Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Die Europäische Union steht vor einem grundsätzlichen Dilemma. Einerseits wächst der Druck, die EU-Strukturen zu reformieren. Das jüngste Ringen um Griechenland hat die Debatte über eine Vertiefung der Eurozone wieder eröffnet, während Großbritannien gleichzeitig zumindest für sich selbst auf weniger Integration drängt. Andererseits lehnen die nationalen Hauptstädte Reforminitiativen, die eine Vertragsänderung notwendig machen (zum Beispiel Kompetenzverlagerungen), von vornherein als »unmöglich« ab. Rechtlich gibt es zwar Möglichkeiten, diesem Dilemma auszuweichen und die EU über Umwege weiterzuentwickeln. Aber auch diese erfordern die einstimmige politische Einigung der nationalen Regierungen – und mittelfristig die Perspektive einer Vertragsänderung, um Transparenz und demokratische Legitimation wiederherzustellen.

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Transnational organized crime (TOC) has developed into a powerful force impacting lives both locally and globally, having benefitted from the increasing integration of the global economy and regional proliferation of state fragility. Particularly in the post-conflict context where multilateral organizations are mandated to support the government in re-building state capacities, there is a lack of understanding how to tackle organized criminal networks–“the elephant in the room”–often deeply entangled with government institutions. While UN peace operations have become increasingly complex since their origins as traditional peacekeeping deployments in a post-World War environment, their capacities remain very limited in properly assessing and responding to threats posed by TOC.

On November 2-6, the International Peace Institute conducted its second training course on addressing and analyzing organized crime in fragile states. The specialization course, held at the Peace Castle in Stadtschlaining, was organized in co-operation with the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) within the framework of Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi). Based on the pilot course conducted by IPI in 2013, the training served as the basis for an EU-certified curriculum that is targeted at staff of multilateral organizations deployed in fragile states where organized crime poses a serious threat to peace and stability.

Conceptually, the training program aimed at providing a holistic perspective to the problem at hand – combining a variety of approaches ranging from law-enforcement to development, which the participants could subsequently apply in a realistic simulation exercise. Equipped with background information about the case study and the opportunity to carry out investigative interviews (with counterparts in the roles of the UNDP resident representative, a local customs official, a rebel leader, a traditional elder and a fisherman), participants were tasked to develop an Organized Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) and provide recommendations for the required capabilities of a planned UN peace operation.

IPI’s extensive research on the issue was used as a basis for this training course, including From the Margins to the Mainstream: Toward an Integrated Multilateral Response to Organized Crime as part of its Peace without Crime project and developed a methodological guidebook on “Spotting the Spoilers: A Guide to Analyzing Organized Crime. The course attracted twenty participants from twelve different countries, including law enforcement and criminal intelligence specialists, as well as TOC and operations planning experts. Course participants had a chance to interact with IPI staff and international crime-fighting experts, learn about the nature, threat and impact of TOC from practitioners and their experiences in the field (such as the case of Mali) and assess existing and potential operational responses and practical tools to address organized crime.

The course also highlighted practical and political dilemmas faced by practitioners dealing with this challenge in the field. For example, when and how should one tackle the problem? Should one mediate with spoilers involved in illicit activities? And what approaches can be taken when threat assessments reveal that senior officials are complicit in criminal activities?

“Since organized crime is a threat in almost every theater where there are peace operations, we hope that this course will inspire national peace training centers as well as regional and international organizations to factor organized crime into their training programs,” said Walter Kemp, IPI’S Vice President.

In Russland beherrscht ein mächtiger Propaganda-Apparat die Medien. Wie nie zuvor verändert der...

La géopolitique est l’interaction du pouvoir et de la terre. La noopolitique est l’interaction du pouvoir et du savoir. Cette interaction est réflexive et disruptive : elle change profondément la géopolitique et l’art de gouverner, car elle s’intéresse à l’art de faire régner le savoir sur le pouvoir, et surtout pas à celui de faire régner le pouvoir sur le savoir, qui est la situation actuelle, et pour laquelle les esprits les plus brillants ont concédé leurs sciences aux États et aux guerres alors qu’ils auraient dû les concéder à l’humanité et à la paix.

Cet article Idriss J. Aberkane : La noopolitique : le pouvoir de la connaissance est apparu en premier sur Fondapol.

Die Proteste, die im Januar des Jahres 2011 in der arabischen Welt ausgebrochen waren, richteten sich gegen eine Reihe autoritärer Regime in Nordafrika und im Nahen Osten.

Auch das Jahr 2015 bleibt kein Jahr ohne Militärputsch. Nach dem erfolglosen Versuch in Burundi hat das Militär in Burkina Faso erneut (kurzfristig) die Macht ergriffen. Putsche bleiben ein verbreitetes Mittel des Regierungswechsels. Die absolute Anzahl hat zwar weltweit abgenommen, aber gerade in Westafrika sind Staatsstreiche weiterhin verbreitet. Von 69 Regierungswechseln zwischen 1990 und 2014 sind dort 33 durch Wahlen und 18 durch Militärputsche zustande gekommen.

Internationale Akteure antworten meistens auf zwei Arten auf Militärputsche. Erstens fordern sie, dass die Putschisten die Macht an eine Zivilregierung abgeben. In rechtlich bindenden Dokumenten haben z. B. die Afrikanische Union (AU) oder die Westafrikanische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (ECOWAS) festgehalten, dass eine Putschregierung nicht an der Macht bleiben darf und die nächste Regierung durch Wahlen bestimmt werden muss. Zweitens haben sich einige Staaten und Organisationen wie die USA und die AU dazu entschlossen, automatisch Sanktionen zu verhängen.

Diese doppelte Antwort, bestehend aus der Zielformulierung eines möglichst schnellen Übergangs zu einer Zivilregierung und Sanktionen, ist eine gute Basis für internationale Akteure, nachhaltige demokratische Strukturen zu fördern. Wenn Demokratieförderung effektiv sein soll, müssen jedoch zuvor drei Fragen beantwortet werden:

• Welche Einstellung zu demokratischer Ordnung hat das Militär? Sollte es sich bei dem Putsch um einen Versuch handeln, die demokratische Ordnung zu destabilisieren (wie jüngst in Burkina Faso), dann ist eine harte Linie gegenüber den Putschisten angebracht. Beendet das Militär jedoch eine autokratische Herrschaft, dann kann das Militär ein Partner sein.
• Was sind die drängendsten Probleme des politischen Systems im Land? Der Fokus internationaler Akteure auf den Rücktritt des Militärs ist sinnvoll, insofern eine zivile Regierung eine notwendige Bedingung für Demokratie ist. Sie ist jedoch nicht hinreichend. Oftmals sind Staatsstreiche Ausdruck struktureller Probleme. Internationale Akteure sollten deswegen ihren Fokus erweitern und sich auch den Ursachen für den Putsch widmen. Es kann sinnvoll sein, Schritte zur Aussöhnung zwischen politischen Parteien, Sicherheitssektor- oder Justizreformen mit der Forderung nach einer Zivilregierung zu verbinden.
• Welche Maßnahmen sind angemessen, um diese weiter gefassten Ziele zu erreichen? Die Suspendierung der Zusammenarbeit kann ein geeignetes Mittel sein, um Putschregierungen zu bestrafen. Jedoch sollte diese Maßnahme um andere Maßnahmen ergänzt werden. Eine Beschränkung auf Sanktionen engt den Spielraum unnötig ein. Militärischer Zwang, positive und negative, materielle und immaterielle Anreize, sowie langfristige Überzeugungsarbeit können – unter bestimmten Bedingungen – die klassischen Sanktionen ergänzen. Welchen Erfolg Maßnahmen letztlich haben, hängt stark von der Einigkeit internationaler Akteure und ihrer Legitimität in den Augen der Adressaten ab.

One strand of current conflict research claims that military victories are beneficial for peace. It is argued that these outcomes produce more unified post-conflict societies, thereby facilitating reconstruction and economic development. The implication of this view is that, instead of encouraging negotiated settlements, international actors should either support one side to victory or allow a conflict to run its course. This briefing paper argues that the case for “peace by victory” is weaker than supporters claim. The most successful conflict resolutions address their root causes and involve a broad range of stakeholders. A quick glance at all civil war terminations since 1946 seems to suggest that military victories are slightly more stabilizing than other outcomes. Rough comparisons, however, are insufficient for drawing conclusions or offering policy advice. A full review of the context and content of peacebuilding reveals a very different picture.

• Focusing only on military victories and peace agreements ignores the most common outcome of civil strife: an ongoing contest between belligerents, albeit with a limited use of force.
• On average, the civil wars that ended with peace agreements lasted eight times longer than those that were terminated through a military victory. Indeed, a one-sided victory almost only occurs when fighting is counted in days or months rather than years. This indicates that protracted conflicts are unlikely to end if allowed to run their course and that negotiations are the only way to end a long-running war.
• Differences in conflict duration mean that the challenges for reconstruction are substantially greater after negotiated settlements than after military victories. International actors seeking to contribute to the rebuilding that follows peace agreements are faced with societies with more victims and divisions, and greater physical destruction.
• Regardless of how a conflict ended, the most important factor for post-conflict stability is the orderly demobilization of former fighters. After a war, it is also imperative for the underlying grievances to be addressed through non-violent policies such as offering the vanquished side the opportunity to form a political party and/or share power in the government.

Long-term success in conflict management calls for dismantling troop mobilization structures as well as those used for repression. This includes ensuring that both the army and militias return to the barracks and come under official civilian control. External actors can best contribute by helping to create outlets where grievances can be aired and addressed peaceably. Although it is very important to reduce violence quickly, armed belligerents must not be seen as the sole representatives of conflicting views. The following recommendations can be drawn from this paper: – Talks about the issues are the only realistic outcome of a protracted conflict.
– Conflict negotiations should not only involve the violent parties but also other non-violent, legitimate stakeholders. 
– While peace negotiations must be held in a central location, local efforts to promote intra-societal trust also need to be initiated and supported. Many potential peace-process spoilers are less concerned with the terms of a national agreement than with their immediate local security.

One strand of current conflict research claims that military victories are beneficial for peace. It is argued that these outcomes produce more unified post-conflict societies, thereby facilitating reconstruction and economic development. The implication of this view is that, instead of encouraging negotiated settlements, international actors should either support one side to victory or allow a conflict to run its course. This briefing paper argues that the case for “peace by victory” is weaker than supporters claim. The most successful conflict resolutions address their root causes and involve a broad range of stakeholders. A quick glance at all civil war terminations since 1946 seems to suggest that military victories are slightly more stabilizing than other outcomes. Rough comparisons, however, are insufficient for drawing conclusions or offering policy advice. A full review of the context and content of peacebuilding reveals a very different picture.

• Focusing only on military victories and peace agreements ignores the most common outcome of civil strife: an ongoing contest between belligerents, albeit with a limited use of force.
• On average, the civil wars that ended with peace agreements lasted eight times longer than those that were terminated through a military victory. Indeed, a one-sided victory almost only occurs when fighting is counted in days or months rather than years. This indicates that protracted conflicts are unlikely to end if allowed to run their course and that negotiations are the only way to end a long-running war.
• Differences in conflict duration mean that the challenges for reconstruction are substantially greater after negotiated settlements than after military victories. International actors seeking to contribute to the rebuilding that follows peace agreements are faced with societies with more victims and divisions, and greater physical destruction.
• Regardless of how a conflict ended, the most important factor for post-conflict stability is the orderly demobilization of former fighters. After a war, it is also imperative for the underlying grievances to be addressed through non-violent policies such as offering the vanquished side the opportunity to form a political party and/or share power in the government.

Long-term success in conflict management calls for dismantling troop mobilization structures as well as those used for repression. This includes ensuring that both the army and militias return to the barracks and come under official civilian control. External actors can best contribute by helping to create outlets where grievances can be aired and addressed peaceably. Although it is very important to reduce violence quickly, armed belligerents must not be seen as the sole representatives of conflicting views. The following recommendations can be drawn from this paper: – Talks about the issues are the only realistic outcome of a protracted conflict.
– Conflict negotiations should not only involve the violent parties but also other non-violent, legitimate stakeholders. 
– While peace negotiations must be held in a central location, local efforts to promote intra-societal trust also need to be initiated and supported. Many potential peace-process spoilers are less concerned with the terms of a national agreement than with their immediate local security.

Die Serie „Finanzierung globaler Entwicklung“ analysiert wichtige finanzielle und nicht-finanzielle Maßnahmen zur Realisierung der neuen Ziele nachhaltiger Entwicklung (Sustainable Development Goals – SDGs) und diskutiert Bausteine für einen neuen globalen Rahmen der Entwicklungsfinanzierung. Ausländische Direktinvestitionen (ADI) sind für viele Entwicklungsländer eine wichtige externe Finanzierungsquelle. Den Zugang von Entwicklungsländern zu globalen ADI-Zuflüssen zu verbessern zählt daher zu den Hauptzielen der Staatengemeinschaft, wie auf den Konferenzen der Vereinten Nationen über Entwicklungsfinanzierung 2002 in Monterrey und 2008 in Doha deutlich wurde. Die Schlussdokumente der Konferenzen unterstreichen die Notwendigkeit, ein „stabiles und berechenbares Investitionsklima“ zu schaffen. Als Politikinstrumente, die ADI-Zuflüsse effektiv steigern können, werden internationale Investitionsabkommen (International Investment Agreements – IIA) genannt. Tatsächlich haben viele Entwicklungsländer IIA unterzeichnet, um ADI anzulocken und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung zu fördern. Jedoch wird diese traditionelle Begründung für IIA zunehmend infrage gestellt. Immer mehr politisch Verantwortliche, Wissenschaftler und nichtstaatliche Organisationen argumentieren, IIA hätten insgesamt nicht zu höheren ADI-Zuflüssen geführt. Sie befürchten zudem, dass IIA die Möglichkeiten der Gastländer zur Regulierung von ADI und zur Förderung nachhaltiger Entwicklung zu sehr einschränken. Diese Skepsis war auch tonangebend für den Abschlusstext der Entwicklungsfinanzierungskonferenz in Addis Abeba im Juli. Darin wird betont, dass sich ADI positiv auf Entwicklung auswirken können, aber nur, wenn ausländische Investoren Sozial- und Umweltstandards einhalten und IIA nicht den nationalen Spielraum für eine entwicklungsorientierte Politik einengen. Eine Gesamtbetrachtung der empirischen Belege für die Auswirkungen von IIA auf ADI-Flüsse ergibt, dass diese Zweifel berechtigt sind. Einigen Studien zufolge wirken sich IIA positiv auf ADI aus. Allerdings sind diese Ergebnisse mit Vorsicht zu interpretieren, da die Messung der Wirkungen wie auch alternativer Belege methodisch schwierig ist. Überdies zeigt sich, dass der Vertragsinhalt wichtig ist und nicht alle IIA den gleichen Effekt auf ADI-Flüsse haben. So wirken sich Verträge, die den Marktzugang von Investoren liberalisieren  positiv auf ADI aus, besonders wenn sie Teil präferentieller Handels- und Investitionsabkommen (Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements – PTIA) sind. Die umstrittenen Investor-Staat-Schieds­klauseln (Investor-State Dispute Settlement – ISDS) dagegen haben keine signifikant positiven Auswirkungen auf ADI. Daher sollten politisch Verantwortliche in Entwicklungsländern, die ausländische Investoren anlocken möchten, das tatsächliche Design von IIA genau im Blick behalten. Die empirischen Belege deuten darauf hin, dass sie einen gewissen Spielraum haben, IIA und nationale Politikziele kompatibler zu gestalten, wenn sie die Investitionsschutzstandards umformulieren. Im Anschluss an die Addis Abeba Konferenz sollte die Staatengemeinschaft Vorschläge entwickeln, wie Entwicklungsländer bei der Reform ihrer IIA unterstützt werden können.

Lorsque l'on considère la société internationale ou ce qui en tient lieu, la première impression est celle de désordre, pour ne pas dire de capharnaüm. Les émotions cultivées par les médias, les interrogations des experts, les doutes des politiques donnent le sentiment d'un imbroglio planétaire que personne ne domine et où chacun se contente de réagir comme il peut à des flux qu'il ne maîtrise pas, aux riches qui se cachent, aux pauvres que l'on cache, aux foules qui s'agitent, aux minorités qui agissent.

Am Allerheiligen-Feiertag begann das Herbstferienprogramm auf Kloster Banz. Jung und Alt konnten in der Ferienwoche zum Beispiel gemeinsam ihre Rhetorik verbessern oder ihr geschichtliches Wissen auffrischen. Das Seminarangebot war wie immer breit gefächert und Spaß hat's auch gemacht.

Abkommen werden nicht eingehalten, immer mehr Zäune gebaut, die EU ist weit weg von gemeinsamem...

Die Regierungskoalition der „Nationalen Einheit“ (Unidad Nacional) von Staatspräsident Juan Manuel Santos, welche die politische Mitte des kolumbianischen Parteienspektrums abbildet, ist am 25. Oktober 2015 als Sieger aus den landesweiten Regionalwahlen hervorgegangen.

Date: Jeudi 26 Novembre 2015Description: Le Forum de Genshagen se tiendra cette année sur le thème : "Quelle politique de sécurité européenne pour les 20 prochaines années ?". Consulter le programme

Am 30. Oktober 2015 veranstaltete die Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung eine Podiumsdiskussion, die die Spannungen zwischen der Ukraine und Russland sowie das Verhältnis Europas zu Russland in den Mittelpunkt stellte.

Vor dem Hintergrund des 2015 durch die indische Regierung vorgelegten Konzeptes „Smart Cities“ lud die Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung vom 26. bis 30. Oktober acht indische Delegierte zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen und Beamte indischer Polizeiverbände nach Bayern ein, um in München, Bamberg und Eichstätt einen Erfahrungsaustausch zum Thema Frauen- und Opferschutz zu führen.

Die Kommunalwahlen vom 25. Oktober 2015 waren ein bedeutender Gradmesser der aktuellen politischen Situation in der Ukraine. Als Zwischenbilanz der Regierung Poroschenko zeigten sie, ob die Prognosen und Analysen richtig lagen und ob sich die relativen Gewichte der politischen Akteure seit der Parlaments- und Präsidentenwahl 2014 verschoben haben.

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Michele J. Sison, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, told an IPI audience that as societies attempt to come to terms with a legacy of past abuses, their transitional justice processes must focus on the victims, not just the perpetrators.

Transitional justice should focus on a “victim-centered approach that responds to the needs and perceptions of families, and the needs and perceptions of communities, as opposed to solely punishing perpetrators,” she said.

Ms. Sison highlighted the importance of including civil society from the beginning of the process. “These transitional justice processes must put victims and vulnerable groups at the very center of our strategies,” she said.

She emphasized it was especially important to consult marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities and youth. “These groups must play an active role in the design and in the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism,” she said.

Ambassador Sison’s remarks opened a panel discussion on “Civil Society and Transitional Justice Processes: How International Actors Can Promote a More Inclusive Approach,” held at IPI October 29th, 2015. High-level panelists discussed how international actors could contribute to processes that ensure justice, accountability and reconciliation.

The event also marked the launch of a new US State Department report, Funding Transitional Justice: A Guide for Supporting Civil Society Engagement. The report is designed to offer guidance on how donors may better integrate civil society into their transitional justice funding strategies.

María Emma Mejía Vélez, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the UN, brought a first-hand perspective on transitional justice to the panel.

Colombia has been embroiled in civil war for six decades. The government and the guerrilla group Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) began a peace process in October 2012, and the negotiations yielded an agreement this September.

The resulting innovative transitional justice framework, Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición (Cohesive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and No Repetition), was unveiled in Havana, along with a timeline to finalize negotiations by March 23rd, 2016.

In a show of good faith, FARC promised to disarm and demobilize within 60 days of signing the agreement.

Ms. Mejía said Colombia’s transitional justice framework “aims to get the maximum possible satisfaction for the victim’s rights.”

She said the framework would achieve this through four key pillars: a truth commission, a special jurisdiction for peace, a special unit for persons who have “disappeared,” and administrative measures for reparation.

The Ambassador added that Colombia aimed to fulfill all of its international commitments in the peace process, the first to be held since the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC), entered into force in 2002.

On the negotiations, she said it would be “easy to say, ‘It’s over with,’ peace, and take the photos,” after they conclude.

Instead, she implored the audience to remember that achieving an agreement is only a first step. “The work will begin March 23rd,” she said. “It’s not the end, it’s just the beginning of a society that has not been reconciled to find out how we will be able to live together, those who have been confronted for so many long decades.”

Geir O. Pedersen, Permanent Representative of Norway to the UN, addressed the importance of civil society for justice, accountability, and reconciliation. “It is doubtful that any transitional justice institution has ever been successful without engaging civil society,” he said.

Mr. Pedersen emphasized three elements of transitional justice—jobs, security and justice—that can make possible democratization, sustainable development and peacebuilding. “It is a no-brainer,” he said. “We need both the state and civil society if we are to be successful in working on these issues.”

Habib Nassar, Executive Director of the Global Network for Public Interest Law (PILnet), spoke to his experience in civil society advocacy in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region.

Mr. Nassar lamented “the growing role of the international and a standardization of the field” of transitional justice. This has “led to a situation in which the local actors are no longer in control of the design of their own processes,” he said.

He outlined the consequences for justice processes when international actors disproportionately influence them. “Transitional justice is becoming the province of technocrats, bureaucrats, and then, the technical is privileged over the political, the general over particular, international over local.”

Homogeneous approaches to transitional justice “cannot accommodate local complexities,” Mr. Nassar said. “The standardized policies and mechanisms generate a rigidity that really paralyzes local creativity. We come and present really fancy nice models, and people are automatically paralyzed because they think that this is the only way to do it.” This is particularly troublesome in the MENA region, where such innovation is desperately needed, he said.

Pablo de Greiff, UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, placed the development of transitional justice in its historical context.

Early transitional justice processes began in the 1980s in highly institutionalized countries like Argentina, Chile, Czechoslovakia, and South Africa. “When you leave that set of countries behind and start thinking about the fate of transitional justice in countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and some of places which now are potential subjects of transitional justice, to some extent it should not be surprising that results are more ambiguous, and challenges significantly higher,” he said.

Contemporary transitional justice processes are unfolding in countries where there has been war, not just authoritarian governance. Today’s victims do not experience “violations that come about from the abusive exercise of state power—they are the violations that come about through something that looks more like social chaos,” he said. “Because violations are different, the means by which they ought to be redressed, one would think, also ought to be different.”

Local conditions matter, Mr. de Greiff stressed. “We need to think much more about how to make transitional justice measures more context-sensitive, while at the same time satisfying and respecting the universalistic commitment from which they come about,” he said.

The Special Rapporteur closed the panel by sharing a disheartening realization he reached while preparing recent reports for the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council. “Strictly speaking, the violations that we are talking about cannot be repaired,” he said. “We do lots of things to mitigate their consequences, but nobody brings back the dead, nobody is un-raped, nobody is free after spending 7 years in prison, those years are gone. So instead of focusing so much attention on correction and redress, we ought to be spending much more time on prevention.”

The panel was co-hosted by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) at the US Department of State, and Public Action Research.
Warren Hoge, IPI Senior Adviser for External Relations, moderated the conversation.

Related Coverage:
Funding Transitional Justice (Public Action Research, 2015)
Remarks on the Launch of “Funding Transitional Justice: A Guide for Supporting Civil Society Engagement” (US Mission, October 29, 2015)

Watch event: