Diplomacy & Crisis News

James Holmes

Security, Americas

Steam isn’t dead, but it is a technology of the past—just like 16-inch guns.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The function of a capital ship is a vessel that can both give out punishment and receive it. This was the role battleships filled during the Second World War, and it's a need that hasn't entirely gone away. But bringing the old behemoths themselves back would present a dizzying array of logistical problems.

There’s a mystique to battleships.

Whenever inside-the-Beltway dwellers debate how to bulk up the U.S. Navy fleet, odds are sentimentalists will clamor to return the Iowa-class dreadnoughts to service. Nor is the idea of bringing back grizzled World War II veterans as zany as it sounds. We aren’t talking equipping the 1914-vintage USS Texas with superweapons to blast the Soviet Navy, or resurrecting the sunken Imperial Japanese Navy superbattleship Yamato for duty in outer space, or keeping USS Missouri battleworthy in case aliens menace the Hawaiian Islands. Such proposals are not mere whimsy.

Built to duel Japan in World War II, in fact, battleships were recommissioned for the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War. The last returned to action in 1988. The Iowa class sat in mothballs for about three decades after Korea (except for USS New Jersey, which returned to duty briefly during the Vietnam War). That’s about how long the battlewagons have been in retirement since the Cold War. History thus seems to indicate they could stage yet another comeback. At this remove from their past lives, though, it’s doubtful in the extreme that the operational return on investment would repay the cost, effort, and human capital necessary to bring them back to life.

Numbers deceive. It cost the U.S. Navy $1.7 billion in 1988 dollars to put four battlewagons back in service during the Reagan naval buildup. That comes to about $878 million per hull in 2017 dollars. This figure implies the navy could refurbish two ships bristling with firepower for the price of one Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. One copy of the latest-model Burke will set the taxpayers back $1.9 billion according to Congressional Budget Office figures. Two for the price of one: a low, low price! Or, better yet, the navy could get two battlewagons for the price of three littoral combat ships—the modern equivalent of gunboats. Sounds like a good deal all around.

But colossal practical difficulties would work against reactivating the dreadnoughts at low cost, despite these superficially plausible figures. First of all, the vessels no longer belong to the U.S. Navy. They’re museums. New Jersey and Missouri were struck from the navy list during the 1990s. Engineers preserved Iowa and Wisconsin in “reactivation” status for quite some time, meaning they hypothetically could return to duty. But they too were struck from the rolls, in 2006. Sure, the U.S. government could probably get them back during a national emergency, but resolving legal complications would consume time and money in peacetime.

Second, chronological age matters. A standard talking point among battleship enthusiasts holds that the Iowas resemble a little old lady’s car, an aged auto with little mileage on the odometer. A used-car salesman would laud its longevity, assuring would-be buyers they could put lots more miles on it. This too makes intuitive sense. My old ship, USS Wisconsin, amassed just fourteen years of steaming time despite deploying for World War II, Korea, and Desert Storm. At a time when the U.S. Navy hopes to wring fifty years of life out of aircraft carriers and forty out of cruisers and destroyers, refitted battleships could seemingly serve for decades to come.

And it is true: stout battleship hulls could doubtless withstand the rigors of sea service. But what about their internals? Mechanical age tells only part of the story. Had the Iowa class remained in continuous service, with regular upkeep and overhauls, they probably could have steamed around for decades. After all, the World War II flattop USS Lexington served until 1991, the same year the Iowas retired. But they didn’t get that treatment during the decades they spent slumbering. As a consequence, battleships were already hard ships to maintain a quarter-century ago. Sailors had to scavenge spares from still older battleships. Machinists, welders, and shipfitters were constantly on the go fabricating replacements for worn-out parts dating from the 1930s or 1940s.

This problem would be still worse another quarter-century on, and a decade-plus after the navy stopped preserving the vessels and their innards. Managing that problem would be far more expensive. An old joke among yachtsmen holds that a boat is a hole in the water into which the owner dumps money. A battleship would represent a far bigger hole in the water, devouring taxpayer dollars in bulk. Even if the U.S. Navy could reactivate the Iowas for a pittance, the cost of operating and maintaining them could prove prohibitive. That’s why they were shut down in the 1990s, and time has done nothing to ease that remorseless logic.

Third, what about the big guns the Iowa class sports—naval rifles able to fling projectiles weighing the same as a VW Bug over twenty miles? These are the battleships’ signature weapon, and there is no counterpart to them in today’s fleet. Massive firepower might seem to justify the expense of recommissioning and maintaining the ships. But gun barrels wear out after being fired enough times. No one has manufactured replacement barrels for 16-inch, 50-caliber guns in decades, and the inventory of spares has evidently been scrapped or donated to museums. That shortage would cap the battleships’ combat usefulness.

Nor, evidently, is there any safe ammunition for battleship big guns to fire. We used 1950s-vintage 16-inch rounds and powder during the 1980s and 1990s. Any such rounds still in existence are now over sixty years old, while the U.S. Navy is apparently looking to demilitarize and dispose of them. Gearing up to produce barrels and ammunition in small batches would represent a nonstarter for defense firms. The navy recently canceled the destroyer USS Zumwalt’s advanced gun rounds because costs spiraled above $800,000 apiece. That was a function of ordering few munitions for what is just a three-ship class. Ammunition was simply unaffordable. Modernized Iowas would find themselves in the same predicament, if not more so.

And lastly, it’s unclear where the U.S. Navy would find the human expertise to operate 16-inch gun turrets or the M-type Babcock & Wilcox boilers that propel and power battleships. No one has trained on these systems since 1991, meaning experts in using and maintaining them have, ahem, aged and grown rusty at their profession. Heck, steam engineers are in short supply, full stop, as the navy turns to electric drive, gas turbines, and diesel engines to propel its ships. Older amphibious helicopter docks (LHDs) are steam-powered, but even this contingent is getting a gradual divorce from steam as newer LHDs driven by gas turbines join the fleet while their steam-propelled forebears approach decommissioning.

Steam isn’t dead, then, but it is a technology of the past—just like 16-inch guns. Technicians are few and dwindling in numbers while battleship crews would demand them in large numbers. I rank among the youngest mariners to have operated battleship guns and propulsion-plant machinery in yesteryear, and trust me, folks: you don’t want the U.S. Navy conscripting me to regain my proficiency in engineering and weapons after twenty-six years away from it, let alone training youngsters to operate elderly hardware themselves. In short, it’s as tough to regenerate human capital as it is to rejuvenate the material dimension after a long lapse. The human factor—all by itself—could constitute a showstopper for battleship reactivation.

Battleships still have much to contribute to fleet design, just not as active surface combatants. Alfred Thayer Mahan describes a capital ship—the core of any battle fleet—as a vessel able to dish out and absorb punishment against a peer navy. While surface combatants pack plenty of offensive punch nowadays, the innate capacity to take a punch is something that has been lost in today’s lightly armored warships. Naval architects could do worse than study the battleships’ history and design philosophy, rediscovering what it means to construct a true capital ship. The U.S. Navy would be better off for their inquiry.

Let’s learn what we can from the past—but leave battleship reactivation to science fiction.

James Holmes is Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over the Pacific. This article was first published in 2019.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Kyle Mizokami

Security, Middle East

Missile and suicide boats could be part of the trick.

Key point: The catch would be to lure the U.S. ships in close and near Iran's coastline. From there, hidden missile batteries could strike.

Recent events, particularly the downing of a U.S. Navy MQ-4 Triton by Iranian military forces, again raise the possibility of war between the United States and Iran. The on again, off again standoff between Washington and Tehran, now in its fourth decade is periodically instigated by both sides, and each time Iran grows stronger. If Iran decides to stage an attack against a larger target, such as an American destroyer or even aircraft carrier, how might it use its missile force to do so? 

Iran has invested considerable resources in its ballistic missile forces over the past forty years, for the same reason China and North Korea did: military aviation is an expensive proposition, and developing and maintaining an air force to rival the United States is very expensive indeed. Ballistic missiles offer a relatively inexpensive way to launch conventional, chemical, biological, and even nuclear payloads long distances. As an added bonus intercepting such missiles is complex and itself an expensive undertaking. All three countries developed large ballistic missile arsenals of varying sophistication, occasionally trading in illicit information among themselves and others. 

Iran, as The National Interest pointed out last month, has a large and varied ballistic missile arsenal. It is difficult to pin down with certainty Iran’s capabilities, as information inside the country is tightly controlled and the government often exaggerates or is evasive regarding its military capabilities. For the purposes of this article, we’ll assume that Iran possesses the missiles as described by The National Interest, such as missiles with infra-red seekers for terminal guidance (Fateh Mobin) and an anti-ship ballistic missile with a 434-mile range. Iran would need such a capability to even consider hitting ships at sea. 

Perhaps just as important as having ballistic missiles is the “kill chain” of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets required to keep constant tabs on a U.S. Navy battle group, allowing Iran’s missileers to launch their missiles with the most current targeting information available. U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and their escorts can steam at speeds of up to 35 knots, making information even just an hour old useless for targeting purposes. 

Experts reckon that China will have a similar requirement for persistent ISR across the vastness of the Pacific, but Iran will have a considerably easier task. The Islamic Republic’s southern borders run the length of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, a coastline longer than that of California, Oregon, and Washington combined, and both are less than three hundred miles wide at their widest. Even a country like Iran, lacking sophisticated reconnaissance assets, would find it easy to keep track of something as large as a carrier battle group. Military assets including outdated military aircraft and helicopters, the many small boats and ships of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Iranian intelligence agents, and regime-friendly civilian vessels could keep track of a fleet of U.S. ships relatively easily. 

Iran would likely want to pull an American carrier battle group as close to the Iran coastline as possible. This would allow the country to disperse its fleet of ballistic missiles across a wider area and farther inland, giving them a better chance of escaping detection before launch. U.S. reconnaissance assets such as JSTARS, the RQ-4 Global Hawk, and others can peer into Iran without entering Iranian territory, making detection of missile movements possible without entering Iranian airspace. As Iranian missiles gain in range and sophistication, such missiles could be deployed deeper within the country’s interior where they are more difficult to detect. It is worth keeping in mind Iran is a large country of approximately 636,000 square miles, making it larger than California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Utah combined. 

In the event of an attack, Iran would likely launch every missile it could possibly throw at a carrier strike group, ideally scores or even hundreds of missiles. Even missiles that have no reasonable chance of striking a moving warship, the vast majority of the missile force, would be launched in order to overwhelm the carrier’s defenders with threats. Iran, which pioneered the use of small boats armed with rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machine guns, and artillery rockets during the Iran-Iraq War, has long been a fan of overwhelming enemy forces with obsolete or ineffective weapons to conserve combat power. A missile attack would likely be no different. 

An alert carrier battle group’s defenses, directed by a guided missile cruiser armed with the Aegis Combat System, would likely take out most of the incoming missiles. Shorter-range ballistic missiles launched from the coastline would be engaged with SM-6 air defense missiles, and the more common Standard SM-2 Block IV has a limited anti-ballistic capability. It might be necessary to use SM-3 ballistic missile interceptors against longer-range Iranian missiles. Most Iranian missiles would miss, having never had a reasonable chance of hitting, contributing best as a means of confusing the enemy. 

Could a lucky Iranian missile actually sink an American carrier? It’s unlikely. The missiles with the best chances of hitting, short-range missiles with terminal guidance like the Fateh Mobin, have the smallest warheads and move at the slowest speeds. Such a missile would have to carry a nuclear warhead to pose a mortal threat to a 100,000-ton warship, and Iran lacks the fissile material and expertise to build such a warhead. A smaller target, such as a destroyer, would be more vulnerable but also more difficult to hit.

Even under ideal circumstances, Iran’s missile arsenal is unlikely to pose a credible threat against the U.S. Navy. That having been said, Iran can be expected to continue to develop longer-range missiles with greater throw weights and improved accuracy. The time may come when the Pentagon, out of an abundance of caution, might decline to send carriers beyond the Gulf of Oman--but that time is not now. 

This first appeared in 2014.

Image: Reuters

Jared Keller

Security, Asia

Photos of the J-20 provide an up close and personal look at the fuselage of the new interceptor. But the photos also appear to show a sensor system that looks awfully similar to the Lockheed Martin Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) on the front of the F-35 Lighting II.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Does the sensor system on China's J-20 fighter jet look familiar to you? It should. 

Photos from a few years back of the J-20 provide an up close and personal look at the fuselage of the new interceptor. But the photos also appear to show a sensor system that looks awfully similar to the Lockheed Martin Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) on the front of the F-35 Lighting II.

There’s a reason for this: In 2007, Lockheed Martin dealt with something of a cyber Ocean’s 11 when Chinese hackers stole technical documents related to the development of the F-35. The details on the hack, eventually revealed in documents leaked by Edward Snowden, are just one example of Chinese attempts to steal foreign aviation technology; as recently as 2017, Chinese hackers went after Australian F-35 defense contractors, nabbing even more info on the cutting-edge fighter.

Although the two electro-optical systems pictured above are not identical, they share quite a few similarities in shape and placement: compared to the Eurofighter or Su-57’s electro-optical systems and Infrared Tracking Systems (IRTS), respectively, which are also mounted on top of the fuselage, the differences between the Lockheed Martin and J-20’s Systems are relatively minor. The system’s positioning under the nose of the aircraft also reinforces that the J-20 is probably designed for both long-range strike missions against ground targets and interceptor duties. However, the J-20 EOTS appears to be less capable than the F-35 equivalent, judging by the size and layout of the J-20 EOTS enclosure.

Much about the J-20 is shrouded in secrecy, but the plane is most likely powered by the same two AL-31F engines which are used in the Su-27, a Russian fighter that is capable of a top speed of Mach 2.3. But the J-20 could also be flying with indigenous (but less reliable) WS-10B engines, due to a lack of Russian engines or as a stopgap until the more powerful WS-15 jet engines are ready for operational use. And while parts of the design of the J-20 appear to resemble the F-22 and it’s stealthy curves, these similarities could be skin deep as the angularity on the jet inlets and wings remain quite different, and the J-20 lacks all-aspect stealth. Recently the Indian Air Force claimed they could track the J-20 using the Su-30MKIs electronically scanned ‘Phazotron Zhuk-AE’ radar.

Although the J-20 has been pushed into service, recent problems with the J-15 carrier-based fighter suggest that the Chinese answer to the F-22 isn’t quite ready for prime-time despite propaganda from Chinese-owned media outlets that portray the J-20 as a fully-armed and operational battle station. That certainly sounds familiar …

This first appeared in Task and Purpose here. 

Image: Reuters. 

John Venable

Security, Eurasia

Saturating an area with unmanned hunter-killer systems like the Orbiter 1K and Harop drones can overwhelm even the best air defense artillery and missile systems currently fielded, which is one reason both China and the United States are researching technologies that feature swarms of drones.

Worldwide military use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) or drones has grown by leaps and bounds since the mid-1990s when the first General Atomics MQ-1 Predator took to the air.  Over the last twenty-five years, the number, type, and mission set of drones has expanded considerably, and the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijani conflict suggests that drones will play an increasingly significant role in future conflicts. 

Originally, the Predator served exclusively as a reconnaissance platform. That changed in 2001 when an MQ-1 successfully launched a Hellfire missile and hit its target on a test range in Nevada. 

The MQ-1 and its younger sibling, the MQ-9, have been used as if they were manned light reconnaissance and attack platforms instead of autonomous systems. They have logged more hours per aircraft than any other manned reconnaissance platform and probably more than all manned fighters in the U.S. arsenal. These two aircraft are at the upper end of tactical drones with regard to size, weight, complexity and cost, and they have been incredibly effective for the United States and its allies.

Military UAS platforms in the medium to small categories run from hand-launched, short-range reconnaissance drones with electro-optical/infrared sensors, to medium-sized drones with several hours of endurance that can be used for reconnaissance and/or attack. And every system is capable of delivering significant tactical effects for the warfighter.

In January 2018, a swarm of “home-built” drones carrying small explosive devices attacked Russian forces at Hmeimim Air Base (AB) and Tartus Naval Base in Syria.  While neither the damage inflicted nor the effectiveness of Russian counter-drone systems has been independently verified, there is little doubt that the swarm of thirteen drones presented a significant targeting challenge to the defenders. The small size of the drones and their low radar cross-section made them hard to detect, and recent engagements of state of the art hunter-killer drones prove that, when the drones get through, they are deadly.

In the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Azerbaijanis have employed three different drones against Armenian armor and personnel to great effect. The Turkish Bayraktar TB2 is a large drone, in the same class as the MQ-9 Reaper. It carries laser and infrared-guided anti-tank munitions. The Israeli Obiter 1K and Harop drones have been used for reconnaissance and recovered to fly again, or employed as kamikaze attack drones.  Collectively, these three types of drones reportedly destroyed more than eighty Armenian armored vehicles in the first few weeks of fighting.  Each has a significant loiter capability, and video from the ongoing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict appears to show numerous systems operating in concert.   

Saturating an area with unmanned hunter-killer systems like the Orbiter 1K and Harop drones can overwhelm even the best air defense artillery and missile systems currently fielded, which is one reason both China and the United States are researching technologies that feature swarms of drones. 

China’s recent swarming experiments involve dozens of explosive-filled suicide drones launched simultaneously from specially designed vehicles and aircraft.  Once airborne, the drones can loiter over the battlefield hunting for targets or an operator can designate a target and send the drones to move together and destroy it.

While it may be hard to visualize the size and overwhelming nature of swarming drones, testing conducted by the U.S. Navy in 2016 graphically demonstrated the hopelessness one would feel as a target in the center of such an attack.    

In that test, three FA-18s released 103 micro-drones over China Lake, California. The UAVs executed several missions/maneuvers showing the ability to operate together, deconflict flight paths and then simultaneously attack a single target.  The eyewatering video demonstrates the incredible tactical impact even the smallest drones will have on battlefields of the future.  

For now, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict highlights the deadly mechanisms at play in modern warfare where drones can find and destroy virtually any target on the battlefield.  As long as these unmanned aerial systems have free movement above the enemy, they will wreak havoc on their armor, vehicles and fielded forces.   

America has both a technological edge and decades more operational experience with offensive unmanned aerial systems than its global competitors. While that is a significant advantage, the losses that will come without an effective means of detecting and then countering or destroying the offensive drones of those who would do us harm will be substantial.    

The Defense Department’s first joint strategy to counter small drones is about to hit Defense Secretary Mark Esper’s desk. That’s a step in the right direction. But DARPA and the Defense Department as a whole must put the development of counter-drone systems that can handle swarms of drones near the top of its growing list of priorities.

A twenty-five-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force, John “JV” Venable is a senior research fellow in The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense. 

Image: Reuters

Dov S. Zakheim

Politics, Americas

Donald Trump’s four years in office have exhausted the nation. Even Republican legislators are already beginning to back away from him. Hopefully, sooner rather than later, the country will as well.

Joe Biden has won. The Republicans appear likely to retain control of the Senate; they also have eaten into the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives. For Americans who desperately seek stability, there could not be a better outcome. 

Biden is not a socialist, as Donald Trump alleges. Nor does he favor, or is a favorite of, the extreme left-wing of the Democratic Party. Were the Democrats to pull off a miracle and take over the Senate, for example, if they were to take both Georgia seats should both be contested in that state’s January 11 run-off election, which together with the vice president’s tiebreaker vote would give them a majority, Biden would be unable to prevent a sharp lurch to the Left. He would become a hostage to “the squad” and other extreme progressives in the House and have to cope with Bernie Sanders as chairman of the Senate Budget Committee. It is an unenticing prospect for the vast majority of Americans, and probably for Biden too.  

On the other hand, a Republican majority Senate, with Kentucky’s Mitch McConnell returning as majority leader, would serve as a backstop against the more wild-eyed, high-cost proposals that Bernie Sanders, “the squad” and their fellow travelers might offer. Biden could tell his more progressive supporters that he could not do more than extort a compromise from McConnell.  

The majority leader could pitch the same message to those elements of his own party who hanker after unvarnished Trumpism, be it border walls, further restrictions on immigration, or legislation to undermine the Affordable Care Act. The result of the separate posturing by Biden and McConnell could be deadlock. On the other hand, it could also lead to compromises that might include dealing with the pandemic; responses to China’s theft of intellectual property; immigration reform including writing DACA into law; infrastructure modernization; and the renaming of military facilities currently bearing the names of Confederate officers. To anticipate compromise is not a drug-infused hallucination. After all, Biden and McConnell were colleagues in the Senate for over three decades and both are not strangers to reaching across the political aisle. Moreover, and importantly, and there is little evidence of any personal animosity between them. Indeed, they co-sponsored several bills in the Senate and in 2012 negotiated the extension of most of the 2000 tax cuts that were due to expire, a deal that exasperated the Democratic progressives. 

Donald Trump continues to refuse to concede defeat; he claims the election is rigged and points to Biden’s margins in what he terms “corrupt” democratic cities. He clings desperately to the safety that the White House affords him. Once he leaves office, he will be vulnerable to certain indictment in New York for tax fraud and other criminal violations.  

Trump will rail against his enemies and against standard election procedures. He will pursue a scorched earth policy to the very end. He will press lawsuits as far up the judicial chain as he possibly can. He will issue a flurry of executive orders that reflect the most extreme position that his supporters can conjure up. He will veto any legislation that is put before him. And he will refuse to permit anyone to cooperate with the incoming transition team.  

His four years in office have exhausted the nation. Even Republican legislators are already beginning to back away from him. Hopefully, sooner rather than later, the country will as well. 

Dov S. Zakheim served as the undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the U.S. Department of Defense from 2001–2004 and as the deputy undersecretary of defense (planning and resources) from 1985–1987. He also served as the DoD’s civilian coordinator for Afghan reconstruction from 2002–2004. He is vice chairman of the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

Robert Farley

Security, Asia

Both countries are cooperating more than ever, but would Moscow really help Beijing in that way?

Key point: Russia has the knowledge, but China has the money. Would Moscow help Beijing for the right price?

It appears that China is relying on Russian know-how and experience to develop the reactor for its first nuclear aircraft carrier. As the South China Morning Post reports, China appears to be studying the nuclear reactors on Russia’s largest icebreakers, an approach that the Soviet Union also took when it planned to build nuclear carriers in the 1980s. Specifically, Russia has invited China to bid on the construction of a new class of nuclear icebreaker, necessarily requiring the development of surface-ship based reactors. This approach stands in contrast to how the United States and France developed nuclear reactors for their largest carriers, but probably represents the best choice for China at this point. 

This first appeared earlier and is being republished due to reader interest.

History: 

To appreciate what’s at stake in China’s pursuit of nuclear-powered surface warships, it’s important to review the experience of the United States and the USSR. After the successful development of the USS Nautilus and the Skate class nuclear attack submarines (as well as the merchant ship NS Savannah) provided proof-of-concept regarding nuclear propulsion, the USN began to evaluate nuclear power for surface warships. The first USN nuclear surface warship was the cruiser USS Long Beach, commissioned in 1961. Long Beach was powered by 2 C1WS reactors, generating around 120 MW, enough power to produce a speed of 30 knots for the 17,000-ton cruiser hull. The USN rapidly followed up with USS Enterprise, powered by 8 A2W reactors, each quite similar in construction and output to the C1W. Those reactors generated 120 MW each, translating to 280,000 SHP, driving the 100,000-ton Enterprise at up to 33 knots.

A few other nuclear cruisers and destroyers followed, but the advantages of nuclear power in surface warfare ships was limited by cost. Aircraft carriers were a different story. The Nimitz class, which began to enter service in 1975, use two A4W reactors, each rated at 550 MW. The recently commissioned USS Gerald R. Ford carries two A1B reactors, capable of generating 700 MW. The extra power generation capacity of the Fords has little to do with speed. Rather, the power provides a surplus usable for a variety of different systems, including EMALS and highly sophisticated sensors. Down the road, the extra energy may power point-defense lasers and similar equipment. Overall, the reactors open up space to modernize and modify the Ford-class vessels, keeping them effective for their decades of project life.

The Soviet Experience: 

The Soviet experience was somewhat different. While the Soviets enjoyed considerable success in developing nuclear reactors for submarines, they approached the question of surface warships much more carefully. The first nuclear powered Soviet ship was the icebreaker Lenin, commissioned in 1959 with three OK-150 reactors (90 MW each). Between 1975 and 1990, the Soviets would commission nine more nuclear icebreakers of the Arktika and Taymyr classes, generally displacing between 20,000 and 25,000 tons and carrying two OK-900 reactors, capable of 150 MW. 

These ships provided valuable experience, but the Soviets were slow to make the leap to nuclear-powered surface combatants, in part because Soviet warships were expected to operate closer to home than their U.S. counterparts. In 1974, however, the Soviets began building the first of four ships of the Kirov class, 26,000-ton battlecruisers with both nuclear and conventional propulsion. Reports differ on the power capacity of the two KN-3 reactors, with a range from 150 MW to 300 MW. These reactors would also have powered the Ulyanovsk class supercarriers, a class of ships that was canceled upon the collapse of the USSR. 

What China Wants: 

The Chinese are undoubtedly thinking along lines similar to those of the late Soviets. Expectations for Carrier 004 (003 will be a conventional CATOBAR carrier) suggest a ship roughly the size and sophistication of the Ford-class, which of course would require immense power-generation capabilities. Like the United States, China wants excess power generation in order to field a suite of future weapons and sensors. For this purpose, China needs reactors more powerful than those that it currently uses on its submarines, and building icebreakers for Russia may provide the necessary experience.

This approach stands in contrast to that of the French Navy, which decided to upscale based on experience building nuclear reactors for submarines. While France has enjoyed success with nuclear subs, the Charles De Gaulle is widely believed to be underpowered relative to other fleet carriers. Charles de Gaulle uses two Areva K15 reactors, the same type as employed on French submarines. These reactors provide 150 MW each, but only drive the 43,000-ton carrier some 27 knots. It’s worth noting that India considered, but wisely rejected, the idea of building INS Vishal as a nuclear carrier, largely because of the technical challenges of developing a powerful enough reactor.

Parting Thoughts: 

The idea of using Russian technical data and nuclear know-how certainly makes sense from the perspective of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. The PLAN doesn’t have the luxury of the incremental approach adopted by the United States, and has good reason to find the French approach insufficient to its needs. That the Russians seem okay with letting the Chinese study their icebreakers suggests, once again, that Moscow and Beijing currently see cooperation as in their long-term interests. Of course, nothing will be certain until China’s first nuclear carrier actually enters service, perhaps sometime around 2030.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed here are his personal views and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, the Army War College, or any other department or agency of the U.S. government. This first appeared earlier and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Charlie Gao

Technology, Europe

What is the future of this excellent design?

Here's What You Need to Know: The MiG-31 is the standard long range interceptor of the Russian Air Force and is expected to serve into the 2030s.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’ s Air Defense Forces (VPVO) needed a series of heavy interceptors to patrol its massive borders. Most regular “light” fighters like the early MiGs were not up to the task, as they lacked the range and speed to intercept to rapidly climb and intercept supersonic American bombers, who were expected to zoom over the Arctic to drop bombs on the Soviet Union.

As a result, a specialized class of aircraft was created for this purpose. The first was the Tupolev Tu-28 and Tu-128. These aircraft would lay the template for later interceptors: they were large for good endurance, fast, and were armed solely with missiles.

This design was obsolete from the time it entered service in the 1960s, as the B-58 Hustler that was in service at the time could outpace it. However, the MiG-25 “Foxbat” was also in development at the time. This aircraft would go on to become the definitive interceptor of the VPVO.

Blisteringly fast and armed with the massive R-40 air-to-air missiles, the Foxbat stood ready to defend the Soviet Union’s borders against all threats. Its airframe also saw adaptation into more tactical roles, photo reconnaissance and strike versions of the MiG-25 were created for the Soviet Air Force (VVS).

In the 1980s, the MiG-25 was followed up by the MiG-31, which added in a second weapons systems officer on all models and increased the flight performance, radar and weapons of the craft. Early versions also featured a cannon, but this was quickly deleted once it was determined that such extras were not necessary on a pure interceptor.

Nowadays the MiG-31 is the standard long range interceptor of the Russian Air Force (the VPVO was merged with the VVS in the 1990s) and is expected to serve into the 2030s. A “mid-life upgrade” of the MiG-31 is currently being procured: the MiG-31BSM. This modification integrates many new strike weapons onto the MiG-31 and modernizes most systems. The MiG-31 was also chosen as the primary carrier aircraft for the Kinzhal hypersonic missile.

But in August 2018, Russian outlets announced that experimental design work was beginning on a next generation pure interceptor that is meant to replace the MiG-31. Following the naming convention of Russia’s other next generation aircraft projects (PAK (XX)), the new interceptor project is called PAK DP, or Prospective Aviation Complex Long-range Interceptor.

The continuation of a line of dedicated interceptors is interesting because the existing PAK-FA/Su-57 fighter in many ways could fulfill the same role as the MiG-31. It has a highly advanced radar, it can supercruise (maintain Mach 1+ flight without the use of afterburners), and it could be armed with long range air-to-air missiles.

While the range is less than a MiG-31, air-to-air refueling can make up the gap. But since the capabilities as they stand are so similar, why the need for a separate airframe? Sukhoi fighters have also served in the interceptor role before, the Su-27P variant of the Flanker was meant explicitly for the VPVO. There are a couple reasons why the Russian government still considers the PAK DP to be necessary.

The first is that the PAK DP might build off the multirole nature of the earlier MiG-31 and MiG-25 conversions. An aircraft close to the original conception of the F-111 could be in the cards for Russia in the PAK DP: something that can carry a ton of long-range missiles and also perform strike with a wide range of munitions (including hypersonic ones)while moving very fast.

Another possible reason is that Russia wishes to keep the heritage of MiG alive within United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). Since Sukhoi has done the majority of the design work and has had its name attached to the PAK FA (in the Su-57 designation), MiG needs a next generation project of their own to work on. The MiG-35, while advanced, is still not of the PAK family of next-generation craft and MiG not have an aircraft to work on in the future.

The last reason is that the VVS might want to future proof their interceptor force against future developments in UAV technology. While the PAK FA is fast, it does represent a step backward in speed compared to the MiG-31. While the SR-71 Blackbird is retired, UAVs incorporating some of its technology may come online in the future. Russia might need a plane that can really push the limits of speed to intercept them and keep its airspace safe.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues.

This article first appeared in August 2018.

Image: Flickr

Sebastien Roblin

History, Asia

When Japan launched her surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and on British and Dutch possessions in East Asia, the 521 Zeroes serving in the Japanese Navy quickly became the terror of Allied fighter pilots

Here's What You Need To Remember: Both the Zero and Wildcat saw action through the remainder of World War II, many of the former ending their days as Kamikaze aircraft. The Wildcat carried on a little-known but surprisingly successful career with the U.S. and Royal Navies in the European theater, dueling French fighters over North Africa, flying from small escort carriers to hunt Nazi bombers and submarines, and even embarked on the last Allied air raid of the war, sinking a U-Boat in Norway on May 5, 1945.

Japan began the Pacific War with two major technological advantages over the U.S. Navy: the much more reliable Long Lance torpedo, and the Mitsubishi A6M Zero carried-based fighter, a design that defied expectations by outperforming land-based fighters when in it was introduced into service in 1940.

Designer Jiro Horikoshi maximized the Zero’s performance by reducing airframe weight to an unprecedented degree by cutting armor protection and employing an “extra super” duralumin alloy.  Combined with an 840-horsepower Sakae 12 radial engine, the A6M2 Type Zero could attain speeds of 346 miles per hour, while exhibiting extraordinary maneuverability and high rates of climb. For armament, the Zero boasted two punchy Type 99 20-millimeter cannons in the wing—though only with sixty rounds of ammunition—and two rifle-caliber machine guns firing through the propeller.

The elegant airframe weighed only 1.85-tons empty, giving the Zero a tremendous range of 1,600 miles—very useful for scouting for enemy ships and launching long-distance raids. By comparison, Germany’s excellent contemporary Bf 109 fighter could fly only 500 miles, fatefully reducing its effectiveness in the Battle of Britain.

The Zero debuted fantastically in combat in July 1940, with thirteen land-based A6M2 Zeros shooting down twice their number of Russian-built I-16 and I-153 fighters in a three-minute engagement.

When Japan launched her surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and on British and Dutch possessions in East Asia, the 521 Zeroes serving in the Japanese Navy quickly became the terror of Allied fighter pilots. U.S. Army P-39 Airacobras struggled to match the Zero’s high altitude performance. Even the pilots of agile British Spitfires found they were likely to be out-turned and out-climbed by a Zero.

The U.S. Navy at the time was phasing in the Grumman F4F Wildcat at the expense of the infamously awful F2A Buffalo. The tubby-looking Wildcat was heavier at 2.5 to 3 tons and had a range slightly over 800 miles. The Wildcat’s supercharged 1,200 horsepower R-1830 radial engine allowed it to attain speeds of 331 mph while armed with four jam-prone .50-caliber machine guns, or 320 mph on the heavier F4F-4 model with six machine guns and side-folding wings for improved stowage.

Thus the U.S. Navy’s top fighter was slower and less maneuverable than the Zero. But unexpectedly—after a rough start, and despite starting the war with less combat experience, Wildcat pilots managed to trade-off evenly with Zeroes. At Wake Island, just four Marine Wildcats helped repel besieging Japanese forces for two weeks and even sank the destroyer Kisaragi. In February 1942, Wildcat pilot Edward “Butch” O’Hare managed to shoot down three Japanese bombers and damage three more during a raid.

Though the Wildcat didn’t claim air superiority over the nimble Japanese fighters, they performed well enough to allow American dive and torpedo bombers to sink five Japanese aircraft carriers in the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway—finally turning the tide of the war in the Pacific.

How did they pull it off?

The Zero’s lack of armor and a self-sealing fuel tank (which have internal bladders that swell to close off holes) meant they were infamously prone to disintegrating or catching fire after sustaining light damage. Meanwhile, once a Zero pilot expended his limited supply of 20-millimeter shells, the remaining rifle-caliber machine guns struggled to down better-armored Wildcats. Navy and Marine Wildcat pilots learned to make slashing attacks from above leveraging their superior diving speed. But it simply wasn’t always possible to avoid getting into a turning dogfight with a Zero.

Contemplating this problem, naval aviator John Thach, devised the tactic called the Thach Weave in which two Wildcats flying side-by-side laid a trap for pursuing Zeros. Both the “bait” and “hook” plane would complete two consecutive 90-degree turns towards each other, forming a figure eight. A Zero choosing to pursue the bait plane would end up having its tail in the sights of the hook.

After successfully testing the maneuver with Wildcat ace Edward O’Hare, John Thach had a chance to try his Thach Weave the Battle of Midway. On June 4, Thach’s six F4Fs of VF-3 squadron from the carrier Yorktown were escorting Devastator torpedo bombers when they were bounced by fifteen to twenty Zeros, one of which immediately set a Wildcat ablaze while another knocked out the radio on the Wildcat of Thach’s wingman.

Thach called on the radio for rookie pilot Ram Dibb to help him perform the Weave maneuver. Steve Erling’s book Thach Weave recounts what happened next:

“With so many enemy planes in the air, Thach was not sure anything would work, but the answer came when a Zero followed Dibb during one of his turns… Thach found himself angry that the young inexperienced Dibb was the target of this Zero. Wisdom called for a short burst of shells to hopefully cause the Zero to break off the pass, but it was apparent this Zero was not going to break off. Anger rising, Thach continued straight ahead, the firing button depressed, rather than ducking under the Zero. At last the Zero broke off, and as he passed close by, Thach could see flames pouring from its underside.”

“Continuing the weave now discouraged the Zeros from following the Wildcats in their turns, but one made the same mistake as Thach’s first kill, and when he was too slow in his pullout, Thach shot him down and added a third mark on his kneepad. Soon after, Dibb erased another enemy fighter converging astern of Thach and Macomber.

By then the Zeros had shot down all but two of the torpedo bombers and might have finished off the Wildcats. But at that moment, two squadrons of SBD dive bombers came screaming out from the clouds on the now unprotected Japanese carriers. The Zeros were too low and far afield to intercept them, and bomber proceeded to fatally cripple the carriers Akagi and Kaga.

The Thach Weave was subsequently adopted by other Navy and Marine squadrons, and top Japanese ace Saburo Sakai described the maneuver vexing a squadron mate’s attack run over Guadalcanal in his biography.

The Wildcat never exceeded the Zero in performance, but over time the non-existent armor protection and loss of entire carriers took a heavy toll on Japanese aviators, eroding their experience advantage. In 1943, new, much faster U.S. fighters such as the F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair decisively won air superiority for the Allies. In the 1944 Great Marianas Turkey Shoot over the Philippine Sea, Allied fighters and flak gunners shot down over 500 Japanese warplanes for just 123 USN aircraft lost.

Both the Zero and Wildcat saw action through the remainder of World War II, many of the former ending their days as Kamikaze aircraft. The Wildcat carried on a little-known but surprisingly successful career with the U.S. and Royal Navies in the European theater, dueling French fighters over North Africa, flying from small escort carriers to hunt Nazi bombers and submarines, and even embarked on the last Allied air raid of the war, sinking a U-Boat in Norway on May 5, 1945.

Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This first appeared in December 2018.

Image: Wikipedia.

It’s time the United States and Europe start taking their democracies more seriously.

Warfare History Network

Security, Asia

Much of the credit goes to spies like Yoshikawa, a youngish looking naval reserve ensign who had only arrived in Hawaii nine months earlier.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Japan’s successful intelligence-gathering operation on Oahu in the months leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor prompted the United States to tighten its national security efforts in the decades that followed.

“You are probably the nearest to war that you’ll ever be without actually being in it,” said Commander Harold M. “Beauty” Martin as he addressed his men on the morning of December 6, 1941, at Kaneohe Naval Air Station on Mokapu Peninsula, located less than 15 miles east-northeast of Pearl Harbor. “Keep your eyes and ears open and be on the alert to every moment,” said the well-respected commander.

One fellow who was keeping his eyes wide open that day was Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa. He closely observed the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor on the south side of Oahu late in the afternoon from vantage points at Aiea Heights and the Pearl City Landing. Later the same day he sent a coded report to Tokyo noting that the U.S. Army had ordered equipment for barrage defense balloons, but none was yet on scene, and he opined that torpedo nets probably were not in place to protect the battleships at anchor in Pearl Harbor. “I imagine that there is considerable opportunity left … for a surprise attack,” he added, as the clock continued ticking.

Meanwhile, Commander Martin’s somber, cautionary message earlier in the day was being widely debated by the American sailors, a number of whom belittled the racial and intellectual capabilities of the Japanese, especially their ability to handle fast-moving aircraft. Some even argued that any aggressive Japanese actions against the United States would be quashed within two weeks.

But within 24 hours those men and their American compatriots at Pearl Harbor would be in the fight of their lives against two waves of incoming Japanese bombers and fighters. Within 90 minutes of the first attack early on December 7, the Japanese had sunk four battleships and damaged another four of the large ships, three cruisers, and three destroyers and consigned nearly 200 American aircraft to the scrapyard. Worse yet, more than 2,400 Americans were killed and more than 1,175 wounded in the surprise attack.

Raid on Kaneohe Naval Air Station

Those at the Kaneohe Naval Air Station were among the first to face the enemy onslaught that Sunday morning. The nimble Mitsubishi A6M Zeros came in at 7:48 am, strafing a small utility plane and fanning out over the station and firing promiscuously. The officer on duty called nearby Bellows Field requesting help, but his message was treated as a joke. Kaneohe contractor Sam Aweau called both Bellows and Hickam airfields, but his warnings also were met with disbelief.

Commander Martin, for his part, was gulping a cup of coffee in his quarters and preparing hot chocolate for his 13-year-old son when the youth reported seeing the Japanese planes maneuvering above. Once Martin spotted the Rising Sun emblem for himself, he quickly tossed his uniform on over his blue silk pajamas and dashed for the car. Screeching through the still-quiet residential neighborhood at upward of 50 miles per hour, Martin managed to park near his command post and run toward it amid a hail of bullets.

The first parked plane was already in flames when Martin arrived at Kaneohe, and soon the Japanese bombers joined the fray. He was proud of how his men responded, many of whom were newcomers to the service. “There was no panic,” he said. “Everyone went right to work battling back and doing his job.”

Unfortunately, Kaneohe had no antiaircraft guns. Sailors and marines fired their pistols and rifles at the low-flying aircraft without success. Once the first wave of attackers disappeared, the men dashed to the hangars and planes. The ordnance staffers began issuing rifles and machine guns and disbursing ammunition from locked storage areas.

Aviation Chief Ordnanceman John W. Finn positioned both a .30-caliber and a .50-caliber machine gun on the parking ramp for the Consolidated PBY Catalinas (PBY) and began dueling with the Japanese Zeros as they strafed Kaneohe. Finn moved back and forth between the two weapons, but he spent most of his time at the .50 caliber. As he fired, he was assisted by sailors who replenished his ammunition. Finn’s steady firing damaged several Zeros. No one knows for sure whether it was Finn or someone else, perhaps an ordnanceman named Sands, who fired the rounds that struck flight leader Lieutenant Fusata Iida’s aircraft.

The nine Zeros led by Iida were beginning to reassemble to head back to the carrier fleet when Iida motioned to his wingman that he had sustained damage to his fuel tanks and would not be able to make the return flight. He therefore decided to make a kamikaze run on Kaneohe’s armory. As he lined up and flew toward the armory, more ground fire struck his aircraft. The plane missed the armory and crashed into the ground.

By the time the fighting was finished at Kaneohe, the Japanese had destroyed or damaged 33 PBYs, killed 19 servicemen, and caused major damage to the installation. Despite the great risk they took, the Japanese suffered few losses in the audacious attack against the home of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Takeo Yoshikawa: Japanese Spy at Pearl Harbor

Much of the credit goes to spies like Yoshikawa, a youngish looking naval reserve ensign who had only arrived in Hawaii nine months earlier. He was employed as a cover by the Japanese foreign ministry using an alias while actually working for the Imperial Japanese Navy. He had been providing continuous and rather thorough updates on U.S. Navy deployments, arrivals and departures from Pearl Harbor, centerpiece of U.S. naval operations in the Pacific. Yoshikawa was scrupulously careful, carrying no camera, maps, or documents with him and never jotting down notes on what he observed on his outings around Hawaii.

In many ways, Yoshikawa was the perfect man for the mission. He had a solid naval background, having graduated in 1933 from the Japanese Naval College as well as from torpedo, gunnery, and aviation programs in the Imperial Japanese Navy. He also had served as a code officer aboard a cruiser. He then had worked three years in Tokyo with the Imperial Japanese Navy’s British affairs section before expressing an interest in working abroad as an agent. That led to his assignment in Hawaii working for Japan’s foreign ministry as a cover.

Yoshikawa did not have diplomatic immunity, and he was not officially linked to the Imperial Japanese Navy when he arrived in Hawaii. Otherwise, he would have been known to the American counterintelligence officials nearly immediately. Only Nagao Kita, the new consul in Hawaii, and Vice Consul Okuda, who had done some prior spying in Hawaii, were aware of Yoshikawa’s true role in providing Japan with updates on the U.S. Navy.

Yeoman First Class Harry T. Thompson

American security had tightened before Yoshikawa’s arrival, in part due to deteriorating relations between the two countries. The deteriorating relations were a result of Japan’s continued aggression in China and concerns about future potential moves against such Western interests as Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and the oil-rich Dutch East Indies.

Two Japanese spying incidents on the American mainland in the 1930s had put the United States on alert. One involved former Navy Yeoman First Class Harry T. Thompson who had been discharged from service for problems relating to alcohol, overspending, and “an appetite for attractive young men,” according to one source. His services were retained by the Japanese, and he used a chief yeoman’s dress uniform, purchased at a tailor shop near a base, to gain entry to American bases and ships, thanks to his uniform, lax security, and fast talking. He managed to obtain gunnery manuals and reports on the 8-inch guns carried by the USS Pensacola, the first of a new class of cruisers capable of 32 knots and costing Japan its previous technical advantages in the cruiser category.

Toward the end of 1934 Thompson was able to board a number of ships stateside where he obtained important quarterly schedules of employment for battleships and cruisers, as well as information on main batteries, torpedoes, and related intelligence. He boarded the USS Mississippi in December and managed to abscond with a 230-page U.S. Navy gunnery school publication from a confidential file. He reboarded the ship the next month and purloined reports on the main gun batteries and torpedoes.

His former live-in boyfriend exposed Thompson’s homosexuality to Navy officials. Officials followed Thompson for a while, gathered additional evidence, and questioned him about his suspicious activities. At that point, Thompson confessed to working as a spy for the Japanese. When efforts by the Office of Naval Intelligence to have Thompson cooperate as a counterspy failed, he fled using funds supplied by the Japanese. He was apprehended and in mid-1936 was found guilty of espionage and sentenced to 15 years in federal prison.

John S. Farnsworth: Japanese Spy in the Naval Academy

Even more troublesome for U.S. officials and perhaps the American public was the case involving John S. Farnsworth, a 1915 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy who had been selected for postgraduate work at Annapolis as well as postgraduate work in aeronautical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He had commanded Marine Observation Squadron Six, Aircraft Squadrons’ Scouting Fleet, before being relieved of command in 1927 and court-martialed. He was cited for drinking, gambling, and borrowing money from an enlisted man and refusing to pay it back as well as submitting falsified affidavits regarding the matter.

That resulted in a six-year downward spiral of drinking that led to his spying for the Japanese using an American-owned business as cover. His efforts to obtain classified aeronautical information caused suspicion among the tight-knit community of Naval Academy graduates who ran the U.S. Navy in the prewar years, especially because of his earlier court-martial. The head of naval intelligence got wind of Farnsworth’s snooping efforts and sent a cautionary bulletin out, effectively cutting him off from information that would prove useful to Japanese intelligence.

Farnsworth’s drinking increased substantially, and he became more desperate as his money problems escalated to the point where he appeared at his former business partner’s Washington office in an effort to get a place to sleep. In mid-1936 he contacted a Hearst-owned news service with a scheme to sell his tell-all story for $20,000 while he was also working his Japanese contacts to obtain another $50,000 for past and future services.

Both the Office of Naval Intelligence and the FBI were on his tail by then and he was picked up on July 13. He signed a confession admitting to some of his espionage and was found guilty and sentenced to four to 12 years in federal prison. His Japanese contacts were conveniently out of the country, having been transferred home.

A Shift Toward Homegrown Spies

Despite increased American security measures, the Japanese continued efforts to obtain information both on the American defense industry and bases in the continental United States and Hawaii. It was probably because of the Japanese military’s experiences with Farnsworth and Thompson that they began to rely more heavily on homegrown spies like Yoshikawa.

Yoshikawa, for his part, was exceptionally security conscious. In sallying forth from the consulate, he dressed casually and conscientiously refrained, for the most part, while associating with Japanese Americans, with the exception of his two trusted drivers. They drove him around Oahu in their personal vehicles rather than in consulate cars to avoid unwanted attention.

The drivers, especially Richard M. Kotoshirodo, who had been born in Hawaii and who had received his early education in Japan, proved exceptionally reliable. Kotoshirodo was coached by Yoshikawa so he was able to correctly identify ships by their silhouettes and conduct surveillances by himself. This effectively added another set of skilled and trustworthy eyes to his spying effort.

Yoshikawa’s Views of the Harbor

One of their favorite haunts became the Pan American Clipper Landing at Pearl City near the moorings for the U.S. carriers. Yoshikawa also liked to visit Eto’s Soda Stand adjacent to the Pearl City Landing, a popular transit point for Ford Island and ships’ personnel going or returning from leave. He and his drivers arrived at the landing dressed as workmen and blended with the workers to pick up tidbits of useful information and observe work in the East Lock where the aircraft carriers were provisioned and fueled. They also counted the number of vegetable trucks at the landing to determine the projected upcoming timing of departures for maneuvers and the length of time planned at sea.

They also went to Aiea Heights, located just north of the harbor, for a panoramic view of the area. From this vantage point, they were able to monitor all of the U.S. naval and aircraft assets in Pearl Harbor.

Yoshikawa often took in the view from the Shuncho Ro Japanese Teahouse on the heights that conveniently had a second-floor telescope for viewing the harbor. And the teahouse was owned by a friendly Japanese woman born in the same region as the intrepid spy. Yoshikawa also befriended a waitress there who he often brought along to provide cover while on espionage trips around the island.

He even took a sightseeing flight in the early fall over Oahu, bringing a geisha along as cover. While the flight was not permitted over Pearl Harbor, he was able to tally the airplanes and hangars at Wheeler and Hickam airfields, and see the battleship anchorages. He was also able to calculate air turbulences and currents along the route, which was crucial information for the Japanese pilots who would participate in the attack.

He found that Hickam Field, located just southeast of Ford Island, was difficult to observe from afar. He solved that by attending an August 6 open house to observe the Curtiss P-40 Warhawks on the ground and in the air. He took note of the hangars and the length and width of the multiple runways at Hickam Field.

Commander Martin’s air station at Kaneohe also drew Yoshikawa’s attention with its PBY reconnaissance aircraft and recent construction work there. He took a number of commercial tourist boat trips around Kaneohe and used a nearby elevated roadway for an additional view of the base.

Bernard Otto Kuehn: An Asset From Nazi Germany

Yoshikawa’s increasing and detailed reports proved exceptionally useful to his employers in Japan, who had also developed a stay-behind agent in Hawaii named Bernard Otto Kuehn. A German national who arrived in Hawaii in 1935, Kuehn was already employed as a spy for Nazi Germany. Although initially believed too nervous for the assignment, the Japanese did bring him on board in the late 1930s, providing him with a small radio transmitter with a range of 100 miles. He was to use it to relay messages on ship movements and construction to Japanese submarines which, in turn, would relay them to Tokyo.

It was vital that he remain well below the radar of American intelligence officials, but his spending habits, lack of employment, and careless pro-Nazi comments had brought him to the attention of the Office of Naval Intelligence. His wife’s early 1940 trip to Japan to obtain bank funds in $500 bills and his family’s flashing of crisp, new $100 bills raised eyebrows as did using cash to pay off a second mortgage on one of his houses.

The Kuehn family seemed oblivious to the need for stealth. His daughter Ruth worked as a modest hairdresser, but she paid her bills with large denomination currency. She also compared her success in collecting contributions to a local charity to her previous experience raising funds for Hitler in Germany. And the supposed need for additional family funds prompted the hapless spy to make at least three direct visits to the Japanese consulate to make a plea for funds.

Discovering the Spies

Interestingly, Yoshikawa was activated on October 2 when he was sent directly to the Kuehn house to deliver $14,000 in new Federal Reserve bills along with a note that Kuehn was to test his radio transmitter. The German passed a note back to Yoshikawa saying he was unable to make the test.

Kuehn was hesitant to use the radio transmitter for fear that the U.S. military might discover and locate his signals. They then developed a system of rather strange visual signals that could use car headlights, lights flashed from the upper levels of his home, and symbols hung from Kuehn’s sailboat. All would necessitate a Japanese submarine sailing rather dangerously close to shore to see the signals.

The hapless German, who had been under surveillance for years, was arrested on December 7, tried in Honolulu, found guilty of espionage in February 1942, and sentenced to death by firing squad. The evidence obtained after his arrest was rather substantial and included monies given to him by Yoshikawa, extensive binders with newspaper clippings on the U.S. fleet, its bases, and aircraft, along with an array of photographs of navy ships. Kuehn’s sentence was later reduced to 50 years in prison once Yoshikawa was identified as the main spy behind the attack.

Yoshikawa, for his part, had sailed for Japan in a diplomatic exchange after the attack and well before his role was discovered during interrogations of his driver Kotoshirodo. Kuehn and his family were sent back to Germany after the war.

Japan’s successful intelligence-gathering operation on Oahu in the months leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor prompted the United States to tighten its national security efforts in the decades that followed.

Originally Published January 27, 2019.

This article originally appeared on the Warfare History Network.

Image: Wikipedia

Warfare History Network

Security, World

One hell of a plane.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The P-38 did not have a “joy stick” for the pilot, but something more akin to a steering wheel. Its propellers spun in opposite directions. This, of course, meant that the torque created by one propeller was negated by that of the other. Thus the pilot would not have to struggle against torque as he accelerated the aircraft for takeoff. In 1939, the P-38 broke a speed record for transcontinental flight.

Contrary to most other planes designed and used in World War II, Lockheed’s P-38 Lightning had twin booms ending in vertical stabilizers and rudders. The pilot sat in a span between twin engines, nothing behind him but air until the horizontal stabilizer connected the booms at the rear.

The Story of the Lightning

The story of the P-38, which was in production all through World War II—possibly the only plane so honored—and which flew in every theater of the war, goes something like this: In the late 1930s, the U.S. Army Air Corps saw the need for a high-altitude interceptor fighter with speed, firepower, and range. Because propeller aircraft engines were coming to the peak of perfection beyond which they might not proceed much farther, the idea flourished that two was better than one.

There were plenty of two-engine planes then, of course, but the idea of the twin booms was, according to Gil Cefaratt, who worked at Lockheed in 1944 and founded the P-38 National Convention in 1986, less drag and the fact that landing gear could be braced in the engine compartments and not in the wings proper. In fact, the P-38 was the first fighter with “tricycle” landing gear, that is, wheels mounted on the nose and two engines without one at the rear. This allowed the craft to take off and land with its tail about as high as its nose.

Strength vs. Manuverability

The two engines also reflected the fact that the U.S. military was keen on “heavy” aircraft, those with armor that would protect the pilot and other equipment that would make them effective in combat. The Japanese relied on stripping their fighters such as the Zero to the bare necessities. Consequently, Zeros could maneuver well—they could out-turn P-38s and most other aircraft—but caught fire more quickly when hit and far more often took their pilots down with them.

The P-38 did not have a “joy stick” for the pilot, but something more akin to a steering wheel. Its propellers spun in opposite directions. This, of course, meant that the torque created by one propeller was negated by that of the other. Thus the pilot would not have to struggle against torque as he accelerated the aircraft for takeoff. In 1939, the P-38 broke a speed record for transcontinental flight.

Richard Bong: P-38 Fighter Ace

Lloyd Curtis, who also worked at Lockheed during the war, points out that the P-38 offered difficulties when the pilot had to bail out: He was in danger of hitting the horizontal stabilizer. A remedy for this was eventually a pilot’s seat that was ejected from the cockpit, a forerunner of today’s versions. Other measures, says Cefaratt, included putting the plane into a stall, crawling out on the left wing and jumping, or inverting the aircraft and falling out (hoping the fighter would not loop around and smash you seconds later).

The pilot who was most successful in the P-38 was Richard Bong, the United States’ most accomplished fighter ace. Between December 27, 1942, and December 17, 1944, he shot down 40 Japanese planes, still a U.S. record. He was awarded the Medal of Honor and twice was pulled from combat owing to the psychological impact on both sides should be he killed by the Japanese. Bong is thought to have been so successful in P-38s due to eye/hand/foot skills gleaned from a young manhood handling large farm machinery in rural Wisconsin.

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The Bong World War II Heritage Center

He preferred to climb and then dive down on Japanese planes, or to rise up swiftly beneath them—and to come so close before shooting that he often flew through the explosive wreckage. He was killed at age 24 in California on the day the Hiroshima bomb was dropped while testing Lockheed’s first jet fighter.

The Richard I. Bong World War II Heritage Center opens in September 2002 in Superior, Wisconsin. On display, of course, will be a replica of “Marge,” Bong’s exquisite P-38.

This first appeared in Warfare History Network here.

Image: Wikipedia.

Right-wing leader Janez Jansa called the election early—for the wrong side.

Trump withdrew from the WHO. Biden can rebuild ties with the organization and make the United States an influential player in the fight against COVID-19.

Sebastien Roblin

Security,

t remains to be seen whether the U.S. withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal, which can already be linked to an escalating proxy war in Syria, may also see a resumption of the shadowy covert war between Israel and Iran.

Here's What You Need To Remember: It’s hard to deny that the campaign used tactics that would be labelled “terrorism” or “murder” in the West were they waged against Israeli or American scientists engaged in weapons research. It seems assassinations are condemned or praised not according to the methods used but depending on who is performing them.

Approaching eight o’clock on the morning of January 12, 2010 Professor Massoud Alimohammadi walked to his car parked next to his house in North Tehran, passing a small motorbike on the side of the road. The fifty-one-year-old elementary particle physicist was a leading Iranian theorist on quantum-field states, and known to his friends as a political moderate.

As the professor’s open his car door, the person who had been observing him pressed a button on a remote control. The bike suddenly exploded with such force that all the windows on Masoud’s four-story apartment building were shattered. Massoud was killed instantly, and two nearby bystanders injured. The triggerman, ostensibly a man named Arash Kerhadkish, strolled over to a car waiting nearby and was driven away.

Initially, some speculated that Iranian hardliners sanctioned the killing of a reformist professor. However, anonymous Iranian and Western intelligence sources eventually told a different story: the professor was an important figure in a nuclear-research program run by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Nine months later, on the morning of November 29, a quantum physicist named Majid Shahriari was driving through Tehran with his wife, Dr. Bejhat Ghasemi, in the passenger seat when several motorbikes road up beside him near Artesh Boulevard. While one rider hemmed in Shahriari’s car, another rider (believed to be Arash Kerhadkish), attached a package of C4 explosive to the door beside Shahriari, then drove back and triggered a detonator. The explosion killed Shahriari, injured his wife and colleague, and even knocked over one of the motorbike-mounted hitmen, wounding the hitman.

At nearly the same time, another motorbike assassin rammed the car of Sharhiari’s colleague, Professor Fereydoon Abassi, a prominent leader of Iran’s nuclear-research program as he awaited Sharhiari for an appointment at Shahid Beheshti University. He and his wife jumped out of the car just before the bike exploded, seriously injuring Abassi in the face and the hand.

Eight months later on July 23, 2011, Darioush Rezaeinejad and his wife drove to pick up their daughter Armita up from kindergarten. At 4 p.m., the thirty-five-year-old postgrad in electrical engineering deposited his wife and child on the curb and was returning to his vehicle to park the car when two bearded motorcyclists pulled up next him and opened fire with nine-millimeter pistols. Rezaeinejad was shot five times in the arm, neck and chest. His wife, Shoreh Pirani, attempted to pursue the attackers, but they shot her too. The engineer died shortly after being hospitalized at Resalat Hospital. Shoreh recovered, and later told an interviewer that her five-year-old daughter continued to draw pictures of the moment of her father’s death.

Darioush’s wife would also state in a later interview that the engineer had been a member of the Iranian nuclear program and had received anonymous threats prior to his death. Tehran blamed the United States and Israel for the killing. The United States denied the charge, while Israeli government social-media accounts suggestively expressed that it did not condemn the killings, whoever might have perpetrated them.

Six months later on January 11, 2012—nearly the anniversary of Alimohammadi’s killing—Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, an expert on uranium enrichment, was the next to fall victim while driving to work through Eastern Tehran in his Peugeot 405. Deputy director of the Natanz facility, he had been photographed with Mohamed Ahmadinejad, who was president at the time. Supposedly, he was tailed by multiple assassins, including the ubiquitous Kerhadkish. One of those assassins attached a magnetic mine to Roshan’s car, which detonated and killed him, but spared the life of his wife, who was sitting beside him.

Iranian counter-intelligence operatives in the Ministry Of Intelligence and Surveillance apparently were at work, however. In 2011, reportedly thanks to a tip from a third country, MOIS picked up a twenty-four-year old aspiring kick-boxer named Majid Jamali Fashi, who claimed to have dropped of the explosive motorbike that killed Alimohammadi. Fashi confessed on public television to receiving training and a payment of $120,000 from Mossad (Institute), the Israeli spy agency connected to dozens of assassinations over the years, including German rocket scientists, Olympic terrorist plotters, and the Canadian Gerald Bull, developer of the of the Iraqi Project Babylon “super gun.”

In May 2012, Fashi was hung—and Tehran announced it had captured eight male and six female Iranian nationals involved in the killings. Iranian media subsequently aired a half-hour documentary dramatizing their confessions. The nationals were reportedly drawn from sympathizers or members of the MEK (Mujahedin of Iran), a violent opposition group to the government Tehran. In this account, the agents had received forty-five days of training in Israel, and then operated in multi-cell teams that had meticulously spied on their victims to determine their routines and then executed the hits based on instructions from Israeli handlers.

Iranian security forces are infamous for using torture, sexual assault, and threats to relatives and to compel false public confessions of guilt. However, anonymous sources in Israeli intelligence and American diplomatic circles conveyed to media that Israel really was behind the assassination campaign that Fashi at least had given a generally true confession, and that Israel really was training MEK members to serve as operatives in Iran.

In 2014, a journalist revealed that Washington had pressured Israel to cease the assassinations, which had threatened to derail attempts to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Tehran. Earlier, president Bush was reportedly angered to learn that Israelis posing as CIA agents had recruit Iranian nationals in Pakistan for its sabotage and assassination campaign in Iran.

Of course, both public Iranian and anonymous Israeli accounts may be calculated and less than reliable. It seems possible, for example, that the Iranian nationals implicated in the assassination may have been working besides un-apprehended Israeli operatives from Kidon (Hebrew for “Tip of the Spear”) an elite assassination unit within Mossad. According to some accounts, the attacks may also have stopped because additional killings would have posed too great a risk, and remaining targets were too well guarded.

There are also a few ambiguous cases to consider. Earlier on January 15, 2007, Iranian scientist Ardeshir Hosseinpour died mysteriously in Isfahan due to a “gas poisoning” incident. The journals Stratfor and Haaretz claimed Hosseinpour’s death was the work of Mossad, while the Iranian government and sources in Mossad denied involvement. Years later, Hosseinpour’s sister claimed instead that the professor had been killed by the Revolutionary Guard for refusing to work with the nuclear program. In 2015, Iranian security claimed it had foiled another Mossad hit. Israeli sources don’t appear to have stepped forth to corroborate either claim.

In 2018, an article by Ronen Bergman in Politico sketched out the longer history of the Israeli assassination campaign, identifying it as the “fifth prong” of a four-part strategy devised in 2003 by Tamir Pardo, then serving as deputy head of Mossad under Meir Dagan. The concept was to pressure Iran into abandoning its nuclear program using economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, support for Iranian minorities and opposition groups, and interdiction of key nuclear technologies. Though the wider campaign involved close cooperation with the U.S., which famously collaborated to develop the Stuxnet computer virus responsible for destroying hundreds of Iranian centrifuges, Israel alone was involved in plotting assassinations, which the CIA claims it was unwilling to become involved in and preferred not to be aware of. (Bergman also gives an alternate versions of Rezaeinejad’s killing, claiming he was tailed by a lone motorcyclist, and shot while approaching the fortified Imam Ali facility.)

Bergman alleges that the campaign was effective in terrorizing Iranian scientists into avoiding or disassociating with Tehran’s nuclear program, and caused Iran to institute expensive and highly time-consuming security measures to protect its scientists and attempt to root out traitors and bugs. In his account, Dagan saw the assassinations as potentially heading off a push by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Nethanyahu to directly attack Iranian nuclear sites from the air, a course of action he saw as disastrous.

The Mossad campaign did, however, cause the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to plot a series of retaliatory terrorist attacks across the world using its Unit 400 cover operations branch. Hastily and ineptly planned, all but one of the roughly twenty Iranian plots failed, often in spectacular fashion. The campaign’s only “success” was the killing of five Israeli tourists and a local driver on July 18, 2012, in a suicide bombing executed by Hezbollah at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria.

The Mossad assassination campaign did not continue after 2012, though both U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources allege it was effective in slowing the progress of the Iranian nuclear program. While assassination was disavowed by U.S. diplomatic and intelligence officials, some politicians have voiced their support for the scientist killings. After all, the reasoning goes, such targeted assassinations kill far fewer bystanders than would missiles launched in a wider military conflict.

However, it’s hard to deny that the campaign used tactics that would be labelled “terrorism” or “murder” in the West were they waged against Israeli or American scientists engaged in weapons research. It seems assassinations are condemned or praised not according to the methods used but depending on who is performing them. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal, which can already be linked to an escalating proxy war in Syria, may also see a resumption of the shadowy covert war between Israel and Iran.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This first appeared earlier in 2018.

Image: Reuters

David Axe

Security,

To even try to sink an American flattop, you first must hit it. That's not easy.

Here's What You Need to Know: The story starts in 2005.

A Chinese admiral and pundit told a trade-show audience that Beijing could resolve China's territorial disputes by sinking two U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and killing thousands of American sailors.

Rear Adm. Lou Yuan's threat isn't an empty one. The Chinese military has deployed an array of weaponry that it acquired specifically to target American flattops.

But a U.S. Navy test in 2005 proved that even if you hit them, carriers are really hard to sink.

Lou made his provocative comment on Dec. 20, 2018 at the Military Industry List summit, according to media reports.

“What the United States fears the most is taking casualties,” declared Lou, an anti-American author, social commentator and military theorist at the PLA Academy of Military Science.

Sinking just one carrier could kill 5,000 Americans, Lou pointed out. Sink two, and you double the toll. "We’ll see how frightened America is" after losing 10,000 sailors, Lou crowed.

Leaving aside the likelihood of a full-scale war breaking out between the world's two leading military powers and economies, sinking a carrier is easier said than done. History underscores the difficulty of the undertaking.

In 1964 Viet Cong saboteurs managed to damage and briefly sink the former U.S. Navy escort carrier Card while the vessel, then operating as an aircraft ferry for U.S. Military Sealift Command, moored in Saigon.

But the last time anyone permanently sank a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in combat was during World War II. Twelve American carriers sank during the war, usually following intensive air attacks. The last to sink, USS Bismarck Sea, fell victim to Japanese kamikazes in February 1945.

In subsequent decades, American flattops suffered serious accidents including collisions and fires, but none sank. It's very difficult to sink a buoyant, thousand-feet-long ship that's mostly made of steel.

The U.S. Navy knows this from experience. In 2005, the Navy itself targeted the decommissioned carrier America in order to determine just how much punishment the vessel could withstand before slipping beneath the waves.

"The ship was pummeled by explosions both above and below the waterline," The War Zone reporter Tyler Rogoway explained in 2018. "After nearly four weeks of these activities, the carrier was scuttled. On May 14, 2005, the vessel's stern disappeared below the waterline and the ship began its voyage to the seafloor."

"America stood up to four weeks of abuse and only succumbed to the sea after demolition teams scuttled the ship on purpose once and for all, it's clear that America was built to sustain heavy damage in combat and still stay afloat."

Consider also the carrier-shaped pontoon ship that Iran built as a scale target for a 2015 war game. While small and flimsy compared to a real flattop, the pontoon vessel itself endured an intensive assault. "Iran struck the faux carrier with a barrage of anti-ship missiles, then swarmed it with small boats and then landed commandos on it," Rogoway reported.

Still, the fake flattop apparently remained afloat.

To even try to sink an American flattop, you first must hit it. That's not easy, either. No carrier sails without an air wing with as many as 50 fighter aircraft plus several escorting destroyers, cruisers and submarines. A virtual wall of defensive weaponry surrounds the flattop out to a distance of several hundred miles.

Still, China or another country could attempt to target the carriers with submarines, cruise missiles and ballistic rockets. 

"They will employ multiple systems in order to confuse and overwhelm U.S. defenses," naval historian Robert Farley wrote in 2017. "They will rely on the threat of attack to keep U.S. carrier battle groups as far as possible from the main theaters of operation."

"But the observation that the enemy has a missile or torpedo that can kill a carrier only begins a conversation about carrier vulnerability," Farley continued. "Shooting anything at an aircraft carrier is a costly, difficult operation."

The carrier's attackers could face withering counterfire from the vessel's defenders. "Beyond the monetary cost, launching an open attack against an American carrier strike group, with its own cruisers, destroyers and submarines, is almost certainly a suicide mission."

And if the United States' reaction to the 9/11 terror attacks is any indication, Washington surely would deploy all its remaining military might, including its surviving eight or nine carriers, against country behind the sinking.

"So there are two questions that remain for anyone who thinks they even have a shot at taking down one of these enormous steel behemoths," Farley explained. "Can you do it? And even if you can, is it worth it?"

David Axe served as the new Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad.

This article appeared last year.

Image: Flickr / U.S. Navy

David Axe

Security, Middle East

Numerous, cheap mines could slow America's large, high-tech warships.

Here's What You Need to Know: The Islamic republic has the potential to drop thousands of mines in key waters.

In the event of war with Iran, the U.S. Navy’s small, aging force of Persian Gulf-based minesweepers would struggle to locate and disarm Iran’s underwater mines.

The consequences for U.S. military operations, not to mention world trade, could be severe.

Four of the Navy’s 11 1980s-vintage Avenger-class minesweepers sail from Bahrain and, if war broke out, would be responsible for clearing the strategic Strait of Hormuz and other important waterways of mines.

But the Avengers suffer from obsolete equipment and a lack of spending. The minesweepers “routinely need repairs,” one Navy officer told Pro Publica reporters Robert Faturechi, Megan Rose and T. Christian Miller.

The Navy for years has diverted minesweeping funding into the development of multi-mission Littoral Combat Ships. The LCS were supposed to replace the Avengers, but the new ships have proved expensive, unreliable and unsuitable for many of the missions the Navy hoped they would handle.

The sailing branch in 2016 canceled development of a dedicated minehunting robot for the LCS. All the while, the Avengers slowly have rusted away.

“The companies that used to make a variety of spare parts no longer exist,” the reporters added. “A sailor recently aboard one ship said the sonar meant to detect mines was so imprecise that in training exercises it flagged dishwashers, crab traps and cars on the ocean floor as potential bombs.”

Minesweeper USS Devastator with the hull number MCM 6 was non-operational for so long that sailors jokingly referred to her as “Building 6,” since she never moved.

Senior Navy officials have called their mine warfare fleet in the Persian Gulf — a mix of aging ships, high-tech drones and helicopters — “the best and the brightest around,” and a Navy spokesman recently said the minesweeper fleet was “fully capable” of fulfilling its mission of finding and neutralizing mines. The Navy’s underwater drones, the spokesman said, “have a high rate of success,” and the sonar systems on the ships “are very accurate at detecting mines.”

While the spokesman conceded “there are challenges with all older ships, including maintenance and repair” that might make it take longer for the ships to accomplish their mission, he said maintenance problems have “dramatically improved” of late. He noted that as recently as July 6, [2019], all four of the older minesweepers based in the Persian Gulf had been at sea at the same time. (An officer aboard one of the ships called it a “photo exercise” and said it was “extraordinarily rare” to see all four out at once.)

War with Iran could require an intensive demining effort. The Islamic republic has the potential to drop thousands of mines in key waters. “Iran’s arsenal includes a mix of cheaper, older ones that float and blow up on impact, and more sophisticated ones that can be dropped from planes,” Faturechi, Miller and Rose wrote. “They sit on the ocean floor and explode after detecting nearby ships.”  

“We certainly have the ability to do it,” Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said last month about closing the Strait of Hormuz, a critical commercial passageway. “But we certainly don’t want to do it because the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf are our lifeline.”

Sailors in the 5th Fleet’s minesweeping operations said they have watched the escalation of hostility in the Persian Gulf — the downing of drones by Iran and the U.S., masked gunmen rappelling from an Iranian helicopter to seize a British-flagged oil tanker — with a mix of excitement and pessimism. They are eager to contribute but doubt their ability to do so.

The Navy wants by 2020 to decommission three Avengers based in the United States in order to free up spare parts for the right minesweepers sailing from Bahrain and Japan. LCSs are still scheduled eventually to handle some minehunting missions, but the Navy also is experimenting with so-called “vessels of opportunity.”

Under that initiative, sailors embark on transport ships, amphibious auxiliaries or other non-combat vessels and use them as bases for minehunting divers, underwater drones and helicopters.

David Axe served as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels  War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad.

This first appeared in August 2019.

Image: Reuters

David Axe

Security,

The U.S. Marine Corps is practicing a new method of speeding firepower across a war zone.

Here's What You Need to Know: HIMARS packing new missiles could give the Corps a serious and survivable anti-ship capability.

The U.S. Marine Corps is practicing a new method of speeding firepower across a war zone. And that could have big implications for America's military strategy in the western Pacific.

On Dec. 7, 2018, Marines with Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 hauled two M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers from Camp Pendleton in California to Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah, where a war game was underway.

At least one of the 12-ton HIMARS, a wheeled vehicle that fires a variety of surface-to-surface rockets, rolled off its KC-130J transport, quickly fired a training rocket, then loaded back into the KC-130J for its return flight.

There's a name for the practice of deploying a rocket launcher via aircraft, promptly firing then redeploying. The U.S. Army, which pioneered the method, calls it "HIMARS Rapid Infiltration" or HIRAIN.

Combined with other new tactics and new rockets, HIRAIN could allow U.S. force to quickly position long-range artillery, frustrating an enemy's own movements. The method might even allow American troops to impede China's expansion in the western Pacific.

Beijing considers the string of islands stretching from Japan south to The Philippines -- what it calls the "first island chain" -- to be China's historical sphere of influence. The Chinese Communist Party uses trade deals, diplomacy and the threat of military force to exert influence over the region and, in the event of war, could seize many islands along the chain.

The Pentagon aims to complicate this expansion. While air and sea forces are central to American strategy in the region, ground troops could play a role, too. Retired U.S. Army general H.R. McMaster, who briefly served as Pres. Donald Trump's national security advisor, said he wanted the Army to consider "projecting power outwards from the land."

Janine Davidson, an undersecretary of the Navy under former president Barack Obama, said she tried to "get the Army to sink a ship." The Marine Corps, which possesses many of the same capabilities that the Army does, likewise could sink ships.

Imagine a Chinese flotilla sailing toward some remote island group near Japan or The Philippines during some near-future war. A Marine rocket battery could quickly deploy to one island aboard Marine or Air Force transports and lob a few rockets at the Chinese ships while the transports idled nearby. "After firing each volley, the missile battery would move to a new hide site and await orders to fire again," the California think-tank RAND explained in a 2017 report.

"Fortifying the offshore island chain while deploying naval assets in adjoining waters could yield major strategic gains on the cheap," James Holmes, a professor at the Naval War College in Rhode Island, advised in 2014. "Doing so is common sense."

The Army has practiced parts of the concept in realistic conditions. During the Rim of the Pacific war game in and around Hawaii in July 2018, an Army HIMARS battery struck the decommissioned U.S. Navy amphibious ship Racine with five rockets. An aerial drone provided the coordinates for the 50-mile strike.

Still, an unguided 227-millimeter-diameter rocket with a 200-pound warhead and a 40-mile range -- of which a HIMARS can cary six at a time -- is less than ideal as an anti-ship weapon.

Alternatively, a HIMARS can carry one guided 610-millimeter Army Tactical Missile System with a 500-pound warhead and a 190-mile range. In 2016, the Army began modifying the seekers on some ATACMS in order to improve their ability to hit ships.

The Marine Corps is considering buying a dedicated anti-ship missile for its HIMARS launchers. The Corps proved, in a fall 2018 demonstration in Arizona, that an F-35 stealth fighter can pass targeting data to a rocket battery, improving its accuracy. A Marine F-35B detected a metal container on the ground and passed the GPS coordinates via radio data-link to the HIMARS crew.

HIMARS packing new missiles could give the Corps a serious and survivable anti-ship capability. Adding F-35s could help the rockets strike with greater accuracy. And swiftly moving the launchers by air could protect them from counterattack ... and keep the enemy guessing.

David Axe is the author of the new graphic novels MACHETE SQUAD and THE STAN.

This article appeared last year.

Image: Flickr / U.S. Marine Corps

The damage done to the U.S. reputation may take years to repair.

European allies who regularly clashed with Trump were among the first to applaud the U.S. president-elect on his victory. Now even the president's closest friends abroad are joining in.

Seth J. Frantzman

Security, Middle East

Why are they needed? Think gas deposits.

Israel has been known for its expertise in counter-insurgency and using hi-tech aircraft, like the F-35 jet, to confront enemies across the Middle East. Israel’s power was concentrated on land with its Israel Defense Forces investing in the best air defenses and new combat vehicles. Now that may be changing as Israel takes delivery of its new Sa’ar 6 corvette ships. These four new 2,000 ton vessels, which will be delivered from Germany over the next year, will give Israel new firepower at sea and the ability to protect its emerging gas fields off the coast.

In a recent statement the commander of the Israeli Navy, Maj. Gen. Eli Sharvit: Said that "the mission of defending Israel's exclusive economic zone and strategic assets at sea is the primary security mission of the Israeli Navy. These assets are essential to the operational continuity of the State of Israel, and having the ability to protect them holds critical importance.” The gas exclusive economic zone stretches over an area twice the size of Israel. Gas fields off the coast, near Lebanon and Gaza, both could be threatened by missiles. Israel confronted a surprise missile threat like this in 2006 when Hezbollah targeted the INS Hanit.

More recently reports indicated Hezbollah may have access to the Russian-made Yakhont missile or a variant. The group already has stockpiled some 150,000 missiles and rockets with Iran’s support. It is also developing precision-guided munitions. The threat of missiles at sea is well known, especially after the Houthis targeted ships off the coast of Yemen and after militants in Gaza struck an Egyptian ship in 2015. Anti-ship missiles can pose a major threat to modern navies. During the Falklands war in 1982 Argentinian Dassault-Breguet Super Etendard planes air-launched Exocet missiles that struck several British ships. During the Iran-Iraq war in 1987, the USS Stark was hit by a missile as well.

For this reason, Israel is putting to sea advanced ships with stealth technology and the latest in Israel’s Adir phased array radar, as well as numerous interceptors designed to protect it from missile threats. Many of the combat systems on the Sa’ar 6 ships will be new or recent designs and more than ninety percent will come from Israel’s defense companies. For instance, Rafael Advanced Defense systems reportedly supplies the C-Gem offboard active decoy, which defends against missile threats. Elbit Systems electronic warfare suite will be incorporated along with IAI’s Barak missiles and the sea version of Israel’s Iron Dome. Israel has made rapid advances in all this technology over the last several years, attempting to keep up with the threats emerging from Iran and Hezbollah Lebanon. For instance, Israel announced it had tested a new ship-to-ship missile in September. The missile represented a partnership between IAI and Israel’s research and development division within the Ministry of Defense. At the time Israel said, “the new missile system offers enhanced offensive precision capabilities, has longer range, possesses improved offensive flexibility and is better equipped to engage advanced threats.”

On November 11, the Israeli Navy will receive the new ship but it will still be in Kiel in Germany where it was laid down at Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems. It will then sail to Israel. Israel’s navy says that “Upon the arrival of the corvette to Israel and after the operationalization and installation of battle systems, of which the vast majority are Israeli-designed systems, INS Magen will start its operational service in the Navy and will lead the defense of the Israeli economic exclusive zone and maritime strategic assets.”

The name of the ship and the program, “Magen,” comes from the Hebrew term for “shield.” This is because the ship is a shield for the gas platforms and off-shore infrastructure Israel is investing in. This will include a new gas pipeline to Cyprus and Greece, according to a recent agreement. It is also part of Israel’s increased role in the eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which was established this summer. Israel is increasingly a naval ally of Egypt, Cyprus and Greece. As tensions have increased between Turkey and Greece, Ankara has also laid claim to rights to the Mediterranean stretching to Libya, which puts it astride the potential pipeline. An Israeli ship was harassed by the Turkish navy in December 2019 as Ankara pushed its demands in the Mediterranean. The IDF has assessed that Turkey could be a future challenge and reports in British media have indicated the Mossad also sees Turkey as an emerging threat.

This shift in naval strategy, although it is not tailored to relate to Turkey, gives Israel more eight at sea and a more relevant navy that can operate further from shore. Previously Israel relied on small patrol boats to deal with terror threats from Gaza, as well as a handful of missile boats. It also commissioned a half dozen submarines since the late 1990s. Now Israel will have fifteen surface vessels, the four Sa’ar 6 ships, three Sa’ar 5 ships and eight missile boats. The decision to build the Sa’ar 6 was made in 2013 and represents a major investment in the navy. The last time Israel put new surface ships to sea in such a build-up was in the 1990s. The Sa’ar 6 is supposed to be the backbone of the navy for thirty years. Combined with the Dolphin-class submarines, it will give the Israeli navy the latest technology for naval warfare.

Israel’s navy held a briefing and put out an explainer about the new ships in early November. The navy says that the ships will defend the gas fields up to several hundred kilometers offshore and that they can not only be on station at the rigs for a significant period of time but can also do other missions. “The ability to carry mid-size helicopters, such as the Seahawk: The new Seahawk helicopters that will be used by Sa’ar 6-Class Corvettes will be powerful, and able to operate over long ranges and extended periods of time. In this fashion, the ships will be able to provide a comprehensive defensive envelope.”

The understanding of the threat Israel faces has grown in recent years. Israel once had to confront convention armies, fighting the Soviet-armed Egyptians and Syrians in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1990s the threat shifted more to counter-insurgency. Now the threat has moved to what Israel calls the “third circle,” a term used for Iran. Israel incorporated this understanding into its new Momentum plan. That means Israel is reducing some of its older units, making its armored corps and infantry more “multi-dimensional” and relying on communications, artificial intelligence and algorithms to bring the most amount of information to frontline troops to give them more lethality in times of conflict. That is designed to land a knock-out blow on an enemy.

Israel is also training more with the United States using the F-35, of which Israel is acquiring at least fifty of the advanced aircraft for several squadrons. The goal of Israel’s current operations, called the Campaign Between the Wars, is to reduce the Iranian threat and Iranian entrenchment in Syria and prolong the period before the next war. At sea, that means dealing with potential missile threats from places like Lebanon. Only one missile getting through Israel’s defense net can harm the gas platforms. That necessitated ships of the type Israel is putting to sea, and also knitting them in to Israel’s advanced early warning systems on land. This means confronting “blue water” and “brown water” threats, at sea and closer to land.

Israel receives most of its trade from the sea. It’s two Mediterranean ports, Haifa and Ashon, now account for around 43 percent and 53 percent respectively, with the Red Sea port of Eilat taking in only four percent of the country’s trade. New relations with the UAE and new pipeline deals could change some of that situation. Changing Israel’s strategy meant assigning ships to the three gas fields and taking into consideration that one ship might always be at port or on other missions. It also means having better naval-air connectivity, and multiple layers of defense. This basically means extending the Iron Dome and David Sling and other defense system umbrellas to the sea.

Recent attacks by Iran, such as the drone and cruise missile swarm used to attack Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq in September 2019, point to the kinds of threats that Israel must consider. The Sa’ar 6 will have around 80 personnel on board and Israel is also hoping to have a quarter of the personnel on the new ships be female. In recent years, Israel’s navy increased the number of women in the service. It is thus a technological and societal leap for the country.

The ship was custom-designed so that it has the stealth capabilities and room to install the weapon systems Israel wants. This is an upgrade of existing corvette-class ship models. Many navies today are racing to put to sea better ships, especially as the naval arms race continues in the Pacific and elsewhere. Not all the plans for new types of ships, such as the American Zumwalt-class destroyers or the littoral combat ships like the USS Independence, have proven successful. Israel hopes its updates will be a model that does perform well.

Israel engaged in what I call a “design spiral” to build these ships. That included making sure the payloads, such as the massive radar, could be incorporated. It also meant making it flexible and with a low radar cross-section. It is the boat with the highest firepower per square meter, the Israeli navy says. In the end, I will also have a 76mm cannon as its main gun, along with the missiles it carries. Together the firepower and defenses will be a gamechanger off the coast of Tel Aviv and extending far into the sea.

Seth J. Frantzman is a Jerusalem-based journalist who holds a Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis and a writing fellow at Middle East Forum. He is the author of After ISIS: America, Iran and the Struggle for the Middle East. Follow him on Twitter at @sfrantzman.

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