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L'annonce d'un accord avec l'Iran a été un cadeau d'anniversaire bienvenu pour le président, mais son succès ou son échec pourrait bien dépendre des détails.

Quelle autonomie pour la Corse ? Un délicat débat constitutionnel s'ouvre ce mardi 16 juin à l'Assemblée nationale, entre partisans de pouvoirs de dérogation accrus pour répondre aux défis de l'île, et ceux qui y voient une faille dans la cohésion de la République.

Le sénateur de l’opposition Salomon Idi Kalonda appelle le président de la République, Félix Tshisekedi, à retirer la proposition de loi sur l’organisation du référendum en République démocratique du Congo, adoptée lundi 15 juin au Sénat. Dans une lettre ouverte adressée au chef de l’État le même jour, l’élu dénonce une initiative qu’il juge à la fois inopportune et porteuse de graves risques politiques.

Survivors are bringing hope to health workers struggling to control the outbreak.

Survivors are bringing hope to health workers struggling to control the outbreak.

Tisztújító kongresszusán a FIDESZ 8 szavazat híján további bizalmat szavazott Orbán Viktornak, aki egy évre vállalja a párt vezetését. A választási kudarcot követő két hónap kevés volt a fiaskó feldolgozására, és arra, hogy érdemi választ adjon a formáció a bukásra, illetve a megújulásra. Horn Gábor nem köntörfalaz: szerinte csakis a személyi konzekvekciákat levonó pártnak van […]

Articolul A 32-es csapdája, avagy mekkora lehet egy félfordulat? apare prima dată în Kolozsvári Rádió Románia.

L’Égypte a livré une prestation convaincante lundi soir 15 juin face à la Belgique (1-1) pour son premier match de la Coupe du monde 2026. Opposés à une équipe belge expérimentée, les Pharaons ont ouvert le score en première mi-temps avant l’égalisation des Diables rouges en seconde période.

Written by Anja Radjenovic.

CONTEXT

According to Directive 2008/115/EC, third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a European Union (EU) Member State should, as a general rule, be issued a return decision obliging them to leave the EU. However, available data suggest that, among those who receive such a decision, only about a quarter actually leave the EU. The limited effectiveness of the return policy is due to several challenges that the EU and Member States face when carrying out return procedures, including difficulties related to implementation at national level. To increase the effectiveness of the EU return policy, the European Commission announced in its 2025 work programme that it would develop a new common approach to returns, including a new legislative proposal on the subject.

Legislative proposal

2025/0059(COD) – Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC – COM(2025) 101, 11.3.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0059(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘A common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

In today's edition: electricity grid, nuclear funding, emissions permits, greenwashing

In today's edition: SAFE, Aspides, Lockheed Martina artillery, EDIP

 

Introduction: Warfare, Complexity, and the Expanding Environmental Dimension

Over the past four decades, security policy has undergone a profound transformation. What once centered primarily on kinetic military capabilities and traditional geopolitical rivalries has evolved into a multidimensional field shaped by technological innovation, global interdependence, and increasingly complex threat environments. Modern conflicts no longer unfold solely on conventional battlefields; they extend into cyberspace, critical infrastructure, supply chains, and the natural environment itself. As security challenges have diversified, so too has the need to understand the broader systemic consequences of military activity.
Within this expanding landscape, the environmental dimension of warfare has emerged as one of the most overlooked yet consequential aspects of contemporary security. While the immediate destruction caused by kinetic operations remains visible and devastating, the ecological footprint of modern warfare now extends far beyond explosions, troop movements, and territorial occupation. Advanced weapons systems rely on resource-intensive production processes, cyber operations can trigger cascading environmental failures, and post-conflict regions often face long-term ecological instability that undermines recovery and resilience.
Recognizing these dynamics is essential for any comprehensive analysis of modern security. Environmental degradation is not merely a byproduct of war; it is a strategic factor that shapes human security, economic stability, and geopolitical outcomes. As conflicts become more technologically sophisticated and globally interconnected, their environmental consequences grow more complex, more persistent, and more deeply embedded in the fabric of affected societies.
This publication examines the full spectrum of warfare’s environmental impacts—from immediate kinetic destruction to the hidden ecological costs of technological warfare and the long-term instability that follows in the wake of conflict. By integrating these dimensions, it seeks to highlight why environmental resilience must become a central pillar of contemporary security policy and military planning.

Transition to the Main Analysis

As the scope of security policy continues to expand, understanding the environmental implications of modern warfare becomes not only relevant but indispensable. The intersection between military activity and ecological stability is no longer a peripheral concern—it is a central component of contemporary security dynamics. The environmental footprint of conflict influences human health, economic recovery, resource availability, and long-term regional resilience. Yet despite its strategic significance, this dimension often remains underexamined in both academic discourse and policy planning.
To address this gap, the following analysis explores the environmental consequences of warfare across three interconnected layers. First, it examines the direct and immediate impacts of kinetic operations, where physical destruction and contamination shape the ecological landscape of conflict zones. Second, it investigates the hidden environmental costs embedded in technologically advanced forms of warfare, from resource-intensive production processes to the cascading ecological effects of cyber and electromagnetic operations. Finally, it considers the long-term instability that persists after hostilities end, revealing how environmental degradation can hinder reconstruction, exacerbate human insecurity, and perpetuate regional fragility.
By integrating these perspectives, the analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of how modern warfare reshapes the environment—and why environmental resilience must become a core element of future security strategies. What follows is an in depth exploration of these dynamics, tracing the full spectrum of ecological pressures generated by contemporary conflict.

Main Analysis: The Environmental Footprint of Modern Warfare

1. Direct Environmental Impacts of Kinetic Warfare

Conventional military operations remain a major source of acute environmental degradation. Explosive munitions contaminate soil with heavy metals and chemical residues, while the destruction of industrial facilities, fuel depots, and critical infrastructure releases hazardous substances into air and water systems. Forests and agricultural lands are often devastated, leading to habitat loss, reduced biodiversity, and long-term soil erosion. These effects are not confined to the duration of hostilities; unexploded ordnance and landmines can render large areas unusable for decades, preventing ecological recovery and safe human resettlement.

2. Hidden Ecological Costs of Technological Warfare

The shift toward high-tech military capabilities introduces new, often overlooked environmental pressures. The production of drones, precision-guided munitions, and advanced sensors depends heavily on rare earth elements, whose extraction is associated with severe ecological damage, including toxic waste and water contamination. Cyber operations, though seemingly intangible, can trigger physical consequences: attacks on power grids, water treatment facilities, or industrial control systems may lead to uncontrolled pollution events or prolonged service disruptions. Electromagnetic warfare can interfere with communication networks and energy systems, indirectly affecting environmental monitoring and emergency response mechanisms.

3. Long-Term Ecological Instability in Post-Conflict Regions

Beyond the immediate and technological impacts, modern warfare generates structural environmental instability that persists long after ceasefires. Displacement of populations places immense pressure on urban ecosystems, often overwhelming waste management, water supply, and energy systems. In conflict zones, environmental governance collapses, allowing illegal logging, unregulated mining, and uncontrolled waste dumping to flourish. Military bases and supply chains leave behind significant ecological footprints, including soil contamination, disrupted water flows, and long-term land degradation. These cumulative effects hinder sustainable reconstruction and increase vulnerability to future environmental crises.

Case Studies: Environmental Impacts Across Contemporary Conflict Zones

Case Study 1: The Russo‑Ukrainian War (2014–2024)

The conflict in Ukraine illustrates how modern warfare generates both immediate and systemic environmental damage. Kinetic strikes on industrial facilities, fuel depots, and chemical plants have released hazardous substances into soil and waterways. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in 2023 triggered widespread flooding, soil erosion, and long-term ecological disruption across the Dnipro basin. Drone warfare and electronic attacks have increased demand for rare earth elements, intensifying global extraction pressures far beyond the battlefield.

One of the most alarming ecological consequences has been the mass mortality of Black Sea dolphins. Marine biologists documented thousands of dead dolphins washing ashore in Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The primary causes include acoustic trauma from naval sonar systems, underwater explosions, and the disruption of migratory and feeding patterns due to intensified military activity. The collapse of fish stocks in the northern Black Sea—driven by pollution, noise, and naval operations—further contributed to starvation and ecological stress. This phenomenon highlights how modern warfare affects not only terrestrial ecosystems but also marine biodiversity, with cascading consequences for regional ecological stability.

Case Study 2: The Syrian Civil War (2011–present)

Syria demonstrates how prolonged conflict erodes environmental governance. Years of fighting have devastated agricultural regions, accelerated deforestation, and contaminated water systems. The collapse of regulatory institutions enabled uncontrolled waste dumping, informal oil refining, and unregulated resource extraction. These activities have produced toxic emissions and soil degradation that will hinder recovery for decades.

Case Study 3: The Nagorno‑Karabakh Conflicts (1991–2023)

The recurring conflicts in Nagorno‑Karabakh highlight the long-term ecological consequences of militarized landscapes. Landmines and unexploded ordnance have rendered large areas inaccessible, preventing agricultural use and ecological restoration. Forest fires triggered by shelling have destroyed biodiversity-rich habitats. Soil contamination and disrupted water flows demonstrate how even short, high-intensity conflicts can produce enduring environmental instability.

Case Study 4: The Gulf War (1990–1991)
The Gulf War remains one of the most striking examples of deliberate environmental destruction. Retreating Iraqi forces set fire to more than 600 Kuwaiti oil wells, releasing millions of barrels of crude oil into the desert and the Persian Gulf. The resulting smoke plumes darkened regional skies for months, causing severe air pollution, acid rain, and long-term soil sterilization. Marine ecosystems suffered extensive contamination, and respiratory illnesses increased sharply among local populations. The Gulf War demonstrated how environmental devastation can be weaponized as part of military strategy.
Case Study 5: The Vietnam War (1955–1975)
The Vietnam War introduced the world to the concept of “ecocide.” The widespread use of herbicides such as Agent Orange destroyed millions of hectares of forest and farmland, causing irreversible biodiversity loss and long-term soil toxicity. Chemical contamination continues to affect human health and ecosystems decades later, with elevated cancer rates and birth defects documented in affected regions. This case exemplifies how environmental manipulation became a tactical instrument of warfare, with consequences that persist across generations.
Case Study 6: The Balkan Wars (1991–1999)
The wars accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia revealed the deep interconnection between ethnic conflict, infrastructure destruction, and environmental collapse. Bombing campaigns targeted industrial zones, oil refineries, and chemical plants, releasing toxic substances into the Danube and other regional waterways. NATO air strikes on Serbia in 1999—including attacks on petrochemical facilities near Pančevo—caused severe air and soil contamination, with long-term health effects documented in surrounding communities. Deforestation and land degradation followed mass displacement, as refugees relied on wood for heating and temporary shelter. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, unexploded ordnance and landmines continue to threaten both human safety and ecological restoration efforts. The Balkan conflicts thus stand as a stark reminder that environmental damage can persist long after political borders are redrawn, shaping regional stability and public health for generations.

Policy Recommendations: Integrating Environmental Resilience into Security Strategy

1. Establish Environmental Monitoring as a Core Component of Military Planning

Armed forces should incorporate environmental impact assessments into operational planning, including real-time monitoring of air, water, and soil quality in conflict zones.

2. Strengthen International Legal Frameworks on Environmental Protection During Armed Conflict

Existing conventions require modernization to address cyber operations, critical infrastructure sabotage, and resource-intensive weapons production.

3. Promote Sustainable Defense Procurement and Resource Use

Defense industries must adopt cleaner production methods, reduce reliance on rare earth elements, and invest in recyclable materials.

4. Integrate Environmental Recovery into Post‑Conflict Reconstruction

Reconstruction programs should prioritize decontamination, reforestation, and restoration of water systems.

5. Enhance Regional Cooperation on Environmental Security

Regional organizations should establish joint monitoring mechanisms and coordinated ecological recovery initiatives.

Conclusion

Modern warfare has evolved into a complex, multidimensional phenomenon whose environmental consequences extend far beyond the battlefield. Kinetic operations inflict immediate ecological damage, technological warfare introduces hidden pressures, and long-term instability persists in post-conflict regions. Environmental resilience must become a central pillar of military planning, defense procurement, and post-conflict recovery. Only by addressing the full spectrum of warfare’s ecological footprint can states build sustainable security architectures capable of withstanding twenty-first-century challenges.

References (APA Style)
Balsari, S., Dresser, C., & Leaning, J. (2020). Environmental health in conflict and post-conflict settings. The Lancet, 395(10222), 1647–1657.
Belcher, O., Bigger, P., Neimark, B., & Kennelly, C. (2020). Hidden carbon costs of the “everywhere war”. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 45(3), 506–521.
Darbyshire, E., & Weir, D. (2023). Environmental dimensions during and after the Nagorno Karabakh conflict of 2020. Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management, 19(2), 360–365.
Grimes, E. S., Kneer, M. L., & Berkowitz, J. F. (2024). Military activity and wetland dependent wildlife: A warfare ecology perspective. Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management, 20(6), 2153–2161.
Hailemariam, et al. (2024). Managing the environmental impacts of war: What can be learned from conflict vulnerable communities? Science of The Total Environment, 927, 171974.
International Committee of the Red Cross. (2022). Guidelines on the protection of the natural environment in armed conflict. ICRC Publishing.
Krampe, F. (2017). Sustainable peacebuilding and the environment. International Affairs, 93(1), 231–244.
Krampe, F., Kreutz, J., & Ide, T. (2025). Armed conflict causes long-lasting environmental harms. Environment and Security, 4(1), 3–17.
Murillo Sandoval, P. J. (2023). Disentangling the landscape during armed conflicts and post peace agreements. Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management, 19(2), 355–359.
UN Environment Programme. (2017). Environmental dimensions of armed conflict. United Nations.
Wenning, R. J., & Toma, T. D. (2023). Using US Natural Resource Damage Assessment to understand the environmental consequences of the war in Ukraine. Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management.
Zyck, S. A., & Muggah, R. (2013). Post-conflict reconstruction: Environmental challenges and opportunities. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 8(1), 74–79.

A The Environmental Footprint of Modern Warfare: A Comprehensive Analysis bejegyzés először Biztonságpolitika-én jelent meg.

Environmental change can affect social contracts, which are the relationships between societal groups and between such groups and the state. Droughts, river pollution and rising sea levels often change the distribution of resources within countries or harm some societal groups more than others, raising questions about compensation. Social contracts can also trigger environmental change, mainly because the environment and future generations cannot themselves participate in social contract negotiations. Many social contracts allow influential elites to overuse or pollute natural resources, harming the environment, other societal groups and future generations. Drawing on existing social contract and environmental governance research, this introductory article develops a conceptual approach for analyzing the bidirectional effects between the environment and the relations between different parts of society and the state. It presents different types of interaction using multiple examples. This approach helps to identify starting points for the negotiation of more sustainable and inclusive social contracts.

Environmental change can affect social contracts, which are the relationships between societal groups and between such groups and the state. Droughts, river pollution and rising sea levels often change the distribution of resources within countries or harm some societal groups more than others, raising questions about compensation. Social contracts can also trigger environmental change, mainly because the environment and future generations cannot themselves participate in social contract negotiations. Many social contracts allow influential elites to overuse or pollute natural resources, harming the environment, other societal groups and future generations. Drawing on existing social contract and environmental governance research, this introductory article develops a conceptual approach for analyzing the bidirectional effects between the environment and the relations between different parts of society and the state. It presents different types of interaction using multiple examples. This approach helps to identify starting points for the negotiation of more sustainable and inclusive social contracts.

Environmental change can affect social contracts, which are the relationships between societal groups and between such groups and the state. Droughts, river pollution and rising sea levels often change the distribution of resources within countries or harm some societal groups more than others, raising questions about compensation. Social contracts can also trigger environmental change, mainly because the environment and future generations cannot themselves participate in social contract negotiations. Many social contracts allow influential elites to overuse or pollute natural resources, harming the environment, other societal groups and future generations. Drawing on existing social contract and environmental governance research, this introductory article develops a conceptual approach for analyzing the bidirectional effects between the environment and the relations between different parts of society and the state. It presents different types of interaction using multiple examples. This approach helps to identify starting points for the negotiation of more sustainable and inclusive social contracts.

Le sommet du G7 a débuté lundi soir à Évian en France, avec un dîner de travail qui a réuni les chefs d’État et de gouvernement participants. Au menu, évidemment, le protocole d’accord avec l’Iran négocié et présenté à ses pairs par le président américain. Mais ce n’est pas le seul conflit du moment. Il y a aussi l’Ukraine, où la guerre continue.

Politikwissenschaftlerin Laura von Daniels zum Abkommen zwischen Iran und USA

In today's edition: CAIDA, von der Leyen's Davos claims, digital omnibus

In today's edition: AI tobacco campaign, clinical trials, SPC

In today's edition: gene editing, seeds, CAP

The Russian state has, through legislation and stigmatising rhetoric, systematically worked to isolate the LGBTQ+ community. Graphic: IPS

By Ed Holt
BRATISLAVA, Jun 16 2026 (IPS)

LGBTQ+ people in Russia are being forced to increasingly use self-censoring strategies in their daily lives as they struggle with systemic vulnerability, one of the largest surveys of the LGBTQ+ community in the country has shown.

The latest annual survey of more than 6,000 people across Russia by the Coming Out and Sphere Foundation organisations showed that, in 2025, the situation for the community had neither improved nor significantly worsened.

But it showed a reinforcement of existing adaptive strategies among LGBTQ+ people, including selective approaches to coming out and avoidance of situations in which their gender identity or sexual orientation could be revealed.

There was also an increase in some forms of abuse, particularly in online spaces, and threats of violence, extortion, denunciation, and pressure from close circles continued to contribute significantly to the everyday vulnerability of LGBTQ+ people.

The groups say the findings reinforce the perception that LGBTQ+ people in Russia – where a series of repressive laws demonising and persecuting the community – are likely to face persistently high levels of vulnerability and threats to their safety, health, and quality of life for some time to come as they come under attack simply for being who they are.

“Our data shows that repression of LGBTQ+ people has moved from persecution for specific actions to persecution for their identity, for who a person is, not what they do. There are more and more legal cases against people who are living their lives, not doing anything against the government or trying to promote human rights,” Denis Oleinik, Executive Director at Coming Out, told IPS.

“What we have seen in 2025 is a “normalisation” or “routinisation” of catastrophe. LGBTQ+ people now just live with [the situation], with these things happening. It’s as if this has become normal life. It’s absolutely horrible,” he added.

Russia’s LGBTQ+ community has faced increasing discrimination and marginalisation for more than a decade.

While there has historically been a degree of anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment in Russian society, this has deepened significantly with the introduction of a series of laws and increasingly hostile government policies against the community.

In 2013, not long after Vladimir Putin had returned to power as president, a law was implemented banning “the propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations” to anyone under the age of 18.

The start of what critics say has been a decade-long campaign by the Kremlin to marginalise and vilify the LGBTQ+ community in the country, the law was extended in 2022 to cover all public information or activities supporting LGBTQ+ rights or displaying non-heterosexual orientation, regardless of age.

A ban on same-sex marriage was also written into the constitution, and in 2023, legislation was passed banning transgender people from officially or medically changing their gender.

The same year also saw a ruling by the Supreme Court, which outlawed the non-existent ‘international LGBT movement’, declaring it ‘extremist’ – allowing people to be fined or prosecuted for anything that could be construed as promoting “non-traditional sexual relations”.

At the same time, homophobic political discourse has become increasingly normalised, as the Kremlin has looked to promote ‘traditional family values’ in society and cast LGBTQ+ activism as a product of a degenerate West and a threat to Russia.

This has fuelled a growingly virulent and often violent rejection of LGBTQ+ people in large parts of society and has left many in the community fearing for their physical and mental health.

Grigory*, an LGBTQ+ student from a major city in Russia, said they were selective in revealing their sexuality and gender identity and that while they do not live in permanent fear of physical attacks, they have adjusted their behaviour to avoid certain locations.

“Sometimes in the evenings I avoid certain places because I could be considered stereotypically gay, perhaps because of my voice or the way I walk. I don’t hide my sexuality in public, but I don’t manifest it either,” they said, adding that this was easier for them than for some other members of the LGBTQ+ community.

“Transgender people suffer the worst problems. It must be very hard for someone to be transgender in Russia. They are so brave and strong. I’m astonished they can keep going,” they said.

The Coming Out and Sphere Foundation showed the situation for transgender people in the vast majority of indicators for quality of life, including specific measures of discrimination and well-being, was worse than for other members of the LGBTQ+ community. Notably, they were significantly more likely to face physical threats and experience actual physical violence, including sexual and domestic violence, more frequently than other LGBTQ+ people.

“A lot of trans people right now live their whole lives at home without even going outside to the shops if they have access to courier services or some relatives or friends who can help them buy what they need. We’re seeing this more and more,” said Oleinik.

Grigory said they felt, along with many others in the community, if not fear of physical attacks, a specific sense of aggression towards them.

“I feel it indirectly. It comes through government narratives in the media and in the public sphere, or in something an acquaintance might say. Queerphobia in Russia is mainly government-induced. Of course it existed before all these awful laws, but it wasn’t that strong. The laws have made it much worse,” they said.

LGBTQ+ rights campaigners say the patterns of behaviour among the community in Russia described in the report are unsurprising given the years of growing repression against them.

“When marginalisation and criminalisation on any grounds are a long-term feature of daily life, people develop ways of managing their daily exposure to harm,” Anastasia Smirnova, Deputy Director and Director of Programmes at rights group ILGA-Europe, told IPS.

She added, though, that LGBTQ+ people in Russia were facing a very specific challenge, as the Russian state has, through increasingly harsh legislation and stigmatising rhetoric, systematically worked to isolate LGBTQ+ human rights defenders and then LGBTQ+ people from each other and from everyone around them as part of a broader dismantling of the conditions for free association and dissent.

“This is what makes it different from social prejudice: it is not a reflection of society, it is a project of the state, and its target is civic life. For many people living through this, the daily acts of self-censorship described in the report are the lived reality of that project,” Smirnova said.

The potential harms of such actions on individuals and the wider community are severe, with impacts on both mental and physical health as individuals are left isolated and in some cases afraid to access healthcare.

“The impact on children is particularly severe. State propaganda targeting schools, the absence of age-appropriate relationship and sex education, and the climate of fear surrounding LGBTI topics leave young people exposed to extreme harm and isolation, especially children who are themselves LGBTI or have LGBTI family members, but also any child who might be perceived as LGBTI,” said Smirnova.

While the report did not show a significant deterioration in a number of indicators compared to previous years – in fact there was a slight improvement in some areas – its authors warn this could be misleading, highlighting that the report relied on the willingness of respondents to “share sensitive information in an increasingly oppressive environment” and that real levels of discrimination and violence could be higher.

Whatever the true levels of discrimination against the community are in Russia, many people are suffering gravely in the current environment.

Grigory said they are currently in therapy, partly to help them deal with the challenges of being LGBTQ+ in Russia.

They said that among the community, “thoughts of killing oneself and suicide attempts are pretty common.”

LGBTQ+ people and activists in touch or working directly with members of the community who spoke to IPS said substance abuse, or self-medication through unsupervised use of anti-depressants, was not uncommon either.

Trying to get help for such problems is difficult though amid mistrust of state health institutions because of widespread homo- and transphobia and concerns over staff potentially breaching patient confidentiality about sexuality.

As the pressure on LGBTQ+ people continues, many feel they have had no choice but to leave the country.

The annual report included responses from hundreds of people who had emigrated, both in 2025 and in the last few years before that.

Severe anxiety and psychological discomfort were the most commonly cited reasons for emigration (66%), while other major reasons included intensified censorship (59%), personal safety risk (57%), and increased homophobia and transphobia in Russian society (57%).

Tellingly, the majority of participants who had emigrated (63%) did not consider returning to Russia an option – a rise of 8 percentage points on the previous year.

This is perhaps unsurprising, given that many in the community see little or no prospect of the situation in Russia improving for many years.

“Many things have changed in the last few years, not just in Russia but all around the world – the far right is winning everywhere, and LGBTQ rights are under attack all over the world. I’m not expecting anything good to happen inside Russia in the next five to ten years,” said Oleinik.

But others say that despite, or perhaps because of, the report’s findings, there is an even greater need now for LGBTQ+ people in Russia and groups both inside and outside the country to do whatever they can to resist the state’s ongoing repression of the community.

“There is an important distinction to draw between acknowledging that a democratic reversal in Russia is not on the near horizon and concluding that nothing can or should be done in the meantime. The power of the Russian state, backed by resource wealth and a willingness to use every available instrument of repression, is real and cannot be minimised. And yet what we see from our position, working in support of human rights organisations, defenders, organisers, and activists, is not resignation, but realism paired with determination,” said Smirnova.

“People are continuing to organise, even though the time horizons are long and murky and the measures of ‘value’ of the organising are different from what they might be somewhere else. But keeping the lights on for the possible forms of civic engagement, critical thought, and solidarity is a form of resistance that does have long-term value,” she added.

Oleinik vowed his organisation would not be giving up on LGBTQ+ people in Russia.

“We need to continue our work, our support, because we know that LGBTQ+ people in Russia need us. Right now it might look like there is little hope of positive change, but that does not mean we should stop what we are doing,” he said.

*Name changed for security reasons

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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