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Mi ketten egymást meg nem értjük,
Nagyon sajnálom, asszonyom,
De ha nem kellek szeretőnek
Egyébre nem vállalkozom.

Például arra, mit gyakorta
Szónoki hévvel mond kegyed,
Hogy meggyötört szegény szivének
Legjobb barátja én legyek.

Legjobb barát! szavamra mondom,
Megtisztelő egy hivatal,
De nem vagyok hozzá elég vén,
S ön aggasztóan fiatal.

Ön csupa élet, csupa illat,
Lángol vakít, hevít, ragyog,
Hát hogyne szomjaznám a csókját
Én, aki angyal nem vagyok?

Olyan kevés amit kivánok…
Ha osztozkodni restel is,
Legyen a tisztelt lelke másé
Nekem elég a teste is.

Legyen lelkének egy barátja,
Kivel csevegni élvezet,
De ez az őrült,
ez a mamlasz,
Ez a barát nem én leszek.

Legyen övé minden
poézis.
És az enyém: csak ami tény,
Ő oldja meg a problémákat,
A ruháját viszont csak én.

Hogy ez a hang szokatlan önnek,
Kétségbe, kérem, nem vonom,
De annak, hogy megértsük egymást
Csak egy a módja asszonyom:

Adjon az Úr, ki egy tenyérbül
Rosszat is, jót is osztogat,
Rosszabb erkölcsöket kegyednek,
Vagy nekem adjon jobbakat!

The post Heltai Jenő: Vallomás appeared first on Kárpátalja.ma.

Brazil is pursuing partners across the globe, turning pressure into opportunity. Could Europe play a pivotal role?. Credit: ChatGPT

By Monica Hirst
RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil, Sep 4 2025 (IPS)

Since January 2025, Donald Trump’s second presidency has been focused on securing the global supremacy of the United States. It justifies a package of international coercive and intimidatory measures, accompanied by an aggressive, arrogant rhetoric. Right at the outset, the new administration announced a veritable tsunami of tariffs and immediately implemented them as a sign of its new independence.

This demonstrated Washington’s willingness to turn access to the US market into a challenge fraught with uncertainty and protracted bilateral negotiations. This massive blow to the global trading system affects all of the United States’ economic relations – including those with Brazil.

In addition to a general 10 per cent increase in all tariffs on US imports, a differential treatment policy for countries and regions was introduced based on varying and sometimes opaque criteria. The US President interprets the need to combat the American trade deficit as a national emergency that justifies the imposition of counter-tariffs.

By August, 94 countries were already affected by this contentious policy. Some, including Vietnam, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the European Union, managed to reach tariff agreements, but only at the cost of various concessions and often significant losses.

An ideology-driven policy

In the first few months of Trump’s term in office, Brazil kept a safe distance from Washington’s coercive measures. The Lula government managed to continue its active and self-confident foreign policy.

Brasília’s claim to influence, whose voice is heard on issues of global governance, was bolstered by its role as host of high-level multilateral meetings held this year, including the G20 summit, the meeting of BRICS heads of state and government, and, before long, the COP30 world climate conference.

Relations with China, Brazil’s most important trading partner, accounting for 28 per cent of Brazilian foreign trade, also gained new significance; both sides signed 36 agreements on a wide range of economic, technological and cultural issues.

While the Lula administration sought dialogue with the White House to address the consequences and potential damage of the new US tariff policy – as Brazil’s second-largest trading partner, the United States accounts for 12 per cent of the country’s exports – it was only a matter of time before the US administration’s aggressive stance on trade and tariffs would have an impact on Brazil’s economy.

On 18 July, the American government informed President Lula da Silva in a letter that tariffs of 50 per cent would henceforth be levied on imports from Brazil, marking the start of a heated exchange with the Planalto, the seat of the president’s government.

By executive order, Trump imposed an additional 40 per cent tariff on Brazilian imports, supplemented by a list of 700 exceptions.

The justification for increasing tariffs to offset the bilateral trade deficit proved unfounded, as the trade balance has consistently shown a surplus in favour of the United States for more than 15 years.

Additionally, the American president’s letter went beyond trade policy arguments and addressed political issues related to the court proceedings against former President Bolsonaro and the rulings of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF), which affect the interests of US digital platform companies.

Lula’s government perceived the letter as ‘unacceptable blackmail,’ leading to growing tensions that were exacerbated by repeated public statements by the US president and his staff. Value judgements were made about Brazilian democracy and its institutions, and the priorities of Brazilian foreign policy were called into question, including the organisation of the BRICS, which Brazil currently chairs.

This was followed by an investigation by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) based on Section 301, which allows unilateral retaliatory measures to protect national interests. By executive order, Trump finally imposed an additional 40 per cent tariff on Brazilian imports, supplemented by a list of 700 exceptions.

The Trump administration also began to question the competitive conditions for North American companies in Brazil, attacking the PIX instant payment system and criticising environmental policy, anti-corruption policy, the handling of digital platforms and the effects of preferential trade agreements with third countries.

Right-wing circles seized the opportunity to blame Lula for the escalation with Washington.

A further boost to this ideologically motivated campaign came from the close ties between individual actors and political organisations on the American and Brazilian far right, particularly between Trumpism and Bolsonarism.

The influence of the United States in Latin America, especially in Brazil, is not a new phenomenon, but in this case it took on a new form: Digital media channels were mobilised in coordination with the ideological crusades of the local right against the institutions of the Brazilian republic — especially the judicial system.

Creating fault lines between Brazil’s political forces, exacerbated by the real economic costs that the tariff shock entailed for Brazilian industries. Right-wing circles seized the opportunity to blame Lula for the escalation with Washington.

The timing of Trump’s tariff shock, coinciding with the court ruling against former President Jair Bolsonaro – for his responsibility in the attempted coup in 2023 – further fuelled the fire. The Magnitsky Act was instrumentalised to sanction STF judges and stylise Bolsonaro as a victim of human rights violations in the eyes of Trumpists.

At the same time, Washington rejected the dispute settlement mechanisms of the World Trade Organisation, justifying this with security policy arguments that increasingly dominate Trump’s narrative.

Trump’s criticism of Brazil’s international policy is also becoming increasingly vocal in this context. The political steadfastness and keen sense of economic opportunity that have characterised Lula’s foreign policy to date will be powerless against the thorny and delicate prospects in the short to medium term.

The country’s right to determine its position in the world autonomously is being called into question. The Planalto’s response to the repeated political coercion of Trump’s tariffs is based on the inseparability of sovereignty, autonomy and the defence of democracy.

Alternative partnerships

The Brazilian government does not see this as a lonely crusade, but is increasingly seeking partners and allies in all directions. Opening the doors to Japan, Indonesia and Vietnam is intended to add further counterweights to the connection with China and better link the Brazilian economy with the dynamic Asian value chains.

At the same time, Brasília is focusing on dialogue with India – a key partner in the BRICS – on issues of global governance, investment, agribusiness and digital technologies. Within the region itself, the aim is to overcome the inertia that has long prevented greater progress in relations between Brazil and Mexico.

The Trump nightmare is a strong incentive to overcome the mutual indifference that has stood in the way of sustainable cooperation between Latin America’s two largest economies. As far as European countries are concerned, Brazil is keen to expand the agenda of common interests at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

The European Union is currently one of Brazil’s most important trading partners, with a trade volume of over nine billion dollars. Of particular note is the Brazilian government’s commitment to concluding the long-delayed EU-Mercosur agreement, driven by the need to expand common interests and opportunities in areas such as energy transition, technology and strengthening multilateralism.

Closer cooperation with the world’s democracies is taking on new significance – as a safeguard for the rule of law in Brazil itself.

So far, the European Union has treated the BRICS and the Global South with palpable scepticism and has avoided acknowledging their contributions to negotiations on international policy issues. Instead of taking note of the neutral and pragmatic positions and initiatives of many states, the EU is dominated by the interpretation – shared by Trump – that these are anti-Western groups.

It would be a mistake not to develop a dialogue with the emerging powers of the South to address issues such as the genocide in Gaza, an understanding with Iran or a just peace between Russia and Ukraine.

Even if this does not reduce the costly strategic dependence on the US in the short term, these steps would enable European governments to engage in inclusive and constructive projects on the changing world stage.

Undoubtedly, the Lula government would be the first to support moving the political game in this direction. Closer cooperation with the world’s democracies thus takes on new significance – as a safeguard for the rule of law in Brazil itself.

Monica Hirst is a research fellow at the National Institute for Science and Technology Studies in Brazil.

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS), Brussels

IPS UN Bureau

 

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In today’s edition: the Coalition of the Willing meets in Paris to discuss security guarantees, French regulators fine Google and Shein record sums over cookie breaches, and experts warn US isolationism is draining Europe of expertise and funding

The sinking of a small boat the U.S. president said was carrying drugs violated traditional procedures.

CONTRE-POINT - Le chef de l’État ne peut se permettre de subir la chute de tous les premiers ministres qu’il nomme. S’il s’en remet à la responsabilité, c’est bien sa propre crédibilité institutionnelle qu’il joue à partir de lundi prochain.

Le Pen's new message: dissolution or chaos

Europe is congratulating itself on avoiding a new tariff war. But avoiding conflict is not a strategy

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REPORTAGE - Le ministre des Armées, dont le nom est cité pour Matignon, s’est lancé dans une tournée éclair pour défendre la hausse du budget militaire. Après la chute quasi assurée du gouvernement Bayrou, le 8 septembre, « je ne veux pas qu’on perde le fil de l’effort pour nos armées », insiste-t-il.

La campagne électorale pour le référendum constitutionnel s’est ouverte en Guinée dans un contexte tendu. Trois principaux partis politiques opposés à la gestion de la transition ont été suspendus par les autorités. La Haute autorité de la communication interdit aux journalistes de leur donner la parole, une décision que dénonce le syndicat de la presse. Les explications de Malick Diakité notre correspondant à Conakry.

President Xi Jinping is flaunting Beijing’s weapons development and close ties with other autocratic leaders.

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L’équipe nationale algérienne de football, les Verts, affrontera le Botswana ce jeudi au stade « Hocine Aït Ahmed » de Tizi Ouzou, dans le cadre de la […]

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Lengyelországban maradnak az odavezényelt amerikai katonák, és ha a lengyelek úgy kívánják, Washington akár növelheti is a kontingens létszámát – jelentette ki Donald Trump amerikai elnök szerdán Washingtonban, a Karol Nawrocki lengyel elnökkel tartott találkozójának kezdetén.

A TV Republika lengyel konzervatív hírtelevízió élő közvetítésében Trump a sajtó képviselőinek arra a kérdésére válaszolt, hogy Lengyelországban maradnak-e az amerikai katonák. „Azt hiszem, hogy maradnak. (…) Esetleg több katonát is telepíthetünk oda, ha azt kívánják” – reagált Trump. Hozzátette: Varsó „már régóta akarta a katonai jelenlét növelését”.

Egy további kérdésre válaszolva Trump kifejtette: az amerikai kormányzat „soha nem gondolt arra”, hogy Lengyelországból visszavonná fegyveres erőit. „Más országokra vonatkozóan ezt fontolóra vesszük, de Lengyelországgal folyamatosan vállvetve járunk” – fogalmazott Trump, utalva a lengyel-amerikai kapcsolatok „rendkívüli jellegére”.

„Lengyelországban örökké ott maradunk, és segítünk neki a védekezésben”

– tette hozzá az amerikai elnök.

Lengyelországban jelenleg mintegy 10 ezer amerikai katona állomásozik, többségük úgynevezett állandó rotációs jelleggel.

Karol Nawrocki ezzel összefüggésben elmondta: a 20. és a 21. századi lengyel történelemben „először fordul elő, hogy a lengyelek örülnek külföldi katonák jelenlétének”, amelynek köszönhetően „biztonság honol lengyel földön”.

Ez a jelenlét „jelzést jelent Oroszország felé is, hogy összetartunk, hogy nem ingyen akarunk NATO-tagok lenni” – érvelt Nawrocki. Rámutatott: Lengyelország a GDP-jének 4,7 százalékát költi védelemre, és azt ígérte, hogy ezeket a kiadásokat 5 százalékra emelik.

Donald Trump nyilatkozatát az amerikai katonai jelenlét fenntartásáról Donald Tusk lengyel kormányfő és Radoslaw Sikorski lengyel külügyminiszter is üdvözölte az X-en. „Ezek fontos szavak, megerősítik szövetségünk időtlen jellegét” – fogalmazott Tusk.

Andrzej Duda előző lengyel elnök az X-en úgy kommentálta Trump szavait: „A NATO keleti szárnya továbbra is biztonságos marad a szövetségesek együttműködésének és az amerikai csapatok lengyelországi jelenlétének köszönhetően”.

Karol Nawrockit augusztus elején iktatták be az elnöki tisztségre, és Washingtonba vezetett első hivatalos külföldi útja.

Forrás: MTI

The post Trump: az amerikai katonák Lengyelországban maradnak appeared first on Kárpátalja.ma.

RÉCIT - Le chef de l’État cherche à amadouer les socialistes, alors que les appels à la dissolution ou à la démission se multiplient.

A természetvédelem nem mindig látványos faültetésekből vagy nagyszabású akciókból áll. Gyakran csendes, következetes munka rejlik mögötte: adatgyűjtés, felmérés, figyelem, amely hosszú távon alapja lehet valódi változásoknak. A PAPILIO – Természet- és Környezetvédelmi Egyesület a magyarországi PET Kupa együttműködésével, a Diageo CallAction 3 projekt támogatásával 2025-ben is folytatta a monitoring programját, amelynek célja feltérképezni és nyomon követni a hulladékszigetek kialakulását a Latorca folyó Nagydobronyi Vadvédelmi Rezervátumot kettészelő szakaszán.

A Latorca a maga kanyargó útján egyszerre jelent életet és kockázatot a természet számára. A folyóvíz mozgása révén sokféle élőlényt táplál és életteret biztosít, ugyanakkor sajnos a hulladék is könnyedén sodródik benne. A tavaszi árhullámokkal érkező műanyagpalackok, zacskók és más szennyeződések a víz sodrásában megtorpanva, a part menti ágakba, uszadékfák közé akadva hulladékszigeteket hoznak létre. Ezek a szigetek nem csupán esztétikai problémát jelentenek: a helyi ökoszisztéma egészsége forog kockán.

A monitoringprogram keretében az egyesület önkéntesei és szakemberei rendszeres terepbejárásokat tartanak. GPS-koordináták rögzítésével, fotódokumentációval és mennyiségi becslésekkel követik nyomon a hulladéklerakódások alakulását. A cél egy olyan adatbázis kialakítása, amelyből egyértelműen láthatóvá válik, mikor és hol keletkeznek a legnagyobb szennyezett gócpontok, és hogyan változik a helyzet évszakról évszakra.

A projekt célja, hogy az összegyűjtött adatokkal hosszú távon is segítse a hatóságok, helyi önkormányzatok és más civil szervezetek munkáját. A pontos információk birtokában ugyanis célzottabb tisztítási akciók indíthatók, és megelőző intézkedések is tervezhetők – például a hulladék utánpótlásának csökkentésére.

Az első hónapok tapasztalatai rámutattak: a Latorca mentén a hulladék mennyisége közvetlen összefüggésben áll a folyó menti települések hulladékgazdálkodásának hiányosságaival. A folyó sajnos nem ismer határokat: amit egy település partján eldobnak, azt a víz könnyedén elsodorja, és néhány kilométerrel lejjebb már mások problémájává válik. Éppen ezért a hulladékmonitoring üzenete messze túlmutat a rezervátum határain: a folyó menti közösségek összefogása nélkül nincs tartós megoldás.

A PAPILIO Egyesület munkatársai bíznak abban, hogy a program hosszú távon hozzájárulhat a Latorca tisztaságának megőrzéséhez. Az adatgyűjtésből idővel térképek, grafikonok, sőt tanulmányok is készülnek, amelyek alapot adhatnak további természetvédelmi kezdeményezésekhez.

A Nagydobronyi Vadvédelmi Rezervátum számára ez a munka különösen fontos. A védett terület célja ugyanis nem csupán az élővilág védelme, hanem annak bemutatása is, hogy az ember és természet békés együttélése lehetséges. A hulladékszigetek elleni küzdelem pedig ennek a küldetésnek szerves része.

PAPILIO – Természet- és Környezetvédelmi Egyesület

The post Hulladékszigetek nyomában – monitoringprogram a Latorca partján appeared first on Kárpátalja.ma.

Topic: Air Warfare Blog Brand: The Buzz Region: Americas Tags: Canada, NGAD, NORAD, North America, and Sixth-Generation Aircraft Canada’s Sixth-Gen Fighter Snub Is Straining Its Alliance with the United States September 3, 2025 By: Andrew Latham Share

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Ottawa’s inaction on the NGAD program is not merely embarrassing. It is dangerous—putting the foundations of Canada’s most important security partnerships at risk.

On one side of the US-Canada border, the United States is racing ahead with the F-47 and the broader sixth-generation NGAD program—constructing the aircraft and networks that will form the core of its future way of war. On the other, Canada has effectively chosen to remain parked at the fifth generation with the F-35. This would be concerning enough if the stakes were limited to lost procurement opportunities or missed industrial contracts. But they are not. By standing on the sidelines of the Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, Canada is threatening the very foundations of its defense partnership with the United States, starting with NORAD and rippling outward across the North American security relationship writ large. None of this is in Canada’s national interest.

How Sixth-Generation Fighter Jets Will Work

Sixth-generation airpower is not about another incremental step in fighter capability. It is about building an integrated network of command, control, sensor fusion, and AI-enabled kill chains that will determine how warfare is waged in the 21st century. The platforms at the heart of these programs are not so much new fighters as airborne command nodes, which will need to operate at machine speed in a battlespace where the distinctions between air, space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum are intentionally and increasingly blurred. This is the guiding logic behind sixth-generation fighter development all over the world—America’s NGAD program, Europe’s Future Combat Air System (FCAS), and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) now linking Britain, Japan, and Italy. Each program is less about the specific capabilities of the machines involved than it is about seizing control over the architecture of coalition warfare for decades to come. States that fail to stake out an early place in these ecosystems will not just be behind the curve. They will be locked out.

Canada is on the outside of the NGAD ecosystem looking in. Ottawa has no role in shaping the doctrine or military-technical requirements of NGAD. Canada’s firms have no share in the industrial benefits, and the country’s military leaders have no voice in how the architecture of sixth-generation airpower is being built. The costs of that absence will be heavy. In the NGAD era, “interoperability” will not mean flying compatible aircraft or radios that can talk to one another, but rather sharing integrated cloud-based systems, feeding sensor data into real-time AI engines, and trusting allies with mission-critical code.

Trust in each other’s software—and therefore in each other’s ability to make reliable use of that code on the battlefield—will have to be earned over time through co-development and co-production, not by buying a few dozen platforms off the shelf once the code is already written and frozen. Nor will the US combat cloud stretching from sea to space, from low Earth orbit to the hypersonic layer, slow down to accommodate Canadian platforms left out of code-level integration and unable to feed sensor data back into the wider network. Shared situational awareness will become a veneer. And once trust in that shared situational awareness starts to decay, the partnership itself begins to crumble as well.

Canada Was an Active Partner in America’s Defense. What Changed?

This is not remotely comparable to how Canada partnered with the United States on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. As a founding partner in that fifth-generation program, Canadian firms won billions of dollars in defense contracts, Canadian pilots gained access to emerging doctrine, and Ottawa received a seat at the design table. With NGAD, the situation is very different. Ottawa has passed on those options, and is choosing instead to play the role of a late-arriving customer—if even that. The contrast is obvious to Washington and other allies and partners: whereas Canada was a full participant in shaping the future of airpower in the past, it is a bystander today.

The implications for NORAD, the cornerstone of continental defence for over six decades, are especially stark. When NORAD was created in 1957, Canada was not merely along for the ride: it was at the center of the vision, which understood North America as a unified and indivisible whole. When the North Warning System was built in the 1980s, radar lines crossed the continent in arcs that bisected Canadian territory. Canadian and American officers worked side-by-side in a genuinely integrated command. And throughout the Cold War, Canadian fighters sat alongside American ones on alert as equal partners, defending North American airspace.

That model of binational cooperation became a global symbol of allied trust and confidence. But when NORAD’s architecture is being remade to address the threats of the 21st century—including hypersonic missiles, stealthy cruise systems, and cross-domain synchronization—Canada is not modernizing to the same standards as the United States. Washington is moving ahead with NGAD integration, and Canada is not.

Ottawa’s neglect is especially glaring when it comes to the Arctic. The northern approaches to North America are once again a zone of great-power competition. Russia continues to operate long-range bombers from Arctic bases, and new hypersonic glide vehicles that are capable of attacking North America over the pole are already entering service. China has announced itself a “near-Arctic power” and is making inroads with both influence operations and mapping of polar routes for commerce and military access. Geography makes Canada an indispensable part of continental defense, but without NGAD-level integration, that advantage risks becoming irrelevant. An air force unable to plug into next-generation command networks will not be able to defend the Arctic effectively, nor reassure Washington that Canada is serious about its own northern responsibilities.

This is not merely a technical problem, but also a strategic one. The United States does not run its alliances based on sentiment, nostalgia, or past contributions—particularly in the era of President Donald Trump, who has made no secret of his transactional worldview. Today, Washington measures and rewards contributions made today, and expects its partners to do the same. States that step up, take hard decisions, and invest in the capabilities of the future are given influence in return. Those that do not are marginalized and quietly pushed to the side.

Ottawa’s current position all but guarantees that Washington will see Canada in the latter camp. The long-term result could be the hollowing out of NORAD as a genuinely binational command. Ottawa would still be briefed, but only after the fact and with no say in decisions that really matter. At that point, the “joint” nature of North American defence will be more fiction than fact.

Canada Cannot Free-Ride Off of America Any Longer

This is where the true failure of Canada’s current path becomes clear. Canada’s political class has spent decades convincing itself that the United States will always foot the bill for continental defence. Governments on both sides have treated defense procurement as optional spending, and strategy as something to defer to its partners on. These governments seem to have fallen under the illusion that Canada could hedge its way through great-power competition—perhaps even relying on Russia and China to balance against each other, all while somehow magically sustaining its sovereignty without needing to pay for it.

That illusion is unraveling further each day. Washington has made clear that it is no longer willing to subsidize allied indifference or complacency. In an era of great-power competition, relevance must be earned. Other allies have heard this message loud and clear; Australia, Japan, South Korea, and even Finland are busy embedding themselves in sixth-generation ecosystems, whether through NGAD partnerings, European FCAS programs, or the Anglo-Japanese-Italian GCAP. They are buying access, building capability, and harmonizing doctrine. They are making sacrifices in order to ensure that they are not just consumers of American security but contributors to it. Canada is doing none of this.

The costs are not just strategic, they are industrial. NGAD, FCAS, and GCAP will dominate the defence marketplace for decades. The intellectual property associated with these programs will be tightly controlled, and access to contracts tightly rationed to those on the inside from the start. Canadian firms will not see another F-35-style bonanza. They will instead be reduced to the role of subcontractors, dependent on the goodwill of others. That might be tolerable in peacetime, but it would be catastrophic in wartime—when Canada would find itself with little leverage, few options to surge production of critical components, and mired in deep dependence on third parties.

The economic effects in this scenario will also have political effects. If Canadian industry is systematically locked out of the cutting edge, Ottawa will lose one of the few tools it has to justify large defense expenditures to the Canadian public—namely the benefits of such expenditures to the Canadian economy. Without contracts going to Canadian companies, creating Canadian jobs, domestic support for higher spending will decline even further. Canada’s political class, already allergic to defence investment, will find new excuses to defer and delay, kicking off a vicious cycle of weakness and strategic irrelevance.

Canada Cannot Put Off Defense Spending Any Longer

Policymakers in Ottawa might attempt to persuade themselves that the NGAD program and its European competitors are still years away from completion. This is no longer the case. NGAD prototypes are already in the air, engines are being tested, and early platforms are scheduled to enter service in the 2030s. FCAS demonstrators are in development, and GCAP partners are building toward their first test flights in the early 2030s. The architecture for sixth-generation airpower and the battle networks it will enable will be locked in long before that. By the end of this decade, those on the inside of the ecosystem will be in. Those on the outside will be out. Today, Canada still has options to reverse its irrelevance—but time is running short.

Those options require a change of mindset. Ottawa could lobby for observer status on NGAD. It could begin making investments in plug-in technologies—AI, advanced sensors, drone teaming, and so on—that would at least give Canada a semi-integrated role in the wider network. It could use NORAD modernization as a bargaining chip to secure meaningful participation. But none of this is possible if Canadian leaders continue to defer hard decisions, then depend on the United States to cover for them.

Ottawa’s inaction up to now is not merely embarrassing. It is dangerous—putting the foundations of Canada’s most important security partnerships at risk. If Canadian leaders do not reverse course and find a place for Canada inside the sixth-generation ecosystem, the country will come to be regarded as a free rider, a bystander, and ultimately a liability for North America’s defense. The blame for that state of affairs will rest squarely on the shoulders of the existing political class—so addicted to deferral, and so blinded by short-term calculation, that it has chosen to gamble away Canada’s security and broader national interest at the very moment when both are more vital than ever.

About the Author: Andrew Latham

Andrew Latham is a senior Washington fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, where he focuses on military strategy, great power politics, and the future of warfare. His work has appeared in The National Interest, RealClear Defense, 19FortyFive, The Hill, and The Diplomat. He is also a tenured professor of International Relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

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