Diplomacy & Crisis News

(Own report) - With a special "team" the EU is seeking to create a pro-western media audience in the East European countries and the Caucasus - including Russia - as was confirmed by the German government in its response to a parliamentary interpellation. The EU's "East StratCom Team" seeks to establish networks with journalists in the countries of the EU's "Eastern Partnerships," and in Russia. It is also developing "communication campaigns" systematically aimed at the populations of these countries. "Young people" and academics are among the specially targeted audiences. Overall, the EU team is focusing on the urban middle classes, which, in large sectors of Eastern Europe are pro-western oriented and had significantly supported Ukraine's Maidan protests. Asked about the orientation of these activities, officially labeled as "support for media freedom," the German government has explained that the purpose is to "communicate" one's own position to the public, like the PR-work of governments, parties, and associations. The government has also confirmed that the EU team will examine the East European activities of Deutsche Welle (DW), Germany’s international broadcaster, for possible "synergy effects."

На крајот на летото Македонија прогласи вонредна состојба и привремено ги затвори своите граници со Грција и Србија. Малата балканска нација се придружи на поголемиот дел од Европа во паничниот, слабо разгледан и лошо имплементиран одговор на трагедијата со азилантите. Македонија е ситен играч во таа криза, која што достигнува димензии на Voelkerwanderung – масовно движење на лица со размери невидени на континентот после падот на Римската Империја. Но, како што летото преминува во есен, Македонија мора брзо и конструктивно да ѝ пристапи на нејзината домашна криза или да ризикува насилни судири.

Myanmar will go to the polls on Nov. 8 in what will be a landmark election. The main opposition National League for Democracy party will be contesting nationally for the first time in a generation. And if all goes as expected, next year Myanmar will see its first democratic transfer of power since 1960.

Le « deux poids, deux mesures » observé en matière de discours stigmatisants repose souvent sur une approche ethnoculturelle. Mais il se prête à une tout autre lecture, essentiellement sociale. / France, Histoire, Immigrés, Inégalités, Sécurité, Islam, Jeunes, Judaïsme, Médias, Migrations, Minorité (...) / France, Histoire, Immigrés, Inégalités, Sécurité, Islam, Jeunes, Judaïsme, Médias, Migrations, Minorité nationale, Droits des minorités, Mouvement de contestation, Police, Presse, Racisme, Religion, Société, Répression - 2015/02

Comprendre le conflit entre la Russie et l'Ukraine implique d'intégrer les points de vue concurrents de tous les acteurs. Mais, dans les chancelleries occidentales, les proclamations morales supplantent souvent l'analyse. / Russie, Ukraine, Conflit, État, Géopolitique, Idéologie, Nationalisme, (...) / Russie, Ukraine, Conflit, État, Géopolitique, Idéologie, Nationalisme, Relations internationales, Stratégie, Diplomatie, Frontières - 2014/04

As armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere continued to inflict much suffering and instability around the world, the heads of the UN and International Committee of the Red Cross issued an unprecedented joint warning about the impact of today’s conflicts on civilians and called on states to redouble their efforts to find sustainable solutions to conflicts. Welcoming the call to action, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, President & CEO of the International Crisis Group, said: “It is imperative that the world do much more to respond to early warning signs and prevent wars breaking out in the first place”.

Cette recension d’ouvrages est issue de Politique étrangère (3/2015). Julien Brault propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Matthieu Auzanneau, Or noir. La grande histoire du pétrole (Paris, La Découverte, 2015, 718 pages).

L’auteur analyse l’histoire du XXe siècle à travers celle du pétrole. Celui-ci est d’abord le produit de sociétés militarisées fondées sur la guerre mécanisée – la guerre de Sécession, la Première Guerre mondiale, le Blitzkrieg vu comme une gestion optimisée de l’énergie, jusqu’à l’usage du napalm au Vietnam. L’industrie pétrolière apparaît ainsi dans cet ouvrage comme un système monopolistique, coercitif et corrompu créé par les Rockfeller. Sauveurs du système financier américain à la fin du XIXe siècle, artisans de la création de la Fed, se présentant comme les grands défenseurs d’un système néolibéral dont ils seraient la banque, ceux-ci auraient orchestré une transformation du capitalisme en corporatisme. S’alliant successivement avec le charbon, le chemin de fer, l’automobile, l’agriculture, l’ingénierie, la banque, le fisc, la science et notamment la science économique, ce cartel international aux multiples ramifications connaîtrait depuis 1989 un renouveau, incarné notamment par JPMorgan et Citigroup. L’auteur souligne, à l’inverse, le rôle des figures qui combatirent Big Oil, de l’essor du Staline de la Bakou pétrolière aux luttes de Kennedy contre les majors.

C’est l’ensemble de l’histoire récente des relations internationales que l’auteur présente comme inféodé à l’or noir, en s’attachant au récit de ses événements marquants : percement du canal de Suez, accords Sykes-Picot, invasion de l’Éthiopie, création des organisations internationales après 1945, renversement de Mossadegh, mort de Mattei ou guerre du Biafra. Au centre du jeu : une alliance américano-saoudienne fondée sur les astuces fiscales des majors, le refus de la démocratie et le réinvestissement des pétrodollars. À ce titre, la crise pétrolière et ses conséquences – chômage, dette et restructurations néolibérales – sont interprétées comme profitant avant tout aux majors américaines. La révolution iranienne et la première guerre d’Afghanistan conduisent d’ailleurs à un renouveau rapide de la puissance américaine au Moyen-Orient, la CIA jouant les uns contre les autres, notamment pendant la guerre Iran-Irak. Le contre-choc pétrolier apparaît quant à lui comme un tribut payé par les Saoud à Washington pour accélérer la chute de l’empire soviétique. Georges W. Bush se garde d’ailleurs bien d’inquiéter les Saoudiens après le 11 Septembre, qui l’en remercieront en favorisant sa réélection. Au regard du chaos irako-syrien actuel, ce renouveau américain au Moyen-Orient apparaît aujourd’hui comme un échec, qui profite paradoxalement aux compagnies chinoises. La dernière facette de la question pétrolière est enfin écologique, et renvoie à un déclin, qui détermine aujourd’hui l’évolution d’une partie du système international.

Le livre pâtit d’un certain nombre de longueurs, de considérations philosophiques approximatives sur la nature du progrès, et d’un défaut d’analyse économique. L’auteur n’hésite ainsi pas à lier étroitement le pétrole à l’essor du fascisme, mais aussi à une libération des potentialités humaines… D’un indéniable talent littéraire, rempli de détails fouillés et de brillants passages, il comble néanmoins utilement un vide dans un champ traditionnellement dominé par l’historiographie anglo-saxonne.

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

(Own report) - At the upcoming EU summit on refugees in Malta's capital Valletta, Germany will seek to reinforce the border and deportation management aimed at thwarting migration from Africa. According to the German government, the "fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking" as well as the enforcement of the refugees' "return and readmission" by the participating African countries will be central issues to be discussed at next week's summit of EU and African heads of states and governments. Particular emphasis will be placed on "supporting" Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Mali and Niger with "police cooperation" to "monitor and control" their borders and the most important routes of migration. EU "liaison officials" should be dispatched to the "relevant African countries" to collect "information on the migration flow" in cooperation with the local repression administrations. "Multifunctional centers" are to be established in Niger and other African countries to demonstrate the "risks of irregular migration" to refugees. In return for stemming the flow of migration and "readmitting" illegal migrants, the African countries of origin and transit will be promised "enhanced" cooperation "on economic, foreign, and development policy issues."

Il y a 50 ans, Mehdi Ben Barka était enlevé à Paris par deux policiers français. Idéologue prolifique, travailleur acharné, rassembleur charismatique, l'opposant marocain ne pouvait pas disparaître si facilement. En tout cas pas dans les consciences de générations de militants. / Algérie, Amérique (...) / Algérie, Amérique latine, France, Maroc, Colonialisme, Histoire, Idées, Idéologie, Mouvement de contestation, Personnalités, Services secrets, Cuba, Socialisme, Maghreb - 2015/10

Vieilles de plusieurs siècles, les querelles territoriales n'ont pas été réglées après la seconde guerre mondiale et la décolonisation. Des îles comme les Spratleys et les Paracels sont revendiquées par cinq pays : Chine, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaisie, Brunei. Certains conflits sont réglés ou en voie (...) / Asie, Chine, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Inde, Malaisie, Philippines, Russie, Vietnam, Armée, Conflit, Géopolitique, Brunei, Frontières, Décolonisation - Asie

"La France a-t-elle encore une politique arabe ?" "Est-elle passée, au Proche-Orient, d'une approche dite gaullo-mitterrandienne à une tentation néo-conservatrice ?" Que signifie le récent rapprochement avec les Etats du Golfe et notamment l'Arabie Saoudite ? Le débat public ne manque pas d'interrogations récurrentes sur le sujet, avec cependant plusieurs biais ou angles morts.Un débat erronéLe premier d'entre eux consiste à ne plus questionner les termes eux-mêmes, or ceux-ci posent problème. La "politique arabe", vocable datant des années 60, remis brièvement au goût du jour par Jacques Chirac lors d'un discours à l'Université du Caire en 1996, désigne-t-elle une politique par nature pro-arabe (ce dont on a longtemps accusé le Quai d'Orsay), ou bien une tentative pour définir une stratégie au sud et à l'est de la Méditerranée, qui n'exclue d'ailleurs pas la prise en compte de la diversité des situations nationales ? Que signifie encore une approche "gaullo-mitterrandienne", 25 ans après la fin de la guerre froide, outre la volonté louable de maintenir à l'échelle globale une vision française indépendante de l'allié américain (sans pour autant rompre avec lui), vision qui soit toujours universaliste et non réduite à la défense des seules valeurs occidentales ? Qu'appelle-t-on au juste "néo-conservatisme" en France ? Très loin de ses origines intellectuelles américaines, le terme désigne souvent à Paris, parfois un peu vite, un mélange d'atlantisme (qui existe depuis longtemps dans notre pays), d'occidentalisme, et d'interventionnisme militaire appliqué à une vision manichéenne de l'échiquier international, sur lequel  faudrait frapper d'abord les ennemis supposés consacrés, par solidarité avec des alliés supposés naturels.
Un deuxième biais consiste à aborder la politique française au Moyen-Orient comme la traduction d'un tel choix idéologique, plutôt que comme le résultat d'une marge de manœuvre en réalité fort étroite. Car la capacité française d'agir sur la région ne permet pas autre chose que des ajustements subtils, des compromis pragmatiques, des postures prudentes. Ce qui est certes déjà beaucoup. Mais quand bien même un décideur arrêterait-il une diplomatie délibérément idéologique dans un sens ou dans l'autre, la complexité de cette aire géographique le rattraperait rapidement pour le ramener à la réalité. Perte de repèresCette réalité, quelle est-elle ? Traditionnellement, la France entretenait des liens étroits avec le Liban (ancien mandat, et de tradition toujours francophone), ambigus et conflictuels mais teintés de connaissance mutuelle avec la Syrie (ancien mandat elle aussi), des liens de confiance plus personnels avec plusieurs chefs d'Etat arabes (en Egypte, en Arabie Saoudite, au Qatar et dans les Emirats, jadis avec Yasser Arafat...), tandis qu'hors du monde arabe, la relation restait traditionnellement méfiante avec Israël, entachée de contentieux lourds depuis les années 1980 avec l'Iran (guerre Irak-Iran, dossier libanais, attentats en France, litiges financiers...), et pervertie avec la Turquie par la question de l'adhésion à l'Union européenne. Les proximités arabes se sont trouvées bouleversées par la disparition physique ou politique des acteurs connus de longue date (comme Arafat, Hariri ou Moubarak), par les printemps arabes, les déceptions consécutives (avec la Syrie, sous Jacques Chirac puis Nicolas Sarkozy), et l'extrême complexification des enjeux, avec la montée en puissance d'acteurs non étatiques (Hezbollah, Al Qaida, Daech, Hamas...). Soit dit en passant, cet éloignement progressif ou cet estrangement, dirait-on en anglais, vaut aussi pour le Maghreb, où les jeux à multiples facettes de la situation algérienne, la mort de Hassan II au Maroc en 1999, plus récemment le renversement de Ben Ali à Tunis, ont changé la donne pour la diplomatie française. Plus encore, l'intervention militaire de 2011 en Libye, initialement saluée, est aujourd'hui portée au passif de la France (comme de ses alliés britanniques et américains), et sert d'argument à Moscou et Pékin pour s'opposer à tout règlement occidental de la crise syrienne.
Dans le même temps, les relations avec les Etats non arabes ne se sont pas améliorées. En dépit d'une courte lune de miel au début du mandat de Nicolas Sarkozy, la relation franco-israélienne s'est à nouveau dégradée après la crise de Gaza de 2010, pour se heurter ensuite régulièrement à la personnalité de Benjamin Netanyahu. Le dialogue avec l'Iran n'a naturellement pas bénéficié de l'intransigeance de Paris dans les négociations sur le dossier nucléaire, alors que Washington imposait finalement un accord. La question turque enfin, à peine remise de l'hostilité déclarée de Nicolas Sarkozy à l'adhésion d'Ankara à l'UE, s'est trouvée otage par la suite de la nouvelle posture d'Erdogan (devenu président en 2014), autoritariste en interne et ambigüe à l'international.
Que reste-t-il alors ? Un Moyen-Orient dont l'agenda politique est aujourd'hui dominé par l'expansion de l'Etat Islamique à partir de l'Irak et de la Syrie, devenus Etats effondrés (l'Irak l'était déjà depuis 2003) alors même que les abcès de fixations antérieurs ne sont pas réglés (les question palestinienne, la question kurde, la situation libanaise, les inégalités de développement, les conséquences des guerres américaines puis des printemps arabes...). Un Moyen-Orient en quête de stabilité,[1]où les acteurs étatiques régionaux ont perdu la main face aux groupes armés et aux clivages ethniques et religieux, où les Etats-Unis hésitent (on se souvient du recul de l'administration Obama face au choix de frapper le régime de Damas en 2013), où l'Europe reste absente (après les échec successifs du processus de Barcelone en 1995 puis de l'Union Pour la Méditerranéeen 2008), où la Russie, soudain, se rêve à nouveau en puissance globale, poussant son avantage jusqu'à oser l'engagement militaire Syrie. De quoi la politique moyen-orientale de la France est-elle le nom ?Face à cette poudrière, que fait la France, et quelle lecture peut-on avoir de son action? Après la séquence difficile des printemps arabes (commencée par la situation tunisienne, qui a entraîné le changement du ministre français des Affaires étrangères), Paris semble plus proche aujourd'hui des acteurs conservateurs de la région, qui n'avaient pas caché leur opposition aux "printemps". Les nombreuses visites officielles au plus haut niveau dans les Etats du Golfe, des objectifs stratégiques en phase avec ceux de Riyad (sur la destitution de Bachar al-Assad, la méfiance à l'égard de l'accord iranien ou la situation au Yémen), des contrats commerciaux importants passés avec les Etats du Golfe ou financés par eux (l'achat d'avions Rafale par Le Caire - qui constitue par là même un soutien au régime d'Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, une aide militaire de 3 milliards de dollars à l'armée libanaise), semblent attester d'une ligne dont la cohérence est assumée, et qui privilégie la garantie de stabilité au moins à court terme, en dépit des critiques que cela ne manque pas de susciter.
Par ailleurs, la diplomatie française joint le geste à la parole, en assumant une posture interventionniste inverse à celle de Jacques Chirac sur l'Irak en 2003. En militant ouvertement pour des frappes contre le régime syrien en 2013, en engageant des moyens important contre Daech en Irak depuis 2014 (opération Chammal, mobilisation du porte avion Charles de Gaulle), en ouvrant la voie à des frappes sur le territoire syrien à l'automne 2015, Paris fait preuve du même volontarisme politico-militaire qu'en Afrique, au Mali et en Centrafrique, et avec le dispositif Barkhane.
Plusieurs de ces choix, on l'a dit, rencontrent ceux de l'Arabie Saoudite et de ses alliés émiratis ou koweïtiens. D'autres, comme l'intransigeance sur le dossier iranien, rencontrent nécessairement un écho favorable en Israël. D'autres encore, comme l'engagement militaire contre Daech, viennent soulager l'allié américain. Dans le même temps, le lien de la France avec le Qatar reste fort, même si la priorité, par rapport aux années Sarkozy, semble s'être recentrée sur le grand voisin saoudien. Comment interpréter alors cette posture ? 
L'hypothèse d'un alignement sur un axe Washington – Riyad – Tel Aviv ne résiste pas à l'analyse, ne serait-ce que parce que cet axe n'existe pas. On connaît l'état des relations entre Washington et Riyad d'une part, Washington et Tel Aviv de l'autre, toutes deux victimes entre autres de l'accord sur le nucléaire iranien, après des années de méfiance croissante. L'hypothèse plus idéologique d'un rapprochement français non pas "générique" avec les Etats-Unis et Israël, mais "partisan", avec les Faucons de chacun des deux pays, se heurte aux anomalies que constitueraient alors l'excellente relation de la France avec Riyad et Doha, ou encore les votes français à l'ONU en faveur de la Palestine (en 2011 pour l'intégration de cette dernière à l'UNESCO, en novembre 2012 pour son statut d'observateur non membre de l'ONU, en décembre 2014 en faveur de la résolution palestinienne sur le retrait israélien des Territoires occupés avant la fin 2017, en septembre 2015 pour autoriser les Palestiniens à faire flotter leur drapeau au siège de New York). L'hypothèse plus subtile encore d'un retour, par François Hollande, à une politique de type SFIO, beaucoup plus favorable à Israël sans pour autant s'aliéner les pays arabes, est plus crédible car plus nuancée, mais se heurte aux nombreuses recompositions récentes, qui ont fait voler en éclat l'affrontement binaire et simpliste entre d'un côté "les Arabes" et de l'autre Israël. 
La lecture par une Realpolitik mercantiliste, qui voit la France privilégier les acteurs à la fois très solvables et férus de stabilité régionale, paraît plus solide, à condition de ne pas la ramener à une seule affaire de signature de contrats. Certes, la politique étrangère développée par l'actuel exécutif depuis 2012 et exposée régulièrement par Laurent Fabius, ne fait pas mystère de l'importance à accorder à l'économie, considérée comme le nerf de la guerre dans une diplomatie moderne (d'où  le rattachement du commerce extérieur et du tourisme au quai d'Orsay, la création d'une direction des entreprises et de l'économie internationale, etc.). Et dans cette perspective, les contrats signés avec ou grâce au Golfe, importent. Mais c'est la concordance de cet horizon commercial avec l'objectif de stabilité qui fait désormais l'originalité des liens bilatéraux. La priorité donnée à un environnement stratégique plus stable sur son flanc sud  s'accommode par exemple de l'initiative égypto-saoudienne d'une force arabe commune.
Reste que les multiples contradictions régionales demeurent, qui rendent toute politique unidimensionnelle impossible.  Cette complexité n'est naturellement pas ignorée du quai d'Orsay, qui estime depuis plusieurs mois qu'une confrontation Riyad-Téhéran doublée d'une concurrence Riyad-Doha constitue l'une des toiles de fond de nombreuses tensions actuelles. On sait également que la question de savoir qui, du régime de Damas ou de l'Etat Islamique, doit être tenu premier responsable du chaos syrien, est particulièrement délicate pour maintenir les équilibres entre les différentes amitiés proche-orientales. De surcroît, ces amitiés ne doivent pas altérer l'alliance américaine, dont Paris ne veut pas se départir : même si l'épisode des "lignes rouges" syriennes de 2013 (lorsque Washington avait renoncé au dernier moment à frapper la Syrie en dépit de la volonté française) a laissé des traces profondes, on est conscient à Paris qu'aucune politique forte dans la région ne peut s'envisager seul, sans l'appui américain. 
La politique de la France au Moyen-Orient n'est ni aussi erratique ou improvisée qu'on le prétend parfois, ni aussi déterminée idéologiquement qu'on le soupçonne ailleurs. Elle demeure plus simplement contrainte par les paramètres d'une rencontre à haut risque entre une puissance moyenne à vocation globale, et une région en proie à un chaos que nul ne maîtrise, mais que tout le monde subit.
@charillon


[1] F. Charillon, A. Dieckhoff, Afrique du Nord Moyen-Orient : Logiques de chaos, dynamiques d'éclatement, La Documentation Française, Paris, 2015.

Gearing up for the COP 21 via Flickr (user greensefa)

Former Black Panther, Eldridge Cleaver is reported to have said something along the lines of—if you are not part of the solution then you are part of the problem. Well, unbelievable as it may seem, a group of corporations, apparently at President Barack Obama’s behest, have taken upon themselves to be part of the solution to a problem they are widely seen as being very much a part of.  By signing on to the American Business Act of Climate pledge, they are agreeing to variety of green measures designed to slow climate change. Just in time for the Conference of Parties (COP21) in Paris next month.

In the U.S., any discussion involving climate change tends to deteriorate into an argument between two factions—those who feel that climate change is a very real threat to the planet, and those who say it is nothing but a scare tactic. History shows that the former are labeled tree huggers and bleeding heart liberals, and the latter tend to be what’s generically called Big Business. However, both sides do agree on one thing—climate change conferences are, more often than not, a colossal waste of time.

With the announcement of the commitment of American business to fight climate change, the COP21 may just prove to be something more than an exercise in futility—if the participants are serious about this undertaking. So far, governments, keen to avoid a repeat of the disastrous Copenhagen conference, have largely toed the line of pledging to decrease CO2 emissions. Even China and Russia pitched in. On the private sector side however, Exxon Mobil and Chevron , two of the most controversial corporations, were conspicuously absent from the list of companies pledging to act. In fact, 63% of all carbon emissions between 1850 and 2010 were produced by just 90 companies involved in fossil fuels and cement—Exxon has single-handedly emitted 3.2% of historical carbon emissions.

Exxon has stated, in effect, that technology alone can handle the problem. A curious statement from a company that historically has denied that there was a problem of any sort, and worked hard to prove it. Evidently Exxon Mobil has known about the dangers of carbon emissions from the product they were producing since 1977, but has done nothing about it—except to deny, and work in conjunction with tobacco industry warriors in an attempt to cast doubt on the issue. Exxon’s reason for not signing the pledge? According to their CEO, they are not going to take the pledge because they don’t want to “fake it”. He may have a point. If this is to be nothing more than image building, why do it? However, as John Kerry pointed out, the onus rests on the oil and gas sector to encourage governments to adopt carbon limits and voluntarily curb emissions. But why would he single out specifically the O&G sector, when agriculture is just as polluting? Simple, because most economic activity depends on the way electricity is produced. It’s pointless to buy a Tesla if the electricity powering it comes from coal burning.

Consider aluminum production. Ubiquitous aluminum—from beverage containers to the vehicles we drive, it is a large part of our everyday life. Regarded as more eco-friendly than steel, the problem arises when we note that production requires substantially more electricity. However, depending on where in the world it is being produced, this can be a non-issue. According to a recent AluWatch study, producing one ton of aluminum emits 16,5 tons of greenhouse gases. However, those numbers are set to drop if the private and public sector join hands to invest in building renewable energy sources. China, the world’s number one producer of aluminum relies almost entirely on coal to fire up its smelters, while Norway, Iceland and Russia use hydroelectricity, a much greener way of generating power.

Energy companies would do well to study the supply chain behind aluminum production, and develop a similar strategy—in concert with government—working to find a means to shift a good portion of production of oil to the much cleaner natural gas or by  ‘going green’, meaning investing in solar, wind or biomass. Should Obama’s newfound corporate friends start a trend, legislators and consumers could very well compel other companies to follow suit.  Something for COP21 attendees to consider.

Is the pledge the beginning of something of substance? It is far too early to say, but in order to force industry to toe the line it may be necessary to hit them where it hurts – their bottom lines. Carbon taxes and measurable yardsticks with punitive penalties for failure to meet targets should stay on the table. Admittedly, it is difficult to impose anything resembling a punitive financial penalty on a corporation that can easily buy its way out of any problem. Obama’s pledge falls short of this by allowing participants to set their own benchmarks on their own timetable. It is simply a promise to do better in the future. But it is a start.

Or rather, another start – we have witnessed a multitude of efforts in the past – and we would like to think that COP21 will deliver the best possible agreement.

As summer ended, Macedonia declared a state of emergency and temporarily closed its borders with Greece and Serbia. The small Balkan nation joined much of Europe in a panicked, poorly considered and awkwardly implemented response to the asylum tragedy. Macedonia is a bit player in that crisis, which is assuming the dimensions of a new Voelkerwanderung – a mass movement of people the scale of which has not been seen on the continent since the Roman Empire crumbled. But as summer turns to fall, Macedonia must quickly and constructively address its own domestic crisis, or risk violent confrontations.

La Revue Politique et parlementaire a publié dans son dernier numéro une recension sur le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (3/2015).

« Dans une région secouée par des guerres sans fin, au milieu d’un chaos généralisé, le Maroc et l’Algérie semblent relativement épargnés. Pour combien de temps encore alors que l’environnement international risque de remettre en cause ce calme relatif : chute des prix du pétrole, baisse de la rente entraînant une dislocation du tissu social, mettant à nu le fonctionnement du système : structures politiques opaques, clientélisme corruption, faisant le lit d’une islamisation rampante et un chaos extérieur explosif (Sahel, Tunisie, Lybie). Le dossier de Politique étrangère donne un éclairage percutant de l’ensemble de ces questions. Sont également abordés deux thèmes majeurs de 2015 : le centenaire du génocide arménien, occasion de rapprochement entre Ankara et Erevan gaspillée, mais révélatrice, entre autres, des contradictions turques ; et la mutation des migrations internationales, en particulier celles qui concernent l’Europe et l’espace méditerranéen.

D’autres sujets de réflexion y sont développés : la négociation d’un éventuel TTIP, la vision chinoise des « nouvelles Routes de la soie », l’état de la Somalie, la piraterie dans le golfe de Guinée, les rapports entre les États musulmans et l’islam de France. En rendant compte des débats relevant des
relations internationales et en proposant des analyses approfondies de l’actualité internationale, La revue trimestrielle Politique étrangère constitue un instrument de référence pour les milieux académiques, les décideurs et la société civile. »

 The USS Lassen, a guided-missile destroyer. Photograph: John Hageman/U.S. navy via The New York Times

Tuesday’s voyage of the guided-missile naval destroyer USS Lassen through waters claimed by China in the South China Sea had the potential to escalate an already tense situation.  Despite being perfectly legal— international maritime law allows “innocent passage” of warships through territorial seas without notification—Beijing responded with the deployment of its own guided-missile destroyer, the Lanzhou, and its naval patrol ship Taizhou to issue warnings and shadow the U.S. destroyer.  Fortunately, cool heads prevailed, and the American destroyer sailed without incident within the 12-nautical-mile territorial limit China has declared surrounding one of its artificial islands.  

The artificial islands, located in the hotly disputed Spratly island chain, were previously submerged reefs during high tide, and turned into islands after significant dredging efforts by the Chinese.  Under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed by China, nations have no claim to 12-nautical mile limits around man-made islands built on previously submerged reefs.  The Spratly island territory is disputed among Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam—all of which, except Brunei, occupy some of the maritime features.  

Tuesday’s mission by the U.S. Navy was ostensibly a routine exercise in freedom of navigation.  White House spokesman Josh Earnest referred to “billions of dollars of commerce that float through that region of the world,” adding, “Ensuring that free flow of commerce … is critical to the global economy.”

Yet while the naval maneuver was an exercise in freedom of navigation, it was also understood in many quarters to be a direct challenge to Beijing’s claims of sovereignty, following last month’s declaration by Beijing that it would “never allow any country” to violate its territorial waters and airspace in the Spratlys.  The U.S. mission had been expected, following Washington’s discussion of its proposal with other claimants to the waters.  

Not only was Tuesday’s mission widely foreshadowed, but it followed similar actions by the U.S. to counter Beijing’s claims to the waters and air of the East and South China Seas.  Back in May, a U.S. P8-A Poseidon surveillance aircraft flew near the artificial islands (but outside the 12-mile limit) with a television crew aboard from CNN.  And in 2013, two U.S. B-52 bombers flew through an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea—newly-established by China to cement its claims over territory contested with Japan.  The last time the U.S. challenged a 12-mile limit claimed by China was in 2012, also in the Spratlys.

As in the past, the reaction by Beijing to the latest challenge to its claims of sovereignty  was swift and pronounced, but largely targeted to a domestic audience. Lu Kang, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said the U.S. destroyer had “illegally entered” the waters near the islands “without receiving permission from the Chinese government.”  The state news agency, Xinhua, issued a warning, “Decision-makers in Washington need to be reminded that China has little room for compromise when it comes to matters regarding its sovereignty, and it will take whatever means at whatever cost to safeguard its sovereign interests.” The Chinese Embassy in Washington had earlier warned the United States should “refrain from saying or doing anything provocative and act responsibly in maintaining regional peace and stability,” arguing, “Freedom of navigation and overflight should not be used as excuse to flex muscle and undermine other countries’ sovereignty and security.”  

These comments and others, along with the shadowing of the U.S. destroyer, have clearly illuminated Beijing’s stance concerning the artificial islands. Beijing considers these new islands as Chinese territory de facto and will oppose all efforts to challenge that authority.  So far that opposition has been one of rhetoric to please the home crowd, and given the inefficiencies of the Chinese navy, should remain so as long as the U.S. maintains its strategic pivot to Asia, where 60% of the U.S. Navy’s assets are expected to be deployed by 2020.

Besides, any military action by China would be premature, given that its own military experts reckon their navy has another 30 years to go before being able to match the efficiency of the U.S. Navy.  And although the Pentagon figures China has more than 300 warships, submarines, amphibious ships and patrol boats compared to 200 among Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, the combined forces of the U.S. and its regional allies could easily neutralize any and all of its military bases in the South China Sea should push come to shove.

This past week’s freedom of navigation exercise went a long way in reassuring Washington’s allies in the region, and did not escalate due to Beijing being fully cognizant of the risks of a military response.  The sail-by exercise by the U.S. should be thought of as tantamount to a neighborhood foot patrol by police—not as a SWAT team crackdown like some Chinese netizens would seem to think.  Should the exercises continue, as expected in the coming weeks, Washington will again need careful planning and timing, coalition-building and advanced warnings (while maintaining a low-key approach), for its actions not to raise any geopolitical alarms.

Perhaps over time, these freedom of navigation exercises will become as newsworthy as the barely mentioned news of five Chinese naval vessels penetrating the 12-mile limit of the U.S.-owned Aleutian Islands off Alaska last month, during a visit by President Barack Obama.

To mark the 20th anniversary of International Crisis Group, we are publishing a series of 20 essays by foreign policy leaders forecasting the “Future of Conflict”.

(Own report) - Disputes over US military provocations are accompanying the German chancellor's current visit to China. After a US Navy destroyer transited through the maritime waters claimed by Beijing near the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, the Chinese government summoned the US ambassador. German government sources have confirmed that this conflict will play a role in the talks, Angela Merkel will hold today in Beijing, and expect discord. Berlin is already in a difficult position. The transformation of China's economy from an investment-driven to a consumer- and service-driven growth model will be of disadvantage to the German industry. "German capital goods and automobiles" will most likely "no longer enjoy the same levels of demand growth in China as previously," according to Sebastian Heilmann, Director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin. Because of the structural transformation of China's economy, the "country’s demand for access to finance and currency markets, as well as general demand for service-related know-how" has increased massively. In this respect, Great Britain "is much better positioned than Germany." A "strategic shift is taking place in European-Chinese relations" - away from Berlin and towards London.

via Wall Street Daily

In the last fifteen years, the United States has spent a total of between $4–6 trillion on its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, all the while running up its national debt, and damaging its international prestige. The root cause of these foreign entanglements, and America’s costly position as Middle Eastern hegemon, stems directly from the perceived need, since the 20th century, for any great power to control oil-rich areas of the planet. Meanwhile China may be on its way to being a hybrid leader that can avoid this type of overseas adventurism as it tries to rapidly abandon fossil fuels and modernize its unstable neighbors’ economies.

Internally, despite the serious drawbacks of corruption, massive pollution and uneven social benefits, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strategy of buying off political discontent at home with economic development has broadly worked since the first pro-market reforms were initiated back in 1978. By any reasonable measure of human timeframes it has succeeded. GDP per capita in China stood at approximately $12,000 per person in 2015, when adjusted by purchasing power parity. While this conceals big disparities between provinces—and China’s growth has slowed significantly recently, to ‘only’ 7.4% in 2014—the CCP is still China’s undisputed ruling party. While rates of growth may be the lowest since 1990, personal incomes in China’s nine coastal provinces and cities have now roughly caught up with developed countries.

But to achieve all this economic growth, and to satisfy the consumer demand that has come with it, the CCP has overseen a huge increase China’s energy consumption. Coal consumption from domestic and foreign sources like Mongolia used to generate electricity skyrocketed from 1,500 million tons in 2000 to 4,500 million in 2014. Meanwhile oil imports for its booming transportation sector turned China into a net importer of fossil fuels by the early 1990s. In 2009, the country became the world’s second largest importer of petroleum products. It became the largest global energy consumer in 2011, and then passed the United States as the largest net importer of petroleum at the end of 2013.

The major danger for China is that as its thirst for energy grows it risks getting dragged into the same poisonous political conflicts that have dogged America since it allowed itself to be drawn into the Middle East under the Carter doctrine, and later Central Asia. Already over half of China’s total oil imports came from the Middle East and the country is finding its firms responding to the same market incentives as previous customers did before them. The Chinese market’s central importance to competing Middle Eastern producers will also incentivize them to maintain or expand their current export levels to the People’s Republic. China’s oil consumption growth accounted for about 43% of the world’s oil consumption growth in 2014 and was projected to account for more than one-fourth of the global oil consumption growth in 2015.

Even as the various threats to that supply attract the worried gaze of Chinese diplomats and security chiefs, finding the energy supplies to meet consumer and industrial demand has forced the wary CCP to raise its profile overseas as Chinese oil companies have ventured into countries where the Chinese state has been compelled to follow. Admirers have noted its grand strategy as well as plans to invest in developing troubled states like Pakistan. The latest example of this has been China’s contribution of peacekeeping troops to South Sudan, a template for a foreign policy in service to a business-driven diplomatic strategy. China has also been active in seeking to calm tensions in Central Asia, where pipelines crossing the region linking China to local suppliers, as well as Russia’s Siberian gas fields, are being mooted.

However the Chinese are also arriving as a superpower when efforts to wean consumers and industry off fossil fuels are bearing some potentially interesting fruit. When America was becoming a superpower, oil was the strategic resource par excellence. China’s rise coincides with a much wider array of energy resources and power generating options, if her leaders choose to take advantage of them. Wary of entanglements abroad, and watching with increasing concern the price tag that fossil fuel economic development has brought with it at home, there is reason to believe that Beijing is hedging its bets with its future energy polices.

China has already elaborated on targets it struck with the U.S. in November 2014 to cut its greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP by 60-65% from 2005 levels under a plan submitted to the United Nations ahead of the Paris climate change. China also said it would increase the share of non-fossil fuels as part of its primary energy consumption to about 20% by 2030. According to estimates by E3G, an environmental NGO, if successful this plan will see China install as much low-carbon energy as the whole of America’s electricity system capacity to date. A key test of its ability to meet these ambitious targets will be how effective its introduction of a national cap-and-trade system by 2017 is. Trials since 2013 have produced mixed results and even China’s authoritarian one party-state may struggle with the scale and complexity of the challenge.

While critics may be justified in voicing some skepticism towards a country with a track record for producing woefully inaccurate data, Beijing’s announcement stands in stark contrast to the political gridlock in the U.S. at the federal level over producing a national program for pricing carbon. There, fracking has driven a revival of the domestic U.S. oil industry and subsequently a lowering of the international market price as America’s Middle Eastern allies cut prices in response. Yet the U.S. remains militarily embedded in an unstable region, whose oil supplies it may no longer need to rely upon so heavily, and whose fossil fuel resources may be gradually on their way out in the coming decades. As rapidly developing renewable technologies provide the power to new devices designed to run off electric battery power, China seems to be the country with one eye on the future.

Economic modernization can go hand in hand with security—if Beijing moves away from a carbon-heavy model of energy generation and moves as far as possible towards meeting its energy needs from solar, wind and nuclear sources. Solar energy in particular is becoming a real affordable alternative for many (still) developing countries like China. Switching away from coal burning power plants to greener ways to generate power has long been a Chinese aim, as well as a stumbling block (with the Chinese version of the oil lobby leading the opposition). If it invests in green electricity now it can also be a key early beneficiary of a global move towards electric powered vehicles, which are already beginning to appear on the market. A decade or more long term project to map out and build a network of charging stations for electric cars and trucks would do a lot more good to boost China’s flagging economy then building more empty apartment blocks. It would also give China a valuable industry to export around the world.

By some measures China has already achieved the world’s largest economy and overtaken the U.S. as the world’s economic engine. Politically, it is far better placed to concentrate its resources and attention in the countries along its periphery whilst America spreads itself thinly, trying to pivot to Asia, contain Russia, and support its allies in Europe and the Middle East all at the same time. But the process of moving to a Sino-centric world order will take many decades and is not based on economic progress alone. A rising China still faces many internal and external challenges it must overcome before it can supplant the U.S. as the pre-eminent global power. Modern China’s leaders would continue to profit today if they managed to refrain from the type of aggressive foreign interventions that powers like France and Russia have lately joined the U.S. in making and spent more time thinking about how to charge and power their planes, ships, trains, cars and trucks with clean energy.

An earlier version of this article appeared here at Juan Cole’s Informed Comment website.

At the epicenter of the new escalation of Israeli-Palestinian violence is a deep dispute over Jerusalem's Holy Esplanade -- known to Jews as the Temple Mount, and to Muslims as the Haram al-Sharif, site of the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

via flickr kakhunwart

French television viewers were treated to high drama last Thursday night, as National Front leader Marine Le Pen bailed on France 2’s Des paroles et des actes (“Words and Deeds”) only a few hours before airing. The political debate show, which has already hosted her six times over the past four years, became a lightning rod for criticism from France’s mainstream parties before the broadcast. Resurgent Republicans leader Nicolas Sarkozy and Socialist Party head Jean-Christophe Cambadélis joined forces to protest the “excessive” airtime being allotted to Le Pen on French television. An impressive show of solidarity, given that not even the Charlie Hebdo attacks had been enough for Sarkozy to take Cambadélis’ calls in January.

While the France 2 fiasco capped a week of headlines for Marine Le Pen, whose trial for racist remarks in 2010 had been front-page news just two days prior, her National Front continues to gain ground in December’s regional elections (and in the 2017 presidential elections, where a third of French voters plan to vote for her). Marine, who herself leads the National Front’s candidates in the région of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, rejected the primetime invitation after her regional rivals (representing Sarkozy’s Republicans and François Hollande’s Socialist Party) were tacked onto the program. The concession to strict rules on equal airtime prompted Le Pen to rebuff France 2 and presenter David Pujadas with her trademark acerbic flair, asking on Twitter: “Do they take me for their dog?”

Given her “slightly Stalinesque” role within the National Front and the dearth of other high-profile leaders, Marine Le Pen’s steady stream of controversies (and the resulting media coverage she uses to great effect) masks surprising strides made by her lieutenants across France. One standout example, watched closely by the French political elite but little noted by outside observers, is the race currently being run by Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, Marine’s niece and the youngest member of the National Assembly since the French Revolution. As head of the National Front candidates in Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (known as PACA and including Marseille and Nice), the youngest Le Pen is projected to come first in the first round of voting in December, a disconcerting setback for Republicans candidate and Nice mayor Christian Estrosi.

The PACA race is making waves that reach as far as Paris. Estrosi, hard-pressed to generate momentum in the campaign, is a titan in the region and a fixture on the national political scene. A textbook example of “accumulating mandates,” he is not only the long-serving mayor of Nice but also a sitting member of the National Assembly and a Sarkozy-era minister. Ironically, the long resume has proven a stumbling block in the 60-year-old’s efforts to keep up with his young challenger. Even after he qualified the National Front as an “operation to ‘recycle’ local neo-Nazis,” Maréchal-Le Pen’s campaign has preserved its first-round lead. Throwing his multiple mandates back at him, she forced him to admit he would remain leader of Nice in a televised debate last week: “You are going to remain a Niçois, which the people of Marseille will certainly appreciate.”

In many ways, the race has become a microcosm for political battles to be waged in 2017 and beyond. When François Hollande’s term ends, France’s mainstream parties will face intense scrutiny from voters angry with economic stagnation. They will do so with leaders tainted by scandals and unpopularity. Hollande’s historically low approval ratings have gotten no better, standing at only 19% in September. Nicolas Sarkozy, meanwhile, has managed to regain the leadership of France’s center-right while battling allegations of corruption and illegal fundraising. Just last year, the former head of state found himself answering questions in police custody. In PACA, Estrosi has portrayed himself as the candidate “best positioned to keep the National Front out of power,” but he will need the help of the Socialists to do so. With Marine Le Pen projected to outdo both Hollande and Sarkozy in the first round of presidential voting, the two parties may well have to repeat their joint effort against her father in 2002. A turn of events that may, ironically, reinforce Le Pen’s message that the Socialist Party and the Republicans are two sides of the same coin.

A strong performance in December would prove an important milestone in the Front’s quest for “de-demonization“, but neither French voters nor the rest of Europe should take electoral success as a sign of moderation. Marine Le Pen is a savvier speaker than her firebrand father, but the National Front still embodies a xenophobic, racist, and anti-Semitic movement that seeks to lead France out of Europe and back down the road of narrow-minded populism. Behind Marine’s theatrics at the European Parliament (referring to President Hollande as “vice-chancellor of the province France“), the National Front still earns its keep by playing on fears of Islam, immigrants, joblessness, and multiculturalism. Like Donald Trump and Ben Carson in the U.S. and Viktor Orban in Hungary, the siege mentality France’s far right actively perpetuates offers no substantial solutions to the country’s real economic struggles. Unfortunately, as Messieurs Estrosi, Sarkozy, and Hollande well know, France’s political elite has failed to come up with any breakthroughs either. Keeping Marine Le Pen off television can only work for so long.