The National Interest

James Holmes

Australia,

A permanent American military installation in the land down under would bring a number of advantages. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: Australia occupies a central position midway along the arc between Japan and Bahrain, at the seam between the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean where the U.S. presence is thinnest. Forces based there could swing from side to side as circumstances warrant. Australia lies just outside the embattled South China Sea, a major prospective battleground.

Some ideas are worth broaching even when it’s plain no one will act on them instantly, in whole, or even in part. They make sense even when vagaries of politics or strategy may rule out implementing them. They force people to think—and on occasion, the times catch up with the idea. Case in point: back in 2011 my wingman Toshi Yoshihara and I bruited about the idea of basing U.S. naval forces in Australia. We went big. Under our proposal, an aircraft-carrier expeditionary strike group or another heavy-hitting fleet contingent would call some Australian seaport home.

That would make Oz a U.S. naval hub on par with Japan, where Yokosuka and Sasebo play host to the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

The idea occasioned some buzz in policy circles, and it was more than whimsy. There is a historical precedent. After all, Australia acted as an unsinkable aircraft carrier during the Second World War. It was a staging point floating just outside imperial Japan’s “Southern Resource Area” in the South China Sea. Fremantle, in Western Australia, offered safe haven to U.S. Navy submarines sent forth to raid Japanese mercantile and naval shipping. The ledger of Australian contributions to Allied victory unrolls virtually without bound.

Yet folk in Canberra cast gimlet eyes on our proposal. Australians are redoubtable allies. They also understand that they will have to live with China forever—and that a Communist China that saw Australia take league with the United States against China would be a wrathful China indeed. That prospect gives them pause. Nor was it obvious back then that China would pose a threat of Japanese magnitude. Hence officialdom in Canberra was reluctant to take sides in an incipient rivalry until forced to it. This made prudent strategy for the days when Beijing could wage a charm offensive without provoking snickers.

That was then.

Since 2011 Beijing has taken to glowering at Pacific neighbors as opposed to carrying on smile diplomacy meant to convince them of Chinese beneficence. It claims waters apportioned to neighboring coastal states as its own, flouts international tribunals that overrule its claims, and deploys a maritime militia embedded within the fishing fleet alongside a muscular coast guard and navy to cow outmatched coastal states into submission. Might, it seems, now makes right for China’s leadership. “Sharp” diplomacy, to use the latest gimmicky phrase, has ousted smile diplomacy from China’s Beijing’s strategic toolkit.

China has come to look like an aggressor on par with Imperial Japan in terms of physical capability if not—yet—malign intent.

At last Beijing may have supplied sufficient incentive for Canberra to set aside its misgivings toward permitting a standing foreign presence on its soil. In fact, it has been doing so by increments for years now. U.S. Marine contingents now regularly rotate through the northerly harbor of Darwin, if on a token scale amounting to some 2,500 troops. Stars & Stripes reports that Australian and American air forces are working together with newfound intimacy. Aviators are integrating stealth aircraft into collaborative endeavors, cooperating on aircraft maintenance, and practicing medical evacuations.

These are workmanlike yet portentous developments. Such efforts pay dividends in peacetime while preparing the allies to fight cohesively in wartime. They bolster “interoperability” not just between allied hardware but between allied tactics, techniques, and procedures. Interoperability, then, is a material and human thing. And from a political standpoint, investing in pricey deployments proves that Washington has skin in the game of great-power strategic competition. Being a trustworthy ally means convincing others you will keep your commitments. That means convincing them you will—and must—share the risks, hazards, and costs inherent in martial enterprises.

Words are fine. Putting your own people, national treasure, military hardware, and reputation in harm’s way lends credence to promises in a way the most dulcet-toned diplomacy never could.

By contrast, those who refuse to share danger are apt to skedaddle when the going gets tough. Or as Nassim Taleb puts it: “Never trust anyone who doesn’t have skin in the game. Without it, fools and crooks will benefit.” Let’s not be fools or crooks. Doubt will linger in allied minds unless they regard American commitments as irrevocable, but U.S. deployments to Oz are skin in the game. Stationing military forces overseas inspires trust. In turn, an unbreakable bond between America and Australia could give China pause the next time it contemplates making mischief.

Capability and cohesion buttress deterrence. So, interoperability is good because it translates into capability, and because capability joined with common purpose transmits a message—disheartening potential foes, giving heart to allies, and helping win over doubters we would like to recruit as allies or coalition partners. Interoperability—a tactical function—has direct political import.

But concentrating on tactics and politics obscures the strategic worth of stationing forces in Australia. As President Franklin Roosevelt enjoined radio listeners on Washington’s Birthday 1942, during the darkest days of World War II: look at your map. Looking at your map reveals that Australia constitutes prime strategic real estate. Few locations rival it for any power that aspires to primacy in the Pacific and Indian oceans. In other words, the geostrategic imperative for Washington to pool its fortunes with Canberra is real and compelling.

Think about it. In recent years strategists of a geographic bent have embraced the notion that the two oceans comprise a unified “Indo-Pacific” theater. The Trump administration wrote its support for this conceit into policy, most prominently by rechristening the U.S. Pacific Command the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. But the Indo-Pacific force structure is stretched between the theater’s eastern and western extremes—between the Seventh Fleet homeported in Japan and the Fifth Fleet homeported in Bahrain.

Australia occupies a central position midway along the arc between Japan and Bahrain, at the seam between the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean where the U.S. presence is thinnest. Forces based there could swing from side to side as circumstances warrant. Australia lies just outside the embattled South China Sea, a major prospective battleground. And it lies mainly out of reach of shore-based Chinese anti-ship weaponry, granting shipping based there relative freedom of movement around the South China Sea rim as well as multiple routes of entry into Southeast Asian waters.

In short, the advantages of basing forces Down Under are legion, the case for doing so increasingly captivating—for both allies. These advantages remained mostly hypothetical in 2011. Today the time has come to expand and deepen the transpacific relationship beyond periodic U.S. Marine deployments and air-force exercises.

So, let it be written, so let it be done.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and the author of A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy, due out next month. The views voiced here are his alone.

This article first appeared earlier this year and is being reposted due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters

James Holmes

Russia, Eurasia

To understand where Russia is headed under Vladimir Putin, one must understand where the country has been. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: Warlike one-upmanship helps Russia burnish its image as a virile political and military force after the traumatic 1990s. It holds fear at bay while earning new respect.

Winston Churchill’s truism that Russia is “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” remains as acute as it was when he articulated it during an October 1939 BBC radio address. It verges on impossible to forecast what Moscow will do tactically. What it will do strategically, however, is more intelligible and thus more predictable.

Perhaps, added the future prime minister, “there is a key” to the riddle—namely “Russian national interest.” Seeing Nazi Germany overrun southeastern Europe or the Black Sea basin “would be contrary to the historic life-interests of Russia.” He delicately avoided mentioning that the Soviet Union and Germany were fresh off conquering and partitioning Poland under a secret pact, doing so the month before Churchill took to the airwaves. Had he included the invasion in his catalog of Russian interests, he would have seen that it made perfect sense to Soviet leaders to seek a strategic buffer in Poland. It advanced the national interest as the Soviets reckoned it.

Anyway, it’s worth asking how Moscow interprets Russia’s historic life interests eighty years hence. What do Russians want today?

It’s a question that’s ripped from the headlines yet feels like a throwback. In recent years, Russian warplanes have resumed their Cold War practice of buzzing American ships or aircraft that venture into any sea or airspace that Moscow considers a Russian preserve. The Black Sea has been a favorite arena for mock combat, as Churchill might have prophesied judging from his BBC address. U.S. Navy destroyers cruising there have repeatedly filmed Russian planes making close, unsafe passes. The crew of USS Donald Cook must have felt singled out: the ship endured harassment in both the Black Sea and Baltic Sea.

But Russian aviators seem to have taken routine probing of the United States and allied air defenses uptempo since the coronavirus swept the globe. Twice in recent weeks, for example, Russian aircraft have passed within twenty-five feet of U.S. Navy P-8 surveillance planes over the Mediterranean Sea. Twenty-five feet is a hair’s breadth in aviation terms, as a Chinese fighter jock found out in 2001 after colliding with a U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane over the South China Sea and plunging to his doom. A longstanding agreement between Washington and Moscow proscribes such hotdogging for fear it will provoke an armed clash.

Nor do close-quarters encounters exhaust the spicy news out of the Russian military. For example, the New York Times carried an intriguing story about the ultra-deep-diving submarine Losharik, which suffered a fire sixty miles off the Norwegian coast last year. Fourteen Russian sailors perished in the blaze, which seems to have ignited in the nuclear-powered boat’s battery compartment. There’s far more to the story than human drama, though. The New York Times notes that Losharik is far from your ordinary submarine. Naval historian extraordinaire Norman Polmar estimates that the boat can dive to a maximum depth somewhere in the neighborhood from eighty-two hundred to twenty thousand feet.

No manned sub in the U.S. Navy inventory approaches even Polmar’s lower figure. Americans deploy unmanned underwater vehicles when they want to plumb the oceans’ deepest recesses. Losharik’s hull is evidently built around a series of titanium spheres housing the control room, living spaces, and machinery spaces. Spheres are strong when made of stout materials. Hence the boat can voyage to the bottom of the sea without being crushed by extreme pressure. Why bother building such a craft? Well, the official account out of Moscow depicted its mission as scientific in nature. That Losharik was undertaking research when it caught fire is plausible, true or not. Humanity has much to learn about the underwater realm.

But Losharik’s ability to prowl the seafloor gives the Kremlin less benign options as well. Options like cutting transoceanic cables that provide internet connectivity, connect up the world’s financial institutions, and on and on. Severing an antagonist’s communications is a time-honored opening move in the war. Great Britain cut the telegraph cables connecting imperial Germany to the world at the outset of the Great War a century ago. Information and disinformation warfare is a field of combat Moscow likes to bestride. Losharik supplies a weapon for waging it.

Losharik’s crew could also attack Western anti-submarine sensors strewn across the seabed in the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. gap and other narrow passages. Puncturing Western navies’ monitoring capability would clear a transit corridor for Russian Navy boats into the North Atlantic high seas or other operating grounds, where detecting, tracking, and assailing them is far harder than in confined quarters. In short, the Losharik disaster shines a spotlight on yet another Russian implement for making mischief at Western expense.

All is not rosy for Moscow, though. The Russian armed forces—like all armed forces—have to live within their means. Russia depends heavily on exporting oil and natural gas, so low energy prices constrict its national income and thus its ability to afford pricey armaments. Prices have been low for some time and have run off a cliff amid coronavirus lockdowns. Just this week, for instance, the news broke that the Severnoye Design Bureau, a division of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, has halted the development of a nuclear-powered destroyer and a bulked-up variant of the Russian Navy’s Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate. Summarily canceling two marquee projects can’t be good tidings for Russian sea power.

In fact, Russian weapons acquisitions invert the pattern from the Cold War, when the Soviet military was vast in numbers but backward in technology. Quantity, believed Soviet chieftains, boasted a quality all its own. Modern-day Russia prefers to invest in small numbers of high-quality armaments at the expense of quantity. Whether Russian mariners, aviators, and soldiers can compensate for the resulting shortfall in mass remains in doubt. Quantity isn’t everything. But if the lynchpin of strategy is to deliver more combat power than the foe at the scene of combat at the decisive time, a few impressive platforms may not suffice. Quantity still matters.

So much for the roundup of Russian defense news. How to make sense of Russian motives underlying the news? Well, two millennia ago Thucydides posited that fear, honor, and interest represent three prime movers impelling human actions. Start with the Russian national interest, as Churchill did in 1939. Peacetime military strategy is an armed conversation with opponents, allies and friends, and prospective allies and friends. The conversation is about relative power and weakness. Not just pugilists but spectators decide the outcomes of peacetime confrontations between armed forces. Whoever most observers believe would have won in wartime tends to come out ahead in peacetime. Shaping perceptions, then, is armed conversationalists’ goal.

General George S. Patton explained the logic in his famous address to the Third Army: people flock to a winner and scorn a loser. Buzzing ships or warplanes might cow U.S. crews over time, rendering them risk-averse. That’s one audience for Russian antics. But the Kremlin’s true aim is to project an image of power and resolve, molding perceptions in capitals that matter. Shaking confidence in U.S. military might dishearten political leaders and ordinary citizens in countries where Moscow covets influence—NATO members, former Soviet republics, and former Eastern Bloc states in particular. If U.S. allies and friends come to disbelieve in their superpower protector, they will prove increasingly pliant when Russia demands something. Patton would instantly grasp the reasoning behind Russia’s playground hijinks. They could help the Kremlin get its way.

Fear blends with the Russian thirst for honor. During the 1990s Moscow watched as the West intruded into the former Soviet space and, in some cases, made allies out of former Soviet republics or Warsaw Pact clients. NATO waged war in the Balkans, a region Russians have long regarded as a sphere of interest, etc. Events fanned Russia’s ingrained paranoia about Western martial endeavors around its periphery, and there was little Moscow could do about them during that chaotic phase in Russian history. It only seems natural for Moscow to reassert itself in its near abroad now that it sports the wherewithal to do so.

So warlike one-upmanship helps Russia burnish its image as a virile political and military force after the traumatic 1990s. It holds fear at bay while earning new respect. Or as Thucydides might put it, provoking small-scale armed encounters in which U.S. forces remain passive slakes Moscow’s thirst for honor. Fear, honor, interest; primal motives drive moderns the way they drove the ancients. But don’t rule out other motives, either. Thucydides doesn’t claim that fear, honor, and interest are the only motives that animate human beings, just three of the strongest. There are others.

Such as merriment. It’s hard for even a casual observer of Russian president Vladimir Putin to escape the impression that he’s having a blast. He takes delight in causing trouble for the West, even apart from sober concerns such as fulfilling national interests, warding off threats, or repairing wounded national honor. Politicians who find the game of statecraft fun enjoy an edge over those who feel burdened by it. Putin plays a weak hand well—and gleefully.

Winston Churchill was right about Russia during World War II when national survival was at stake. Back then fending off military menaces came before all else. And the Russian national interest remains a good way to decipher Russian actions. Applied to Putin’s Russia, though, Churchill’s diagnosis is incomplete. Russia is less an enigma than a product of its unique history combined with basic human passions that endure from age to age. These forces shape politics and strategy in Moscow.

Let’s interpret the daily news that way.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over the Pacific. The views voiced here are his alone.

This article first appeared earlier this year and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Trevor Filseth

Child Tax Credit,

These payments—particularly for large families—can be worth thousands of dollars.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The increase in the Child Tax Credit will only last until the end of 2021, despite the attempts of some lawmakers to extend it; after this, the payments will return to being worth $2,000 per year and become non-refundable once more. This means that the relevance of the higher payments in future divorce cases is likely to decrease.

The March 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) provided for six early payments of the Child Tax Credit, a tax break intended to help cover the expenses of parents with children during the coronavirus pandemic. Prior to March, the credit was set at $2,000 per child per year, and made non-refundable, so parents owing less than $2,000 in taxes would not be able to fully benefit from it.

The ARPA increased these payments by fifty percent, to $3,000 per month. It also added a $600 bonus for the parents of children under the age of six, and it made the tax credit fully refundable, meaning that families who did not owe enough in taxes would receive the difference as a cash payment. Lastly, it arranged for half of the credit to be sent out in the form of six advance checks—the first of which was sent on July 15, and the third of which will be sent on September 15.

These payments—particularly for large families—can be worth thousands of dollars. It comes as no surprise, then, that they often make their way into divorce cases, along with other tax breaks such as the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit. In particular, though, the fully refundable status of the Child Tax Credit separates it from other tax credits, which generally require the recipient to work and pay taxes in order to receive the benefit. This means that the Child Tax Credit is increasingly worth fighting over in divorce court.

Given this, rules have been established for how the Child Tax Credit is given out. The recipient must cover at least fifty percent of their child’s expenses and live with them for at least half the year. This usually means that the parent who gains custody of the children will receive the tax credit. There is, however, a form—Form 8332—for parents who willingly give up the tax credit to the other parent, even if they do not technically meet the guidelines required.

One possible reason is that the credit has an upper-income limit. In previous years, this limit has been $200,000 for single tax filers and $400,000 for couples filing jointly. However, the ARPA reduced this level to $75,000 for single filers, $112,500 for heads of families, and $150,000 for couples filing jointly.

In this case, if one person makes $200,000 per year, and the other makes $60,000, it makes little sense for the higher earner to claim the credit since for them it would be worthless.

It is not clear how much longer the current situation will last. The increase in the Child Tax Credit will only last until the end of 2021, despite the attempts of some lawmakers to extend it; after this, the payments will return to being worth $2,000 per year and become non-refundable once more. This means that the relevance of the higher payments in future divorce cases is likely to decrease.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Ethen Kim Lieser

Unemployment Benefits,

With this in mind—and even with the delivery of three stimulus payments to most Americans over the past year—studies and polls are suggesting that millions of Americans are still struggling to make ends meet amid the surge in new coronavirus cases due to the Delta variant.

States that decided to withdraw early from enhanced federal unemployment benefits witnessed slightly higher job growth—but it was also responsible for a $2 billion cut in overall household spending, according to a new study authored by economists and researchers at Columbia University, Harvard University, the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, and the University of Toronto.

Governors of the twenty-six states opted out of the unemployment program that tacked on $300 in weekly enhanced benefits several weeks before they were set to expire on Labor Day. The mostly Republican governors had long argued that the benefits kept some unemployed Americans from seeking work.

Spending Cut

According to the study, the states that ended the federal benefits early witnessed employment rise 4.4 percentage points compared to the states that continued with the benefits. However, that translated to just one in eight unemployed individuals in the “cutoff states” who eventually found employment.

More concerning, these same states also saw a twenty percent cut in weekly spending from residents—amounting to roughly $145 each week. As a result, the economies of the states that declined the benefits had to endure a reduction of nearly $2 billion in consumer spending from June through early August, the study noted.

Come Labor Day, a recent study conducted by the People’s Policy Project, citing data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey, revealed that approximately ten million more Americans on unemployment will lose those benefits.

With this in mind—and even with the delivery of three stimulus payments to most Americans over the past year—studies and polls are suggesting that millions of Americans are still struggling to make ends meet amid the surge in new coronavirus cases due to the Delta variant.

Calls for Assistance

In recent weeks, both ordinary citizens and some lawmakers have been calling on the White House and Congress to quickly approve more financial assistance to Americans.

“For our team and other Americans who can claim unemployment, even the maximum payments will not be enough for most people to continue paying their bills—and avoid slipping into poverty,” contends one highly popular Change.org petition that has garnered more than 2.8 million signatures.

“The facts are, even successful small businesses can’t go months with their doors closed. But supplying Americans with monthly support until they can get back on their feet can save our communities from financial ruin,” it adds.

Moreover, twenty-one Democratic senators have signed off on a letter to President Joe Biden to take necessary action.

“While we are pleased that the American Rescue Plan included a one-time direct payment and an extension of federal unemployment insurance programs, a single direct payment will not last long for most families,” they wrote. “This crisis is far from over, and families deserve certainty that they can put food on the table and keep a roof over their heads.”

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters

Sebastien Roblin

USS Halibut, Asia

A submarine unlike any other.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The Halibut and other submarines began regular courier runs to install new tapes on the tap while bringing back the old tapes for analysis by the NSA in what was called Operation Ivy Bells. However, it was human frailty, not sea storms or Soviet sonars, which brought an end to the intelligence bonanza. When the Parche went to pick up the latest tape, the tap was missing.

Since 2015, there have been reports of Russian submarines and spy ships trawling the waters near the ocean-spanning underwater fiber-optic cables vital to trans-oceanic Internet access. In fact, reported activity by spy ship Yartar off the U.S. nuclear-armed submarine base in King’s Bay, Georgia is likely in search of secret military cables used exclusively by the Pentagon.

The Russians might be interested in hacking into those cables because the U.S. Navy pulled of such an exploit forty-six years earlier using a specially-modified spy submarine, a nuclear-powered wiretap, and some helium-swilling aquanauts.

The Halibut, Missile-Sub Turned Spy Submarine

Commissioned in 1960, the USS Halibut was a one-of-a-kind nuclear-powered submarine designed to launch Regulus II nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. The 5,000-ton submarine housed two 17.5-meter-long Regulus II missiles in a grotesquely bulged hangar on her foredeck. The missiles were launched while surfaced from a hydraulically extended ramp to strike targets up to 1,150 miles away.

However, by the time the Halibut entered service, the Navy had developed the Polaris, the U.S.’s first Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile, which could be fired from underwater into space to strike target nearly 3,000 miles away. The obsolete Regulus II was canceled a year before the Halibut was commissioned in 1960, and the submarine spent four years lugging five older Regulus I missiles on deterrence patrols before these too were retired.

Still, the Navy saw useful potential in the Halibut’s unconventional layout, and in 1968 she received a unique overhaul. The bulged missile hangar was converted into the ‘Bat Cave’ (inspired by comic book character’s lair) stuffed full of spy equipment, including a rare 60s-era 24bit UNIVAC computer, a retractable seafloor-scanning sonar, and a photo-developing lab. A well underneath the Bat Cave could deploy two 2-ton ‘Fish’—remotely operated underwater spy vehicles. Halibut’s lower hull had special thrustors and anchoring winches to maintain its position on the sea floor and later received four skids allowing it to safely ‘land’ there.

An apparent mini-submarine was prominently strapped onto the Halibut’s rear deck, which the Navy publicly boasted was a Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRV) simulator. This was a deception: the pod actually housed a special pressurized chamber for use by saturation divers, with an integrated diving lock.

Deep-sea divers risk decompression sickness (the ‘bends’) caused by gas bubbles forming within the body when reacclimatizing to regular air pressure. Based on technology pioneered in the SEALAB underwater habitats, the pressure chamber was designed to give divers a long-term pressure-stable habitat so they would only need to depressurize once at the end of their mission. The divers used oxygen mixed with helium rather than heavier nitrogen to aid acclimatization. You can see an amazing diagram by HI Sutton of the Halibut and its gadgets here.

The Halibut’s first mission was to locate the Soviet ballistic missile submarine K-129, which on March 8, 1968 sank nearly 5,000 meters to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean under mysterious circumstances. The Soviet Navy searched for K-129 for months, but it was the Halibut that finally found her with her “Fish” that August, after having the search radius narrowed to ‘only’ 1,200 square miles using data from the Navy’s SOSUS hydrophone network.

In 1972, the Captain James Bradley of the Office of Naval Intelligence thought of a new use for the Halibut. The Soviet Navy maintained a major nuclear-missile armed submarine base at Petropavlovsk on the remote Kamchatka Peninsula. Bradley felt it was likely that the base maintained an undersea communication cable to transmit messages directly across the Sea of Okhotsk.

However, the cable’s presence was not even confirmed, so how was it to be located? Bradly was inspired one day by recollecting the signs he had seen on the side of the Mississippi River warning ships not to lay anchor in areas near underwater cables. (Anchors remain a frequent cause of damaged cables.)

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Reasoning the Soviets would use similar signs, he dispatched the Halibut off the coast of Kamchatka to search for them. The Halibut was not particularly quiet by the standards of modern submarines, and she risked being attacked if she was discovered penetrating the perimeter formed by Soviet naval bases on the Kuril Islands seized from Japan at the end of World War II. In fact, the Halibut had a self-destructive device to ensure she and her crew could not be captured.

After a week of snooping, the Halibut’s crew finally spotted beach signs in Cyrllic warning ships not to lay anchor. Discretely, the technicians in the Bat Cave began scanning the seafloor with her ‘Fish’, and in a matter of hours spotted the cable 120-meters below the sea via a grainy video feed. The 5,000-ton submarine carefully settled close to the seafloor, deploying her special anchors. The elite saturation divers in the pod swam out to the cable and wrapped a three-foot long magnetic induction device around the cable. Rather than risking damage and detection by piercing inside cables, the tap recorded the activity passing through the cable.

The operation was considered so secret that most of the Halibut’s crew were told their mission was to recover fragments from a P-500 “Sandbox” missile test for analysis. The supersonic anti-ship missile was rumored to use an advanced infrared-seeker. To reinforce the cover, after recording several hours of conversation, the Halibut sailed to the site of the test and her dovers did recover two million tiny P-500 missile fragment, which were reassembled jigsaw-like until it was discovered that Sandbox used only radar guidance!

The brief tape was brought back to Pearl Harbor and found to be highly promising. The Navy rapidly commissioned a new six-ton wiretap device from Bell Laboratories called ‘the Beast’ (photo here) which used a nuclear power source and a massive tape recorder to records of weeks of conversation across multiple lines at the same time.

The Halibut returned and installed this new device, and the sub’s crew were soon listening in on Soviet telephone conversations, celebrating their success by feasting on a spider crab scooped up from the sea floor.

Thenceforth, the Halibut and other submarines began regular courier runs to install new tapes on the tap while bringing back the old tapes for analysis by the NSA in what was called Operation Ivy Bells. The Halibut herself was decommissioned in 1975, and the courier runs taken over by the USS Parche, Sea Wolf and Richard B. Russell.

The tapped cables provided a treasure trove of intelligence for the NSA: mixed in between personal calls to family and sweethearts were private conversations on sensitive political topics and detailed information on Soviet submarine operations. Much of the Soviet traffic was unencrypted because cables were considered a highly secure form of communication.

This candid, unfiltered portrait of the Soviet Navy’s state of mind vis-à-vis the United States reportedly influenced U.S. military leaders to deescalate activities which were threatening to panic Moscow, and also apparently informed the Washington’s negotiating posture for the SALT II treaty which limited the size of strategic nuclear weapons forces.

Cheap Betrayal

The cable-tap operation did have its risks. In Sherry Sontag’s book Blind Man’s Bluff, he describes how on a later tape-recovery mission, a sea storm bucked the Halibut to and fro until her anchors snapped, causing her to begin rising uncontrollably with divers trapped outside. The Halibut risked exposure in Soviet territorial waters, and her tethered divers risked death from rapid decompression. Captain John McNish decided to flood the Halibut until it smashed onto the seafloor and brought the divers back into their pressure habitat. But now the Halibut was dangerously mired.

After completing the planned data collection, the Halibut tried a dangerous emergency blow to free herself from seabed sediment, followed by an immediate dive to avoid breaching the surface. The submarine had only enough compressed air to try the maneuver once—and luckily, it worked.

In 1980 mishap also befell the USS Sea Wolf, which was uniquely equipped with a liquid metal-cooled nuclear reactor. On one tape-recovery mission, a storm caused her to crash into the seafloor and become stuck, with mud and mollusks gumming up her insides. Her captain considered scuttling the vessel before he managed to wriggle it free to surface in a noisy emergency blow out. After this incident, Soviet ships were observed heading towards the site of the cable tap.

However, it was human frailty, not sea storms or Soviet sonars, which brought an end to the intelligence bonanza. When the Parche went to pick up the latest tape, the tap was missing.

In July 1985 Soviet KGB defector Vitaly Yurchenko revealed that Ronald Pelton, a heavily indebted former analyst for the NSA, had walked into the Soviet embassy on January 14, 1980, and sold the secret of Ivy Bells for $5,000—with an additional $30,000 paid for later consultation. This led to the tap’s removal by Soviet divers, though it’s possible that the Soviets might have planted misleading information in the cable traffic before doing so.

Nonetheless, Ivy Bells proved one of the greatest coups by U.S. intelligence during the Cold War. The U.S. Navy maintained its undersea espionage capabilities today, particularly in the super-stealthy Sea Wolf-class submarine USS Jimmy Carter, which has a special chamber for splicing undersea cables.

And what came of the tapping device installed on the cable in Okhotsk? It can be seen today in the Great Patriotic War Museum in Moscow.

Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This article first appeared two years ago.

Image: Wikimedia Commons. 

Sebastien Roblin

Su-25, Europe

The Su-25 is a flying tank that can pack a huge punch.

Key point: The Su-25 is the Russian version of the deadly American A-10 Warthog. Here is how it helps Russian ground forces win their battles.

The Su-25 Frogfoot, known as the Grach or “Rook” by Russian pilots, is one of those aircraft that may not be at the cutting edge of technology, but still has seen widespread service around the world because it offers an effective and useful solution to the need to blast targets on the ground.

As such, its obvious stablemate is the American A-10 Thunderbolt II attack plane. But while the U.S. Air Force wants to retire the A-10 starting in 2022, the Su-25 is undergoing extensive upgrades to keep with the times.

This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Also unlike the Thunderbolt, it has been disseminated it all over the world and seen action in over a dozen wars, including in the air campaigns over Syria, Iraq and Ukraine.

Not only has Russia had a lot of experience flying Su-25s in combat—it has shot several down as well.

During World War II, Russia’s armored Il-2 Sturmovik attack planes, nicknamed “Flying Tanks,” were renowned for their ability to take a pounding while dishing it out to German Panzer divisions with bombs, rockets and cannon fire.

Unlike the U.S. Air Force in the 1960s, which was enamored with the concept of “winning” nuclear wars with strategic bombers, the Soviet air service, the VVS, placed more emphasis on supporting ground armies in its Frontal Aviation branch. However, no worthy successor to the Shturmovik immediately appeared after World War II

In 1968, the VVS service decided it was time for another properly designed flying tank. After a three-way competition, the prototype submitted by Sukhoi was selected and the first Su-25 attack planes entered production in 1978 in a factory in Tbilisi, Georgia. Coincidentally, the American A-10 Thunderbolt had begun entering service a few years earlier.

Like the A-10, the Su-25 was all about winning a titanic clash between the ground forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact by busting tanks and blasting infantry in Close Air Support missions. This meant flying low and slow to properly observe the battlefield and line up the plane for an attack run.

Flying low would also help the Su-25 avoid all the deadly long-range SAMs that would have been active in a European battlefield. However, this would have exposed it to all kinds of antiaircraft guns. Thus, the pilot of the Su-25 benefited from an “armored bathtub”—ten to twenty-five millimeters of armor plating that wrapped around the cockpit and even padded the pilot’s headrest. It also had armored fuel tanks and redundant control schemes to increase the likelihood of surviving a hit. And in their extensive combat careers, Su-25s have survived some really bad hits.

Despite the similarities with the A-10, the Su-25 is a smaller and lighter, and has a maximum speed fifty percent faster than the Thunderbolt’s at around six hundred miles per hour. However, the Frogfoot has shorter range and loiter time, can only operate at half the altitude, and has a lighter maximum load of up to eight thousand pounds of munitions, compared to sixteen thousand on the Thunderbolt.

More importantly, the types of munitions usually carried are typically different. The Thunderbolt’s mainstays are precision-guided munitions, especially Maverick antitank missiles, as well as its monstrous, fast-firing GAU-8 cannon.

The Su-25’s armament has typically consisted of unguided 250 or 500 kilogram bombs, cluster bombs and rockets. The rockets come in forms ranging from pods containing dozens of smaller 57- or 80-millimeter rockets, to five-shot 130-millimeter S-13 system, to large singular 240- or 330-millimeter rockets. The Su-25 also has a Gsh-30-2 30-millimeter cannon under the nose with 260 rounds of ammunition, though it doesn’t have the absurd rate of fire of the GAU-8.

The lower tip of the Frogfoot’s nose holds a glass-enclosed laser designator. Su-25s did make occasional use of Kh-25ML and Kh-29 laser guided missiles in Afghanistan to take out Mujahideen fortified caves, striking targets as far as five miles away. KAB-250 laser-guided bombs began to see use in Chechnya as well. However, use of such weapons was relatively rare. For example, they made up only 2 percent of munitions expended by the Russian Air Force in Chechnya.

The Su-25 was still packing plenty of antipersonnel firepower—and that’s exactly what was called for when it first saw action in Afghanistan beginning in 1981. The Su-25 was the workhorse fixed-wing attack plane in the conflict, flying more than sixty thousand sorties in bombing raids on mujahedeen villages and mountain strongholds. They often teamed up with Mi-24 attack helicopters to provide air support for Soviet armored units.

However, as the Afghan rebels began to acquire Stinger missiles from the United States, Su-25s began to suffer losses and the Soviet pilots were forced to fly higher to avoid the man-portable surface-to-air missiles. In all, some fifteen Su-25s were shot down in Afghanistan before the Soviet withdrawal.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Su-25s were passed onto the air services of all the Soviet successor states. Those that didn’t use Su-25s in local wars—on both sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, for example—often exported them to countries that did. Frogfoots have seen action in the service of Macedonia (against Albanian rebels), Ethiopia (against Eritrea, with one shot down), Sudan (target: Darfur), and Georgia versus Abkhazian separatists that shot down several. And that list is not comprehensive.

In one notable episode, Cote d’Ivoire acquired several Su-25s and used them in its civil war. When the government of President Laurent Gbagbo was angered by the perceived partisanship of French peacekeepers, his mercenary-piloted Su-25s bombed the French camp, killing nine. Whoever ordered the attack didn’t consider that there was a French contingent stationed at the Yamoussoukro Airfield where the Frogfoots were based. The French used anti-tank missiles to destroy the fighter bombers on the ground in retaliation.

Russian Su-25 were back in action in the Chechnya campaign of 1994 to 1995, flying 5,300 strike sorties. Early on they helped wipe out Chechen aircraft on the ground and hit the Presidential Palace in Grozny with anti-concrete bombs. They then pursued a more general bombing campaign. Four were lost to missiles and flak. They were again prominent in the Second Chechen War in 1999, where only one was lost.

Of course, it’s important to note at this juncture that the Su-25 is one of a handful of Soviet aircraft that received its own American computer game in 1990.

Modern Su-25s

In addition to the base model, the Frogfoot also came in an export variant, the Su-25K, and a variety of two-seat trainers with a hunchback canopy, including the combat-capable Su-25UBM.

There were a number of projects to modernize the Su-25, including small productions runs of Su-25T and Su-25TM tank busters. But the Russian Air Force finally selected the Su-25SM in the early 2000s for all future modernization.

The SM has a new BARS satellite navigation/attack system, which allows for more precise targeting, as well as a whole slew of improved avionics such as news heads-up displays (HUDS), Radar Warning Receivers and the like. The Su-25SM can use the excellent R-73 short-range air-to-air missile, and has improved targeting abilities for laser-guided bombs. Other improvements reduce maintenance requirements and lower aircraft weight.

The National Interest’s Dave Majumdar has written about the latest SM3 upgrade, which includes the capacity to fire Kh-58 anti-radar missiles, which could enable Su-25s to help suppress enemy air defenses, as well as a Vitebsk electronic-countermeasure system that could increase its survivability against both radar- and infarred-guided surface to air missiles.

Georgia and Ukraine also have limited numbers of their own domestically upgrade variants, the Su-25KM and the Su-25M1 respectively. You can check out the Su-25KM variant, produced with an Israeli firm, in this video full of unironic 1980s flair.

Speaking of Georgia, things got messy in 2008 when both Russia and Georgia operated Frogfoots in the Russo-Georgian War. The Georgian Frogfoots provided air support for Georgian troops seizing the city of Tskhinvali. Then Russian Su-25s assisted Russian armor in blasting them out. Russia lost three Su-25s to MANPADS—two likely from friendly fire—and Georgia lost a similar number to Russian SAMs. To the surprise of observers, however, the Russian Air Force did not succeed in sweeping Georgian aviation from the sky.

In 2014, Ukraine deployed its Frogfoots to support ground forces combating separatist rebels in Eastern Ukraine. They assisted in the initial recapture of the Donetsk airport in May, would be followed over a half year of seesaw battles ending in a separatist victory in 2015. Ukraine lost four Su-25s in the ensuing ground-attack missions—three were hit by missiles (one MANPADS, two allegedly by longer-ranged systems across the Russian border), and a fourth was reportedly downed by a Russian MiG-29. Two others survived hits from missiles. As a result, Su-25 strikes were sharply curtailed to avoid incurring further losses.

In 2015, the Russian separatists of the Luhansk People’s Republic claimed to have launched airstrikes with an Su-25 of their own. Depending on who you ask, the airplane was restored from a museum or flew in from Russia.

The Iraqi Air Force has deployed its own Su-25s in the war against ISIS, purchasing five from Russia in 2014 and receiving seven from Iran that had been impounded during the 1991 Gulf War.

Finally, in the fall of 2015, Russia deployed a dozen modernized Su-25SMs in support of the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad. Many observers noted that of the aircraft involved in the mission, the Su-25s were the best adapted for the close air-support role. The Frogfoot flew 1,600 sorties against rebel-held Syrian cities, and expended more than six thousand munitions, mostly unguided bombs and S-13 rockets. They were withdrawn this year, leaving attack helicopter behind to perform more precise—and risky—close air support missions.

Lessons Learned from Flying Tanks?

While it’s fun to admire high-performing fighters like the MiG-29 or F-22 Raptor, the unglamorous Su-25 has so far had a greater impact on a wide range of conflicts. We can draw a few lessons from its recent combat record.

First, the significant losses suffered by Su-25s demonstrate that without effective air-defense suppression and electronic counter-measures, low-and-slow ground support planes are poised to take heavy losses against Russian-made surface-to-air missiles deployed in sufficient numbers.

Second, observation of Russia’s Syrian contingent suggests that despite possessing a diverse arsenal of precision guided munitions, the Russian Air Force continues to rely primarily on unguided bombs and rockets for the close air support mission.

Lastly, aircraft capable of delivering punishing attacks on ground targets while retaining a good chance of surviving hits taken in return are going to remain in high demand worldwide.

Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Stephen Silver

Electric Cars,

Lucid will bring out two different editions of its Air Dream car, which will be called the Dream Edition Performance and the Dream Edition Range.

Lucid Motors, the electric car company based in California, is known to have been working on the next big electric car, with the car’s arrival likely not that far away.

The company, formerly known as Atieva, got its start as a producer of batteries for other electric cars but has since pivoted to making its own models.

The Lucid Air will be the first car to arrive from the company.

“Our [Air] reservations have just exceeded 10,000,” the CEO, Peter Rawlinson, told Yahoo Finance, from Lucid’s just-opened New York City studio back in July. “They are bona fide reservations with appropriate deposits. Some people have even paid over a $7,000 deposit.”

Now, Lucid has announced more about its rollout plans.

Lucid will bring out two different editions of its Air Dream car, which will be called the Dream Edition Performance and the Dream Edition Range.

“Dream Edition Performance will feature a powertrain optimized for speed and acceleration, with 1,111 horsepower,” the company said. “Dream Edition Range will deliver 933 horsepower while embodying Lucid’s exacting focus on maximizing range.”

Both will have a price of $169,000, or $161,500 after the U.S. tax credit for electric cars.

“As a technology company, we seek to exceed expectations and this is clearly evident with our Lucid Air Dream Edition Performance and Range variants,” said Rawlinson said in the press release. “I’m delighted to provide our Dream Edition customers with this additional choice and breadth of capabilities.”

Deliveries of the Lucid Air Dream Edition will begin “later this year,” the company said, with the Lucid Air Grand Touring coming “shortly thereafter.”

Earlier this week, the 2022 Lucid Air Dream Edition got its first drive with the media, as MotorTrend took it for a spin.

“The Lucid Air Dream Edition R reminds me of a Nissan GT-R, especially one of the NISMO GT-Rs. The Air's handling is the big surprise. You know a 933-hp car will be quick, and I'd ridden around Laguna Seca in an Air before, so I knew how ridiculously quick the Air is, and how lovely its interior is,” the MotorTrend writer said. He also praised the car’s interior, comparing it favorably to that of Tesla’s cars.

“I even knew Lucid's 500-mile-or-more range claim was legit. I assumed the Air Dream Edition R would be decent enough to drive around big sweepers, but about ten miles into our run-up Angeles Crest Highway, I discovered the car enjoyed being manhandled through tight corners. The harder I pushed, the better the Lucid Air got. It leaps and bounds out of corners, much like the way a NISMO GT-R behaves. The "throttle" pedal unleashes a tsunami of thrust that the smart all-wheel-drive system takes full advantage of—When you're mostly pointed straight, the Air is mostly rear-wheel drive.”

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist, and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Sebastien Roblin

North Korea, Asia

America's military has suffered defeat before.

Here's What You Need to Know: Pyongyang always stands prepared for war.

At noon sharp on October 12, 1950, the minesweeper USS Pirate had just completed a busy but productive morning off the North Korean port of Wonsan when everything went wrong at once. 

Hours earlier, the small, 625-ton vessel had led the five ships of Mine Division 32 based in Sasebo, Japan through two belts of contact mines laid in a channel just one mile wide, and fourteen miles long leading into Wonsan Harbor in North Korea. 

At the time U.N. troops were on the offensive following a successful amphibious landing at Inchon on the western coast of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, a second landing called Operation Tailboard at Wonsan on the eastern coastline was planned. But that meant the minefields barring access to Wonsan had to be cleared first. 

This was no piece of cake, as North Korean boats had laid over 3,000 Soviet-supplied contact and magnetic mines in the 400 island-congested square miles surrounding the port.

Knowing the division was entering dangerous waters, skipper Lt. Cornelius McMullen ordered all non-essential personnel on deck with life jackets to minimize the number that might be trapped below should things go wrong. Cornelius’s superior, Lt. Commander Bruce Hyatt, was also aboard to coordinate the actions of the five-ship division.

But for the first few hours things went swimmingly. Pirate’s crew detected and disabled six mines spaced 50 meters apart using the vessel’s mechanical “sweep” that fanned the water behind it, cutting the cables connecting mines to the seafloor. The mines then floated to the surface where they could be blasted by the ship’s gunners. Fellow Admirable-class minesweepers Pledge and Incredible located another string of four.

But at a minute past noon, a Navy helicopter orbiting overhead reported a third, dense ‘cabbage patch’ of mines near Pirate’s position. At the same time, Pirate’s sonar operator reported multiple contacts all about her hull.

Then eight minutes later a lookout spotted a large spiky contact mine straight before the Pirate.

Pirate’s sweep was designed to disable mines behind her, but her current trajectory meant she was bound for a deadly collision.

McMullen faced a terrible choice, as turning risked triggering the mine as well.

Crew member Earl Richard, at the time manning an anti-aircraft gun close to the bridge, recalled what happened next to the CNO’s Naval History Division:

“The skipper called for a hard left rudder to try and turn away from the mine, but we were so close that by the time the ship began its turn, the port side of the ship came right on to the mine and it stuck the back quarter of the ship on the port side. The hole was wider than a two-car garage.

Everyone on the bridge was blown in different directions. Some were blown over the side, and I was blown to the main deck. I can only remember being showered by what smelled like diesel oil and tons of dust and debris.”

Her back broken in two, the Pirate’s separate halves rapidly sank. 

Richard recounted the horrifying four minutes:

“When I finally realized what had happened, I was picking myself up from the main deck and heard a shipmate yelling, only to find he was trapped under several hundred feet of 2 inch diameter mooring line that had been coiled on top of ventilating unit. When the ship listed the line slid off and trapped his legs. One other shipmate and myself were able to get him out from under at the same time the ship was going down. It had listed to the starboard side and when it came back to the port side, we slid off into the water. With the other guy and myself we were able to drag the injured guy away from the ship before it went completely under water which was in about four minutes.

I remember the water was very cold and at first most of the crew began swimming towards the shore until the beach guns opened fire and began blowing guys out of the water.”

The three coastal batteries were situated upon Sin Do island three miles to the southwest. Another battery of smaller, rapid-fire guns opened fire from Ryo-Do island to the southeast. This map shows the positioning of the minefield belts and the two islands here.

Fellow minesweepers Pledge, Incredible and Kite began dueling the battery with their single 3” deck guns. But the most effective fire came from beefier 1,600-ton USS Endicott, with her four 5” gun turrets. 

Six years earlier during World War II, the Gleaves-class destroyer had sunk two German corvettes in a swashbuckling action off southern France. Since then she had been converted into a “fast minesweeper,” but had not lost her fighting spirit (nor her guns).

Meanwhile, Pledge surged towards the Pirate’s position in an effort to rescue the scattered survivors but was bracketed by accurate shellfire.

Just ten minutes into the engagement, a second huge explosion announced that Pledge too struck a mine while engaged in a hard turn attempting to dodge shellfire.

For 45 minutes, skipper Lt. Richard Young led a frantic effort to save his wounded ship as water poured into her ruptured hull. But the North Korean shore gunners zeroed in on the floundering minesweeper.

Finally, Young too had to give the order to abandon ship.

It was the turn of the even smaller 320-ton USS Redhead—named after the duck, not gingers—to come to the rescue.

The YMS-1 class boat managed to weave around the numerous mines in the channel, but was repeatedly battered by North Korean shells as she trawled for thirty minutes picking up survivors, all the while her smaller 3” deck gun returned fire at her tormentors.

The Incredible too helped rescue twenty-seven sailors before her engines seized up and she had to disengage.

Soon, Corsair fighter bombers from the carrier USS Leyte came howling overhead, blasting gun positions with napalm, rockets and bombs. Meanwhile, a paunchy PBM5 Marine flying boat from Navy squadron VP-47 flew overhead to help the Endicott’s and Redhead’s shellfire.

Together, shells from Endicott and Redhead managed to silence all three North Korea batteries. Navy divers belonging the Underwater Demolition Teams swam and boats launched from the Endicott recovered additional sailors.

The four-hour rescue effort saved 170 crew from Pledge and Pirate—though a dozen crew from Pirate and Pledge would never make it back home. 

The following day, Navy divers swam to the sunken Pledge and Pirate and recovered their sensitive encryption systems, before demolishing the wrecks. The ships and their commanders would all be decorated for their valor in action.

The amphibious landing at Wonsan never took place as it would be overrun by U.N. troops advancing on land. But just a few weeks later Wonsan fell to a massive Chinese-North Korean counterattack. Beginning in February 1951, the port was subject to a U.N. naval blockade that would become the longest in modern history. During the 861-day long blockade, three more small boats were sunk by mines, and over two dozen more ships were damaged by them and coastal gunfire.

Two years after the traumatic incident, the Pirate’s skipper McMullen received a mysterious package in the mail: the Pirate’s flag, recovered by an anonymous benefactor.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States.

This article first appeared in September 2019.

Image: Reuters

Stephen Silver

North Korea,

While starvation is a problem in North Korea, there is also said to be an obesity epidemic among North Korea’s elite class.

North Korea has been suffering of late from food shortages so bad that the regime has confessed to the problem in its official state media.

Leader Kim Jong-un, in comments in late July, admitted that North Korea was facing a “crisis of hardship.” Kim has also compared the present circumstances to the famine faced by North Korea in the early 1990s.

Now, a new report says there’s more bad news when it comes to North Korea and food supply- prices have risen for fruits and vegetables.

According to Daily NK, “prices of some fruits and vegetables in North Korea has recently skyrocketed to nearly twice last year’s prices.” This is the result of “scorching heat,” as well as poor pest control, both of which have caused a drop in production.

“The price of cabbage, which used to cost KPW 900, is also climbing every day,” the site’s source, based in South Pyongan Province, said. In addition, peaches now cost KPW 9,000 each, apricots KPW 12,000 each, and plums KPW 11,000 a kilogram, all of which represent doublings of the prices from a year ago.

“With good rains in spring, we got decent harvests of spinach, spring cabbage, and eggplant, cucumbers, chili peppers, pumpkins, and lettuce, so the prices were OK,” the source said.

“Recently, however, you can hardly find cucumbers, eggplant, or chili peppers, and sellers can name their price.”

The source added that the shortage has come with an uptick in the theft of fruits and vegetables.

“With more and more days pushing daytime highs of 33 to 38 degrees Celsius, there are continuous reports of damage like vegetables and fruits ceasing to develop and sunburned produce,” the source said. “In particular, in Sukchon and Pyongwon—major fruit-producing areas of the Pyongan provinces—apples, pears and peaches got hit hard by hail in June, with a drought on top of that. So people are saying there’s little to harvest.”

The food trouble in North Korea has coincided with reports that Kim Jong-un himself has dropped a noticeable amount of weight, a development which has intrigued North Korea watchers.

While starvation is a problem in North Korea, there is also said to be an obesity epidemic among North Korea’s elite class.

Meanwhile, the North Korean regime has warned North Koreans not to speculate on Kim’s health.

“As stories of health problems related to the Highest Dignity’s weight loss spread among the residents, many of the neighborhood watch units here in Chongjin made official statements to the people at their weekly meeting, saying that it is a ‘reactionary act’ to talk about the leader’s health,” a North Korean resident told Radio Free Asia earlier this month.

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist, and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Sebastien Roblin

Missiles, Asia

American aircraft carriers remain vulnerable.

Here's What You Need to Know: What is clear, however, is that the Chinese government is telling the world that the DF-100 is a hypersonic, regional-level anti-ship missile that will impose a new, challenging threat-vector for long-range attacks against large warships over a thousand miles of China’s coastline.

On October 1, 2019, the People’s Liberation Army rolled out an impressive procession of advanced new weapons systems to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China.

Still, many of the weapons officially debuted that day, like the DF-17, the first hypersonic missile to officially enter regular service, had been public knowledge for some time.

But that was not the case for the regiment of sixteen ten-wheel TEL trucks that came rolling past Tiananmen Square, each lugging two octagonal launch canisters with the designation ‘DF-100’ prominently stenciled on their sides. You can see the video footage here.

The DF, or Dongfeng (“East Wind”) designation, is mostly reserved for China’s many types of ballistic missiles, which arc high into the atmosphere before plunging down at tremendous speeds. But the existence of the DF-100 had never been reported before.

Curiously, the announcer seemed to ignore the DF designation.

“Here comes the CJ-100 cruise missile formation…the latest in the CJ series. The hypersonic weapon features high precision, and long-range strike capability, as well as fast response.”

The CJ-designator, for Cháng Jiàn (“Long Sword”), is used for a land-attack cruise missile, which skim close to the earth’s surface over hundreds of miles. So what on Earth is the CJ-100 or DF-100?

The “CJ-100”

The DF-100’s launch canisters afforded no glimpse of the missiles supposedly inside. But a week earlier on September 25 the PLA Rocket Force posted a video montage including a two-second clip of the launch from a desert test site of a “CJ-100” missile which had never been seen before—then removed that segment shortly afterward.

On the face of it, the PLARF accidentally leaked footage of heretofore secret missile. More likely, this may have been a viral marketing ploy to create buzz in advance of the DF-100’s official reveal during the parade. Note that the missile in the clip was launched by the same ten-wheel truck-based launcher subsequently seen in the parade.

Anonymous sources told Chinese media the CJ-100 was a long-range supersonic cruise missile with a “near space” flight altitude, capable of speeds between three and four times the speed of sound. Analysts speculated that the unusual strakes at the bottom of the missile were possibly intakes for a ramjet a propulsion system, which is optimized for sustained supersonic travel.

A larger-diameter rocket booster at its base (described as identical in size to that of a DF-11A short-range ballistic missile) is designed to loft the missile upwards at high speeds, at which point the booster is discarded and the ramjet takes over.

But at the anniversary parade, state media organs described the DF/CJ-100 as hypersonic missiles—meaning they travel at least five times the speed of sound.

The confused DF and CJ designations may be because hypersonic missiles travel at extremely high speeds and exit the atmosphere like a ballistic missile—but then adopt a flatter trajectory during which they remain maneuverable, allowing them to descend upon their target faster, and making them harder to intercept with anti-ballistic missile defenses.

China’s unique-looking DF-17 land-attack hypersonic missile (technically, the DF-17 is the carrier for a triangular hypersonic glide-vehicle called the DF-Z) was given a DF designator, so perhaps the CJ-100 was re-designated for reason of consistency. 

But why is China bothering to develop a second land-based hypersonic missile?

‘Carrier-Killer’ Redux

A parade review by the South China Morning Post sheds some light:

“A military insider says the weapon is now in active service. It has a range of about 2000-3000km [1242-1864 miles] and is mainly designed for big targets at sea.”

“Big targets at sea” almost certainly means “aircraft carriers.”

A China Times article on the September 25 launch described it as being for “attack large enemy surface ships and high-value targets such as communications and command hubs.”

China has already developed two truck-born “carrier-killing” anti-ship ballistic missiles, the DF-21D and DF-26B, with ranges of around 1,000 and 2,000 miles respectively. In 2019, the PLARF test-fired several on maritime targets, possibly for the first time. In response, the U.S. Navy has developed the SM-3 and SM-6 anti-ballistic missile interceptors to defend its surface ships against the new threat.

The DF-100, therefore, maybe intended to complement China’s ASBMs with a weapon which flies on a different trajectory and may prove even more challenging for air-defense missiles to intercept.

One of the chief difficulties facing any very long-range anti-ship weapons—both ballistic and hypersonic—is that there’s no way the launch unit will be able to directly track a carrier over a thousand miles away. Instead the battery must receive the initial targeting data from a separate pair of eyes, such as a drone or patrol plane in radar range of the target ship. The missile then soars towards the target’s general vicinity using inertial and GPS guidance, preferably while receiving mid-course updates (as ships are, of course, moving targets), before a seeker on the missile takes over for precise guidance in the terminal phase. 

The China Times writes the CJ-100 likely benefits from new composite guidance technology designed to integrate multiple systems, including inertial navigation, terrain image-matching, and satellite navigation using China’s Beidou constellation.

The description of the CJ/DF-100 being ‘fast responding’ therefore makes sense given it would have only fleeting windows of opportunity to exploit relayed targeting data on a moving ship, and likely implies use of a solid-fuel rocket booster as liquid fuel is impractical for a prompt-response system.

A Chinese defense blogger points out that the missile’s mid-body fins and peculiar low-body strakes resemble those on the SY-400 short-range export ballistic missile and U.S. Navy’s SM-6 missile. As a ‘penetration aid,’ the authors claims the missile possesses both an integral jammer to disrupt hostile sensors, and be hardened for resistance to enemy countermeasures (ECM)—which it claims “is a first for a domestically-built missile.” The author points out that it’s increasingly common for modern missiles to do double duty as single-use reconnaissance, jamming or decoy systems.

To be clear, the claims from non-official Chinese media must be treated cautiously as being anonymously sourced, or as merely informed conjecture and speculation. 

Many important characteristics regarding the DF-100 remain unclear: is it capable of carrying a nuclear as well as conventional warhead? Is it also intended to deliver surface strikes against command and control centers as a backup to the DF-17? Will the DF-100 be adapted for launch from an H-6N strategic bomber or missile destroyer? Does it actually glide at hypersonic speeds during the midcourse phase, or does it only ‘dash’ to those velocities during its terminal phase?

What is clear, however, is that the Chinese government is telling the world that the DF-100 is a hypersonic, regional-level anti-ship missile that will impose a new, challenging threat-vector for long-range attacks against large warships over a thousand miles of China’s coastline.

It’s also noteworthy that the new missile has apparently been developed and ostensibly entered operational service without making it to the public eye until a week ago—and without receiving specific mention in the U.S. Department of Defense’s annual Chinese military assessment.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: Reuters

Ethen Kim Lieser

Coronavirus,

Earlier this month, White House chief medical advisor Dr. Anthony Fauci shared similar sentiments, as he sounded the alarm that an even more severe coronavirus variant could emerge relatively soon.

Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla has contended that he believes that it is “likely” that a coronavirus variant that is resistant to currently available vaccines will eventually emerge.

“Every time that the variant appears in the world, our scientists are getting their hands around it,” he said on Tuesday during an interview on Fox News’ America’s Newsroom.

“They are researching to see if this variant can escape the protection of our vaccine. We haven’t identified any yet, but we believe that it is likely that one day, one of them will emerge,” he added.

Bourla, however, was confident that Pfizer could manufacture within about three months new versions of its vaccine that could be effective against a variant.

“We have built a process that within ninety-five days from the day that we identify a variant as a variant of concern, we will be able to have a vaccine tailor-made against this variant,” he noted.

Other Experts Agree

Earlier this month, White House chief medical advisor Dr. Anthony Fauci shared similar sentiments, as he sounded the alarm that an even more severe coronavirus variant could emerge relatively soon.

The head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases asserted that the United States could be “in trouble” if this happens because recent studies have revealed that the Delta variant possesses viral loads that are a thousand times higher than the original strain.

“What we’re seeing, because of this increase in transmissibility, and because we have about ninety-three million people in this country who are eligible to get vaccinated who don’t get vaccinated—that you have a significant pool of vulnerable people,” Fauci noted in an interview with McClatchy.

“If we don’t crush the outbreak to the point of getting the overwhelming proportion of the population vaccinated, then what will happen is the virus will continue to smolder through the fall into the winter, giving it ample chance to get a variant which, quite frankly, we’re very lucky that the vaccines that we have now do very well against the variants—particularly against severe illness. We’re very fortunate that that’s the case. There could be a variant that’s lingering out there that can push aside Delta,” he continued.

Delta Concern

In recent weeks, new coronavirus cases largely have been driven by the Delta variant, which was first detected by scientists in India last fall. Here in the United States, it represents more than ninety-five percent of all sequenced cases, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

The seven-day average of daily new coronavirus cases now stands at about one hundred forty-seven thousand, which is more than ten times higher compared to two months ago. As of Wednesday, nearly fifty-two percent of the U.S. population is fully vaccinated, while about sixty-one percent have had at least one shot, according to data compiled by the CDC.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters

Chris Mason

Afghanistan, Middle East

We can keep our promises and support the bona fide Afghan resistance to the unlawful seizure of power in Kabul by an illegal armed group. We can help the Afghans continue the fight, and not least in so doing, salvage some of our national honor.

The Taliban have control over thirty-two of Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces. But one, Panshir, is firmly in government hands, and a second is contested, with at least three districts retaken by Northern Resistance forces as of August 20. We should not as a nation be rushing to raise the white flag of surrender to the Taliban and throw our Afghan allies under the bus before the Taliban even get the flagpole erected and the bus started. Under both international law and the Afghan Constitution, the lawful president of Afghanistan is now First Vice President Amrullah Saleh, and he is in Panshir Province with a force of some 10,000 men, including about 6,000 commandos. Defense Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi is there as well. They have at least five operational helicopters and a number of armored vehicles. They have been stockpiling ammunition and supplies for four years.

The Panshir Valley was the heart of Afghanistan’s resistance to the Soviet invasion from 1979 to 1989 and it never fell to the communists. The Soviets attempted at least nine assaults into the Panshir with huge armored forces, armored personnel carriers, and Hind gunships. Their wreckage litters the valley floor to this day. The Taliban would not fare better. Since he became president, Joe Biden has promised to continue to support the lawful government and armed forces of Afghanistan, and under international law, the lawful government of Afghanistan is still on Afghan soil. It urgently needs international support. There are other centers of resistance in other parts of Afghanistan as well, notably in Nangarhar Province and in Khost Province, where the Khost Provincial Force comprised of around 4,000 Zadran and Kharoti Pashtun tribesmen remain fiercely anti-Taliban as they have been for a quarter-century. And Afghan society itself has changed dramatically since the last time the Taliban were in power. Half the population of Afghanistan has no memory of Taliban rule and its draconian laws. The Taliban are faced with overrule of a population which does not support them. Just because they would not fight for the corrupt and incompetent Ashraf Ghani does not mean they want the Taliban in power.

The United States does not have to run from Afghanistan. We can keep our promises and support the bona fide Afghan resistance to the unlawful seizure of power in Kabul by an illegal armed group. We can help the Afghans continue the fight, and not least in so doing, salvage some of our national honor. We have been in this position before, in the Philippines in 1941, for example, when the Japanese invaded after Pearl Harbor. Powerful Japanese forces captured most of an unprepared U.S. Army garrison and forced the unprepared U.S. Navy conventional forces out of the Philippines. U.S. prestige in Asia was at a low ebb then too. However, resistance among the Filipino population to the brutal and rapacious occupiers began immediately. A number of U.S. personnel escaped Japanese captivity and helped organize and fight with guerilla bands in the mountains of Luzon. Later, the United States supported guerilla units there, as well as in Burma, China, Vietnam, France, and other occupied countries. As my colleague Dr. Barnett Koven and I discussed here in May, this is originally exactly what the U.S. Army Special Forces were created in the 1950s to do: The first mission envisioned for the Special Forces was to support resistance forces in enemy-held territory in Europe in the event of a Soviet invasion.

Both China and Russia are now chomping at the bit to get back into Afghanistan and start supporting the Taliban usurpers. Neither country gives a hoot about international law or human rights, as their behavior at home has demonstrated. The economy of Afghanistan was in bad shape before the Taliban seized most of the country; now it will crater. The value of the national currency, the afghani, is at an all-time low. The Taliban believes it does not need much Western diplomatic recognition to govern, however, because China has assured them it will arrive with cash to fund their illegal government. China just wants access to Afghanistan’s mineral wealth in return, of course, beginning with the copper at the mines at Mes Aynak, where China tried and failed a decade ago to exploit Afghanistan’s resources. The first quid pro quo for China’s recognition of the Taliban’s illegal seizure of power will be a guarantee of security for its legal looting of Afghanistan’s copper.

This would be a much worse bargain with the devil for China however if the transportation infrastructure required to extract the minerals were vulnerable to guerilla sabotage and destruction of roads, rail lines, and bridges. The Taliban were good at insurgency, but they have no experience in counterinsurgency at all, and no means of maintaining an armed security force beyond a few local thugs with guns. International aid from the United States and Europe funded 90 percent of the Afghan government, including all military salaries. The Taliban will receive none of that. Instead of a large military, from 1996-2001 in areas they controlled they relied on fear, terror, and intimidation to maintain order and prevent resistance. Since China is not going to station troops in Afghanistan, defending Chinese debt trap investments will be on the shoulders of the Taliban alone.

In the new era of “Great Power Competition,” the United States must be willing to employ all means available to win. We are clearly not winning the economic war with China now, nor the “war of ideas.” The fiasco in Afghanistan this summer has made countries around the world doubt the wisdom of alliance with the United States. Even our NATO partners are discussing a world order without a reliable United States to back it up. In this new era, we will not always be able to throw our conventional weight around as we did during Desert Storm, and great power competition is highly unlikely in any case to take the form of the kind of major conventional armored warfare of the type the U.S. Army prefers to fight. The struggle for a free and fair global economic order will instead be fought by China and Russia in the shadows, with industrial espionage, debt-trap diplomacy, bribery, cyber sabotage, critical infrastructure attacks, and paramilitary guerillas. The United States standing up for democracy and free and fair economic systems is the right thing to do. But whether we like it or not, just espousing high-sounding policy goals while playing by the Marquis of Queensbury rules is not going to win that fight, any more than it won the Cold War.  If we don’t relearn from the last period of great power competition and reengage in this war in the shadows, China’s momentum will only accelerate, and Russia will continue its grey zone machinations to realize Vladimir Putin’s dream of restoring Russia’s former empire.

Recognizing and supporting the legal government of Afghanistan in the Panshir will not be without risks and costs. But it would show the world that we d.o stand by our friends. It would provide a critically-needed counterterrorism toeprint in the middle of Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda is now present in fifteen provinces. A small covert presence could enable the delivery of critical supplies to the resistance, such as spare parts for their helicopters, medical supplies, and aviation fuel via cargo drone. It could be supported by unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities like the RQ-4 Global Hawk aircraft. The new Aevum surveillance and cargo drone offers even greater support options. One of the MH-47G Special Operations Chinook helicopters in Afghanistan now could be flown into the Panshir. The MH-47G can operate at up to 19,000 feet and has midair refueling capabilities, giving a small special operations forces element an emergency exfiltration capacity. There are certainly challenges and obstacles to overcome as well, such as the lack of a paved airstrip in the Panshir. But this can be done. We have done it before. It will take political courage and commitment to our allies, and it will stretch our long-range covert mission capabilities to the limit, but it can be done. For our national security in combating Al Qaeda, ISIS, and Haqqani network terrorism, it should be done. And the whole world is watching

Dr. Chris Mason is a professor at the U.S. Army War College and a retired Foreign Service Officer who has worked in and on Afghanistan for twenty years. His book The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan: Why the Afghan National Army will not Hold predicted the collapse of the Afghan National Army six years ago.

Image: Reuters.

Trevor Filseth

Afghanistan, Asia

While the Taliban is officially led by Amir al-Mu’minin Hibatullah Akhundzada, Baradar is officially the group’s second-in-command and has been described as its de facto leader. 

William Burns, a longtime U.S. diplomat and the current Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, met with Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar on Monday, according to the Washington Post. 

The CIA declined to comment on Burns’ activities, as the agency does not comment on the actions of its director as a rule.  

Burns’ visit to Afghanistan comes as the chaotic evacuation of the Kabul Airport has continued. Taliban leaders recently communicated via spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid that the United States was expected to be fully withdrawn by August 31. The Taliban claims that any longer would cross a “red line” and would lead to severe consequences. For his part, President Joe Biden affirmed on Tuesday that the U.S. withdrawal would be complete by that date, ignoring complaints from U.S. allies, including Britain, France, and Germany, that the withdrawal could not be completed by that date if the tens of thousands of Afghans waiting in the airport were to be rescued.  

In his remarks, Biden mentioned that “contingency plans” had been created if the United States proved unable to evacuate the airport by the end of August. “It’s been a tenuous situation,” the president admitted, emphasizing that “the sooner we can finish, the better.” 

Over the past ten days, Biden claimed that around seventy thousand people, including Afghans, Americans and European nationals, have been evacuated from the Kabul airport. 

While the Taliban has claimed it has issued a blanket amnesty for all Afghans working for the United States or the government of Ashraf Ghani, there are isolated reports of violence and reprisal killings. For this reason, although Mujahid and other Taliban spokesmen have urged Afghans currently awaiting evacuation at the airport to return to their homes, very few have done so. 

While the Taliban is officially led by Amir al-Mu’minin Hibatullah Akhundzada, Baradar is officially the group’s second-in-command and has been described as its de facto leader. Following his arrest in 2010, the senior Taliban commander was imprisoned in Pakistan for eight years, until 2018; at the urging of the Trump administration, he was released from prison, later serving as the chief negotiator for the Taliban in Doha and the signatory of its February 2020 agreement with the United States providing for American withdrawal.

The Trump administration perceived Baradar as a relative moderate who was willing to preside over peace negotiations with the United States and the Afghan government. 

Trevor Filseth is a foreign and current affairs writer for the National Interest. 

Image: Reuters

Stephen Silver

PC Sales,

The pandemic changed the game for consumer technology. 

Shipments of PCs surged last year, once Americans realized they would be stuck at home for a long time. Now, in 2021, those shipments have surged even more. 

According to a release this week by research firm Canalys, the PC market in the United States grew seventeen percent year-over-year in the second quarter, with total shipments rising to 36.8 million units. Shipments of notebook computers rose by twenty-seven percent, desktops jumped twenty-three percent, and tablets were mostly flat, dropping one percent. 

“It is clear now that pandemic-related use cases will extend well into the future,” Brian Lynch, Research Analyst at Canalys, said in the release. “This points toward a significant refresh opportunity in the future—fantastic news for PC vendors and their channel and ecosystem partners. The commercial and education segments have exploded, triggering tremendous refresh potential. The US economy has bounced back well from its pandemic woes and small businesses are recovering, which will lead to a wave of purchasing from the segment.”

In terms of brands, HP led the market share with 21.9 percent, followed by Apple with 20.6 percent. Dell was third with 15.6 percent, Lenovo fourth with 12.4 percent and Samsung fifth with 8.2 percent. The “others” category consisted of 21.3 percent. 

Apple had led the market share race in the second quarter of 2020, with 24.8 percent. 

“Apple had more success with notebooks, with twenty-four percent year-on-year shipment growth, partly due to the success of the M1 chip. Dell saw comparatively modest growth, at eleven percent. Lenovo and Samsung continued to outperform other vendors, posting twenty-five and fifty-one percent growth respectively in PC sales-out,” Canalys said in the release. “Lenovo performed well by investing in the surging U.S. Chromebook market. Aside from its rapid ascendancy in the Chromebook market, Samsung has also solidified its status as a mainstay in the US tablet market, growing this quarter while the overall market shrunk slightly.”

In terms of tablets, Apple retains the lead, with forty-five percent, followed by Amazon with twenty-two percent and Samsung with eighteen percent, followed by “others” with fifteen percent. 

The tablet market, however, has slowed of late. 

“The tablet market ballooned in 2020 as consumers were stuck at home, with families looking for extra screens for entertainment and communication. That surge has faded slightly and lacks the future refresh cycle strength that notebooks will see from purchases made early in the pandemic. iPads performed well in Q2 2020 as Apple kept up with component shortages better than its key competitors. Since then, other vendors have made up ground, leading to Apple shrinking while Amazon and Samsung have grown,” Canalys said in its release. 

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist, and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

Nuclear Deterrence,

Nuclear weapons are inherently paradoxical or even self-contradictory, but extremely effective.

Pentagon leaders want to make sure that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s emerging concept of integrated deterrence combines nuclear and conventional tactics and strategies together to ensure a more lasting, impactful, and varied approach to preventing major power conflict. 

“The Department of Defense, following Secretary Austin's vision, is pursuing this larger pole by developing the concept of integrated deterrence. So to achieve integration, every capability in every domain must be considered. Some people like to think about nuclear as if it somehow exists in its own separate box sitting off here to the side,” Adm. Charles “Chas” Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, told an audience recently at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium, Huntsville, Alabama. 

Richard, who is in charge of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal, made the point that nuclear weapons are inherently paradoxical or even self-contradictory, but extremely effective. Richard said nuclear weapons could achieve their maximum effectiveness by existing in large numbers, but never being used. That is the point, and many advocates for a robust U.S. nuclear weapons capability make the point that, since the dawn of the nuclear era, there has not been a global great power conflict on the scale of World War II. Millions died in World War II, and while warfare has continued, the threat of nuclear annihilation, many believe, is the principal reason major global superpowers have not gone to war with one another. This dynamic, Richard emphasized, needs to be fully woven into any kind of deterrence-oriented defense strategy as the two can reinforce and impact one another.  The foundation of integration deterrence can be identified as being essentially “multi-domain.” 

“Integrated deterrence includes nuclear. It includes space, cyber, and information operations. It includes our allies and partners and it includes missile defense. We have to maintain strategic deterrence in all domains,” Richard said. 

Missile defense is a huge part of this, as should one major power believe it can achieve overmatch or superiority when it comes to a nuclear engagement, that could massively increase risk and drastically threaten the status quo. With this in mind, Richard emphasized missile defense as indispensable to any kind of a deterrence equation and specifically warned about Chinese and Russian advances in the areas of missile defense and nuclear weapons. Should any major power have reason to believe they could potentially prevail in some kind of nuclear exchange, due to highly advanced or superior missile defense technology, the threshold to nuclear war might be substantially lowered.  

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Patrick Fox

Afghanistan, Middle East

Whatever the final disposition of coalition forces in Afghanistan, personnel trapped in Taliban-controlled territory must be secured and evacuated.

The current situation in Afghanistan grows more dire by the day for the fate of the thousands of American, coalition, and Afghan civilians trapped by the Taliban. The last time the United States was faced with comparable thousands of its civilians trapped behind enemy lines was 1942 when the Japanese invaded and overran the Philippines. Back then, the outcome for U.S. civilians and prisoners of war was brutal beyond belief. Fortunately, the situation in Afghanistan should not require three years and a sixteen-division invasion force to rectify. What it will require is a willingness to embrace harsh expediency, to a degree not evidenced by the U.S. military in decades.

Conditions in Afghanistan are fluid. For the moment the Taliban seem to be limiting themselves to harassing and curtailing the movement of foreign nationals to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIAP), rather than abducting them or worse. There is no guarantee that restraint will continue. The United States should prepare for this status quo to deteriorate rapidly once the euphoria of the Taliban’s victory dissipates and they begin to exercise a greater degree of control over their various forces.

To this end, there are multiple avenues of approach toward achieving what must be the overarching objective of NATO forces: securing and evacuating all coalition personnel, civilian and military. The methods will depend largely on how the Taliban behaves, but they can be broadly anticipated. Local Afghans are a secondary objective. Despite current emotional appeals, even vetted Afghans actively operating with coalition forces have a long history of betrayal. While those who are loyal and deserving of U.S. assistance should not be abandoned, blanket assumptions of loyalty will only lead to the direct importation of enemy combatants into the United States and coalition nations. Rigorous vetting will be complicated, time-consuming, and imperfect. It is also vital to prevent one last additional disaster that will have internal ramifications for years to come.

Broadly speaking there are three possibilities moving forward, with some overlap between them. Each of these will be impeded by the almost unbelievable fact that neither the U.S. State Department nor the Defense Department can accurately identify how many coalition nationals need to be evacuated out of Afghanistan, or where they are in the country. This colossal and astonishing failure makes it infinitely more likely that eventually some number of coalition nationals will end up in Taliban custody and need to be retrieved.

The first scenario, and the easiest to deal with, would be a slight modification of the status quo. The Taliban continues some harassment of Westerners fleeing to HKIAP, but ceases to prevent them from actually reaching the airport. While humiliating for the United States, it is also broadly acceptable in that it accomplishes the goal of eventually securing most coalition nationals currently in the Kabul area. Unfortunately, though reports are conflicting, some Westerners appear to be trying to shelter in place in the wake of State Department and Defense Department warnings that they cannot be protected as they travel through Kabul to HKAIP.

The fact that American forces are not entering Kabul proper to conduct Search and Rescue (SAR) operations during this lull in hostilities is another major leadership failure and likely to result in some isolated personnel, too afraid to risk venturing onto the streets, being left behind if the August 31 withdrawal date is adhered to. The British 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (2 Para), is under no such constraints. British Ministry of Defense and on the ground reports confirm 2 Para, along with Canadian, French, and Spanish Special Forces, are foraying into the city specifically to secure their own nationals, but are also taking custody of any Westerner they encounter. This must be emulated by the Americans immediately before they squander the gift of Taliban preoccupation with their victory.

Active SAR for trapped personnel, while the Taliban is still in a state of relative restraint, is the only possible way that all trapped personnel can be secured before the coalition is eventually forced to confront the necessity of negotiating for their release from the Taliban. Even if these efforts are enacted immediately by American forces, 100 percent retrieval is unlikely. The odds are excellent some will be left behind and fall into Taliban hands.

The pressing question then becomes how we would retrieve U.S. personnel if and when they are taken into Taliban custody. Broadly speaking, there are two options with some overlap: negotiation and force.

Negotiation is the preferable first option. Ideally, we assure the Taliban that prompt return of U.S. personnel will ensure we adhere to the August 31 withdrawal date. The Taliban, anxious for foreign military personnel to depart, then hand them over. This is theoretically plausible but unlikely.

The more probable scenario is that the Taliban demand some form of ransom or finder’s fee for “protecting” coalition personnel in their custody. This could take the form of international recognition from the United States, international aid, direct payments (as was done for convicted deserter Bowe Bergdahl) or assurances that allied forces will not take steps to destroy the military equipment that the Taliban has seized from Afghan forces. One possible pitfall to such an exchange is the uncertainty that all captive Westerners would be returned by the Taliban. The Taliban could easily, as the North Vietnamese did, release a few at a time while constantly claiming to “find” more allied personnel in order to increase their reward from any such exchange. Coalition nations would then be on the hook to continually pay as more of their nationals were “discovered” to secure their release. This could perhaps be countered by coalition threats to stay until all their nationals are turned over, but this is again hampered by the fact that the United States does not have accurate data on how many of its citizens remain in the country and where they are located.

The more dangerous scenario is that the Taliban could openly hold some allied personnel as bargaining chips, either to incrementally boost any ransom payments or to ensure coalition withdrawal from Afghanistan within the agreed timeline. Or, most dangerously, to be used overtly as hostages to leverage concessions from NATO members under threat of their execution. This would trigger the use of the second option to secure U.S. personnel with force once negotiations break down.

Once negotiations break down, U.S. forces must be prepared to execute a “heavy” military response to position U.S. forces for the task ahead and to send an unambiguous message of U.S. resolve. This will require the simultaneous execution of three operations. The first will be an insertion of the 82nd Airborne Division (minus its ready brigade already tasked to HKIAP) to recapture Bagram Airbase. A secure airhead remote from any major urban center with multiple runways and a defensible perimeter will be crucial to subsequent operations and provide a mooring point to which surviving Afghan forces still in the fight can rally or be evacuated to via American airlift.

The second would be the airlift of additional U.S. troops in the country to Bagram Airbase. The 10th Mountain Division, the 101st Air Assault Division, and the remainder of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit would be prime candidates. This movement should coincide with U.S. Air Force deployment of two to three squadrons of ground attack aircraft, the A-10 Warthog and AC-130 gunship equipped units would be ideal, supported by an air superiority or multi-role capable squadron. The former will act in the traditional ground support role while the latter’s mission will be the complete destruction of any Taliban air assets. The Air Force would also be required to conduct a marshaling of Air Mobility Command assets to affect the aforementioned movement and subsequent withdrawal of ground forces and civilians.

The third operation would involve the capture of the family of every member of the Taliban leadership currently identified, by units assigned to Joint Special Operations Command. As former President Donald Trump indicated in a statement to Sean Hannity last week, we know where they are. These individuals would then be extracted to secure facilities on Bagram Airbase.

Operations to secure trapped American/coalition civilians would then proceed as follows. Once Bagram Airbase is secure, American ground forces would proceed to establish collection points around the outskirts of Kabul to which trapped personnel would be instructed to rally. Instructions could be delivered via the internet or broadcast by loudspeaker from helicopters. Additional collection points or dedicated recovery operations would also be mounted to secure or free coalition nationals stranded outside Kabul. Coalition forces would sweep Kabul (and any other suspected locations) to ensure compliance and the completion of a full evacuation.

The ultimatum to the Taliban would be simple. Free all coalition prisoners and cease interdicting the movements of non-Afghans towards HKIAP or a collection point. Any opposition to U.S. recovery operations would be met with immediate and unrestrained combat operations by all forces in theatre against any and all identifiable Taliban targets. Any engagement of coalition forces would also precipitate the transfer of Taliban-affiliated prisoners into the custody of surviving Afghan National Government forces.

America must relearn the art of making “hard war,” forcing an opponent to say “yes” to a proposal by simultaneously offering a favorable outcome and by holding a knife to their throat. If the Taliban agree, recovery operations should proceed as swiftly and thoroughly as possible. If they refuse that ultimatum, the United States must be prepared to deliver on its threat of force and ignore all considerations other than the safe recovery of coalition personnel, including the inevitable civilian casualties inherent in major combat in an urban center. In either case, the center for evacuation should be transferred from HKIAP to Bagram Airbase as soon as is feasible.

The Taliban cannot be trusted to turn over all coalition personnel. Coalition forces must therefore have the capability to determine to their own satisfaction that all trapped nationals have been located and secured. Once this is accomplished, the United States, and other coalition units, can safely withdraw to Bagram Airbase to complete their evacuation as should have been done in the first place.

Once all coalition personnel has been safely extracted to Bagram Airbase, the United States will have a decision to make. It can leave, it can remain in the country to support the remnants of the Afghan government still fighting from Bagram Airbase, or it can leave while conducting strikes to destroy things like major captured equipment stockpiles (assuming they have not already been destroyed at this stage) and decapitate Taliban leadership. This should not be glossed over as a foregone conclusion or downplayed as unworthy of serious consideration. In light of the current disaster, all three options are viable and can garner significant public support by polling.

Whatever the final disposition of coalition forces in Afghanistan, personnel trapped in Taliban-controlled territory must be secured and evacuated. To accomplish this the United States will need to deploy sufficient combat power and secure sufficient negotiating leverage to force the issue in the face of Taliban opposition. The entire reason for the Government of the United States is the protection of its citizens. If it openly fails in this paramount duty to such a degree that thousands of Americans are betrayed and left to the tender mercies of the Taliban, it will face an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy internally and internationally. 

Patrick Fox is an Iraq War veteran who served with the United States Air Force from 2005-2013. He holds a BS in Political Science from Tennessee State University and a Masters in Security from the University College of London.

Image: Reuters

Trevor Filseth

economy, Americas

However, the federal government’s reluctance to pass out cash has not stopped state and local governments from passing stimulus measures of their own.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Since most states generally have not had access to enormous cash surpluses, their “stimulus” measures can sometimes be more targeted, directed towards specific occupations or income levels. However, this is not always the case. 

President Joe Biden has more or less officially established that there will not be a fourth stimulus check. The president’s second infrastructure bill, the framework of which has already been approved by the Senate, does not include a fourth stimulus check measure. The last such measure, approved in the March 2021 American Rescue Plan Act, cost the government roughly $450 billion to send out; a similar expenditure today, while the U.S. economy rapidly recovers from the pandemic, would meet fierce opposition from fiscally conservative lawmakers. In the absence of a fourth major stimulus check, a series of smaller and more targeted ones have been sent out, in the form of the now-fully refundable Child Tax Credit to 36 million American families across the nation. 

However, the federal government’s reluctance to pass out cash has not stopped state and local governments from passing stimulus measures of their own. Since most states generally have not had access to enormous cash surpluses, their “stimulus” measures can sometimes be more targeted, directed towards specific occupations or income levels. However, this is not always the case. 

The “Golden State Stimulus” payment in California represents the largest state-wide stimulus check program in the United States. California, which emerged from the pandemic with a multibillion-dollar surplus, is compelled by a State Senate bylaw from the 1970s to return unspent money to taxpayers, rather than using it on other projects. The state’s Democratic governor, Gavin Newsom, has enthusiastically embraced the payments—possibly to improve his odds in an upcoming recall election, which polling has indicated a surprisingly close margin for in the deep-blue state.  

Consequently, every Californian earning between $30,000 and $75,000 per year is entitled to a payment of $500 or $600—including undocumented immigrants. Parents of dependents will also receive an extra $500 for each child. 

In Colorado, Gov. Jared Polis (D) has announced that all of its residents who received at least one unemployment payment from March until October 2020 will receive a $375 bonus.  

In Maryland, a statewide stimulus program has also been announced for filers of the Earned Income Tax Credit, with $500 for families and $300 for individual filers. 

Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis (R) has announced a bonus payment of $1,000 for workers in key areas, such as teachers, administrators, police, and first responders, who continued working through the pandemic. A similar plan is under development in Georgia and Tennessee, where full-time teachers and administrators will receive $1,000, and in Michigan, where they will receive $500.  

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Mark Episkopos

Tsirkon Hypersonic Missile,

The contract has been inked and the missiles are underway.

The Russian Defense Ministry announced on Tuesday that it has signed its first contract for the delivery of Tsirkon missiles to Russia’s military. “A government contract on the delivery of the 3M22 missile (the Tsirkon hypersonic missile) has been signed. The contract has been handed to CEO of the Research and Production Association of Machine-Building Alexander Leonov at the [Army-2021] international military-technical forum," according to the Defense Ministry’s press statement.

Leonov confirmed the news on the sidelines of the ARMY 2021 defense exhibition, adding that "the contract on Tsirkon missiles will be fulfilled by 2025. The missile has been standardized and can be used both from surface ships and submarines. The only difference is in the launcher used on surface ships or submarines.” Top Russian officials previously posited that the military could begin taking serial Tsirkon deliveries as early as 2022, but Leonov’s phrasing— “by 2025”— suggests that this timeline may prove too optimistic.

The statement did not specify which Russian vessels will be getting the vaunted Tsirkon upgrade first. But, according to earlier reports sourced by statements from anonymous Russian defense industry insiders, the honor will go to Admiral Golovko—the third frigate of the Project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov class. Tsirkon is likely to eventually make its way to numerous ships in Russia’s naval roster, including the Kirov-class battlecruisers Petr Velikiy and Admiral Nakhimov, as well as the modernized Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates and the Karakurt/Buyan/Gremyashchiy-class corvettes. The missile will also figure prominently into the offensive capabilities of Russia’s new Yasen-M class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines, seven of which are expected to enter service through 2028. Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to suggest in late 2019 that a land-based Tsirkon variant is in the works, but all current signs point to Tsirkon being a ship and submarine-launched weapon for the foreseeable future.

 3M22 Tsirkon (also known as “Zircon”) is a winged, anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile that is reportedly capable of reaching speeds of up to Mach 8-9 and maneuvering in mid-flight to evade enemy air defenses. The missile boasts an effective operating range of around 1,000 km, though its precise reach reportedly depends on whether it is engaging ground or naval targets. Russian military observers have projected confidence that Tsirkon can credibly hold American Carrier Strike Groups (CSG’s) at risk and impede the U.S. Navy’s current carrier wings from operating effectively.

Previously derailed by unspecified technical problems encountered in development, the Tsirkon has gotten back on track with a flurry of reportedly successful launch tests—many of which were conducted from the lead Project 22350 ship Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov—in 2020 and 2021. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexei Krivoruchko said earlier this month that Russia plans to wrap up the Tsirkon missile’s state trials in 2021. Defense sources told TASS state news that the missile’s first test launches from the Yasen-class Severodvinsk submarine are planned for September, before the White Sea freezes.

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest.

Image: YouTube

Sebastien Roblin

Su-25, Europe

The Su-25 is the Russian version of the deadly American A-10 Warthog.

Key point: The Su-25 is a flying tank that can pack a huge punch. Here is how it helps Russian ground forces win their battles.

The Su-25 Frogfoot, known as the Grach or “Rook” by Russian pilots, is one of those aircraft that may not be at the cutting edge of technology, but still has seen widespread service around the world because it offers an effective and useful solution to the need to blast targets on the ground.

As such, its obvious stablemate is the American A-10 Thunderbolt II attack plane. But while the U.S. Air Force wants to retire the A-10 starting in 2022, the Su-25 is undergoing extensive upgrades to keep with the times.

This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Also unlike the Thunderbolt, it has been disseminated it all over the world and seen action in over a dozen wars, including in the air campaigns over Syria, Iraq and Ukraine.

Not only has Russia had a lot of experience flying Su-25s in combat—it has shot several down as well.

During World War II, Russia’s armored Il-2 Sturmovik attack planes, nicknamed “Flying Tanks,” were renowned for their ability to take a pounding while dishing it out to German Panzer divisions with bombs, rockets and cannon fire.

Unlike the U.S. Air Force in the 1960s, which was enamored with the concept of “winning” nuclear wars with strategic bombers, the Soviet air service, the VVS, placed more emphasis on supporting ground armies in its Frontal Aviation branch. However, no worthy successor to the Shturmovik immediately appeared after World War II

In 1968, the VVS service decided it was time for another properly designed flying tank. After a three-way competition, the prototype submitted by Sukhoi was selected and the first Su-25 attack planes entered production in 1978 in a factory in Tbilisi, Georgia. Coincidentally, the American A-10 Thunderbolt had begun entering service a few years earlier.

Like the A-10, the Su-25 was all about winning a titanic clash between the ground forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact by busting tanks and blasting infantry in Close Air Support missions. This meant flying low and slow to properly observe the battlefield and line up the plane for an attack run.

Flying low would also help the Su-25 avoid all the deadly long-range SAMs that would have been active in a European battlefield. However, this would have exposed it to all kinds of antiaircraft guns. Thus, the pilot of the Su-25 benefited from an “armored bathtub”—ten to twenty-five millimeters of armor plating that wrapped around the cockpit and even padded the pilot’s headrest. It also had armored fuel tanks and redundant control schemes to increase the likelihood of surviving a hit. And in their extensive combat careers, Su-25s have survived some really bad hits.

Despite the similarities with the A-10, the Su-25 is a smaller and lighter, and has a maximum speed fifty percent faster than the Thunderbolt’s at around six hundred miles per hour. However, the Frogfoot has shorter range and loiter time, can only operate at half the altitude, and has a lighter maximum load of up to eight thousand pounds of munitions, compared to sixteen thousand on the Thunderbolt.

More importantly, the types of munitions usually carried are typically different. The Thunderbolt’s mainstays are precision-guided munitions, especially Maverick antitank missiles, as well as its monstrous, fast-firing GAU-8 cannon.

The Su-25’s armament has typically consisted of unguided 250 or 500 kilogram bombs, cluster bombs and rockets. The rockets come in forms ranging from pods containing dozens of smaller 57- or 80-millimeter rockets, to five-shot 130-millimeter S-13 system, to large singular 240- or 330-millimeter rockets. The Su-25 also has a Gsh-30-2 30-millimeter cannon under the nose with 260 rounds of ammunition, though it doesn’t have the absurd rate of fire of the GAU-8.

The lower tip of the Frogfoot’s nose holds a glass-enclosed laser designator. Su-25s did make occasional use of Kh-25ML and Kh-29 laser guided missiles in Afghanistan to take out Mujahideen fortified caves, striking targets as far as five miles away. KAB-250 laser-guided bombs began to see use in Chechnya as well. However, use of such weapons was relatively rare. For example, they made up only 2 percent of munitions expended by the Russian Air Force in Chechnya.

The Su-25 was still packing plenty of antipersonnel firepower—and that’s exactly what was called for when it first saw action in Afghanistan beginning in 1981. The Su-25 was the workhorse fixed-wing attack plane in the conflict, flying more than sixty thousand sorties in bombing raids on mujahedeen villages and mountain strongholds. They often teamed up with Mi-24 attack helicopters to provide air support for Soviet armored units.

However, as the Afghan rebels began to acquire Stinger missiles from the United States, Su-25s began to suffer losses and the Soviet pilots were forced to fly higher to avoid the man-portable surface-to-air missiles. In all, some fifteen Su-25s were shot down in Afghanistan before the Soviet withdrawal.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Su-25s were passed onto the air services of all the Soviet successor states. Those that didn’t use Su-25s in local wars—on both sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, for example—often exported them to countries that did. Frogfoots have seen action in the service of Macedonia (against Albanian rebels), Ethiopia (against Eritrea, with one shot down), Sudan (target: Darfur), and Georgia versus Abkhazian separatists that shot down several. And that list is not comprehensive.

In one notable episode, Cote d’Ivoire acquired several Su-25s and used them in its civil war. When the government of President Laurent Gbagbo was angered by the perceived partisanship of French peacekeepers, his mercenary-piloted Su-25s bombed the French camp, killing nine. Whoever ordered the attack didn’t consider that there was a French contingent stationed at the Yamoussoukro Airfield where the Frogfoots were based. The French used anti-tank missiles to destroy the fighter bombers on the ground in retaliation.

Russian Su-25 were back in action in the Chechnya campaign of 1994 to 1995, flying 5,300 strike sorties. Early on they helped wipe out Chechen aircraft on the ground and hit the Presidential Palace in Grozny with anti-concrete bombs. They then pursued a more general bombing campaign. Four were lost to missiles and flak. They were again prominent in the Second Chechen War in 1999, where only one was lost.

Of course, it’s important to note at this juncture that the Su-25 is one of a handful of Soviet aircraft that received its own American computer game in 1990.

Modern Su-25s

In addition to the base model, the Frogfoot also came in an export variant, the Su-25K, and a variety of two-seat trainers with a hunchback canopy, including the combat-capable Su-25UBM.

There were a number of projects to modernize the Su-25, including small productions runs of Su-25T and Su-25TM tank busters. But the Russian Air Force finally selected the Su-25SM in the early 2000s for all future modernization.

The SM has a new BARS satellite navigation/attack system, which allows for more precise targeting, as well as a whole slew of improved avionics such as news heads-up displays (HUDS), Radar Warning Receivers and the like. The Su-25SM can use the excellent R-73 short-range air-to-air missile, and has improved targeting abilities for laser-guided bombs. Other improvements reduce maintenance requirements and lower aircraft weight.

The National Interest’s Dave Majumdar has written about the latest SM3 upgrade, which includes the capacity to fire Kh-58 anti-radar missiles, which could enable Su-25s to help suppress enemy air defenses, as well as a Vitebsk electronic-countermeasure system that could increase its survivability against both radar- and infarred-guided surface to air missiles.

Georgia and Ukraine also have limited numbers of their own domestically upgrade variants, the Su-25KM and the Su-25M1 respectively. You can check out the Su-25KM variant, produced with an Israeli firm, in this video full of unironic 1980s flair.

Speaking of Georgia, things got messy in 2008 when both Russia and Georgia operated Frogfoots in the Russo-Georgian War. The Georgian Frogfoots provided air support for Georgian troops seizing the city of Tskhinvali. Then Russian Su-25s assisted Russian armor in blasting them out. Russia lost three Su-25s to MANPADS—two likely from friendly fire—and Georgia lost a similar number to Russian SAMs. To the surprise of observers, however, the Russian Air Force did not succeed in sweeping Georgian aviation from the sky.

In 2014, Ukraine deployed its Frogfoots to support ground forces combating separatist rebels in Eastern Ukraine. They assisted in the initial recapture of the Donetsk airport in May, would be followed over a half year of seesaw battles ending in a separatist victory in 2015. Ukraine lost four Su-25s in the ensuing ground-attack missions—three were hit by missiles (one MANPADS, two allegedly by longer-ranged systems across the Russian border), and a fourth was reportedly downed by a Russian MiG-29. Two others survived hits from missiles. As a result, Su-25 strikes were sharply curtailed to avoid incurring further losses.

In 2015, the Russian separatists of the Luhansk People’s Republic claimed to have launched airstrikes with an Su-25 of their own. Depending on who you ask, the airplane was restored from a museum or flew in from Russia.

The Iraqi Air Force has deployed its own Su-25s in the war against ISIS, purchasing five from Russia in 2014 and receiving seven from Iran that had been impounded during the 1991 Gulf War.

Finally, in the fall of 2015, Russia deployed a dozen modernized Su-25SMs in support of the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad. Many observers noted that of the aircraft involved in the mission, the Su-25s were the best adapted for the close air-support role. The Frogfoot flew 1,600 sorties against rebel-held Syrian cities, and expended more than six thousand munitions, mostly unguided bombs and S-13 rockets. They were withdrawn this year, leaving attack helicopter behind to perform more precise—and risky—close air support missions.

Lessons Learned from Flying Tanks?

While it’s fun to admire high-performing fighters like the MiG-29 or F-22 Raptor, the unglamorous Su-25 has so far had a greater impact on a wide range of conflicts. We can draw a few lessons from its recent combat record.

First, the significant losses suffered by Su-25s demonstrate that without effective air-defense suppression and electronic counter-measures, low-and-slow ground support planes are poised to take heavy losses against Russian-made surface-to-air missiles deployed in sufficient numbers.

Second, observation of Russia’s Syrian contingent suggests that despite possessing a diverse arsenal of precision guided munitions, the Russian Air Force continues to rely primarily on unguided bombs and rockets for the close air support mission.

Lastly, aircraft capable of delivering punishing attacks on ground targets while retaining a good chance of surviving hits taken in return are going to remain in high demand worldwide.

Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Stephen Silver

LG OLEDs,

We might not see that 42-inch gaming OLED TV until 2022.

Last January at the Consumer Electronics Show (CES), LG introduced its latest generation of OLED TVs, which featured “new panel technology, even more powerful processors, and a completely redesigned webOS experience.”

Among the products announced at the time was a new 42-inch OLED gaming TV. And while traditionally TVs that are introduced at CES in January arrive before the end of that year, a new report says we might not see that 42-inch gaming OLED TV until 2022. The TV would be the smallest OLED TV yet, after the previous smallest was fort-eight inches. 

According to the Korea Economic Daily, the 42-inch TV, which had been expected to arrive by the end of the year, will instead arrive as part of the 2022 lineup. The unveiling is expected to take place at CES in 2022. 

“Apparently, LG wants to add the model to next year’s TV lineup to maximize its marketing efforts rather than unveiling it later this year,” a source told the Korean publication. 

The TV, whenever it arrives, will be optimized for all of the major gaming consoles, PlayStation 5 (PS5) and Xbox Series X. In addition, the panels would be mass-produced by LG Display. 

“If all of this pans out, it’ll ideally have a 120Hz refresh rate display with multiple HDMI 2.1 ports that allow 120 frames per second 4K gameplay (in games that support it) on PC, PS5, or Xbox Series X,” The Verge said regarding news of the delay. “It should also support variable refresh rate (VRR) and auto low-latency mode, which are features that can make gaming look and feel smoother and more enjoyable. Though, with specs like that, I wouldn’t expect this to be a particularly affordable TV. The current 48-inch C1 was originally priced at $1,499.99 (but can currently be purchased for $1,299.99), so this smaller one will hopefully cost a little less.”

Following the virtual CES that took place in January 2021, the massive trade show is scheduled to return to Las Vegas next January, although the event will still have a virtual component. The organizers of CES announced last week that they will require proof of vaccination for in-person attendees of the event. 

"Based on today’s science, we understand vaccines offer us the best hope for stopping the spread of COVID-19,” Gary Shapiro, president and CEO, of CTA, said in a statement announcing the move. “We all play a part in ending the pandemic through encouraging vaccinations and implementing the right safety protocols. We are taking on our responsibility by requiring proof of vaccination to attend CES 2022 in Las Vegas.”

 Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters