France

Monday 27 April

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The press conference scheduled for Wednesday at 11.00 has been cancelled.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The press conference scheduled for Wednesday at 11.00 has been cancelled.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Image from Education under Attack / Save Schools in Ukraine: https://saveschools.in.ua/en/

Kateryna Suprun

In the increasingly turbulent economic environment facing many European higher education institutions (HEIs) (Pruvot et al., 2025), performance-based funding (PBF) remains a popular instrument for allocating at least part of core public funding (European Commission, 2023). Traditionally, PBF involves governments rewarding HEIs for meeting specific objectives – an approach often assumed to improve university performance (Kivistö & Mathies, 2023). Yet a key question is: does steering by incentives actually change how HEIs work, or does it merely encourage them to look good on paper?

In my recent article (Suprun 2026) published in the Policy Reviews of Higher Education, I draw on the strategic response framework (Oliver, 1991) to establish if the PBF policy recently adopted in Ukraine has made HEIs change their internal practices. Guided by interviews, surveys and document analysis, I explore the lived experiences of 22 public HEIs between 2020 and 2022 and invite their reflections on the revival of the PBF policy in 2024 amid a protracted military crisis. This approach allows tracing how Ukrainian HEIs have responded to the PBF policy and to which extent they have internalised its expectations.

 

From Policy Design to Institutional Practice

The PBF policy implementation in Ukraine tells a story of policy relevance shaped by political power struggles. Formulated against a backdrop of vested interests, an inflated higher education network, and a historical reliance on student numbers, the PBF policy aimed to make public funding transparent, apply uniform performance indicators, and strengthen better performing HEIs. It was introduced during the policy window of 2020, facilitated by the political turnover, became suspended with the outbreak of the all-in Russian war in 2022, and returned to the policy agenda in 2024, after yet another change of government.

The PBF design has undergone changes in each year of its active implementation, signalling an incremental transition pathway, political volatility and war-induced adjustments of the performance metrics. The resulting fragmented and contested implementation of the PBF policy – often associated with ‘gaming the results’ (Mathies et al., 2020) – calls for its analysis from the perspective of HEIs as street-level bureaucrats tasked with its day-to-day execution.

The strategic responses of the consulted HEIs towards the PBF policy closely correspond to their gains or losses from its implementation: winners tend to comply, while others engage in compromise and manipulation. PBF beneficiaries find it easy to follow the PBF rules: they perceive the PBF targets consistent with their university goals and view the PBF logic beneficial for institutional effectiveness. At the same time, their reported dependence on PBF is modest – ranging from just a few percent to no more than one third of core budget, – supporting the argument that high-performing universities advance their work regardless of PBF incentives (Shea & Hara, 2020).

In contrast, loss-exposed HEIs feel coerced towards PBF, consider its metrics constraining, and experience uncertainty in their financial prospects. Paradoxically, these are precisely the institutions that rely most heavily on PBF disbursements, with some depending on them for up to 70% of their public funding. As the organisational responses of universities are clearly differentiated, the question is if those receiving larger incentives are more inclined to steer by performance internally.

 

How Universities Adapted Internally – and Where They Did Not

The data indicate changes taking place in most of the engaged Ukrainian HEIs, with several clearly emerging trends. PBF beneficiaries are particularly active in introducing internal performance structures and funding models that mirror or adapt the system-level metrics. The reported changes to institutional policies and practices concentrate primarily on the performance areas of external research funding and internationalisation. While the universities adversely affected by PBF have attempted to become more performance-driven, their efforts were reversed with the temporary halt of the national policy in 2022 – unlike those of PBF-winning HEIs who continued with performance practices.

The PBF policy has also produced a few unintended consequences, hindering institutional changes. Limited coordination among national authorities has triggered audits of universities, making them comply simultaneously with the PBF policy and its preceding regulations on student-staff ratio and pay scales. Confronted with these contradictory demands, many HEIs continued to base their financial planning on the outdated model of historical funding.

The one-size-fits-all design of the PBF model, favouring research-intensive and internationally-exposed HEIs, has too yielded frequent grievances on the part of the financially vulnerable HEIs, lacking research capacity and global networks. Finally, the zero-sum logic of the PBF policy and restricted financial autonomy have discouraged or disabled some HEIs to act on the performance targets.

 

Implications for Policy and Practice

The case of Ukraine shows that HEIs adapt internally when they feel aligned with policy objectives, capable of introducing changes and engaged to the decision-making process. Albeit counterintuitively, the PBF policy volatility appears to function as a double-edged sword: while universities are caught in a perpetual turbulence, frequent revisions also reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour.

Importantly, most consulted HEIs recognise the relevance of the PBF mechanism also in times of protracted war. However, their testimonies highlight unresolved inquiries beyond the current design of the PBF policy: do policy-makers acknowledge the value brought by HEIs through their third mission activities? And if so, how can they be measured and incentivised in a transparent and objective manner?  Whether future iterations of the PBF policy will be able to address these challenges remains to be seen.

 

Kateryna Suprun is a Doctoral Researcher at the Faculty of Management and Business, Tampere University, Finland, and a member of the Higher Education Group. Her research explores policy implementation in higher education, with a focus on performance-based funding models and Ukraine. She has previously worked at the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine on higher education and digital transformation policies, alongside emergency humanitarian planning and resource mobilisation. She has also held various roles under the World Bank, European Commission, and European Higher Education Area frameworks.

 

Bibliography:

European Commission. (2023). Final report of the study on the state and effectiveness of national funding systems of higher education to support the European universities initiative. Volume I. Publications Office. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/885757

Kivistö, J., & Mathies, C. (2023). Incentives, rationales, and expected impact: Linking performance-based research funding to internal funding distributions of universities. In B. Lepori, B. Jongbloed, & D. Hicks (Eds), Handbook of Public Funding of Research (pp. 186–202). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800883086.00019

Mathies, C., Kivistö, J., & Birnbaum, M. (2020). Following the money? Performance-based funding and the changing publication patterns of Finnish academics. Higher Education, 79(1), 21–37. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-019-00394-4

Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes. The Academy of Management Review, 16(1), 145. https://doi.org/10.2307/258610

Pruvot, E., Estermann, T., & Popkhadze, N. (2025). Financially sustainable universities. State of play and strategies for future resilience. European University Association. https://www.eua.eu/images/Funding_briefing_final.pdf

Shea, S. O., & Hara, J. O. (2020). The impact of Ireland’s new higher education system performance framework on institutional planning towards the related policy objectives. Higher Education, 80(2), 335–351.

Suprun, K. (2026). Implementation of the performance-based funding policy in Ukrainian higher education: impact on institutional behaviour? Policy Reviews in Higher Education, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/23322969.2026.2622677

The post Chasing Indicators or Changing Practices? Ukrainian Universities under Performance‑Based Funding appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Saviez-vous qu’un bœuf ou un poulet industriel ont jusqu’à deux fois plus de graisses saturées qu’un animal accédant à l’extérieur ? Et que 85 milliards d’animaux sont tués chaque année dans le monde pour notre consommation ? En élevage intensif, les cochons et les volailles sont les plus consommés et les plus mal traités. Dans la Loire, un éleveur de poules pondeuses marie rentabilité et bien-être animal. Aucune de ses pensionnaires ne finit à l’abattoir !

Des députés se prononcent lundi 27 avril sur la publication ou non du rapport sur l'audiovisuel public rédigé par leur collègue UDR Charles Alloncle, un vote incertain après les polémiques sur ses méthodes. Les explications de notre journaliste Flore Simon.

Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, at a press conference on the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Credit: Eskinder Debebe/UN Photo

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 27 2026 (IPS)

The Eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will meet at the United Nations in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2026. State parties to the treaty will meet with the urgent aim of finding common ground on the issue of nonproliferation.

“The NPT is very often referred to as a cornerstone of the international disarmament and nonproliferation regime and also a very important pillar of international peace and security,” said Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA).

The NPT came into effect in 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995. This landmark international treaty calls for all signatories to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote nuclear disarmament above all and encourages pursuing more peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It remains the only legally binding agreement that nuclear powers adhere to, with 191 states, both nuclear and non-nuclear, as signatories to the treaty. Review conferences are typically held at five-year intervals beginning in 1970 (the conference originally scheduled for 2020 was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and was later held in 2022).

The president of the conference is Do Hung Viet, the Permanent Representative of Vietnam to the UN. The conference is expected to begin with a general debate during the first week, which will be followed by thematic discussions under each of the three pillars of the Treaty.

It will be attended by high‑level representatives, including Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as well as senior representatives of key international organizations. Side events will be held in parallel to the thematic discussions by attending members of civil society. This year’s conference will assess the implementation of the NPT since the last review conference, which ended without countries reaching a consensus on the final outcome document.

Ahead of the conference, Nakamitsu spoke to reporters at UN headquarters on 24 April. She remarked that state parties should take this meeting as an opportunity to converge on common ground when it came to nonproliferation. Ultimately, country representatives would want to avoid both an increase in proliferation and the intentional use of nuclear weapons. It will be a collective responsibility, said Nakamitsu, for the state parties to reach a consensus on the outcome document.

The NPT Review Conference will convene during a period of deepening geopolitical tensions, where major nuclear powers are embroiled in regional conflicts. The current military conflict in Iran and, in particular, the war in Ukraine from 2022, have caused shifts in countries’ attitudes about nuclear proliferation.

Some experts have claimed that the situation has led to a start of a new arms race as more countries hold discussions around “improving” nuclear weapons and even outright expanding into procuring nuclear arms themselves, as some see weapons as the “ultimate guarantor of national security”. Nakamitsu acknowledged this as a “proliferation driver”, or growing public sentiment for nuclear proliferation, irrespective of the formal governments’ position on the NPT. She also expressed concern over the increased rhetoric that threatened the use of nuclear weapons, warning that the more nuclear weapon states there were, the greater the risks of nuclear weapons being used by mistake or by miscalculation.

“[The] prevention of nuclear weapons’ use will have to become also one of the key focuses of the conference because when it comes to nuclear weapons, again, it’s not just one or two countries’ security; it goes beyond the borders. It is the security of all of us,” said Nakamitsu. “We need to put to rest the wrong narrative that more nuclear weapon states would guarantee our security.”

A “shared sentiment in crisis” within all state parties may in fact encourage them to “protect and maintain” the NPT. Despite this, Nakamitsu warned that with a growing leniency around nuclear weapons, this poses a risk to the gains made right after the end of World War II and throughout the Cold War.

In the current strategic security environment, the rapid rise of certain technologies will also be a factor in discussions. The advent of artificial intelligence has sparked great debate within the international community for its application in certain sectors and the risk of misuse without the proper guardrails.

It was only in December 2024 that the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that detailed the use of AI in the military domain and ‘its implications for international peace and security’, though it should be noted that there is no reference to the use of AI in the context of nuclear weapons.

When asked whether the issue of AI in the military-nuclear nexus would be discussed during the NPT conference, Nakamitsu noted that the integration of AI in the nuclear command and communications channel is “beginning to be discussed on different platforms”, and further consultations would also be held in Geneva this year. The NPT conference may not be the forum for further discussions around this issue or regarding AI governance in the military context. However, this is something that state parties recognise will require investigation, including when it comes to placing guardrails on the use of AI in the military domain.

“There is an increasing awareness that when it comes to nuclear weapons’ command and control, obviously humans have to retain oversight,” Nakamitsu told Inter Press Service.

The challenges facing the international world, particularly in the context of the conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, are placing “significant stress on the treaty,” according to Nakamitsu.

But it is also what makes the NPT review conference and its outcomes all the more relevant. A shared understanding that nuclear proliferation will only lead to further instability and insecurity is what will push member states to engage in critical dialogue over the next four weeks. This must also yield a shared commitment to uphold the principles of the NPT by the end.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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ÄNDERUNGSANTRÄGE 1 - 290 - Entwurf eines Berichts Bericht 2025 der Kommission über das Kosovo
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Riho Terras

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Credit: Phil Nijhuis/ANP via AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Apr 27 2026 (IPS)

Yasmin Ullah, from Myanmar’s persecuted Rohingya minority, is determined to see justice. On 13 April, she filed a complaint alleging genocide against Myanmar’s president, Min Aung Hlaing, to Indonesia’s Attorney General’s Office. Min Aung Hlaing led the 2021 coup that ousted a democratically elected government and this month was named president following a sham election held amid intense repression, rubber stamping the army’s continuing grip on power. However secure he appears in his position, Yasmin Ullah’s legal action offers hope his impunity may not be guaranteed.

The complaint accuses Min Aung Hlaing of genocide against Rohingya people, a predominantly Muslim ethnic group denied citizenship despite being long established in Myanmar. He’s accused of being responsible for the burning of Rohingya villages, forced evictions, killings and mass rape in a 2017 military operation, during which around 24,000 Rohingya people were killed and over 700,000 forced to flee. The UN’s fact-finding mission and its Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar have extensively documented atrocities. Civil society has played a key role in gathering testimonies from survivors and preserving evidence.

The case was made possible by changes to Indonesia’s criminal code that came into effect in January. While civil society has raised concerns about revisions to other parts of the code that restrict Indonesian people’s ability to speak out and protest, this particular change stands out as a positive development, enabling people to bring charges against alleged perpetrators of atrocities in other countries under the principle of universal jurisdiction.

Universal jurisdiction on the rise

Universal jurisdiction applies to crimes under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, on the grounds that these crimes are an offence against humanity as a whole and as such aren’t bound by borders.

Some states, including France and Germany, have passed laws to enable universal jurisdiction prosecutions. Many powerful states however still refuse to recognise the principle, citing national sovereignty, the long-established doctrine of immunity for heads of state and the potential for prosecutions to be politically motivated.

Yet the question of whether government leaders should be immune from prosecution has increasingly been contested. Immunity wasn’t granted when leaders of Sierra Leone and former Yugoslavia were prosecuted for crimes committed during civil wars, and the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC), removed the principle of immunity where it has jurisdiction. Ironically, the Trump administration, which resists international accountability over its officials, may have contributed to further eroding the doctrine of immunity by abducting Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro and placing him on trial for drug trafficking.

Universal jurisdiction cases have increased since the end of the Cold War. Belgium, Finland and Germany convicted people for their role in the Rwanda genocide. Switzerland secured the first guilty verdict for crimes committed in the Liberian civil war, while France convicted another Liberian war criminal in 2022. Germany convicted a Bosnian paramilitary soldier of genocide and, in 2021 and 2022, found two Syrian officials guilty of atrocity crimes.

Hopes of justice

Rohingya people have no hope of justice in a country that refuses even to recognise them as citizens, so diaspora civil society organisations are seeking it wherever they find opportunities. In 2025, an Argentinian court issued arrest warrants against Min Aung Hlaing and other senior Myanmar officials on crimes against humanity and genocide charges, in a case brought by a Rohingya organisation. Earlier this year, a human rights organisation filed a criminal case against the Myanmar regime in Timor-Leste. When authorities appointed a senior prosecutor to examine the case, Myanmar retaliated by expelling Timor-Leste’s ambassador.

These efforts complement proceedings in international courts. In 2024, the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Min Aung Hlaing for crimes against humanity, while in January, hearings began at the International Court of Justice in a case brought by the Gambian government accusing Myanmar of breaching the Genocide Convention. It isn’t a question of choosing between national jurisdictions and international courts, but rather of taking every avenue available to demand justice.

Universal jurisdiction has its limits. Those accused tend to be safe when they hold power; when states have successfully prosecuted perpetrators, it’s after they’ve lost the power that enabled their crimes. Currently, this means attempts to hold Israel’s leaders accountable for the genocide in Gaza, such as arrest warrants a Turkish court issued against 37 officials, only have symbolic value. Cases motivated by political point-scoring also risk discrediting the principle, as when a body created by Malaysia’s former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad found an array of US officials guilty in absentia, without legal basis or consequence.

Actions under universal jurisdiction, when targeted at evident offenders, can nonetheless help build moral pressure and signal that justice may eventually come. At a time when the brutal and illegitimate Myanmar regime is buttressed by China, India and Russia, and with the USA easing its pressure in pursuit of economic benefits, it matters that other countries keep holding the line, isolating the junta and exposing its atrocities.

It matters all the more when pressure comes from Southeast Asian countries, depriving the Myanmar regime of the excuse that human rights accountability is a western imposition. Two members of the Association of Southeast Asian nations, Indonesia and Timor-Leste, have now taken action against a fellow member. But other attempts in the region have faltered. Philippine authorities declined to proceed when five survivors of atrocities filed a case in 2023, while an investigation civil society filed with Indonesia’s national human rights commission that same year, alleging that Indonesian companies were supplying military equipment to Myanmar, has so far seen no progress.

As 2026 president of the UN Human Rights Council, Indonesia is uniquely placed to take the lead in the pursuit of justice for atrocity crimes. Indonesian authorities must treat this case as a priority and give it the attention and resources it needs.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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Journalists are invited to a press conference with rapporteur Nils Ušakovs following the vote on Parliament's guidelines for the 2027 EU budget.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Journalists are invited to a press conference with rapporteur Nils Ušakovs following the vote on Parliament's guidelines for the 2027 EU budget.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Journalists are invited to a press conference with rapporteur Nils Ušakovs following the vote on Parliament's guidelines for the 2027 EU budget.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Credit: Nikada/iStock by Getty Images. Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)

By Abebe Aemro Selassie
WASHINGTON DC, Apr 27 2026 (IPS)

Sub-Saharan Africa’s economies entered 2026 with significant momentum. The region had notched its fastest growth rate in 10 years—4.5 percent in 2025—buoyed by reduced macroeconomic imbalances, rising investment levels, and a generally supportive external environment.

Countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Rwanda led the charge, with growth exceeding 6 percent. The median inflation rate fell to about 3.5 percent and public debt levels had started to decline. These gains were hard-won, the fruit of politically difficult but meaningful reforms such as exchange-rate realignments, better spending allocation, and tighter monetary policies.

Progress on the fiscal front has been particularly impressive. The region’s general government primary balance has been steadily improving and is now near balance. By contrast, primary deficits in both advanced economies and other emerging markets remained noticeably wider in 2025 than before the pandemic.

Sub-Saharan Africa achieved this consolidation while simultaneously sustaining reasonably decent growth and bringing down inflation, thanks to bold reforms and notwithstanding headwinds from elevated global uncertainty and much reduced concessional financing.

And just as the region has begun to secure these gains, the war in the Middle East has brought a significant new shock that threatens to stall, or even unwind, that progress. It has pushed up global prices for oil, gas, and fertilizer, disrupted trade routes, and tightened financial conditions. These developments are weighing on the region’s outlook.

We expect growth to slow to 4.3 percent this year, some 0.3 percentage points below pre-war forecasts, while inflation is projected to rise. That may sound benign by global standards, but for a region where rapid growth is imperative to create millions of new jobs for the rapidly expanding population, any hit to growth is problematic.

Oil importers, many of them low-income or fragile states, face worsening trade balances and rising living costs. Oil exporters may benefit from higher oil prices, but remain exposed to volatility and the temptation of procyclical spending.

And the risks are mounting.

A prolonged conflict could further inflate commodity prices, trigger a risk-off episode in global markets, and force abrupt fiscal adjustments in countries with large refinancing needs.

In a severe downside scenario, as detailed in the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook, regional output this year could fall 0.6 percent below pre-war forecasts, with oil importers suffering the most, and inflation could surge by an additional 2.4 percentage points.

The human costs are equally stark. Food insecurity looms large: the region remains acutely vulnerable to food-price shocks, and the war has already driven up fertilizer and shipping costs. A 20 percent rise in international food prices could push more than 20 million people into food insecurity and leave 2 million children under age 5 acutely malnourished.

Climate shocks intensify the strain—the recent floods in Mozambique and Madagascar serve as a reminder of the region’s deep vulnerability to weather disruptions.

The unprecedented decline in foreign aid strips away a critical buffer. Unlike past contractions, 2025 marked a sharp structural break in aid flows, with cuts falling hardest on the most fragile states and threatening to unravel essential services—healthcare above all—in countries with no alternative source of finance.

Debt vulnerabilities are also rising. More than one-third of countries are at high risk of, or already in, debt distress. In 21 countries, fiscal deficits exceed the levels that are needed to stabilize debt. Rising interest bills and dwindling concessional finance are inflating debt-service burdens and crowding out essential development spending.

In some cases, growing reliance on domestic borrowing has deepened ties between government debt and bank balance sheets, raising the specter of financial instability.

In this fraught environment, policymakers must navigate competing pressures. In the short term, they should anchor inflation expectations, shield the most vulnerable from rising prices, and avoid procyclical fiscal policies.

Oil exporters should treat windfalls as fleeting, using them to rebuild buffers and strengthen social safety nets. Oil importers with fiscal space can offer targeted, time-bound support; those without must focus on increasing the efficiency of spending and boosting domestic revenues.

Even as policymakers grapple with the immediate shock, the medium-term reform agenda cannot wait. The premium on accelerating structural reforms—to boost growth and resilience—is now even higher. Improving the business climate, strengthening governance, and reforming state-owned enterprises, especially in energy, transport, and telecommunications, can help attract investment and lift productivity. Deepening regional integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area could bolster supply-chain resilience and expand markets for local producers.

Digital transformation offers promise, but also highlights the region’s infrastructure gaps. Artificial intelligence is already helping farmers boost yields, doctors improve diagnoses, and students master difficult concepts faster.

But scaling such innovations will require investing in electricity, internet access, digital skills, and data governance. Today, just 53 percent of the region’s population has access to electricity, and only 38 percent to the internet.

International role

The international community has a role to play, especially when the economic troubles facing many countries stem largely from shocks beyond their control. Predictable financing, technical assistance, and capacity-building support can help countries weather current storms and sustain reform momentum.

Aid should be prioritized for low-income and fragile states, where alternative sources of finance are scarce. The IMF is already deeply engaged, with programs in 22 of the region’s 45 countries, and stands ready to scale up support for members facing acute balance-of-payments pressures linked to the war.

The optimism that greeted 2026 was not misplaced: it was earned, through years of difficult but necessary reform. The fallout from the war in the Middle East is now testing that progress, but it does not need to erase it. African policymakers have demonstrated they can deliver under pressure. The choices they make now—whether to hold the line on inflation, protect the vulnerable from the worst of the shock, and resist the temptation to unwind the reforms that got them here—will determine whether these hard-won gains endure.

The job of the international community is to support that effort. But the boldness and resolve that the moment demands must come from within the region itself.

This IMF blog is based on the April 2026 Regional Economic Outlook for sub-Saharan Africa, “Hard-Won Gains Under Pressure,” prepared by Cleary Haines, Michele Fornino, Saad Quayyum, Can Sever, Nikola Spatafora, and Felix Vardy.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Parliament’s president and the co-rapporteurs on the multiannual financial framework (MFF) will brief journalists after the plenary vote on Parliament’s negotiating position.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Parliament’s president and the co-rapporteurs on the multiannual financial framework (MFF) will brief journalists after the plenary vote on Parliament’s negotiating position.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Parliament’s president and the co-rapporteurs on the multiannual financial framework (MFF) will brief journalists after the plenary vote on Parliament’s negotiating position.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

La publication du document final de la commission d’enquête reste suspendue au vote des députés, prévu ce lundi.

In the bustling Chifubu constituency of Ndola, the provincial capital of Zambia’s mineral-rich Copperbelt Province, 31-year-old Victoria Bwalya is usually among the early risers, cleaning and setting up for the day in her restaurant business. But before now, Bwalya’s hustle felt like a punishment and just a matter of survival. With only a primary school […]

Plusieurs prisons étaient bloquées, lundi, à l'appel du syndicat de surveillants pénitentiaires Ufap-Unsa pour protester contre la surpopulation carcérale. Le taux d'occupation global atteignait au 1er mars 137,5 %. Les délégués dénoncent également les sous-effectifs chroniques de surveillants, en comptabilisant 5 000 postes non pourvus.

Autoproclamé indépendant depuis 1991, le Somaliland, situé au nord de la Somalie entre Djibouti et l’Éthiopie, s’est affirmé comme un acteur relativement stable dans une région marquée par les crises. Bien qu’il ne soit pas reconnu officiellement par la communauté internationale, le territoire entretient depuis des années des relations avec plusieurs acteurs étrangers, à travers des projets de coopération ou des partenariats économiques. En décembre 2025, sa reconnaissance par Israël a ravivé l’attention portée à ce territoire. Si cette décision peut apparaître comme une étape importante pour la légitimité du Somaliland, elle s’inscrit dans un contexte régional marqué par des tensions anciennes, des rivalités entre États et une recomposition des équilibres dans la Corne de l’Afrique. Dans quelle mesure la reconnaissance du Somaliland par Israël marque-t-elle un véritable changement pour ce territoire ? Quelle pourrait être ses répercussions dans une région déjà instable ?  Le point avec Géraldine Pinauldt, chercheuse associée à l’IRIS, spécialiste de la Corne de l’Afrique.

Dans quelle mesure la reconnaissance du Somaliland par Israël constitue-t-elle un tournant diplomatique pour ce territoire ?

L’annonce de la reconnaissance complète et réciproque du Somaliland par Israël le 26 décembre dernier a fait éclater une crise diplomatique et médiatique mondiale (non sans le précédent de janvier 2024) et a remis le Somaliland sur le devant de la scène mondiale. Pour autant, malgré le passage d’un État de facto à un État reconnu, il est difficile de qualifier cette reconnaissance de rupture diplomatique, en ce qu’il n’y avait de fait et depuis 1991, aucune présence des institutions somaliennes au Somaliland. De plus, de très nombreux partenaires internationaux y avaient déjà des représentations, des bureaux ou des actions. En effet, outre les bureaux de liaison des États voisins – Éthiopie depuis 25 ans, pour laquelle le représentant a un rang d’ambassadeur, et Djibouti – Hargeisa est depuis une quinzaine d’années le siège d’un certain nombre de projets des coopérations européenne, allemande, britannique ou danoise. La coopération française, arrivée tardivement, y mène d’ailleurs un projet de valorisation du patrimoine, mais on peut rappeler que la France fut le premier État à aider l’armée somalilandaise naissante au début des années 1990 en lui fournissant ponctuellement vivres et uniformes. L’autorité intergouvernementale pour le développement (IGAD), dont la Somalie est le fondateur, opposée à la reconnaissance du Somaliland, y réalise toutefois des projets dans le cadre de l’intégration régionale et le Somaliland accueille une école vétérinaire de rang régional, faisant cohabiter son drapeau et celui de l’IGAD. Un certain nombre d’institutions onusiennes ont également bureau et actions au Somaliland, certes souvent dans des projets de portée « nationale », c’est-à-dire à l’échelle de la Somalie, ce qui leur a parfois valu d’être suspendus par le Somaliland.

Plus que de facto, c’est peut-être statu quo qui pourrait caractériser une période antérieure, notamment avec deux dates : 2010 et 2012. En 2010, les États-Unis ont autorisé le financement direct des « régions somaliennes » permettant ainsi à la Banque mondiale de financer des projets au budget de la République du Somaliland. En 2012, le passage de la Somalie d’un gouvernement de transition à un gouvernement fédéral a laissé libre interprétation du terme « Somaliland » rapidement « reconnu » par Mogadiscio comme l’un des États fédérés, entérinant un statu quo, chacun pouvant voir le Somaliland comme il le souhaitait. Depuis Hargeisa toutefois, on était bien loin de Mogadiscio.

Si ces présences étrangères ne constituent pas une reconnaissance et qu’elles ont bénéficié de la confusion possible, leurs arrivées progressives à partir du milieu des années 2000 ont été autant de validation des progrès significatifs réalisés par la République du Somaliland en 35 ans. 35 ans, cela signifie qu’une première génération d’enfants nés somalilandais est pleinement engagée dans les responsabilités, suivie de près par une seconde génération. Aussi, on peut dire que la reconnaissance n’a pas pour l’instant d’impact direct sur le quotidien des Somalilandais.

La seule conséquence concrète a porté sur les relations entre Djibouti et le Somaliland, avec la rupture des liens diplomatiques et la rupture de la connexion aérienne entre les deux capitales. La relation entre les deux voisins se caractérise toutefois depuis l’ouverture de représentations réciproques, par des épisodes de rupture et de rapprochements, et des séquences d’ouverture et de fermeture de leur frontière commune. L’Éthiopie, qui a des accords bilatéraux formels depuis le début des années 2000 avec le Somaliland et qui constitue un partenaire constant depuis lors, a gardé le silence sur cette reconnaissance.

Dans quelle mesure cette reconnaissance pourrait-elle bouleverser les équilibres géopolitiques dans la Corne de l’Afrique ?

La reconnaissance du Somaliland par Israël est à la fois un évènement géopolitique majeur et un non-évènement en soi pour la géopolitique de la Corne de l’Afrique. L’analyse globalement admise qui tend à dénoncer la République du Somaliland comme étant la cause, par sa reconnaissance, de la dégradation sécuritaire dans la Corne de l’Afrique semble relever d’une communication certes réussie mais qui résiste mal à l’observation des faits. Aussi convient-il de rappeler que sévit depuis 2023 une guerre sans nom au Soudan, qui est en train de déborder de ses frontières, que le Soudan du Sud est en guerre civile depuis son indépendance en 2011, que l’Éthiopie multiplie les conflits dans toutes les parties de son territoire depuis 2015 et que la Somalie du Sud, dont le conflit a changé d’habits au gré des problématiques internationales, atteint sa 37e année de guerre civile.La Corne de l’Afrique est instable, car des processus profonds sont en cours touchant les constructions nationales territorialisées de tous ses États, et que ces processus sont aggravés par la corridorisation de la région, accentuant les rentes de situations et aggravant les déséquilibres territoriaux alors que sont rarement mis en œuvre des mécanismes de compensation.

Aussi, face au commentaire de l’actualité, il convient de considérer les évènements actuels avec une profondeur historique allant un peu au-delà de décembre 2025 ou de janvier 2024, de constater le progressif raidissement de la Somalie qui voit l’activisme somalilandais pour sa reconnaissance internationale se réveiller à partir de 2017 et bousculer le statu quo, certes inconfortable pour tous, mais relativement fonctionnel depuis 1991.

Les observateurs internationaux s’interrogent sur les raisons propres à Israël pour cette reconnaissance, alors qu’elles sont d’une grande évidence (présence de Houthis au Yémen, proximité de l’Iran, contrôle de la mer Rouge et processus engagé par les accords d’Abraham). Mais la véritable interrogation porte à mon sens beaucoup plus sur les raisons pour lesquelles le Somaliland, à ce moment précis, pouvait accepter une reconnaissance d’Israël. En effet, Israël, représenté en Éthiopie et y ayant initié un certain nombre d’investissements, notamment agricoles dans l’État régional somali d’Éthiopie, a montré un intérêt pour le Somaliland dès sa reprise d’indépendance. Au début des années 2000, une forme de diplomatie sanitaire est mise en place avec l’organisation d’évacuations sanitaires vers Israël d’enfants somalilandais atteints de pathologies cardiaques. Depuis, les tentatives de rapprochement en haut lieu ont été nombreuses.

Au début des années 2020, Abiy Ahmed échoue à établir une « pax arabico-aethiopica » sur une grande Corne de l’Afrique qu’il aurait souhaité unifier. Devant l’accélération du renversement du monde, chacun des deux États, Somalie et Somaliland, en marge de pourparlers qui ne parviennent pas à s’installer, utilisent les cartes régionales et mondiales à leur portée et leurs rentes de situation respectives afin d’arriver à leur fin : la reconnaissance pour le Somaliland et l’intégrité territoriale pour une Somalie qui, avant même d’arriver à la question du Somaliland, peine à faire cohabiter un gouvernement central et des États fédérés qui ne le reconnaissent pas, ce dans un contexte où une immense partie du territoire est administrée par Al-Shabaab, un mouvement terroriste islamiste contre lequel les troupes de l’Union africaine, l’armée turque et les troupes d’élites états-uniennes appuyent l’État somalien

Le Somaliland signe un premier partenariat tripartite avec l’Éthiopie et DPWorld en 2016 pour l’utilisation et la gestion du port de Berbera et du corridor. Le jeune État dont la stratégie de recherche d’une reconnaissance semblait timide depuis plusieurs années, se dote, à partir de 2017, d’un comité en charge de travailler à la reconnaissance et d’établir de nouvelles relations diplomatiques, notamment avec un tour d’Afrique. Les relations avec Taïwan, débutée en 2009, ont abouti en 2019 à leur affirmation et en 2020 à l’échange de représentants et ambassadeurs alors que la Chine avait rétabli une ambassade à Mogadiscio en 2013. Sur fond de conflit frontalier maritime et d’une guerre du khat avec la Somalie, le Kenya se rapproche du Somaliland en 2019, qui ouvre une représentation officielle à Nairobi en 2024. À partir de 2022, les États-Unis effectuent plusieurs visites à Berbera.

Devant cet activisme qui vient brusquer l’histoire, la Somalie se dote d’outils inédits et offensifs : accords militaires bilatéraux avec la Turquie en 2017 puis en 2024 et enfin avec l’Égypte en 2024 et 2025, outils numériques, mise en œuvre d’une loi sur le e-visa exigeant des compagnies aériennes qu’elles ne reconnaissent pas le visa somalilandais en septembre 2025, et instrumentalisation des dynamiques centripètes au Somaliland, ce alors que le fondement de l’État somalilandais repose sur l’allégeance initiale des clans au projet national.

La profonde crise politique entre le Somaliland et la Somalie s’intensifiant depuis plusieurs années, dans le contexte d’une Corne de l’Afrique en mouvement, il devenait urgent pour le Somaliland de se protéger face à un État somalien très appuyé.

Il serait plus juste de lire que ce sont les bouleversements des équilibres géopolitiques de la Corne de l’Afrique et dans le monde depuis 2015 qui ont présidé à la reconnaissance du Somaliland par Israël.

Est-ce la « mauvaise reconnaissance » ?

Depuis l’adoption de sa Constitution en 2001, la République du Somaliland misait sur la reconnaissance incontestable de ses avancées démocratiques pour obtenir une reconnaissance qui lui semblait méritée. Par ailleurs, faisant valoir son indépendance du protectorat britannique du 26 juin 1960 et de ce fait le respect de la Charte de l’Union africaine attachée à l’intangibilité des frontières héritées de la colonisation, ainsi que la non-ratification de l’acte d’Union avec la Somalie et le non-respect par Mogadiscio des principes de l’Union entre 1960 et 1991, le Somaliland estimait sa recherche d’indépendance suffisamment légitime au regard du droit international pour être reconnu. Il est vite apparu évident qu’être un bon élève ne suffirait pas à obtenir la reconnaissance des Nations unies attendant celle des organisations régionales dont la Somalie est membre : l’IGAD et la Ligue arabe. Pour des raisons tenant à leur géopolitique interne et au grand jeu régional, aucun État membre de l’IGAD, particulièrement l’attendue Éthiopie n’allait le reconnaitre. Pour des raisons tenant aux relations entre l’Égypte et l’Éthiopie la Ligue arabe s’est, dès les années 1990, positionnée pour une Somalie réunifiée et forte face à l’Éthiopie. Dès lors, la reconnaissance ne pouvait arriver que d’une puissance internationale pour ses intérêts propres. Et une telle reconnaissance n’allait intervenir que dans un contexte de crise internationale – tel que les crispations autour de la mer Rouge. Dans cette configuration, toute reconnaissance l’aurait été « pour de mauvaises raisons », c’est-à-dire pour les raisons de l’autre et dans un jeu géopolitique déjà engagé dans la région.

Il faut se méfier des raisonnements par « axes internationaux » : il y a de la part des Somalilandais un profond sentiment de souveraineté et la certitude qu’ils maîtrisent leur destin et qu’une alliance n’est jamais une allégeance. C’est une vision de la souveraineté très partagée dans la Corne de l’Afrique, où les alliances à des blocs ont toujours été opportunistes et jamais idéologiques, et où d’autres États parviennent à gérer des alliances contraires, et ont d’ailleurs réussi à préserver des relations tant avec la Somalie qu’avec le Somaliland.

Ainsi, dans la configuration actuelle de la Corne de l’Afrique et de ses alliances, le Somaliland avait-il une alternative à cette reconnaissance ?

L’article Somaliland : longue route vers la reconnaissance est apparu en premier sur IRIS.