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Au cœur du parc national de la Sutjeska, en Bosnie-Herzégovine, le festival Jelen OK Fest a réuni des milliers de festivaliers venus des Balkans, entre nature spectaculaire, musique éclectique et engagement. Trois jours de fête et de réflexion dans un lieu marqué par la geste des partisans de la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

- Articles / Courrier des Balkans, Tourisme balkans, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Culture et éducation

Perché sur les hauteurs du Kosovo, le village de Kukaj a accueilli, du 6 au 12 juillet, la 15e édition du festival Etnofest. Théâtre, musique, expositions, gastronomie et créations contemporaines venues d'ailleurs ont exploré cette année encore le thème de l'« identiteti ». Reportage.

- Articles / Courrier des Balkans, Kosovo, Culture et éducation, Gratuit

Seo Sam-seok, National Assembly member for Sinan: a stark reminder that elected officials who assume public responsibility should bear public humiliation—not the powerless

In April 2025, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued a Withhold Release Order (WRO) barring imports of salt produced by Taepyung Salt Farm in Sinan, citing credible evidence of forced labor. This marked the first WRO imposed on a South Korean product, following a 2022 petition by advocacy groups. The CBP identified nine indicators of forced labor, as defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO), including the exploitation of vulnerable workers, movement restrictions, confiscation of identification documents, debt bondage, unpaid wages, and physical abuse. The WRO effectively halts imports unless the company can conclusively demonstrate that its supply chain is free from forced labor. This move represents a significant escalation in U.S. efforts to hold South Korea accountable on labor rights, reigniting scrutiny of a case long emblematic of systemic failures.

The Sinan salt farm slavery scandal first drew international attention in 2014, when media and police investigations exposed widespread abuse, particularly of people with disabilities. Since then, the U.S. Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report has consistently cited labor exploitation concerns in South Korea, frequently referencing Sinan as a representative case. In 2021, a fresh incident of forced labor and wage theft triggered on-site investigations by the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, which relayed detailed findings to Washington. Although South Korea has maintained its Tier 1 ranking in the TIP Report, the U.S. has repeatedly urged stronger enforcement, framing Sinan as a litmus test for Seoul’s commitment to international human rights norms. Even after the high-profile 2014 investigation, further cases emerged. In 2021 and 2022, new abuses were exposed, with reports that local police at times ignored victims’ pleas or returned escapees to their exploiters. Notably, in 2019, South Korea’s Supreme Court ruled that the government and police bore responsibility for failing to prevent such abuses, underscoring the systemic nature of the problem.

The Sinan case illustrates how entrenched local power structures and economic dependencies perpetuate exploitation. In isolated regions like Sinan, local elites—including landowners, law enforcement, and religious figures—often maintain overlapping interests, blurring the boundaries between governance and personal gain. Victims were not hidden; their suffering was an open secret sustained by collective silence and complicity. This points to a broader systemic problem: a feudal mindset that allows abuses to persist under the pretext of “community cohesion” and loyalty to entrenched power brokers. Such corruption not only obstructs justice but also undermines public trust in national protections.

No evidence to date implicates leaders of specific religious organizations or denominations directly in the Sinan forced labor case. However, media reports and NGO investigations have documented instances where salt farm owners leveraged their status as church elders or maintained close ties with local pastors to bolster their social standing. This influence sometimes discouraged whistleblowing or helped maintain a code of silence within the community. While isolated cases have seen individual pastors or church officials investigated for alleged complicity or negligence, there is no indication of formal involvement by religious institutions. The dominant pattern remains one of collusion among salt farm owners, politicians, and police, rather than coordinated action by religious groups.

Democratic Party politicians—many of whom represent constituencies in Jeollanam-do—have faced criticism for their muted response. Analysts point to a combination of regionalist loyalty, fear of alienating influential local actors, and a political culture averse to intra-regional critique as reasons for the inertia. Despite promoting human rights and labor reforms on the national stage, these politicians have often downplayed or sidestepped the Sinan scandal, wary of unsettling their rural support base.

The persistence of forced labor on Sinan’s salt farms galvanized artists and documentarians, who sought to confront public apathy. The UK-based Channel 4 documentary series Unreported World, produced by one of Britain’s leading public service broadcasters, aired a detailed episode in 2018 that investigated the Sinan salt farm forced labor case through firsthand testimonies and on-the-ground reporting. The program exposed how disabled and vulnerable individuals were lured under false pretenses, forced to work without pay, and subjected to violence and threats, all enabled by systemic failures in welfare protections and local complicity.

Although government crackdowns and rescues followed these media exposés, a 2023 investigation by Jeollanam-do authorities confirmed that exploitative labor practices persisted. Most perpetrators received only lenient sentences, such as probation, and many local elites avoided prosecution entirely. As a result, survivors continue to face daunting challenges in rehabilitation and reintegration.

The Sinan salt farm forced labor scandal is not a closed chapter of history; it remains an ongoing human rights challenge demanding vigilance, comprehensive reform, and above all, sustained commitment from all levels of governance and civil society. But such commitment must not be distorted or diluted by shifting narratives. A case in point is recent coverage by Maeil Business Newspaper, which highlights a media framing pattern that deserves scrutiny. While quoting workers, employers, and officials, the reporting tends to emphasize incremental improvements while downplaying systemic issues. The narrative often pivots to external trade concerns—such as U.S. misunderstandings or diplomatic repercussions—rather than keeping human rights violations at the center. Heavy reliance on government data without deeper investigation, and sympathetic space for employer grievances, may reflect subtle media bias aligning with official narratives. This framing risks diluting accountability and diverting focus from the structural reforms still urgently needed.

Der US-amerikanische Chiphersteller Intel hat die Pläne für eine Chip-Fabrik in Magdeburg endgültig aufgegeben. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Martin Gornig, Forschungsdirektor für Industriepolitik in der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die geplante Ansiedlung von Intel in Magdeburg wäre ein zentraler Baustein für den Aufbau eigener Halbleiterkapazitäten gewesen. Angesichts geopolitischer Spannungen und globaler Abhängigkeiten – etwa bei Mikrochips – wird die Versorgungssicherheit bei einer solchen, für viele Produkte entscheidenden, Komponente immer dringlicher. Investitionssubventionen, wie sie im Fall von Intel staatlicherseits geflossen wären, sind deshalb quasi eine Versicherungsprämie gegen zukünftige Krisen. Deutschland und die EU müssen nun umso entschlossener den Aufbau eigener Kompetenzen zur Chipproduktion vorantreiben – etwa über Initiativen im Rahmen der Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI), wie sie bereits in Dresden erfolgreich umgesetzt wurden.

ENTWURF EINES BERICHTS über die Empfehlung an den Rat, die Kommission und die Vizepräsidentin der Kommission und Hohe Vertreterin der Union für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik zu der diplomatischen Strategie und geopolitischen Zusammenarbeit der EU in der Arktis
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Urmas Paet

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

ÄNDERUNGSANTRÄGE 1 - 209 - Entwurf eines Berichts Maßnahmen gegen die länderübergreifende Unterdrückung von Menschenrechtsverteidigern
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Chloé Ridel

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Qui n’a jamais ressenti ce mélange d’excitation et d’appréhension face à un déménagement ? Cette étape marquante dans une vie symbolise souvent un nouveau départ, mais s’accompagne également d’une dose considérable de stress. Entre les cartons qui s’empilent dans le salon, la paperasse administrative qui s’accumule et toute la logistique à orchestrer, on peut vite […]

En trois jours, deux hommes ont été exécutés à Podgorica, tandis que le maire de Budva était agressé sur une plage. Derrière cette flambée de violence, la guerre des clans criminels monténégrins refait surface, alors que les autorités sont accusées d'impuissance, voire de compromission.

- Le fil de l'Info / drogues, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Monténégro, Défense, police et justice

Gradual institutional socialization and internalization of the US-led deterrence identity—fostered by the ‘peace through strength’ doctrine—brings greater unity and satisfaction to the free world, symbolized by Trump’s successful breadwinning at the NATO table.

In the cacophonous return of great power competition, where authoritarian states test the margins of the liberal international order, a curious pattern has emerged: allies of the United States are not peeling away under pressure, but rather pulling closer. At the center of this gravitational force is not merely the United States itself, but a particular brand of American leadership—unapologetically transactional, muscular in posture, and deeply committed to the premise that peace is most credibly kept through strength. U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s foreign policy approach, long derided in elite diplomatic circles as reckless or unsophisticated, may be enjoying a quiet vindication. More than a foreign policy instinct, “peace through strength” is emerging as a functional mechanism of alliance synchronization and deterrence—one that modern international theory is now beginning to better explain.

The evidence is no longer anecdotal. The recent NATO summit in 2025 delivered one of the most historic shifts in alliance behavior in decades: European and Canadian allies committed to raising defense spending to 5% of GDP, a staggering leap beyond the long-disputed 2% threshold. More notably, this was not an isolated gesture of appeasement but part of a broader cascade of synchronization. Allies also agreed to tighter planning protocols and robust compliance mechanisms, echoing the kind of coordinated institutional behavior more commonly associated with wartime unity than peacetime policy.

While critics of Trump-era strategy warned that his bluster would alienate partners and destabilize norms, the opposite may now be unfolding: under the stress of external threat and internal hesitation, allies appear not only to follow Washington’s lead but to internalize it. What once looked like grudging compliance is morphing into institutional socialization. Supporting American leadership is not just a matter of obligation—it is becoming an expression of identity.

From Coercion to Internalization

Much ink has been spilled on hegemonic stability theory—the idea that a single dominant power underwrites international order through the demonstration of force and economic leadership. Trump’s doctrine fits snugly here, particularly with regard to his use of military signaling to reinforce deterrence. Case in point: the targeted U.S. operations against Iranian nuclear sites, conducted with surgical precision, significantly delayed Iran’s enrichment capabilities and delivered a costly signal not just to Tehran but to the broader international community. The message was clear: U.S. resolve was real, and its capabilities unmatched.

Yet to stop there would miss the deeper story. Unlike traditional coercive frameworks, the Trump-led realignment reveals patterns consistent with institutional socialization. As current international relations theory suggests, allies that routinely engage with a capable and consistent hegemon begin to internalize that hegemon’s norms—not just because they fear reprisal, but because they gradually come to see alignment as beneficial, legitimate, and even identity-defining.

Several conditions amplify this process. First, Trump-era diplomacy, for all its rhetorical volatility, has offered clarity of norms. There was no ambiguity about expectations: contribute more to collective defense, or face a reckoning. Second, by presenting NATO as both a burden and a benefit, the Trump administration forced allies to grapple directly with questions of institutional utility. Third, the repeated engagement—both in summits and behind-the-scenes military coordination—built the kind of social interaction that fosters shared identity.

The shift was subtle but real. Allies who once rolled their eyes at Trump’s demands are now aligning policy with Washington not out of compulsion, but conviction. And unlike more delicate forms of diplomacy that rely on endless consensus-building, the Trump doctrine seemed to understand a basic psychological principle of alliance politics: clarity and resolve, however brash, are often more persuasive than soft ambiguity.

A Networked Logic of Resilience

Beyond socialization, another theoretical frame further illuminates the Trump-era alliance realignment: resilience through interdependence. This model rejects the zero-sum lens of alliance politics and instead views security as a networked, shared good—dependent on the collective strength of interconnected actors.

In this context, Trump’s policies operated as a catalyzing force. By making credible demonstrations of U.S. capability, the administration reminded allies of their own reliance on the integrity of the transatlantic system. The 5% GDP commitment is not merely a concession to American pressure; it reflects a recognition that prosperity and stability are deeply intertwined with a robust and assertive alliance structure.

Moreover, interdependence is not merely functional—it becomes emotional. Solidarity emerges from crisis management and shared sacrifice. In this way, Trump’s pressure campaign—while confrontational—sparked an internal reckoning among allies. Do they wish to be passive observers in a system increasingly shaped by revisionist powers? Or will they reaffirm their place in what one might call the “House of the Free World”?

They chose the latter. This is not just compliance. It is contribution.

Theoretical Convergence and Practical Outcomes

When we map Trump’s approach onto the modern theoretical landscape, we see a surprising convergence. Hegemonic stability theory explains how his bold use of power coerced alignment. Signaling theory validates the credibility of actions like the Iran strikes. But it is institutional socialization and interdependence theory that give the most profound insights: they explain why the alliance is cohering more tightly now than at any time since the Cold War’s zenith.

To be sure, this realignment is not without risk. Overreliance on coercive tools can breed resentment, especially if leadership appears inconsistent or narcissistic. A purely transactional view of alliances can erode the kind of trust and shared identity that underwrite long-term solidarity. But Trump’s surprising strength was that, through the smoke and fire of confrontation, he clarified the stakes of membership in the liberal order. He didn’t merely ask, “What have you done for us lately?”—he forced allies to ask, “What happens if we don’t stand together?”

The answer, increasingly, is that fragmentation leads to vulnerability. In an age of networked threats—cyberwarfare, gray zone tactics, economic coercion—the collective is only as resilient as its weakest node. The Trump administration understood this, even if only instinctively, and the resulting behavior among allies suggests that a deeper transformation is underway.

An Anchor in a Shifting Sea

The world’s geopolitical landscape in 2025 is choppier than ever. China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s continued provocations on NATO’s eastern flank, and Iran’s regional adventurism all paint a picture of sustained instability. And yet, amid this turbulence, there is one surprising constant: the House of the Free World is not splintering. It is consolidating.

This is not a nostalgic return to postwar liberalism, but a more hard-edged, updated form of Western unity—less about Wilsonian idealism and more about a shared recognition of threat and mutual benefit. Trump, for all his breaches of etiquette, reminded the alliance that it is a house worth defending. More than that, he showed that defense requires clarity, commitment, and consequence.

Of course, the success of this model is not guaranteed. It depends on continued U.S. credibility, the institutional health of NATO and its adjunct bodies, and a commitment to the kind of routine engagement that sustains identity and interdependence. It also requires a leadership style that, while perhaps confrontational, is not capricious. Trump’s strength was his resolve; any future leader seeking to emulate his success must preserve that credibility without descending into chaos.

Conclusion: A New Strategic Normal

Peace through strength may once have sounded like an anachronism of Cold War thinking. But today, in an age of hybrid warfare and global fragmentation, it may be the only language that hostile actors and hesitant allies alike understand. Trump’s ability to extract historic concessions from NATO allies—and more importantly, to catalyze a shared sense of strategic identity—is not an aberration. It may be the blueprint for what comes next.

In this blueprint, power is not the opposite of persuasion—it is its precondition. Strength is not the negation of diplomacy—it is its amplifier. And leadership is not merely a seat at the table—it is the resolve to set the terms. If Trump has taught the free world anything, it is that the architecture of freedom is not self-sustaining. It must be funded, defended, and yes, demanded.

As the new strategic normal unfolds, the United States remains the anchor. And with Trump’s model—however polarizing—as the template, the House of the Free World appears ready, willing, and increasingly able to follow.

 

 

ENTWURF EINES BERICHTS über militärische Mobilität
Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung
Ausschuss für Verkehr und Tourismus
Roberts Zīle, Petras Auštrevičius

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

The BBC revisits the city of Goma six months after it was seized by M23 rebels.

Sous pression et souvent seuls face à leurs responsabilités, les dirigeants évoluent dans un environnement où la charge mentale est intense, mais rarement nommée. Alors même qu’ils incarnent la stratégie et la vision de leur organisation, leur propre équilibre psychologique est trop souvent relégué au second plan. Pour combler ce manque, l’Institut Choiseul, avec le soutien du Groupe Baudelet, de Petit Bambou, de la FHP-Psy et de moka.care, a mené une enquête inédite auprès de 670 chefs d’entreprise, mettant en lumière une réalité aussi préoccupante qu’invisible.

Un malaise silencieux mais massif 

75 % des dirigeants interrogés déclarent ressentir des symptômes de stress au moins une fois par semaine. Plus inquiétant encore : plus d’un tiers évoquent une surcharge mentale quotidienne, qui déborde fréquemment sur leurs temps de repos. Le phénomène concerne tous les profils, mais il se révèle particulièrement aigu dans les TPE et PME, où les responsabilités stratégiques, opérationnelles et humaines reposent souvent sur une seule personne. 

Et ce malgré une conscience bien ancrée de l’enjeu : neuf dirigeants sur dix reconnaissent que leur santé mentale a un impact direct sur la performance de leur entreprise. Pourtant, seuls 36 % ont déjà consulté un professionnel. 

Une parole empêchée, un leadership sous tension 

Entre l’injonction à l’infaillibilité, la pression de l’exemplarité et l’absence de lieux d’expression, près de deux dirigeants sur trois estiment qu’il est encore tabou de consulter un professionnel de santé mentale. Le soutien, lorsqu’il existe, repose souvent sur le cercle familial ou amical — un appui précieux, mais qui ne suffit pas toujours face à l’intensité des pressions vécues. La culture managériale dominante valorise la maîtrise, masque la fatigue, et tolère mal la vulnérabilité.

Or, comme le rappelle Caroline Poissonnier, Directrice générale du Groupe Baudelet,

« Un dirigeant épuisé, physiquement ou moralement, ne peut pas piloter efficacement son entreprise. »

Trois leviers d’action identifiés pour une transformation durable :  

Les résultats de l’enquête montrent un paradoxe persistant : la conscience des enjeux progresse, mais les outils concrets restent largement sous-utilisés. Pour remédier à ce décalage, trois niveaux d’action structurants doivent être mobilisés : 

• À l’échelle individuelle : 

Il s’agit d’abord de lever l’autocensure et d’aider les dirigeants à reconnaître leurs propres signaux d’alerte. Intégrer des temps de récupération réguliers (sommeil, activité physique, déconnexion), ne pas hésiter à solliciter un accompagnement psychologique, et redonner toute sa légitimité à la démarche de soin sont des gestes essentiels. Un dirigeant qui prend soin de sa santé mentale renforce sa lucidité stratégique, sa capacité à déléguer, et sa stabilité émotionnelle dans les moments critiques. 

• À l’échelle de l’entreprise :  

L’enjeu est d’intégrer pleinement la santé mentale dans la stratégie de gouvernance. Cela passe par la mise en place de dispositifs accessibles et confidentiels (écoute, accompagnement ponctuel, coaching), une répartition plus équilibrée des responsabilités pour éviter l’isolement décisionnel, et une formation des cadres à l’écoute active et à la prévention des signaux faibles. Il s’agit aussi de faire évoluer les représentations du leadership en valorisant des postures plus humaines, capables d’accueillir la vulnérabilité comme une composante normale de l’engagement. 

• À l’échelle sociétale :  

La santé mentale des dirigeants doit être reconnue comme un enjeu collectif, et non comme une affaire privée. Cela implique de déstigmatiser le sujet dans les discours publics, d’inclure la santé mentale dans les indicateurs RSE, de soutenir les dispositifs de relais (binômes, congés préventifs, mentorat), et de renforcer l’offre de formation à destination des dirigeants, notamment dans les TPE. La reconnaissance de ce sujet au titre de Grande Cause nationale 2025 va dans ce sens : elle doit être le point de départ d’une action durable et soutenue. 

Vers un nouveau modèle de leadership 

L’objectif de cette étude n’est pas de dresser un tableau alarmiste, mais de mettre en lumière une réalité encore trop peu exprimée. En documentant les signaux faibles et les tensions structurelles, elle vise à outiller les acteurs économiques, publics et associatifs pour agir de manière ciblée et efficace. Car sans dirigeants capables de préserver leur santé mentale dans la durée, il ne peut y avoir d’entreprise pérenne, ni de transformation soutenable. 

La Croatie aborde le cœur de sa saison touristique avec appréhension. Les prix en forte augmentation dans l'hôtellerie pourraient pousser les habitués vers d'autres destinations moins coûteuses. Mais avec des chiffres en trompe-l'œil, le secteur s'obstine dans sa politique de l'autruche.

- Articles / Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Economie, Tourisme balkans

The new ALGREE thematic report entitled “Mapping the dominant media frames between Greece and Albania and exploring alternative frames to override negative stereotypes” is a key output of the “ALGREE – Albania-Greece: Understanding. Connecting. Partnering” project. Authored by Panagiotis Paschalidis and Kriton Kuci, and implemented by the South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP, the study investigates the ways in which Greek and Albanian media portray the other’s country and proposes constructive counter-narratives to challenge negative stereotypes.

Using a mixed-method approach that combines quantitative content analysis with qualitative frame analysis, the report explores media coverage through six case studies focused on politically and socially sensitive topics, such as Albania’s EU accession process, the Greek minority in Albania, maritime border disputes, regional dynamics, economic cooperation, and the high-profile “Beleri case.” It examines both the tone and framing of news stories and highlights how political alignment often influences media narratives on both sides.

Its key findings include a persistent politicization of media discourse, a strong focus on conflict-laden narratives, and a lack of attention to positive themes such as culture, society, and economic cooperation. While some progress is noted—particularly regarding regional cooperation and perceptions of economic partnership—the presence of stereotypes remains a significant obstacle to balanced representation.

The report offers a series of recommendations aimed at depoliticizing media narratives and encouraging more nuanced and constructive reporting. By fostering alternative frames that promote mutual understanding, the study contributes to the broader goals of ALGREE in support of evidence-based dialogue, informed policy-making, and improved bilateral relations between Greece and Albania.

You can read the thematic report here.

 

OPINION on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2006/43/EC, 2013/34/EU, (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Barry Andrews

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

En 2023, l'Union européenne prenait des sanctions contre Pristina. La société civile du Kosovo est la première touchée. Ainsi, la rénovation du cinéma Lumbardhi de Prizren a perdu le soutien financier de Bruxelles. Le cri d'alarme et de colère de son directeur, Ares Shporta.

- Articles / Kosovo, Gratuit, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Culture et éducation, Questions européennes

The concept of generic fascism helps understanding Russia’s war against Ukraine

 

Andreas Umland

 

The use of the term “fascism” in connection with the modern Russian state and its actions has at least three dimensions. First, it is a historical analogy used to guide public interpretation of current events in light of well-known developments in the recent past. Second, it is a Ukrainian code expressing the lived experience of millions of Ukrainians today. Third, “fascism” is an academic umbrella term that serves scientific classification, enables comparisons across time and space, and highlights differences and similarities between historical fascism, on the one hand, and Putinism, today on the other.

 

Fascism as a historical analogy

Most public references to Putin’s regime as fascist serve as a diachronic analogy or metaphorical classification to better understand recent developments in Russia and its occupied territories. Such historical comparisons and verbal visualizations of current phenomena with events and images from the past help to identify key characteristics and challenges of today’s Russia. The attribution of “fascism” to Putin’s regime serves to illustrate to the general public what is happening in Russia and the Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories.

This comparison is justified insofar as there are numerous parallels between the political rhetoric and actions of Putin’s Russia, on the one hand, and Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, on the other. By mid-2025, many political, social, ideological, and institutional similarities will have accumulated. These range from increasingly dictatorial and partly totalitarian features of the Russian regime to revanchist and increasingly genocidal features in the Kremlin’s external behavior. Against this backdrop, the use of the term fascism serves to guide debates in mass media, civil society, and educational institutions.

 

Fascism as lived experience

The use of the term “fascism” to describe Putin’s regime by outside commentators aims to give audiences outside Russia and Ukraine an impression of current Russian domestic and foreign affairs. In contrast, the Ukrainian use of the term “fascism” and the neologism “rashism” – a combination of “Russia” and “fascism” – is primarily an expressive act. In Ukraine, describing Russia as fascist has, since 2014, articulated the collective shock, deep grief, and ongoing despair at the Kremlin’s morbid cynicism toward ordinary Ukrainians—especially in the last three and a half years of war.

“Fascism” or “rashism” also serves as a battle cry for the Ukrainian government and society to mobilize domestic and foreign support for resistance against Russian aggression. These terms are intended to draw the outside world’s attention to the serious consequences of Russia’s war of expansion and destruction for Ukraine. The adjectives “fascist” and “rashist” indicate that Russia’s military expansion is not just about conquering Ukrainian territory. Russia’s revanchist adventure, especially since 2022, aims to destroy Ukraine as an independent nation-state and a cultural community separate from Russia.

The words and deeds of the Russian government are largely consistent in this regard. Statements by Russian government officials, parliamentarians, and propagandists, especially since February 24, 2022, indicate that Russia’s intentions toward Ukraine go beyond merely redrawing state borders, restoring regional hegemony, and preventing the Westernization of Eastern Europe. Moscow has already since 2014 been ruthlessly suppressing Ukrainian identity, culture, and national sentiment in Crimea and the Donbas.

It would be going too far to equate Russian Ukrainophobia with the biological and eliminatory anti-Semitism of the Nazis. With its irredentist war, Moscow “only” wants to destroy the Ukrainians as a self-confident nation and integrated civil society. The Kremlin does not aim to physically eliminate all Ukrainians, as the Nazis attempted to do with the Jews. Nevertheless, the Russian agenda goes beyond “mere” expulsion, harassment, deportation, re-education, and brainwashing of Ukraine’s inhabitants. It also includes the expropriation, terrorization, imprisonment, torture, and murder of those Ukrainians (as well as some Russians) who oppose Russia’s military expansion, political terror, and cultural dominance in Ukraine in word and/or deed. It is therefore hardly surprising that many Ukrainians, as well as some Russian observers, spontaneously describe Russia’s genocidal behavior as “fascist.”

 

Fascism as a scholarly concept

A growing number of prominent experts on Central and Eastern Europe today describe Putin’s Russia as fascist. In contrast, many contemporary historians and political scientists who work with comparative methods have so far avoided using the term fascism to categorize Putinism. This has to do with the narrow definitions of generic fascism used by many of these academics. According to these definitions, the key feature that distinguishes fascists from other right-wing extremists is their goal of political, social, cultural, and anthropological rebirth.

Fascists often refer to a supposed Golden Age in their nation’s distant past and use ideas and symbols from this mythologized prehistory. However, they do not want to preserve or restore a past era, but rather to create a new kind of national community. Fascists are right-wing extremists, but they are more revolutionary than ultra-conservative or reactionary. Today, many comparativists would be cautious about applying the term fascism to Putinism, as Putin seeks to restore the Russian Empire rather than create an entirely new Russian state and people.

Admittedly, Putin’s transformation of Russian domestic and foreign policy over the past 25 years has had a clear direction. It has meant a continued increase in rhetorical aggression, internal repression, external escalation, and general radicalization, which now culminates in monthly Russian threats of world war. For most comparative historians, nevertheless, these and similar changes in the last quarter-century of Russian history would still be insufficient to classify Putinism as fascism.

 

Ukraine as Russia’s interior

On the other hand, Russia’s policy in the occupied Ukrainian territories could be classified as quasi-fascist in a more direct sense. The ruthless Russification campaign that the Russian state is carrying out in the annexed parts of Ukraine through targeted terror, forced re-education, and material incentives aims to achieve a profound sociocultural transformation of these areas. Admittedly, such irredentist, colonizing, and homogenizing policies are not seen as necessarily fascist in comparative imperialism studies. However, the instruments used by the Kremlin to implement its Ukraine policy and the desired outcomes are in some respects similar to those of the fascist revolutions attempted by Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany.

Moscow wants to fundamentally reshape the conquered Ukrainian municipalities and turn them into cells of a culturally and ideologically standardized Russian people (russkii narod). Russian imperial ultra-nationalists regard most parts of Ukraine as originally Russian territory and refer to them as “New Russia” and “Little Russia” (Novorossiya, Malaya Rossiya). Ukrainians – insofar as the term is accepted at all – are thus merely a sub-ethnic group of the greater pan-Russian people, whose Ukrainian language is merely a Russian dialect and who have regional folklore rather than a national culture.

According to the Russian irredentist narrative, the western Russian border dwellers were misled by anti-Russian forces in order to form an artificial nation, “the Ukrainians.” Foreign actors such as the Catholic Church, imperial Germany, the Bolsheviks, and/or the West today have divided the larger pan-Russian people. They have alienated the “Great Russians” (velikorossy) of the Russian Federation from the “Little Russians” (malorossy) of Ukraine.

Moscow’s occupation policy in Ukraine, aimed at reversing this supposedly artificial division of Russian civilization allegedly caused by foreign powers, could be understood as an attempt to give new birth to “Little Russia.” The Kremlin’s goal is to bring about a local political, social, cultural, and anthropological revolution in the Ukrainian territories annexed by Russia. The Russification policy in Ukraine is thus sufficiently similar to classic fascist domestic and occupation policies, so that Moscow’s transformative goals and actions with regard to Russia’s Ukrainian “brothers” could be classified as, at least, quasi-fascist.

 

Dr. Andreas Umland is an analyst at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) in the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).

 

This article is the summary of larger chapter forthcoming in: Ian Garner and Taras Kuzio, eds., Russia and Modern Fascism: New Perspectives on the Kremlin’s War Against Ukraine. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2025.

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