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This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to the previous day. The Mission recorded a significant level of fighting during the night of 5-6 August in Donetsk region. The SMM analysed craters in Krasnohorivka, Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove) and Sakhanka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas. The Mission noted the absence of 12 towed howitzers from permanent storage sites in “LPR”-controlled areas. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions, all in areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM received concrete responses to recent incidents by the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination, but no such information regarding incidents that took place in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.

On the evening of 4 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard in two minutes 14 undetermined explosions 6-8km north-north-west of its position. On the night of 5-6 August, the SMM heard 42 undetermined explosions, including 30 assessed as anti-aircraft cannon rounds, 7-10km north of its position.

On night of 4-5 August, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west of its location. Earlier that evening, the SMM had heard in one minute 20 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, explosions assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher and recoilless-gun rounds as well as heavy-machine-gun bursts 700-1000m north of its position 7km north of Horlivka. While in Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-east of its location.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:39 and 21:48 on 4 August recorded 11 rocket-assisted projectiles fired from west to east and one undetermined explosion at unknown distance north-west of its position. During the night of 5-6 August, in about three hours, the camera recorded 118 undetermined explosions as well as bursts of tracer fire (in sequence) from south-west to north-east, west to east and east to west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard within 50 minutes in the afternoon 94 undetermined explosions assessed as rounds of different weapons (82mm and 120mm mortar, automatic grenade launcher), as well as heavy-machine-gun fire 4-6km south-east of its position. In the course of the day, whilst positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 2 to 6km west, west-north-west and north-north-west of its position.

In one hour in the morning, whilst in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 10-12km north-west, and four undetermined explosions 10-12km north-north-east of its position. In the night hours of 5-6 August, within just over two hours around midnight from the same location, the SMM heard 42 explosions, including 30, which it assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-east of its position. In Horlivka, on the same night, the SMM heard 43 explosions, including 27 it assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 7-9km north-west of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 4 August. Positioned 2km north of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5-15km west of its position. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (65km west of Luhansk), within about 20 minutes, the SMM heard over a dozen bursts of small arms 2km east of its position.

The SMM followed up on civilian casualties and conducted crater analysis. At the Kalinina hospital morgue in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM accompanied by Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), observed the body of a woman with extensive shrapnel injuries to her head, neck, limbs and torso. According to the autopsy report, she had succumbed to shrapnel injuries she had received due to triggering a booby trap while working in her garden in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district on 4 August.

On 4 August, in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM saw four fresh craters, all of which it assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds. The SMM assessed the first crater near an abandoned house as caused by a round fired from a westerly direction. The second crater was in the backyard of a house inhabited by an elderly woman and the SMM assessed that the round had been fired from a south-westerly direction. The last two craters were located near a road in the same area and the SMM assessed that one round had been fired from a north-north-westerly direction and the other – from a north-westerly direction. According to residents, the shelling had taken place between 06:00-06:35 on 3 August. No casualties were reported.

In Sakhanka (“DPR”-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw three fresh craters. The first crater was 20m away from an electricity sub-station and the SMM assessed it as caused by a projectile fired from a westerly direction. The SMM saw shrapnel damage to the sub-station. The SMM assessed the second crater, which was located in a field at the outskirts of the village, as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a north-westerly direction. The third crater was located in the backyard of a house inhabited by a middle-aged woman and the SMM saw two broken windows. The SMM assessed it as caused by a projectile fired from a north-north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that the shelling had occurred on 3 August at 22:30. No casualties were reported.

In Molodizhne (“DPR”-controlled, 20km south of Donetsk) the SMM saw nine fresh impact sites in a “detention” facility guarded by armed “DPR” members. One impact had caused the south-east part of the flat roof of an administrative building to partially collapse. The remainder of the impacts had struck the hard surface of the yard. The SMM assessed four of the craters as caused by 122mm or 152mm artillery rounds fired from a south or south-westerly direction, while a fifth had been caused by a projectile of unknown calibre fired from a northerly direction. The SMM was unable to analyse the remainder of the craters as they had been tampered with. According to the “head” of the facility, the shelling had occurred around midnight on 4 August. He also told the SMM that two “detainees” had sustained minor injuries. Medical personnel at the Dokuchaievsk hospital who treated them told the SMM that one had a shrapnel injury to his ankle and the other - to his chest and jaw. Both had been released back to the facility less than two hours after their arrival to the hospital. Near the facility, the SMM saw a two-storey house with a shattered window and spoke to a resident living in the house who stated that the window had been shattered by shrapnel around midnight on 4 August.

In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM visited two residential properties reportedly shelled on the night of 4-5 August. At the first, the SMM saw a crater in the asphalt surface on the yard of the house, and minor shrapnel damage to the nearby east-facing wall. The SMM saw the tail fin of an 82mm mortar round stuck in the asphalt and assessed that the round had been fired from an east-south-easterly direction. At the second location, a five-storey apartment building, the SMM saw a direct impact on the east-facing wall and assessed it as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from an east-north-easterly direction. No casualties were reported at either location.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 120mm) westbound on the M04 (E50) road near government-controlled Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk), and two tanks of unknown type in “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). 

Beyond the respective withdrawal line but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed 13 stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 11 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM21 Grad 122mm). The SMM also observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it had been since 26 February, with 12 MLRS (BM21 Grad 122mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) missing. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM noted the presence of eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).*

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At “LPR”-controlled sites the SMM noted that 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) with 12 armed “LPR” members on board travelling west and one stationary combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) on a tank (T-72) chassis.

The SMM continued to insist on accountability and responsibility for violations related to impediments to SMM monitoring and verification. The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative presented the SMM with details of the investigations and disciplinary measures taken against the perpetrators. With regard to the shots fired at the SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle near Lobacheve on 30 July (see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2016), the representative informed the SMM that the person responsible had been identified and he had disobeyed direct orders.

In relation to the violation near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 29 July 2016) in which armed individuals had threatened the SMM at gunpoint, Mr. Zakharchenko continued to refuse to meet the SMM in order to indicate effective steps taken in response.*

The SMM reminded the JCCC of continued restrictions and impediments to monitoring and verification, including in the areas near Zolote and Petrivske, and reminded the JCCC of its obligations under the Addendum to help ensure these and other violations were remedied as a matter of urgency. The SMM likewise reminded the JCCC that many of these restrictions were caused by mines, which the signatories of the Memorandum of September 2014 had insisted should be removed, and the Trilateral Contact Group's decision of 3 March, stipulating that the JCCC should be responsible for overall co-ordination of mine action, with the support of the SMM.

The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM revisited an area in Debaltseve (“DPR”-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) where it had seen UXO assessed as an MLRS round (BM27 Uragan, 220mm; see SMM Daily Report 5 August 2016). A local farmer stated that “emergency services” had visited the site on 4 August and declared the rocket safe. He also showed the SMM another UXO on a footpath in the area, which the SMM assessed to be a 122mm artillery shell. The SMM informed the JCCC of the location of both pieces of UXO.

The SMM observed a new mine hazard sign 2km west of government-controlled Lobacheve (18km north-west of Luhansk) on the side of the road, which connects Lobacheve to government-controlled Lopaskyne (24km north-west of Luhansk). The sign read “Mines” in Russian and was hand-written on white cloth, which was hung on a movable wooden barrier.

The SMM continued to observe queues of pedestrians at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. In the morning between 09:09 and 10:09 the SMM saw 203 people (mixed gender and age) leaving government-controlled areas through the government checkpoint. In the same time period, the SMM saw 265 people (mixed gender and age) entering government-controlled areas through the same checkpoint. At 10:22, the SMM saw some 450 people still queuing to leave government-controlled areas. The SMM saw no traffic in the opposite direction. Between 15:45 and 16:15 the SMM observed 115 people (mixed gender and age) enter government-controlled areas through the government checkpoint. Within the same time frame, the SMM saw 132 people (mixed gender and age) proceed in the opposite direction.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

 

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• An armed “DPR” member stopped the SMM east of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Lyuksemburg, “DPR”-controlled, 82km south of Donetsk), and prevented the SMM from proceeding further east. The SMM took an alternative route to Novoazovsk (“DPR”-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Four armed “LPR” members in two vehicles stopped the SMM in “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). An armed “LPR” member threatened one of SMM’s monitors with “arrest”, unless the SMM complied with their instruction not to stop at a pedestrian path leading to the railway tracks. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• Armed men limited the SMM’s access to a weapons holding area. The gate was locked and the SMM was informed that the guard with the key was unavailable. The armed “DPR” members present only allowed two monitors and a language assistant to climb the wall (1.2m) in order to record the serial numbers of the designated weapons. The JCCC was informed.
• An armed “LPR” member stopped the SMM at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge at government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk). He informed his superior and only allowed the SMM to proceed after noting down monitors’ names and IDs.

 

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

 

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This report is for media and the general public.

On 6 August at 07:51hrs the SMM heard an explosion approximately 3.9km east of its location in Luhansk city.

The SMM went to the site from where it had heard the explosion located at the intersection of Karpynsky and Vatutyn Street in Luhansk city, 500m north-east of SMM’s accommodation. The site was cordoned off, by so-called “LPR” “police” and the SMM could assess from a distance of approximately 15-30 meters, that an explosion had likely been caused by an improvised explosive device (assessed as approximately 1kg of high explosives) placed next to or in, a lamp post about two meters away from the vehicle, which was damaged and downed, at the side of the road. The SMM saw a black sport utility vehicle “Toyota Landcruiser Prado” severely damaged with windows shattered and front and side airbags deployed.

“LPR” “police” members at the site told the SMM that there were two casualties, without giving further details. Mr Vladislav Deynego, “LPR” member, told the SMM that Mr Plotnitsky was “in a bad condition and not able to receive visitors.”  At the time of writing, the SMM could not reach personnel at either of the two hospitals in Luhansk city for confirmation.

The SMM will continue following up to confirm the information, and observe further developments.

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WARSAW, 6 August 2016 – Michael Georg Link, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), today criticized the call by the Prosecutor General of Tajikistan for the reintroduction of the death penalty, and expressed concern over recent discussions related to removing the bans on capital punishment in some other OSCE participating States.

“Countries in the OSCE have committed themselves to consider the complete abolition of capital punishment, not to reconsider that abolition,” the ODIHR Director said. “Yesterday’s call by the Prosecutor General in Tajikistan for the reintroduction of capital punishment in that country is completely out of place in a region where most of the countries recognize the inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading nature of a punishment that fails to act as a deterrent and makes any miscarriage of justice irreversible.”

Tajikistan’s Prosecutor-General, Yusuf Rahmon, told a press conference yesterday that perpetrators of premeditated murder, terrorists and traitors must be punished by death. His words followed similar statements by other leaders, among them President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and President Viktor Orban of Hungary, suggesting that the reinstitution of the death penalty should be opened for discussion.

Tajikistan suspended the application of the death penalty in 2004, while Turkey and Hungary completely abolished capital punishment, in 2004 and 1990, respectively.

“Rather than reversing its course, it is my hope that Tajikistan will take further steps toward the complete abolition of the death penalty,” he said. “It is also my hope that Turkey, remains with the vast majority of the OSCE participating States and will continue to  act as a strong advocate for the global abolition, as it has in recent years.”

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KYIV, 5 AUGUST 2016 –OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Madina Jarbussynova, on Friday concluded an official visit to Ukraine aimed at raising awareness of human trafficking and the risks encountered by the most vulnerable groups as a consequence of the current crisis.

During her five-day visit, she met with representatives of the Donetsk Oblast state administration and female Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Kramatorsk. Ambassador Jarbussynova also travelled to Kharkiv to talk to relevant civil society representatives about the situation on the ground, how to prevent the expansion of the conflict-driven human trafficking phenomenon, and to evaluate existing mechanisms of identifying, referring and assisting victims of trafficking in human beings.

“More than one-and-a-half million citizens have been displaced – a vast number that demands a comprehensive response,” Jarbussynova said. “This vulnerable group can easily find itself in situations where human trafficking may occur.”

In Kyiv, the OSCE Special Representative met with Ukrainian authorities to discuss progress in anti-trafficking measures and review future plans.

“The Government of Ukraine has recently demonstrated a high level of commitment to addressing human trafficking, particularly in enhancing its victim identification efforts and in filing cases to relevant courts”, said Jarbussynova.

At the same time, she noted that there are still considerable gaps in the National Referral Mechanism for victims, and that long-term, sustainable measures should be sought.

The Special Representative travels regularly to Ukraine, engaging with high-level authorities and holding training sessions together with the Special Monitoring Mission and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator to strengthen the capacity of the Ukrainian institutions and OSCE monitors to spot human trafficking trends and to report on alleged cases.

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This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to the day before including more than 520 explosions. In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day. On the night of 4 August, the SMM heard single shots of small-arms fire in close proximity to  its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). The SMM analysed craters in Zaitseve, Luhanske and Novozvanivka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, and noted the absence of numerous weapons from permanent storage sites in government-controlled areas. The SMM followed up on reports of water and power supply cuts in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions – two in government-controlled areas and two in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM noted a higher number of ceasefire violations[1] recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period, including more than 520 explosions.

On the evening of 3 August, while in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions 8-15km north-west of its position.

On the same night, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 104 undetermined explosions 7-10km north, and 12 explosions assessed as outgoing armoured personnel carrier (BMP-1, 73mm) cannon fire 5-8km north of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:35 and 22:31 of 3 August, facing north-east, recorded 63 undetermined explosions and 30 bursts in the following sequence: five bursts of undetermined tracer fire and 25 bursts of direct tracer fire from east to west, north to south, south to north, north-west to northeast, north-east to north-west, east to north-west, north-east to west, south-east to north-west.

The following day, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of the city centre), the SMM heard 236 undetermined explosions all at locations 3-10km ranging from north-west to north-east of its position. The most intense violence was noted between 08:14 and 08:42, when the SMM recorded 100 undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-east of its position. 

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and 13 outgoing explosions assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher fire 1-7km west-south-west, west, west-north-west, north, north-north-east and north-east of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 3-5km east and south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 3 August. Whilst in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. While positioned 1.5km north-west of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard, within a half-hour period, more than 100 bursts of small-arms fire 1.5km east-south-east of its position – the location of a known shooting range – and assessed them as live-fire exercise – within the security zone – in violation of the ceasefire and of the Trilateral Contact Group decision on the prohibition of live-fire exercises within the security zone. Subsequently, while in the vicinity of a shooting range, the SMM saw five armed “LPR” members wearing ski masks with sniper rifles.

At 21:45 on 4 August, the SMM while at its base in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), heard 16 single shots of small-arms (pistol) fire at an undetermined location 100-150m away from the base. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling area.

The SMM conducted crater analysis. In “DPR”-controlled parts of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh crater in a field 60m away from a house and assessed it as caused by a mortar (82 or 120mm) round fired from a north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that shelling had occurred during the night of 2-3 August. Across the street, the SMM also saw a completely burnt and destroyed house and two neighbouring houses with minor damage. No casualties were reported.

In government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw four relatively fresh craters  with fragments of 120mm mortar rounds and 122mm artillery rounds in a garden of an inhabited house. The SMM was unable to determine the direction of fire due to contaminated craters after the recent heavy storms.

In government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw four craters near an inhabited house and assessed two of them as caused by 82mm mortar and the other two as caused by 122m artillery rounds, all fired from an easterly direction. Two residents told the SMM that shelling had taken place during the night time two days prior.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: five self-propelled howitzers (2S1Gvozdika, 122mm) in Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk); four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152 mm) in a military compound in Donske (57km south of Donetsk); one radio-guided anti-tank system (9K114 Shturm, 134mm) mounted on a stationary armoured tracked vehicle (MT- LB) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 12 tanks together with other hardware including 19 armoured vehicles and 44 military-type trucks in an industrial complex in “DPR”-controlled Budonivskyi district of Donetsk city.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), while it noted as missing six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) as first observed on 8 July. The SMM also observed that two areas continued to be abandoned, as they have been since 3 July, with 12 towed howitzers (D-30, 12mm) and six Addendum-regulated mortars (2B11, 120mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At Ukrainian Armed Forces sites, the SMM noted that 22 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (five 2B9M, 82mm; and two BM-38, 82mm) remained missing. In addition, the SMM also observed missing for the first time 36 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (BM-37, 82mm). The SMM noted that one of those sites continues to be abandoned and another site has been newly abandoned.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol); one light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun heading north near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) at an “LPR” checkpoint south-east of Shchastia across the contact line; one infantry fighting vehicle (BTR) heading north near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 33 armoured vehicles and 169 military-type trucks in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, in addition to aforementioned present in the same compound as the tanks (see above).

The SMM followed up on reports about cuts to water and power supply in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. In Avdiivka, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that at around 23:00 on 3 August, water and power supply to the town had been interrupted as shelling had caused damage to power transmission lines and to the Donetsk water filtration station located between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. At Yasynuvata railway station, an employee (a woman in her thirties), stated that at approximately 04:00 of the day the water supply had been interrupted affecting large parts of the town. She added that most residents currently used water from private wells and bottled water.

The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from government-controlled Lopaskyne to Lobacheve (24 and 17km north-west of Luhansk, respectively) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that the perpetrators had been identified. The SMM also requested the meeting with a senior “DPR” member to follow up on the incident of 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 30 July 2016). He subsequently  refused  the request.*

The SMM observed the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM for the first time saw a tailfin of a multiple-launch rocket system (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) stuck in soil 30m away from an inhabited house and some 50 rusty shells of 82mm mortars (without fuses) scattered in a nearby field.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning and widening of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant, repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), repair works to gas pipelines in areas between “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk and Pryshyb (28 and 34km north-west of Luhansk, respectively).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the morning, at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 132 cars waiting in a queue to cross into government-controlled areas and six cars in the opposite direction. A man in his forties told the SMM that he had been waiting for four hours since 06:00. A man in his early thirties with his wife and 8-year-old son stated that they were travelling to receive medical treatment for his son in government-controlled areas, expressing his concern as his son should not stay in the sun for a long time.  

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In government-controlled Hranitne (25km north of Mariupol), armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to enter a military compound. The JCCC was informed.
• Armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a military compound in government-controlled Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from their superior. The JCCC was informed. 
• A senior “DPR” member refused to meet with SMM, when it attempted to follow up on the incident 29 July near Lukove.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 1 August 2016

MOSCOW, 5 August 2016 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission (EOM) deployed by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 18 September State Duma elections in the Russian Federation, the mission will hold a press conference in Moscow on Monday, 8 August 2016.

Jan Petersen, the head of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the EOM and its upcoming activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 15:00, Monday, 8 August, at Interfax, 1-ya Tverskaya-Yamskaya ul., 2 Moscow, 127006.

For further information, please contact Inta Lase OSCE/ODIHR EOM Media Analyst, at +79166214710 (mobile) or Inta.Lase@odihr.ru

or

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

 

 

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257951 Communication and Media Relations Section

Representatives of relevant ministries and other state agencies of Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan responsible for implementing provisions of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction met at an OSCE-supported peer review meeting in Minsk from 2 and 5 August 2016, to discuss progress in their work.

Experts from the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee also attended the meeting, which was hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, and is the second event of its kind to be held in the OSCE region and in the world, and the first to be held in trilateral format.

Opening the event, Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus Valentin Rybakov said that the issues of non-proliferation are among his country’s priorities in the area of international security.

He noted that Belarus was the first state of the former Soviet Union to voluntarily refuse the opportunity to possess weapons of mass destruction, and that the withdrawal of such weapons from the country’s territory was completed in 1996. Rybakov added that his country also initiated the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution on prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Adriana Volenikova of the  OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre said regional co-operation on UNSCR 1540-related issues has become one of the most efficient means in bolstering national implementation and enhancing an open dialogue between countries that face similar challenges and benefit from close interaction in related areas.

The three States will work on a joint report on implementation and later submit it to the UNSC 1540 Committee and the UN Security Council.

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DUSHANBE, 5 August 2016 – Twenty officers  of the Tajik Border Troops, ranked between warrant officer and major, mainly coming from border detachments  on the Afghan and Tajik border, successfully completed a four-week course today on patrolling and leadership at the Gissar Training Centre in Dushanbe.

The course, organized by the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, focused on enhancing participants’ knowledge of conducting observation missions using topographical maps, satellite imagery and other tools. They also learned about reporting and analysis, repelling methods, communications and tactical movement.

Uniforms and common tactical equipment were given to each participant. Separate medical lessons were delivered by trainers from the United States Embassy in Tajikistan. The sessions on gender mainstreaming and demining awareness were delivered by experts of the OSCE Office. Two officers of the Tajik Border Troops, who previously passed the course, also supported the OSCE in delivering the lessons.

OSCE Office in Tajikistan Counter-terrorism and Police issues Adviser Wolfgang Nikolaus, congratulated the officers on completing the course and said: “The OSCE continues supporting efforts to enhance the capacity of Tajik Border Troops Staff by providing such high-quality training courses."

The course is the eighth to be held under the third phase of the Patrol Programming and Leadership Project. The Project aims to increase the capacities of Tajik border staff in detection and interdiction of illegal cross-border movements.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk region the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with many concentrated around government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska and Trokhizbenka. The SMM analysed craters in Stanytsia Luhanska, Pobeda and Hnutove. It observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. It monitored border areas not controlled by the Government and encountered one restriction. It faced another freedom-of-movement restriction, also in an area not controlled by the Government*.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.[1]

On the evening of 2 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west of its position.

Whilst in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard in the late evening of 2 August explosions assessed as 20 artillery impacts (122mm), eight mortar impacts (120mm) and  seven mortar impacts (82mm) 2km south- east its position; and 23 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (122mm) 3km south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as outgoing recoilless-gun fire (SPG-9, 73mm) 0.7-1.5km north of its position and ten explosions assessed as outgoing mortar fire (82mm), 1-10km north of its position.

On 3 August, positioned during the day in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 56 undetermined explosions 3-5km west, north-west and west-south-west of its position.

Positioned during the day in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 49 undetermined explosions 4-5km south-east, south-south-east and south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) throughout the day, the SMM heard five single undetermined explosions 6-12km ranging from north-north-west to south-west of its position.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) and government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk). While in Stanytsia Luhanska in the late evening of 2 August, the SMM heard during a two hour period 48 undetermined explosions 3-5km south and south-south-west of its position; 14 explosions assessed as outgoing 73mm recoilless-gun (SPG-9) fire and 14 impacts of 73mm SPG-9 rounds, 17 rounds of outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher fire (AGS-17) and 17 AGS-17 impacts, and intensive small-arms  and heavy machine gun-fire 3.5-4km south of its position.

On 3 August in the morning while positioned in Trokhizbenka, the SMM heard 81 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. In Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) throughout the day, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions within a  40 minute period in the morning, 5km south of its position.

The SMM conducted crater analysis and followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. At the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, approximately four metres south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces position closest to the bridge, the SMM observed a crater containing pieces of shrapnel which it assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from an undetermined direction. Near the same location the SMM observed three fresh craters assessed as caused by grenade launcher (AGS-17) rounds fired from an undetermined direction. The SMM observed 25m south of the “LPR” forward position at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge the SMM saw grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground approximately 15-20 metres north of the checkpoint. No craters were observed in either location.

The SMM observed four fresh craters at a farm in government-controlled Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk). Due to security concerns the SMM could not conduct crater analysis. The SMM saw from a distance that the craters were in soft ground and contained fragments of 125mm shells. The SMM saw that one shell had hit a concrete fence facing a southerly direction, while another shell had hit a pigsty. The director of the farm told the SMM that shelling had occurred on 2 August.

In government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed damage to a fence surrounding a house and damage to the roof of the house. The SMM saw shattered windows and shrapnel damage on the house’s wall facing a southerly direction. The SMM did not observe any crater.

In Stanytsia Luhanska medical personnel of the emergency department at the hospital confirmed to the SMM that two wounded Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers had been hospitalized on 2 August. Both soldiers had surgery at the hospital and one of them had been transferred on 3 August to a military hospital.  

At the hospital in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on the condition of the two civilians (a woman and a man) injured during the shelling in the night of 1-2 August (see SMM Daily Report, 3 August 2016). The medical personnel told the SMM that both patients were in critical condition. According to medical personnel, the female patient was still in the recovery unit, while the other had been transferred to Luhansk hospital for further treatment.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and one tank (T-72) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk), in violation of the respective withdrawal lines.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines, but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed: 15 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in government-controlled Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk); and ten stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 31 July of the 26 towed artillery pieces and 35 tanks together with other hardware including 96 armoured vehicles, 80 military-style trucks and 14 trailers near “LPR”-controlled Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a “DPR”-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 16 mortars (PM-38, 120mm), 15 towed howitzers (D30, 122mm), could not account for two towed howitzers (D30, 120mm) and noted five additional such heavy weapons .

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces site, the SMM noted that 40 tanks (T-64), seven anti-tank guns (five D-44, 85mm and two D-48, 85mm) and nine mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing  (first eight observed missing on 19 April, the last on 29 June 2016).

At a “DPR”-controlled site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs, BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers, one of which had six anti-tank missiles mounted on its roof near Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk); and at the northern outskirts of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2), travelling north and one IFV (BMP-2) travelling towards the bridge.

In addition, an SMM UAV spotted one IFV (BMP) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM followed up on the incident on 2 August when SMM monitors were stopped at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk (see SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that an investigation was currently on-going and that findings should be soon presented.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the H15 highway near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed in the morning about 500 pedestrians and 145 civilian vehicles waiting to exit government-controlled areas. The SMM observed that the queue moved approximately 30 meters every 10-20 minutes. The SMM saw that three drivers alighted from their cars and walked towards the checkpoint. At this stage there were about 10—15 vehicles in front of them. They returned after 15 minutes and then drove their cars directly to the checkpoint surpassing the cars in front of them. The SMM spoke separately to several passengers and bus drivers who said that they have heard about bribery taking place at the checkpoints, but could not give concrete examples. At the first Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed in the morning approximately 200 pedestrians (mostly elderly people) waiting to proceed towards areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM observed that the elderly people in the queue were suffering from the heat. In the afternoon within 40 minute period the SMM saw 104 pedestrians leaving government-controlled areas and 84 pedestrians entering government-controlled areas.

The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government and was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members in Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, 28km east of Luhansk).* At the Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 45 civilian cars (the majority with Ukrainian license plates and one with a “Novorossiya” sticker partially covering the plate) and two covered commercial trucks (also Ukrainian license plates) lined-up in a queue waiting to exit Ukraine.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

•  At the border crossing point near “LPR”-controlled Makariv Yar an armed “LPR” member told the SMM to leave the area and checked ID cards of the SMM monitors. The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors. 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations on the day before, with many concentrated around “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). A peaceful protest was held outside the SMM’s base in Kadiivka. Later, at the same location, the SMM heard bursts of small-arms fire in the vicinity of their base and saw an individual running from the area. An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position threatened the SMM at gunpoint in Lobacheve. The SMM analysed craters on both sides of the contact line. It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. “LPR” members prevented the SMM from monitoring in border areas.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before[1].

On the evening of 1 August, while in government-controlled Mariupol, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions at an unknown distance east and east-north-east of its position. On the same evening, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded fighting in the following sequence: five explosions (impacts) north-east, and fifty bursts of tracer fire from east in an unknown direction; four bursts of tracer fire from south-east to north-west; four undetermined explosions; 12 bursts of tracer fire from east to north and 34 air bursts from south-east to north-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre in the early morning hours of 2 August, the SMM heard 67 undetermined explosions 5-15km north and north-west of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 2-5km west and north-west of its position. Later, positioned at the Yasynuvata railway station the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 4-6km north-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard

16 undetermined explosions and two explosions of automatic grenade launcher fire 3-4km ranging from south-east to south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard 22 mortar impacts (120mm), 30 mortar impacts (82mm) and 50 automatic grenade launcher impacts 5km south-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) on the evening of 2 August, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions, 14 airbursts from an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and multiple bursts of small-arms and heavy machine gun-fire 1-2km north.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). While in Kadiivka in the early morning of 2 August, the SMM heard 91 explosions, some of them assessed as impacts and some as outgoing rounds, 32 of which were in areas 5-10km north-north-west and 59 in areas 5-10km west and south-west. For an hour during this period of shelling, the electricity supply to the city was cut.

At 20:34 on 2 August, the SMM, positioned in one forward patrol base in Kadiivka, heard three bursts of small-arms fire 50-100m north of its location. At 20:45, while positioned at another patrol base, the SMM heard 4-5 bursts from an automatic rifle fired in the air 10-15m away, just beyond the perimeter fence. In the darkness the SMM observed a person running from the area. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling the area.

In government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works, the SMM heard a mortar impact (possibly 82mm) and saw smoke rising approximately 1.5km east of its position. A short time later the SMM heard a further two mortar impacts approximately 1km east. Approximately an hour later the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-4km north and north-east of its position.

The SMM followed up on recorded ceasefire violations and conducted crater analysis. In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed craters at two locations. In Oleha Koshevoho  Street in a residential area in the south of the town the SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed that it was caused by artillery (calibre unknown) fired from a westerly direction. A woman told the SMM that children had taken remnants of a shell from the crater. The SMM observed damage to adjacent houses, including shattered windows and shrapnel-damaged walls. Two residents (a 60 year-old man and a 70 year-old woman) said that the shelling, which had begun at about 01:30, had critically wounded a 50 year-old man who was taken to hospital.

At a second impact area in a residential area in the north of Kadiivka the SMM observed shell damage and analysed craters. The SMM observed a crater in the yard of a house, which it assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a north-westerly direction. The SMM observed damage to the exterior walls of the house, broken windows and saw that the interior ceiling was damaged by shelling. A second crater was analysed in this area, and was assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a westerly direction. A tree had sustained a direct hit from a shell. According to Russian Federation officers at the JCCC who were present, armed men had visited these impact sites and removed pieces of shrapnel. Nevertheless, the SMM observed pieces of shrapnel at these sites that indicated the use of artillery or rockets. Residents told the SMM that two women (70 and 79 years-old) were injured in the shelling and that both were hospitalized in Kadiivka, with one of them subsequently moved to Luhansk for further treatment.

On 1 August, near the government-controlled Maiorsk checkpoint (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw damage to checkpoint barriers and nearby trees. The SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed it to have been caused by multiple-launch rocket systems (122mm, Grad) fired from a south-south-westerly direction. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the checkpoint nearby told the SMM that heavy shelling had taken place on the night of 31 July.

An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position stopped two SMM vehicles in government-controlled areas travelling east on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk). The armed man, wearing military-style clothing with no marking, threatened at gunpoint one of the SMM monitors and said in Russian, “Stop. You are not going anywhere”. Later, four armed men arrived, some in military-style clothing and appearing to be intoxicated, carrying assault rifles (AK-74).  After 15 minutes the SMM was allowed to leave the area and proceed to Lobacheve (See SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira 100mm) in “DPR”-controlled Zelene (28km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm). In another government-controlled area the SMM saw 17 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) but could not account for one. When the SMM asked a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier why one anti-tank gun had black soot on its muzzle break he said it was because it had recently been used in training exercises. One government-controlled area continued to be abandoned, as it has been since 19 December 2015, with all 12 mortars (2S12 Sani, 120mm) missing. The SMM observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it has been for since 12 July 2015, with all six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At one site in “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed that two tanks (T-64) were missing for the first time and other weapons had been added. Tank ammunition was seen stored next to tanks.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone: two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM) near government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed an armoured tracked vehicle (MT-LB) travelling west in the direction of the contact line in a convoy of 20 military-type vehicles, one of which the SMM observed to be carrying approximately 125 anti-tank mines.

The SMM observed new mine hazard signs. Between Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed two new mine hazard signs on the sides of the road in the area of the proposed disengagement area.

The SMM requested that “DPR” members and officers at the JCCC follow-up the incident on 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (See SMM Spot Report, 30 July). In Lukove, the SMM met with “DPR” members, including from the “ministry of defence”. A “DPR” member who had threatened the SMM, apologised. “DPR” members told the SMM that an investigation is planned. The SMM await the response of “DPR” members to the violation.

During the afternoon of 2 August a group approximately 30 protestors (mainly young people) gathered in front of the SMM base in Kadiivka, some carrying signs with slogans such as, “OSCE is blind”. Local “police” was present. The protestors dispersed peacefully after an hour. At the same time in another part of Kadiivka, a stone was thrown at an SMM vehicle, causing no damage.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote. Following explosions in the area of Zolote the SMM left the area due to security concerns.

The SMM attempted to monitor border areas not controlled by the Government but was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members who stopped the SMM near Diakove (70km south-west of Luhansk).*

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from travelling through a checkpoint towards the west of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The JCCC was informed.
• A Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC office in Yasynuvata denied the SMM access to the roof of the building to conduct ceasefire monitoring, citing security concerns. He refused to share his ceasefire violation log with the SMM.
• On 1 August, water company officials refused to meet the SMM in “LPR”-controlled Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, 43km south-east of Luhansk), claiming that the SMM needed permission from the “municipality” to hold such a meeting.
• On 1 August, in Sorokyne, the “director” of the cultural centre and the “deputy head” of the “culture department” in the town asked for the SMM’s patrol plan and to produce some sort of “registration” from “LPR” members in order to have a meeting. The SMM refused and left.
• Two armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM near Diakove and asked for a signed and stamped patrol plan in the Russian language. The SMM informed the JCCC. After 40 minutes of waiting the SMM left, and were unable to travel to their planned destination, “LPR”-controlled Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk). The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “DPR” members allowed the SMM to proceed through a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve after checking the trunk of SMM vehicles.
• An armed “LPR” member at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names of SMM monitors.

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 29 July 2016

Idén nyáron több német döntéshozó is Görögországba megy nyaralni. A politikusok az után döntöttek így, hogy megtudták, az országba 50 százalékkal kevesebb turista érkezik 2012-ben, mint az azt megelőző években – írja a Deutsche Welle.

A politikusok pusztán egyéni szolidaritásból utaznak a déli országba. A német döntéshozók a válság kirobbanása óta megszilárdult negatív előítéletek ellen is „fel szeretnék használni” nyaralásukat, szerintük a görögöknek látniuk kell azt, hogy a német politikusok a görög gazdaság fellendítése érdekében egyéni nyaralásaikkal is támogatni kívánják az országot, így sarkallva más német polgárokat is az utazásra.

Bár első pillantásra furcsának tűnhet a német politikusok kezdeményezése, mégis tény, hogy az idegenforgalom a harmadik legnagyobb társadalmi-gazdasági tevékenységi terület az EU-ban, becslések szerint ez a szektor az EU GDP-jének több mint 10%-át és az összes munkahely kb. 12%-át biztosítja, így a válságból való kilábalás egyik záloga lehet. A görög gazdaság talpra állításának is az egyik fontos eleme az odalátogató turisták számának növelése, azonban a görög politikai viharok, amelyek az utcákon is lecsapódtak, sok ezer turistát bizonytalanítottak el.

A német politikusok pont ez ellen kívánnak tenni, és szeretnének jó példát mutatni. Az egyik Görögországba készülő politikus azonban megjegyezte: „persze nem úgy fogok körbejárni a szigeteken, hogy azt hangoztatom, én egy német politikus vagyok”.

Négyévente az EU vezetői mindent elkövetnek annak érdekében, hogy uniós köntösbe bújtassák az olimpiai részvételt, és arra biztatnak, hogy az EU-tagállamok eredményeiket egységesen kezelve keljenek versenyre harmadik országokkal.

Az elmúlt olimpiák során is előszeretettel hangoztatták uniós vezetők a tagállamok által elért eredményeket. 2004-ben Romano Prodi a Bizottság akkori elnöke az EU- tagállamok által szerzett 82 aranyérmet közös uniós érdemnek nevezte. A 2008-as pekingi olimpia után Nicolas Sarkozy, az EU soros elnökségét betöltő Franciaország elnöke az ötkarikás játékok során megszerzett uniós előnyről beszélt.

Egy uniós brosúra a Europe: The Cradle of the Olympic Movement, a 2012-es Londoni Olimpiai Játékok előtt számba veszi az EU, vagy ha jobban tetszik az uniós tagállamok eddigi és várható eredményeit. Az összefoglaló megjegyzi, hogy Európa az olimpiák bölcsője és, hogy „az ötkarikás játék végre visszatér a hazájába”. Az eddig megrendezett 30 olimpia közül ez lesz a 24. amelyet az EU 27 tagállamának egyikében rendeznek meg.

Nile Gardiner, a The Telegraph publicistája a témában írt véleményrovatában kifejti: az uniós vezetők hajlamosak elfeledkezni arról, hogy a sportesemények inkább szólnak az egyéni és a nemzeti teljesítményekről, mint egy egységes „európai állam” eszményéről.

Európa és az unió számára rendkívül sok pozitív, főleg gazdasági hozadéka van egy, az öreg kontinensen megrendezett olimpiának, azonban az semmiképpen sem állítható, hogy ez lenne az az esemény, amely teret ad az uniós összetartozás érzésének. Az EU tájékoztató füzet szerint mindenesetre 108 érmet szerezne az a csapat, amely egységesen képviselné az Európai Uniót.

Egy friss Eurobarometer kutatásból kiderül, hogy az uniós polgárok féltik a személyes adataikat, és nem bíznak az online fizetési műveletekben. Ez a fajta bizonytalanság nem tesz jót az uniós gazdaságnak, ugyanis gátolja a nemzeti és határon átnyúló online vásárlások elterjedését.

Az online vásárlások a teljes uniós kiskereskedelmi forgalomnak mintegy 3%-át teszik ki, azonban a fogyasztói bizalmatlanság miatt csak nagyon lassan növekszik ez az ágazat. A Bizottság adatai szerint, ha például a fogyasztók bátrabban választanák a határon átnyúló internetes szolgáltatások adta lehetőségeket, akár 204 milliárd eurós összeget is megtakaríthatnának. Továbbá az internetes gazdaság minden megszüntetett nem internetes állás helyett 2,6 új online állást hoz létre.

Az Eurobarometer-felmérés szerint az internethasználók rendkívül aggályosnak ítélik a kiberbiztonság helyzetét: a válaszadók 89 százaléka tartózkodik a személyes adatok interneten történő közlésétől, 74%-uk véleménye szerint pedig az elmúlt évben megnőtt az esélye annak, hogy számítástechnikai bűnözés áldozatává váljanak. A netezők 29 százaléka nem mer az interneten online banki műveletet végezni vagy vásárolni. Persze az internetezők sem védik megfelelően adataikat, a felmérés arra is rámutat, hogy 53 százalékuk egyetlen online jelszavát sem változtatta meg az elmúlt évek során.

Magyarországon az uniós átlaghoz képest valamelyest rosszabb a helyzet, a magyarok csak 22 százaléka vásárol a neten – az uniós átlag 53 százalék – valamint csak 19 százalékuk fizet az internet segítségével, az uniós 48 százalékkal szemben.

A Bizottság a fogyasztói bizalom megteremtése érdekében már több kampányt is indított, azonban az EU továbbra is nagy lemaradásban van az IKT-szektorban, az uniós polgárok nem tudják kihasználni az internet adta lehetőségeiket. Az internethasználók tájékozatlansága pedig oda vezetett, hogy 12 százalékuk volt már online csalás szenvedő alanya, míg 8 százalékuk személyazonosság-lopás áldozatául esett.

A válság időszakában az EU nem engedheti, hogy ez a jövedelmező ágazat ilyen hátrányba kerüljön az unión belül, ezért a Bizottság 2015-ig megduplázná az internetes vásárlások számát.  Ezt azonban nehéz lesz megvalósítania a fogyasztói bizalom javítása nélkül, amelyben már a tagállamok felelőssége is igen nagy.

A gazdasági válság kirobbanása óta a hitelminősítők a nehéz helyzetben lévő országok mumusává váltak. Hétről hétre kerülnek országok bóvli kategóriába, miközben az unió minden erejével a gazdaság beindítására törekszik, azonban a rossz besorolások mellett egyre nehezebb talpon maradni.  A küzdelem bár heroikus, sziszifuszi is.

A nagy hitelminősítők, mint a Fitch Ratings, a Moody’s, vagy a Standard & Poor's az évek során egyre több támadást kaptak és kapnak azért, mert abban az esetben is leminősítenek egy-egy országot, amikor az éppen megszorításokat hajt végre.

A minősítők fent idézett nagy hármasát a válság óta érik kritikák, többek között azért, mert a krízis kirobbanása előtt még kiváló minősítést adtak az amerikai jelzálogpiaci válságot előidéző cégeknek, valamint azért is, mert az unió több válságban lévő országának „megnehezítik” azzal a helyzetét, hogy a stabilitására irányuló intézkedések ellenére is többször tovább rontják azok szuverén adós besorolását. A legnegatívabb nézetek szerint a nagy hitelminősítők irányítják a világ gazdaságát, hiszen döntéseikkel jelentősen meghatározzák egy-egy régió helyzetét.

Az EU intézményei évek óta próbálnak megoldást találni a problémára több-kevesebb sikerrel, mivel arra a Bizottság is igen korán ráeszmélt, hogy a hitelminősítők tevékenységükkel hozzájárultak a pénzügyi válság kialakulásához.

Korábban több „mentőötlet” is felmerült: egyes elképzelések szerint az európai hitelminősítők felügyeletét ellátó Európai Értékpapír-piaci Hatóság kezdeményezhette volna azon európai országok hitelminősítésének felfüggesztését, amelyek nemzetközi támogatásban részesülnek, illetve azokét, amelyek osztályozása növelné a piaci bizonytalanságot. Sokáig szerepelt a felvetések között egy uniós, konkurens hitelminősítő intézet létrehozása is, azonban ez az ötlet sem öltött hivatalos bizottsági javaslati formát. Az uniós jogalkotás eddig még falakba ütközött, ráadásul a legnagyobb hitelminősítők székhelyei nem az unió területén vannak: a gépezet így tehetetlen.

Az uniós intézmények azonban nem adják fel a küzdelmet. Az EP előtt heverő újabb jelentés szerint meg kellene határozni annak a menetrendjét is, hogy mikor hozzák nyilvánosságra az országok adósságbesorolását. A gazdasági szakbizottság olyan intézkedéseket sürget, amelyek csökkentenék a három nagy hitelminősítőtől való függést, és korlátoznák azt a hatást, amellyel a hitelminősítők egy-egy döntése befolyásolja a hitelhez jutás feltételeit.

Az unió lépéskényszerben van a hitelminősítőkkel szemben, mivel egyre több ország sodródik válságba, részben az egyre rosszabb minősítéseknek is köszönhetően.

Tanácsok kezdőknek és haladóknak útiokmányokról, biztonságról, alkoholról és cigarettáról, valamint hasznos telefonszámokról.

Június 8. és július 1. között szurkolók milliói érkeznek Lengyelországba és Ukrajnába, szurkolni, bulizni, vagyis jól érezni magukat.

Nem árt tudni, hogy ha magyar állampolgárként érkezünk ezekbe az országokba, milyen jogaink és kötelezettségeink vannak, valamint, hogy mire figyeljünk annak érdekében, hogy ne váljon rémálommá a 2012-es EB. Ne gondoljuk, hogy csak a vandál szurkolók kerülhetnek nehéz helyzetekbe.

Fontos tudnunk, hogy a magyar állampolgárok érvényes személyi igazolványukkal is beutazhatnak Lengyelországba (nem kell útlevél), azonban Ukrajnába útlevél szükséges. Ezt akkor se felejtsük el, ha például egyik helyszínről a másikra, Lengyelországból Ukrajnába utazunk. Indulás előtt tehát nézzük meg jól a lejárati dátumokat utazási okmányainkon, ugyanis könnyen kárba veszhet a megvásárolt jegyünk.

A másik „okmány”, amiről érdemes gondoskodnia a felkészült sportrajongónak, az Európai Egészségbiztosítási Kártya, amely Lengyelországban (sajnos Ukrajnában nem) feljogosítja használóját az orvosilag szükséges ellátások igénybevételére. A kártyát ingyenesen igényelheti az, aki biztosítással rendelkezik Magyarországon. Ha valakit baleset ér, a kártyával felvértezve biztos lehet abban, hogy ugyanabban az ellátásban részesülhet, mint a lengyel állampolgárok.

A lengyel és az ukrán nagykövetségek honlapjai is figyelmeztetnek arra, hogy az EB ideje alatt elszaporodhatnak a bűncselekmények az országokban, így a szurkolóknak fokozottan kell figyelniük okmányaikra, értékeikre. Javasolt, hogy a szurkolók ne is vigyék magukkal útlevelüket, személyijüket a meccsekre, csak annak fénymásolatát hordják maguknál a zsúfolt helyeken.

Az alkohol és dohánytermékek be- és kivitelével is vigyázni kell. Lengyelországgal kapcsolatban könnyebb a helyzet, mivel uniós országról van szó, így egységes szabályok vonatkoznak arra, hogy pontosan mennyi alkohol és dohányterméket vihetünk be – azaz milyen mennyiség nem minősül még kereskedelmi mennyiségnek. (800 db cigaretta, 110 liter sör, bor és pezsgő együttesen 90 litert, alkoholtermékből 10 liter stb.) Ukrajnába kisebb mennyiséget lehet csak bevinni (200 db cigaretta, 1 liter égetett szesz, 2 liter bor, 5 liter sör.) Azonban arra is figyeljünk, hogy Ukrajnából Magyarországra  autóval már csak személyenként 2 doboz cigaretta hozható be vámmentesen.

Az sem mindegy, hogy a bevitt alkoholtermékeket hol fogyasztja el az ember. Lengyelországban és Ukrajnákban is tilos az utcákon, parkokban és egyéb nyilvános helyeken alkohol tartalmú italokat fogyasztani, a szabályok megszegése súlyos büntetést vonhat maga után. (Figyelem, az utcai vizeléssel is ez a helyzet.) Ha valaki a stadionokba szeretné bevinni az alkoholt, kár megpakolni a bőröndjét, ugyanis egyik stadion lelátójára sem lehet bevinni italt, és az ittas személyek beléptetését is megtagadhatják a bejáratnál.

Ha mégis baj történne az Európai Unió segélyhívó számát, a 112-es telefonszámot, valamint az EB ideje alatt működő fogyasztói információs forródrót egyikét (800 007 707, +48 228 27 5474) lehet feltárcsázni. Továbbá a két országban működő magyar nagykövetségekhez is bátran fordulhatunk.

Túl sok életet követelnek a dohányzás okozta betegségek és szövődmények, így az unió „bekeményít”.

John Dalli uniós biztos februári EP-felszólalásában világított rá arra, hogy a cigaretták csomagolása jelenleg túlságosan színes és érdekes, túl figyelemfelkeltő. Véleménye szerint ezeknek a dobozoknak sokkal egyszerűbbnek kellene lenniük, azt kellene sugározniuk, hogy a termék, ami bennük van, súlyosan károsítja az egészséget. (A súlyos egészségkárosító hatások esetén pedig senkinek sem a szivárványszínek jutnak az eszébe.)

A Bizottság szeretné kötelezővé tenni nagy, figyelmeztető piktogramok feltüntetését a dobozokon. Mi több, a szabályozás a tervek szerint minden dohányterméknek egyszerű csomagolást írna elő, a dobozon pedig egységes betűtípussal kellene feltüntetni a cigaretta márkáját. A márka kis helyet kapna a dobozon, a felületet inkább a felhívó figyelmeztetések uralnák.

Az Európai Bizottság régóta fáradozik azon, hogy visszaszorítsa a dohánytermékek fogyasztását, ugyanis a dohányzás egészségügyi „ára” igen magas; évente az unióban 700 ezer idő előtti elhalálozáshoz vezet.

A Dohányzásmentes Világnap apropóján kiadott legfrissebb felmérések szerint az uniós polgárok nem is bánnák igazán ezeket a változtatásokat, mivel a polgárok átlagosan 60%-a támogatja azokat az intézkedéseket, amelyek célja, hogy a dohánytermékek kevésbé legyenek feltűnőek és vonzóak.

Azonban az éremnek két oldala van: míg a polgárok több mint fele kiáll bizonyos intézkedések mellett, a statisztikák azt mutatják, hogy a cselekvés, azaz a leszokás mellett már kevesebben döntenek. 2009-hez képes csak kis mértékben csökkent az unióban a dohányosok száma, és az elszívott cigaretták aránya is csak kissé mérséklődött. Így valószínű, hogy a kevésbé színes dobozokat is sokan a kezükbe fogják venni.

Mindenesetre nincs könnyű helyzetben a Bizottság, mivel rendkívül nehéz a leszokásra motiválni a dohányosokat úgy, hogy a nagy dohánygyárak is folyamatosan versenyben vannak a fogyasztókért.

A Dohánymentes Világnap alkalmából készített felmérés itt olvasható.

Egyre magasabbra ível az európai filmgyártás csillaga: az unió 2014–2020 között 900 millió eurót szán a filmgyártás támogatására.

Az idei Cannes-i filmfesztiválon az unió által támogatott filmek közül 18 is bekerült az Arany-Pálmáért folytatott versenybe. Az európai filmek az Oscar-gálán is nagy sikert arattak, a 17000 eurónyi támogatásban részesült „A némafilmes” öt, az 1,5 millió euróval támogatott „A Vaslady” két Oscar-díjat is bezsebelt. Az Európai Bizottság MEDIA programja keretében 1991 óta 1,6 milliárd eurót fordítottak a film, a forgalmazás, a képzés, valamint az innováció fejlesztésére.

Ne ijedjünk meg, nem indul be a sikerek hatására a brüsszeli filmgyártás, és az uniós vezetők sem fognak feltűnni a filmekben, de a Bizottság a következő 7 éves programozási időszakban továbbra is jelentős összegeket kíván az európai filmekbe fektetni, pontosan 900 millió eurót. Persze a költségvetési tárgyalások még folytamban vannak, így a bizottsági elképzelésekhez nyilván a tagállamoknak is lesz egy-két szava.

A filmgyártás ilyen nagyvonalú támogatása a válságban akár úri hóbortnak is tűnhet, de az Európai Bizottság szerint a kultúra lehet a válságból való kilábalás egyik húzóágazata, és az európai filmsikerek nagy szerepet kaphatnak a gazdaságélénkítésben.

A Cannes-i filmmustra május 27-ig tart, szorítsunk a „saját” filmjeinkért.
 

Május 15-én este a világsajtó visszafojtott lélegzettel várta, hogy Francois Hollande francia elnök puszit vált- e Angela Merkel német kancellárral. A puszi elmaradt.

Miután Francois Hollande elfoglalta elnöki hivatalát, első útja Németországba vezetett. Az út szimbolikus jelentőséggel bírt, mivel a francia választások után a közvélemény azt találgatta, hogy vajon hova vezet az elnök első útja, hiszen az erős francia-német tengely fenntartása fontos az Európai Unió jövője szempontjából.

A baloldali Francois Hollande győzelme után felvetődött, hogyan léphet majd elődje, Nicolas Sarkozy nyomdokaiba, aki híresen jó viszonyt ápolt Angela Merkel kancellárral. Hollande tehát mindent megtett a jó kapcsolat megőrzése érdekében. Az elnöki beiktatás napján azonnal a kancellárhoz utazott, mint ismert, még egy villámcsapás sem tarthatta vissza (aki hisz a vészjósló jelekben, akár ebbe is beleláthat valamit).

Azonban Angela Merkel nem várta ölelő karokkal politikustársát, míg korábban Sarkozy elnök mindig kapott a kancellári puszikból. Fel is szisszent a világsajtó: ez a viszony már kevésbé baráti.

Persze mi nem vonnánk le messzemenő következtetéseket ebből az egy mozzanatból. Először is, a két vezető most találkozott először, úgyhogy várjuk ki a végét...

Másodszor a felek sok kérdésben egyezségre jutottak. A találkozó után tartott sajtótájékoztatón hangsúlyozták, tudják, a két ország közötti kapcsolatnak különleges jelentősége van az európai egységfolyamat előrehaladásában, és ennek megfelelően végzik majd munkájukat. Kiemelték azt is, hogy nincsenek köztük olyan nagy nézetkülönbségek, mint ahogyan azt a sajtó tálalja.

Puszi ide vagy oda, mi bízunk abban, hogy Európa megnyugodhat, a német-francia tengely továbbra is erős marad

Ha valaki kíváncsi a puszik történetére, itt megnézheti.

Az uniós statisztika fekete hónapja volt 2010 januárja, amikor kiderült, hogy a csőd felé száguldó Görögország nem közölt pontos adatokat gazdaságának valós állapotáról, megvezetve ezzel egész Európát. Ma már az unió mindent megtesz, hogy ez még egyszer ne fordulhasson elő.

Az EUobserver hírportál emlékeztet arra, hogy a tagállamok korábban az Eurostat elől eltitkolhatták valós statisztikai adataikat. Sőt mi több, a korábbi lazább állapotokat jelzi, hogy a 90-es évek végén Németország nyomást gyakorolhatott az Eurostatra, adjon zöld utat az olasz deficit ellenére is az ország euróövezethez való csatlakozásához – derült ki a Der Spiegel hétfői összeállításából.

A válság előtt a gazdasági adatok összegyűjtésére, közlésére finoman szólva sem fektettek túl nagy hangsúlyt. Walter Radermacher az uniós statisztikai hivatal vezetőjének hétfői (május 7.) európai parlamenti beszédéből az is kiderült, hogy korábban minimális kapacitással dolgoztak a hivatalban. A fejlődést érzékeltetve elmondta: a 90-es években két-három ember foglalkozott a gazdasági adatokkal, ma már egy 900 fős részleg kezeli ezt. Rámutatott arra is, hogy korábban hiányzott a folyamatokból a kontroll. Azonban a hibákból tanulva, az Eurostat ma már ellenőrzi a tagállamok által közölt adatokat.

Az EU a válság kirobbanása után levonta a tanulságot: a statisztikák kezelése nem lehet pusztán nemzetállami hatáskör. Általánosan kialakult vélemény, hogy ha a görög kormány nem szépített volna gazdasági mutatóin, az unió gyorsabban be tudott volna avatkozni, nem lett volna szükség gyors tűzoltásra.

Az uniós szintű statisztika több kihívással is küzdött az elmúlt években. Az egyik problémát, az erőforrás hiányát már sikerült orvosolni, azonban az egyes országok eltérő statisztikai módszereit már nehezebb közelíteni egymáshoz.

Az Európai Bizottság a koherensebb és megbízhatóbb nemzeti adatok előállítása érdekében komoly statisztikai szigorításokat helyezett kilátásba, elszámoltathatóbb és átláthatóbb módszereket kíván kialakítani. A cél az, hogy ne fordulhassanak elő olyan „stiklik”, mint korábban, mivel a befektetői bizalmat is csak a megbízható adatok szolgáltatásával lehet visszanyerni.

Biztosítani szeretnénk, hogy soha többé ne fordulhasson elő, hogy a politika befolyásolja a statisztikát - nyilatkozta még áprilisban Algirdas Semeta uniós biztos a szigorúbb intézkedésekkel kapcsolatban.

Az elhúzódó válság következtében és a tagállami megszorítások láttán képmutató magatartásnak tűnne, ha az uniós bürokrácia nem törekedne saját kiadásainak csökkentésére. Az uniós vezetők ezt felismerve takarékoskodásba kezdtek, és igyekeznek minél nagyobbat húzni azon a bizonyos nadrágszíjon.

Az Európai Bizottság még január végén felszólította az Európai Unió központi intézményeit, hogy jövő évi költségvetésük tervezésekor tanúsítsanak maximális önmérsékletet. Itt kell megjegyezni, hogy az intézmények működési költsége 2010-ben a teljes EU-költségvetés kevesebb mint 6 százaléka volt, és ennek mindössze felét tették ki a bérek.

Az EP ennek megfelelően el is fogadott egy jelentést, amely kimondja, hogy jövőre reálértékben nem nőhet az EP intézményi költségvetése, és meg kell vizsgálni, milyen további takarékossági lehetőségek állnak rendelkezésre. Mi több, az EP jogi szakbizottsága előző héten fogadta el azt a javaslatot, amely előírná az eurokraták fizetésének csökkentését, a nyugdíjkorhatár emelését, valamint a fizetett utazások költségének mérséklését is.

A Bizottság, valamint az EP legfrissebb javaslatai kapcsán azonban felvetődött az a kérdés, hogy meddig lehet úgy csökkenteni a kiadásokat, hogy az még ne menjen a munka rovására, meddig nem érzi meg az uniós gépezet a forráselvonást. A Parlament fent említett szakbizottsága is felhívta arra a figyelmet, hogy nem hajthatnak végre felülről irányított leépítéseket, hiszen az károsan hatna az intézmények működésére. Ezért az, hogy az intézmények hol szorítanak jobban saját költségvetésükön, rájuk van bízva.

Szegény eurokratákra manapság amúgy is rájár a rúd, a European Voice csütörtöki számában számolt be arról, hogy az uniós bürokratákat Brüsszelben egyre több atrocitás éri a munkájuk miatt.