Diplomacy & Crisis News

En rétablissant l'autorité et les finances de l'Etat russe, le président Vladimir Poutine a su gagner la confiance de la population, malgré les dérives autocratiques. Mais la question du chauffage urbain montre que la restauration des capacités d'investissement public ne s'accompagne pas d'une mise à (...) / Russie, Capitalisme, Écologie, Économie, Énergie, Politique, Matières premières, Privatisation - 2014/06

Talking with a Venezuelan seeking political asylum in the U.S., we asked her why she was leaving her country. “Venezuela does not offer a future anymore” she said. It once did.

Chavez’s 21st century socialism has failed and (sadly) has pushed Venezuela to the brink of one of the major humanitarian crisis in the region. There goes another lost decade for a Latin American country.

Between 2004 and 2008, Venezuela experienced an economic miracle. Its economy grew 10% per year on average, while GDP per capita expanded by 26%. Now Venezuela is going backwards. By 2018, the country is expected to return to the GDP levels of 2005, but with an additional 6 million people, a 20% population increase. Thus, GDP per capita will fall to 2000 levels by 2018, as if 18 years of economic activity had never occurred.

Venezuela’s economic crisis will have unprecedented consequences in terms of poverty. Encovi, a local survey on life conditions shows that in 2015, 76% of Venezuelans lived in poverty, up from 52% in 2014. The extremely poor increased by 9 million through 2015, or 25% of the population.[i] The local universities conducting the survey warn that this is a conservative estimate, for they are only assuming a 170% inflation.

Source: LATAM PM with data from IMF and ENCOVI 2015

On October 15 of 2014, surrounded by supporters of the PSUV and with a loud round of applause, President Maduro announced a 30% increase in the minimum wage bringing it in VEF$9,648.2 a month—or $9.95 taking the 968.8 USD/VEF exchange rate used in black market by most Venezuelans. The problem is that with the 205% inflation estimated for 2015 by the local think tank Ecoanalítica, a monthly food basket now costs eight times the minimum wage according to the NGO Center for Documentation and Social Analysis (CENDAS). The IMF estimates that inflation could reach 720% this year.

Venezuela based its economic model on public expenditure supported by oil revenues, which constituted 96% of the total country’s exports in 2014. According to ING Group, Venezuela needs a $125-dollar barrel to balance its budget, but its mix currently trades at around $24. Venezuela has no money; this is problematic in a country that imports pretty much everything. The port of Guaira, one of the main three trade ports in the country, now looks empty.

Source: LATAM PM with Google Earth images

Tariffs and price controls have also triggered shortages of food and essential products. CENDAS reported at the end of 2015 that 38% of the products that form the basic food basket are not available in the stores anymore. This includes milk, beef, poultry, sugar, wheat flour, pasta, sardines and canned tuna. Last year, the Venezuelan Pharmaceutical Federation reported that 70% of medicines are in short supply.

The drastic deterioration of life conditions is the reason why Venezuelans voted to end the hegemonic control of the PSUV, giving the opposition control of the National Assembly. However, in recent days, there has been an increasing confrontation between the two sides. The Assembly wants to pass an amnesty law for political prisoners. Maduro threatens to veto it. Following the initiative, Maduro declared a state of economic emergency—promptly blocked by the Assembly. The current political impasse has done little to provide any sign of relief for Venezuela’s economic implosion.

Now, the most important question is whether or not the opposition’s supermajority in the Assembly will call a referendum on Maduro’s continuity later this year. The opposition (MUD), formed by a coalition of more than 20 parties, is showing a lack of unity on the issue. Without the support of every single MUD’s deputy, the referendum will not be held. In the meantime, Maduro has threatened to take the fight to the streets, if necessary.

LATAM PM’s View: With or without referendum, the probability of a major social and political crisis will continue to grow, which in turn could have important implications for the region. Wealthy Venezuelans are already leaving their country in search of opportunities in Colombia and Ecuador. But as life conditions deteriorate fast, the risk of a mass exodus increases too.

[i] Extremely poor people are defined as those who do not have the income to eat 2,200 calories every day. Poor are those who cannot acquire that same basic basket plus essential services such as electricity and transport.

This article was originally published by LATAM PM

The post Going Backwards: The Crisis in Venezuela appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The refugee crisis is morphing into one about the very nature of the European project. This is far more critical for the Union than the euro crisis, which, ultimately, could be resolved with a show of financial solidarity and money. The refugee issue, however, strikes at the heart of the values that underpin EU members’ core political solidarity.

Le double sens du mot « cliché » prend une résonance particulière lorsqu'on découvre les photographies de l'Italien Daniele Tamagni rassemblées dans Global Style Battles . Du Sénégal à la Bolivie en passant par Cuba, le Congo ou la Birmanie, ce baroudeur à l'objectif acéré, déjà primé pour sa série sur (...) / Afrique du Sud, Bolivie, Sénégal, Culture, Mondialisation, Photographie, Cuba, Botswana - 2016/02

Parmi les inconnus célèbres que sont devenus les grands tribuns de la IIIe République, Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929) semble être celui qui a le mieux résisté à l'oubli ; mais il est souvent réduit à des clichés. Deux livres récents entendent généreusement le présenter comme un homme de gauche, combattant (...) / France, Colonialisme, Histoire, Personnalités, Politique, Socialisme, Répression - 2016/02

Old habits die hard for Hungary’s ruling elite.

If anyone thought 2016 would bring with it a change in approach by Hungary’s ruling Fidesz Party they were sadly mistaken. The arrival of the New Year in Hungary has been marked by surging public discontent and street protests opposing proposed constitutional amendments that would provide the government with sweeping anti-terror powers.

Draft proposals leaked to the media suggest the government is seeking to amend the constitution by creating a new category of emergency: a “terror threat situation,” which, if declared, would enable it to issue decrees, suspend certain laws and modify others. Among some 30 proposed changes are controls on the internet, deployment of the army domestically, closing of borders and the imposition of curfews in areas affected by a terrorist threat.

Critics, including several opposition parties and civil rights groups, describe the vaguely defined “terror threat” legislation as a thinly veiled attempt by the government to clamp down on civil liberties. Unfortunately, the latest proposals represent the continuation of a longer term trend that has seen the gradual erosion of civil liberties under Victor Orbán’s Premiership.

The motivations for the ruling Fidesz Party’s authoritarian approach are complex, but one factor is undoubtedly the volatile and turbulent shifts the country’s political landscape has witnessed since the fall of communist rule in 1989. Viktor Orbán is the country’s only post-communist Prime Minister to have completed an entire mandate and be re-elected.

Part of this political turbulence can be attributed to the economic uncertainty the country experienced following the collapse of communism. As with the USSR and other soviet satellite state, the collapse of the communist regime in Hungary left a void in terms of institutional infrastructure and regulatory oversight.

This vacuum created a ‘wild west’ that offered fertile ground for wealthy individuals and speculators keen to exploit the absence of effective regulatory oversight and plunder the region’s resources. Hungary was no exception. Well documented, the now infamous Russian ‘oligarchs’ were quick to capitalize on the wealth of opportunities created by the collapse of communism. Less well known however are the Western entrepreneurs who also flocked to the region.

One of the most notable is Ronald Lauder the son of Hungarian Jewish immigrant Estée Lauder who successfully founded the family beauty-products empire. Lauder’s older brother, Leonard, assumed the helm of the company when their father, Joseph, died in 1983. Leonard subsequently took the company public, making him and his brother billionaires.

Seemingly lacking the business acumen of his brother, Ronald was keen to emulate his family’s success. Following a failed run for Mayor of New York, and his ignominious failure to secure the Republican nomination in 1989, Lauder presumably spotted his chance in 1994: his moment to step out of the shadow of his successful family, and establish his own identity.

Ronald set about establishing a string of commercial media and entertainment ventures across the former Eastern bloc countries. It all began to unravel, however, when it was revealed that a U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York was investigating Lauder’s television holding company, Central European Media Enterprises (CME), over allegations that the company had bribed state officials in Ukraine.

Perhaps most notably though was the media mogul’s dealings in Hungary. In 1996, Lauder was sued by his former business partner, Seymour Holtzman, for wrongful termination of their joint venture. Holtzman alleged Lauder had forced him out of their partnership in the Central European Development Corporation, the company he’d formed in Hungary in 1989. Describing Lauder, Holtzman explained to the Wall Street Journal that: “[Lauder] is mean-spirited …. He thinks he’s above everyone else.” The matter was eventually settled in court for an undisclosed sum.

But the Holtzman case was nothing compared with what was to come. In 1997, Perekhid Media, a Western-owned rival in Ukraine, brought a suit against Lauder and CME in New York, claiming that it had bribed Ukrainian officials, to essentially snatch from Perekhid a license which the company had obtained in 1993. Mr. Lauder had subsequently started a station called Studio 1+1 there using the license.

These questionable, some might say nefarious, business dealings by Western “entrepreneurs” help to demonstrate the aggressive business practices pursued by individuals across the Eastern bloc following the collapse of communism and help to illustrate how the economic turmoil fueled by the West has helped foster a culture of paranoia and an eagerness to hold on to power among Hungary’s political elite.

The post Any New Year’s resolutions Mr. Orbán? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon pays lip service to democracy, but his presidency is characterised by economic and social stagnation exacerbated by venality and mismanagement. The only meaningful opposition party, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), has been banned and labelled terrorist. Fraudulent elections and dozens of arrests in 2015 have silenced political foes and an exiled opposition leader was even murdered in Turkey in March. Activists fear harassment and NGOs “operate in a high risk, uncertain environment”.

Des centaines de chrétiens ont été menacés l'an dernier en Inde. Plusieurs musulmans soupçonnés d'avoir mangé de la vache ont été battus à mort. / Inde, Christianisme, Histoire, Identité culturelle, Islam, Minorité nationale, Nationalisme, Parti politique, Racisme, Religion, Société, Violence, Hindouisme, (...) / Inde, Christianisme, Histoire, Identité culturelle, Islam, Minorité nationale, Nationalisme, Parti politique, Racisme, Religion, Société, Violence, Hindouisme, Répression - 2016/02

Brisant le corset culturel colonial, une fraction des élites congolaises, particulièrement le mouvement Conscience africaine et l'Abako, le plus ancien parti du Congo, libéra la pensée. Elle éveilla et aiguisa la conscience politique de la population, ouvrant ainsi la voie à l'indépendance du pays, (...) / Afrique, Belgique, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Colonialisme, Histoire, Intellectuels, Mouvement de contestation, Politique, Congo, Afrique des Grands Lacs, Zaïre 1971-1997, Congo belge 1908-1960 - 2016/02

In the past few years, Saudi Arabia has not managed to make a single foreign policy decision that makes logical sense to anyone outside the Saudi royal family. Things started to go downhill for Saudi Arabia when it decided to inundate the oil market by pumping excess oil to suppress prices and recapture the market share lost to U.S. shale oil and other producers with higher operational costs.

Previously, Saudi troops helped suppress the Shi‘a uprising in Bahrain. Then came along the threat of ISIS. Making things worse, Saudi Arabia started bombing the Shi‘a Houthi rebels in Yemen, dragging the country in a protracted conflict. Government finances have taken a hit and its first sovereign bonds sale in decades occurred a few months ago. And now finally, following years of rhetoric, Saudi Arabia and Iran are now literally at each others necks.

One might be surprised by how the execution of a prominent Saudi Shi‘a cleric has sparked outrage throughout the region. Indeed, Iran also has not been quiet. Iranian proxies have controlled the so-called “Shi‘a crescent”—a crescent-shaped territory comprising of Iraq, Syria and the Shi‘a militia Hezbollah in Lebanon—for a decade now. But within Saudi Arabia, the Shi‘a minority (~25% of the population) have been relatively calm, despite massive government oppression excluding it from the wider Saudi society. Thus, the Saudi Shi‘a have been a time bomb waiting to go off. The execution of the cleric might have marked the point of no return.

The manner in which protesters in Tehran behaved, attacking the Saudi embassy, portrays the long standing animosity. The Syrian conflict has degenerated into a Shi‘a-Sunni sectarian war. Iran is replacing its own troops in Syria with Pakistani Shi‘a volunteers.  The current standoff sparked off on January 4 is sure to define the path the region is going to take in 2016. And it is not going to be a pretty one.

Since protesters in Tehran set fire to the Saudi embassy, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar have downgraded their diplomatic relations with Iran. They have not gone to the extent of cutting diplomatic relations with Iran because of the economic and demographic links they must sustain for their own stability. Iran replied by accusing the Saudi coalition of bombing its embassy in Yemen on purpose.

Some have come to speculate that the Saudi-Iran crisis has been engineered toward preventing Iran from releasing a further 500,000 barrels per day on the market over the next month as the sanctions are lifted. Further, some speculate that an all-out war between oil producing nations will finally cause long anticipated hikes in the oil price. High prices are essential to the proper functioning of the Gulf country finances if they are to maintain autocratic regimes supported by massive social transfers to their population. In that case, some parties do have an incentive to find ways to prevent Iran’s increased oil supply.

Iran strikes an uneasy balance between democratic institutions and its theocratic nature. A plethora of different factions are represented in its ruling elite. Rouhani comes from the more moderate faction who manage to take over power since the more hardline faction of Ahmadinejad almost destroyed the country’s economy. One can speculate that Saudi Arabia intends on increasing Sunni-Shi‘a tensions so that public support in Iran reverts back to the hardliners. The Saudi embassy on fire surely made the fundamentalists happy while undermining the moderates’ attempt to portray to the world a progressive Iran.

Iran has a dynamic and vibrant young population which has grown to favor more engagement with the West. The failed 2009 “Green Revolution” was an attempt by these youth to end the rule of the hardliners. If they return to power, they will have a lot of youth dissent to curb. That means a lot of additional human rights violations which will lead to new sanctions being imposed.

Iran badly needs economic growth to avoid being sidelined. For it to retain the title of defender of Shi‘a Muslims, it must have the ability to support Shi‘a governments and factions abroad. Indeed, Hezbollah, Assad and Iraqi Shi‘a militia all depend on Iranian support. Hence, ironically, the fundamentalists have to support the moderates to run the country efficiently in order to achieve their goals of regional hegemony.

Developments in the Middle East will depend heavily on how Iran and Saudi Arabia react to each other’s actions. Rouhani will have to ensure that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps does not carry out overt aggressions. The missile test in October and the recent detaining of two U.S. patrol boats near Qatari waters were risky. A country of Iran’s stature has the right to develop its own ballistic missile system and to detain trespassing naval vessels. Brazil has its nuclear-powered submarines and Pakistan has its nuclear weapons. No one is imposing sanctions on them for that.

The difference is that Iran has lost its reputation as a responsible member of the international community since 1979. It needs to rebuild it and the Rouhani government has taken a lot of positive steps toward that direction. Paraphrasing President Obama, Iran is too large a country to keep isolated from the rest of the world. The world also needs to understand that Rouhani cannot immediately act friendly with the West—Iranians have grown up to loathe the West for decades. To stay in power, Rouhani must be seen as protecting Iranian interests and its self-perceived power. If he is seen as a Western stooge, the fundamentalists will return to power.

The post Saudi Arabia-Iran: Tensions and Intertwined Futures appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Predicting what will start a war, and when, is an unrewarding business. Long-term trends (‘causes’) are often clear enough, but not the proximate causes, or triggers. We can assess the comparative significance of competition for resources, hunger for power, the nature of political systems, the psychology of leaders. What precipitates a conflict, though, may be a sudden, unforeseen event: an accident, misreading or miscalculation, or a temperamental leader’s flash of hubris. Often, of course, it is a combination of such things. Yet there is nothing inevitable about the outbreak of conflict.

On vante souvent dans le polar la rigueur de la mécanique. Mais il est des œuvres dont tout le charme tient justement à leur façon de dynamiter cette rigueur. Il y eut les Américains Carl Hiaasen (Queue de poisson, Denoël) et Donald Westlake — avec son héros flegmatique John Dortmunder —, le grand (...) / Argentine, Audiovisuel, Culture, Littérature, Médias, Société, Fiction - 2016/02

Styliste reconnue, Kranti, la cinquantaine, se donne la mort dans son appartement des beaux quartiers de Paris. Elle a choisi pour héritier son amant, qui fut aussi son psychothérapeute, et lui laisse en prime son journal : deux cahiers, l'un rouge et l'autre noir. Ils irradient la peine suscitée (...) / Inde, Culture, Femmes, Littérature, Société, Violence, Droits des femmes - 2016/02

Escribir sobre el futuro es un negocio arriesgado. La bola de cristal está agrietada; las fuentes son escasas; las extrapolaciones, dudosas. Pero no resulta mucho más fácil recordar la historia reciente, o comprender qué ha estado pasando exactamente. Cuanto más cerca estamos del pasado, más opaco aparece este.

Photo By Abdolreza Mohseni

Iran will present its new oil contracts during a scheduled conference in February 2016 in Tehran. By 2020, the country hopes to increase crude production to about 6 million barrels per day (bpd), an increase compared to levels produced before the sanctions imposed by the West in response to its nuclear program.

But Tehran will probably need much more time to achieve this desired level of production. To develop new oil fields and ensure better infrastructure, Iran needs an additional $100 billion in financing from foreign investors. And while lifting sanctions will open up possibilities for external financing, the country also needs international oil companies to establish activities on Iranian soil. This could be a challenge, as binding regulations have historically made it difficult for energy companies to operate in Iran.

The lifting of sanctions brought the oil price down: Iran is the second largest producer, behind Saudi Arabia for conventional oil, and is fourth behind Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Canada if we include unconventional crude. Beyond the impact of lifted sanctions, the slowdown in global growth, the strength of the U.S. shale industry and the global glut of oil supply (a surplus estimated at one million bpd) continue to fuel the downward spiral of the market.

Can a Public Private Partnership (PPP) provide the solution for the financing of energy infrastructure projects, at a time when Iran is facing declining revenues as a result of years of crippling sanctions? Iran’s new contract model is designed to gain the interest of international oil companies to participate in joint venture projects. Under the new Iranian Petroleum Contract, a foreign company would have several years to explore and develop deposits followed by 10 to 15 years of production rights. Meanwhile, the Iranian state oil company, The National Iranian Oil Co., would compensate the foreign company depending on the deposit, production volumes and oil prices.

Iran needs to consider a PPP and a legislative framework that would give more flexibility than the current contract in place.

Investments in the Energy Infrastructure

The introduction of a PPP in the new Iranian Petroleum Contract (IPC), would also allow the private sector to supply public services and infrastructure in the energy sector—both fundamental to the development and growth of Iran. The current oil price, which is at a record low, presents an excellent opportunity to create and maintain oil fields and, consequently, provides some scope for private and public sector. Crucially, it would allow the country to address its battered infrastructure, which have suffered from crippling sanctions and chronic underinvestment.

If companies are reviewing their budget in the development and exploitation of deposits, they have a chance to regain some of that capital through oil sales. If a project is technologically more difficult, it might gain higher income. So even if it requires more investment, it will yield greater returns. Investors will also be engaged in projects over a longer period, which should encourage greater production.

Management is key in the energy sector—partnering private and public actors will prove effective for improving service delivery. Reducing costs and time of executing projects is a priority in a very volatile market. The private sector has the ability to implement project within time and budget and eliminate cost overrun due to delays, a significant financial incentive.

The aim is not to prioritize the private sector but to balance risks in both sector associated with their own duties. This type of partnership mobilizes all the human and financial resources (public, private, international) and thus avoid costly disruptions in public investment programs, during periods of recession and budget cuts.

The PPPs are not a solution to a budget crisis led by its sanctions or simply low oil prices. But as a mean to optimize resources, PPPs are a contractual arrangement over the long term by which the public sector transfers to the private sector all or part of conception, financing, operation and maintenance responsibilities. Contrary to conventional wisdom, PPPs contracts enable government to determine the tariffs for users, standard levels to be achieved and met. The Iranian government will still be involved in the supervision of the PPP contract and ensure that public service objectives are met.

While Iran has huge economic and human resources, improving the economic situation will depend heavily on political reforms and major economic changes. The ideological nature of Iran’s system makes it difficult to bet on political and economic reforms capabilities.

A Competitive Edge for Iran?

Iran is at present estimated to hold about 157 billion barrels or 9.3% of world reserves. In comparison, Iraq has 150 billion and Saudi Arabia almost 266 billion barrels. Iranian production in late 2013 was 3.558 million bpd against 3.751 million bpd a year earlier, a 6% decrease relative to 2011. Iranian crude oil is light, with a low extraction cost. However Iranian deposits have low recovery rates (between 20 and 25%), which require investment and the injection of more gas into the wells.

 The new Iranian Petroleum Contract could potentially give an advantage to Iran over its competitors in terms of attracting new investments. If we look at it by sector, the most prominent one to benefit from such a partnership would clearly be Iran’s energy industry. The U.S. and other foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector should grow rapidly, allowing Iran to develop its production capacity and export oil, gas and petrochemicals.

Several international oil companies have already shown interest in the new contracts. Royal Dutch/Shell, Total and Eni were in Tehran during the last three months to discuss investment opportunities through the so-called ‘special conditions contracts’ to reserve ownership for exploration and development.

Immediately after the lifting of sanctions, European companies will probably be the first to invest. They have the most recent experience of doing business with Iran and will be less constrained by their own governments. It is common to see international players parterning with local businesses who have a good knowledge of the terrain.

Attracting Investors

Low oil price may have been the catalyst for the promulgation of PPPs. Iran’s new Petroleum Contract will be able to invite private companies and international investors to finance and operate energy assets at an attractive price. It will be interesting to watch the development of PPPs in Iran and evolution in the current volatile market as confidence will progressively build through an increase in the quality and quantity of projects coming in line.

To be viable in terms of attracting foreign investment, the new IPC should include four key things: appropriate risk allocation, a sound financial package, reliable concessionaire consortium and favorable investment environment. In order to do so, energy projects should be aligned with both public and private parties and ensure the appropriate management structures and procedure to obtain application of those four core aspects.

The success of the new Iranian Petroleum Contract model also depends on the specific fiscal terms of the agreement, which have not yet been finalized or announced. And even if Iran really managed to sign new contracts with foreign energy companies, these companies will still face major obstacles when it comes to actually investing, operating and advancing these contracts.

Iran can eventually return to production levels it had before the sanctions, but it will probably take much longer than the ‘immediate effect’ promised. Ultimately, fiscal terms that Iran will offer to foreign energy companies under its new contract model might be appealing enough to overcome the significant challenges that come with operating in the country.

In these partnerships, private companies can offer innovative design, project management skills and risk management expertise. A PPP IPC will require the private agent to take full responsibility for the performance of the asset over a long term, so that efficiencies arising from long term investment and asset management could be realized.

A diversified service can be adopted through these contractual relationships: concession contracts, lease-develop-operate, and build-operate-transfer among others. A collaboration between public and private sector for the purpose of delivering a project traditionally provided by the public sector.

The sole challenge will be to find the right balance between private sector capacity, government regulatory function and public satisfaction. Adding the political and social obstacles that will come through different phases of projects, the lack of legal framework and the rising of tariff to cover the costs of projects may face some important challenges. This new financing model will allow the presence of foreign investors in projects but in an operational and reasonable manner.

Only time will tell, but there are efforts being made to attract international investors in Iran. Future work is clearly needed before a PPP can be added to Iran’s economic model in a satisfactory manner. Partnership, if precisely planned and structured, can be a powerful tool not only to keep public company viable but also to address cost and investment challenges, improve efficiency and service quality, increase expertise, attract more rapid and substantial investments in infrastructure and new energy technologies.

The post A Public Private Partnership for Iran’s New Petroleum Contract? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In the Horn, where cash-strapped regimes often teeter on the brink of financial survival and alliances are made and broken with bewildering regularity, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has found willing partners as Saudi-Iranian tensions escalate.

Le blog Reflets du Temps, qui consacre une large place aux questions internationales et des recensions de qualité, a publié le 23 janvier dernier un article mettant à l’honneur le numéro d’hiver (4/2015) de Politique étrangère.

« Particulièrement riche, ce numéro d’hiver de PE, puisqu’en plus du dossier Justice pénale internationale, étudié ici, un autre dossier alléchant : « Une ère nouvelle d’abondance pétrolière », et quelques forts articles-repères, tel celui sur les Primaires américaines ou celui sur le changement de position de l’Allemagne en termes de sécurité, permettent des lectures particulièrement enrichissantes.

Le bilan après 70 ans de Justice pénale internationale s’impose, tant dans les modes de fonctionnement, l’évaluation du rapport objectifs/résultats, les difficultés et insuffisances réelles, que dans les chemins d’améliorations possibles. 4 grands chapitres se partagent la tâche : « Entre âge de fer et âge d’or », « Le TIP pour l’ex-Yougoslavie », « Le TIP pour le Rwanda », « Le Droit à réparation ». Lectures foisonnantes et non moins passionnantes. […]

La faillite du TIPY, dont nous conservons tous en mémoire des débats, des images, a marqué durablement – hélas – nos imaginaires en termes de rêve abattu et de chute de l’idéal de primat universel du Droit. Jean Arnault Dérens décline avec la meilleure des pédagogies cette « aventure », née en 93, voulant « créer une juridiction neutre et impartiale, pouvant dire le Droit alors que la guerre se poursuivait encore », et mettant en cause, avec Milosevic, le Premier Président (Serbe, ici) en exercice de l’Histoire. Le tribunal de La Haye aura jugé 125 personnes, au cours de ses séances ; il y eut pas mal de procès avortés, de prévenus relaxés après appels, de décès, de suicides. Acquittement par exemple des chefs de l’unité Scorpions de la police, ayant mené le massacre de Srebrenica !!! Valse des procureurs ; lignes directrices hétérogènes, constantes pressions difficiles des grandes puissances et des leaders régionaux… S’il est bien un lieu où théorie de départ et état à l’arrivée divergent, c’est bien dans ce TIP ad hoc. D’autant que l’intégration dans l’Union Européenne des pays « neufs » de la zone fit l’objet de négociations aux allures de chantage, incluant le résultat des « passages » devant la Justice internationale. D’autant, encore, que le Kosovo, dernier théâtre de la guerre, échappe encore à l’heure qu’il est aux investigations poussées. […]

A lire, cette – encore cette fois – remarquable Revue, en ces temps que nous traversons. Car, ces références à un positionnement d’ensemble du Monde, dans le domaine de la Justice, font l’actualité, d’autant que la montée du Terrorisme, et les exactions par exemple en Syrie amènent de nouvelles demandes en termes de Justice Internationale. »

Pour lire l’article dans son intégralité, cliquez ici.

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

El presidente tayiko, Emomali Rahmon, habla mucho de democracia, pero su presidencia se ha caracterizado por un estancamiento económico y social, agudizado por la corrupción y la mala gestión. El único partido de oposición con verdadero peso, el Partido del Renacimiento Islámico de Tayikistán (PRIT), ha sido prohibido y tachado de terrorista. Las elecciones fraudulentas y docenas de detenciones en 2015 han callado a los adversarios políticos, y en marzo asesinaron en Turquía a un líder de la oposición en el exilio. Los activistas temen el acoso de las autoridades, y las ONG “actúan en un entorno incierto y de alto riesgo”.

Suite à la parution de son numéro d’hiver 2015-2016, la revue Politique étrangère vous invite à la rencontre-débat organisée autour du thème : « La justice pénale internationale : un bilan ».

Avec Joël Hubrecht, responsable du programme « Justice pénale internationale et justice transitionnelle » à l’Institut des Hautes Études sur la Justice (IHEJ) et auteur, dans Politique étrangère, de l’article « La justice pénale internationale a 70 ans » ; et  Hélène Dumas, historienne spécialiste de l’histoire du génocide des Tutsi rwandais de 1994, et auteur, dans Politique étrangère, de l’article « Rwanda : comment juger un génocide ? ».

La rencontre sera animée par Marc Hecker, rédacteur en chef de la revue Politique étrangère.

Rendez-vous le jeudi 11 février à 18h à la librairie LDEL (362 ter, rue de Vaugirard, Paris 15e, métro Porte de Versailles).

L’entrée est libre et gratuite dans la limite des places disponibles.

Lord Mark Malloch-Brown, Crisis Group’s Co-Chair, joins Jonathan Prentice, Crisis Group’s London Office Director and Senior Advocacy Adviser, at an event in London’s Chatham House on 19 January 2016 to present the 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2016. In his speech, Lord Malloch-Brown addresses the changing nature of conflicts, increased multi-polarity of the international system and ongoing rise of non-state armed groups which will continue to affect the crises of today.