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Publication resulting from the UACES 2018 Graduate Research Conference

Russia and the European Union (EU) emerged as twin products of the end of history, writes Daniel Matthews-Ferrero. Arguing that the return of history is exemplified in both domestic politics (through the decomposition of liberal democracy, best expressed through the rise of populism) and in international relations (increasing multipolarity, best expressed through the Ukraine Crisis with Russia), he analyses the latter case and the challenge it poses for the EU.

Geopolitical concept of the Ukraine military conflict © kirill_makarov/Adobe Stock

Russia and the EU emerged as twin products from the end of history. The EU was a product of liberalism’s global victory, while Russia was the product of the defeat of the revolutionary ideas behind the Soviet state.

With the Leninist extinction, it was supposed that liberal democracy would gradually extend across the globe, with world history on autopilot. However, this conception has suffered increasing setbacks.

There are two exemplary cases of the resulting return of history. One arises in domestic politics: through the decomposition of liberal democracy, best expressed through the rise of populism. The other arises in international relations: through creeping multipolarity, best expressed through the Ukraine Crisis.

In domestic politics, liberalism’s global victory entailed shackling democracy domestically through a withering away of politics (i.e. policy subject to popular contestation). Politics is the inevitable task of any state applying bureaucratic discretion to the distribution of scarce resources among determinate social groups.

With the victory of our global liberal path dependency, the possibility for mass publics to alter the direction of their national democracies has become increasingly remote, giving rise to political apathy and declining turnouts. Once the financial crises necessitated political opposition, the lack of institutionalised possibilities gave rise to Western populism.

The illiberal turn with the rise of Western populism represents the return of history in domestic politics. History has also marked its return in international relations, however.

Europe’s economic instability and political turmoil have accelerated the reemergence of an assertive Russia. Its transition to democracy is looked back on as a humiliating phase of kowtowing to Western interests. It has consequently asserted its national sovereignty through authoritarianism. This has resulted in a classic nation-state, contrasting with a post-modern transnational EU.

Yet, both polities have come to resemble one another in their domestic politics more than is commonly admitted. Managed democracy has taken hold in both polities through a de-politicised administration of things.

The paths followed towards this destination differ, but the end result is similar: In the EU we find democracy without sovereignty, in Russia sovereignty without democracy.

Ukraine, as the borderlands between these polities, has come to mark the external limits of the end of history.

The groundwork for Ukraine’s nation-building were laid by its dominant Russian Other under Bolshevik nationalities policy, later complimented by quasi-genocidal repression under Stalin. The contradictory results, with nation-building on the one hand and Siberian gulags on the other, represent the conflicting dual legacy Ukraine confronted when deciding its post-Soviet future.

Independent Ukraine thus faced a choice between two competing spheres of influence. The EU denies the existence of such a logic, yet even the shape of its neighbourhood policy would be arbitrary were it not for EU strategic interests. The mutual incompatibility of economic integration into Russia and the EU’s trade agreements gave the game away.

The EU’s historically oscillating treatment of Ukraine also betrays a realist logic. The EU’s “Russia first” policy sees Ukrainian EU accession efforts relegated behind Turkey’s, with this policy eventually giving way to more aggressive expansionism. Such changes would be inexplicable without a sense of the EU tactically and tacitly manoeuvring around spheres of influence.

Yet, Ukraine violated realist expectations when it chose to de-nuclearise in the early 1990s. This is because foreign policy cannot be the automatic product of some realist formula; it must be constructed as a choice, after subjectively surveying available options.

Ukraine’s internally constructed policy to de-nuclearise ultimately relegated the nation to a bystander to its own national crisis, with other great nuclear powers tussling over its territorial sovereignty in realist fashion.

Given the interpretative, constructivist basis of internal foreign policy formulations, when it comes to preventing crises, communication between great powers is vital. This is how they come to understand the likely reactions arising from different policy options.

In this context, what has been described as the EU’s “autistic disorder” becomes particularly problematic. After all, it made it possible to muddle into war.

The explanation for this troubling situation can be found in the structure of the post-Cold War unipolar world order, with the US as global hegemon. Detached from hard power considerations by the institutional division of labour with NATO and member states while nestled comfortably under the US security umbrella, it became natural to survey the surrounding international scene with a rosy tint.

If, as the EU claims, each nation has a right to choose its foreign policy alignments irrespective of great power strategic interests, why did the West not make more forceful overtures towards Ukraine when it was still a part of the USSR? The reality of Soviet power precluded it, of course.

The vacuum eventually brought about by Soviet collapse was exploited by the West and EU. The liberal theories used to justify this are only now catching up to the creeping multipolar reality. They are evidently struggling to adjust, with the end of history slamming into a brick wall with the Ukraine Crisis.

For now, the EU continues to deny basic realism and the possibility for other powers to defend strategic interests that impinge on any country’s supposed right to choose its foreign policy alignments ex nihilo. It is as if the EU’s economic magnetism were an insignificant factor compared to the attraction of its norms and values in the global extension of liberalism through an end of history logic.

By maintaining such delusions, further conflicts are only made more likely for the liberal order externally. Internally, doubling down against populism through an entrenchment of de-politicising liberal policy frameworks will only accelerate the current disintegrative spiral of liberal democracy.

In this way, the unfolding of liberalism’s own internal logic since the end of history has given rise to a domestic and an international crisis.

The survival of the EU, the intellectual product of liberal triumphalism at the end of history now depends on its ability to adjust to the realities of the return of history.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Shortlink for this article: http://bit.ly/2PmvO0i

Daniel Matthews-Ferrero | @MatthewsFerrero

Daniel completed a BA in European Studies at the University of Kent, UK and an MA in European Interdisciplinary Studies at the College of Europe, Poland. He is due to start a PhD at the University of Aberdeen from October, on the POLITICO programme on political concepts in the world. His primary research interest is in populism.

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Monday, 3 September 2018, 15:00-18:30, room JAN 2Q2

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will take place on Thursday, 6 September, 9:30-12:30 in Brussels.

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REPORT on the state of EU-China relations
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Bas Belder

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REPORT on the state of EU-US relations
Committee on Foreign Affairs
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On 12-13 July 2018, forty postgraduate and early career researchers gathered at KU Leuven in Belgium to present and receive feedback on their work on contemporary Europe and the European Union.

The theme of this year’s conference was ‘An Actor on Multiple Stages: the EU as a Local, Regional and Global Power’, introduced by Kolja Raube (KU Leuven) in his keynote lecture.

When we speak about EU's legitimacy, we should focus not only on internal legitimacy (from within the EU) but also the external dimension – @raube_kolja @UACESgf #UACESgf18

— Diāna Potjomkina (@DianaPotjomkina) July 12, 2018

"The EU is not just an organisation but a community… and we need to explain why this community matters." says @raube_kolja in his #UACESgf18 keynote.

— Anna Wambach (@AnnaWambach) July 12, 2018

Five research sessions took place over the next two days, with presentations by delegates from a range of countries and disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. They examined the different stages on which the EU is present, and how these are reflected in the challenges it is facing: e.g. Brexit, Russia’s awakening, the future of the eurozone.

The final plenary session, chaired by UACES Graduate Forum Committee member Kamila Feddek, featured Nisida Gjoksi European Commission and academic and Katja Biedenkopf (KU Leuven). Their fascinating discourses were focused on the power of the European Union and its challenges in specific areas.

Katja Biedenkopf discussed EU external governance and diplomacy in the fields of environmental protection and climate change, global environmental and climate governance, while Nisida Gjoksi delivered a presentation on the EU’s enlargement policy and the role that the European Commission plays in this area, and also, on the policy towards the Western Balkans and the specificity of this enlargement wave. Nisida Gjoski emphasised the EU’s significant power towards this region which somehow contrast the view that the EU is losing power and Katja Biedenkopf focused on the historical evolution of EU climate leadership and presented four scenarios for its future based on her recent published research.

Nisida Gjoski

Both presenters initiated thought-provoking debate and they answered several questions related to constantly changing and complex role that the European Union currently plays on local, regional and global stage.

The conference was co-funded by the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union. Thank you to all the speakers, the Graduate Forum Committee and past committee member Thibaud Deruelle, our hosts Kolja Raube and Daan Fonck, and to the staff members at KU Leuven who chaired the research sessions.

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The programme and papers are available here.

Over the next few months, we’ll be publishing blog posts on Crossroads Europe, videos and podcasts arising from the conference. Follow and like @UACESgf to stay notified.

Blog posts:

• ‘Russia, the EU and the Return of History‘ – Daniel Matthew-Ferrero

Very happy to be attending this year's UACES graduate conference, which kicked off with an inspiring keynote by @raube_kolja, followed by an even more inspiring discussion. Exiting times are ahead of us as a future generation of EU studies scholars! #UACESgf18 https://t.co/Cw9lLBCkUj

— Vladimir Bogoeski (@bogoeskiv) July 12, 2018

A pleasure to chair a panel and lively debate on #Euroscepticism and #EUpoliticalparties at #UACESgf18 @UACESgf https://t.co/cQxu6rvAXQ

— Alex Andrione-Moylan (@AndrioneMoylanA) July 12, 2018

Hello from our Chair @AnnaWambach during the 1st day of #UACESgf18!

Learn more about our #PhD & #ECR #europeanstudies conference and view the programme at: https://t.co/us7exFmL77 pic.twitter.com/AHEWmJOFeJ

— UACES Graduate Forum (@UACESgf) July 12, 2018

 

Report by Kamila Feddek and Helena Cicmil

To take advantage of future UACES events and opportunities:

• Become a UACES Student Member
• Join us for the 2018 Doctoral Training Academy
• Follow @uacesgf on Twitter and on Facebook
• Join the EuroResearch mailing list

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The new reform of EU drone regulation is likely in order to establish a precise common framework for drone operations, at least in the civil field, taking into account both the Riga Declaration on Remotely Piloted Air Systems: Framing the future of aviation, of 6 March 2015[1], and the Resolution of the European Parliament on the safe use of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), commonly known as UAVs, in the field of civil aviation (2014/2243(INI)) (October 20, 2015) that followed (hereinafter, REP of 20 October 2015)[2] as well as the proposal by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to establish common rules for drone operation in Europe from September, 2015[3], developed and materialized in a recent Proposed Amendment (NPA) first published in 2017[4] and after that adopted as Regulation (EU) 2018/1139  which will entry into force on 11 September 2018[5].

While Regulation 216/2008 refers to aircraft and drones within this group in a general way, it also therefore does so for unmanned aircraft regardless of whether they are remotely controlled or not (automated aircraft that include a flight program), the REP of October 20, 2015 refers specifically to RPAs, that is, to remotely controlled drones. Moreover, this REP differentiates between two different categories of RPAs according to their nature, which should then be subject to different requirements within the EU regulatory framework: those for professional use and those for recreational use.

In addition, the REP of 20 October 2015 is clear in its anticipation of the need to “develop a clear, harmonized and proportionate European and global regulatory framework”, removing the 150 kg threshold, and “replacing it with a regulatory framework for the EU that is coherent and comprehensive”, on the basis “of a risk assessment that avoids the imposition of disproportionate regulations for companies, which are likely to undermine investment and innovation in the RPAs sector, while at the same time providing appropriate protection for citizens and helping to create sustainable and innovative jobs” (statements 20 and 21).

This is the main of the new EU common rules (Regulation (EU) 2018/1139)  which include drones within the scope of more ambitious general civil aviation regulation in the European Union which principal aim is “to establish and maintain a high uniform level of civil aviation safety in the Union” (article 1(1) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139) and the “Single European Sky airspace” (article 40) which is based on a risk-based approach and the principle of proportionality (statement 27), and therefore attending “to the nature and risks associated with the different types of aircraft, operations and activities” (statement 12).

It is important to note that the New common rules include “unmanned aircrafts”, i.e. drones, not only RPA, meaning “any aircraft operating or designed to operate autonomously or to be piloted remotely without a pilot on board” (article 3(30) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139). There are doubts regarding the application of the new regulation for drones used indoors, in fact De Molina suggests that the EU regulation is based on the Single European Sky airspace and therefore “still only applies to outdoor drones” and therefore the solution is ethics (de Molina et all, 2018)[6].

The specific regulation for drone technology is in the Section VII of the Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 “Unmanned Aircraft”, articles 55 to 58, based on a certification system to be implemented by the Commission.

Of course at national or local level, the possibility of domestic regulation is determined by European regulation (Sarrión Esteve, Benlloch Domènech, 2017: 123) and the new EU common rules although being a general regulation leaves EU member States the competence for regulate drone carrying out military, customs, police, search and rescue, firefighting, border control and coastguard or similar activities and services undertaken in the public interest by or on behalf public authorities and the personnel and organisations involved in these activities (article 2(3a) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139). Nevertheless, Member states can consider – due to safety, interoperability or efficiency gains grounds- preferable to apply instead of their national law the EU regulation (statement 18 and article 2(6) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139)[7].

But although the EU regulation is also open to a degree of flexibility “taking into account various local characteristics within individual Member States, such as population density” (statement 27 new EU common rules) it not allows EU Member States to except the application of the regulation to the design, production, maintenance and operation activities of unmanned aircrafts (article 2(8) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139)[8].

Nevertheless, the new EU common rules stipulate that EU Member States have the possibility to “lay down national rules to make subject to certain conditions the operations of unmanned aircraft for reasons falling outside the scope of this Regulation, including public security or protection of privacy and personal data in accordance with the Union Law” (article 56(8) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139).

Therefore, National Legislation can introduce more requirements for drone operations under public security or fundamental rights protection issues in accordance with the EU law[9].

Acknowledgements. This post has been developed thanks to the Independent Thinking UNED Research  project Actual challenges for the regulation of the civil use of drones (DroneLawChallenges).

I will present my paper Actual Challenges for fundamental rights protection in the use of drone technology” in the upcoming UACES Annual Conference, Bath, at the Panel 408: UACES Research Network: Advances in Unmanned-Vehicle Research in a European Security Context  

More about dronelawchallenges:

De Miguel Molina, M., Santamarina Campos, V., Carabal-Montagud, M.A., De Miguel Molina, B. (2018). Ethics for civil indoor drones: a qualitative analysis, International Journal of Micro Air Vehicles, 2018. Available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1756829318794004

Sarrión Esteve, J. (2014). Actual Trends and Challenges of the Constitutional Fundamental Rights and Principles in the ECJ Case Law from the Perspective of Multilevel Constitutionalism. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2656394  or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3014376

Sarrión Esteve, J. (2017). El régimen jurídico de la utilización de los drones. Una aproximación multinivel a la legislación europea y española. Revista de la Escuela Jacobea de Postgrado, 12, 103-122.

Sarrión Esteve, J. Benlloch Domènech, C. (2017). Rights and Science in the drone era. Actual Challenges in the civil use of drone technology. Rights and Science: R&S, 0, 117-133. Available at https://rightsandscience.juri-dileyc.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2017/10/J.-Sarrio%CC%81n.-C.-Benlloch.-Rights-and-science-in-the-drone-era.pdf

Sarrión Esteve, J. (2018). Actual Challenges for Fundamental Rights Protection in the Use of Drone Technology (August 27, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239562

[1] Riga Declaration on Remotely Piloted Air Systems: Framing the future of aviation, 6 March 2015, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/news/doc/2015-03-06-drones/2015-03-06-riga-declaration-drones.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2018)

[2]  European Parliament resolution of 29 October 2015 on the safe use of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), commonly known as UAVs, in the field of civil aviation (2014 / 2243 (INI)), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015-0390+0+DOC+PDF+V0//ES (September 27, 2016)

[3] EASA. European Aviation Safety Agency, Proposal to establish common rules for the operation of drones, presented firstly on September 2015, available at: https://www.easa.europa.eu/download/ANPA-translations/205933_EASA_Summary%20of%20the%20ANPA_ES.pdf (Accessed 27 September 2016)

[4] EASA. European Aviation Safety Agency, Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-5 (A) Introduction of a regulatory framework for the operation of drones, available at: https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/NPA%202017-05%20%28A%29.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2018)

[5] Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91. OJEU L 212/1 (August, 22, 2018).

[6] However, the EU new common rules introduce an open concept of unmanned aircraft and if one reads article 2 It is not so clear that it only applies to outdoors drones, it seems to me that the Regulation covers in general drones.

[7] In particular a Member State may decide to apply concrete EU rules in the activities of national competence “where it considers that, considering the characteristics of the activities, personnel and organisations in question and the purpose and content of the provisions concerned, those provisions can be effectively applied”. This decision must be notified to the Commission and the Agency with all relevant information (art. 2.6 New common rules).  It is a revocable decision.

[8] It is interesting because EU Member States may decide to exempt from the EU regulation several categories of aircrafts: aeroplanes, helicopters, sailplanes, powered sailplanes with some requirements, but not for unmanned aeroplanes, unmanned helicopters, unmanned sailplanes, unmanned powered sailplanes.  There is a general presumption of more risk in unmanned vehicles that in human drived ones.

[9] There is a map with national regulation development at DroneRules.eu, Dronerules consortium, Facilitating Access to Regulation for Light Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), http://dronerules.eu/en/recreational/regulations [Accessed 25 August 2018], and UAV Coach Master List of Drone Laws, https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws/ [Accessed 25 August 2018].

The post The new EU drone regulation: some remarks appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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