Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Avec 57 cas déclarés au dimanche 12 avril, le Gabon est relativement épargné par le Covid-19. Cela n’a pas empêché les autorités de rapidement mettre en place des mesures de prévention, alors que le Président Ali Bongo déclarait l’état d’urgence sanitaire le 9 avril dernier. Comment la situation sanitaire peut-elle évoluer ? Quelle réponse du gouvernement ? Quelles…

Jeudi 9 avril, les ministres des finances de la zone euro sont parvenus à un accord sur les modalités de financement d’un plan de soutien aux pays victimes de la crise Covid-19. Charles Michel, président de l’Eurogroupe, l’a présenté comme une stratégie "exhaustive et coordonnée". Que retenir de cet accord ? Est-il à la hauteur du défi auquel la zone euro doit faire face ? 3 questions à Eric Chaney, conseiller économique de l’Institut Montaigne.…

Face à un virus contre lequel n'existent encore ni vaccin ni traitement avéré, différentes options ont été adoptées, révélant crûment les moyens dont chaque État disposait en matière d'équipements (masques, tests, matériels hospitaliers), mais aussi de capacité à utiliser les données de santé pour contrôler l'avancée de l'épidémie. Des pays comme…

La pandémie de coronavirus interroge sur les risques existentiels qui pèsent sur l’espèce humaine. Ricardo Abromovay plaide pour un dépassement des réthoriques nationalistes et une gestion rationnelle et coopérative à l’échelle mondiale. Coronavirus : et après ? franceinfo ouvre le débat. Un échange à grande échelle pour stimuler et partager des questions, des idées, des […]

The post #EtAprès. Coronavirus : face aux risques existentiels que court l’humanité, la nécessité d’un « plan global » appeared first on Fondapol.

La République démocratique du Congo (RDC) compte au 9 avril 215 cas confirmés positifs. L’épidémie s'est déclarée dans le pays le 10 mars et le gouvernement a rapidement mis en place un Comité multisectoriel de riposte. Comment la situation sanitaire peut-elle évoluer ? Quelles mesures ont été mises en place ? Quelles leçons les autorités ont-elles tiré de leur expérience acquise lors de la gestion de l'épidémie…

Jeremy Adelman est professeur d'histoire et directeur du Global History Lab de l'université de Princeton.

Aux États-Unis comme ailleurs, les débats font rage sur le manque de préparation et les réponses tardives, souvent désordonnées du mille-feuille fédéral américain, commencent à être disséquées. Les revirements de Donald Trump, dans un climat pré-électoral qui a accentué les divergences entre États républicains et…

Le nombre de personnes atteintes du Covid-19 est en forte hausse en Côte d’Ivoire, qui est désormais l’un des pays africains les plus touchés avec 444 cas confirmés à ce jour, dont 52 guéris et 3 décès. Le pays a enregistré son premier cas de coronavirus mi-mars et le Président Ouattara a déclaré quelques jours plus tard l’état d’urgence sanitaire, l’instauration d’un couvre-feu et un…

The growing number of UN personnel deployed to missions in violent, volatile, and complex settings has pushed the UN to take all means necessary to improve the safety and security of its staff and of civilians under its protection. The UN’s Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy, which was first developed in 2017 and later revised in 2019, has been a central part of these efforts.

This paper outlines the difficulties of creating and implementing this policy. It addresses the origin and evolution of UN peacekeeping-intelligence as a concept and explains the need for this policy. It then discusses how peacekeeping-intelligence was and is being developed, including the challenge of creating guidelines and trainings that are both general enough to apply across the UN and flexible enough to adapt to different missions. Finally, it analyzes challenges the UN has faced in implementing this policy, from difficulties with coordination and data management to the lack of a sufficient gender lens. The paper recommends a number of actions for UN headquarters, peace operations, and member states in order to address these challenges:

1. Optimize tasking and information sharing within missions by focusing on senior leaders’ information needs;
2. Harmonize the content of peacekeeping-intelligence handbooks with standard operating procedures while ensuring they are flexible enough to account for differences among and between missions;
3. Refine criteria for recruiting civilian and uniformed personnel with intelligence expertise and better assign personnel once they are deployed;
4. Improve retention of peacekeeping-intelligence personnel and encourage member states to agree to longer-term deployments;
5. Tailor peacekeeping-intelligence training to the needs of missions while clarifying a standard set of UN norms;
6. Apply a gender lens to UN peacekeeping-intelligence;
7. Improve coordination between headquarters and field sites within missions by adapting the tempo and timing of tasking and creating integrated information-sharing cells; and
8. Establish common sharing platforms within missions.

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En 1966, le Président Johnson déclarait : "Quand le poids de la présidence me semble lourd, je me rappelle que les choses pourraient être pire : j’aurais pu être maire". Aux États-Unis comme en France, les gouvernements locaux font face aux effets terrifiants de la pandémie Covid-19 sur les territoires.

Quand les premiers cas sont apparus sur la côte Ouest du pays, les maires ont réagi les premiers dans un climat d’…

Avant même que la crise du coronavirus ne débute, la relation transatlantique traversait déjà une mauvaise passe. L’hostilité du président Trump envers l’Europe ainsi que l’escalade de la guerre commerciale avaient profondément ébranlé leurs relations, le Royaume-Uni avait quitté l’Union européenne, et les propos d’Emmanuel Macron sur la "…

On ne sait pas si Viktor Orban a lu Machiavel, mais il a retenu une leçon importante de l’auteur du Prince : une crise peut fournir une opportunité pour étendre son emprise sur le pouvoir, sur tous les pouvoirs. C’est précisément ce qu’a fait le Premier ministre hongrois en faisant adopter le 30 mars par le Parlement, où son parti, le Fidesz, a une majorité des deux tiers, une "loi sur la protection contre le coronavirus" qui lui permet de gouverner par décret pour…

Au Royaume-Uni comme en France, les "travailleurs du front", qui s’occupent notamment des soins aux malades, de l’approvisionnement en biens de première nécessité et de la logistique du dernier kilomètre, sont devenus les plus visibles.

Encore davantage qu’en France, ce sont aussi les travailleurs qui se trouvent le plus souvent dans des formes "atypiques" d’emplois — temps partiel, contrats "zéro heure" ou travail indépendant —…

In China hat die Ausbreitung des Coronavirus die Kommunistische Partei (KP) und Staats- und Parteichef Xi Jinping vor große Herausforderungen gestellt. Anders als bei den Tiananmen-Protesten, der SARS-Epidemie 2003 oder der globalen Finanzkrise 2008 geht es heute nicht nur um den Machterhalt der KP, sondern auch um den des Mannes an ihrer Spitze: Xi Jinping ist der erste Parteichef seit der Zeit Mao Zedongs, der alle Fäden der Politik in China in einer Hand hält. Bislang scheint die Corona-Pandemie Xis Machtposition nicht zu beeinträchtigen oder gar zu gefährden. Als Xis Achillesferse könnte sich jedoch die Wirtschaft erweisen, sollte es hier zu einer massiven Verschlechterung der Lage kommen.

In February, the Islamic Republic announced its first confirmed cases of the coronavirus. Within weeks, Iran became the epicenter of Covid-19 in the Middle East, prompting a serious health emergency. However, the current crisis is posing more than just medical and economic challenges that Iran has to cope with while under external pressure from sanctions. It also holds long-term socio-political ramifications for the Iranian state.

The corona outbreak took root in the city of Qom, home to significant religious seminaries and sites. It is not surprising that the virus spread particularly fast in pilgrimage cities such as Qom and Mashhad. The Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad alone attracts around 20 million visitors every year. Yet, nearly four weeks passed before spiritual centers in the country were closed down. Although the decision was made out of medical necessity, it was by no means self-evident. It was the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic that the government had to close mosques, cancel Friday sermons, and prohibit pilgrimages. The fact that a state which self-identifies as an Islamic republic is denying access to religious sites in times of a crisis has caused major grievances among its social base. Protesters gathered in front of holy shrines in Qom and Mashhad, where they were supported by local clerics. Some of them forcibly tried to gain access to the sites, clashing with the police. The corona crisis puts the theocratic state in an unfamiliar and rather uneasy position. It is forced to suspend religious rituals that are an essential part of its political identity and, what is more, it has to actively prevent people from performing those rituals. Due to corona, religion has been put into the back seat for the time being with the approval of the highest religious authority of the state, the Supreme leader himself.

The current crisis is having an impact on the status of religion in Iran, but it is also affecting faith. Closing down shrines that, for centuries, were considered places of immunity and healing, is tantamount to demystifying long-held Shiite beliefs. Amid the crisis, the trend toward alternative medicine, such as “Islamic remedies” that have been largely promoted by the state in recent years, had to give way to reality as well. The corona crisis has publicly exposed the clear-cut limits of faith and superstition. Some clerics already fear a theological crisis and are warning of an Iranian renaissance that would go hand in hand with people turning their backs on religion altogether. Supporters of a secular state, on the other hand, see the current situation as a chance for a gradual cultural transformation in Iran. This perspective is based on the notion that in Europe, too, a pandemic had once contributed to the disenchantment of religion, thus ultimately paving the way for the emergence of the Renaissance. Given the current conditions, the idea of secularism in particular is gaining new traction. A separation of the political and religious spheres would fundamentally contradict the ideational concept of the Islamic Republic, which categorically rejects secularist thought. Still, the current crisis gives rise to the question of what the relationship between religion and the state should look like – a topic that has preoccupied many Iranian philosophers, sociologists, and clerics alike, even before the Islamic Republic was founded.

Lastly, the current crisis has further exacerbated the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy problem. In light of the celebrations for the anniversary of the revolution and the parliamentary elections in February, corona cases were not made public for quite some time. But even in the aftermath of official reports about corona-related deaths, the Iranian state acted hesitantly. Domestic power struggles hampered effective coordination efforts and made crisis management much more difficult. At the same time, the level of public trust in authorities was low. This became evident when, after the outbreak of the virus, a large segment of the population was unwilling to comply with governmental instructions. The high level of distrust toward the state was not only based on the fact that Iranian authorities had withheld information and initially not taken the situation seriously themselves. The Iranian leadership had already lost a lot of credibility after a massive crackdown on protests in November 2019 and when the Revolutionary Guards shot down a passenger plane by accident only a few months afterwards. The initial handling of the corona crisis reinforced the perception among many that the state was not up to the challenges of the day. Opponents of the Islamic Republic, who reject the idea that the state had any legitimacy to begin with, see the corona crisis as yet another confirmation of clerical incompetence. At the same time, the cluster of crises in recent months and the ways in which they have been handled have also sown doubts among supporters of the system. As a result, the question of legitimacy has now reached the social base of the Islamic Republic itself.

The fact that the Iranian leadership has temporarily put religion into the background is not a new phenomenon. The Islamic Republic has always given priority to political requirements when deemed expedient for the system as a whole. Still, in the current crisis, religion has taken an unprecedented back seat. For the first time since 1979, religion in its institutionalized form has been largely removed from the everyday lives of the Iranian people. Although there will be access to religious sites again before long, faith has lost part of its social relevance. Moreover, many will remember significant Shiite shrines not as places of salvation but rather as symbols of the spread of a grave pandemic. As of now, infection rates are decreasing across the country, but in the aftermath of the corona crisis, the Iranian state will face a whole new set of socio-political challenges.

Le Covid-19 touche tout le monde, y compris les médias. Vagues de désinformation, baisse de revenus, nécessité de continuer à opérer… "Comment les médias de votre pays se sont-ils organisés pour assurer la diffusion d’informations fiables autour de l’épidémie ?" : voici la question que nous avons posée à Anais Ginori, journaliste au sein du journal italien La Republicca, Victor Mallet, chef du bureau de Paris du journal britannique …

La propagation du Covid-19 révèle les profondes faiblesses de la politique sociale américaine et de son filet de sécurité sociale : vulnérabilité du système de santé, manque de congés maladie payés et structure fédérée du système de politique sociale.

En temps de crise, une nation se tourne vers ses dirigeants afin d’en obtenir honnêteté, détermination et réconfort. Mais au détriment de ces vertus, le président…

• 27 janvier : premier cas de Covid-19 détecté en Allemagne dans le Land de Bavière. 
• 24 février : le ministre de la Santé Jens Spahn annonce que l’épidémie a atteint l’Allemagne. 
• 4 mars : l’Allemagne interdit l’exportation de matériel de protection médical hors de ses frontières. …

L’épidémie de Covid-19 a vu une baisse drastique de l’activité mondiale, entraînant à son tour une baisse de la consommation énergétique. Quelles en sont les implications, à la fois pour la France et pour le monde ? Réponse de notre Senior Fellow Énergie & Climat, Benjamin Fremaux.

The Corona pandemic underlines the continued importance of improving foresight capabilities. Over the past decade, we have been confronted with an abundance of unexpected situations: the global refugee and migration crisis, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the election of Donald Trump, and Brexit – all of which caught states and societies off guard. It is therefore no surprise that uneasiness about the volatility of global affairs is growing, particularly in politics. No policy-maker will feel comfortable making decisions that affect the security of the population and the welfare of the nation – especially under time pressure and with a high degree of uncertainty about the effects of the decisions.

Fortunately, research about how effective people are at anticipating future events demonstrates that it does not have to be this way. But first a caveat: Representative statistical studies show that experts do not fare much better at making predictions than can be expected on the basis of a mere random distribution. About half of their expectations are correct, whereas the other half are not. Consulting experts is therefore not enough to obtain better predictions about the future.

However, it is still possible to increase the number of accurate predictions – the so-called forecasts – of concrete events. The current pandemic would be one such event. A carefully designed and methodically controlled forecasting tournament has demonstrated how forecast accuracy can effectively be increased. More than 20,000 participants took part in the Good Judgment Project, including both laymen and experts. They responded to questions about conceivable events in the future. At present, hypothetical questions could include, for example: Will Donald Trump win the US presidential election in November? Will the Dow Jones close above 20,000 points at the end of this year? Will North Korea conduct a nuclear test in 2020? Or simply: Will there be another global pandemic within the next 12 months?

At the end of the period to which the question refers, it is checked whether the forecasts of the participants were accurate. Analysing the results highlights differences: Some participants are correct more often than others. This is not due to clairvoyant powers. Rather, good forecasters proceed methodically. They actively look for information that could be important for answering the question at hand. They also take into account information contradicting their opinions. And if newly available facts require it, they adjust their assessments. Apparently, the most important prerequisite for accurate forecasting is to learn systematically from mistakes. Forecasters with above-average performance levels like to exchange information with their peers – about success factors, but also about failures and misjudgements. In practice, this means rigorous analysis of one’s own forecasts and continuous monitoring of successes as well as failures.

If above-average forecasters are combined in teams, the accuracy levels of their aggregate forecasts increase even more. Of course, this is no guarantee that all nasty surprises can be anticipated in the future, even if forecasting tournaments are continued and developed further. But as the Good Judgment Project shows, a significant increase in accurate forecasting can be achieved: The goal of the project, which was initially set up for four years, was to increase the average accuracy levels of forecasts given by a control group by 50 per cent – which was achieved after only two years. The number of unforeseen events can thus be reduced.

But improving forecast accuracy, and thus reducing the number of unexpected events, is only one side of the coin. For even if future events can be predicted more often, it is not automatically guaranteed that the appropriate preparations will be made. This is due to the process of policy-making. Political as well as electoral majorities are needed to decide on and implement far-reaching and costly measures. In crises situations such as the current pandemic, this is much easier, as we are experiencing in real time. Conversely, with a view to less visible events in the future, it is notoriously difficult to mobilise the necessary majorities for far-reaching precautionary measures. Even scientifically well-founded demands for drastic measures are difficult to implement, as has been observed in recent years with regard to health studies and climate research.

However, it would be wrong to blame political leaders alone for the lack of preparation. For it should not be forgotten that predictions can be wrong – there are plenty of examples for this as well. Time-consuming and costly preparations to ward off an anticipated pandemic could possibly prove redundant, as it might only occur in 10, 20, or 30 years. Of course, decision-makers would have to take the blame for this as well. Deciding about which measures to take in preparation of a forecasted nasty surprise – for which the impact is hardly knowable in advance – requires balancing conflicting interests. The outcome depends very much on expectations about public support for these measures – or opposition against them.

Conflicts about what priorities for political action should be taken in the future will be unavoidable, even after the Corona pandemic. Often at the heart of these conflicts are different assumptions about the future. Even if there is no automatism between good predictions and political action, the standards of rigorous analysis and the continuous monitoring of successes as well as failures can help in the making of informed decisions during such conflicts, thus contributing to more targeted preparation.

Turkey’s prison population has been rising steadily for two decades. Official capacity has reached 234,000, but the actual number of prisoners in March was 300,000. Of these, 43,000 people are on remand awaiting trial.

While overcrowding had long been criticized, the coronavirus crisis completely changed the parameters of the discussion. Social distancing and personal hygiene are key elements of the fight against the virus, but neither are possible in the current Turkish prison environment. Cells are overcrowded, with very limited access to water. A shortage of beds sees prisoners even sleeping on the floor next to the toilets. After living for years under such conditions, many prisoners are in poor health and particularly vulnerable. Once the virus enters the prisons many deaths can be expected.

The Turkish government initially responded by banning visits, but complete isolation is not feasible. For one thing, the 67,000 prison staff are possible vectors – and themselves potential victims.

To step up its response, the government is accelerating reforms to the Law on the Execution of Sentences and Security Measures (Law 5275). Under the proposed changes, prisoners will be eligible for parole after serving half their sentence (currently two thirds), with probation increased from one to three years. Inmates over the age of 60 with chronic illnesses, and women with children younger than three will be released immediately and serve the rest of their term under house arrest. It is expected that these changes will lead to the release of almost 100,000 prisoners.

There is controversy, however, over the question of who will not benefit. There is broad public consensus that those convicted of serious crimes such as murder and sexual offences should be excluded. But the bill also excludes prisoners held under anti-terrorism laws. Under Turkey’s very broad definition of terrorism, this category also covers political activists, journalists, lawyers and human rights defenders. Most prisoners even remotely linked to the Gülen movement or Kurdish political organizations have also been convicted under anti-terrorism legislation. As a result, there are estimated to be about 40,000 political prisoners, including such prominent figures as the journalist and author Ahmet Altan, the businessman and philanthropist Osman Kavala, and the former leader of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party, Selahattin Demirtaş. Civil rights organizations are calling for political prisoners to be included in the early release initiative.

While the release of up to 100,000 prisoners will certainly provide relief for those who remain, excluding political prisoners will further undermine trust in the justice system. It will also sharpen existing cultural and political polarization.

The issue has multiple aspects. In humanitarian terms it is crucial to release inmates, particularly those most vulnerable to the virus. Legally the basic principle of equality is at stake. And in the political sphere the issue draws attention to Turkey’s extremely arbitrary use of anti-terrorism charges.

Even the release of 100,000 prisoners is unlikely to be sufficient. Most of the increase in capacity from 111,000 to 234,000 was accomplished by adding beds to existing spaces (bunk beds, floor). So the prisons will still not be spacious enough to meet the standards required to address the pandemic. Further measures to decrease prison numbers are under therefore discussion, including immediate release of remand prisoners and transfer of certain inmates to house arrest with electronic tagging (including all those with documented health issues).

These immediate changes could also form the starting point for long-term improvements in the justice system. The crisis provides an opportunity to correct Turkey’s extremely arbitrary use of anti-terrorism charges. Criticisms particularly focus on two topics: the practice of lengthy pre-trial detention and more significantly, the very broad definition of terrorism, which includes non-violent political activity and threatens freedom of speech. Without a new approach, technical changes such as the current early releases, or even amnesties, will have only temporary effects. Turkey released petty criminals in 2016 to make space for the post-coup purges. Only three years later, the prisons are once again overcrowded. European policy-makers should urge Turkey to take the necessary emergency steps.

But the long-term solution is to reform the anti-terror legislation. The preparations for emergency early release have triggered a public debate on the abuse of anti-terrorism charges. European policy-makers should capitalize on this discussion and continue to press Ankara for reforms in line with the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the European Union that Turkey, at least formally, aims to meet.