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Making war on hackers
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Future of Mobile Marketing?

ven, 15/01/2021 - 10:18
What Is Mobile Marketing? Mobile marketing is becoming more and more popular as businesses are becoming aware of how smartphones are almost always within arms reach. In the UK, 7 out of 10 people own a mobile phone so if you’re not using SMS marketing then you’re likely missing out. Mobile marketing allows you to quickly create, send and have your message read by your customers within minutes. The speed at which the text message is sent & received means you can utilise mobile marketing for quick sales, provide new company updates & to increase ROI and client retention.

Most people who own a smartphone check their messages and emails in the morning so from a marketing perspective it’s paramount to make full use of mobile marketing.

So why use mobile marketing?

  • Instant Deliverability
  • Flexible Platform
  • High open rate
  • High conversion rate
  • It’s an opt-in method
  • SMS marketing is affordable
  • SMS are short, quick and very personal
  • Create a free mobile site

The other advantage of utilising mobile marketing is that iPhones are getting bigger, iPads can have a Simcard & be linked to your messages so soon people will be using their mobile device for the majority of their activities giving you a huge timeframe to contact them via SMS.

Once you have the mobile numbers of your subscribers you can reach them within seconds and have the majority of them open your message as statistics show 8/10 text messages are opened. Best of all GraphicMail makes it easy for you to implement…

Creating Your Text Message

Within your account you can easily create your text message by clicking on Mobile (tab at the top) >> SMS/Text Messages >> Create or Edit (to edit an existing one). You can then use the SMS/ Text Editor to input the text message you’d like to send. If you go over the 160 character limit then it will use an extra credit when sending.

Sending Your Text Message

Once you have created your text message, you can send it by clicking on ‘Send SMS/ Text’ >> Send to List. Within this section you can choose the mailing list you’d like to send to, select the SMS/ Text message and then click the button ‘Send to List’.

View Your Campaign Results

Once your bulk text message has been sent, you will then see detailed statistics showing sent, received, clicks and more. This can be viewed by clicking on Reports & Statistics (tab on the left) >> Delivery Reports, you can then select your send and view the statistics from it.

As mobile marketing is instant and as it has a higher open rate it gives you a great opportunity to communicate with your clients helping you build a relationship with them.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

Old favourites still ring true for apps

dim, 15/11/2020 - 10:22

We are now in a day where there is an app for everything, our lives are pretty much run by small program applications from everything from deciding what to eat for tonight’s dinner to personal banking.

So what are the best apps out there? Well, I can’t answer that as there are so many but I can give you an overview of the apps I use, why I use them and where to get them.

1. Adium (Mac)
This is a one-stop shop for Instant Messaging on the Mac. You can organise hundreds of contacts within one main window which allows for organisation and structuring. What I like about this program is you can connect different types of chat accounts in one place; I currently use MSN, Google Talk, MobileMe and Facebook but there are 18 different options to choose from so it gives massive amounts of flexibility! The only thing it lacks for me is the use of video chat. Chuck that in and this would be a massive winner!

You can download Adium for free from www.adium.com

2. Checkpoint Widget 2.2 (Mac)
This widget allows you to compare the brightness and colour differences thus checking “Checkpoint 2.2” of the “Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 1.0”. You can check the colours either by using hex references or RGB values.

This I feel is really useful and convenient when designing for screen and can be downloaded for free from the www.dirkeinecke.de.

3. Crypt3 (Mac)
This program allows you to easily encrypt files and folders so sensitive material doesn’t get ‘accidentally read’. It’s really handy if more than one person uses your machine or you save material externally to a hard drive or server with shared access.

You can download this for free from here

4. Cyberduck (Mac)
This is a basic FTP client which I tend to use for general uploading and downloading of files, it allows for bookmarking and the storing of passwords in your keychains.

This is available to download for free from www.cyberduck.com

5. Echofone (iPhone App)
This is a basic Twitter app for the iPhone that I use, it’s probably for more of a ‘social user’ such as myself as it probably doesn’t allow for the functionality of other Twitter apps, but I like it. It’s fast, allows for push notification and multiple accounts. You can also download it as a Firefox browser plugin, which I use. This places a tiny Twitter icon in the bottom right hand corner of the browser window which when clicked shows you a quick insight into the world of your twitter contacts. This is great for quickly sharing links and thoughts without having to log in to the Twitter main page, again this saves you a little time but it’s worth it!

This can be downloaded for free from www.echofon.com/

6. iCal, Address Book and Mail (Mac)
For me this is a bundled package that comes with every Apple Machine and its awesome! We use it throughout the Creativitea Studio and are all synched in together; we share contact lists, calendars and to do lists, etc, on all our machines and iPhones and find that the programs work seamlessly together as if they were one. Without this we would be completely lost and its already included!

To find out more visit Apple’s website.

7. IE Tester (PC)
The bane of every web developer’s life is cross browser testing (and IE6 support). With this program, which is free to download for the PC, you can look at your websites side by side throughout IE versions, ensuring the sites work and are looking great! There is a debug bar which is also available to download for free which allows you to look at any snagging you may have to do along the way.

You can download this for free from www.my-debugbar.com/

8. iPlotz (Air Desktop Application and Online)
iPlotz is essentially a wire framing and sitemap generating application that can be used as an online tool or as a desktop application run through Air. What I like about this program is it is so fast to put complex page structures together and elements in place. You can quickly link up all the main pages of your websites and share it as a preview URL so you and your clients can experience the new website in wire frame format. Building the pages couldn’t be simpler; you have the option of drawing out websites using a complex number of web elements, from forms, tabs and media placements. This program has it all!

iPlotz is available from a limited free account or from $15 a month subscription, visit their website at www.iplotz.com

9. Lorum Ipsum Generator Widget (Mac)
This is basically a widget that generates dummy copy to be used within your designs. You can choose from a selection of preset options; paragraphs, lists, sentences, titles and single words. You also have the custom length option, say 200 characters for instance. This simply copies the text to your clipboard to paste into place.

You can download this for free from the Apple website.

10. Navicat Lite (Mac and PC)
I haven’t really had much to do with this program, however I can see massive potential with it and have found it quite useful so far. It is basically an online database administration tool, which is built for simplifying database management. If your familiar with FTP clients, etc, you’ll find the GUI intuitive, secure and easy to use. So far I have only used it for testing my SQL connections so I haven’t fully explored the program but I will be looking into it in the near future.

Check it out at www.navicat.com. The lite version is free but for more advanced usage you can upgrade for a small fee.

So like I say, there are thousands of apps out there just destined to help us all out with our day to day lives-I can’t mention them all! If you have a recommendation, let us know and we’ll check it out.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

Hello world!

jeu, 09/04/2020 - 15:04

Welcome to WordPress. This is your first post. Edit or delete it, then start writing!

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

Huge Android 12 leak shows off tons of new features — here’s what to expect

dim, 15/03/2020 - 10:09
ANDROID DEVELOPER

There are a number of methods that an expert can use to make a legitimate living. A considerable option for software developers is becoming an Android developer. This could be the best decision that one ever makes. The option helps one to become his own boss and make programs of his choice. Nonetheless, it is imperative to understand that not every professional reaps the full benefits of this option. A number of prior preparations ought to be made for one to benefit fully. Below are a number of things that one has to look at when planning on joining the Android development program.

BE THE BEST DEVELOPER ANDROID

If you definitely decided to be an Android developer, then we must say that you need to be prepared for getting into the world of app development. We are going to help you by presenting you some helpful tips and steps you need to follow.

Remember, the competition is huge, so you better give the best from you. Stay informed and believe in your skills. Every beginning is hard, but doesn’t mean you cannot succeed in the Android app development world.

BECOME AN ANDROID DEVELOPER

Android OS can be used by thousands and thousands of businesses from all around the globe. Lots of new, innovative Android app development and mobile games can be developed using the Android platform that can finally lead to improved business growth in real-time. And that is not all, professionals can simply construct SDK without investing on additional manpower or infrastructure. Programs can also be changed free of cost as per the client demands thus making Android OS the most cost-effective interface till date. Businesses thus can make enormous profit selling different applications developed using the Android platform.

Imagine a situation where an organization has to merge multiple programs, in such cases Android app development is definitely the best. Businesses can easily control and incorporate various simple to extremely complex programs exploring the platform.

Other mobile platforms involving Blackberry or Symbian, Android-based apps can be delivered in various ways. For instance, businesses can utilize the Google Android market to allocate and promote their applications. As a matter of fact, businesses have complete freedom to develop their own allocation methods and create new app stores, etc. Thus with the help of Android developers, businesses can not only create different applications but can also produce a huge range of allocation platforms to reach the potential customers on a global scale.

It is recommendable to stay informed about all that is related to Android app development, if you want to become respected and reliable Android developer of course.

DEVELOP ANDROID AND HELP BUSINESSES ACHIEVE THEIR MAXIMUM

A growing number of businesses nowadays are concentrating on Android app development with the aim of improved business effectiveness and basic ROI. That is the reason why they are hiring the best of professional Android application developers to work for them and help the gain various benefits.

Android applications for business help to maintain better connection with the potential and existing users through common updates of products and services news on the popular social media and far-reaching email marketing along with expense tracking and so on. The major advantage of using Android operating system is that it is open-source; hence the source codes are easily approachable by professionals to edit or see how the system works. Developers can constantly keep on updating Android applications to gain an edge over the competitors and make sure the Android platform is safe and secure from intruders.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

#CCLKOW So you say you want innovators and disruptive thinkers?

lun, 07/03/2016 - 13:46

Greetings! This week’s piece pivots off of the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ comments regarding disruptive thinkers, which intersects nicely with an article I am wrapping up on Evans Carlson and his Raider concept in WWII. It is also influenced by the broader context which seems to favour and privilege innovation. And so, as the tide seems to be in favour, I thought I would just disrupt things a little. Enjoy the piece and join the discussion on Twitter at the hashtag, #CCLKOW.

 

In a call for support from the Corps’ hidden legions of disruptive thinkers, General Robert Neller initiated what amounted to a cultural revolution. Confronting what seems to be an increasingly complex world it is hoped that such individuals, as well as contenders from the rank and file whose experiences can light the path to real world solutions, will aid the agility and effectiveness of the Corps. This latest genuflection at the altar of the novel builds on the larger trend which values innovative thinking.

We are all quite certain this is a good thing, right?

But is it?

First, Neller is correct to note that the culture of the Marine Corps must adapt if this has the slightest chance to offer anything more than fits and starts of short-lived new ideas. For its many strengths, there is an historical resistance to figures whose ideas lie too far outside the standard. Evans Carlson, father of a wildly innovative warfighting unit and concept, did not succeed within the institution. Nor did William Corson, the Marine officer behind the first and very novel Combined Action Program in Vietnam. The successful Marines of the last 75 years have been those who have moderated change at the fringes but not fundamentally altered course. These are the cultural terms of success that will need to be countered. Of course, the problem is that institutional culture is a very difficult thing to change, and it is debatable whether that can be achieved under the tenure of a single commandant.

Second, this effort and others more generally assume that the best answers will come from within the armed forces and in direct response to issues. But important innovation is often found in odd spaces disconnected from the particular problem at hand. Much of the smart advances in air mobility between the two world wars came from the private sector or other public services. While I am not in favour of the thinking which posits that war and commerce as activities are similar, I am not so dogmatic that I cannot see the value of certain competencies crossing between the two areas. This is not to suggest that internal voices not be listened to or even heard, but only to caution that left and right of arc is limited if the box one need get outside of is only the military one.

Third, if everyone is disrupting and innovating, when do the armed forces develop competency? There is a point at which there will be diminishing marginal returns if this trend is pushed too far. Yes, at the extreme of every argument one finds foolishness, but in this case I suspect the frontier to that point is far closer than most people want to admit. And as we heap more praise and value upon innovation and disruption, I suspect the ability to admit that frontier will become more difficult. But at some point armed forces must train and do, neither of which are entirely amenable to constant flux. Alternatively, we can let loose the dogs of intellectual and other creativity and ingenuity because this is truly a period of existential peace. Arguing for both sides, the need to plan, prepare, and execute while simultaneously embarking upon revolutionary change seems only a recipe for disaster.

Fourth, are things really changing at such a rate that constant disruption and innovation are necessary? There are elements to the character of warfare which are shifting, but many stable elements remain, and certainly key principles remain immutable. I heard at the beginning of my career in military affairs that a Marine well-trained to his basic job could, on the basis of discipline and leadership, adapt to any situation. I heard the same thing today in class from a French officer. Despite the seeming revolutionary change of the last two decades of conflict, this basic approach remains a significant touchstone to many. Much like the liberal arts remain a valuable education for many different life and career choices despite every effort to drive novelty in university learning, perhaps the old way needed no superseding.

To close, I would point to the arena of military hardware. There is an unrelenting push to create, deploy, and destroy with the next cycle the technology of war. The F-35 has barely entered service and the next generation of aircraft is already a thing. And it will be a costly thing. Replicated across the armed forces, such a phenomenon acquires a heft that I doubt many can truly comprehend. And to what end? It is uncertain what military advantage is gained, but the costs are staggering. Whether these investments can be maintained indefinitely is entirely questionable. Even if possible, to impose this phenomenon across the armed forces, in thinking, software, and hardware, may not, in the end, achieve any greater marginal benefit than is currently seen with every new, expensive bit of major kit.

So, my questions for discussion are:

What is the innovation that American, British, or other armed forces need?

How do we drive the right innovation? How do we kill the bad?

At what point is disruption merely disruptive and not productive? 

Can the culture of armed forces really change? Or, historically, have the best innovations been the ones which accommodated themselves to the extant institutional culture?

What is the right admixture of innovators, disruptors, and status quo defenders for the armed forces?

Join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

#CCLKOW On Professional Military Education

jeu, 25/02/2016 - 12:09

Greetings dear CCLKOW readers and discussants. This week’s post differs from the norm in that it is not necessarily short term discussion based. Rather, like last’s week’s piece from Company Command, its aim is about the longer term conversational arc for the series. In this case the focus is specifically on the matter of professional military education. There are no particular questions posed, discussion in this case being driven by recommendations and interest. 

 

I have been interested in professional military education for as long as I have been in military history and defence affairs. Its content interests me in detail and for its expression of policy and intent. I have worked across various parts of it in the US and now here in the UK. My thesis research relied upon its 19th and 20th century emergence as a key piece in the development of the logistics of industrial warfare. I have also sat in as a student in much of a standard war college course. In sum, it is a critical  junction of scholarship, practice, and policy, as important to security and defence as it is to research.

For the purposes of this blog, when I speak of professional military education (PME) I mean the schoolhouses of the field grade ranks. The modern military school system which comes under this umbrella was borne of an era in which the operations of the line units exceeded the direct control of the army or campaign commander. War’s complexity increased first in the Napoleonic Wars as the nation in toto could be leveraged to increase manpower. This was followed by the complexity which the increasing mass that industrialisation enabled. To meet the widening spectrum of subject matter competencies which modern warfare required, PME evolved early to comprise a mix of academic and military subject matters. By the end of WWI, the educational scheme which an American or a British practitioner would generally recognize today had taken form, even as it continues to modify and reform itself according to changing needs.

If we are faced with an evolving character of warfare, it seems only fitting to examine the contours of the education which is meant to sustain the martial intellect. As such, it is my interest to bring more pieces on issues relevant to PME to CCLKOW and Kings of War. While I have some ideas in mind and plans in place, I would like to hear from a wider audience the PME topics and issues of concern. And so, this week’s discussion is a response to a that simple request.

Give a thought and add your views on Twitter at #CCLKOW.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

CCLKOW: Part 2 – The Military Must Inevitably Take the International Lead In HADR

lun, 08/02/2016 - 14:35

And this, dear CCLKOW readers, is the second instalment. In it, the necessity for the military response is argued. Take note, do-gooderism is not the driving force behind this argument. Rather, the linkages between these events and security drive the need for proper consideration, while the needed capabilities already held within the armed forces argue for their appropriateness. So, now that you have read both, it is for you all to consider which side of the argument you fall down on and join the conversation on Twitter at #CCLKOW.

 

While the spectre of global conflict is a daunting proposition to the human condition, the looming potential for disasters, both man-made and natural, to wreak similar havoc and impose like consequences upon humanity should equally concern societies. If the migrations of late from conflicts abroad are but the mildest preview of what might be faced in the aftermath of any significant humanitarian event, at the worst end is the magnitude of managing communicability on a global scale or contested salvation. The disaster flashpoints in the world centre around points of great population densities, and too often correspond with populations already on the brink. Taking the other side from my dear colleague, then, this piece will argue the inevitably necessary leading role for the armed forces in HADR. Although their efforts are important, and must continue, private and NGO capabilities will not be sufficient to the growing demands. As humanitarian crises are likely to be an increasing feature of the international security landscape, armed forces must plan and prepare robustly for the spectrum of contingencies it will confront.

The top end scenarios matter. Contrary to the dismissal in the first piece of the armed forces for their utility in the extreme circumstances only, it is exactly for contingency’s sake that these organisations must prepare for humanitarian operations. We do not, for example, put aside the armed forces role in conflict because war is an extreme iteration of organised violence. Furthermore, I would argue that HADR is the top end of emergency response. ‘Disaster’ is not your every day ‘sticky situation.’

The Faceless Bureaucrat is correct to note that many emergencies do not require a military response. However, as the capabilities, doctrines, and tactics are developed, it will certainly be useful for them to face live testing in lower echelon events. Exercising the skills, equipment, and approaches will make for improved performance in larger, more critical events.

I am ever mindful that the militarisation of activities is a slippery slope. However, the security ramifications of human suffering is not a new or extravagant concern. Wellington certainly understood that the humanitarian disaster of the strategy at the Lines of Torres Vedras would have to be mitigated. So too did the Western Allies connect humanitarianism with security after WWII. And the population upheavals wrought by natural and conflict disasters of late serve only to highlight this point. The matter is, and has been for at least two centuries, of geo-strategic concern. The armed forces are not the only response that must be readied, but it is the critical one.

The armed forces encompass the broad spectrum capabilities necessary. The armed forces maintain the far and away edge in contingency logistics that can endure. While civilian capabilities have their niche specialisms, across the breadth of demand it is the armed forces that are best placed to answer. And in disaster operations this will be wider than most contemplate – see for example, the panoply of marine demands required in the Haiti earthquake relief operations. (1)

It bears considering as well that at some point the need for security and force will be necessary. Most obviously, this will be a need in R2P HADR scenarios. Thinking more pragmatically, to maintain order against the worst circumstances, whether destruction or disease, will be a necessity. It is not a pretty thing to admit, but its distasteful nature does not absolve us of our requirement to prepare for such contingencies.

The security implications demand serious response.

HADR is neither optional nor altruism. At both ends, sceptics would like to dismiss the necessity for armed forces in these events. From the military there is often the sense that these are ‘nice to have’ operations that can be disregarded as necessary, whereas the civilians dismiss the effort for being self-serving. Both are wrong. The security risks of humanitarian disasters are already manifest and will only worsen. And it is for this reason that the debatable altruism of such actions is irrelevant: such a sentiment will no longer be necessary to save lives and rebuild.

In the 21st century, saving lives will no longer be the province of the do-gooder. Rather, this metric of effect is about to assume strategic proportions. The struggles of at least the near future will be decided by the lives saved, not taken, in conflicts averted not won. Looking only to the realm of natural disasters, both weather/environmental disasters and communicable disease scenarios demand the state take this planning on board with the armed forces. Dealing with these contingencies must become part of the domestic and international defence and political discussions. Not only must strategies and plans be in place and practised, but international agreement must be achieved. When considering that the use of forces might be necessary in some instances, international agreement on the standards must be agreed.

Delicate circumstances, robust response. The human condition in these circumstances is delicate. This does not mean that a robust answer is not the best response. One could easily blanch at the practices found in an emergency room. However, in such circumstances, delicacy is not necessarily helpful. So too in the first phases of a disaster. Squeamishness will not assist our response to the worst of human calamities.

This does not mean that the armed forces should not adopt and practice an approach for such circumstances that includes the recourse to gentility wherever practicable. And returning to the medical analogy, it will be in the recovery phases, once the trauma has been passed and the long path to recuperation is begun, that issues of ‘bedside manner,’ of the attention to the social, political, and cultural delicacies will come to the fore. It is at this point that the provision of care from the civilian sector will be most effective and useful.

 

Thus, given its demands and security implications, the armed forces are best suited to lead the delivery of capabilities in HADR. Accepting this reality and responsibility sooner will mean the international community is best suited to deal with this emerging and critical contingency.

 

 

 

 

Notes

1 “Haiti Earthquake Port Rehabilitation” from Think Defence.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

CCLKOW: Part 1 – In HADR Humanitarian Principles Mean Civilians Must Lead

lun, 08/02/2016 - 14:30

Greetings CCLKOW readers. This week we bring you something different. Rather than a single post on a theme, today we present two sides of an issue for your consideration. In this case, we are discussing HADR, and more specifically the proper lead for this growing contingency. Below, The Faceless Bureaucrat argues the case for the civilian and public sectors, largely short of the armed forces. Against the demands of the circumstances, both tangible and otherwise, these actors are the ideal lead. The second piece, from me, will argue the opposite. It will be for the Twitter discussion to consider both perspectives and debate the merits of each. So, enjoy this blog, and then move on to the next one! (JSR)

 

While many (mostly Western) military forces may consider themselves the best candidates for conducting Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief missions around the world, I posit that, in circumstances short of Level 3 mega-disasters, they are not.  I base this argument on three main ideas:

1.  Military action is an extension of politics and is, therefore, at odds with humanitarian principles.

Humanitarianism is meant to address affected populations on the basis of need alone.  Military intervention is usually carried out to further a particular foreign policy goal, whether it be improving a country’s image on the world stage or winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of a particular society.  I am not saying military delivered or facilitated aid cannot do material good, but it cannot be seen as being purely altruistic, either.  The simple fact that international militaries respond to emergencies based on a set of strategic calculations means that they are not, by definition, humanitarian.

Furthermore, given that foreign militaries are political actors, sometimes their enormous technical capabilities are overshadowed by political considerations.  Following the Katmandu earthquake last year, for instance, USMC Osprey aircraft could not operate in many parts of the country, due to the sensitivities of Nepal’s neighbours. Hence, the humanitarian value of these aircraft was severely limited because of their political significance.

2.  The militarization of humanitarian aid has knock on ethical implications for the beneficiary population.

When a hungry or displaced population is ‘rescued’ by a military force, rather than by its own state apparatus (ideal) or another civilian entity (second-best), it perpetuates the notion that the military provides the best solution to difficult problems.  In most parts of the world, there is considerable effort  being made to de-militarise essential services (through DDR and SSR programmes, for instance) and to normalise the state’s ability to provide for its citizenry.  Much of this effort is erased if the cavalry (quite literally) comes over the horizon to save the day.

3.  There are alternate mechanisms that can and do work, most of the time.

While the military is capable of providing logistical services quickly and effectively at short notice and with global reach, the civilian humanitarian system (composed of host countries; the International Red Cross/Red Crescent system (ICRC, IFRC, and national societies); Agencies, Funds and Programmes of the UN system; and national and international NGOs) manages to provide a wide-range of humanitarian and disaster relief services to millions of people around the world without military assistance.  For instance, the World Food Programme (part of the UN family) is a world leader in humanitarian logistics, fielding an impressive Air Service with 70 cargo aircraft and operating a fleet of over 5000 trucks every day, in places like Somalia, Syria, and Central African Republic. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs provides the necessary ‘command and control’ (to use a not 100% apt military term) mechanisms–such as planning, liaison, information management–to help make the myriad actors work effectively to support the affected states and their populations.

In mega-emergencies, military assistance is required and very much welcomed, but it, too, must be coordinated and subordinated to the needs of the affected people.  It should be as humanitarian as possible (given the political realities) and disappear when it is no longer needed.  Commercial providers, such as DHL, are also starting to play major roles in logistics provision in HA/DR scenarios.  While they are also not entirely humanitarian actors (and may engage in HA/DR missions for PR reasons) they can offer services that were once only available from military sources.

Yes, the humanitarian system is imperfect: it needs more money and requires reform, especially in the area of involving the people who are most affected (reform will be the subject of the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul later this year), but these problems cannot be neglected in favour of having some militaries ‘step up’ and then taking over these delicate operations.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

CCLKOW: Led by Donkeys, you say?

lun, 25/01/2016 - 14:57

Greetings! In this week’s CCLKOW I intend to shake things up again, turning a common practice on its head. No one who has ever spent time around company and field grade officers does not know that general officers are among their fondest targets for criticism. And yet these same people are those who eventually become the general officers. There is, obviously, a disconnect. So, read the piece, ponder the questions, and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW.

 

A common, if incorrect, refrain regarding the British First World War military experience is that the army was ‘lions led by donkeys.’ A criticism of the senior ranks who prosecuted the war, this seeming truism has largely been dispelled. But while this description no longer stands up to deeper more nuanced scrutiny, the practice of criticising general officers is like a blood-sport right of passage across armed forces.

What I find very interesting about this phenomenon is that it is enduring. Each generation of officers thinks those at the very top are often the picture of incompetence. And every single one of those generations ultimately steps into those shoes to lead the next generation of malcontents.

I understand that inter-generational disdain is common. Whether disparaging the youth in our trail or those who lead us, it is very easy to believe there is something entirely lacking about those outside our own peer groups. However, even controlling for this more general influence, there remains a marked difference in the phenomenon in the armed forces.

So, what is happening?

Are the personnel systems, which drive the selection of officers to command billets and, correspondingly, higher rank, to blame? Do these systems drive out the best and the brightest and leave behind a middling, muddling sort?

Is there a fundamental disconnect between what a field or company grade officer understands about general officership in the armed forces and reality? Do these officers simply not understand the demands upon executive leadership, that the relative stability of tactical practice has given way to the far less firm domains of strategy and politics?

What could a general officer tell you about the role to clarify that what looks like a donkey is not?

 

 

 

 

 

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

CCLKOW: Why Warriors?

lun, 11/01/2016 - 11:42

#CCLKOW readers, this week we bring you one of Kings of War’s own, The Faceless Bureaucrat, to revisit the matter of warrior self-identification in the armed forces, particularly those of the US. We have trod this ground before with our Colonel Panter-Downes (here). But the trend is pernicious, so today we offer another perspective in opposition. Written originally as a comment to a post at Carrying the Gun, it has been expanded for our use this week. Where the Colonel offered a review from within the military institution, the Faceless Bureaucrat takes a historical approach. And it’s good. So, give this piece a read, peruse the Colonel’s musings, check out Don Gomez’s writing, and then join the discussion on Twitter at the hashtag. — JSR

 

Over at Carrying The Gun @dongomez has posted an interesting essay on what he calls an ‘odd Valhalla obsession‘.   In it he says, “What I wonder is what the constant referencing of ancient warrior cultures says about our own military.”

Now Dear Readers, it may be a new year, but there was no way that I was not going to comment on his post.  I couldn’t help myself.  It was like birdseed left in the middle of the road by Wile E. Coyote.  In true Roadrunner fashion, I dived in, awaiting the inevitable car crash as a 10 tonne truck exited the phony tunnel mural that was plastered on the cliff-face behind me.  Instead, the comment grew and grew and attracted some attention, so I decided that I would turn it into post over here.  (Repeat after me: recycling is good.)  So, lightly edited, please find below my thoughts.

It won’t surprise you–given what I have written several times here at KoW (here and here, for example) about the whole Warrior trope–that I believe there is something unhealthy in the way that certain elements of armed forces in the West (particularly in, but not limited to, the U.S.) cleave to mythical Warrior identities. The Warrior is not a simple, straight-forward ‘good role model’; as individuals (idealised and actual) and as functional types, Warriors have always had a complicated relationship with collective violence. This is true across much of, inter alia, the Indo-Persian-Greco-European mythological imaginary. Homeric, Vedic, and Norse heroes are not worthy of blind emulation, partly due their inherently self-centred approach to combat.

As iconoclastic as it may be to say that (and I guess it must be, given the threats I have received from those who believe they are Warriors when they read my writing on this) the real mystery is to figure out what the allure is. Aesthetics is probably part of it, but why do serving, professional service people want to be associated with images of ill-disciplined, immature, selfish, greedy, individualistic, hedonistic, unaccountable committers of atrocities from centuries ago? Why not choose chivalric ideals, for example? Why not choose home-grown patriotic symbolism instead (from winning US armies, I mean)?

Part of the reason, I reckon, is so that members of contemporary armed forces can distance themselves from civilians–politicians, civilian strategists, diplomats, whizz-kids, bureaucrats, hedge fund managers. Could it be a version (an extended, extreme, perverse version) of Huntington’s ‘professionalisation as isolation’ movement espoused in his 1957 classic The Soldier and The State? “Anyone can get a grad degree; only Warriors go to Valhalla.” Taking this further, it is likely a move to ensure a degree of ontological security (an attempt to avoid the chaos that lurks in life without a comforting framework, as Giddens might have expressed it) for those who believe they are the heirs of Achilles or Beowulf.

This is problematic for several important reasons, but let me mention two here. The first is that Warriors don’t follow orders well: they don’t ‘fight and win the nation’s wars’, they fight their own (often deeply personal) wars, and this is dangerous for liberal democratic states. Modern war is an extension of politics (I read that somewhere), not a private quest for glory. Or revenge. Or a ‘bonding experience with yer mates’.

The second is that Warriors almost always have problematic relationships with female figures (as beneficiaries, bystanders, supporters, victims, and peers). Hyper-masculinity does not play well in a society made up of diverse, fluid, complex gender relations.  Choosing hyper-masculine (for the most part Warriors have been men) role models is not going to improve the situation.

Returning to Huntington’s conceptual landscape to conclude, Warriors wrongly believe they must focus solely on the military’s functional imperative, seeing no value in supporting its societal imperative. In primitive societies, role differentiation may have allowed for this (and certainly in our epics, this is often emphasized), but contemporary societies, contemporary politics, and contemporary wars demand that armed forces achieve a balance of functional and societal appropriateness.

Now is the time to leave fantasy role-playing behind and get on with the serious business of soldiering.*

(*I use the term soldiering regardless of the service to which one belongs.  I know everyone is different, just like every snowflake is different, but choosing the word warrior to act as a some universal term so that Marines, dragoons, grenadiers, sailors, aviators, etc. don’t get upset does not offset the negative aspects of the term as I have mentioned).

So with that said, a few questions to get the discussion started:

 

  1. Do you find that the Warrior identity is prevalent in your military experience?  In what ways is it introduced and reinforced?
  2. In what ways do you believe that a Warrior identity actually benefits the individual, the military (as an institution), and the state?
  3. How might those benefits be incorporated into an identity model that eschews the downsides mentioned in the post?

 

 

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

To Boost or Not to Boost: North Korea’s Nuclear Trajectory

mer, 06/01/2016 - 18:44

And so it begins… again. Today’s North Korean nuclear test comes as no surprise. In April 2015 North Korean scientists indicated they were developing fusion technology, and last month Kim Jong-Un, the Stalinist regime’s leader, stated the country had a hydrogen weapon capability. While these claims may be an exaggeration, this most recent test still suggests technical advancements and has strategic implications. Nuclear weapons remain a crucial security tool for North Korea, and the West, particularly the United States, can meet this threat by maintaining and strengthening its own deterrent whilst promoting arms control- a delicate balance, to be sure.

This is North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and follows tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. Information about the test is still trickling in, but the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Organization’s International Monitoring Service, along with geological surveys and various governments, reported an ‘unusual seismic event’ at 1:30 UTC in the northeast region of North Korea, close to the Punggye-ri site of the previous nuclear tests. North Korea issued a press announcement that it had tested a ‘miniaturised hydrogen bomb’, developed as ‘self-defense against the U.S. having numerous and humongous nuclear weapons.’

Based on initial reports and seismic readings, the test measured at 5.1 on the Richter scale, meaning an explosive yield between 1 and 30 kilotons equivalent of TNT, and in all likelihood it was a single-stage atomic weapon potentially with boosting technology. Hydrogen weapons, also often referred to as thermonuclear weapons or fusion weapons, are more sophisticated than fission weapons and were only developed by the advanced nuclear states after years of testing. In as simple terms as possible, a ‘boosted’ device is one in which fusion technology increases the yield of an atomic weapon. The more advanced and challenging design is a multiple-stage thermonuclear weapon, with a fission primary that triggers a secondary fusion detonation. This can be further expanded upon in a three-stage weapon, such as the Tsar Bomba, the Soviet Union’s largest nuclear weapon ever exploded that produced a yield of 50 megatons. The yield of today’s nuclear test is much smaller than what would be expected of thermonuclear weapon, and therefore was likely a boosted weapon.

Monitoring of nuclear testing includes various techniques which eventually may be able to confirm whether or not the test was a hydrogen device, but North Korea has a track record of exaggerating its nuclear test performance. Its 2006 test was likely a ‘fizzle’, whereby the explosion inefficiently used the nuclear material by burning through it faster than it could produce a self-sustaining chain reaction. Pyongyang claimed its 2013 test was a miniaturized device, which requires technological advances well beyond its previous tests, but there was no evidence to support this claim. With regards to today’s test, as one North Korea expert posited, ‘North Korea may be claiming a successful hydrogen bomb test because it’s not grabbing much attention with atomic bombs.’ This test may prove to be underwhelming for the North Koreans, but still sets off at least three alarm bells.

First, it is a technological achievement because regardless of the success of the fusion technology, whether boosted or two-stage, North Korea will benefit from the new data generated by the test. The next test might not be a failure and North Korea is producing enough fissile material to ‘waste’ it on testing rather than saving it for nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Second, the test demonstrates Pyongyang remains willing to be an international pariah despite international pressure and waning support from China. Previously, North Korea relied heavily on Chinese financial and political support, but that may no longer be the case as Beijing has already condemned the test, as it did in 2013, and summoned the North Korean ambassador to lodge a protest. The big question is whether or not China has the leverage to reign in Pyongyang.

And finally, North Korea continues to rely on nuclear weapons for regime security and as a symbol of the Kim dynasty’s longevity and status on par with other nuclear powers. North Korea is not alone in its reliance on nuclear weapons. Over the past two years Russia has participated in nuclear ‘sabre-rattling’ and continued to emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Other states, such as Pakistan, remain reliant on nuclear weapons for security, as well, in the face of a conventionally superior adversary.

Nuclear disarmament advocates will likely point to today’s test as evidence of the need for a nuclear weapons ban and for nuclear possessors to further reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Conversely, more hawkish analysts are likely to call for more nuclear capabilities, more missile defence, and more reliance on nuclear weapons to meet this growing threat. Nuance is in short supply in most contemporary nuclear debates.

But deterrence and arms control are not mutually exclusive, and North Korea’s nuclear posturing offers an opportunity for the West to practice this principle. It can ensure the norm against nuclear testing is upheld by speaking out against the North Korean test, levying further sanctions against the Kim regime, and cooperating with the CTBT Organization.

In light of the Russian and North Korean tandem nuclear threats, the United States can strengthen its deterrent by increasing investment in the nuclear infrastructure and proceeding with renewal and modernization of existing nuclear capabilities, reassuring allies of extended nuclear deterrence guarantees, and continuing to engage in activities such as joint exercises, rather than standing down in the face of North Korean aggression. More must be done to strengthen deterrence both to reassure allies, but also to reassure adversaries that any nuclear aggression will be met with retaliation.

Due to Russian aggression, 2015 was a dismal year for nuclear weapons policy, and North Korea has started 2016 on a similarly sour note. But 2015 was also the year of a major arms control breakthrough with the Iran nuclear agreement that brought together the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany in a unique and powerful multilateral effort to target nuclear transgressions. The goal for 2016 should be similarly ambitious. One possible step would be for the United States and China, jointly, to revisit ratification of the CTBT. They are two of the eight remaining states, including North Korea, that inhibit the treaty’s entry into force. Partisanship along with damning reports about the status of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure will not make this easy. But if done in parallel with Chinese ratification this would further stigmatize North Korea, demonstrate multilateral cooperation on denuclearization, and be a tangible contribution to nuclear disarmament. And if done in parallel with steps to strengthen deterrence, 2016 could have potential for striking that delicate balance necessary for security and stability.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

Britain’s strategy in Syria: Gunga galunga… gunga, gunga-lagunga. No, really.

sam, 02/01/2016 - 21:14

A month ago I remarked on the non-sensical decision by Britain’s parliament to authorise bombing by the RAF in Syria–see Britain’s Stupidest War. My point then, the clincher at any rate, was that I thought we would come to regret how as a society we’d allowed our wars to be so totally hijacked by domestic politics that they now served essentially little more than as props in political theatre. This piece then in today’s Telegraph caught my eye for the obvious reasons: RAF bomb raids in Syria dismissed as ‘non-event’. It turns out that not only are we not really doing much in the way of bombing (we may be doing a bit more on reconnaissance, but we were doing that before the momentous vote too), but actually the target that got all the attention was actually one that had been serviced by the USAF over a month before.

So, what’s up KOW readers? What’s the point of it? Obviously, Shakespeare came to mind first–Macbeth, Act 5, Scene 5:

And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.

But, honestly, very shortly thereafter I realised the more appropriate metaphor was from the genius pen of Harold Ramis–Caddyshack, scene something or other:

But what does it mean? I hear you say. What’s the strategy? How does action X contribute to the realisation of policy Y? Wrong question, Grasshopper! What’s important is how it makes you feel. Blessedly, we made it through the new year celebrations without a major terror attack on revellers enjoying the peaceful fireworks shows that just lit the skylines of the world’s major cities. There’s going to be one, though, for sure, and another one after that, and another one after that, and so on and so forth, and so far not much sign of a plausible concept of avoiding them either. At which point the government can say ‘we’re doing our best!’ It’s down to you to forget that doing their best consisted of driving the occasional ball 10,000 feet down a crevasse.

Anyway, happy 2016!

 

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

Thinking about war underground

jeu, 17/12/2015 - 14:02

No one has done better than the great British comic illustrator Heath Robinson to illustrate the intrinsically reciprocal dynamic of military engineering in general and mining and countermining in particular. This cartoon is from a collection Heath Robinson at War I found in a rummage sale years ago–no doubt there are abundant reprints.

 

 

I  would guess, though, that for many KOW readers the dominant mental image of war underground is more akin to that in Sebastian Faulks’ novel Birdsong, later adapted for television. The harrowing scenes of tunnel warfare beneath the trenches of the First World War are extraordinarily vivid. In his introduction Faulks described it as ‘a hell within a hell‘. For a lot of people, it seems to me on the sound scientific basis of a dozen or so conversations (some of them drunken), that’s where tunnel warfare resides–at a safe historic distance from today, a claustrophobic nightmare of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers.

Of course this is completely wrong. Tunnel warfare has been a constant in human history for as long as there have been humans making war. In recent memory it was a major preoccupation of the American military. Consider the poem below written in praise of the massive tunnelling efforts of Vietnamese communists during the Vietnam War. I love it. (Can anyone tell me if the words ‘your entrails, Mother, are unfathomable’ rhyme in Vietnamese?) I found it in the front matter of the classic book The Tunnels of Cu Chi by Tom Mangold and John Penycate.

The Mother–The Native Land

by Duong Huong Ly

When she dug the tunnels, her hair was still brown.
Today her head is white as snow.
Under the reach of the guns she digs and digs.
At night the cries of the partridge record the past.
Twenty years, always the land is at war.
The partridge in the night cries out the love of the native land.
The mother, she digs her galleries, defenses,
Protecting each step of her children.
Immeasurable is our native land.
The enemy must drive his probes in everywhere.
Your unfathomable entrails, Mother,
Hide whole divisions under this land.
The dark tunnels make their own light.
The Yankees have captured her.
Under the vengeful blows she says not a word.
They open their eyes wide but are blind.
Cruelly beaten, the mother collapses.
Her body is no more than injuries and wounds.
Her white hair is like snow.
Night after night
The noise of picks shakes the bosom of the earth.
Columns, divisions, rise up from it.
The enemy, seized by panic, sees only
Hostile positions around him.
Immeasurable is our native land.
Your entrails, Mother, are unfathomable.

And even more recently tunnel warfare has begun to concern Israel in a major way since the 2006 capture of Corporal Gilad Shalit by Hamas commandos who attacked his army outpost near Kibbutz Kerem Shalom via an infiltration tunnel originating in Rafah. Locating similar tunnel entrances and destroying them was the primary objective of the 2014 IDF incursion into Gaza (Operation Protective Edge). I cannot recommend highly enough this report on Hamas’ tunnelling efforts in and out of Gaza by Dr Eado Hecht given as testimony to the UN. There are dozens and dozens of journalistic accounts but none so far as I’m aware approaches Hecht’s in detail and sheer good judgment.

In other words, the underground battlespace has always been an aspect of warfare but in contemporary times it’s vitality has become much more apparent. That being the case it merits more serious attention than it has gotten of late. I’ve been doing some of that lately in the form of quite a lot of library time (my forte) as well as some fieldwork in Israel and in the sewers of a major city, which I can’t talk too much about yet because technically I wasn’t supposed to be there. I thought I might share a few observations for the amusement of the handful of other claustrophile war studies types who must exist out there.

Why is tunnelling and counter-tunnelling the new hotness?

I think the reasons that the underground is an increasingly active component of the warfare are possibly pretty obvious. Firstly, consider the scene below–no doubt you’ve seen dozens like it, this one’s from some marketing bumf of the Lockheed Martin company ‘Staying ahead of the curve‘, which purports to show the post-2030 battlespace. Everybody loves these clean scenes, right out of a George Lucas film. Yay blue! Get those reds!

 

 

‘ ‘Damn’, says the half of the world that can’t afford the high tech accoutrements of the system of systems, ‘since I can’t hope to challenge “next generation air dominance” I guess I’ll just give up.’ Well, no, not actually. In the real world, clever people who are determined in their cause find other ways of bringing/avoiding the pain. In the case of Hamas attacking the IDF from infiltration tunnels is in fashion because every other means of advancing to contact with them is pointlessly suicidal. Similarly never operating without top cover–or at any rate scurrying like mad whenever you’re in the open is simply what you do in an era of ubiquitous surveillance and sensor-to-shooter gaps measured in minutes or seconds. I suspect we all know now that the post-2030 battlespace will look a lot like this 2015 one from Damascus–apparently shot from a Russian operated commercial drone with a go-pro camera. Yay gray! Get those grays!

Another reason for the proliferation of tunnels is the parallel proliferation of walls in our world today–the two basically always seem to go together, always the ying to the others yang, where you have walls you will soon have tunnels. This is less directly related to warfare than it is primarily to the efforts of governments to curtail migration and smuggling (and somewhat plausibly terrorism). See for instance this CNN report on a drug ‘super tunnel‘ running under the US-Mexico border. Pretty crappy, eh? Here, have some more Heath Robinson.

 

 

A final reason is simply the much discussed and completely self-evident urbanisation of the surfaces of  the planet where most people now live. If you’re fighting in cities you are either fighting in and from tunnels or you are dead.

Anyway, you get the point. Tunnelling is a time honoured asymmetric tactic. Also if you put a wall between someone and the potential of great profit that they can’t around then they will put a lot of energy into going under.

The science of tunnelling and counter-tunnelling is surprisingly slow moving*

In this day and age of rapid innovation and scientific progress it is sometimes oddly disorientating to come across fields of endeavour where the number of really fundamental ‘game changing’ innovations are so few. Remember this famous scene from Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey? It’s not in a cave but that’s what the war was about–the winning tribe got to keep the cozy cave by the water, the losers got to carry on roaming the desert being preyed on by leopards.

That’s stage 1. People lived underground in the comparative comfort of natural caves and undoubtedly had to defend them against the attentions of others who craved those same natural security and comforts.

Stage 2 differed only in that people started to dig their own caves and tunnels where they wanted them, for defence or for hiding, instead of waiting for Mother Nature to do it for them. Accounts of such activity are found in the The Bible, Judges, Chapter 6, Verse 2: ‘And the hand of Midian prevailed against Israel: and because of the Midianites the children of Israel made them the dens which are in the mountains, and caves, and strong holds.’ And actual remnants, some very extensive and well preserved, such as the cave cities in Cappadocia, Turkey built initially as defence against the Hittites in 1000 BC and inhabited up until just a few centuries ago, can be found in many places.

Stage 3 began in the late Middle-Ages with the invention of gun-powder. Then as now heroism alone was no real challenge to a fortress that was minimally competently defended; you had to go underground. The miner was the most feared of all attackers:

The skill of the miner was reflected in the number of sites which, otherwise vulnerable, were immune through water to the slow but deadly process of undermining. Considerable subtlety was employed in the underground approach. The entrance would be distant and well-concealed. Diversionary attacks would be staged to distract the defenders’ attention. As nothing could be achieved from the surface the castle holders would dig out countermines, and on several occasions would break into the besiegers’ galleries and engage them in hand-to-hand combat. There are numerous accounts of desperate battles underground, and the skill, science, and courage of the attacker was often matched by similar qualities in the counter-miner.

Philip Warner, Sieges of the Middle Ages (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1968), pp. 23-26.

(If you haven’t already read the report on Gaza tunnels by Hecht that I mentioned above then do that now and reflect on what, if anything, has changed in this basic dynamic).

Pre-gun powder the basic technique of attack was this: choose a vulnerable section of the fortress, a turret, say, then slyly dig a tunnel beneath it. Once you are beneath the foundation then expand your tunnel–very quietly–into a large cavity shored up with stout timbers so it does not collapse on you as you work. Now stuff the place with inflammables and set it alight. In the ensuing fire the supports will be consumed and the structure above will come crashing down beneath its own weight. Undoubtedly effective, the technique also required great skill in quiet mining and accurate navigation–and was intrinsically perilous. After all if the defenders detected your efforts they could dig a tunnel to intercept yours. There is a terrific example of this at St Andrews Castle, Scotland where you can still see the mine dug during a siege in 1546 and the counter-mine, which after some initial difficulty locating its target ultimately allowed the defenders to ambush and slaughter their attackers. Here’s an illustration:

Gun powder made the job of the attacker simpler and easier. Its explosive power meant that you didn’t have to dig such a large cavity, meaning also that you didn’t have to make as much noise or take so much time and were therefore less likely to be intercepted. Also if your underground navigation was off a bit there was still a good chance that you could ruin a fair chunk of the wall you were attacking. Over a few centuries the arms race of mine and counter-mine came to the point where by the early modern era a really properly defended fortress would, in theory, have a system of counter-mines already dug long before the besiegers arrived–in fact, actually at the first stage of the fortification’s construction.

A system of permanent countermines was one of the most expensive but effective systems of fortification, enabling the governor to offer a foot-by-foot three-dimensional defence of the ground from the tail of the glacis all the way back to the counterscarp… From the main  gallery, a number of galleries or half galleries (four and a half feet by three) radiated underneath the glacis along the imaginary prolongations of the capital (central) lines of the bastions and ravelins. From these again there was a further proliferation in the form of major branches (rameaux, three by two and a half) and simple branches or listeners (ecoutes, two and a half by two) which sprouted off at right angles. These stuffy masonry tubes gave the counterminers the means of detecting the approach of the enemy, and offered a variety of sites where they could plant their charges of gunpowder. The branches and listeners were built of such small dimensions not for the sake of economy (in fact it was very awkward to excavate them), but because small tunnels were easy to tamp (stop up) when a charge was about to be exploded.

Christopher Duffy, Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660-1860 (London: Greenhill Books, 1996). pp. 83-84.

(If this all sounds quaintly ancient to you then read go read Hecht’s piece, particularly para. 36 where he remarks on the extreme difficulty of locating tunnels. In the old days ‘listeners’ would use barrels of water into which they would plunge their heads to enhance the sound of distant tunnelling–think of how things sound when you submerge your ears in the bath–or basic microphones, such as a brass cymbal placed against a wall of a mine, in the hope of triangulating on their attackers. That’s still fundamentally how it’s done today.) Again, Heath Robinson’s imagination is fanciful but not entirely inaccurate.

Stage 4 came along in the late 19th century with the invention of excavating machines that could bore tunnels faster and more accurately than men could with shovels and pick axes. At first glance, you might think this a terrifically consequential development allowing the rapid excavation of lots of large tunnels. In actuality, the extra noise made by mechanical digging greatly compromises their offensive utility because it makes them more easily detectable to anyone listening. It has long been known that North Korea has dug several very large,  deep, and long ‘invasion’ tunnels suitable for the use of large units into South Korean territory but there is a good deal of dispute over how many there may be.

Stage 5 is where we are now and it involves the development of really effective detection equipment. It bears emphasising how difficult this is technically. The ground underneath you is naturally a jumble of layers of differing density and full of cracks and fissures so mapping it with ground penetrating radar, say, even if useful depth could be achieved would still present big problems of analysis. Infiltration tunnels, moreover, can run deep and do not need to be large–a space sufficient for a man’s shoulders or perhaps the width of a bicycle’s handlebars is perfectly sufficient for commandos to transit even with heavy weapons–and they can be dug quietly. Finding a tunnel is a bit like finding a spaghetti noodle in a plate of spaghetti.

Siege warfare is never anyone’s first choice. It’s extremely expensive. It’s exhausting and challenging on many levels. But when every other option is locked down it works. In fact, it’s never really gone completely out of use. It’s probably that our belief in the salience of mobile warfare practically since Napoleon ran roughshod over Europe two centuries ago has just blinded us a bit to it’s new fashionableness. Anyway, it’s back.

So, what next?

Well, this post is already quite long so I’ll keep this bit short. Let’s recap. For a variety of reasons the ground beneath us is now a vital part of the battlespace. Historically, this is nothing new–perhaps what we’re seeing is a reversion to the norm. That being the case it is worth spending some time reacquainting ourselves with the strategic and tactical wisdom of the past, much of which now lies forgotten on dusty shelves. But we should also be exploring more and be more attentive to the infrastructure of the places we live. On which point I must admit that I have something of a man crush on this fellow, urban historian and photographer Steve Duncan. I don’t think I could get away this as a research methodology–pretty sure my university would disown me. Have a watch:

 

But, really, if we’re going to make some progress in this field we need to be scrambling around these places more and learning from the people who work and live in these environments a lot more. Also, goddamn that looks fun.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

It’s that time of year again…Terrorism and Santa Redux

mer, 16/12/2015 - 08:06

Hello, Dear Reader! Yes, it has been a long time since I’ve posted here. Thanks for not bringing it up.

2015 will certainly stand out as a banner year for things going to Hell in a hand basket.  Planes, trains, rock concerts…nothing was immune from terrorist attacks. ISIS (or ISIL, or IS, or Daesh) was everywhere…

Or was it?

I am reminded of a post that I crafted here five years ago (5 years!?!  where does the time go, eh?) Given that re-gifting is the new…er…uhhh…gifting the same thing more than once, I thought I would share it with you again, for a second time, once more:

Terrorism and the Myth of Santa: Do you believe?

All the very best for this time of year (wink, wink, nudge, nudge) and here’s hoping 2016 is broadly better than 2015.  (No, Hallmark, you can’t steal that sentiment, it’s all mine.)

 

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

CCLKOW: Future Planning

lun, 14/12/2015 - 17:08

Greetings CCLKOW and other interested readers. In this, my last post before the end of term and the New Year, I think it fitting to talk about the future. Or rather, the defence approach to imagining and dealing with the future. The inspiration for this piece was a two day workshop on future concepts that I attended, and my response to the structure of the content and the contemplations, specifically the use of scenarios. Because this sort of exercise so frequently relies upon this model to drive the conversation, I am of course of a mind to question it – conventional wisdom tends to have that effect on me. Of course, it may be that scenarios are the best way forward for providing the most effective review of a potential future, but for the time being let us live in an intellectual world where we have the freedom to create the process anew. Read the thought piece, consider the challenge, and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW.

 

Last month I spent a fun* couple of days with DCDC contemplating the way forward for for the armed forces. In this particular workshop exercise the view was towards imagining the application of landpower in a changing world in support of the centre’s re-issue of the Future Land Operating Concept. This is not my first experience of such exercises, as it is exactly twenty years ago that I participated in my first of these sorts of exercises with NDU. The world of 2015 seemed rather far off at that time. And yet, here we are again, considering the world two decades hence.

Returning to the more recent workshop I participated in, nothing was decided and there are months to go before the review is completed. But the two days included interesting conversations across a range of topics between an even broader range of specialists and experts. It is not my intention to discuss the content of the workshop. Rather, I am interested in the processes applied in the approach to such endeavours, because how we do things can shape the intellectual outcomes. Whereas this particular event was scenario driven, in this piece I would like to challenge the methodological assumption to think about what may be alternative frameworks for thinking through future capabilities, challenges, and opportunities.

As a means to consider other ways to think about the future, my first point is about challenges and opportunities, because it is the former which overwhelmingly dominates the discussion. The nature of security and defence, particularly the exercise of thinking through how to cope with future threats, certainly has a darkening influence on the mood. Pessimism in such cases is understandable. In an effort to be as ruthless as possible with respect to the challenges so as not be caught out, the potential future enemy in such scenarios is inevitably drawn in proportions which reality would not sustain.  Nevertheless, I never fail to be struck by the absence of imagining what opportunities the changing world might offer. Thus, an alternative approach to this process could be organised around discussions which divine the contours of both sides of this coin to imagine both the challenges and the opportunities that will arise out of changes in the economic, social, political, and military worlds.

Another way to address the issue is to play with the threat-context-end relationship. While threats and ends are in common parlance in defence, by context I mean to include the political, social, economic, and perhaps even climatic, dynamics which shape the conflict environment by defining desires, fears, and priorities. Breaking the pieces down into these portions of an equation allows for variation and control of each of the constituent parts. Requirements, options, challenges, and opportunities will emerge from the analysis depending on which piece in the equation is held constant and what is changed in the other parts.

These are just two alternatives which came to my mind. Please feel free to lob any thoughts you might have at my suggestions.  They are illustrative of other means available to think our way to sound preparations for the future, but they are not meant to be exhaustive. There are as likely as many options as there are thinkers on the subject. And that, my dear CCLKOW readers, forms the crux of this week’s questions and discussion:

What are the merits and weaknesses of scenario-based future thinking?

What alternatives to a scenario-based process would you propose?

Cheers!

 

 

 

 

* If this is fun, I really need to get a life.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

Sayre’s Law in Syria

ven, 04/12/2015 - 12:36

So, Britain goes to war. Ten hours of Parliamentary debate (including that speech by Hilary Benn) over whether or not to use forces that will be a marginal addition at best resulted in roughly two thirds of MPs voting yes. David Cameron’s strategy, if it is worth the word, appears to be a combination of the Underpants Gnome model (“Step 1: Use force, Step 2: … Step 3: Peace! Victory! Votes!”), and the Goldilocks approach to intervention (Not enough to “win”, not enough to be irrelevant, just enough to make us beholden to events). From my perspective, the pitch of debate regarding what was at stake in the Parliamentary debate appeared to be Sayre’s law in action, albeit with added high explosives. Professor Wallace Sayre’s original formulation, that “Academic politics is the most vicious and bitter form of politics, because the stakes are so low” is all the more relevant, since we were already using force against ISIS and committing ISR assets to the region.

So what changed? Or rather, what now? The problem, as I see it, is that we are now ultimately responsible for a civil war that doesn’t appear to have an acceptable end for anyone. Ending the Syrian civil war appears to be the top priority. Writing in The New York Times, Anatol Lieven argues that this will require working with Russia, and carving up both Syria and Iraq to a greater or lesser extent. I think he’s probably right, but it won’t end there, because, from my perspective, this option ends with complete and utter impunity for war crimes. Much is made of the need to put political pressure on Assad to make way, as this is a symbolic move that might allow the civil war to end. But what about the war crimes? Are we going to have a re-run of the ICTY in the Levant? If yes, please explain to me how we’re meant to make Assad give way, and convince his security forces and military to stop fighting. If no, I’m somewhat bemused that Parliament has managed to debate its way into a crusade for the common good and justice that is predicated impunity.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

Strategies of the Artificial: The Machine View of Strategy and its Consequences

ven, 04/12/2015 - 10:59

(Editor’s note: Adam Elkus is a PhD student at George Mason University working on computation and strategy)

Recently, KCL’s Kenneth Payne published an article on the potential meaning of artificial intelligence for future strategy. Some of the complexities of tackling this science fiction-esque topic lie in the duality of AI itself as a scientific discipline. While many believe that AI is a discipline oriented around the engineering of synthetic intelligence, one should also note that it has also alternatively claimed that doing so will help us understand human (and other forms of) intelligence. For example, Herbert Simon and Alan Newell’s General Problem Solver was an endeavor with relevance for both AI and cognitive science. Simon and Newell derived the idea of means-end reasoning from a view of human problem solving and implemented it programmatically in a way that could be mechanized by a machine. The same holds true for artificial neural networks as well, which are based somewhat on ideas from computational neuroscience and much more so on engineering utility for problems in machine learning.

Payne and his co-author Kareem Ayoub focus in particular on the use of games and microworlds to develop AI systems:

More complex scenarios than Atari games are possible. Microworlds are abstract representations used by the military to assist in strategic decision-making. They have been used to conceptualise the terrain, force deployment, enemy responses and movements. The use of modular AI in this example domain allows users to create their own microworld simulation with its own rules of play and run limitless iterations of possible events. Jason Scholz and his colleagues found that a reinforcement-learning based AI outperformed human counterparts in these microworld wargames. Their ability to do this rested on two factors: (1) the machine could go through rounds much faster than a human counterpart, and (2) the machine could process every possible move simultaneously, providing previously unseen recommendations.  Allowing that many military campaigns can be dimensionally reduced to microworlds – indeed many tabletop staff college exercises do precisely that – such an approach with modular AI proves valuable for rapid iteration of potential options.

A worthy addition to this observation, however, is that microworlds such as strategy games presume a certain view of human problem-solving behavior that is relatively new to strategic theory. [0] Consider the machine representation of chess, the most famous strategic game played by humans and computers. Like game theory, chess is can be visualized via extended-form representation, as seen in images like this:

The minimax algorithm visualizes strategy in terms of how both “min” and “max” players connect the initial moves to the payoff values in the terminal nodes at the bottom of the tree. The goal of min is to force the max player to the lowest payoff. Conversely, max would like to receive the highest payoff value. For a full explanation of minimax, readers are advised to consult the nearest friendly neighborhood game theorist, such as political scientist Phil Arena.  [1] Yet despite the fact that zero-sum games in game theory and chess share the same basic representation and solution concept, they diverge in one peculiar way.

The following image does not build the full game tree; notice that it only partially encompasses it:

This is due to the problem of how chess is represented on a machine; building the full game tree would be intractable due to the sheer size of the game. Moreover, a chess program would not be able to reason about other games that lack chess’ peculiar characteristics. [2] Two methods that have been commonly used to explain how humans and machines deal with chess’ sheer complexity are knowledge representation and search:

Given the relatively slow rate at which moderately skilled players can generate analysis moves, estimated in Charness (1981b) to be about four moves per minute, it is obvious that much of the time that human players spend is not in generating all possible moves (perhaps taking a move per second) but in generating moves selectively and using complex evaluation functions to assess their value. Computer chess programs can achieve high-level play by searching many moves using fast, frugal evaluation processes that involve minimal chess knowledge to evaluate the terminal positions in search. Deep Blue, the chess program that defeated World Champion Garry Kasparov in a short match in 1997, searched hundreds of millions of positions per second. Today’s leading microcomputer chess programs, which have drawn matches with the best human players, have sophisticated search algorithms and attempt to use more chess knowledge but still generate hundreds of thousands or millions of chess moves per second. Generally,   chess programs rely on search more heavily than knowledge; for humans it is the reverse. Yet, each can achieve very high performance levels because knowledge and search can trade off (Berliner & Ebeling, 1989).

Both knowledge and search, however, stem from the same fundamental way that old-school cognitive scientists and computer scientists define the problem of strategy, which is very different how the strategic studies profession views it. First, let us note therepresentation of game states as a hierarchal tree that proceeds from most abstract to most primitive; it takes us the entire time to move from the top of the tree to the end of the game and the actual payoffs. Another example can be found in the way in which hierarchal task network planning algorithm in AI begins with composite tasks and breaks them down until the algorithm reaches simple actions, which vaguely corresponds to distinctions of strategy and tactics known to Kings of War readers:

Computer-literate readers will also notice the similarity to this tree structure and the directory structure on a computer filesystem. [3]

Why does it make sense to view the world as a tree that moves from most general to most specific? This is an interesting topic about which a good deal of intellectual history was been written. Broadly speaking, it is not surprising that Cold War-era efforts to optimize hierarchally organized systems such as military bureaucracies produced a view of the world as a hierarchally decomposed tree. But that in and of itself does not fully explain the choice of representation. Ontologies, taxonomies, and other forms of hierarchal knowledge representation are common in science and philosophy. What computing did was make them dynamic processes. The interaction or composition of components produced behavior.

George Miller, the famous cognitive scientist, produced a book titled Plans and the Structure of Behavior. In contrast to behaviorist conceptions that did not envision much of an intermediary structure between stimulus and behavior, Miller and his counterparts in AI argued that the internal organization of cognition could tell us much about the outward manifestations of complex behaviors. Hence, it makes sense to study chess players in terms of how they organize their knowledge and search processes, as such internal representation could tell us much about how they are capable of producing complex strategies.

While deep neural networks are often viewed as oppositional to this broadly cognitivist view, this is not necessarily the case. [4] After all, one sees hierarchal representations (albeit defined highly differently) frequently in deep learning research. Hierarchal representations are key to recent research in reinforcement learning as well. And hierarchies also appear quite frequently in both AI work on evolving neural networks and neuroscience research on computation in the brain. Finally, one should also note that hierarchy (differing levels of abstraction) and modularity (different functions) appear to be one of the more interesting explanations for what ideas about animal behavior have in common with computing.

The consequences of this view are that the principal problems of strategy, seen computationally, lie in computational limitations.

The main problem for action selection is combinatorial complexity. Since all computation takes both time and space (in memory), agents cannot possibly consider every option available to them at every instant in time. Consequently, they must be biased, and constrain their search in some way. For AI, the question of action selection is: what is the best way to constrain this search? For biology and ethology, the question is: how do various types of animals constrain their search? Do all animals use the same approaches? Why do they use the ones they do?  …. Ideally, action selection itself should also be able to learn and adapt, but there are many problems of combinatorial complexity and computational tractability that may require restricting the search space for learning.

The core problem with a computational view of strategic behavior is that it views strategy in terms of the interface between an “outer environment” and an “inner environment.” If the inner environment of an artifact is well adapted to the outer environment that surrounds it, it will serve its purpose. In other words, if, say, the Department of Defense is able to configure its force structure and military operational concepts to meet the threat of X or Y adversary, its “inner environment” is well-adapted to realize the intended purpose of war and defense. This sort of view of strategy and defense underlies both systems analysis and net assessment, though net assessment is far more qualitative and eclectic. It also underlies the idea of ends, ways, and means held by many strategists – we must find the correct configuration of ways (actions) and means (resources) to meet the desired end. [5]

Let us contrast this to a more classical view of strategy, which would see strategy as the way in which a political community finds a way of fulfilling a desired purpose through the instrumental usage of violence. Here, the problem is not really the combinatorial complexity of searching for a path to the goal or optimizing a utility function, but in the difficult process of using social action to achieve a desired end. First, the end might be contested or ambiguously defined. As KCL PhD candidate Nick Prime and I noted, many strategic ends are essentially compromises and products of fractious politics. Second, what it means to fulfill it is always fairly uncertain during the actual process of strategy formulation.

Mathematically measured criteria are useful for measuring the distance between intention and goal, but metrics of progress depend on highly subjective definitions of not only the goal but also what it means to realize it. Defining the problem in Vietnam, for example, in terms of eradicating enemy infrastructure in South Vietnam presumes that the most important problem lies in Vietcong “shadow governments” that erode power and authority. This is a highly contestable view of the problem, because a combination of targeted killings and the toll of the failed Tet Offensive wiped out enemy infrastructure inside South Vietnam and we still failed to achieve our strategic goals.

Computation is likely a very useful model for thinking about strategy, especially (as Ayoub and Payne do) from a machine’s point of view. But it should also be observed just how alien this view is from the perspective of classical strategy, and recognized that no model is the territory. As a computer modeler, I never assume that any abstractions I build for coursework are anything but reductions of the “real” thing. [6] As computers become more and more present in strategy and command, we should keep these thoughts and the distinctions they suggest in mind. But is there any middle ground?

One meeting ground between the “system” view of strategy and the more humanistic view can be found potentially in the idea of “control” expressed by J.C. Wylie and others.

Control denotes the utility of strategy being found in the way in which an agent is able to manipulate the key features of the environment in a way that advantages the strategist and disadvantages the opponent. The classical view of computation and behavior in AI and cognitive science has been opposed by another set of views that de-emphasizes elaborate internal representation and emphasizes the way in which interaction with the environment produces intelligent behavior. [7]

The environment defines a relation between environmental object and an organism that affords the organism with the capability to perform a certain action. Control of the sea, for example, affords certain strategic capabilities that airpower and landpower does not, and vice versa. The simplest way of designing a mobile robot around its environment, for example, would start with basic behaviors (if X stimulus, perform Y action) and then utilize more complex control structures to inhibit or favor certain behaviors based on the situation. One behavior might be privileged over another even if they both correspond to the same environmental input. Hence, by changing the nature and pattern of the environment to your advantage, you in term exert control over your opponent. If I am playing hide-and-seek with a TurtleBot, for example, I can thwart my Dalek-like adversary if I re-arrange the topology of my apartment as to frustrate it in numerous ways. [8]

Food for thought, certainly. Meanwhile I will continue to dump Golang code into my ParrotAR in the vain hope that I can engineer a taco copter to deliver me tacos while I do research. I at least know that robots can deliver coffee, which is a good start. I can live without tacos but its hard to see how a PhD student can be “intelligent” without any coffee.

 

Adam Elkus is a PhD student in Computational Social Science at George Mason University and a 2015-2016 New America Foundation fellow in NAF’s Cybersecurity Initiative. He writes on strategy, technology, and other subjects while finding time to ponder how a drone can deliver tacos to his domicile.

[0] It is rather old in the social and behavioral sciences as well as other fields. See Margaret Boden’s Mind as Machine for a good history of the cognitive science view. Lawrence Freedman and Nils Gilman have aptly covered the social science literature.

[1] You can use Manhattan distance or some other metric to compute what is “near” in this statement.

[2] Chess and machines have a very old and interesting history. For more, see this handy overview of computer chess.

[3] This is a representation of the UNIX filesystem structure. See this article for an overview of the distinction between Linux and Windows filesystems. Linux and Mac OSX also differ in their interpretations of the basic UNIX structure. For more, see this and this.

[4] Connectionism (known as the Parallel Distributed Processing research program) in artificial intelligence and cognitive science is a different level of analysis. To see how the classical conception of AI and cogsci perceives mind, consult the physical symbol systems hypothesis.

[5] Indeed, Ends-Ways-Means can be viewed as a kind of organizational programming, as implied by Antulio Echevarria here and stated more bluntly by Christopher Paparone here.

[6] For a dense look at the philosophy of simulation, I recommend Manuel De Landa’s book on “synthetic reason.”

[7] It’s worth noting that the answer to understanding rationality probably lies in a combination of both. See this recent overview of new work in neuroscience and AI.

[8] There are two design strategies in AI, broadly. Make a simple organism that can be effective in a range of environments or build a highly brittle and complicated system for a well-defined environment. See Poole and Mackworth for more.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

Britain’s stupidest war*

jeu, 03/12/2015 - 15:09

A great fuss is being made over the speech by Labour shadow foreign secretary Hillary Benn in yesterday’s House of Commons debate over bombing in Syria. Watch for yourself, if you like, or I’ll paraphrase:

Islamic State is bad, super bad, Mussolini bad.

We should do something. Not something adequate. But something.

If we don’t then we’ll look stupid and weak and our friends will be sad.

Now face the firepower of this fully armed and operational battle station…err, well maybe a dozen or so 30 year old RAF Tornados!

I can’t fathom the acclaim for it.

First, attacking Islamic state in Syria does nothing to prevent attacks here in Europe. This argument has been so comprehensively debunked that I can hardly believe anyone still tries it on.

Second, yes, sure we are at war with a mood in the Islamic world of sullen resentment that we might as well call Islamic fascism, though really I’m not sure that Benn really grasped that this was the phrase he was resurrecting. Next up: it’s a crusade? But you can’t go name check Hitler and Mussolini and wax lyrical about this island’s brave stand against tyranny and then pretend that a few more British  bombers in the Middle East is any sort of proportionate response. People may be somnolent and distracted but they’re not so stupid as to miss the giant gap between rhetoric and action.

Third, going to war against an enemy in this desultory fashion that by design can never lead to victory just puts them under a natural selection pressure that insures that they evolve into something more nasty and resilient. Have we literally learned nothing from the last 15 years? How many times does it have to be said that you can’t fight wars amongst the people without being actually amongst them?

Fourth, why does it not seem to worry everyone who voted for bombing that the countries of the region that have more than enough power to deal with Islamic state actually don’t seem to care all that much about it? They’re more concerned with Houthi militiamen allegedly propped up by Persian bogeymen.

So, let’s take stock of the situation. We have no plausible aim. Therefore there is no meaningful strategy. In any event the means available are inadequate. We have very little knowledge of those whom we’ll be killing. And we have very little knowledge of those upon whose supposed behalf we’ll be doing it. The commitment of our friends to the effort is as guarded and ambiguous as our own while the commitment of our enemies is seemingly quite total. Meanwhile, every country in the region is playing a double or triple game. Basically everybody is lying to everyone else but the biggest dummies are lying to themselves.

I’m sure it will all work out great.

I do suppose though it makes bad war it’s probably good political theatre in a junior school sort of way. Jeremy Corbyn’s forced to sit on a tack. Haha! And when it comes Britain’s turn to suffer a Beslan-Mumbai-Nairobi-Utoya-Paris style attack, as it inevitably will, Westminster will claim it did all it could.

*actually, I don’t know. We’ve had a lot of wars, many quite stupid but this one really ranks up there.

btw, buy my book. It explains everything.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

To Bomb, or Not to Bomb?

mar, 01/12/2015 - 16:50

Should the UK bomb IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh in Syria? That is, go above and beyond killing our own citizens in “self defence”. The Prime Minister, David Cameron, says yes, Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the Labour Party and the opposition, says no. The fact that the lethal component to any aerial campaigns in Syria will border on insignificance is, from the looks of things, inconsequential. I think I’m in the “containment” camp (e.g. something like: prevent ISIS from taking more territory, propping up the Iraqi government, but otherwise not committing to extensive military operations in Iraq and Syria) and here’s why.

Problem One: “Defeat ISIS” is an aspiration, not a strategy

On the whole, I think Corbyn (alongside dissident Conservatives) is right: the articulated plan to “degrade and defeat” ISIS is both woolly and ill-conceived. What, if anything, will an increased tempo of airstrikes achieve? How will the UK’s minimal contribution to this effort change the overall character or pace of the campaign? The problem here is that I don’t think anyone has quite worked out what IS is, and how it relates to the UK. In the words of Eli Berman and Jacob Shapiro: “Is it [IS] a tremendously well-resourced terrorist group that controls substantial territory, which it uses to plan attacks, vet operatives and manage a complex financial network? Or is it a fledgling nation-state that sponsors terrorist attacks?” If IS is a fledgling nation-state, then containment works (sortof, in the long run, with the likelihood of international terrorist plots in the meantime), since IS is very bad at actually being a state so there’s good reason to believe it will collapse at some future point in time. Until states can agree on a set of political aims beyond “beat the bad guys” it’s probably best not to tilt headlong into a situation that is already bad, and likely to get worse before it gets better.

More to the point, “defeating” ISIS would require urban warfare, either through proxies (the vaunted 70k non-extreme militia) or through the commitment of western forces (Uh, not gonna happen). We have all the precision-guided munitions in the world, but while that might disrupt and degrade ISIS’s ability to act, that is quite different from defeating or destroying the organisation. The west lacks the political will to commit large scale forces to the defeat of ISIS (for some reason, the public got fed up after Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya) and it’s probable that ground forces would fan the flames of the Syrian conflict, if anything. One doesn’t have to read far into academic literature on strategy to figure that a divisive conflict, far away, with lofty goals but an unclear aim (and decisive means foreclosed), is unsustainable.

Problem Two: There is no neutral option

I am signed up to the Colin Powell school of thought: you broke it, you own it. I’m also fully signed up to the fact that if the UK contributes ISR assets to a military campaign, then it doesn’t matter who pulls the trigger, we’re still on the hook for whatever happens. From this perspective, the fact that the UK is conducting strikes in Iraq and helping out in Syria means that we are already responsible for acts of violence on both sides of the border. At the same time, there is no violence-free option available to the UK. If we do nothing (as in, pack up our planes and go home) then violence still exists in the region – packing up and going home shunts responsibility for doing something about it to our erstwhile allies, or worse, gives the worst perpetrators of violence in the region license to go about their business of brutally suppressing populations and dissent. I think that it’s at least arguable that nothing we can do now will save us from an unfavourable judgement by generations to come. After all, we stood by and watched while IS erased substantial elements of the common heritage of humankind with high explosives. Whatever happens, therefore, we’re still involved, somehow, even if that means packing up all our kit and taking it home with us. The “act/don’t act” binary (pushed on both sides, I might add) is therefore a sham. Moreover, the UK might be a target of IS, but it’s always going to be a target of IS (and like groups). Free will means that we don’t get to pick who is allowed to dislike us. All the above pushes towards some form of engagement for the UK – we lose more by walking away than staying involved in the US coalition, but this doesn’t necessitate committing ourselves to trying to eradicate ISIS beyond what we’re already doing. The symbolic value of overturning the commons vote against action in Syria would send a message, but the action that follows from it wouldn’t change a thing. Better, in my view, to re-assert our existing commitment with America, and if necessary throw more resources in, rather than committing to a lofty goal that appears impossible with current (or projected) means.

At the end of the day: someone has to pull the trigger

My ultimate unease at widening attacks on IS into Syria relates to my equal unease at British strikes within Iraq. All the high-minded arguments about the ins and outs of international politics and grand strategy boil down to someone, somewhere, being asked to kill human beings, and bear that experience with them for the rest of their life. This doesn’t change if they’re sitting at the controls of a UAV back here in blighty, soaring over the deserts of Iraq, or if they happen to be holding a rifle and face to face with their target. I think that’s a lot to ask of a person. Thankfully, we have an all-volunteer force so some of the moral questions relating to compelling people to kill are at least ameliorated. Still, the political impulse to “do something” in the face of a Gordian knot tends to ignore the fact that service personnel aren’t toys. For all the talk of drones reducing war to a “video game mentality” (which is disproved in most serious takes on the subject), the political reduction of the armed forces to an intercontinental screwdriver is worse. I think there is a clear role for violence in both Iraq and Syria, but the goal of pushing IS out of Iraq, and attempting to prop up and strengthen that state (and perhaps cajole the Iraqi government into rapprochement with its Sunni population) is achievable. Is there a role for expanding strikes in Syria to achieve this? Definitely. But this should be predicated on the political aim of protecting and stabilising Iraq, not on taking us into an indefinite war against a proto-state that we haven’t figured out how to deal with. Articulating this (limited) goal is far more preferable in my mind to lofty goals with total aims.

Anything that looks like a joint campaign with Russia is a really bad idea

The polite way of putting this is that “proportionality” is a subjective concept that has no precise basis in international law, and is therefore an expression of national military cultures and their interpretations of international humanitarian law treaties. The impolite way of putting this is that Russia doesn’t give a toss about killing civilians in the pursuit of military objectives. At the time of writing, Air Wars has tracked just over 8500 US coalition strikes, killing a claimed 20,000 IS fighters, while also killing between 682 and 2057 civilians in the process. At the same time:

Airwars presently assesses 44 Russian incidents as having likely killed civilians in Syria to October 30th – which between them reportedly killed 255 to 375 non-combatants. This is roughly ten times the level of credible allegations against US-led Coalition operations in Syria.

Whatever disagreements campaigners may have with the US or UK government over the conduct of aerial warfare, targeting and precaution, I think both would agree that no-one wants a Russian-style air campaign. The problem is, if the US-led coalition escalates a large scale aerial campaign against IS in Syria, and Russia also strikes IS in Syria, the two campaigns will not only become functionally indistinguishable to those on the ground, but also to audiences worldwide. It really won’t matter if we take every precaution possible under the sun, wait 72 hours for someone to drive a Toyota into an abandoned road before killing them with a bomb, or conduct battlefield assessments to make sure that no-one else got hurt, if at the same time the Russian air force piles in and bombs an urban area without guided munitions. The US (and potentially, the UK) could say “It wasn’t me” until they’re blue in the face, but all the world is really going to care about is the headline civilian casualty count, which isn’t going to distinguish between us and the Russians (or, for that matter, the Syrian government). With this in mind, restricting the use of lethal force to areas that the Russians don’t operate in is a good way of maintaining some sort of distinction between us and them. Even if we part “own” strikes by the US, the UK could still maintain a semblance of narrative distance from Russian attacks.

Conclusion: Whoever wins, the UK loses

This is pretty much a foregone conclusion. We will spend money, effort and time killing people in an attempt to achieve a more-just state of affairs than the one that preceded it, in the midst of a region dominated by religious governments that are completely illiberal and, on the whole, antithetical to the core values of western democracies. Walking away doesn’t work because Russia and China would probably be there to take our place, which leaves long term engagement, which is messy. Note here that I am talking about governments, not people. If we could treat populations as indivisible from those that rule them, then the choices on offer would be a lot simpler. We know, however, that the societies living under theocracy and autocracy contain many people who, like us, just want to get along with their lives, rather than export their own brand of religion across the region. Those people tend to face persecution or execution (hi Saudi Arabia!), calling into question every single element of ongoing engagement. Nonetheless, we must engage, somehow. The extent to which we engage may be a reflection of circumstance, but it always remains a choice. The question is whether we double-down for no apparent reason and nail ourself to a cross of “Defeat ISIS” or whether we continue muddling along, trying to do our best with what is available to us. I’m for the latter, until a better option presents itself.

Catégories: Defence`s Feeds

CCLKOW: Call out the Militia!

lun, 30/11/2015 - 18:25

Today in CCLKOW we are reorienting you to the homeland and the problems of interoperability between police and the armed forces. Even without the Paris Attacks earlier this month, the subject of mastering the ‘JIIM’ environment is critical, both in military operations at home and abroad. To discuss this, I am very happy to bring to you a special guest writer, Ian Wiggett, recently retired as an Assistant Chief Constable from Greater Manchester Police. It should be understood, then, that this piece is written from the British perspective, which includes a significant difference with respect to the use of force by the police, particularly as concerns the generally disarmed stance. Nevertheless, the issue of integrating a military response to an attack to the homeland matters even to the US. Although the matter of Posse Comitatus would seem to forestall the use of the regular forces domestically, this matter has never been tested against any significant threat. And in fact, even as it was ultimately tabled, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks the military role in homeland defence was put on the table for serious debate. It is also worth noting that the American disdain for soldiers operating in the homeland is a legacy of our British heritage, and so to a similar degree the use of the armed forces in domestic circumstances is discomfiting on this side of the Atlantic. Furthermore, although they come under the control of the Governors, the National Guard formations of the individual states are trained as military, not police, forces. Thus, even in the American setting, how the armed forces will act in support of local, state, or even federal law enforcement remains a challenge. Alternatively, should the terrorist threat upon the European Continent reach sufficient proportions, it is not out of the realm of the possibility for recourse to NATO forces to be contemplated. Finally, as the importance of security and stabilization campaigns rise, the ability to work with civilian authorities will become more important. If the problems have not been hashed out for homeland defence, it is very unlikely they will succeed in foreign contingencies. Thus, the locus of operations of the armed forces has shifted and it is time to give serious thought to the issues. Read the piece, consider the implications and questions posed, and join the conversation on Twitter, at #CCLKOW and, it is hoped, the newly launched hashtag for policing discussion, #WeCops. — Jill S. Russell

 

First, some history…

Military Assistance to the Civil Powers (MACP) – also known as Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) – has existed for centuries.  In the days before a regular civilian police force existed, it was only the military that had the numbers, organisation and capability to restore order and maintain control.  That was, indeed, the role of the militia: a body of soldiers that could be raised at short notice to provide homeland defence.  It was the militia in North America that provided the backbone of the Revolutionary Army, and after independence, the United States retained the militia as the National Guard.

The original concept of “MACP” was therefore built around the military, either militia or regulars, being the force of last resort to restore and maintain the Peace.  Use of force (or at least, show of force) was central to that.  Armed soldiers putting down the insurrection – and casualties and collateral damage were expected.

 

The Peterloo Massacre, Manchester, 1819.
Contemporary cartoon, Cruikshank

The folk memory does not easily or quickly forget the intervention of armed forces.  The Peterloo Massacre of 1819 is still invoked to inspire radicalism in Manchester, and the impact of that violent suppression is generally acknowledged as leading to further radicalism and ultimately to wider reform.  The Easter Rising in Dublin involved only a relatively small number of republican combatants, but the violence of the military response arguably pushed many towards the cause of independence.  In South Wales mining communities Churchill is known not as a wartime Prime Minister, but as the Home Secretary who had sent troops against striking miners in 1911.

 

Troops deployed in support of local police to suppress striking miners, Rhondda Valley, 1910-11

History therefore suggests that the relationship between the people and the military has to be managed carefully.  Too much force, applied clumsily, may achieve its immediate objective of quelling a riot – but the lasting impact may be far more damaging to the established order.  The ‘silent majority’ are very grateful that the forces of law and order (whether dressed in blue or green) have made it safe for them to walk the streets and sleep soundly at night.  But if too many skulls are cracked, that ‘silent majority’ can quickly change sides.

 

How does MACP/MACA work today?

Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities (MACA) falls into three main types.  The first is simply about extra manpower and equipment to help deal with emergencies such as flooding, heavy snow, evacuations, etc.  The military can bring in large numbers people and specialist equipment or skills at short notice.  Filling sandbags to protect critical sites from flooding.  Moving people away from flooded homes.  Helicopters transporting vital supplies.  Building temporary bridges. This is also known as Military Assistance to the Civil Community.   The military also step in when critical services are threatened by industrial action.  Recent examples include fuel deliveries, firefighting, and ambulances.  This is also referred to as Military Assistance to Government Departments.

A second category, closely linked to the first, is the provision of additional or specialist support which may not be available to the civilian authority.  Installing communications equipment in remote areas, deploying radar or aerial photography, for example.  Both the Olympic Games and the Commonwealth Games used military staff to provide searching and access control.  There are long standing arrangements for handling of explosives and munitions, and until recently the military air sea rescue service worked frequently with local police forces and mountain rescue.

This all has to be paid for, of course.  Whilst the military may be very willing to offer their help, the MoD will want to know which authority to recover their costs from.  This has caused delays in the past, with civilian authorities sometimes being reluctant to call in military because of the costs, and/or arguing over which authority would be responsible for paying. Somewhat of a challenge if the emergency was due to an act of God!

Things have moved on considerably in recent years, with a much wider understanding that protecting life and property is far more important than petty turf wars or arguments over bills.  However, there has a growing tendency over the past decade for political leaders to want to do ‘something’ when faced with a crisis.  This has led to the Army being ‘ordered in’ to ‘sort out’ emergencies such as the foot and mouth outbreak, or the Somerset Levels flooding.  The mission may be loosely defined, and the intervention options may be limited – but it’s ok, the army’s here!   In these situations it’s important that the military recognise local sensitivities.  The civilian authorities will have been working hard for some time, and will feel that military intervention represents a criticism of their efforts.  The Army will also feel uncomfortable about being drawn into incidents that inevitably have political ramifications.

The third category is the use of force – Military Assistance to the Civil Power.  This is the most difficult aspect of MACA.  The military are trained to fight wars, not to be police officers.  It is many decades since the military was deployed to restore order on the streets of the mainland UK, although of course they spend several decades supporting the RUC in Northern Ireland. That deployment still has a painful legacy.

In more recent years, the capability, training and tactics of police and special forces have transformed in response to the changing terrorist threat. For obvious reasons, little of that is seen outside of the counter-terrorist functions.  There is a lot of catching up to be done by politicians, communities and those police and military leaders not directly involved in this specialist area of policing in relation to how the police and military will work together – and what this means for constitutional arrangements, and the longer term impact on the police-military-public relationships.  The maintenance of the Queen’s Peace remains a policing mission, even if it is carried out by the military on the police’s behalf.

 

How MACA/MACP works

In simple terms, the civil power requests the assistance of the military.  The advice to the civil authority is to ask for the ‘effect’ desired, not to specify the resource required.  The military cannot deploy without the authority of the minister of defence.  This is an important constitutional check which we perhaps fail to recognise the significance of in the UK.  In countries where there have been instances of military coups, civil war, or military government, the deployment of the military into the civil space can be highly politically charged and in some cases even outlawed.

In the UK, the civil authorities are used to operating on their own initiative, without ministerial or political involvement.  Consequently, the MACA/MACP approval can be seen as a bureaucratic process, mainly to allow the costs to be recharged.  For more sensitive deployments, the request to deploy military assets will require approval from both the minister overseeing the requesting civil power, and the minister of defence.  This ministerial approval process still applies in critical, fast moving incidents.  There are arrangements to ensure the decisions are made quickly, but the process of contacting ministers and completing paperwork will inevitably introduce some degree of delay.

 

Use of military force in support of police

Churchill directing troops at the Sidney Street Siege, 1911.

 The dividing line between police and military used to be clear.  Police forces simply did not have the capability to take on a well armed terrorist cell.  That was the job of Special Forces. Once the civil police could no longer cope, the incident was handed over to the military and special forces neutralised the threat. The most famous example is the Iranian Embassy Siege. Civilian police surrounded the embassy, but at the point when it was decided a forced conclusion was required, a handwritten note on a scrap of paper allowed the police commander to hand the incident over to the military commander. Once concluded, control was handed back to the police.

Planning for a long time since was based on that premise. The incident would be defined and contained.  When the point was reached that an intervention was decided, this would be conducted by special forces. Police handed control to the military until the incident was resolved. The scene would then be handed back to police.  But the world has changed.

 

So what’s changed?

Alongside the changing nature of terrorism, from 9/11 to lone actors and suicide bombers, the attacks that prompted the most rethinking have been Mumbai and Westgate in Nairobi.  Marauding terrorists, well armed, attacking crowded places pose real challenges for the conventional police armed response.  Police firearms officers are trained to contain the threat and make considered decisions whether to open fire. They should use the minimum force necessary – and indeed, rarely open fire, looking to use less lethal options whenever possible.  Once contained, they negotiate a resolution, again avoiding the use of lethal force as far as possible.  Each decision has to be individually justified and will always be subject to intense scrutiny afterwards, particularly if there has been a fatal discharge.

Terrorists intent on killing as many people as possible require very different concept of operations in response.  Armed officers need to respond quickly and take on the terrorists in order to minimise the loss of life. Negotiation is likely to be pointless (but cannot be discounted, regardless of what has happened).  Police forces will need to bring as many armed officers together as quickly as possible.  They will work as ad hoc teams, put together as they arrive.  This has led to common training, tactics, and weaponry.  The fast response also includes Special Forces, mobilised quickly by air.  As the military component will be arriving alongside the civilian police response, the training includes shared and flexible command models. The priority is to save life, and they will need to get in quickly and resolve the incident, using whatever resources are available.

Depending where and when the incident occurs, command structures and ministerial involvement may be ‘in flux’. MACP/MACA will still be needed.  But the situation on the ground will be developing rapidly and is likely to be confused.  There are a number of possible scenarios, ranging from police dealing with the situation themselves through to a full handover to SF.  The priority will always be saving life.

 

But the threat continues to change? What about other scenarios?

In the last few years we have seen: the two Paris attacks; a shooter on a train in France; an attack on a synagogue in Copenhagen; incidents in Belgium; the attack by Anders Breivik in Norway; car bombs in Glasgow and London; lone actors attacking Parliament and the military in Canada; the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby; several attacks and plots in Australia; the downing of civilian jets over Egypt and Ukraine; the attack on tourists in Tunisia.  In the meantime, counter terrorist police and the Security Service have continued to disrupt attack plots in the UK.  The threats range from multiple and coordinated attacks with automatic weapons and explosives, unsophisticated attacks by individuals or groups with knives, to bombing plots with homemade explosives.  The targets could be military personnel, police, crowded spaces, sensitive religious locations or communities, high profile individuals, or representatives of particular countries and communities.

The range of possible attack scenarios is endless. The greatest unknown, however, is the number of threats/incidents that have to be confronted at the same time.  One attack is bad enough, but several happening simultaneously and/or lasting over a long period will stretch the available specialist capacity.   The threat level in the UK is already at severe, the second highest level.  If the threat increases, we are entering unprecedented territory for the UK in peacetime.

The recent Paris attacks could have conceivably happened in the UK.  The response in France and Belgium was a massive armed military presence on the streets.  An incident in the UK or overseas could lead to our government deciding to deploy armed soldiers (other than SF) across the UK.  There may or may not be intelligence to inform the specific response required.  Whilst planning has already envisaged this sort of event, the questions remain – what are they going to do?  What is their role? What are they expected to deal with?

An incident (or incidents) in the UK may require extra numbers to be drawn in beyond the current planning assumptions.

For police forces, there have been further changes in planning assumptions and responses brought about by the 7/7 and 15/7 bombings, the riots of 2011, the 2012 Olympics, and Austerity.  In short, even the largest forces cannot deal with major incidents without support from other forces.  If there are multiple major incidents happening simultaneously and/or for extended periods, police forces may struggle to cope without assistance.  The most likely, if not only source of assistance is the military.

The progressive increase in the threat level in the UK has also brought into question whether police in the UK can remain unarmed for much longer.  There are only a few countries in the world where the police are unarmed.  Whilst a lone officer with a handgun may have limited impact against a group of terrorists armed with automatic weapons, routinely armed police have options which are not available in the UK.  There are between 5,000 and 6,000 armed officers available in the UK, many being committed to protection of vulnerable sites or high profile individuals.  Multiple and protracted incidents could require additional armed resources, which could only come from the military.  But the way police operate with firearms is very different to the way soldiers are trained for combat.

 

What are the likely scenarios?

The various terrorist attacks around the world show the range of possible scenarios.  The unknowns as ever are the where and when.  But the issue for planning are the assumptions about the scale of the attacks and the number of simultaneous attacks (or other incidents).  For the purpose of this paper, the assumption has to be that additional military support has been requested because events are beyond the capability of police and SF capacity.

Without examining each possible scenario, there are are some key considerations that the military need to prepare for:

  • Command and Control. It is likely that the incident will remain under civil police command.  Are these arrangements understood?  Does the military understand the police organisational structure?
  • Can the military operate effectively within civil police communication systems? What if those systems break down?
  • Concept of Operations. Is it clear what the role of the military is? Is this understood by all agencies? Is there a mutual understanding of each other’s roles, constraints, and ‘red lines’?
  • Use of Force. What authority is required? What are the rules of engagement? What options are available, including less lethal? What risks and contingencies are envisaged?  What guidance and instructions have been given to the those deployed?  Is the guidance fit for purpose?  Who carries the responsibility if soldiers end up in a situation where they have to defend themselves?
  • Locality and Community. How does the local context affect decision making and the options available? What information is needed, and how does that get relayed?

 

Beware of linear assumptions

Planning in the past has been based on a phased, incremental escalation of a single incident.  As the incident escalates, military assistance is engaged.  The mission is relatively clear, and the military resources required are self-selecting.

Planning and preparation are no longer so easy.  It is not inconceivable that the military is deployed for a general security and reassurance presence.  Presumably, though, they will need to react or respond if something happens.

The support requested may be for a specific purpose or role. Perhaps the civil police need additional explosives officers, or logistics, or certain technical skills to deal with the incident, but the military will not be engaged in tackling the threat directly.

There may be a general emergency which requires additional security presence, perhaps for guarding and searching, or to support and work alongside civil police, or even to replace civil police if they are not available or not able to deal with the threat.

And there may be a need for additional armed resources to be deployed quickly to tackle an armed threat, and the current police armed capability may not be available or sufficient.

 

National Security Strategy 2015

The new Strategic Defence and Security Review sets out the need to strengthen domestic resilience, and the need to tackle the terrorist threat at home and abroad using the ‘full spectrum of capabilities’.  Ten thousand military personnel will ‘be available on standby to support the civil authorities for significant terrorist incidents at short notice, supported by a wide range of niche military experts’.

MACA is now a central part of domestic security policy and planning.

 

There is much in the piece to contemplate, and so rather than limiting the discussion to answering a few questions, what I prefer to do is merely set the big issues up as areas of primary concern for debate. To my mind these are very broadly in two categories:

first, the Use of Force and the Rules of Engagement for the armed forces upon the civilian streets; and,

second, the differences between police/law enforcement and the armed forces across the universe of tactics, doctrine, language, etc., for as certainly as ‘secure the house’ means something different between the services (we all know the joke, right?), so too does the same issue apply in this case.

Specifically for the Americans, I would be interested to hear your thoughts as to what level of threat or incident would alter the political calculus on Posse Comitatus.

Join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW and #WeCops.

 

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Ian Wiggett is a former police officer who retired in 2015 after 30 years service. Ian served in the Metropolitan Police, Cheshire Constabulary, and Greater Manchester Police, reaching the rank of Assistant Chief Constable. During his service, Ian worked in both detective and uniformed specialist roles, gaining particular expertise in serious crime and counter terrorism investigations, public order, specialist firearms command, and intelligence. He was the chair of the Cheshire Local Resilience Forum and deputy chair of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum, and has been Gold commander for numerous major operations and events. He was the North West regional lead for counter-terrorism, firearms, and air support. He was the national lead for Casualty Bureau, a member of the national boards for Prevent, and for Protect and Prepare, and a member of the national civil contingencies committee. Ian has led a number of major change programmes and as national lead for systems thinking and continuous thinking helped lead work on demand and new performance measurement approaches nationally.

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