Diplomacy & Crisis News

Pope Francis and Donald Trump share a key personality rate that's fueled their rise.

This map shows how many refugees each participating country would take under a recent EU proposal.

The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) today stressed the need to ensure women refugees and migrants moving across Europe have access to life-saving sexual and reproductive healthcare, as it appealed for $4.2 million for humanitarian assistance.

The United Nations envoy for Libya has announced the finalization of a proposed peace plan to end the political crisis in the North African nation, adding that it is now up to the parties to act on the text.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and its Goodwill Ambassador and international pop star Shakira urged global leaders today to invest heavily in early childhood development in the wake of new science that is creating a revolutionary shift in understanding the lasting effects of deprivation and stress on the developing brains of young children.

Two independent United Nations human rights experts today called on the Philippines Government to investigate the deaths of three human rights defenders in Surigao del Sur in Mindanao.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has urged both the Israeli and Palestinian sides to defuse tensions and prevent an escalation of the current situation on the ground, during a recent phone call with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

European Union leaders are meeting in Brussels today and tomorrow to discuss the ongoing refugee and migration crisis, in what the United Nations cautioned may be the last chance to create a coherent response to end the suffering and exploitation of refuges and migrants.

Returning from consultations with Syrian interlocutors in Damascus and Istanbul, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria announced today that he met with facilitators appointed by the Secretary-General to head working groups designed to find a political solution to the five-year conflict.

Vietnamese fishermen return after surviving a gun attack by a foreign boat on September 11, 2015. Photo: Dinh Tuyen

Local fishermen in the South China Sea have long gone unprotected when fishing in their own waters or in waters claimed by other countries. But this may soon change, following attacks this year on Vietnamese fishing boats.  On September 11, a group of fishing vessels off the southern Vietnamese province of Kien Giang, were fired upon by a Thai Coast Guard vessel, leaving one fisherman dead and two others injured.  Vietnamese authorities claim the shooting incident occurred in Vietnamese waters that border those of Malaysia while Thai authorities claim the incident took place 45 kilometers off their shore.

Local Vietnamese media reported the Thai ship consisted of six crew members who proceeded to detain the captain of one of the Vietnamese boats. The Thai vessel then chased a pair of fishing boats, warning them in Vietnamese, “the Vietnamese ships are required to stop or you will be shot dead”. 

Shortly thereafter, the Thai vessel fired upon one of the boats for 15 minutes, injuring the captain.  Afterward, it chased another fishing vessel, reportedly shooting at it for 10 minutes.  Another pair of Vietnamese fishing boats were also fired upon for 15 minutes.  One of the captains of a local boat, Ngo Van Sinh, died in his cabin, while another was released before the Thai patrol boat fled the waters.  The same Thai boat has been accused by local fishermen of firing on four Vietnamese boats over the past two months, with one fisherman dying last month after being shot while fishing off of Kien Giang province.

Vietnamese fishermen have also been attacked in recent months by Chinese naval vessels near the Truong Sa (Spratly) and Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands, which are claimed by both Vietnam and China.  On June 19, a Vietnamese fishing boat operating off the Hoang Sa archipelago was boarded by a Chinese crew, which destroyed its fishing gear and confiscated an ICOM walkie-talkie, a positioning system, and about five metric tons of catch worth US$13,780.  

Previously, on June 10, four ships surrounded a Vietnamese fishing boat and then forcefully boarded it, forcing the 11 Vietnamese fishermen to transfer all of their catch – about six metric tons – to the other vessels.  Also, two fish detectors, a positioning system, an ICOM walkie-talkie, five tanks of oil, and diving clothes were taken from the fishing boat.

As a result of these attacks, the Vietnamese government now plans to allow its coast guard to employ weapons to help chase away foreign vessels which have illegally entered Vietnam’s waters.  The rule is expected to start being implemented on October 20, but comes with a warning for Vietnamese fishermen to obey the laws of the sea:

“Given such attacks, we once again advise that local fishermen absolutely comply with the sea-related laws and regulations of Vietnam and its neighbors to avoid regrettable losses of their lives and property as well as not to cause damage to the diplomatic ties between Vietnam and other countries,” said Colonel Tran Quoc Lap, vice commander of the provincial Headquarters of Border Guard.

Hanoi’s authorization for use of force and a plan to augment its coast guard patrol capabilities means Vietnam (and its neighbors) are taking these threats seriously.  Japan has agreed to supply Vietnam with 200 million yen (US$1.6 million) in non-refundable aid to buy used Japanese patrol ships and to conduct joint search and rescue exercises at sea.  The U.S. has already provided Vietnam with five patrol vessels and has pledged to contribute more in the future.  And the Philippines expects to boost defense ties by signing a strategic partnership agreement with Vietnam by the end of this year.

Given the propensity of local fishermen to follow the catch and pay little attention to maritime boundaries, another confrontation is likely.  The recent spate of attacks on Vietnamese fishermen in the disputed waters of the South China Sea is unlikely to cease, and a more serious and deadly clash may well take place.  Unfortunately, given the various overlapping claims on waters and pledges of allegiances in the region, China may step up its aggression in order to save face and enforce its claims, while the U.S. may well be dragged into the conflict to defend its allies in the South China Sea.

A en croire l'auteur, le dernier ouvrage de Michel Onfray serait à la fois son premier livre et son grand œuvre. « Cosmos » renoue avec un discours qui exalte l'irrationnel et la tradition. / Crise des valeurs, Idées, Intellectuels, Personnalités, Religion, Science, Société - (...) / Crise des valeurs, Idées, Intellectuels, Personnalités, Religion, Science, Société - 2015/07

Almost every aspect of the security in Somalia is outsourced to deeply entrenched competing foreign interests of various shades. None of them are accountable to the Somali government. Not even the legally mandated African Union Mission to Somalia peacekeeping force—AMISOM.

Contrary to the noble services that it provided in its early years, AMISOM has become a serious liability to the stabilization and also the main obstacle to Somalia’s sovereignty. Like IGAD—the East Africa regional authority on development—AMISOM has morphed into a politico-security monster that does not honor its mandate. Currently, AMISOM is Ethiopia, and Ethiopia is AMISOM.

AMISOM played an aggressive role in legally ushering in the Ethiopian Trojan Horse. Along with Kenya, Ethiopia espouses a thinly disguised zero-sum objective. For the last decade, the Ethiopian military has been aggressively pursuing said objective. Today, Ethiopia is the de facto leader of the military campaign to fight al-Shabaab. And this is a serious problem.

Firsthand Experience

On November 2013, right before the Ethiopian troops were accepted into AMISOM, I received a formal invitation from AMISOM’s political office to attend an event intended to solicit the Somali diaspora’s support for the group. The event was to be held in a luxury venue in a third country, and it was to be attended by high level officials.

I thought to myself perhaps this would be a great opportunity to highlight why the inclusion of Ethiopian army into AMISOM would be disastrous and, in the process, persuade the African Union leadership to turn down Ethiopia’s offer.

So, I asked a simple question to the official: “If I joined you and in my presentation made a case against inclusion of Ethiopian forces into AMISOM would that be taken into consideration; also would it appear in your public literature?” Next day, I got his response: “Have you received details of the retreat?” I thought he forgot to answer my question, so I repeated it. Next day, I got his response: “Please send me a copy of your passport so we can process your travel arrangement”. I repeated my question for the third time. Next day I received his response: “I can’t beg you. If you are not interested, I am sure others will jump on this invitation”. So I responded: “I am sure you would match well.”

The message was clear: Welcoming Ethiopia into AMISOM was a fait accompli and the event itself was nothing more than a PR stunt to preempt any negative public sentiments.

Abyssinian Empire and Its Stooges

The “global war on terrorism” could not have been declared at a better time for Ethiopia. The late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi saw an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone. He could become a terror-preneur and position himself as the Horn of Africa’s Parvez Musharraf (former President of Pakistan) and generate for his nation its sorely needed resources and political backing to swallow Somalia, one piece at a time.

Meles was a Machiavellian visionary and a brilliant strategist. Though it was no secret that he came to power by the barrel of a gun and that he would only invoked the principles of ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’ to hypnotize the progressive elements within his Western partners, he was lionized by neoconservatives.

In 2002, Ethiopia released its Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy which lays out its foreign policy toward Somalia. “Somalia has become a haven and conduit for terrorists and extremists. Anti-peace elements are using the country as a base and place of transit in order to threaten Ethiopia’s peace.” Needless to say, at that time, Somalia was ruled by ruthless warlords who were never accused of ever having any religious affiliation.

In the same document, one of the main motives that compel land-locked Ethiopia to keep Somalia divided and to use all of its means to install a cardboard president in each region is stated: “starting from the port of Zeila […] to Kismayo, there are no less than seven ports in Somalia that can be used by different parts of our country.”

Contrary to the phrase often used by the beneficiaries of Ethiopia’s micromanagement of Somali political affairs, “Itoobiya waa dowlad eynu walaalo nahay” or Ethiopia is a brotherly state; states, due to their shifting interests and alliances, are never “brothers”. This naïve perception of international relations secures Ethiopia the privilege to maintain its embassy virtually within the presidential compound.

Keeping Political Stooges Dependent

Almost a decade since AMISOM assumed the peacekeeping mission, Somali soldiers still remain poorly-equipped and unpaid, thanks to a corrupt leadership busy squandering money in luxury hotels abroad. Within that context, it is hardly surprising that the Somali leadership depends on AMISOM for security.

In Somalia, fear is a traded commodity. And these phenomena play major roles in perpetuation of fear: ghost assassinations of patriotic civil servants with institutional memories, government officials, and activists; and periodical suicide bombings that never get investigated. AMISOM bomb experts are notoriously absent from the scene—with photo opportunities being the only exception.

Furthermore, AMISOM routinely manufactures insecurity by abruptly evacuating towns and territories gained from al-Shabaab. This is a tactic that Ethiopia was known to use in order to manufacture insecurity for political expedience. The latest were the evacuation of Burhakabe, El Salindi, and Kunturwarey. Al-Shabaab reoccupied all three areas. In Burhakabe, among other atrocities, they beheaded two brothers for “spying.” Meanwhile, al-Shabaab, which was estimated around 3,000 gunmen when the Ethiopian tanks rolled into the heart of Mogadishu almost a decade ago, is now an international corporation of terror that wreaks havoc in Somalia and Kenya, but not Ethiopia—supposedly its worst enemy.

Conclusion

Somalia has been kept in a state of political uncertainty and security catastrophe in which no level of the state security apparatus is independent or wholly operated and governed by Somalis.

Ethiopia seems to have taken a page out of the playbook of the global war on terrorism. In order to get leaders to dutifully march to the beating drums of jingoism, they must be psychologically terrorized beyond common sense. Neoconservatives were very effective in tightly managing this perception of reality.

Former President George W. Bush’s shining moment came when he was most vulnerable, despite the fact that he was being flown across the country to keep him safe in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. “In the thick fog of war, Bush heard (manufactured apocalyptic) reports that Camp David and the State Department had been attacked, that there was a fire in the White House, and that his ranch in Texas may have been targeted.”

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s ‘shock doctrine’ moment or his total submission to Ethiopia and its zero-sum strategy came when al-Shabaab bypassed AMISOM barricades and attacked the presidential palace.

In conclusion, no peacekeeping operation can succeed without the support of the local population; and, under the Ethiopian de facto command, AMISOM’s credibility is beyond repair. As I stated in the conclusion of my article titled Somalia’s Sullied Security, I would like to reiterate my call for the Somali government to request UN Blue Berets to replace AMISOM. A similar call was recently made by the British think tank Chatham House.

Meanwhile, the fateful scenario of the stubborn python trying to swallow the wounded tiger continues to play itself out.

Photograph by AFP

Minority groups in the Middle East who have been at the front lines against the war on terror have benefited from airstrikes in Iraq and Syria against strategic targets. While air strikes are effective to a certain degree, in a strategic sense they are tantamount to precision artillery. Artillery is there to support troops on the ground as opposed to dominating a battlefield by their sole application in a battle. Without material help using ground forces, groups like the Kurds, Yazidis and Arab Christians fight hard to achieve a stalemate in many cases. Help in the form of heavy weapons or added troops have been supplied in scarce amounts from Western countries, even though a defeat for those communities means almost certain slavery or death.

For many groups in Syria and Iraq, assistance in their fight to survive has come too late on almost every occasion. The hopelessness of many currently migrating to Europe comes from the realization that help on the ground is inefficient in keeping some of the oldest cultures alive, and there has been little to no attention given in Western media to the reality that with ancient structures, ancient cultures made up of real people are also becoming extinct.

When assistance has been given, it is often turned into an internal political issue in Western countries. This was addressed by a Kurdish community leader in Toronto who praised the Canadian government for its help with Kurds in Kobani. He highlighted the issue of why more help is not given to Kurds in Syria and Iraq. In his statement, he took aim at opposition leaders in Canada who want to remove all military help for the Kurds, yet wish to gain a job in government by falsely claiming that Canada has done nothing to help. The false narratives and lack of attention on the ground results in Kurdish fighters having little to no heavy weapons, which may result in their ultimate defeat.

The gaps in addressing issues in a reasonable time frame coming from the West since 2009 has done little to help minority communities in the region fight for their political freedoms and existence. With small militias from the region getting limited support on the ground, and the Iraqi army and their Iranian advisers also fighting to a stalemate, the only force in the region that can work as an effective heavy combat force continues to be the Syrian army of Bashar al-Assad. When a chemical attack pulled together Western powers to launch an assault on the Assad government, Russian diplomats negotiated the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria to keep the West at bay. Recently, Russia announced they would give ground support to the Syrian army, betting on the fact that the Syrian army will be the most capable fighting force to gain back ground in Syria.

Despite condemnation from the White House, Russia has decided to fill the gap that the West has left in combating threats in Syria. With limited support having a minimal effect in Syria and Iraq, Russian help and even Russian personnel may be the only option left for the West if they do not want to move beyond air strikes and equip minority groups fighting for their survival in Syria and Iraq. The obvious gap in assistance coming from the Obama administration has brought Russia closer to the Middle East. Western leaders would be hard-pressed to criticize Russia when their efforts have been so lackluster on almost every occasion.

With a defeat of the more dangerous groups by a Syria-Russia alliance, the West can decide whether or not to deal with Assad afterwards with whatever leverage is left. Until Sunni Arabs have a secure place in their traditional lands in Iraq and Syria, it is likely that the region will remain in a state of permanent revolution.

The release on 16 September of the long-awaited report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on its Sri Lanka investigation (OISL) is a dramatic advance that can help the country respond to its painful legacy of war. The report is a compelling examination of the abuses committed by all sides during the lengthy civil conflict and the steps required to pursue justice, accountability and reconciliation as part of democratic recovery. The UN Human Rights Council (HRC), which mandated the report, should demonstrate the same leadership by endorsing and supporting its conclusions and recommendations at the present session.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyaju of Israel complained of Iran’s uranium-enrichment program before the UN General Assembly in 2012. (Photo: UN Photo)

There has been considerable opposition to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the so-called Iran Deal. One of the most curious assertions being made, however, is that we cannot negotiate with the Iranians because they cannot be trusted. This simply defies logic. If we trusted them, we would not need to negotiate an agreement. The JCPOA is all about verification, through which we will know what they are doing with their nuclear program. The verification regime, in turn, is vilified as well. Opponents declare that its provisions fall short of the declared goal of “anytime, anywhere” inspections, not that the term has ever actually been defined. They also seek to create the impression that all inspections will be delayed by 24 days. This last distortion has been described as the “death panels” of the Iran Deal. In general, the discussion has focused not on the most essential aspects of the agreement, but rather on those that appear weak or can be made to appear weak.

Uranium Production and the Verification Regime

It is important to remember is that this agreement, or any agreement, will not prevent every objectionable activity Iran might engage in. Separate issues will have to be dealt with separately. This agreement focuses on the activity that has been at the core of key allegations against Iran, the production of nuclear fuel, which Iran says it wants for peaceful purposes and is entitled to under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). (The NPT grants countries a right to a nuclear industry, but not specifically to the indigenous production of fuel.) When processing uranium with centrifuges, the process is the same whether you want to produce reactor fuel to generate electricity or bomb-grade fuel for a nuclear weapon. The essential difference is in how long you do it, or rather, how many times you run uranium gas through a cascade of centrifuges. Natural uranium consists primarily of two isotopes: it is about 0.7 percent U-235 and 99.3 U-238. Most reactor fuel is enriched to the level of about 3.5 percent U-235; Iran’s Tehran Research Reactor takes a fuel that is just below 20 percent U-235; bomb-grade is in excess of 90 percent U-235. Unfortunately, the process gets easier the further it goes, so that when you have reached 20 percent (or even 3.5 percent), you have actually gone most of the way toward reaching 90 percent. The technical ease with which one might glide from civilian production to military production is at the center of the suspicions directed at Iran. Thus the monitoring of uranium production is at the heart of the Iran deal.

Iran, of course, does not trust the United States, either, and does not want the United States poking around its facilities, regardless of whether they concern nuclear or conventional military technologies. Thus verification is to be carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a neutral third party. For decades, the IAEA has inspected nuclear facilities around the world under the NPT for the purpose of “verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” It has not always been successful, but it has learned from its failures and strengthened its capacities over time.

Under the JCPOA, Iran reaffirms its denunciation of nuclear weapons and acceptance of standard inspections under its NPT Safeguard Agreement; agrees to additional challenge inspections, granting access to nuclear facilities within 24 hours (2 hours if inspectors are already on site), under an NPT Additional Protocol; and is obliged to give prior notification of the construction or modification of nuclear facilities under what is known as modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement (or simply, modified Code 3.1). Furthermore, Iran forswears any research-and-development activities applicable to the development of a nuclear weapon, including dual-purpose activities. These obligations do not expire, ever. In addition, Iran agrees to added measures and restrictions beyond those for a limited time period, with the duration varying from 10 to 25 years, depending on the specific measure. While nothing in life is guaranteed and the situations are not perfect parallels, it is worth noting that inspectors successfully disarmed Iraq in the 1990s without these additional measures.

When it comes to Iran’s uranium-conversion and uranium-enrichment facilities, monitoring by remote-controlled cameras and radio frequency identification (RFID) technology will be permanent and continuous, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, under Iran’s Safeguard Agreement. In addition, for 15 years Iran will permit direct access by IAEA inspectors on demand up to once a day. In an unprecedented arrangement, Iran’s uranium mines and mills will be under continuous monitoring for 25 years. In another unprecedented arrangement, Iran’s centrifuge production facilities will be under continuous monitoring for 20 years. The import of dual-use materials will be monitored for 10 years. The idea here is to keep track of Iran’s uranium-related resources. If inspectors can keep track of how much uranium Iran has and where it is—how much enters each facility, how much leaves, and where it goes—then they should be able to detect if uranium is diverted for unapproved purposes. Without the fuel, you cannot make a bomb.

Not Anytime, Anywhere?

As a precaution going beyond the continuous monitoring of declared nuclear sites, the JCPOA permits inspectors to investigate other sites, military or civilian, if they suspect that illicit activity related to nuclear weapons is being undertaken there. This alone is the subject of the “anytime, anywhere” controversy. The compromise reached allows Iran to challenge the accusation and to give reasons why the accusation is not true. The delay, however, is limited to a maximum of 24 days. It is important to understand that this is a limit on Iran’s ability to stall. Of the 121 countries in the world that adhere to an Additional Protocol, only Iran faces this restriction.

A current television ad attacking the JCPOA claims that the agreement gives Iran “24 days to remove evidence of nuclear activity.” Note the careful wording. The ad makes no explicit claim that it is possible to remove evidence of nuclear activity within 24 days, probably because its producers are fully aware that it is not. Inspectors can detect the presence of nuclear materials years after it has been removed, and efforts to scrub a site leave evidence both of its presence and of the attempt to hide it.

Is it possible, within 24 days, to remove evidence of nonnuclear activity related to the development of nuclear weapons? It is certainly conceivable. Relevant computer simulations could be undertaken without detection under virtually any inspection regime, but by themselves they are not going to give you a bomb. Generally speaking, the easier it is to hide, the less likely it is to produce a breakthrough. Since no inspection regime can guarantee that cheating will never happen, a high likelihood that any possible cheating would be caught or ultimately be irrelevant is an acceptable standard. More importantly, the agreement’s opponents offer no superior solution.

Potential Military Dimensions and Parchin

Finally, considerable attention has been devoted to the uncovering of Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s past research, including possible activities in a particular building at the Parchin military facility. Iran has been accused of doing research on nonnuclear aspects of weapons design, such as testing the reactions of certain materials to high stress and experimenting with conventional explosives that could be used to trigger a nuclear device. The CIA and other sources believe that this activity was halted in 2003, but many people want it investigated. Iran is loath to admit that it engaged in research dedicated to developing a nuclear weapon (the Ayatollah has said publicly that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic) and is reluctant to invite outsiders to inspect its military facilities, but an arrangement has been worked out. The IAEA will investigate the issue and keep the results to itself. Since this concerns past activity, this will involve a one-time investigation rather than ongoing monitoring. Most of the investigation will entail a review of documents, but there will also be some physical inspections of relevant sites. The IAEA will write up its conclusions before the main Iran deal goes into effect. The conclusions will not be shared with the P5+1 countries but will be available to the inspectors. Iran will not have to admit publicly to past misconduct, but the purpose of the JCPOA is to prevent nuclear proliferation, not to elicit public confessions. The IAEA reports that the Iranians have been cooperative so far.

There are reasons for wanting to examine PMD, but that is not the same as saying it is central to the overall agreement. Investigating the PMD allegations potentially serves two purposes. First, if IAEA inspectors can determine how far Iran has progressed toward developing the nonnuclear aspects of a nuclear weapon, then they might be better able to calculate how long it would take Iran to build a bomb if it did indeed break out of the verification regime. (Remember, the much-discussed “breakout time” is not how long it would take them to build a bomb, but rather how long it would take them to produce enough bomb-grade uranium to build a bomb. Building the actual bomb is a separate process.)

The second purpose could actually benefit Iran, depending on the circumstances. If inspectors at some point in the future find evidence of work on bomb components, then a thorough understanding of the work completed in the past will help them determine whether the new find is the product of recent clandestine work or simply a relic of previous efforts. Thus it would help prove that a discovery is evidence of a violation or that accusations of a violation are unfounded. This supports the overall mission. It would certainly be useful in settling disputes, and disputes are sure to arise. Still, it is not essential to the purpose of preventing the diversion of nuclear material for unauthorized purposes.

Parchin is one subset of the PMD investigation. The issue here concerns allegations that Iran may have used a building at the Parchin site for nonnuclear tests related to the development of a nuclear weapon. Since the allegation concerns activity that ended a dozen years ago, since the building may never have contained nuclear material, and since the building may have been used for other purposes since then, the prospects of finding conclusive evidence of anything are slim.

In fact, IAEA inspectors already visited Parchin twice in 2005 and found nothing suspicious. By agreement with Iran, the inspectors were free to pick any quadrant of the Parchin site and examine buildings of their choosing in that quadrant. They did not have to identify the buildings they had chosen prior to their arrival. As it happens, they did not choose to visit the building that they plan to visit now, although it was available to them.

An Effective Agreement

When a politician says “I’ll eat my hat” if X, Y, or Z doesn’t happen, no one really expects him to do it. Yet political discourse in the United States seems to have settled at the level of denouncing public officials for not eating their hats, without concern for what purpose would actually be served by doing so. In this case, “anytime, anywhere” inspections are an admirable goal and a fine starting point for negotiations (although, as far as I know, the term has never been operationally defined), but real-life negotiations do not end up squarely at one side’s starting point. Moreover, repeated accusations that the agreement did not produce “anytime, anywhere” inspections ignore (or purposefully draw attention away from) the fact that the agreement actually produced 24/7 monitoring of the essential aspects of the issue and that the arrangements for challenge inspections of undeclared sites (the aspect that allegedly falls short of “anytime, anywhere”) are perfectly adequate, indeed, an unprecedented achievement in themselves. There is no reason to believe the JCPOA will not be effective. The greatest threat to it are the hard-liners in the United States and Iran, but they would equally be threats to any agreement produced by negotiations.

Republican presidential candidates Ted Cruz and Donald Trump hosted a rally to oppose the Iran Deal in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 10, 2015. (Photo: updatednews.ca)

A great deal has been written about the agreement negotiated between Iran and the P5+1 countries (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China), officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). A lot of the commentary has been nonsense. A great deal of attention has been allocated not according to the relative importance of the various aspects of the deal, but rather according to how vulnerable to attack they appear to be. Also, much of the public discussion has been technically inept. Many assert, for example, that if Iran wants even more centrifuges, then that proves that its nuclear program is really intended for military purposes. In fact, generating fuel for a power plant requires far more fuel (albeit, enriched to a lower level) and many more centrifuges. Iran has had enough centrifuges to make a bomb since the Bush administration.

The JCPOA is complex, and it has been attacked from several directions. I will focus on the key issue of verification in an accompanying post. Here I would like to address three other popular lines of attack.

First, some commentators insist that the only realistic way to deal with the Iranian nuclear program is to bomb it. (The same people often insist that the Iranians will hide facilities in secret locations, so it is difficult to say exactly where they plan to bomb.) They frequently cite Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 as an example of how it can be done successfully. Evidently they are unaware that the Iraqis did not have a serious nuclear-weapon program before 1981. Far from stopping Iraq’s nuclear program, the bombing of Osirak exposed Iraq’s vulnerability to an Israeli attack and prompted Saddam Hussein to pour resources into the development of a nuclear weapon. Much of that nuclear program, as well as chemical and biological weapons, survived weeks of intensive bombing during the Gulf War of 1991. So, what happened to Iraq’s notorious weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? Who finally disarmed the country, leaving it without WMD at the start of the Iraq War in 2003, after bombing failed to do so? The answer is: UN weapons inspectors.

Second, other commentators simply assert that we should discard the agreement and negotiate a better one. A number of experts, administration officials, and foreign envoys have listed factors working against the success of that approach. In brief, Iran is not simply going to be talked into demilitarizing the way Japan did after we destroyed its navy and air force, bombed its cities (two of them with nuclear weapons), and occupied and disarmed it.

If we wanted a better deal, then the time to do it would have been a decade ago, when a previous moderate government was in power in Iran. In 2003 Iran offered to negotiate a comprehensive settlement touching on U.S. interests (WMD, terrorism, coordination on Iraq, and movement toward a Palestinian-Israeli settlement based on a two-state solution, including the possibility of Iranian pressure on Hezbollah) and Iranian interests (an end to U.S. efforts at regime change, an end to sanctions, Iranian access to technology, including nuclear technology; and action against Mojahedin-e Khalq, an anti-Iranian group based in Iraq). The nuclear part of the deal might well have been similar to today’s agreement, except that Iran’s nuclear program was far less advanced at that time, so its bargaining position would have been weaker. In addition, many other loose ends of the relationship might have been covered as well.

The Bush administration, however, was not interested in compromising, or even in negotiating, opting instead to rely on economic sanctions. Rather than respond to the offer, the administration complained that the Swiss ambassador had exceeded his authority by transmitting the message at all. (Since Iran and the United States have no diplomatic relations, Switzerland represents U.S. interest in Tehran.) Could a mutually acceptable arrangement have been worked out at that time? We will never know. What we do know is that in 2003, when the offer was sent, Iran had not yet enriched any uranium. By the time the recent negotiations started in 2013, Iran had a stockpile of 10,000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium and 19,900 operational centrifuges. Moreover, it no longer appeared interested in discussing the other regional and bilateral issues, or at least not until they saw how the nuclear deal went. That was the result of the Bush administration’s decision to hold out for a better deal.

Additionally, the similarity between the 2003 offer and the present deal suggests that the presence of a moderate Iranian government, rather than the force of sanctions, is what makes negotiation possible. The most important role of sanctions may have been in convincing Iranian voters to give moderates another chance. Rejecting the treaty (and some people are still trying to do so) would essentially teach the Iranian public that their hard-liners were right, that the moderates were fools for thinking they could negotiate an acceptable deal with the Americans.

Third, some cite North Korea’s abandonment of the 1994 Agreed Framework, apparently assuming that if one negotiated arrangement turned out badly, then they all must. This may actually be more relevant to the case at hand, but not necessarily in the way those making the argument have in mind. The Agreed Framework was negotiated by a Democratic administration, but a Republican Congress decried it as appeasement and refused to implement certain key provisions that were important to the North Korean government, including the lifting of sanctions and the normalization of relations. Other aspects were delayed for years (sometimes because of North Korean actions that were objectionable but not covered by the agreement). Then a new Republican administration denounced the agreement, threatened the North Korean regime, and unilaterally tried to change provisions of the agreement retroactively. When the Bush administration suspected that the North Koreans were cheating on the agreement, it made no effort to bring them back into compliance. Now North Korea has nuclear weapons. Would North Korea still have cheated if the United States had followed through on its commitments? Again, we will never know. Yet some people seem intent on repeating this singular example of diplomatic failure step for step.

Global and regional leaders met in Alaska at the 2015 GLACIER conference, trying to shape the future of the Arctic. That future will probably look like one of five existing models.

U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy (Wikipedia)

The changes to the environment in the Arctic–the Arctic Ocean as water and ice, its air, its surrounding land, and its plant, fish, animal and human life–revolve primarily around changes to the extent of sea ice.  The findings are consistent: the extent of sea ice is declining, including multi-year ice. An additional concern is Arctic amplification– the concept that less sea ice is self-reinforcing, as more sunlight is absorbed by ocean water instead of being reflected by ice cover–may already be underway.

2015 Sea Ice Extent is far below the 1981-2010 median.

What’s At Stake?

The decrease in sea ice is already impacting Arctic animal life, indigenous peoples, and scientific, industrial and tourism traffic–from oil and gas exploration to the annual North Pole Marathon. In recent years, the polar states have increased their patrols on training, research, emergency response, and border protection missions. In the last ten years, scholarship on the politics of the Arctic has surged–not only on the environment but on the region’s history, people, politics, economics, and security questions.

Who Decides?

States and others interested in the Arctic region have built a number of governing agencies.  The UN’s Law of the Sea Treaty applies rest-of-the-world rules to the region’s natural resources. The UN’s International Maritime Organization deals with shipping and environmental concerns.

Arctic-specific structures start with the Arctic Council, founded in 1996 and now comprised of eight member states and a number of indigenous peoples organizations.  States, sub-state units, and indigenous populations have also formed more localized bodies such as the Barents Euro-Atlantic Council, Nordic Council of Ministers, Northern Front, and Northern Forum.  The 2008 Ilulissat Declaration emphasized the leading role of states.

The United States has issued two recent policy documents on the Arctic: at the end of the Bush administration in 2009, and from the Obama administration in 2013.  Earning considerable criticism in August, President Obama permitted Shell to drill in the Chukchi Sea.  Meanwhile, Russia has called the Arctic central to its security interests, and China is building ice-breaking ships.

What Models for the Arctic?

Combined, these geopolitical questions and governing structures make the Arctic region not “ungoverned” but “under-governed.”  At the GLACIER conference and in the future, the Arctic is likely to develop into one the following models:  development first, international agreement, unilateral universalism, continuing contest, and imminent danger.

Development First.  In ungoverned or under-governed regions, opportunities often take precedence over possible challenges, risks or negative impacts.  The prospect of economic benefits drives policy; indigenous cultures, environmental costs, and political risks are given less regard.   Development first is a common pattern with some familiar examples.  Productive examples include the development of agriculture in Australia and Argentina.  Extractive examples range from copper in Chile to gold in California and diamonds in Africa.  Cases that are more combative and destructive include the seizure of gold from the Aztecs and Inca, the near-extinction of the North American bison, and the African slave trade.  It can also result in unintended consequences, as with poverty reduction programs that contributed to the partial clearing of the Amazon rainforest.

Development first is a potential model for the Arctic in very traditional ways.  Its natural resources (oil and gas, minerals, fishing) and commercial sea routes are coveted by states and industry in a competitive global political economy.

International Agreement.  A second approach to under-governed spaces is international agreement–like in the Arctic’s polar opposite, the Antarctic.

Antarctica, without a native population and not part of potential commercial traffic, is governed primarily by the Antarctic Treaty (1959) and other agreements under the Antarctic Treaty System, committing signatories to peaceful activities only.  It authorizes freedom of scientific research, prohibits military activity, nuclear testing and radioactive waste, specifically does not recognize (nor dispute) states’ territorial claims and precludes additional claims, and establishes annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM).

The 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty  emphasizes the importance of the protection of Antarctica’s environment, prohibits exploration or exploitation of energy or mineral resources, and promotes environmental assessment of activities, emergency response preparation, and international resolution of disputes.  Additionally, the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) is an association of environmental non-governmental organizations, and an official observer to the Antarctica Treaty System.

Mikhail Gorbachev proposed in 1987 an Arctic “zone of peace;” others have called for demilitarization or a non-state “polar park.”  An international agreement model may be relevant to the Arctic if it can draw from existing resources, be adapted to its distinct geographic, biological, political and economic traits – and if signatories can remain motivated to comply.

Unilateral Universalism.  A third approach to existing and potential Arctic trading routes is based on transit free from economic, political, or military hindrances.  The sea routes over Russia and through Canada are each predominantly under the geographical shadow of one state but subject to the interest of many, like the Panama Canal today.

The Panama Canal opened in 1914, shaved some 8,000 miles off the 14,000-mile Cape Horn route from New York to the U.S. west coast, and greatly shortened European and Asian routes as well.  Under U.S. control, the Canal met its maritime goals for the United States and for global commerce, and U.S. military interests shortening the travel time between its Atlantic and Pacific seaboards.  It retains its importance today under Panama’s control.

By comparison, the world’s other most important shipping straits today do not paint an entirely rosy scenario for Arctic potential.  The historical difficulties with the Suez Canal, and the current challenges in the Strait of Malacca, illustrate political, economic, safety and environmental risks.  But perhaps none are as important or as precarious as the Strait of Hormuz.

Imminent Danger.  Critical oil shipping flows from Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz to Western Europe, Asia and the United States. Between Iran and the Arabian peninsula the Strait is vulnerable to small or large efforts at traffic disruption.  There is no easy substitute for the oil flow.  The global economy could face immediate, severe damage if a state or non-state actor were able to impede traffic or even briefly close the Strait.

If Arctic shipping and resource exploration are to expand, and if the environment and indigenous communities are to be protected, the most critical effort is the avoidance of military conflict in the region.  There is no evidence at this time that such a scenario is likely, but increased military presence, border disputes and potentially large economic stakes could lead to escalating conflict.  All parties must remain motivated and committed to avoiding such a path.

Continuing contest.  Short of direct military conflict or the imminent threat of it, another future scenario for the Arctic is ongoing competition. This condition has the chance of armed conflict but the predominance of political and diplomatic discord.  Throughout history, the Bosporus Strait, the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea and others have held this condition–like the Caspian Sea today.  In some sense, this combines elements of the preceding logics:  development, diplomacy, and security risks.
Increased human activities will continue to influence the Arctic.  Nation-states with competing interests have begun to prepare for the opportunities and potential conflicts.  Policy choices, environmental changes and technological advances will continue to influence each other.  The GLACIER conference is a step along, not a resolution to, states and others shaping the Arctic’s future.

 

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