A 6000 fő alatti településeknek szóló program helyi közösségek bevonásával segíti a korai diagnózist, és fontos szerepet játszik a demenciával kapcsolatos ismeretek terjesztésében. A Ne Feledd! Nap memóriaszűrő program keretében a pályázó települések 50 fő memóriaszűrésének megszervezésére kaphatnak támogatást.
In recent years, diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have been decent for the most part, with cooperation in various fields. Although Azerbaijan is an ally of the West and Russia is an ally of Armenia, neither country in recent years has let this interfere with having a positive diplomatic relationship. However, recently, the two countries seem to be speaking different languages. Azerbaijan and Russia have been tense with each other lately due to several events that led to a diplomatic crisis. It seems that everything began with the downing of an Azerbaijani plane by a Russian missile, which killed 38 people and injured 29 others.
When a country causes the death of so many citizens of another country (even if accidentally and without malice) and does not apologize for it, it creates cracks even in the closest of relationships. However, when the two countries are just partners and not allies, the damage caused by such an action is even greater and Azerbaijani-Russian relations have not recovered since. Initially, after the crash, Russian officials denied the event had even occurred and later tried to cover up the details and the reason Russia attacked the Azerbaijani plane.
After the crash, and as the cloud of uncertainty began to lift in Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev demanded an apology from Russia for this tragedy. In contrast to the Azerbaijanis, the Russians were unwilling to make public statements, let alone admit a mistake, and refused to apologize. Although an apology was eventually issued (after insistence from the President of Azerbaijan), this unfortunate incident left lasting scars and undermined trust between the countries.
Azerbaijan’s trust in Russia was so shaken by this event that the Azerbaijanis could not just sit by and leave the situation as it was. They realized that Russia was much stronger than Azerbaijan in terms of its media power. In the tragedy of the Azerbaijani plane crash, Russia began spreading lies loudly, denying its involvement in the incident—a move not typical of an ally. Therefore, Azerbaijan decided to weaken Russia’s media influence and simultaneously strengthen its own, aiming to create parity between the two countries in this field, as well as in diplomacy and humanitarian representation.
As a practical step, Azerbaijan decided to match the number of journalists from the Russian news agency “Russia Today” operating within its borders to the number of journalists from the Azerbaijani news agency “Azertag” working in Russia, which currently stands at just one. Additionally, Azerbaijan decided to shut down the “Russian House” in Baku, also known as “Rossotrudnichestvo,” which has been another point of contention in the relations between the two countries. The “Russian House” was established in 1925 by the Soviet Union’s security services and supposedly aimed to promote Russian culture and language in various countries. In practice, the “Russian House” served as a cover for Russian intelligence activities and the creation of a local network of contacts for Russia in a covert manner.
Not only did Azerbaijan close the “Russian House” operating on its territory, but other countries, such as France, Denmark, Estonia, Croatia, Poland, and many others, have done the same. The Danish newspaper “Information” expressed the issue: “The ‘Russian House’ in Denmark, presented as a center of science and culture, has served as a cover for Russian intelligence for many years. Journalists who examined photo and video materials of events held here have identified some of the expelled spies.” Azerbaijan openly declared that the closure of the “Russian House” was intended to protect its national interests.
Alongside the diplomatic crisis unfolding between the two countries, and perhaps as a result of it, there have been claims of discrimination and threats against Azerbaijani citizens living in Russia. After Russia began tightening its immigration laws, especially the Azerbaijani residents of Russia felt the intensification of the regime’s attitude toward immigrants. The pressure on the Azerbaijanis only grew, especially after various Russian entities, including Russian Telegram channels, painted a false image suggesting that only Azerbaijani migrants live in Russia.
Even Azerbaijanis with Russian citizenship became targets. “Surprisingly,” the whole process of “Azerbaijani hatred” in Russia began after the closure of the “Russian House” in Baku. Responses in Russia included economic threats and anti-Azerbaijani statements from politicians and public figures. Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the remarks made by Nikolai Valuev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Tourism Committee, which included hate speech and threats toward Azerbaijan, and in addition, Valuev’s entry into Azerbaijan was banned.
There were also threats from Russian figures, such as Telegram channels controlled by the government, to revive separatist ethnic organizations in Azerbaijan, such as the “Sadval” organization, which had previously promoted separatist ideas among minority groups. Azerbaijan is well aware of Russia’s attempts to create ethnic conflicts and use separatism as a weapon against other countries. In the past, Russia supported separatists in Karabakh and the creation of the fictional “Talysh-Mugan Republic”.
For Azerbaijan, Russia has been a partner in recent years, but since the tragedy of the Azerbaijani passenger plane, something has changed. Azerbaijan must be cautious, know who its friends are, and always stay vigilant. If Russia has begun threatening the use of separatist forces in Azerbaijan, who can guarantee that Russia will not cooperate with Iran against Azerbaijan? The relations between these two countries are important, but the lives of Azerbaijanis are more important.
Avec le retrait de l'aide américaine USAID, la Structure spéciale de lutte contre la corruption (SPAK) se retrouve désormais au milieu d'une guerre entre la justice et le pouvoir. Lancé en décembre 2019 après cinq ans de travail, ce bras armé de la justice doit encore prouver son indépendance et s'attaquer aux « gros poissons » de la corruption parmi les élus et hauts fonctionnaires.
- Articles / Courrier des Balkans, Politique, Albanie, PS Albanie, Défense, police et justiceJeudi 27 février 2025, de 18h30 à 20h00.
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Rencontre-débat organisée en partenariat avec l'Ambassade du Monténégro à Paris.
En présence des deux acteurs-clé de la politique d'adhésion de ce pays des Balkans, la ministre des Affaires Européennes, Maida GORCEVIC, et du négociateur en chef du Monténégro, Predrag ZENOVIC, nous aborderons le progrès du Monténégro lié à l'adhésion à l'Union européenne, mais aussi les questions (…)
The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for January 2025.
On January 15, 2025, Greece’s Ambassador to the United States Ekaterini Nassika met with the two newly sworn-in Greek-American members of Congress, Congresswoman Maggie Tamposi Goodlander (D-NH) and Congressman Mike Haridopoulos (R-FL). Shortly after they took office, both Representatives welcomed Ambassador Nassika to their offices, where she congratulated both lawmakers on their recent elections, expressing pride in their achievements and underscoring the significance of their roles in strengthening Greek-American relations.
Donald Trump was sworn in as the 47th US President on January 20. Prominent members of the Greek-American community with close ties to Trump were present at the Capitol for the new US President’s inauguration ceremony. Among the attendees was Konstantina Karampatsoli, the only Greek politician at the Trump inauguration. Karampatsoli, a member of the ruling New Democracy party, traveled to Washington DC after receiving an official invitation to the event from Republican Congressman Gus Bilirakis of Florida’s 12th District. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis congratulated President Trump on his return to the White House in a post on X.
On the same day as the US presidential inauguration, US Ambassador George Tsunis’ tenure ended, with Deputy Chief of Mission Maria Olson designated to serve as the top US diplomat in Athens until the new US ambassador to Greece, Kimberly Guilfoyle, arrives and presents credentials to the head of state. Guilfoyle is expected to assume her duties as the US Ambassador to Greece by April 2025, pending confirmation by the Senate.
The Greek Minister of National Defence, Nikos Dendias, visited on 22 January the Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence in Oklahoma, which houses the Army’s Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) University. The Minister had the opportunity to be informed by the Commander of Fort Sill, General Major Winston P. Brooks, about academic training in the field of counteracting Unmanned Aircraft Systems, as well as about the development of state-of-the-art innovations and defence tactics for dealing with new threats. The Minister of National Defence also had the opportunity to meet with Officers of the Hellenic Army, undergoing training in modern Artillery fire directing technologies there.
More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#
Éppen egyik cikkem illusztrációjához keresgéltem régi papírképeim között, amikor kezembe akadt egy Ferihegyen parkoló kék-fehér Fokker F27-es fotója. A kép fényes nappal készült, de egy éjszakai repülés emlékét idézte fel. Feljegyzéseimbe lapozva a repülés dátumát is megtaláltam és mivel ennek éppen 25 éve – ráadásul a kargópilótákról ritkán esik szó – gondoltam, a dolog megér egy visszaemlékezést.
Az ezredforduló környékén egy gyorsposta-szállítással foglalkozó, svájci központú légiforgalmi cég magyar leányvállalata, a Farnair Hungary a legismertebbek között volt. Számos pilótának volt ugródeszka a közforgalmi repülés világába, mert akkoriban a nemzeti légitársasághoz, a Malévhez kevés fiatal jutott be. Ennek többnyire nem szakmai okai voltak. Fogalmazzunk úgy, hogy a kapcsolati tőkéjük még nem nyugodott biztos alapokon. Ők aztán csomagszállító L-410-eseken és Fokker F27-esen alapozhatták meg karrierjüket, majd ülhettek át a rövidesen megjelenő diszkont légitársaságok Airbus 320-asaira vagy Boeing 737-eseire.