earlier in December, the Russian military launched a large-scale, combined arms offensive. To support its ground forces, the Russian military used advanced long-range munitions. However, in a single instance, Moscow used munitions that took months to produce.

“Overnight 12-13 December Russia conducted a large-scale multi-axis attack into Ukraine. As with the attacks that occurred in November and prior, it involved Russian Long Range Aviation assets and Russian fixed wing Tactical Aviation assets launching multiple types of air launched cruise-missile and air launched ballistic missile systems,” the British Military Intelligence assessed over the weekend.

“The air assets were supported by SAGARIS Land Attack Cruise Missiles launched by Black Sea Fleet assets, and One-Way Attack Uncrewed Aerial Systems (OWA UAS) were used from multiple launch sites,” the British Military Intelligence added.

All in all, the Russian military supported its large-scale offensive with approximately 180 suicide drones and ninety ballistic and cruise missiles.

The important thing to highlight is that the Russian military can afford to launch such attacks only every few months. Under the weight of international sanctions and the general production issues of the Russian defense and aerospace industries, Moscow can only produce a fraction of the advanced weapon systems needed to wage a modern war every month. As such, the Russian military has to time its large-scale offensives to match the arrhythmic Russian military production capacity.

“Since August 2024, it is highly likely Russia has chosen to take time to build stocks between strikes and then launch in larger, less frequent strike waves, rather than the more frequent smaller attack conducted earlier in the year,” the British Military Intelligence assessed.

The Russian military is so short on key components, such as semiconductors, that it has to scavenge consumer products like refrigerators, microwaves, and dishwashing machines for chips to put in missiles. Also, the Russian military has been using specialized munitions for the wrong missions—for example, anti-ship missiles against ground targets. The Kremlin is working with other countries to bolster its stocks of munitions. Iran, for example, has provided thousands of suicide drones and hundreds of missiles to Russia.

“The composition and target set of the 12-13 December attack was similar to previous attacks, focusing on Ukrainian Critical National Infrastructure and industry, whilst also attempting to suppress Ukrainian Air Defense and airfields by saturating them with OWA UAS,” the British Military Intelligence stated.

Importantly, the Russian military remains capable of launching missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian urban centers and critical infrastructure at a moment’s notice, even if such attacks can’t always be large-scale.

“However, Russia retains the ability and the stocks to allow such assets to be employed in smaller numbers, as a punitive measure, with little or no warning,” the British Military Intelligence concluded.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Shutterstock.