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Fauzan al-Anshori, right, an Islamic State recruiter in Indonesia, leads the “bayat”, an oath of devotion, to the leader of Islamic State. Photo: SMH/Screengrab

Should a country’s citizens be allowed to return home after fighting for the Islamic State (ISIS)?  It would seem at first a silly question to ask—why welcome home hardened fighters who have the skills and may have the determination to threaten your country’s population?  Yet according to law in a number of countries, many of these fighters are allowed safe passage home.

Some constitutional and human rights lawyers around the world argue that safe passage should be guaranteed—that every person has the right to citizenship and to remove it would in effect make a person stateless.  Some critics argue that citizenship should only be revoked under judicial review (e.g. conviction by a court of law of an act of terrorism directed at fellow citizens).  Conviction appears to be a high standard and forces the onus of prevention on local police officials. Since preventing terrorist acts is extremely difficult—why take any chances by allowing fighters to return?

Despite the opposition by lawyers, countries are starting to take action. Following the siege of a cafe in Sydney in December 2014, Australia moved to pass measures barring its citizens who join, support or train with extremist groups like the Islamic State from returning home from conflict zones.  The new laws not only apply to Australians fighting overseas, but to those who help raise money or recruit new members for extremist groups.

In Canada, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in October 2014 at the Canadian National War Memorial in Ottawa, the country amended its Citizenship Act last May. The amendment now allows the stripping of the citizenship of dual nationals found fighting with any international terrorist organization or found guilty of terrorism, treason, or spying for a foreign government.

Austria, Belgium and Britain have also revised their laws to permit the revocation of citizenship in terrorism-related circumstances, while France is considering a change in their constitution allowing to strip French-born dual citizens of their French citizenship in certain circumstances related to terrorism. The French justice minister, born in French Guiana, recently resigned over the government’s plan. Citizens with dual nationality are being targeted largely since the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness prohibits governments from revoking a person’s nationality if it leaves them stateless.

The latest high-profile country to reconsider its citizenship laws is Indonesia, in the wake of last month’s bombings by the Islamic State in Jakarta’s commercial district, which killed eight people and injured 30 people. Lawmakers and security officials are now busy considering the rewrite of the nation’s anti-terrorism laws, which currently permit Indonesians to return home after fighting with ISIS overseas. The fear is of returning experienced jihadis launching more sophisticated attacks than the one that took place last month, which resulted in the deaths of all four attackers.

Indonesia is now home to roughly 100 Indonesians who traveled to the Middle East to join Islamic State, and may have seen very little or no frontline combat before returning. Around 500 Indonesians have made the trip so far to join ISIS.  

The bombings and shootings in Jakarta last month were the first in Indonesia carried out by ISIS, with the last major attack by Jemaah Islamiyah militants occurring in 2009, when suicide bombers killed seven at two luxury hotels in Jakarta. Indonesian authorities are now on high alert following the publication of a new warning by Islamic State that shopping centers, offices and tourist hotspots in Denpasar and Singaraja may be the next targets.

Given the potential threat posed by some of those who left their countries to join Islamic State, immigration authorities in many countries are right to be nervous about letting potential terrorists back into their country.  Citizens in these countries are already reluctant to let in refugees from Syria and Iraq—even women and children. Yet the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness prohibits leaving persons stateless.  

Perhaps the UN convention needs to be revised and updated to specifically address the world we live in today. To date, the 1961 convention argues in Article 9, “A Contracting State may not deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds”, whose intent is likely to protect non-violent persons from persecution. However, should those persons or groups turn violent, and threaten the state, the UN convention allows for in Article 8:

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, a Contracting State may retain the right to deprive a person of his nationality, if at the time of signature, ratification or accession it specifies its retention of such right on one or more of the following grounds, being grounds existing in its national law at that time:

(a) that, inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the Contracting State, the person

(i) has, in disregard of an express prohibition by the Contracting State rendered or continued to render services to, or received or continued to receive emoluments from, another State, or

(ii) has conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State;

(b) that the person has taken an oath, or made a formal declaration, of allegiance to another State, or given definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his allegiance to the Contracting State.

Given proof that a citizen has travelled to the Middle East and trained as a jihadist, and represents a threat upon returning to his/her country of nationality, it would seem that citizenship could be revoked under (a) (ii). Furthermore, many recruits to Islamic State take an oath of allegiance, and if Islamic State can be defined as a State, citizenship can then be revoked under (b).  

Of course, human rights and constitutional lawyers need to fight for the rights of the innocents, but if my quick, non-lawyer reading of the Article is correct, it would appear that those citizens who travelled to the Middle East (or other regions) to join Islamic State, who took the oath, and who potentially threaten their home countries can have their citizenships revoked. With the proliferation of fake passports, however, these non-citizens will not be left stateless, and will be free to travel to and from weak and failing states, and perhaps even home.

The post Should ISIS Fighters be Allowed to Return Home? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

U.S. President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro adjust their jackets at the start of their meeting at the United Nations General Assembly in New York September 29, 2015. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

Written by Matthew Barbari

During his last State of the Union address President Obama made reference to his hope that the long-standing trade embargo between the United States and Cuba would end during his last term in office. “Fifty years of isolating Cuba had failed to promote democracy, setting us back in Latin America,” the President said adding further, “Recognize that the Cold War is over. Lift the embargo.”

Obama has already begun the process of normalizing relations with Raul Castro’s government. On July 20, 2015, diplomatic ties were restored and it was announced that the Cuban embassy in Washington D.C. would be reopened, along with the American embassy in Havana. However, since the embargo still holds, it seems that it will fall upon the next U.S. President to further Obama’s legacy and end the island’s economic isolationism.

Congressional approval has been the biggest roadblock in lifting the embargo. The Republican-controlled Congress opposes the change, still perceiving Cuba as an adversary and leaving little doubt that Obama will not witness the end of the embargo before he leaves office. While many other issues have been at the forefront of the ongoing Republican and Democratic primaries, Cuba is one that each major candidates has touched upon, providing their opinion on how to handle the relationship between Washington and Havana.

Republican Candidates’ Platforms

Sen. Ted Cruz and Sen. Marco Rubio,two candidates in the Republican primary, have been particularly vocal with regard to the embargo. Both Cruz and Rubio are of Cuban dissent and both have publicly denounced President Obama’s policy of normalization, calling for an end to the embargo. Cruz has called Obama’s policy a “tragic mistake,” arguing that it gives legitimacy to the Castro regime.

Cruz believes that opening trade with the island will harm Cubans that aspire for more freedoms by allowing the communist regime in Cuba to stay to place. This sentiment is shared by Rubio, a senator from Florida, the state with the largest Cuban American population. Rubio has long been a critic of the Castro regime, judging Obama’s policy towards Cuba dangerous.

For him, lifting the embargo “threatens America’s moral standing in the region.” He has also stated that if he were elected president that he would close both embassies in Washington D.C. and Havana and would instead tighten sanctions against Cuba until the Castro regime was overthrown. This puts him at odds even with Cruz who advocates for a gradual reduction of sanctions against Cuba conditional on the improvement of their human rights record.

Democratic Candidates’ Platforms

While Republicans tend to support the embargo, many Democrats have sided with Obama, viewing the embargo has a diplomatic failure and call for the relations with Cuba to be normalized. Sen. Bernie Sanders has publicly stated that he is against the embargo and for normalizing relations, while leaving the future of Cuba up to the Cuban people. He hopes that the island will eventually become a democracy and has a track record in Congress of voting for pro-Cuban legislation. In 2015, Sanders co-sponsored a bill presented to the Senate that would allow travel between the U.S. and Cuba.

The Democratic front-runner is former Secretary of State and New York Senator Hillary Clinton. Clinton has stated publicly that she too supports Obama’s call to normalize relations, despite her past record being in favor of the sanctions. She has stated recently that the embargo is an “albatross”on the U.S. in its maneuvering in Latin America and that American foreign policy no longer needs to be viewed “through an outdated Cold War lens.”

Clinton has also taken the stance that if elected she would push Congress to lift the embargo or use her executive power to reduce travel restrictions and increase trade. She claims that during her time as Secretary of State, she asked Obama to consider ending the embargo. However, the process of normalization only began after her time as Secretary ended.

Clinton has had to defend her current position on Cuba as it contradicts her past record, having supported the embargo during her 2008 presidential campaign. Even during her time as First Lady under President Bill Clinton, she was in favor of measures to strengthen the embargo such as the Helms-Burton Act of 1996. While Clinton is allowed to change her mind about policy issues, it raises the question whether she truly supports such policies or is looking to please her pro-normalization voting base in the bid for the Democratic nomination.

Regardless of candidates’ stances on the Cuba embargo, little will happen as long as Congress remains opposed to ending it. With Raul Castro set to step down in 2018, the coming years will be crucial in Cuban history. Whether we want the U.S. to be a part of it is ultimately up to us.

The post The Cuban Embargo After Obama: The Presidential Candidates’ Platforms appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension d’ouvrages est issue de Politique étrangère (4/2015). Jérôme Marchand propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Chris Woods, Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars (Londres, Hurst & Co, 2015, 400 pages).

Les enquêtes journalistiques sur les drones tueurs et leur déploiement dans les aires de conflit armé, multiples ces dernières années, n’ont pas forcément cherché à remettre en cause les mythes « rassurants » derrière lesquels se retranchent les instances utilisatrices. Sudden Justice représente de ce point de vue un ajout bienvenu. Écrit par un journaliste d’investigation britannique, l’ouvrage examine de près la manière dont les États-Unis font usage de drones équipés de missiles ou de bombes, en guerre « conventionnelle » ou dans le cadre de la lutte clandestine contre les mouvances terroristes ou assimilées. L’ensemble s’articule en douze chapitres suivant globalement une trame chronologique. Il évoque les premiers essais opérationnels, décrit rapidement le profil des cibles individuelles de choix, relate l’extension progressive des doctrines d’emploi, expose la manière dont les administrations concernées (USAF, JSOC, CIA) valident ou non le passage à l’acte, et n’oublie pas de donner la parole aux servants spécialisés (pilotes, observateurs, analystes, contrôleurs), de façon à déterminer l’impact psychologique de cette technologie sur ceux qui la gèrent au quotidien. Nourris de nombreux entretiens individuels, étayés par de solides recherches documentaires, ces passages se montrent vivants et instructifs.

Surtout, Sudden Justice contient des considérations critiques touchant au caractère soi-disant légaliste des frappes dirigées contre certains ressortissants occidentaux, à la fiabilité des discours et rapports officiels faisant état de dommages collatéraux réduits à des proportions minimes, au degré de précision des outils de localisation et d’identification – optiques, renseignements de terrain, profilages sigint probabilistes – utilisés en amont, à la validité profonde des systèmes de légitimation utilisés par les donneurs d’ordres. Plus significatif encore, Chris Woods revient à de multiples reprises sur l’impact contre-productif des frappes non discriminatoires – spécialité de la CIA –, qui génèrent de vastes poussées de ressentiment et de radicalisation parmi les populations touchées, déstabilisent les régimes a priori bien disposés, et vont à l’encontre des objectifs nominaux de pacification durable mis en avant par la Maison-Blanche.

Pour autant, l’ouvrage se garde de basculer dans la charge accusatoire. Quoiqu’exposé à la désinformation et au black-out des bureaucraties concernées, quoique menacé de représailles létales par un « fin dialecticien » du renseignement d’État, l’auteur a su maintenir un discours équilibré, tenant compte des périls que représentent les mouvances extrémistes et des avantages que présente le drone armé, par rapport au support aérien classique. À signaler également que Sudden Justice pose sur le président Obama un regard plutôt tempéré, alors même que l’actuel Chief Executive a étendu le périmètre des assassinats ciblés ou prétendus tels, et lâché la bride à des instances bureaucratiques peu encombrées de nuances et de remords. Point notable, l’auteur attire quand même l’attention sur les effets de dé-légitimation profonde et durable auxquels s’expose une puissance dite dominante qui use et abuse du mensonge officiel pour neutraliser les garanties juridiques de base et masquer ses bavures. Verdict final de l’auteur : pour le moment, la manière qu’ont les États-Unis de solliciter les drones tueurs constitue un exemple à ne pas suivre.

Jérôme Marchand

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

Les négociations internationales sur le climat négligent trop souvent les océans. C'est pourquoi les associations, les scientifiques et les citoyens doivent se mobiliser à l'occasion de la COP21. L'un des enjeux majeurs sera la définition de règles précises concernant la protection des espaces marins (...) / Animal, Eau, Écologie, Mer, Climat, Environnement - 2015/11

(Own report) - In an article published by the leading German foreign policy journal, an influential diplomat predicts that worldwide, there will be a further increase in the number of wars and their victims, this year. "The number of conflicts, their victims, and their refugees" has been increasing worldwide, for the past five years and this development will "most likely continue this year." The journal, "Internationale Politik," substantiates this assumption by presenting an overview of the current wars. Today's deadliest wars - in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and South Sudan - are indeed a direct or indirect outcome of western hegemonic policies. With its military interventions or subversive support for insurgents, this policy is aimed at provoking pro-western putsches or weakening non-compliant states. "Internationale Politik" assesses the possibility of conflicts in China's vicinity. During the years of China's rise, western powers were unsuccessful in knitting strong ties with the resource-rich Arab world, in view of the impending power struggle with the People's Republic of China. This power struggle is already emerging.

China’s African strategy

Speculations over China’s plans to set up a “logistical facility” in the East African country of Djibouti were put to rest following an announcement by the Chinese foreign ministry that the two countries have reached a consensus on the proposal. Although lacking a detailed timeline, the agreement will come as a natural conclusion to what has been an ever tightening of relations between the two countries, dating back to China’s involvement in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden back in 2008.

However, unlike NATO countries and Japan who are also conducting anti-piracy missions in Djibouti, China currently has no permanent naval base in the region. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Hong Lei, “In fulfilling escort missions, [China] encountered real difficulties in replenishing soldiers and resupplying fuel and food, and found it really necessary to have nearby and efficient logistical support.”

Djibouti was the natural choice for the Chinese given that the former French colony already hosts a number of European outposts as well as Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. expeditionary base from where drone operations in Yemen and Somalia are conducted.

In recognition of Djibouti´s geostrategic importance, the country has been the recipient of many financial blandishments from China over the past few years. These include the $590 million injection of funds for the development of its port, aimed at transforming it into a major transshipment terminal, and investment in the $4 billion railway connection between Djibouti and its landlocked neighbor, Ethiopia. It also comes on the back of a deal to set up a free trade zone for Chinese companies in Djibouti and allow Chinese banks to begin operating in the country.

While undoubtedly important, China’s first overseas military facility in Djibouti only accounts for a small piece in a much bigger puzzle being put together by Beijing. Djibouti, and its much larger neighbor to the north, Egypt, mark the final stage posts in the maritime leg of China’s ambitious One Belt One Road (OBOR) project: a vast trade route encircling half the globe and connecting China with Europe along the ancient Silk Road.

Supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund, the overland route will see massive investments in infrastructure, stretching from western China through central Asia and the Middle East into Europe via Russia, Greece and Turkey.

For the maritime route to be successful, it will require that Chinese merchant ships are able to reach the Suez Canal unhindered after traversing the Indian Ocean. Djibouti’s position on the cusp of the Red Sea, leading into the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean, makes it a vital node in that network.

Given that investment in OBOR is expected to top one trillion dollars over the next 10 to 15 years, it is no surprise that the People´s Liberation Army has been slowly moving away from its traditional stance of protecting the homeland and towards establishing a force projection capability in line with its expanding overseas interests.

This newfound assertiveness, of which the base in Djibouti is China’s first statement of intent, is being watched with caution by Western capitals. But according to Shen Dingli, a professor of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, as quoted in the New York Times, it is keeping in line with the behavior of any power whose financial interests abroad are in need of protection.

“The United States has been expanding its business all around the world and sending its military away to protect those interests for 150 years,” Mr. Shen said. “Now, what the United States has done in the past, China will do again.”

However, while China is free to pursue its political ambitions, its presence will most definitely have a negative impact on Djibouti’s freedoms. Beijing’s strict policy of noninterference means that President Ismael Omar Guelleh knows that Beijing will not be critical of his bid to run for a fourth term as president this coming April.

Ever since he inherited the presidency from his uncle in 1999, Guelleh has used a combination of coercion and bribery to keep his hold on power. In 2010 he amended the constitution and scrapped term limits, reneging on earlier promises to run for no more than two terms.

Since then the country has continued its slide down the international rankings for press freedom and human rights and political instability has grown. In 2014, Djibouti suffered its first terrorist attack against Western personnel in the country, stoking fears that the presence of foreign soldiers in a poor, oppressed Muslim country could provide a fertile breeding ground for Islamic extremism. And last December, up to 19 opposition activists were killed when police opened fire at a religious procession, prompting the International Criminal Court to officially place Djibouti on its watch list.

While Guelleh has promised to transform the country into Africa’s Dubai or Singapore, feverishly courting Beijing and Washington for continued financial assistance, the upcoming presidential elections will most likely dispel the fiction that Djibouti and its people are actually benefiting from international attention.

The post China’s Military Pivot to Africa just got Serious appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

From Iraq to Syria, in Lebanon and in Yemen, both are competing for dominance in an ever-deepening tussle for supremacy across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Yet to understand what may happen in the coming years, is to push past the one-tracked, sectarian explanation of current hostilities, and to construct a more multi-faceted and profound, realist-oriented discussion of the conflict.

The ‘tool’ of sectarianism

Toby Mathieson- in discussion with the Council on Foreign Relations- described Riyadh’s use of sectarianism as a ‘tool they use’ to mobilize Sunni support both at home, and across the MENA region. Former US State Department adviser, Vali Nasr, concurs, attributing Nimr’s execution to a Saudi desire to ‘rally Sunnis at home’, as well as to shore up Sunni support from a variety of regional actors.

For Riyadh, a mobilization of internal and external Sunni support is necessary for purely realist reasons – to reinforce the House of Saud’s legitimacy, and subsequently to guarantee its survival, in the face of a revitalized Iran.

The hastily convened ‘Islamic Military Alliance (sans Iran and Iraq) is a convenient sectarian front for what is ostensibly a zero-sum competition for leverage in the Middle East. Further evidence abounds with the Saudis’ role in attempting a rapprochement between wary Sunni ‘bedfellows’, Egypt and Turkey.

Quite simply, Saudi Arabia is using the highly divisive issue of sectarianism to shroud its true intentions – to prevent the hegemonic rise of a re-energized and unshackled Iran. Its policy actions for a number of decades point to such a conclusion.

The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 was designed to counter Iran’s rise after its 1979 Islamic Revolution, and to support Saddam in his nearly decade-long conflict with Iran.

Iranian rancor at Saudi support for Saddam still remains to this day. The Islamic Military Alliance must be viewed in the same light as the formation of the GCC.

An attempt to assuage intra-Sunni squabbles (in the case of Turkey and Egypt) is a further policy prescription by which Riyadh can present a united front against Tehran.

From an Iranian perspective, since the ascension of the Ayatollah Khomeini to the position of Supreme Leader, Iran has sought to buttress links with co-religionists across the region, forming a Shiite crescent comprising Assad’s Alawites and Lebanon’s militant group, Hezbollah.

This ‘crescent’ is wholly fuelled by Iranian desires to return to what Tehran sees as its rightful place within the Middle Eastern order – as the true regional hegemon; a re-Persianization of Iran’s status if you will. Covert support for Yemen’s Shiite Houthi rebels is additional sign of Iranian strategic designs on the MENA region. Iranian exportation of its Shiite ideology across the region must therefore be understood within the context of a regional balance of power, and Iranian attempts to dominate as it has done so before.

Saudi insecurity

The Saudi kingdom is afraid. Its grip on power is predicated upon its religious legitimacy and the social contract that binds the House of Saud to its citizens, in a sentence – bountiful financial benefit in exchange for continued support. Both of these legitimizing tenets have been jeopardized in the past year, through the Hajj disaster and the global collapse of the oil price.

Riyadh has been forced to dig into its (admittedly huge) foreign exchange reserves. It has also announced its first cut to benefits. Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has even announced that Aramco will be partly privatized. Saudi decision-making has always been of a politically realist nature. For the Al Saud family, survival is the goal. Thus its extraneous actions will always be predicated upon ensuring the regime and the state’s survival.

Currently, Riyadh is also facing the very real threat of the Islamic State, which looms large on its border, and even within the kingdom. Thus aside from its regional hegemonic battle with Iran, the House of Saud is being bedeviled by what it views as a number of existential threats.

Nimr’s execution can thus be understood as a Saudi ploy to illustrate its might and its determination to meet what it perceives as existential threats, with overwhelming force. Playing the anti-Shiite card is one small part of this strategy.

Saudi insecurity has also been irretrievably heightened by the Iranian nuclear deal, which Riyadh fears will draw Tehran closer to the United States. Since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, Riyadh has dominated America’s Middle Eastern relations. Thus with Iran slowly being accepted back into the international fold, a great Saudi fear is that in any future clashes between Riyadh and Tehran, Washington could conceivably side with Riyadh’s great enemy, a wholly unpalatable scenario for the Saudi rulers.

NO to direct confrontation

Today’s hostilities do not point towards a shift from cold to hot in what is already an extremely precarious situation.

The Saudis’ military capacity does not match up to the Iranians. Iran has around 500,000 ground troops, compared to less than 200,000 for the Saudis. From an economic perspective, oil sustains the Saudi regime. Oil revenue is used to buy support within the kingdom and friends outside of the kingdom.

The majority of this oil lies in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, a demographic disaster, as the area is predominantly Shiite. Therefore it is vital for Saudi Arabia not to incite trouble (or too much trouble) with Iran so as to ensure its safeguarding of the fundamental Eastern province.

Moreover, Iran will not want to jeopardize its recent welcome back into the international fold and the ensuing lifting of sanctions on the Iranian economy. As a longstanding US ally, Saudi Arabia would expect to receive American support, making overt Iranian aggression against Riyadh unlikely.

What will happen is an intensification of proxy Saudi-Iranian conflicts across the MENA region. Saudi military largesse in Yemen – estimated to be costing the kingdom in Riyadh the princely sum of $1 billion a month – is unlikely to be discontinued. The war shows few signs of abating, with recent talk of a ceasefire failing to staunch the frighteningly large amount of civilian deaths (said to be at nearly 3,000 according to the UN). Nimr’s execution has put a stake through the heart of any Yemeni peace process.

Nimr’s death is also likely to reduce the likelihood of an agreement on the Syrian track in Vienna, as both the Saudis and Iran both reinforce their stances behind their respective Syrian clients. Iran will harden its resolve to see Assad remain in power, while the Saudis will continue to support anti-Assad rebels in Syria, ploughing money and arms into extremist hands.

A solely sectarian-based argument as the catalyst behind the Saudi-Iranian conflict is missing the wider point of international relations. Of the recent spate of Saudi executions, only 4 (out of 47) were Shiite. Contrary to noise emanating from the White House, Nimr was not all that he was cracked up to be. He had clear, public links to Hezbollah al-Hejaz, an armed, Khomeinist group, highly active in the Saudis’ Eastern Province. Nimr has called for an armed struggle against the ‘illegitimate’ Saudi regime. Hezbollah al-Hejaz was even behind the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, which killed numerous Americans.

Instead, the death of Nimr will serve to intensify the Middle Eastern, geopolitical competition of the past decade, as both sides seeks to shore up their claims of regional (and religious) leadership.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by GRI analyst Sam Julius.

The post Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War’ Uses Sectarianism As Tool appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Written by Matthew Barbari

While Americans are focusing on the upcoming U.S. Presidential elections, the United Nations is beginning its own election season. With current Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon term ending this year, the search for his replacement has begun. The UN has stated that it wants this current election to be the most transparent. The difficulty with the nomination revolves around the approval needed from the permanent members of the UN Security Council—The United States, The United Kingdom, France, Russia and China—which have veto power over who is selected for the position.

Qualifications

There is a push for the Secretary-General to be from a region of the world that has yet to be represented, which is the case of Eastern Europe. They must have support from their government, as well as the support from most countries in the region. Previous experience in foreign affairs as well as the ability to communicate fluently in the official UN languages (minimum of 2) is required for the candidate.

This is also the first time that the calls for a woman Secretary-General are being adequately met. Many groups such as the 1 for 7 Billion campaign have called for a woman in the highest office of the United Nations. Under Ban Ki-Moon and the Sustainable Development Goals initiative, the issues of gender equality and the rights of women have been targeted as areas of improvement throughout the world.

Many critics of the UN would point out that only 25% of top UN positions are occupied by women. A major step in the fight for gender equality would be to have a woman as the face of the UN. These are the four current nominees with the best credentials and most support:

Irina Bokova

Bulgaria’s candidate for the position is considered to be the front-runner. The current Director-General of UNESCO as well as former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador, Bokova has a long and respected track record within the United Nations. With the ability to speak several languages fluently, as well as being highly respected for her communication and passion towards peacekeeping and dialogue, she enjoys support from the five Security Council permanent members.

Vuk Jeremić

Serbia’s candidate is the former president of the 67th Session of the General Assembly Vuk Jeremić. Jeremić is another strong candidate considering his work within the UN as well as his support for women’s education, calling for a United Nations Youth Assembly to hear Women’s Rights advocate Malala Yousafzai speak on her struggle for equal education rights in Pakistan. Jeremić had been selected as a potential candidate back in 2012 but was held back by his poor reputation among other countries in the region due to his steadfast denouncement of the 2008 Kosovo declaration of independence from Serbia.

Danilo Türk

The former President of Slovenia, Danilo Türk brings decades of experience working in the United Nations to his potential appointment as Secretary-General. Türk has overwhelming support from his home country as well as the rest of Eastern Europe. Starting as the Representative of Slovenia, Türk has been within the UN system for nearly 30 years, spending time as Assistant Secretary-General under Kofi Annan, as well as a member of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council. His experience and respect make him a very popular candidate and his history of supporting human and gender rights has garnered a lot of support.

Vesna Pusić

One of the founding members of the Croatian People’s Party, Vesna Pusić is a popular candidate for the next Secretary-General due to her support for gender equality, LGBT rights and liberal democracy. Having spent five years as the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs for Croatia she has some experience in foreign affairs. Her lack of United Nations experience is a negative as well as her very vocal support for the LGBT community might not be well received in Moscow.

The post Finding the next UN Secretary-General appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On Sunday, Pyongyang launched a long-range missile, despite the protests of the United States, South Korea and Japan that have immediately condemned the initiative as a further outrageous violation of the UN sanctions, preventing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from using any ballistic missiles technology. The UN Security Council promptly summoned an emergency meeting to express its strong condemnation. While China still opposes expanding sanctions on the DPRK, Washington has recently stressed its determination to support South Korea and Japan against the threat represented by the DPRK nuclear ambitions.

During the last few weeks, Washington has coordinated an intense diplomatic offensive, urging for a Chinese intervention in response to the dangerous escalation characterizing the latest missile crisis. Few weeks ago, Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Beijing to make the case for a more proactive Chinese role over the issue of the North Korea’s nuclear program, the main threat to the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

While both countries have agreed upon the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, Beijing has strongly stressed the need of supporting diplomatic initiatives, aiming to strengthen the status quo in the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK’s nuclear program activities have intensified after the alleged announcement concerning the North Korea’s acquisition of thermonuclear weapons, causing the unanimous condemnation of Japan, the United States and South Korea while China and Russia have expressed serious concerns about consequences of the DPRK nuclear program.

Albeit, China and the DPRK have shared a certain level of ideological affinity, their strategic partnership has waned over the last two decades. Beijing remains the DPRK’s biggest trade partner, providing a vital food and oil supply lifeline. But after the leadership change in North Korea, relations have cooled down. Kim Jung-un took the power in 2011, and quickly set the North Korean nuclear program as one of the top priorities for the regime. However, despite the evident erosion of China’s ability to use its leverage on Pyongyang, Washington demands from Beijing a more steadfast role with regard to the evolution of the Korean crisis.

Chinese interest in the Korean Peninsula

Since the end of the Korean War, Chinese leaders have valued the preservation of the balance of the power in the Korean Peninsula as the most important precondition for regional stability. To preserve the status quo, China strongly opposes the rise of the DRPK’s as a nuclear power. The pragmatic Chinese leadership is not per se concerned with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea but rather, it is worried about the consequences of a growing level of insecurity among the neighboring countries such as Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan, inclined to acquire nuclear weapons of their own  as a source of deterrence.

Eventually, the North Korean nuclear program could push Seoul and Washington to pursue a military intervention, resulting in a reunited Korea under the control of the South and an increased American military presence in  China’s backyard. Since the partition of the peninsula, the DPRK has played an important role as a buffer state between China and the South Korea where more than 30.000 U.S. troops are currently stationed. Moreover, this scenario could increase tensions between China and Washington and its allies, given Beijing’s growing perception a strategic containment fostered by Washington as part of the “pivot to Asia” launched by the Obama Administration in 2011.

From an economic perspective, the event of the collapse and assimilation of the North Korea would trigger a severe humanitarian crisis. This would be a serious challenge to the Chinese leadership, undermining its role in a delicate phase of transition that is currently characterizing President Xi’s rule. Consequently, preventing any alterations in the current Korean peninsula architecture is the main priority for Beijing.

The harsh rule that has characterized Kim Jong Un’ leadership keeps irritating Beijing especially after the execution of Jan Sung-taek in 2013. Due to his close relations with Beijing and role as a supervisor of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) located in the northeast provinces, close to the border, the execution of Jan Sung-taek was considered by many China watchers as a clear attempt to undermine Beijing’s influence while sending a warning to those opposing Kim Jong Un’s rule.

After the Jan Sung-taek incident, Beijing’s attempts to maintain a strong paternal influence over Kim Jong Un have produced limited results. Few days ago the special envoy for Korean affairs Wu Dawei returned to Beijing empty-handed. Additionally, recent remarks from the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang have alimented the speculations about China’s tense relations with Pyongyang on the nuclear issue.

Washington’s view

The challenge represented by the DPRK’s nuclear program unveils Washington’s concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. Besides threatening regional and global security, the advancement of Pyongyang’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities is eroding the international community’s perceived ability to compel nations to abide by rules and regulations expressed by the principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

As mentioned earlier, China does not fear the DPRK as a nuclear power, yet the implications for the United States are different. Pyongyang’s ability to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the foreseeable future would enable the DPRK to strike targets within the continental U.S. in addition to the existing nuclear threat to neighboring countries.

(Source: International Maritime Organization, retrieved from Agence France Press)

Indeed, South Korea and Japan have increased the level of cooperation with Washington through the expansion of trilateral military exercises, improving the level of preparedness required for intercepting missile strikes. In the recent years, the impact of the nuclear threat has induced South Korea to take a more assertive stand against Pyongyang’s provocations. Japan, under Abe’s leadership, has launched a comprehensive package of security reforms to allow Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to fight alongside the U.S. troops after more than 70 years of self-imposed restrictions.

Many analysts in Washington have stressed the correlations between the advancement of the DPRK’s nuclear program and the growing instability of the young Kim Jong Un’s regime. Over the last three years, Kim Jong Un’s leadership has been characterized by a furious attempt to follow the steps of his grandfather Kim Il-Sung, the dynasty founder worshipped by millions of North Korean as a demigod.

However, the sudden appointment of Kim Jong Un as successor has surely left many influent members of the Kims close entourage skeptical about his real ability to rule. Beyond the propaganda façade, characterized by the blind adoration toward Kim Jong Un, his trembling power has mostly relied on purging powerful members of the party and granting privileges to his closest associates, following a pattern laid out elites selectorate model theory, common in authoritarian regimes.

Nowadays, Washington is calling Beijing for more significant and impactful sanctions to force the DPRK to abandon its nuclear ambitions. In order to achieve this goal, China is expected to use its leverage to bring Pyongyang back to the table of negotiations. Additionally, from Washington’s perspective, given its aspirations as a rising power, committed to contributing to the global peace and security, China should share  the responsibilities with the United States. It remains uncertain how President Xi will deal with the issue, but it is certain that the success or failure of Chinese diplomacy will strongly impact the region’s security environment.

 

The post Beijing and Washington: An Uneasy Balance in the Korean Peninsula appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Last week, Twitter announced that it suspended 125,000 accounts since the middle of 2015 that it suspected of “threatening or promoting terrorist acts, primarily related to ISIS.” This statement was the first of its kind from one of the world’s most popular social media platforms and a favorite among extremist groups.

Twitter’s actions against ISIS accounts are not unique. Internet companies, especially those that manage massive social media platforms, have been combating a flood of terrorist propaganda that is saturating the digital landscape.

However, Twitter’s very public statement amounts to a declaration of war against ISIS contrasts with its contemporaries; many of whom chose to take a far less transparent stand in publicizing suspension activities against ISIS and other extremist groups.

ISIS has become so popular so fast that governments are struggling to keep up with the parasitic spread of its appeal. Twitter, being the preferred medium for recruitment, is facing a formidable challenge in its attempt to stop or, at the very least, stymie the proliferation of social media based propaganda operations.

The apocalyptic narrative ISIS is preaching has been buoyed by a grasp on the importance of creating and harnessing a prolific social media campaign that is capable of broadcasting a compelling narrative interlaced with religious extremism: in essence creating a Jihadist highlight reel showcasing its accomplishments to adherents across the globe.

The skills demonstrated on social media platforms are not that dissimilar to what the average millennial is capable of doing, but ISIS is the first terrorist organization to use it to such great effect. The ability of ISIS to spin the narrative to fit specific objectives makes offering up a counter-narrative very challenging—especially considering the lack of credibility Western nations have in regions where ISIS’ message is most popular. As long as ISIS is perceived to be winning the fight to establish a caliphate, whether based in fact or fiction, that message will continue to attract followers.

Twitter has dedicated a considerable amount of time and resources into identifying and suspending ISIS-related Twitter accounts. Unfortunately, given the nature of social media platforms and the anonymity of the internet in general, its efforts to curb ISIS participation is becoming a frustrating game of “whack-a-mole”; but that’s not to say that these efforts are without merit. The ramifications of not trimming the proverbial weeds, as it were, would be incredibly harmful, especially considering the alarming rate of metastasis in ISIS’s presence on social media.

It requires a tremendous amount of effort for ISIS to reconstitute social media networks that have been lost to account suspension—especially the type of massive crackdowns that Twitter announced. The rationale behind utilizing a comprehensive campaign of account suspensions to curb ISIS participation on Twitter is simple: if ISIS is spending its time recreating social media accounts lost to suspensions then it will spend less time spent actually operating those accounts to create and disseminate propaganda.

A study conducted by the Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World found that in September 2014, 8% of ISIS’s online activity was being dedicated to reconstituting its social media network as a result of increased suspensions. The Brookings’ study also states “the pace of account creations has lagged behind the pace of suspensions,” which is a positive sign that an increased suspension regime can have a significant impact.

Jared Cohen, Director of Google Ideas and Senior Fellow at The Council on Foreign Relations, while speaking at the Royal Institute of International Affairs discussed the idea of relegating ISIS to the outer fringes of the Internet, into the dark Web, the open-source network that lets you navigate the Internet anonymously—known as Tor.

These obscure and far-flung regions of the Internet, while difficult to track and monitor, are also difficult for the average person to access and require a higher degree of computer proficiency to operate—it’s not the prime digital advertising space that ISIS would prefer.

Traditionally, the process of radicalization has occurred directly, person to person. However, in the age of pervasive social media platforms and systemic access to the Internet, the gulf that previously separated a radical cleric in Raqqa and a potential adherent in Paris has been dramatically reduced. In the 21st century, it’s the indirect radicalization of an individual, or “self-radicalization,” that is proving the most difficult to combat.

The post Twitter, ISIS and Social Media Whack-a-Mole appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Sri Lanka has always been described as the Pearl of the Indian Ocean. It is never easy for a small island nation to remain a completely sovereign while being located just a few dozen miles off the coast of a behemoth-like country with 1 billion people. Thus, the power relations are distorted in all aspects. No wonder Sri Lankan scholars and journalists refer to India as “big brother.”

The cultural and religious affinities are present in a vibrant history of economic and social interactions. But concurrently Sri Lanka has also tried to remain independent from the politics and conflicts of India, ensuring that a unique identity was developed for the islanders. Sri Lankan Nationalism has been at the forefront of trying to protect that identity.

The long running relationship between the two countries has had quite a few hiccups. The latest has been over the furthering of the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement. It has been under negotiations since 2003 as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), now renamed the Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement (ETCA).

From the very beginning the CEPA has been  controversial in Sri Lanka. There has massive civil society protests against any government’s attempt to finalize the agreement. The current national unity government has also faced the same issue with ETCA.

Trade between the two countries is obviously one sided. In 2014, while Sri Lanka exported $700 million worth to India while India exported $3.1 billion worth to Sri Lanka. It is a massive trade gap for Sri Lanka, but it can do little about it. Indian products have a huge price advantage over Sri Lankan’s.

Ingrained in the memory of many middle aged Sri Lankans are the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accords. The accords involved altering Sri Lanka’s constitution by adding the 13th amendment and introducing a large Indian Peacekeeping Force. To them, their motherland was once again invaded by Indians just 40 years after the British marched away. So now when the government says a new agreement could allow Indians to enter the workforce in the shipbuilding and IT  industries, they see another invasion.

However it is worthwhile to take a brief look into the fledging Sri Lankan shipbuilding and IT industries. The shipbuilding is limited to basically two main operations. First is the Colombo Dockyard Company which is considered to be one of the leading dry-dock complexes in the South Asian region with a significant annual revenue. Second is the Sri Lankan Navy small  vessel construction for its use in littoral waters. Expanding these operations in the short term  will be tough due to the lack of skilled labor.

On the other hand the IT industry has been booming and expanding ever since the mid 2000s. Today,Sri Lanka has up to 80,000 IT professionals as a whole.  Firms like WSO2, Millenium and Leapset/CAKE Labs are entrepreneurial, earning  millions of dollars in revenues, with operations even in Silicon Valley.

However, entrepreneurs do confess that there is a dearth of skilled graduates for recruitment within Sri Lanka. The government wants to increase the IT export revenue five fold by 2020 requiring massive expansions.

Yet where the investments will come is an issue. The Sri Lankan IT industry resists opening up to foreign investors and labor, fearing that it could destroy budding local entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka already has its own version of Uber, Pick me,  Uber’s biggest local competition.

Liberal minded intellectuals and government politicians are calling the ETCA agreement a step forward to making Sri Lankan industries more competitive. Nationalists are calling it a threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and identity.

However, Sri Lanka’s identity is already defined by a number of communities who have migrated to the island over the centuries. The Moors, Malay, South Indian estate workers, Gujarati and Chinese traders just to name a few.

Sri Lanka’s current fiscal status quo is starving for Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). The island state risks to lose its fiscal autonomy if it has to default on its debt servicing and falls under the thumb of the IMF. If properly utilized by the government, ETCA can be used to present Sri Lanka as having a liberal attitude toward trade and foreign investment.

Nationalism has played a decisive role in Sri Lanka ever since it became Asia’s first democracy in 1933. Politicians know exactly how to use it to serve their own interests. Nationalism of the Sinhalese majority turned chauvinism sparked the civil war and massive nationalization of private enterprises and property.

It drowned the country’s dreams of becoming the “Gateway to Asia” despite its geographic location. Today, government action towards recreating that dream is being opposed by nationalism once again. Some politicians are manipulating nationalism, claiming to be defending the sovereignty that Sri Lanka is not losing, only to return to power.

The post Sri Lanka : Nationalism & Indian Free Trade appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

How should the world respond to the extending reach of radical movements like Islamic State, al Qaeda and Boko Haram across today’s battlefields?

(Own report) - The EU is exerting massive pressure to prevent the new Portuguese government from reversing austerity measures. Last Friday, the EU Commission conditionally accepted - with stipulations - Prime Minister António Costa's Draft Budget Plan aimed at phasing out the austerity policy. Brussels has already scheduled a budget reassessment for the spring. During her meeting with Costa, the day of the Commission's decision, Angela Merkel urged Portugal's prime minister to continue to pursue his predecessor Pedro Passos Coelho's austerity policy. Powerful financial market actors, notably the Commerzbank, are also opposing the democratically elected Prime Minister. The socialist minority government - supported by smaller leftwing parties - is facing a crucial test.

French President Hollande at the COP21 in Paris.

Written by Matthew Barbari

When delegates from nearly 200 countries convened in Paris in late November 2015, many were hopeful about the 21st yearly session of the Conference of the Parties or COP21. It could be a watershed moment when the world would unite and finally put forth a plan to combat climate change.

While similar sentiment was shared before the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 and the meeting in Kyoto in 1997, there was a feeling that now—with China, India and the United States on board—a universal climate policy could be agreed upon.

This, however, is not the end of the story. While an agreement was reached, many experts within the scientific community remain dissatisfied. The watershed moment for politicians arguing for their respective countries was not what environmentalists had envisioned, with many criticizing the agreement as nothing more than too little, too late.

Dr. James E. Hansen, a highly respected authority within the climate science community, sees the prospect of the Paris Agreement as “just worthless words,” and criticizing it as “no action, just promises.” Hansen makes a direct reference to the provision within the agreement that allows countries to set their own standards of emissions to keep the global temperature from rising by 2 degrees Celsius. Further arguments are also made about how much money developed countries should provide to developing ones in order to limit the latter’s carbon emissions, as well as any prevent any catastrophic events that climate change could trigger.

Dr. Hansen argues that the notion that renewable energy sources will magically replace countries’ dependence on fossil fuels is silly as long as those fuels remain the cheapest source of energy production. Dr. Hansen also argues for an increase in nuclear energy, which puts him at odds with some within the community.

He believes that nuclear power is necessary to combat climate change as it provides a massive source of energy that does not involve burning fossil fuels. Those against nuclear power point to the massive construction costs of nuclear facilities, events such as the disaster at Chernobyl and Fukushima power plants or the issue of getting rid of nuclear waste.

While the Paris Agreement aims high, it also limits itself to being nothing more than a promise: no penalties are imposed should nations not reach their own targets for limiting carbon emission and developing renewable energy sources. There are also several provisions within the agreement that are not binding, such as the fact that countries can withdraw from the agreement at any time without any penalties.

Further issues arise with the 2 degrees target. Environmentalists argue that this temperature rise would still cause a drastic change in the global climate and that the cuts need to be more severe. This is the biggest concern with the Paris Agreement: it does not attempt to stop climate change but only to mitigate the damages.

Besides these criticisms, there is much positive about the agreement. First, there is a formal agreement, as previous attempts have seen major powers such as the U.S. and China walk out of meetings. The biggest challenge of a universal agreement is the different level of economic development of each individual countries combined to the inherent asymmetry of climate change effects. This is why the agreement pushes for each country to develop a climate policy for themselves.

While the agreement might not have gone as far as some would have liked, it shows that nations around the globe are now finally getting serious about climate change. And that is something to be hopeful about.

The post Paris Climate Agreement: Mixed Reviews appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Bowe Bergdahl thought the Army was failing him and other soldiers, but one incident pushed him over the edge

The Chabahar port agreement is set to be finalized in the upcoming trilateral meeting in Delhi. With all players slated to benefit, Chabahar looks like a win-win for all parties.

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After the identification of four cases of Lassa fever in Benin, the Government, backed by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has immediately launched started a response against the epidemic, the agencies announced today.