Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Le 4 mars, Equileap a publié l'édition 2021 du baromètre de l'égalité femmes-hommes dans les plus grandes entreprises. Ce rapport se concentre sur 3 702 entreprises, dans 23 pays et selon 19 critères différents. Le rapport fait aussi un point sur les conséquences de la crise sanitaire sur les inégalités de genre. La France se place en première position du classement, se distinguant par une plus forte féminisation dans les conseils d'administration de ses entreprises.

L'Ours d'or de la 71ème édition du festival international du film de Berlin, qui s'est tenue en ligne, a été décernée le 5 mars à "Bad Luck Banging or Loony Porn" du réalisateur roumain Radu Jude. Le réalisateur hongrois Dénes Nagy obtient le prix du jury pour le film "Natural Light". L'actrice allemande Maren Eggert se voit décerner l'Ours d'argent du meilleur premier rôle dans le film "I'm Your Man".

Le musée Mudam à Luxembourg propose jusqu'au 30 août une exposition consacrée à l'artiste sud-africain William Kentridge. L'exposition présente ses dessins, ses sculptures, ses œuvres sonores et vidéos, pour la scène et l'opéra. L'artiste aborde des thèmes liés à l'histoire, au temps, au langage et au son, à travers le prisme de son Afrique du Sud natale.

Le musée d'art moderne "sur la Vistule" de Varsovie présente jusqu'au 9 mai une exposition sur l'artiste Marek Wlodarski, né Henryk Streng. Cette figure du modernisme juif polonais développa une vision originale influencée par sa vie sous deux systèmes totalitaires, le nazisme et le stalinisme, et l'expérience de la Shoah.

La galerie Alfonso Artiaco de Naples accueille jusqu'au 24 avril une exposition de Giulio Paolini. Sont rassemblées peintures et plusieurs collages inédits, inspirés de l'histoire de l'art, de l'Antiquité et de la mythologie.

Le musée Sorolla de Madrid accueille jusqu'au 20 juin l'exposition temporaire "Poétique d'une maison. Photographies de Lluís Casals", une occasion de découvrir 46 photographies de l'architecte et photographe catalan Lluís Casals reflétant la dimension intime de l'artiste et sa famille.

Pour sa 11ème édition, Circulation(s), festival de la jeune photographie européenne, est accueilli par le centre culturel Centquatre à Paris mais se tient en ligne du 13 mars au 2 mai. Le site comporte une visite guidée vidéo des photographies affichées dans le centre culturel, ainsi que des interviews d'artistes, des performances en direct, et des e-lectures de portfolios.

Le festival de poésie StAnza, qui se tient dans la ville universitaire écossaise de St Andrews, se déroule jusqu'au 14 mars principalement en ligne. L'événement a pour objectif de promouvoir la poésie en l'apportant au public par des lectures de poème ou des ateliers d'écriture.

L'Europe au temps de Napoléon, ouvrage collectif dirigé par Jean Tulard, dresse le tableau de la mutation politique, économique et culturelle engendrée par le rêve de l'Empereur d'unifier l'Europe. Huit spécialistes proposent un regard sur la conquête napoléonienne vue de Londres, Varsovie, Lisbonne, Amsterdam, Rome, Genève, Vienne et Moscou.

Le thème de Napoléon et l'Europe a été au centre de nombreux travaux historiques dans plusieurs pays. En France, l'ouvrage "Napoléon et l'Europe" coordonné par le président de la Fondation Napoléon, Thierry Lentz, rassemble les contributions de 29 spécialistes issues d'un colloque organisé par le ministère des Affaires étrangères et la Fondation Napoléon en novembre 2004. Au Royaume-Uni, Napoleon and Europe de Philip G. Dwyer se penche sur le pouvoir napoléonien en France et dans l'Empire. En Allemagne, Thomas Schuler propose un voyage sur les traces de Napoléon à travers l'Europe dans Auf Napoleons Spuren. En Espagne, Rafael Zurita Aldeguer livre une synthèse sur L'Europe à l'époque de Napoléon. En Pologne, l'académie Morska de Szczecin évoque l'Europe à l'époque napoléonienne.

The international system for the governance of foreign investments is highly fragmented consisting mainly of bilateral agreements. With the adoption of nine guiding principles for global investment policy‐making in 2016, some observers argue that the G20 can actually serve as a launchpad for negotiations of a multilateral investment agreement. This paper provides empirical evidence on the question of whether the contents of international investment agreements (IIAs) have gradually converged to facilitate the multilateralization of investment rules. We find that IIAs negotiated among non‐G20 countries are more similar to each other than those concluded by G20 countries in general and even more so since 2000 in particular. This result calls into question the premise that the G20 can serve as the most suitable forum to initiate multilateral negotiations on multilateral investment rules. Instead, an extended analysis using different country grouping criteria suggests that the Member States of the European Union may be a more suitable alternative in this regard. Here the EU can jointly take a leading role in facilitating related negotiations on multilateral investment rules.

The international system for the governance of foreign investments is highly fragmented consisting mainly of bilateral agreements. With the adoption of nine guiding principles for global investment policy‐making in 2016, some observers argue that the G20 can actually serve as a launchpad for negotiations of a multilateral investment agreement. This paper provides empirical evidence on the question of whether the contents of international investment agreements (IIAs) have gradually converged to facilitate the multilateralization of investment rules. We find that IIAs negotiated among non‐G20 countries are more similar to each other than those concluded by G20 countries in general and even more so since 2000 in particular. This result calls into question the premise that the G20 can serve as the most suitable forum to initiate multilateral negotiations on multilateral investment rules. Instead, an extended analysis using different country grouping criteria suggests that the Member States of the European Union may be a more suitable alternative in this regard. Here the EU can jointly take a leading role in facilitating related negotiations on multilateral investment rules.

The international system for the governance of foreign investments is highly fragmented consisting mainly of bilateral agreements. With the adoption of nine guiding principles for global investment policy‐making in 2016, some observers argue that the G20 can actually serve as a launchpad for negotiations of a multilateral investment agreement. This paper provides empirical evidence on the question of whether the contents of international investment agreements (IIAs) have gradually converged to facilitate the multilateralization of investment rules. We find that IIAs negotiated among non‐G20 countries are more similar to each other than those concluded by G20 countries in general and even more so since 2000 in particular. This result calls into question the premise that the G20 can serve as the most suitable forum to initiate multilateral negotiations on multilateral investment rules. Instead, an extended analysis using different country grouping criteria suggests that the Member States of the European Union may be a more suitable alternative in this regard. Here the EU can jointly take a leading role in facilitating related negotiations on multilateral investment rules.

The aim of this chapter (in Portuguese) is to present an overview about the challenge of the rise of populist radical right parties in Europe. Based on the literature, it is argued that their electoral rise has allowed these parties to exert influence on the political agenda, beyond the dimension of electoral competition itself. Populist radical right positions have resonated in other spheres, such as public opinion, traditional parties, democratic institutions and public policies. The chapter starts with a definition of populist radical right parties, then discusses what they represent and what are the explanations found in the literature for their emergence and electoral persistence, with a focus on supply-side factors. In the end, the chapter reflects on some of the implications of the rise of the populist radical right in the the European continent.

The aim of this chapter (in Portuguese) is to present an overview about the challenge of the rise of populist radical right parties in Europe. Based on the literature, it is argued that their electoral rise has allowed these parties to exert influence on the political agenda, beyond the dimension of electoral competition itself. Populist radical right positions have resonated in other spheres, such as public opinion, traditional parties, democratic institutions and public policies. The chapter starts with a definition of populist radical right parties, then discusses what they represent and what are the explanations found in the literature for their emergence and electoral persistence, with a focus on supply-side factors. In the end, the chapter reflects on some of the implications of the rise of the populist radical right in the the European continent.

The aim of this chapter (in Portuguese) is to present an overview about the challenge of the rise of populist radical right parties in Europe. Based on the literature, it is argued that their electoral rise has allowed these parties to exert influence on the political agenda, beyond the dimension of electoral competition itself. Populist radical right positions have resonated in other spheres, such as public opinion, traditional parties, democratic institutions and public policies. The chapter starts with a definition of populist radical right parties, then discusses what they represent and what are the explanations found in the literature for their emergence and electoral persistence, with a focus on supply-side factors. In the end, the chapter reflects on some of the implications of the rise of the populist radical right in the the European continent.

Digitalmarktregulierung als eines von fünf digitalpolitischen Großprojekten der EU

This paper compares the allocation of private humanitarian aid to that of official humanitarian aid awarded to 140 recipient countries over the 2000–2016 period. We construct a new database that offers information on the country in which the headquarters of private donors are located to test whether private aid tends to follow the humanitarian aid allocation pattern of the respective official donor. Our empirical results confirm that private humanitarian aid tends to “follow the flag”. This finding is robust against the inclusion of various fixed effects, estimating instrumental variables models and disaggregating private humanitarian aid into corporate aid and NGO aid. Donor country‐specific estimations reveal that private humanitarian aid from China, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States tend to “follow the flag”.

This paper compares the allocation of private humanitarian aid to that of official humanitarian aid awarded to 140 recipient countries over the 2000–2016 period. We construct a new database that offers information on the country in which the headquarters of private donors are located to test whether private aid tends to follow the humanitarian aid allocation pattern of the respective official donor. Our empirical results confirm that private humanitarian aid tends to “follow the flag”. This finding is robust against the inclusion of various fixed effects, estimating instrumental variables models and disaggregating private humanitarian aid into corporate aid and NGO aid. Donor country‐specific estimations reveal that private humanitarian aid from China, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States tend to “follow the flag”.

This paper compares the allocation of private humanitarian aid to that of official humanitarian aid awarded to 140 recipient countries over the 2000–2016 period. We construct a new database that offers information on the country in which the headquarters of private donors are located to test whether private aid tends to follow the humanitarian aid allocation pattern of the respective official donor. Our empirical results confirm that private humanitarian aid tends to “follow the flag”. This finding is robust against the inclusion of various fixed effects, estimating instrumental variables models and disaggregating private humanitarian aid into corporate aid and NGO aid. Donor country‐specific estimations reveal that private humanitarian aid from China, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States tend to “follow the flag”.