The National Interest

Mohammed Al-Sulami

Afghanistan, Asia

Afghanistan has been an open arena for disputes between major world powers and for competition between regional powers for centuries, and this has not changed today.

Events in Afghanistan are moving at a rapid pace and escalating. The fragile government in Kabul has collapsed, and the Taliban has taken complete control over all of Afghanistan’s territories without facing much resistance.

This rapid escalation of events prompted the Afghan government to agree to hand over power to the Taliban and form a transitional government. As developments accelerated, however, two Taliban officials told Reuters that there will be no transitional government in Afghanistan, with the group expecting a full transfer of power to it.

There is no doubt that the impacts of these developments will not be confined to Afghanistan. The Taliban has an overwhelming desire to restore its leadership in the country despite it facing vast disapproval in light of its negative image among huge segments in society—especially among women, minorities, and the young.

Afghanistan has been an open arena for disputes between major world powers and for competition between regional powers for centuries, and this has not changed today. Yet it may be the case that what is happening now is not merely the result of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan after years of extensive talks with the Taliban in Doha. Anyone looking at Afghanistan’s strategic location between China and Russia and its place in China’s Belt and Road Initiative will realize Afghanistan’s significance in Washington’s confrontation with Beijing, particularly since Beijing has thwarted the U.S. naval blockade in the South China Sea by developing overland trade routes and transit corridors going through Pakistan.

In other words, from Washington’s strategic perspective, the latest step against China could be to use Afghanistan to encircle Beijing, cutting off vital overland roads passing through Afghanistan by restoring chaos in a country that is accustomed to being an arena for global powers to settle their conflicts.

In addition to trade, there is also a security dimension in the context of U.S.-China competition. In recent years, U.S. officials and media outlets have become increasingly focused on the predicament of Uighur Muslims in China’s Xinjiang region. Xinjiang represents the “line of contagion” between China and Afghanistan, with no official border crossings in this area due to the region’s harsh terrain. From this perspective and in light of the chaos unfolding in Afghanistan—which is already fertile ground for new extremist groups to emerge—it is totally plausible that a newly rebranded version of Al Qaeda or ISIS will emerge there and swiftly infiltrate the Sino-Afghan border to cross into China, hence creating a security challenge for Beijing and undermining its new commercial artery.

Sensing this potential danger, Beijing has already begun intensifying its communications with the Taliban and recently welcomed a high-profile delegation of Taliban officials. This visit came amid leaked reports, which seem implausible, of a deal underway between the Taliban and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) whereby China will provide the Taliban with money, weapons, and equipment in return for cooperation in cracking down on the Uighurs and crushing separatism in the region of East Turkestan.

It is possible that the Taliban is seeking to dupe both the United States and China by planning to exploit each side’s concerns and objectives by selling deceptive promises until it manages to fully take control of Afghanistan. Regardless, the phase that follows the Taliban’s full exertion of control over Afghanistan will provide answers to many of the questions raised, which remain unknown for the time being.

Iran has interests in Afghanistan, too. Thus far, the Iranian leadership is said to be deeply suspicious of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. As a result, Tehran is doing more observing than acting, watching as the situation plays out across the border. Many analysts focus on the classical approach underpinning the relationship between the Taliban and Tehran, arguing that because the two have opposing religious ideologies that they will have divergent relations. While this was true prior to 2001, the nature of this relationship changed massively after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, with strong bridges being built (although some may insist that this relationship is based on realpolitik, necessity, and shared interests) from the provision of Iranian logistical and intelligence support for the Taliban, which opened an office in the Iranian city of Mashhad near the border with Afghanistan and regularly visited Tehran to meet with senior officials.

Those who have monitored Iran’s comments regarding the Taliban in recent years would have noticed a softening of Tehran’s general position towards the group. For example, in an interview conducted by the Afghan Tolo channel, former Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said, 

As you pointed out, the Taliban killed eight of my colleagues before doing so with others. Therefore, our definition of the Taliban is that the Taliban has committed many terrorist acts. Before naming the Taliban as terrorists, the Taliban is a group in Afghanistan that has committed terrorist acts and it is necessary now to consider the Taliban as part of a future solution, not [the whole] future solution for Afghanistan. There is a big difference in it… Look, the Taliban has committed many terrorist acts. Regarding recognition of the Taliban as a terrorist group, we have not removed the Taliban [from our list of] terrorist groups, in our laws.

Here, it is necessary to point out that the new generation of Taliban leaders may not embrace the complex set of ideological tenets espoused by the group’s founding fathers. Nowadays, they have adopted a more pragmatic approach regarding political objectives that significantly impact the decision-making process among the group’s senior leadership.

It is possible that the Taliban could turn a blind eye to the fact that Iran played a pivotal role in the fall of its former government. But the Taliban’s approach to Iran in the upcoming period depends on the nature of its relations with the remaining actors, especially the United States and China.

On balance, it seems probable that Iran will seek to take advantage of the panic currently gripping Afghan society, especially among Shiites, in order to attempt to legitimize the presence of the Iran-aligned Afghan Shiite militia, the Fatemiyoun Brigade. This militia, created and controlled by Iran, was deployed in Syria to fight alongside the forces of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and the other Iran-aligned militia deployed across Syrian territory.

Considering regular Iranian statements about forming a Shiite army in Afghanistan that would resemble Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, and that many of the Fatemiyoun Brigade’s members have returned to the country, Tehran has created an essential base for rendering such a plan successful. Indeed, informed sources have told me that Iran opened discussions with the Afghan government on this issue some weeks ago, with Ashraf Ghani’s government reportedly requesting some time to study the proposal.

Yet a few hours after I tweeted this news, the Fatemiyoun Brigade issued a statement denying and dismissing the claims as baseless. The Fatemiyoun Brigade’s statement was reported by multiple Iranian media outlets, primarily the semi-official Tasnim news agency affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). However, we should be mindful of the fact that the IRGC’s elite Qods Force is the prime architect of all Iran’s militias in the region. Its incumbent commander, Esmail Ghaani, was a heavyweight field commander in Afghanistan and Pakistan while the former commander, Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad in January 2020, was responsible for coordinating with the Iran-linked militias in the Arab nations.

The challenge for Iran on this issue is how to strike a balance between acting smartly on the Afghan stage in a way that serves its interests while simultaneously avoiding angering China. As long as Tehran remains economically reliant on Beijing, the Iranians will have to tread carefully. 

The fourth nation involved in Afghanistan’s future is Pakistan, which is considered to be the chief inspiration of the Taliban, with accusations repeatedly leveled against Islamabad that it provides the Taliban with money and weapons and directs the group to carry out its instructions. While there may be some exaggeration about Pakistan’s control over the Taliban’s decision-making process, India, Pakistan’s arch-foe, believes that the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan creates new strategic depth for Islamabad and poses an acute danger to New Delhi in the medium run, especially when it comes to the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir.

Considering the depth of Pakistan’s strategic economic relationship with China, any attack or actions by the Taliban on China’s territory could adversely affect the nature of Pakistani relations with the Taliban by damaging Pakistan’s interests. Thus, it is possible that China could exploit its relations with Pakistan to neutralize any danger that the Taliban could pose to China and its interests. 

These developments and the Taliban’s sudden ascendancy in Afghanistan should not be surprising to any close observer of Afghan affairs, especially after the marathon negotiations in Doha. Despite all the initial pragmatic commitments that the Taliban has made, whether with the United States or with China, the group will now find itself in a position that allows it to re-evaluate its interests and how best to achieve its objectives. Previous political analyses on the Taliban’s strength and the degree of approval domestically and internationally are now largely irrelevant and unhelpful in light of the new fait accompli on the ground. Time will reveal how the region adapts.

Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami is the founder and president of the International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah) based in Riyadh, KSA. He tweets @mohalsulami.

Image: Reuters.

Mark Episkopos

Hypersonic Missile,

Russia’s hypersonic Tsirkon missile has undergone yet another round of testing, bringing the weapon a step closer to combat readiness.  

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Russian Navy has reportedly decided to fast-track the remainder of Tsirkon’s state trials, with a flurry of testing activity planned over the course of August.

Russia’s hypersonic Tsirkon missile has undergone yet another round of testing, bringing the weapon a step closer to combat readiness.  

Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced on Monday that its Navy had performed a test launch of the Tsirkon test launch from the White Sea at a notional surface target on the coast of the Barents Sea. “According to live monitoring data, the Tsirkon missile successfully hit a target directly at a range of over 350 km. During the test, the tactical and technical characteristics were confirmed. The flight speed reached nearly 7 Mach,” the defense ministry said in a statement. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence published a brief video clip from the exercise on its Youtube channel. The footage showed the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov, clearly demarcated by its pennant number 454, moving into firing position. The video then showed the Tsirkon missile being launched and flying at an upwards trajectory from several different angles.

Tsirkon, also known as “Zircon,” was launched at least four other times from Admiral Gorshkov since January 2020, hitting both ground and sea targets at distances ranging from 350–500 kilometers. Tsirkon is a winged, hypersonic anti-ship missile that is reportedly capable of reaching speeds of up to Mach 9 and performing mid-flight maneuvers. Tsirkon’s operational range remains unclear, with estimates ranging from 1,000–2,000 kilometers depending on the circumstances of the engagement. A defense insider recently told TASS news that Tsirkon boasts a range of roughly 1,500 kilometers for ground targets and “slightly less” than that for hitting naval targets. Tsirkon appears to have the potential to hold U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Groups at risk and to significantly impede these formations from operating effectively.  

The Russian Navy has reportedly decided to fast-track the remainder of Tsirkon’s state trials, with a flurry of testing activity planned over the course of August. “The first launch from the Admiral Gorshkov frigate within the state trials is planned for the first part of August,” a defense industry insider told TASS state news. “The second part of August will see flight trials of Zircon from the Severodvinsk nuclear submarine," the source added. 

Live-fire tests from submarines are the next major step on Tsirkon’s path to combat readiness, as the hypersonic missile is expected to figure prominently into the capabilities of Russia’s new Yasen-class of nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines. Reports surfaced earlier this month that the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate Admiral Golovko will become the first active-service vessel to receive the Tsirkon upgrade. Other possible Tsirkon fittings include the Kirov-class battlecruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Petr Velikiy. Russia’s Ministry of Defence is also eying select corvettes from the Gremyashchiy-class and Karakurt-class. Russian president Vladimir Putin previously appeared to suggest that a land-based Tsirkon variant is in the works, but the status of those development efforts remains uncertain.

Defense industry insiders told Russian state media earlier this year that Tsirkon is expected to enter service in the “first half of 2022,” pending the success of its upcoming submarine trials.

Mark Episkopos is the national security reporter for the National Interest. 

This article first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters

Mark Episkopos

Guns,

A more formidable Glock 22 that’s not only more accurate but offers better handling and improved durability. 

Here's What You Need To Remember: The Glock 22, along with its smaller Glock 23 counterpart, was recently upgraded to the Gen4 standard. But in 2020, the Glock 22 made the leap to Gen5—Glock’s latest handgun platform. 

One of America’s most popular service handguns, the Glock 22 got even better in 2020 with the vaunted Gen5 upgrade.  

First introduced in 1990, the Glock 22 is a .40 S&W version of the iconic Glock 17. The .40 Smith & Wesson round was designed specifically for law enforcement in 1990, following the infamous 1986 Miami Shootout in which eight FBI agents were outgunned by just two robbers. The Glock 22 became one of the first mass-produced .40 S&W guns, widely adopted by police departments across the United States. Their visual similarities notwithstanding, the Glock 22 employs a slightly different frame from the Glock 17 to account for its heavier .40 S&W rounds. It also carries two less rounds, for a total of fifteen as opposed to the Glock 17’s seventeen. The baseline Glock 22 is only slightly heavier than the Glock 17 but boasts an identical barrel length and trigger pull.  

In the decades that followed, Glock released a steady stream of revisions—dubbed “generations”—to keep pace with competitors. The informal second generation brought minor frame revisions and caliber options for certain models; Gen3 was a more comprehensive upgrade package, offering numerous ergonomics updates in addition to a universal accessory rail for mounting such tools as lights or lasers. Introduced in 2010, the Gen4 revision featured a new backstrap system and Rough Textured Frame (RTF) surface for additional grip support, among other quality of life improvements.

The Glock 22, along with its smaller Glock 23 counterpart, was recently upgraded to the Gen4 standard. But in 2020, the Glock 22 made the leap to Gen5—Glock’s latest handgun platform. Gen5 brings nDLC  (diamond-like carbon) coating for added protection against scratches and corrosion, the new  GLOCK Marksman Barrel (GMB) with superior rifling, flared magwell for more streamlined reloads, ambidextrous slide stop, smoother and more ergonomic trigger design, and the removal of finger grooves to better accommodate all possible hand sizes.

The Gen5 Glock 22 is available in two variants: the baseline model, and the Modular Optic System (MOS) variant that adds compatibility with popular aftermarket optics solutions. The Gen5 iteration of the Glock 22 has little interchangeability with prior models.  

Not terribly impactful by themselves, Gen5’s slew of small-but-thoughtful changes quickly add up to produce a more formidable Glock 22 that’s not only more accurate but offers better handling and improved durability. Nevertheless, the .40 S&W caliber’s popularity has declined precipitously in recent years; even the FBI, which originally commissioned the round, has stopped using it, returning instead to higher-capacity, softer-shooting, and more compact 9mm guns. Although too unwieldy for law enforcement, the 10-millimeter caliber has recently resurfaced as an increasingly popular option for consumers (especially some hunters) who want the stopping power and don’t mind the recoil.

The Gen5 upgrade breathes much-needed new life into Glock’s .40 S&W range, but it likely won’t be enough to reverse the .40 S&W ongoing downwards spiral in the consumer and law enforcement markets. 

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest.

This piece first appeared earlier this year and is being reprinted due to reader interest.

Image: Creative Commons

Mark Episkopos

Tempest Stealth Fighter,

There's no hiding from the cost. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Tempest project’s current partners include Italy and Sweden. The government, which has always been clear that the financial solvency of the Tempest project hinges on securing a steady stream of foreign investment, is also currently exploring partnership opportunities with Japan.

The United Kingdom is forging ahead with its ambitious project to produce a home-grown stealth warplane, even as it strives to retain its status as one of the core partners in the F-35 stealth fighter jet program.

London is doubling down on plans to indigenously produce its upcoming BAE Systems Tempest jet fighter, a next-generation successor to the United Kingdom’s Eurofighter Typhoon fleet. In a March 2021 Command Paper to Parliament, the British Ministry of Defense (MOD) reiterated that the Tempest fighter will be a major procurement priority into the coming decades. “Tempest will exploit our unique industrial base to create a 6th generation combat air enterprise centred in the UK,” the paper reads. “This fully digital enterprise will transform delivery, achieving pace and lowering cost and disrupting traditional approaches to defence procurement.”

The Tempest project’s current partners include Italy and Sweden. The government, which has always been clear that the financial solvency of the Tempest project hinges on securing a steady stream of foreign investment, is also currently exploring partnership opportunities with Japan.

As with most other next-generation fighters, the Tempest fighter will offer its own form of sensor fusion. The fighter’s ambitious Tempest’s Multi-Function Radio Frequency System (MFRFS) data collection protocols will be “four times as accurate as existing sensors in a package 1/10th the size,” according to defense contractor and Tempest partner Leonardo. The MFRFS will filter the battlefield information it collects through its onboard processor suite, generating a dynamic picture of the battlefield that can include everything from enemy movements to terrain layout. Like the F-35 jet, the Tempest fighter can also act as a flying command and control center by feeding some of that information to nearby friendly units. The Tempest project is betting big on future-oriented experimental avionics systems, with BAE Systems working on a “wearable cockpit” interface that replaces both analog and digital inputs with augmented reality (AR) display, supported by an integrated network of artificial intelligence (AI) features.

The Tempest’s project’s preoccupation with unorthodox prototype technologies extends to its weapons loadout. At a Rome seminar on missile defense, Italy’s General Enzo Vecciarelli suggested that the Tempest fighter could incorporate directed-energy weapons to counter hypersonic missiles. “On Tempest there will be a large amount of energy available and I don’t rule out the use of directed energy,” Vecciarelli said. It was previously confirmed that the Tempest fighter will also carry hypersonic missiles of its own, in addition to being able to operate drone swarms.

As the Tempest project moves further along in the development stage, the fate of the UK’s massive F-35 jet procurement plans hangs in the balance. As a “Level 1” partner in the F-35 program, London previously stated it will purchase as many as 138 units of Lockheed Martin’s fifth-generation stealth fighter. London, however, has so far only ordered forty-eight F-35 jet fighters. The MOD says it plans to “grow the [F-35] Force, increasing the fleet size beyond the 48 aircraft that we have already ordered,” but is dragging its feet on whether or not it remains committed to an acquisition target of 138 F-35 fighters.

The Tempest fighter is projected to reach Initial Operating Capability (IOC) by 2035.

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for The National Interest.

Image: Reuters.

Ethen Kim Lieser

Child Tax Credit, Americas

There were still some concerning numbers, such as nearly 30 percent of adults in households with children had a hard time paying for their household expenses in the previous week, which was down only slightly from the previous month.

There only has been one round of payments from the expanded child tax credits, but it appears that it is already having a sizable impact on millions of struggling Americans amid the ongoing coronavirus pandemic.

According to the latest Census Bureau Household Pulse Survey that was released earlier this week, parents who have received the funds reported less trouble affording food and paying for household expenses.

The poll added that approximately 10 percent of American households with children sometimes or often didn’t have enough to eat over the past week—the lowest percentage registered since the pandemic started a year and a half ago.

However, there were still some concerning numbers, such as nearly 30 percent of adults in households with children had a hard time paying for their household expenses in the previous week, which was down only slightly from the previous month.

How Money Was Spent 

Outlining how the tax credits were spent, paying for school expenses topped the board. Nearly 60 percent tapped into at least part of the direct cash to pay for books and supplies, tuition, tutoring, school transportation, or after-school activities. Moreover, nearly half of parents used at least some of the money for food, 28 percent forked over cash for the Internet, cell phones, and other utilities, and about 25 percent targeted more clothing.

The survey further revealed that about 27 percent of parents admitted that they already have spent the child tax credit payment and 32 percent said that they mostly saved the funds. About 40 percent of the respondents said that they used the money to settle outstanding debt.

As for when eligible parents can expect to see the second batch of payments for this month, do take note that they are expected to arrive two days earlier because the usual pay date of the fifteenth falls on a Sunday.

Thanks to President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, the federal government is now allowing eligible parents to receive as much as $3,600 per year for a child under the age of six and up to $3,000 for children between ages six and seventeen.

Broken down further, what this all means is a $250 or a $300 payment for each child will be deposited into the bank accounts of parents each month through December.

CTC’s Future

There also has been increasing talk regarding continuing the expanded credits for years to come. One recent report put together by the Annie E. Casey Foundation showed that a permanent expansion of the credits could potentially lift more than four million children out of poverty.

“Every child needs food, health care, and safe and stable housing. Millions of households with children already lacked these necessities before the pandemic,” the report noted.

“To continue on progress already made on recovery, the foundation recommends: making the expansion of the federal child tax credit permanent,” it added.

Furthermore, the Center on Poverty and Social Policy at Columbia University has estimated that the credits will cut U.S. poverty by over half.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters.

Mark Episkopos

Drones,

They call it "Thunder."

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Grom drone can deliver “precision strikes” against enemy infrastructure or high-value targets without putting its accompanying aircraft at risk.

Fresh details have emerged concerning the new, next-generation Russian combat drone that was previously described as the “loyal wingman” to the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter.

The manufacturer of the upcoming Grom (Russian for “thunder”) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), Kronstadt, gave a far-reaching interview to the Russian outlet TASS earlier this week, noting that it will be able to control a swarm of ten smaller Molniya (“lightning”) drones. These Molniya drones, added Kronstadt, can be operated in strike or reconnaissance configurations: “Reconnaissance drones are capable of flying back. Strike drones, as in the case with loitering munitions, are kamikaze UAVs. Molniya drones will constantly interact with each other and the carrier drone,” said the Kronshtadt representative.

“Molniya drones constantly exchange data among themselves. It is possible to alter an assignment for each member of the swarm,” Kronstadt explained. “They can transfer leader roles and are interchangeable. Artificial intelligence allows a group of drones to fulfil its assignment without constant communications with the carrier aircraft.”

Grom was unveiled, alongside a slew of other attack and reconnaissance drones, at Russia’s ARMY-2020 military exhibition. Though it was previously known that the Grom UAV can operate a drone swarm, Kronstadt’s interview has shed light on the Molniya drone’s operational flexibility and ability to carry out tasks without direct orders from the lead aircraft.

Aside from acting as a swarm drone carrier, the Grom UAV can is designed as a robust combat platform. The UAV, which appears to have a length of 13.8 meters and a wingspan of around ten meters, will have a payload capacity of 1.3 tons, take-off weight of seven tons, and operational range of around 800 km. Grom’s four hardpoints can accept a wide range of weapons, including the Kh-38 air-air-surface missile, KAB-250 and KAB-500 guided bombs, and a new “item 85 smart air bomb.” The Grom UAV not only bears a striking outward resemblance to the U.S.-made Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie, but offers some of the same capabilities.

The Grom drone can deliver “precision strikes” against enemy infrastructure or high-value targets without putting its accompanying aircraft at risk. Additionally, the Molniya drones could be able to saturate and potentially even eliminate certain types of air defense systems. They can also perform unspecified electronic warfare tasks in conjunction with the head aircraft.

Grom’s interoperability with the Su-57 was not explicitly mentioned in Kronstadt’s recent TASS interview—in fact, the manufacturer did not discuss compatibility with any specific aircraft. However, Kronstadt’s Head Designer Nikolai Dozhdkov previously confirmed to Russian media that Grom will be compatible with both the Su-57 and Su-35 fighters.

The Su-57 was also confirmed to pair with the S-70 Okhotnik-B, a stealth-capable multipurpose drone from the same family of Russian next-generation UAV’s as Grom. It is possible that Grom is being developed as an alternate loyal wingman choice for missions requiring swarm drone capability. Whereas Okhotnik-B is scheduled to enter service in 2025, no development or production timeline has been provided for Grom.

Mark Episkopos is the new national security reporter for the National Interest. This article first appeared earlier this year.

Image: Russian Ministry of Defense

Michael Rubin

Afghanistan,

The Taliban may claim victory today but, for Afghanistan, they represent less the end of fighting than one chapter in a bloody history.

The Taliban seized the presidential palace in Kabul, completing their blitzkrieg through Afghanistan. President Ashraf Ghani fled in disgrace. “They tied our hands from behind and sold the country,” Defense Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi wrote. “Curse Ghani and his gang.”  Meanwhile, a humanitarian tragedy is underway. The Taliban are executing those who worked with the United States and reportedly raping their families.

Within Washington, the blame game is underway. President Joe Biden blamed his predecessor, President Donald Trump, and the peace deal with the Taliban that set a deadline for American withdrawal. The Trump-era deal was ill-conceived, but Biden’s excuses are disingenuous for three reasons. First, the Taliban did not abide by the deal and so voided it. Second, its deadline for American withdrawal passed several months ago and, lastly, Biden did not abide by other Trump-era deals about the border wall and Keystone XL pipeline, and so the notion that Trump had tied his hands was nonsense.

That said, while the flag of the Islamic Emirate now flies over the presidential palace in Kabul, the Taliban victory is not the end of the story. The Taliban rampage is less a measure of their popularity and more the result of their Pakistani support and momentum: Afghans seldom fight to the death but instead defect to the stronger side. Biden’s projection of both weakness and callousness was a gift to Taliban leaders seeking to sway provincial governors to step aside in exchange for their lives.

The Taliban, however, are not as strong as they might appear. In March 2000, I visited the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate. At the time, the Taliban controlled ninety percent of the country. They lobbied Washington to recognize them as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates had and argued that they “were no more extreme than Saudi Arabia.” I drove through the Khyber Pass from Peshawar, Pakistan and then visited Jalalabad, Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar. In every city, Afghans said that the security the Taliban had promised when they initially arrived disappeared quickly as the Taliban themselves started preying on the people.

While some progressives, isolationists, and other critics of traditional American foreign policy say that the Reagan administration created the Taliban, this is anachronistic nonsense: The United States supported the mujahideen like Ahmad Shah Masood and others who became to core of the Northern Alliance that fought the Taliban. The Taliban itself formed in 1994. It is fair to criticize Reagan and the Central Intelligence Agency on other matters, but neither armed those who were Kindergarteners when the Soviets invaded.

During this period, the Northern Alliance held out. Many transited the Tajik border that was among the few open to them. In 1997, I had also visited Mazar-i-Sharif that at the time was under the control of Abdul Rashid Dostum. Then, I had entered from Termez, Uzbekistan, which was the route through which Uzbekistan and Turkey supported their proxy warlord. In 1999, Iran and the Taliban almost went to war after the Taliban had slaughtered Iranian diplomats and intelligence agents at their Mazar-i-Sharif consulate. While he did not control territory, the Iranians supported Ismail Khan as their proxy warlord.

Each of Afghanistan’s neighbors with the exception of Pakistan fears the Taliban. Expect each to sponsor over the next several weeks militias and warlords who will try to seize territory along the border to act as a buffer. Certainly, Russia will aid the former Soviet Republics that border Afghanistan since Russia fears radicalization among its growing Muslim population.

Because the Taliban relied more on momentum than military prowess, this means they may soon lose some of the peripheral provinces. Herat, for example, is culturally Persian and, indeed, was once part of Iran. If the Islamic Republic makes a concerted effort to put a proxy in power there, it will likely succeed. They may also assert control over Farah and Nimruz, the other provinces with which they share a border. The same holds true for the Badakhshan region of northeastern Afghanistan that borders Tajikistan.

As Afghanistan’s neighbors become active and sponsor new proxies, it might take a year or two of low-intensity fighting with the Taliban before they establish their own zones of influence and once again divide Afghanistan as it was during the civil war period of the 1990s.

The wildcard is Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made no secret that he has no ideological problem with the Taliban’s extremist platform. Pre-Erdoğan Turkey helped support Turkic warlords in northern Afghanistan and provided medical and logistical support for them through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It is unclear whether Erdoğan will allow that to continue although it is more likely he will try to play both sides to maximum commercial advantage.

As for Pakistan, it is today is riding high but they may rue the day. The Taliban was an indigenous movement in 1994 that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency co-opted. The ISI did so because their former proxy, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was wildly unpopular and so the Taliban, at least initially, was a better option. But the Taliban are the ideological cousins to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan which is responsible for the deaths of thousands of Pakistani soldiers and civilians. Every country that has supported jihadism for export only has suffered blowback, and Pakistan will not be immune. The end of the American presence also means there is no force there to prevent anti-Taliban Afghans to take an insurgency and terror campaign into the Pakistani homeland. Indeed, Afghans with whom I spoke over the years have promised to do so.

In short, the Taliban may claim victory today but, for Afghanistan, they represent less the end of fighting than one chapter in a bloody history. Get ready for the next phase in the Afghan civil war.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Iran, Turkey, and the broader Middle East.

Image: Reuters

Mark Episkopos

Baltic Security,

NATO would have its work cut out for it. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: But if the Baltics have really been so vulnerable for so many years, why is it that the Russians have yet to attack?

Is NATO able to fend off a large-scale Russian invasion of the Baltic states? No, according to most experts.

A 2016 RAND Corporation report, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank,” conducted a series of wargames simulating a Russian assault on the Baltic states. The report reached an “unambiguous” conclusion: Russia’s Western Military District (WMD) can steamroll NATO’s most vulnerable members at a moment’s notice, reaching the outskirts of Tallinn or Riga-- the capitals of Estonia and Latvia, respectively-- in sixty hours or less.

The report, authored by David Shlapak and Michael Johnson, attributed NATO’s crushing defeat to what is an entirely lopsided correlation of forces. The WMD (and to a lesser extent, Kaliningrad) units that would take part in the invasion not only vastly outnumber their NATO counterparts, but are qualitatively superior in most respects. The WMD has received a slew of modern hardware over the past decade, inducing the S-400 missile system, the new T-72B3M main battle tank (MBT), and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV’s).

The report argues that NATO’s light and under-equipped Baltic assets are little match for Russia’s motorized heavy divisions. The tactical disparity is so great, posit the authors, that NATO infantry wouldn’t even be able to retreat successfully from the Russian onslaught and would instead find themselves “destroyed in place.” Even when accounting for the effective use of NATO air power that could inflict noticeable losses on advancing Russian forces, NATO simply lacks the conventional means to resist a full-scale Russian invasion of the Baltic states.

The report further argues that this “Fait Accompli” presents western leaders and NATO high command with three unpalatable options:

1) a bloody and likely abortive counteroffensive to retake the Baltics;

2) to threaten nuclear retaliation, with all of the escalatory risks that entail;

3) or to “concede at least temporary defeat,” thrusting the future of the alliance into question.

The report ends with a proposed course of action by which NATO can avoid the Fait Accompli altogether: a military buildup of about “about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades—adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities.” These forces are still not enough to defeat the Russian incursion outright but will deny Moscow a quick victory and impose severe losses on the invading army. The ensuing battle of attrition will favor the wealthier and more materially powerful west, establishing what the authors see as a sufficient deterrent against Russian aggression.

Five years later, the correlation of forces on NATO’s eastern flank has not drastically shifted. The Baltic states have gradually ramped up their defense spending and receive a steady stream of US military aid, but these modest measures are being offset by Russia’s continued military buildup on its western outskirts and in its Central European enclave of Kaliningrad. A 2021 paper, published by the Swedish Research Agency, largely replicated the 2016 RAND report’s conclusion that Russia’s military can overwhelm the Baltic region in a matter of days.

But if the Baltics have really been so vulnerable for so many years, why is it that the Russians have yet to attack?

Experts have noted that the likelihood of such an invasion remains exceedingly low under present circumstances, in large part because capability does not imply intent. It is indisputably true that Russia can annex the Baltic states with negligible short-term costs, but the avalanche of medium to long-term military, economic, and political consequences-- up to and including an escalatory spiral that could trigger WWIII-- far outstrips any of the dubious, ill-defined benefits that could possibly come from such an endeavor.

Mark Episkopos is the new national security reporter for the National Interest. This article first appeared earlier this year.

Image: Reuters.

Mark Episkopos

Hwasong Missiles, Asia

This is what three of North Korea’s most powerful ICBM models—the Hwasong 14, 15, and 16—are capable of doing.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Whereas a solid-fueled ICBM can be launched nearly at a moment’s notice, deploying a liquid-fueled missile can take as long as eighteen hours. This gap makes liquid-fueled missiles less survivable and limits their value as second-strike nuclear weapons.  

“The United States and its Asian allies regard North Korea as a grave security threat,” opened a recent Council on Foreign Relations report on the DPRK’s military capabilities. These concerns are not entirely misplaced; North Korea is believed to own a stockpile of around sixty nuclear weapons, including a powerful and steadily growing arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM’s). This is what three of North Korea’s most powerful ICBM models—the Hwasong 14, 15, and 16—are capable of doing.

Hwasong 14 

Hwasong-14 is a two-stage, liquid-fueled mobile ICBM, first test-launched in the summer of 2017. Hwasong-14’s single liquid-fueled engine seemingly bears wide-ranging similarities to its Hwasong-12 predecessor. North Korean authorities claimed the missile could “strike anywhere on earth”—although an obvious exaggeration, the Hwasong-14 does manage to set an important precedent. At a likely range of around 10,000 kilometers, it is the first North Korean missile capable of reaching mainland North America. This new range estimate is significantly revised from initial projections, which pointed to a significantly lower range of around 7,000 to 9,500 kilometers. The Hwasong-14 can deliver a payload of approximately 500-600 kilograms, according to the spectrum of western expert consensus. Though Hwasong-14 is a major leap forward for North Korean ICBM capabilities, the missile’s reliability has been called into question. As noted by the CSIS Missile Defense Project, “debate continues over the Hwasong-14’s reentry vehicle and whether it is capable of surviving the stresses associated with ICBM distance.”

Hwasong-15  

Hwasong-15 shares many technical characteristics with its Hwasong-14 counterpart—in particular, they appear to use similar propulsion systems. Still, the Hwasong-15 dwarfs its predecessor in most performance areas. It boasts a significantly greater range of around 13,000 kilometers and is capable of delivering a 1,000-kilogram payload; it also offers a substantially improved control system, allowing a greater degree of precision. Partly as a result of these performance upgrades, the missile is both larger and heavier than the Hwasong-14. It requires a nine-axle transporter erector launcher (TEL), as opposed to the eight-axle TEL of its predecessor.  

Hwasong-16 

North Korea unveiled its new “monster ICBM,” sometimes referred to as the Hwasong-16, at an October 2020 military parade commemorating the seventy-fifth anniversary of the North Korean Workers’ Party. At first glance, the missile appears to be a bigger and more capable successor to the Hwasong-15. In particular, the DPRK’s newest missile appears to support a much greater payload of around 2,000 to 3,000 kilograms. But the Hwasong-16 is, in some key ways, an apparent step backward for North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. The new missile’s colossal size requires a similarly large TEL—it can’t travel very far and only has a small number of available travel paths, making its movements more predictable. By comparison, the Hwasong-15 is markedly more mobile and is still perfectly capable of delivering catastrophic damage with its 1,000-kilogram payload—it has also been successfully tested at least once. Hwasong-16 is, like all its predecessors, liquid-fueled, defying the widespread expectations of western experts that North Korea is finally ready to make the leap to solid-fueled ICBM technology. Whereas a solid-fueled ICBM can be launched nearly at a moment’s notice, deploying a liquid-fueled missile can take as long as eighteen hours. This gap makes liquid-fueled missiles less survivable and limits their value as second-strike nuclear weapons.  

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest. This article first appeared earlier this year.

Image: Reuters

Mark Episkopos

military, Eurasia

Russian officials have not publicly revealed a firm production timeline, but the Tsirkon hypersonic missile is widely expected to enter service in coming years.  

Here's What You Need to Remember: The missile boasts an operational range in excess of one thousand kilometers and up to two thousand kilometers depending on the launch platform and operating circumstances, enough to put the U.S. Navy’s carrier strike groups at risk and to impede the ability of carrier wings to operate effectively.

Following months of speculation, Russian authorities have revealed the first vessel to receive the vaunted Tsirkon missile upgrade.  

A Russian defense industry insider source told TASS news that Admiral Golovko, the third frigate of the Project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov class, “will become the first standard carrier of Tsirkons.” This report has not been officially confirmed or corroborated as of the time of writing, but TASS is a major state news outlet with a long track record for reliable defense industry information. It was known for months that the Project 22350 line was one of the lead contenders for an early Tsirkon fitting; over the course of 2020, the upcoming missile was test-launched at least four times from the lead Project 22350 ship Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov. The TASS report contradicts prior speculation that the Kirov-class battlecruisers Petr Velikiy and Admiral Nakhimov were first in line to receive the Tsirkon upgrade as part of a larger weapons modernization program. The Admiral Gorshkov class is a line of fifteen modernized guided-missile frigates, displacing over five thousand tons and reaching top speeds of around twenty-nine knots. The frigates boast Russia’s latest Paket-E/NK anti-submarine/anti-torpedo system, along with a vertical launching system (VLS) for P-800 Oniks, 3M-54 Kalibr, and Tsirkon missiles. Of the fifteen planned Project 22350 frigates, two are active and the third—Admiral Golovko—has been laid down and is scheduled to enter service within the next several years.  

The 3M22 Tsirkon (also known as “Zircon”) is a winged, anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile with a reported speed of up to Mach 9 or roughly eleven thousand kilometers per hour. The missile was one of six new weapons unveiled by Russian president Vladimir Putin during his 2018 state-of-the-nation address. In addition to a wide range of surface ships, Tsirkon will be compatible with the new nuclear-powered Yasen-M cruise missile submarines.  

The missile boasts an operational range in excess of one thousand kilometers and up to two thousand kilometers depending on the launch platform and operating circumstances, enough to put the U.S. Navy’s carrier strike groups at risk and to impede the ability of carrier wings to operate effectively. Citing the missile’s sheer speed and ability to maneuver mid-flight, Russian military observers have argued that Tsirkon cannot be reliably intercepted by any tools currently available to NATO forces. Retired Russian Col. Mikhail Khodaernok posited in an op-ed published by RT that the Arleigh Burke-class missile destroyers’ current surface-to-air systems were designed to neutralize supersonic cruise missiles like those carried by older Russian warships, but cannot effectively counter hypersonic threats. “Given the very high cruise speed of this state-of-the-art Russian anti-ship missile (Mach 8 and over), a potential enemy’s surface-to-air or anti-missile systems will be rendered ineffective due to zero reaction time (the gap between the moment of threat detection and the launch of an intercepting missile),” he wrote. “In other words, you don’t have any time to react, because your ship gets hit right after the missile is detected.” 

Russian officials have not publicly revealed a firm production timeline, but the Tsirkon hypersonic missile is widely expected to enter service in coming years.  

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest. 

Image: Reuters

Mark Episkopos

military, Eurasia

Russia’s military is on the verge of accepting deliveries of its highly anticipated T-14 Armata tank.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The T-14 tank looks to be more than capable of giving NATO’s current MBTs a run for their money, but the tank has been unable to shake the cost concerns that have plagued the program since its inception. The Armata’s projected per-model cost of roughly $3.7 compares favorably against other fourth-generation platforms, particularly South Korea’s K2 Black Panther, but is still a major strain on Russia’s relatively modest defense budget.

Russia’s military is on the verge of accepting deliveries of its highly anticipated T-14 Armata tank. “The [tank’s] state trials will come to a close next year. It will actively go into serial production from next year,” Russia’s Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov told the state news outlet TASS. 

First unveiled at the 2015 Victory Day Parade in Moscow, the T-14 Armata is a fourth-generation main battle tank (MBT) that brings a wide array of cutting-edge design features to Russia’s ground forces. As noted by Jane’s Defence Weekly, Russia’s defense industry has been less than consistent in its messaging on the Armata tank’s production and development progress. Moscow previously planned to procure as many as 2,300 Armata tanks by 2020, a wildly optimistic estimate that was later pushed back to 2021 and then again to 2025. Manturov reportedly said on Russian state television in April 2020 that serial T-14 Armata deliveries would begin in 2021, seemingly contradicting his most recent statement to TASS. Manturov’s latest timetable appears to align with Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s announcement in March that Russia’s armed forces will take deliveries of a “pilot batch” of T-14 tank’s in 2022, confirming that the tank has been delayed by another year. 

The T-14 MBT weighs forty-eight tons and is capable of reaching speeds of up to ninety kilometers per hour. The T-14 tank features an unmanned turret scheme with an isolated crew capsule, boasting a twenty-five-millimeter 2A82-1M smoothbore gun with autoloader compatibility. Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov noted that the tank’s artificial-intelligence-powered weapons systems can handle the entire acquisition, tracking, and targeting process without any considerable degree of manual input. “The Armata crew does not need to aim accurately,” he said. “It only has to aim the gun roughly. Electronics will do all the rest: it will accurately determine the distance to the target and aim the gun at it. That is, the vehicle uses artificial intelligence elements that help the crew deliver fire.” Nevertheless, Chemezov added that only a human operator can make the final decision on whether or not to take the computer-calibrated shot. The tank also features the latest iteration of Russia’s advanced Malachit explosive-reactive armor and the Afghanit active protection system, the newest onboard digitized equipment, and reported quality-of-life features that include an on-board lavatory. The T-14 tank is based on Russia’s modular next-generation Armata Universal Combat Platform, which also includes the T-15 heavy infantry fighting vehicle and T-16 armored recovery vehicle 

The T-14 tank looks to be more than capable of giving NATO’s current MBTs a run for their money, but the tank has been unable to shake the cost concerns that have plagued the program since its inception. The Armata’s projected per-model cost of roughly $3.7 compares favorably against other fourth-generation platforms, particularly South Korea’s K2 Black Panther, but is still a major strain on Russia’s relatively modest defense budget. The Kremlin is eager to offset the tank’s long-term costs with a series of early export contracts, with Manturov telling TASS—without providing additional details about any possible ongoing negotiations—that several foreign states have expressed interest.

All the technical foundations for a cutting-edge MBT platform appear to be in place, but it remains to be seen if Moscow is able to reign in the T-14 tank’s costs as the tank enters serial production in coming years. 

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Mark Episkopos

T-60S,

In the end, the T-60S’ well-rounded performance and robust combat capabilities were not worth the risks stemming from its more eccentric construction choices.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Sukhoi T-60S project grew out of the older T-4 concept, a proposed Soviet reply to the XB-70 Valkyrie that never made it past the prototype stage.

One of the Soviet Union’s most ambitious postwar aircraft projects, the ill-fated T-60S bomber, offers a glimpse of the modern Russian bomber force that could have been.

In the mid-1980s, the Soviet military launched a procurement search for a new intermediate-range bomber to phase out its slew of aging aircraft. The early 1970’s Su-24 attack aircraft and Tu-22M strategic bomber were most in need of a replacement, but Soviet authorities were also interested in laying long-term plans for a versatile, modernized bomber platform to succeed the newer Tu-22M3.

The Sukhoi T-60S project grew out of the older T-4 concept, a proposed Soviet reply to the XB-70 Valkyrie that never made it past the prototype stage. The T-60S project was shrouded in secrecy since its inception, and many of the details surrounding its rocky development remain classified to this day. Still, it is widely believed that the T-60S is a variable geometry swing aircraft, equipped with two-dimensional thrust vectoring nozzles. The latter change is meant to mitigate control instability at high speeds, one of the chief problems confronting the prior T-4MS program. Capable of supercruising at Mach 2 and boasting a takeoff weight of roughly ninety tons, the T-60S is significantly lighter and marginally faster than the Tu-22M3. There were reports that the T-60S was to utilize new stealth features for enhanced deep penetration capabilities, though the precise nature of these efforts remains unclear.  

Boasting a combat range of 2,200 km, the T-60S was believed to carry a payload of up to 20,000 kg. The bomber’s armaments included cruise missiles from the Kh-101 and Kh-55/65 series, a large catalog of guided munitions, and conventional as well as nuclear unguided bombs—this makes the T-60S similar to the Tu-22M3 in armament configuration, albeit the latter boasts a noticeably larger payload of 24,000 kg.

A T-60S prototype was slated to undergo flight tests in 1996, with the bomber scheduled to enter service in 2003. The collapse of the Soviet Union put a swift end to these plans, with the project facing outright cancellation in the early 1990s. Still, there were some signs to suggest that the T-60S project was headed for technical disaster irrespective of the Soviet collapse. Sukhoi engineers apparently struggled to implement some of the T-60S’ unique design decisions, including controversial changes made to the wing construction.

In the end, the T-60S’ well-rounded performance and robust combat capabilities were not worth the risks stemming from its more eccentric construction choices. The Kremlin decided, not without sound reason, that the Su-34 fighter-bomber was a safer bet. The Su-34 has gone on to become a staple of Russia’s strike fighter forces, with as many as 120 models currently in service and several waves of modernization packages planned in coming years. Likewise, the upcoming Tu-22M3M—one of the handful of Russian aircraft confirmed to be compatible with the new, nuclear-capable Mach 10-speed Kh-47 “Kinzhal” missile—is slated to enter service this year.

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for The National Interest. This article first appeared earlier this year.

Image: Wikipedia.

Ethen Kim Lieser

Child Tax Credit, Americas

Roughly four million children from low-income families are at risk of missing out on the recurring monthly payments if the tax agency does not receive pertinent personal and financial information on time.

The Internal Revenue Service and the U.S. Treasury Department announced on Friday that the second batch of advance monthly payments worth about $15 billion from the expanded child tax credits were issued to thirty-six million families. 

The agencies added that “like the first payments, the vast majority of families will receive these payments by direct deposit,” according to an IRS press statement.

However, “the IRS wants to alert some recipients who received direct deposits in July that they will receive the August payments by mail. Due to an issue expected to be resolved by the September payments, a percentage of these recipients—less than 15 percent—who received payments by direct deposit in July will be mailed paper checks for the August payment. For those affected, no additional action is needed for the September payment to be issued by direct deposit,” the statement explained.

The next payments are slated to head out on the fifteenth of every month through December.  

Focus on Low-Income Households 

The IRS has also made it known that “it’s not too late for low-income families to sign up for advance CTC payments,” urging people to take advantage of the Non-filer Sign-up Tool that will give the IRS the necessary information—such as an address and routing and bank account numbers—to promptly disburse the funds.

Being able to reach the nation’s poorest households has been a primary goal of the agency, and in an effort to achieve that, it has partnered with nonprofit organizations, churches, and community groups to get the word out regarding the new tax credits.

“This important new tax change affects millions of families across the nation, and the IRS wants to do everything it can to help people get the payments,” IRS Wage & Investment Commissioner Ken Corbin, who also serves as the agency’s Chief Taxpayer Experience Officer, noted in a press statement. “Many people miss out on tax benefits simply because they don’t file a tax return.”

A report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities suggests that about four million children from low-income families are at risk of missing out on the recurring monthly payments if the tax agency does not get that necessary personal and financial information on time.

Payments Broken Down

These child tax credit payments—seen by many as being similar to another round of stimulus checks—were approved under President Joe Biden’s highly ambitious American Rescue Plan, which now allows eligible parents to receive as much as $3,600 per year for a child under the age of six and up to $3,000 for children between ages six and seventeen.

Broken down, what this all means is that a $250 or a $300 payment for each child will be deposited into the bank accounts of parents each and every month through the end of 2021—and possibly for years to come if the American Families Plan is ever green-lighted by Congress.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.  

Image: Reuters

Mark Episkopos

Guns,

Kimber’s 1911 lineup is a remarkable achievement in diversity and versatility, revitalizing a 110-year-old platform with a dizzying array of performance improvements and customization options.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Founded in 1979, Kimber Manufacturing is a Troy, Alabama-based small arms manufacturer. Kimber spent the 1980’s striving to define itself in a highly saturated market, first dabbling in a wide spectrum of .22 LR products. Toward the end of the twentieth century, Kimber had found its niche: breathing new life into the 1911 platform.

One of the most prolific handgun designs in U.S. firearms history, the 1911 has spawned countless models over the twentieth- and early twenty-first century. But few manufacturers have done as much as Kimber to keep the 1911 relevant as a modern pistol platform. Here what makes Kimber’s 1911 line special.

First, some context. The original Colt M1911 has its roots in 1890’s efforts to design a “self-loading,” or semi-automatic, pistol. As its name suggests, the M1911 was adopted by the U.S. army just three years prior to the onset of World War I. The M1911 is a single-action, .45 ACP-chambered, short recoil-operated pistol that rose to prominence through its usage as a prolific military sidearm not only during the two world wars, but also in the Korean and Vietnam wars. The pistol has seen minor revisions throughout the century, but the core 1911 design has stayed remarkably consistent—for better and for worse. Both the consumer and military handgun markets have changed dramatically since the early twentieth century, and the 1911 has sometimes struggled to keep pace with the relentless handling, ergonomics, and reliability innovations of competing platforms. That’s where Kimber comes in.

Founded in 1979, Kimber Manufacturing is a Troy, Alabama-based small arms manufacturer. Kimber spent the 1980’s striving to define itself in a highly saturated market, first dabbling in a wide spectrum of .22 LR products. Toward the end of the twentieth century, Kimber had found its niche: breathing new life into the 1911 platform. Since then, the company has earned a well-deserved reputation as a leading 1911 manufacturer.

“Kimber builds the world’s finest 1911 pistols right here in America—something that makes sense, as few things are as American as a 1911 .45 ACP,” reads Kimber’s introduction to its vast online catalog of 1911-style firearms.

Kimber’s design approach to its 1911 lineup hinges first and foremost on customizability. Those looking for a conventional 1911 format should feel right at home with the top-selling Stainless II .45 ACP family, offering checkered grips, fiber optics front sights, and a stainless steel construction. From there, Kimber offers enthusiasts, collectors, and specialists numerous options for a bespoke 1911 experience. Armed with pre-mounted 6.8-inch venom optic red dot sights, improved feed ramp, and host of ergonomic changes, the Kimber Aegis Elite Custom Optic Installed (OI) is a high-performance option that oozes quality at its price point. The 1911 CDP is a plug-and-play personal defense solution that comes with some custom features including a commander-style hammer and three-dot night sights, while the Super Jagare is a 10mm, 1911 hunting pistol. Speaking of calibers, a great chunk of Kimbers’ 1911 range comes with 9mm— and somewhat less commonly, 10mm—choices in addition to the traditional .45 ACP option. Finally, the special edition lineup will appeal to handgun collectors and consumers seeking a particular aesthetic. The Amethyst, Sapphire, and Rose Gold personal defense pistols are nothing if not visually striking; meanwhile, the new Rapide (Black Ice) is a somewhat more subdued performance option for enthusiasts looking to make a strong statement.

Kimber’s 1911 lineup is a remarkable achievement in diversity and versatility, revitalizing a 110-year-old platform with a dizzying array of performance improvements and customization options. If you’re in the market for a 1911-style pistol, Kimber quite likely has you covered.

Mark Episkopos is the national security reporter for the National Interest.

This piece first appeared earlier this year and is being reprinted due to reader interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Mark Episkopos

M1 Abrams,

Poland isn't messing around. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: There is little question that their acquisition will substantially enhance the capabilities of Poland’s ground forces in a pitched conflict with Russia.

Poland’s defense minister Mariusz Błaszczak has confirmed the country’s plans to buy as many as 250 M1A2 Abrams SEPv3 main battle tanks (MBTs). The announcement follows prior reports indicating that Warsaw is looking to refresh its aging stock T-72 and PT-91 tanks with a modernized MBT platform.

The first M1A2 shipments are scheduled to be delivered to the Polish military as early as 2022, according to Polish officials. Reuters reported that the contract is worth 23.3 billion zlotys—or $6 billion—and includes an additional logistics/training package that’s focused on infrastructure upgrades and ammunition procurements.

Whereas most arms import contracts are typically framed in diplomatically neutral terms, Błaszczak did not mince words in describing the reason behind Poland MBT purchase: "Of course this is a response to the challenges we face in terms of international security. Our task is to deter a potential aggressor. We all know where that aggressor is,” he said, in what is a clear reference to Russia.

Not only did Błaszczak cite a specific adversary, but he went as far as to identify the exact Russian product that Poland’s new M1A2’s are intended to counteract: “So we are ordering the most modern tanks. Tanks available in the best-equipped version, tanks that are combat-proven, tanks which were constructed to counter the most modern Russian T-14 Armata tanks,” he said. The SEPv3 revision introduced across-the-board improvements to the tried-and-true M1 Abrams formula, bringing a new radio system, revised infrared (FLIR) systems for enhanced target acquisition, a new electronic warfare system, auxiliary power unit for increased efficiency, and more. The T-14 Armata is Russia’s next-generation MBT platform, notably boasting an unmanned turret design with a 125-millimeter 2A82-1M smoothbore gun featuring autoloader compatibility.

Earlier this year, the Polish military conducted a massive wargame against the Western Military District—arguably the most capable and best-equipped of Russia’s five military districts.  Dubbed “Winter-20,” the wargame involved Patriot missile systems, M142 HIMARS rocket launcher systems, and other examples of Poland’s latest military hardware. The outcome was nothing short of a crushing defeat. Poland’s Air Force and Navy were rapidly degraded and destroyed, while the country’s front-line battalions suffered a staggering loss rate of sixty to eighty percent. The original plan envisioned a twenty-two-day timeframe for repelling the Russian assault but, by the fifth day, Russian troops were already fighting for control of Warsaw on the Vistula River.

The specifics of the wargame remain unknown, with the Polish government telling reporters that  “the winter exercise, its course and conclusions are classified information.” It is unclear whether or not T-14 Armata tanks, which are currently too few in number to make a meaningful battlefield impact, took part in the Winter-20 simulation. Given the confidentiality of the exercise, it is likewise impossible to assess the impact that 250 M1A2 SEPv3 tanks could have had on the course of the wargame. Though it is difficult to see exactly how these tanks could have altered the outcome of the wargame, there is little question that their acquisition will substantially enhance the capabilities of Poland’s ground forces in a pitched conflict with Russia. There may also be potential political benefits, with experts arguing that the purchase sends a clear message to Moscow about Washington’s commitment to NATO’s deterrence mission.

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for The National Interest.

Image: Reuters

Mark Episkopos

F-35, Americas

“This year we’re going to fully unleash the full maneuvering envelope of the F-35. This airplane just takes the flight controls, and puts it on a whole different level.”

Here's What You Need to Remember: “The stuff you see at the airshow is really awesome, but it doesn’t even touch the tip of the iceberg of what this airplane is...you’re talking stealth, you’re talking sensor fusion, and then ‘information fusion… we can paint the battlespace for everybody and share that situational awareness with our fourth-generation brothers and sisters and be a more effective fighting force.”

In a potential preview of the team’s fresh routines for its upcoming shows, a highly-circulated 2019 video depicts Capt. Andrew "Dojo" Olson performing an impressive series of maneuvers never-before-seen by an F-35 demo pilot.

The videos, first posted to Instagram, show snippets from one of Olson’s training sessions at Luke Airforce Base (AFB) in Arizona. The first video shows Olson approaching from the left, flying straight up in what is vaguely reminiscent of the first half of a stall turn; but then, Olson pulls back and executes a remarkably tight loop before descending in a slow, flat spin. The remaining clips show Olson flying at a high angle of attack (AOA), performing tighter oops, and demonstrating what appears to be part of a falling leaf maneuver.

It was revealed late last year that Capt. Olson left the F-35A demo team, having given his last performance at Nellis AFB, Las Vegas, in November 2019. These videos, and others like it that are regularly covered by the National Interest, show just how far the F-35A demo team has come in refining their routines since their initial debut at the Paris Airshow in 2017.

Olson played a central role in the public relations campaign to restore public faith in the F-35 project on the heels of reported engine problems, onboard systems malfunctions, and widespread cost concerns, going out of his way to convince a skeptical defense commentary sphere that the F-35A demo team has barely begun to scrape the surface of the fighter’s performance potential: “This year we’re going to fully unleash the full maneuvering envelope of the F-35. This airplane just takes the flight controls, and puts it on a whole different level. We’ll be able to do some similar maneuvers that [F-22] Raptor does, and without thrust vectoring, just with the advanced flight controls that put the aircraft into a post-stall flight regime and keep it fully controllable,” he said in an interview given last year to The Aviationist, while also stressing the F-35’s under-the-hood features that are otherwise overlooked in the airshow format: “The stuff you see at the airshow is really awesome, but it doesn’t even touch the tip of the iceberg of what this airplane is...you’re talking stealth, you’re talking sensor fusion, and then ‘information fusion… we can paint the battlespace for everybody and share that situational awareness with our fourth-generation brothers and sisters and be a more effective fighting force.”

As if that wasn’t enough, Olson has also become the face of a surprisingly successful social media and branding campaign to marshall grassroots enthusiasm for the F-35 program.

It remains to be seen to what extent the maneuvers depicted in these clips, as well as the rest of Olson’s 2019 lineup, will be absorbed into the F-35 demo team’s 2020 routine, beginning with their first airshow at the Marine Corps Air Station at Yuma, Arizona, in March 13-14, and subsequent March 21-22 performance at Luke AFB.

Olson will go on to become an F-35 instructor at Luke AFB, but not before helping the incoming F-35 demo team ease into their new jobs. It’s clear that Olson’s successor, who was yet to be named by the 388th Fighter Wing, has quite the shoes to fill—not just in a highly demanding technical capacity, but as a brand ambassador for the F-35 program.

Mark Episkopos is a frequent contributor to The National Interest. Mark is also a PhD student in History at American University. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Robert W. Merry

Government Spending,

In the long struggle between the managerial oligarchs of the federal leviathan state and the ordinary folks who have been resisting their power accumulation, the managerial oligarchs may have positioned themselves for the ultimate kill. 

The economic debate unfolding in Congress over President Joe Biden’s massive spending plans is much more far-reaching and consequential than most people realize, even most people in Washington engaged in the fight. It isn’t just about the numbers or the potential inflationary impact from the magnitude of spending that Biden wants or the extent of the sway that Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.) has over the Democratic Party. At its foundation, it represents an ongoing epic struggle over the nature of the American political system, a struggle that has been at the center of American politics ever since President Franklin Roosevelt unveiled the New Deal.  

Its focus is the extent of the federal government’s scope, reach, and power to intervene in the daily lives of Americans and into their economic activities. We seem to be at an inflection point in that long struggle.  

To understand it, we must understand its context, extending back to 1941 and the publication of James Burnham’s pivotal study, The Managerial Revolution: What Is Happening in the World. Much has been written about Burnham in conservative journals of recent years. But his treatise bears noting here as early recognition of a cultural phenomenon of vast significance—the emergence of a new elite structure in America and a new power clash attending that emergence.  

Burnham argued that the great development of the twentieth century wasn’t the competition of Communism vs. Capitalism, as many at the time believed, but rather the rise of a new managerial class of business executives, technocrats, soldiers, government bureaucrats, and various kinds of experts in various kinds of organizations. He predicted that this managerial elite would face resistance from traditional elements of the country but would successfully embed itself into the folds of American society and use its growing power to protect itself from societal adversaries bent on curtailing its reach. Also, the power-enhancement impulse led inevitably to a growing faith in socialism among the new managerial elites who needed a justification for ever greater power accumulation in the name of helping people.  

History has demonstrated that Burnham’s thesis was correct in many respects. To the extent that the American polity is today an oligarchy (as many believe), it is such because of that managerial revolution that elevated the oligarchs to their current dominance. But Burnham was wrong about one significant element of his vision--in the extent to which he believed the oligarchs of the federal government would entrench themselves in the bureaucracy sufficiently to fend off the political opposition and rule at will.  

It never quite happened. Although Democratic presidents (and some Republican ones as well) have sought consistently to aggrandize federal power, and Lyndon Johnson did so with considerable abandon following his landslide 1964 election victory, the managerial bureaucrats always seemed to run up against political forces that curtailed their most extensive big-government plans.  

Even Roosevelt had to downgrade his domestic ambitions following the fiasco of his “court packing” effort in 1937. While the American people thoroughly supported his New Deal transfer of power to the federal government through his first-term legislative blitz, his audacious political assault on the Supreme Court frightened enough voters and siphoned off enough support that further New Deal expansion became impossible. Besides, Roosevelt was turning his attention more and more to the international scene in any event.  

Roosevelt’s successor, Harry Truman, while a thorough New Dealer, didn’t build on the Roosevelt legacy to any significant extent, and his effort to get through Congress major health-insurance legislation fell flat.  

As for President Lyndon B. Johnson, no one can downplay the magnitude of his federal power enlargement through multifarious bills that essentially redefined federalism. Much of it was designed to address the nation’s unfinished business of guaranteeing civil rights to black Americans and protecting their voting rights. But, with total command over Congress, he went much further in fostering enactment of Medicare, Medicaid, the Equal Opportunity Act, and a host of direct-benefit programs in areas such as housing, education, and nutrition.  

All in all, it certainly fit the Burnham thesis. But much of the Johnson domestic-policy legacy proved destabilizing. Coupled with the severe political fallout from the president’s Vietnam debacle, this led to feelings that much of the president’s leadership had failed.  The civil rights initiatives couldn’t prevent rage-filled race riots in American cities that led to scores of deaths. Johnson’s ill-fated decision to protect his Great Society spending while also paying for the Vietnam War led to highly problematic inflationary pressures. Troublesome deficits led the president to push for an unpopular income tax surcharge, eventually passed by Congress as the Johnson presidency disintegrated in the spring of 1968.  

That led to the election of Richard Nixon, a bit of a managerial type himself. But Nixon sought to separate himself from the Democratic power enhancers by crafting federal benefit programs, such as revenue sharing and the Family Assistance Plan, that didn’t significantly enlarge federal bureaucratic power. We’ll never know if that could have proved to be a successful approach because Nixon’s great Watergate transgressions destroyed his presidency.  

The next Democratic president, Jimmy Carter, couldn’t muster enough popular support to get through Congress any major domestic-policy legislation, and so he left the size and scope of the federal government pretty much as they had been when he took power. But his failures in office, especially the deadly mix of simultaneous recession and inflation, proved to be so threatening that the American people turned against the federal government and against any initiatives designed to enhance its power.  

That led to Ronald Reagan, the greatest skeptic of federal power to reach the White House since Roosevelt. While he insisted he didn’t want to undo the New Deal, he unabashedly sought to roll back as much of Johnson’s Great Society as he could. As New York’s Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan repeatedly complained prior to his death, Reagan cut taxes to curtail federal spending. This was only partly true; he also sought to spur production as a way of sopping up those excess inflationary dollars and producing noninflationary economic growth. Reagan excoriated out-of-control government for causing the country’s ills and said that returning power to the people and the states would prove to be the solution. 

Reagan backed up his rhetoric with presidential success in bringing down inflation (with much help from Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker), spurring economic growth, and undoing much of the federal regulatory regimen. He changed the terms of domestic-policy debate, and that contributed to his success--and his popularity.  

But he didn’t roll back much of the Great Society. As Burnham had foreseen, federal power had become too entrenched by that time. He had to content himself with merely curbing its further entrenchment and creating a political environment in which further federal power enhancement would be difficult.  

He succeeded in that goal, as evidenced in the presidency of Bill Clinton, who entered the Oval Office saying he intended to repeal Reaganism and within two years altered that pronouncement to, “The era of big government is over.” In between came the 1994 midterm elections in which Clinton had his head handed to him following his failed attempt to get a major health insurance bill through Congress, for which he lacked a sufficient electoral mandate. Acknowledging Reagan’s legacy, Clinton served the following six years as a generally successful president governing from the center-left.  

Finally, there was Barack Obama, who enacted his big Affordable Care Act despite widespread opposition but who failed in efforts to pass a major energy bill, took a “shellacking” at the next midterm election, lost his mandate for further major legislation, and coasted through the remainder of his presidency without any further major accomplishments. His first term, a mild success, assured his reelection; his second term, a mild failure, gave America Donald Trump.  

What this shows that the one great impediment to excessive federal power accumulation throughout the last ninety years has been the American people and the politicians they sent to Washington. No president since Roosevelt has governed successfully from the far left. Johnson pulled off a series of major power-enhancement initiatives, but his success in doing so ultimately was undermined by his failures, some of them attributable directly to his power-grabbing ways.  

Now comes Biden, along with Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), with every intention of upending the decades-long balance of power between the forces of big-government socialism and the forces opposed to that kind of power enhancement. And the big-government players appear to have substantial prospects for reaching their goal. They may not have an electoral mandate, but they make up for it in brazen resolve.   

The key is entitlement programs, those that spend automatically based on eligibility. These thoroughly entrenched programs—Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Food Stamps, etc.—are almost impossible to curtail or even reform, and they always seem to grow inexorably. Already the nation’s entitlement structure constitutes “the largest money-shuffling machine in human history,” as John Cogan and Daniel Heil of Stanford’s Hoover Institution wrote in the Wall Street Journal. Now, Democrats want to expand the nation’s entitlement reach to some twenty-one million additional Americans.  

Such a broad expansion in federal largess, the largest since Johnson, would constitute not just a major new thrust in income redistribution but also a major thrust in the distribution of governmental power. According to Cogan and Heil, the Biden initiative would increase the numbers of American households on entitlement rolls to more than 50 percent, while adding $1 trillion to the national debt over a decade.  

The obvious aim of the Biden team is to get as many Americans on the federal dole as possible, including middle-class Americans who don’t need such a dependency status but who, it is hoped, will be lured to the Democratic fold by the illusion of getting something for nothing. Indeed, Cogan and Heil estimate that 40 percent of the new entitlement benefits would go to households in the upper half of the nonelderly income-distribution scale.  

Among the items on the list: extending the child-care tax credit; universal pre-kindergarten funding; tuition-free community college; major expansions in Medicare, including a possible lowering of the eligibility age; expansions in the Affordable Care Act; federally financed wage subsidies to cover time off to care for new babies or sick relatives; and more. The concept of personal self-reliance isn’t to be seen anywhere in this program.  

America’s entitlement structure already is under severe financial strain because of decades of mismanagement. In a little more than a decade, according to the latest Social Security Trustee Report, the trust fund that pays out retirement and survivor benefits will be unable to meet its entitlement commitments. Based on current projections, benefits would have to be cut by 25 percent to maintain trust fund solvency. The pandemic could require further cuts. 

And yet now the Biden team wants to layer on ever greater entitlement commitments while absorbing another $1 trillion in federal debt.  

This isn’t about helping people. It’s about power, as Burnham perceived so clearly eighty years ago. In the long struggle between the managerial oligarchs of the federal leviathan state and the ordinary folks who have been resisting their power accumulation, the managerial oligarchs may have positioned themselves for the ultimate kill.   

Robert W. Merry, former Congressional Quarterly CEO and the National Interest editor, is the author of five books on American history and foreign policy, including most recently President McKinley: Architect of the American Century.

Image: Reuters

Trevor Filseth

Coronavirus,

Florida has been hit particularly hard by the virus. Its hospital admission rate, formerly around 1,100 cases per day in January, has now increased to more than 2,000. By comparison, Texas’s daily rate is 1,403, and California’s is 772.

The United States has faced an increased load of COVID-19 cases as the summer has progressed, owing mostly to the prevalence of the highly infectious Delta variant. To date, more than 600,000 Americans have died from the virus, out of 4.3 million deaths worldwide.

While the vaccination program in the United States, which the Biden administration regards as essential for fighting against the spread of the disease, was initially very successful in its rollout, the number of Americans receiving new vaccine shots has trended steadily downward over the summer, at the same time that cases have increased. So far, around fifty-eight percent of the vaccine-eligible population, including all Americans aged twelve and up, are fully vaccinated against the virus.

One telling statistic has been the increasingly divergent new case rate between states that have actively pushed for strict COVID-19 lockdown measures, such as mask mandates and restrictions on unvaccinated Americans, and states that have actively discouraged these measures, such as South Dakota, Texas, and Florida. All three state governments have strongly opposed allowing local authorities to enforce mask mandates, which the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have argued can significantly decrease the transmission of the virus. 

The result has been that California, which reintroduced coronavirus lockdowns only a month after lifting them in June, has reported 141.1 new COVID-19 cases per 100,000 residents over the last week—only half of Texas’s transmission rate, at 297.8 cases, and less than one-fourth of Florida’s, at 653.8.

Florida has been hit particularly hard by the virus. Its hospital admission rate, formerly around 1,100 cases per day in January, has now increased to more than 2,000. By comparison, Texas’s daily rate is 1,403, and California’s is 772.

The White House highlighted that Florida had more COVID-19 cases than the thirty states reporting the lowest new case rates. Much of this discrepancy comes from Florida’s relatively high population, although its per capita infection rate is still one of the highest in the United States.

California’s lower rate is mostly explained by the enforcement of its health and safety guidelines by Sacramento, and by the mask mandates in California’s most populated areas, including Los Angeles County. Furthermore, more than three-fourths of eligible Californians have been vaccinated, compared to 57 percent in Florida and 53.7 percent in Texas.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

Trevor Filseth

Retirement, Americas

While it is possible to live on nothing except Social Security payments, the limited quality of life that they provide is not what many people hope for in their retirement.

When Americans reach retirement age, it is expected that they will file for Social Security, which pays a reliable monthly benefit for the rest of their life. The program, created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as part of the New Deal in 1935, was regarded as an effective anti-poverty program for elderly Americans, and quickly became one of the most popular government programs in the United States. It still is; according to AARP, a senior citizens’ advocacy group, 96 percent of Americans want to continue or increase the payments.

However, while Social Security unquestionably keeps elderly Americans out of poverty, its ability to provide for them above a basic level is limited. The income from the benefits is designed to replace 40 percent of a person’s pre-retirement income, according to the Social Security Administration itself. But 40 percent of one’s pre-retirement income is not enough for most Americans to live comfortably on, especially without other sources of money.

There are some ways that this income can be supplemented. A key way is to wait as long as possible to claim benefits. Waiting until the age of seventy to file for Social Security, for instance, can increase the monthly payments by 25 to 30 percent. Retiring later can also help a person increase the size of their benefits, since the monthly amount is based on the thirty-five highest-paying years of a person’s career and most people make more money at the end of their careers than at the beginning.

Even so, these tricks can only increase the amount by so far. While it is possible to live on nothing except Social Security payments, the limited quality of life that they provide is not what many people hope for in their retirement. To enjoy a more comfortable retirement, it is vital for families to save money and create a nest egg.

There are several ways that this can be done, but the two most effective are by opening a 401(k) and a Roth IRA account during one’s career. Although these differ slightly, they are both essentially tax-free retirement accounts that can be invested during one’s life. Although they cannot be withdrawn until a person’s retirement, they can grow considerably if invested in a relatively safe fund with a reasonable rate of return—such as an S&P 500 index fund, which averages a return of 10 percent per year.

Consider the following. If a person is able to save $5,000 per year from the age of twenty-five until the age of seventy and deposit it into a Roth IRA with an average yearly return of 8 percent, by the age of seventy, they will be sitting on more than $2 million, although this amount will decrease somewhat in real terms because of inflation.

Even if the annual deposit is decreased to only $2,000, the amount is still more than $800,000—and in both scenarios, the retirees will receive Social Security payments on top of this.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for The National Interest.

Image: Reuters.

Mark Episkopos

SR-72,

The SR-72 is the planned successor to the SR-71, the iconic Cold War-era reconnaissance plane that shattered world records for the fastest manned airbreathing jet engine aircraft.

Here's What You Need To Know: It remains to be seen whether or not Lockheed manages to secure the considerable funding required to mass-produce a product as complex and cutting-edge as the SR-72, especially when it’s unclear what specific, pressing operational purpose it is supposed to fill.

Long a source of speculation throughout the defense commentary sphere, the SR-72 “Son of Blackbird” next-generation drone has been mired in mystery for over a decade.

The SR-72 is the planned successor to the SR-71, the iconic Cold War-era reconnaissance plane that shattered world records for the fastest manned airbreathing jet engine aircraft. Initial reports emerged as early as 2007, but it was only in 2013 that Lockheed Martin official Robert Weiss publicly confirmed that the company had made significant headway into developing a hypersonic plane that he called the “SR-72.” Lockheed Martin proceeded to release widely shared concept art for the project—the SR-72 appears to be an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), boasting a groundbreaking purported top speed approaching Mach 6.

In yet another difference with its manned SR-71 predecessor, the SR-72 is a reconnaissance and surveillance craft that doubles as a strike weapon. The UAV will reportedly support hypersonic armaments such as Lockheed Martin’s High Speed Strike Weapon (HSSW), making the SR-72 a potent tool for delivering precision strikes against agile or otherwise hard-to-reach targets.

Following a four-year information drought, Lockheed Martin dropped the announcement that the SR-72 will enter development by the early 2020s. Lockheed rationalized this prolonged interlude on the grounds that the technologies required to produce a plane that fast were not yet sufficiently mature: “Without the digital transformation the aircraft you see there could not have been made. In fact, five years ago, it could not have been made,” said Lockheed Vice President Jack O’Banion, referencing an artist’s SR-72 rendering presented at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics’ annual SciTech Forum in 2018. O’Banion’s statement seemed to imply that an SR-72 prototype or concept demonstrator already exists, prompting fevered interest from defense observers. Lockheed refused to clarify his comments, adding to what increasingly seems to be the company’s purposely cultivated aura of mystery surrounding the SR-72.

“We couldn’t have made the engine itself—it would have melted down into slag if we had tried to produce it five years ago,” O’Banion added. “But now we can digitally print that engine with an incredibly sophisticated cooling system integral into the material of the engine itself, and have that engine survive for multiple firings for routine operation.”

Lockheed Martin maintains that an SR-72 concept demonstrator will take to the skies by the mid-2020s, possibly entering service as soon as 2030. However, unanswered questions—and serious design challenges—linger. For one, it remains unclear exactly how the SR-72 is piloted; will it be operated in real-time by remote pilots, or will it boast a sufficiently robust artificial intelligence (AI) suite to run missions with either no or minimal manual control? Further still, scramjet engine development is notoriously costly and complex. It will likely take many years and colossal investment for a possible SR-72 prototype to be realized as a serially-produced model.

It remains to be seen whether or not Lockheed manages to secure the considerable funding required to mass-produce a product as complex and cutting-edge as the SR-72, especially when it’s unclear what specific, pressing operational purpose it is supposed to fill. From sophisticated satellite surveillance methods to the next-generation B-21 bomber and Northrop Grumman’s new RQ-180 stealth drone, the U.S. military seems to have somewhat covered many of the individual capabilities being offered by the SR-72.

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest.

This piece first appeared earlier this month and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikipedia.