Cette recension d’ouvrages est issue de Politique étrangère (3/2015). Yves Gounin propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Soraya Sidani, Intégration et déviance au sein du système international (Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2014, 200 pages).
L’espace mondial n’est pas – ou pas seulement – une arène où s’affrontent des puissances. Cette grille de lecture réaliste ne suffit plus dans le monde de l’après-guerre froide. D’autres approches qui analysent les relations internationales avec les outils de la sociologie sont nécessaires.
Soraya Sidani interroge la marginalisation des États à partir de l’analyse des ratifications des quelque 317 conventions multilatérales enregistrées au siège des Nations unies entre 1945 et 2014. Elle en tire un classement des États par niveau de ratification, depuis les Pays-Bas qui arrivent en tête avec 214 conventions ratifiées jusqu’au Soudan du Sud, 193e avec 8 conventions ratifiées seulement.
L’utilisation de ce corpus pour analyser la « déviance » soulève une difficulté terminologique. Dévier – deviare : sortir du chemin – implique une action volontaire. Un État n’est pas déviant malgré lui. Or, l’absence de ratification d’une convention internationale peut trouver son origine soit dans le refus unilatéral d’un État d’y adhérer, soit dans son incapacité à le faire. Si dans le premier cas il s’agit bien d’une déviance au sens étymologique du terme, l’expression n’est pas appropriée dans le second, qui constitue plutôt une marginalisation involontaire ou un défaut d’intégration.
Cette réserve posée, on saluera la clarté de la typologie dressée par l’auteur. Elle distingue deux types de déviances : une déviance subie – qui, pour les motifs exposés plus haut, devrait plutôt être qualifiée de marginalité –, et une déviance souhaitée.
La déviance subie s’explique par plusieurs facteurs. Le premier est le défaut d’intégration régionale : un État ratifie d’autant plus de conventions multilatérales qu’il participe à une union régionale intégrée (17 des 20 États en tête du classement sont membres de l’Union européenne). Le deuxième est le retard de développement socio-économique : la négociation, la ratification et la mise en œuvre d’une convention internationale supposent la mobilisation d’un minimum de moyens que de nombreux États, notamment africains ou insulaires en queue de classement, ne possèdent pas. Le troisième est le caractère autoritaire de l’État : moins un État est démocratique, moins il ratifie de conventions internationales.
La déviance souhaitée résulte, elle, d’un choix rationnel. On pourrait croire que ce fût le cas des États contestataires de l’ordre international, successivement qualifiés par la superpuissance américaine de rogue states (1994), states of concern (2000) ou outlier states (2010). Or, ces États ne sont pas les plus mal classés : la Corée du Nord est certes 182e, mais l’Iran 105e, le Venezuela 94e et Cuba 39e. S’ils contestent l’ordre international, ils le font de l’intérieur, utilisant par exemple les organes onusiens comme tribune pour leurs revendications. Les États contestataires ne sont donc pas nécessairement des États déviants.
La déviance n’est pas là où on l’imagine : ce sont paradoxalement les États les plus puissants qui font le choix rationnel de rester en marge du jeu conventionnel. C’est le cas des États-Unis (63e) ou de la Chine (75e). Cette distanciation volontaire par rapport à la norme, privilège du fort, procède d’un réflexe souverainiste et d’une démarche utilitariste : dans le jeu international, le fort ne veut pas se lier les mains par des engagements internationaux.
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Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Vietnam this week, the first by a Chinese president in ten years, drew mixed reaction among the Vietnamese. Beijing has come under criticism in recent months by Hanoi for its dredging of sand to create approximately 3,000 acres (1,200 hectares) of land on submerged reefs in the South China Sea over the last 18 months. China’s island building and other efforts to assert its control over the disputed South China Sea—in the face of competing claims from Vietnam, as well as Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan—have resulted in Beijing coming under fire for perceived violations of international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and a declaration of conduct reached in 2002 by members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Vietnam and other Southeast Asian nations not only challenge China’s claims of sovereignty, they fear the militarization of these islands, as Chinese companies busy themselves constructing airstrips, radar systems and other potential military facilities on the reclaimed islands. The Chinese now control two airstrips on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef and are reportedly constructing a third airstrip on Mischief Reef, all of which belong to the Spratly island chain of the South China Sea.
While the international press focus on the paranoia of the U.S. and many Southeast Asian countries over China’s island-building and aggressive actions in the disputed South China Sea, here in Vietnam the paranoia runs deeper. Prior to Xi’s visit, Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang stated, “as Mr. Xi Jinping claims that the islands have belonged to China since ancient times, we would like to counter-argue that statement. The Spratlys and Paracels have always belonged to Vietnam, and we have all historical and legal evidence to support our sovereignty.
Hanoi reacted angrily last month to news of a Chinese ceremony held to mark the completion of lighthouses constructed on Cuateron Reef and Johnson South Reef in the Spratly islands. Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman Le Hai Binh said the construction of lighthouses “seriously violates Vietnam’s sovereignty … complicates the situation and escalates tensions.” Beijing claims the lighthouses were constructed to assist all seafaring nations with navigation while Hanoi believes the construction of lighthouses is merely an attempt to assert sovereignty.
Hanoi has also disputed Beijing’s adoption of a national marine zoning plan, as reported by Chinese media on August 21. The 380,000 square kilometers zone includes the disputed maritime territories of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, and sets aside maritime zones for exploitation and development, while leaving aside some wholly-protected areas. The prioritized zone for exploitation and development includes waters adjacent to the China’s Hainan Province and the Gulf of Tonkin near Vietnam.
Similarly, the paranoia over China’s claims of sovereignty have extended to the Vietnamese mainland. According to recent issues of two English-language newspapers, Thanh Nien and Tuoi Tre, Chinese buyers are suspected of using locals to purchase prime waterfront properties in the central Vietnamese city of Da Nang. According to the municipal authorities in Da Nang, 13 coastal land plots appear to have been sold to local Vietnamese-run businesses—with mostly Chinese suspected of providing the cash. A new Vietnamese housing law came into effect July 1, prohibiting the purchase of land by foreigners, and allowing only the lease of apartments or houses for a 50-year period.
While some of the land apparently has been used to build seaside hotels and restaurants catering to Chinese tourists, others fear an alternative agenda. At a recent meeting among the city’s leaders, department director Nguyen Dieu warned that the purchase of land by foreigners, mostly Chinese, “poses huge risks” while the secretary of the city’s Party Committee, Tran Tho, called the land purchases “very dangerous.” Le Cao, a local attorney, warned “we have to remain cautious as foreign ownership of coastal land plots can affect the national defense and security.” Authorities in Da Nang are now looking into the purchases in an effort to trace the origin of the cash.
The central coastal city of Da Nang is particularly sensitive to Chinese investment—last December two construction projects were suspended, and yet another has been refused to be licensed as their locations were deemed sensitive areas in terms of national defense. One of the suspended projects in Da Nang was for the cultivation of vegetables, another project was to offer tours of coral reefs in glass-bottomed submarines, while a third project involved the construction of a wharf complex for cruise boats and paragliding. In each case, Vietnam’s Command of Military Zone 5 rejected the investments, citing potential threats to national defense and security.
Vietnamese authorities certainly have the right to uphold their own sovereignty on the undisputed mainland, although these hidden purchases probably have more to do with economic and monetary considerations rather than covert military planning. Rather, the rejection of Chinese investment can be better understood as a reflection upon the deeply-ingrained paranoia the Vietnamese feel when it comes to the Chinese. Vietnamese paranoia has grown and morphed in the wake of centuries of living under the suzerainty of Chinese dynasties, the 1974 clash over the Paracel Islands, the brief and bloody invasion of 1979 (Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said he wanted to teach the Vietnamese “a lesson”), and finally, reflected in the angry protests of May 2014—triggered by the deployment of a Chinese oil rig into Vietnam’s economic exclusive zone.
While Chinese President Xi was welcomed to Hanoi on Thursday with a rare 21-gun salute and warm handshakes, outside the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi about 30 people protested briefly and a larger anti-China protest took place on the streets of Ho Chi Minh City. Despite the warm rhetoric between politicians, and the pledges of cooperation between Communist brothers, fear, paranoia and anger still linger.
This week, A Russian Metrojet airliner Airbus A321 crashed after departing from Sharm El Sheikh on route to St. Petersburg. The Egyptian resort is a well-travelled destination in the Sinai Peninsula, but also has had occasional issues with terror attacks. The Sinai has been the source of much conflict between the Egyptian army and various radical groups. Victims of the crash were mostly Russian citizens, with victims also coming from Ukraine as well as Belarus.
The cause of the crash is not yet known, but witnesses claim that the airliner looked to have fire coming from one of the engines and saw the plane break up midair. It is unclear how reliable this information is, but on November 2nd officials made suggestions that it did not occur from technical or pilot error. Claims from some ISIS-affiliated groups that they brought down the airliner were refuted by the Russian and Egyptian governments, and the case has not been resolved with the cause of the accident remaining unknown. It was suggested that the airliner had been struck by an external object, but the information is not yet conclusive on what that object may have been.
Without a technical issue nor pilot error being the cause of the crash, attention has turned toward a possible external object hitting the plane. The object may have fallen off the plane itself or be a possible missile strike on the plane. Sabotage or an internal attack within the fuselage of the A321 may also have been possible, but to date no theory has proven to be conclusive.
If the fire on the engine did occur, it is unlikely that an internal combustion caused a fire outside of the fuselage of the airplane. Sabotage may be a possibility, but with ground crew claiming that the plane was ready to fly with no issues, further investigation would be needed to qualify that type of action. A bird may also have caused some damage, but it is unlikely it would cause an engine fire and the plane to break up, as engines are designed to process birds and other obstructions.
With Russia’s new role in Syria and terror activities taking place in Sinai, theories on how and why an airliner could have been brought down by a possible attack has become the front page story for many media outlets. There are claims by some experts that while anti-aircraft missiles may have played a role in a possible external strike, the type of missiles needed to hit the airliner over 20,000ft were not present in the Sinai or possessed by radical groups in the area. Systems like the Buk or Tor, or even older systems like the Kub were not present in the area nor their large missiles spotted on radar in the area.
Suggestions that the groups in the area may possess the shoulder launched SA-7 series of missiles or a Chinese variant of the missile may validate the claim of an attack, but the upgraded SA-18 MANPAD that are possibly in the area can only reach targets under 17,000ft, and the airliner was at around 26,000ft to 31,000ft at the time of the accident. The aircraft being hit by missiles, shells or bullets at lower altitude after take-off may be possible, but unlikely.
The dissolution of the security structure in Libya and Syria may have lead to many shoulder launched anti-aircraft missiles like the SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, SA-18 and American Stinger coming into the hands of groups that may use such weapons against civilian targets. The effect of an anti-aircraft missile on the Malaysian airliners flight over Ukraine was horrific, but such advanced larger systems and missiles like the Buk-M1 are not easily hidden or transported. Small, portable missiles like the SA-18 are a danger to mostly lower flying aircraft, but could be used to bring down airliners in Egypt and other regions of the world. A concerted effort to collect and control such weapons should become a paramount issue for the international community.