The National Interest

Any just and lasting peace agreement to the Ukraine conflict must account for a Crimea free of Russian occupation for the sake of regional peace and security. Crimea, under Putin’s control, would likely turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake, severing the Caucasus and Central Asia from Europe and directly threatening NATO members Romania and Bulgaria and effectively precluding Baltic-Black Seas connectivity. 

A Russian Crimea mortally endangers Odesa and Ukraine’s entire southern coast, sowing the seeds for an enduring simmering Ukraine-Russia conflict fueled by concerns over national security, sovereignty, and pride. Russian control would return Crimea to its centuries-old violent history: a flashpoint of regional instability and power competition among all interested in accessing the Black Sea. Furthermore, Russian dominance in the area would significantly boost Chinese and Iranian influence across the Black and Caspian Seas and greater Central Asia more broadly, undermining American, European, and broader free-world interests.

Putin is a puppeteer who is quickly running out of puppets, strings, and stage space. His war economy is fueling unsustainable inflation at home and is unable to replace men and material on the battlefield. According to a recent article in Foreign Policy, Russia is producing twenty artillery and tank cannons a month to replace over 300 lost over the same period. The Russian army is losing over 40,000 soldiers per month and recruiting around 20,000–30,000 around the same period despite lucrative bonuses. As a result, North Korean soldiers are fighting in Kursk, and hapless migrant workers find themselves shanghaied to the frontlines. 

According to present indicators, Ukraine can hold out longer with stronger allied support than Russia can. Putin’s hope could be that American support for Ukraine dries up so Russia can consolidate its battleground gains under the guise of a ceasefire or peace agreement. Consequently, Putin is throwing the kitchen sink at Ukraine in anticipation of a ceasefire on existing lines soon after President Trump is sworn in. Any acknowledgment of a Russian Crimea as part of a (temporary) peace deal would be a big win for Putin and a greater loss for the United States, Europe, and the wider region. 

The Crimean Peninsula, located at the northern center of the Black Sea, dominates the region’s geography—hence Putin’s unlawful seizure in 2014. With Crimea, Russia effectively controls the northern half of the Black Sea, from Georgia to Romania. This strategic advantage allows Russia to reassert dominance across the region, consolidating its influence in Moldova, Georgia, and the Caucasus, strangling Ukraine’s maritime access and threatening Romania’s critical Danube transportation corridor stretching to southern Germany and connecting through the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal to northwest Europe. 

Romania, in partnership with American industry, is poised to develop its significant offshore natural gas fields. By 2027, Romania is projected to become Europe’s largest natural gas producer. Bulgaria and Turkey are also progressing with their offshore gas developments. All of these projects face serious jeopardy if Crimea is officially handed to Putin.

A Russian Crimea jeopardizes European energy independence, threatening not only Black Sea energy development and transit pipelines from the Caucasus and Central Asia but also the connectivity of the Baltic and Black Seas. The Three Seas Initiative, championed by thirteen eastern European nations and President Trump, calls for improved digital, energy, and transport connectivity between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas. The initiative’s robust implementation holds the key to the economic prosperity and resilience of Eastern Europe, NATO mobility readiness, and Ukraine’s integration into Europe. A Russian stranglehold on the Black Sea from Crimea presents an insurmountable barrier to the fulfillment of the Three Seas Initiative. 

Russian dominance over Crimea also jeopardizes transatlantic initiatives to establish digital and physical infrastructure connecting Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia through the Black and Caspian Seas. The EU’s subsea fiber-optic and energy cables across the Black Sea would be vulnerable to industrial sabotage, similar to the threats in the Baltic Sea.

From its Crimean stronghold, Putin can veto any economic activities across the Black Sea (like the Middle Corridor) that contradict Russian interests. This de facto blockade would suffocate Ukraine’s maritime economy and slowly strangle Odesa. It would exponentially heighten pressure on Moldova with the possibility of a reinvigorated Russian presence in Transnistria and fulfill Russia’s goal to turn the republic into a vassal state.

A Crimea under Russian control poses a grave threat to Romania, the United States’ closest Black Sea ally and NATO member. Accepting Putin’s annexation would enable further territorial aggression, following the pattern of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. With Crimea secured, Putin would likely push across the Dnipro River toward Odesa, energizing Russian-backed forces in Transnistria and prompting calls from Moldova’s Gagauz minority for Russian intervention. The Russian playbook of fabricated “patriotic” interventions, seen in Donbas and elsewhere, would likely be repeated in Moldova, bringing Russian troops to Romania’s border. This would make Romania’s 420-mile frontier the second-longest NATO-Russia border after Finland.

The strategically vital Snake Island at the mouth of the Danube Delta would also be endangered. Although Ukrainian resistance has thus far kept Russian naval forces at bay, a hasty peace would reopen the path for a renewed Russian effort to seize the island. This would allow Russia to choke the Danube River gateway, the second-largest maritime route into the Black Sea after the Dardanelles. This would effectively blockade Ukraine, Moldova, and much of Romania, provoking sustained harassment and instability in the region. Currently, 4,500 U.S. troops are stationed at the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, only 100 miles from Snake Island.

Turkey, the dominant Black Sea power, stands to lose the most if the sea becomes a Russian lake. Unfortunately, despite its public support for Ukraine in solidarity with Crimean Tatars, Ankara has been complicit in Russia’s creeping dominance by insisting on a rigid interpretation of the Montreux Convention, which restricts NATO’s naval presence in the Black Sea. As a NATO member, Turkey must recognize that Russian hegemony poses a far greater threat than NATO presence in the region.

Any peace agreement that leaves Crimea under Russian control would be a victory for Putin’s expansionist ambitions to reconstitute the Russian imperial sphere of influence. History suggests such an agreement would only lead to bloodier and more expansive conflicts in the near future, substantially increasing the likelihood of direct NATO involvement.

For the United States, allowing a peace deal that leaves Crimea with Putin would constitute a strategic blunder comparable to the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. History might judge such an agreement alongside the infamous Munich Pact of 1938, which attempted to appease Hitler by ceding Sudetenland, with disastrous consequences. Munich defined and tarnished British prime minister Neville Chamberlain’s legacy for appeasing Hitler. History will be equally unkind to those who appease Putin.

President-elect Trump, by many accounts, is more akin to Churchill than Chamberlain. He should reject any short-sighted peace deal that leaves Crimea in Russian hands and instead make a free Crimea central to a just and lasting peace. With his focus on business and infrastructure and making America great again, Trump could leverage a free Crimea to transform the region into a future of peace and prosperity backed by American industry and ingenuity. Like President Harry Truman and General George Marshall before him, Trump could leave a legacy of reshaping Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Those who underestimate him—and the potential for such a vision—do so at their peril.

Kaush Arha is president of the Free & Open Indo-Pacific Forum and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue.

George Scutaru is the CEO of the New Strategy Center and a former national security advisor to the President of Romania.

Justina Budginaite-Froehly is a security and defense policy expert focusing on defense industrial developments, military mobility, and energy security in Europe.

Image: NickolayV / Shutterstock.com.

In a wintry Ottawa, the Canadian prime minister contemplated his political future. Much had changed since he was first elected. The excitement around his youthful vigor, avowed multiculturalism, and sex appeal that had propelled him to office—“Trudeaumania,” the press had dubbed it—was gone. Critics called him arrogant and out-of-touch. The sheen had even worn off his personal life, with he and his glamorous wife in the midst of a divorce.

His political fortunes had fallen for substantive reasons, too. Canadians were fed up with the high inflation and growing government deficits that had characterized his economic stewardship. Many disliked his energy policy, especially in Western Canada. Many worried about bad relations with the United States under a Republican president.

Within his Liberal Party, the knives were coming out; conservatives, for their part, were reenergized under their younger leader. Indeed, around the world, conservatives seemed to have the momentum, with liberals facing backlash for their unpopular policies. The times had moved past Trudeau. And so, after a tenure that spanned multiple decades, he decided: it was time to step down.

This is not just the story of Justin Trudeau, who announced Monday that he is resigning as leader of the Liberal Party, paving the way for Canada’s first new prime minister in nearly a decade. It is also the story of his father, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who stepped down in 1984 after having been in power, apart from a nine-month period in opposition, since 1968. Ultimately, both prime ministers were felled by global trends they struggled to respond to.

There are differences, of course. On immigration, both Trudeaus made a point of welcoming refugees, especially from non-white-majority countries, but compared with his son’s, Pierre’s immigration policy was miserly. The number of immigrants actually fell in each of his final three years in office, ending at 89,000 in 1983—or 3.5 per 1,000 people. In 2024, some 485,000 immigrants moved to Canada—or 12 per 1,000 people.

On energy, Trudeau père’s undoing was his National Energy Program, a statist plan entailing price controls that alienated Canada’s Western provinces. Trudeau fils tried nothing so radical or unpopular, although his carbon tax has divided Canadians. The specific economic ailments also differ: inflation and unemployment were much higher when the elder Trudeau resigned, while today, GDP growth is in worse shape.

Yet in both cases, shocks to employment, prices, and growth generated a fierce backlash against incumbents the world over. In the 1980s, it manifested in the Reagan-Thatcher free-market revolution, a wave that swept far beyond the United States and the United Kingdom—provoking France’s socialist president, François Mitterrand, to embrace austerity, and sending the leader of Canada’s conservative party, Brian Mulroney, into the prime minister’s office after Trudeau.

The current anti-incumbent backlash is even more powerful, and Justin Trudeau is merely its latest victim. Add his name to the list of democratic leaders who have suffered electoral setbacks or outright defeats in the last year: Joe Biden and Kamala Harris in the United States, Rishi Sunak in the United Kingdom, Emmanuel Macron in France, Olaf Scholz in Germany, Cyril Ramaphosa in South Africa, Narendra Modi in India, Yoon Suk Yeol in South Korea, and Fumio Kishida in Japan. Like voters in the rest of the world, Canadians punished their political elites for COVID-19 policies they considered too restrictive and fiscal policies they considered inflationary (and in many, though not all, cases, immigration policies they considered too permissive).

Canada is a progressive country, one where socialized medicine, abortion, gun control, and gay rights are not hot-button issues but questions settled long ago. Yet this is not an unalloyed progressivism. As Trudeau discovered, there are limits to Canadians’ liberal inclinations. On immigration, it turned out that the median voter held more conservative views than he did (a lesson Harris also learned). His policy was decidedly unpopular, particularly for the way that the growing population was raising housing prices and straining the healthcare system. In October, he made a U-turn, announcing that he was dropping the annual targets for the number of new permanent residents by more than 100,000.

This identity crisis is most evident in economic policy. The nature of the Canadian economy has always tugged the country rightward. While not quite Saudi Arabia with snow and elections, Canada depends heavily on oil and gas production, along with mining, which explains why its environmental policies have long been more industry-friendly than one might otherwise expect, and why Trudeau’s climate policies were less popular than they might have been in, say, Denmark. Canada is also a major manufacturing exporter, which explains why Canadian prime ministers of all political stripes have been avowed free traders.

Yet unlike other fallen leaders, Trudeau faced a particular second-order effect of the anti-incumbent wave: the change of government it produced in Canada’s neighbor, closest ally, and biggest trading partner. Pierre Trudeau once quipped that living next to the United States was like “sleeping with an elephant: no matter how friendly or temperate the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.” And in November, Americans reelected a leader whom most Canadians considered neither friendly nor temperate.

Pursuing Canada’s interests without offending the United States is hard in the best of times, but that task became impossible for Trudeau with Donald Trump’s second electoral victory. The two leaders had a poor relationship during Trump’s first term: in 2018, after Trudeau promised that Canada would “not be pushed around” on tariffs, Trump called him “weak” and “dishonest,” and at a 2019 NATO summit, Trudeau was caught on camera joking with other leaders about Trump’s erratic ways. And relations were on track to be even worse during Trump’s second term.

In November, after Trump pledged to slap a 25 percent tariff on all Canadian goods, Trudeau made the pilgrimage to Mar-a-Lago, promising enhanced border security to appease the incoming president. It didn’t work: the following month, Trump belittled Trudeau on social media, calling him the “governor” of the “state” of Canada. Any Canadian prime minister was destined to have a strained relationship with Trump, given his protectionist impulses, but none more so than Trudeau, given their history, a reality that even his supporters recognized. Trudeau probably wouldn’t have lasted long during a Harris administration, but Trump’s election sealed his fate.

Historically, relations between Canada and the United States have been frosty when their leaders hail from opposing political tribes. Richard Nixon called Pierre Trudeau “a pompous egghead” and a “son of a bitch.” (Trudeau responded in his memoirs by saying he had “been called worse things by better people.”) Trudeau got along better with Ronald Reagan, although the American president later recalled being “horrified by his rudeness” at a G-7 summit in London.

Mulroney came to office promising to “refurbish relationships with the United States, our best and closest friend” and ended up becoming a personal friend of Reagan’s. There has perhaps never been a greater display of warmth between the two countries’ leaders than the “Shamrock Summit,” which began on St. Patrick’s Day of 1985 and ended with the two leaders, both of Irish heritage, singing “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling.” (Fittingly, Mulroney delivered a eulogy at Reagan’s funeral.)

Mulroney’s eventual Liberal successor, Jean Chrétien, got along famously with Bill Clinton, spending hours with him on the golf course. But Chrétien and his successor, Paul Martin, also a Liberal, clashed with George W. Bush over Iraq and a U.S. missile defense plan. And so the hot-and-cold pattern continued, through the elections of Stephen Harper, Barack Obama, Justin Trudeau, Trump, and Biden. If Pierre Poilievre, the leader of the Conservative Party, is elected prime minister this year, as polls suggest he has a good shot of doing, then one can expect a measure of cross-border calm to prevail. In a podcast interview with the psychologist and conservative commentator Jordan Peterson, he pitched Trump on the “great deal” the two leaders could make on trade.

With Trudeau’s resignation, Trump may now imagine that just as he has the power to tip GOP primaries and kill Congressional legislation, he can bring about the downfall of foreign leaders. In this way, by treating the leader of a close ally as a subservient political opponent deserving of mockery, Trump was acting out the fantasy he relayed to Trudeau at Mar-a-Lago and repeated Monday: that Canada is “the 51st state.” But for the most part, Trudeau was swept out of the prime minister’s office by the same global wave that Trump rode back into the White House.

Stuart A. Reid is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of The Lumumba Plot.

Image: Shutterstock.

The United States Navy has protected commercial shipping in the Middle East from Houthi attacks for more than 15 months, but in that time, Chinese vessels haven't come under attack. That is because the Iran-back proxy group, which controls vast swaths of Yemen, has been backed by Beijing.

As Maya Carlin reported for The National Interest, citing a report from Israeli-based i24 News, the Houthis have even been employing Chinese-designed weapons to carry out their attacks.

"In exchange, the terror group will cease attacks on ships flying the Chinese flag. With a shared mutual contempt for the West, Beijing and Tehran's collaboration in the region makes sense," Carlin wrote.

China's support for the militant group has ensured its vessels have been spared from Houthi attacks, although one Chinese-linked oil tanker did come under fire in March of last year. This is more than Beijing just paying off the Houthis.

"We now have credible reports that China's communist rulers are supplying arms to the Houthi Islamists in Yemen supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran," explained Clifford D. May, founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in a post earlier this month.

"By now it should be apparent that the West is literally under fire from an Axis of Aggressors: Beijing, Moscow, Tehran and its proxies, and Pyongyang," May added. "They are determined to establish a new international order based on their power and their rules. The United States and its European allies have not responded effectively to this reality. Perhaps the incoming administration will do a better job."

China's Great Game in the Middle East

The fact that the PRC may have taken such a position on Houthis should come as absolutely no surprise to anyone closely watching the unfolding events for a few reasons, geopolitical analyst Irina Tsukerman, president of Scarab Rising, told The National Interest.

"China has been assisting Houthis in the past for pragmatic business reasons, such as selling their drones considered inferior to Western and Turkish variants, which were allegedly paid for by Qatar – without ever being held accountable," she explained.

She noted that Beijing already has a long history of doing business with all sides in the Middle East. This is in part to secure as broad an economic influence as possible and in part to fund its domestic and international priorities through such trade schemes.

"Over time, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been increasingly gravitating towards closer cooperation with Iran and Russia, which colored all aspects of domestic and international priorities," Tsukerman warned. "The CCP has been using TikTok and other government-linked platforms, for instance, to spread outright antisemitic and anti-Israel propaganda and to provide open political backing to Hamas, Iranian, Hezbollah, and Russian propaganda."

For those reasons, it absolutely should come as no surprise that it would be part of a broader network among these countries that would favor the proxies of one of its top oil suppliers and anti-Western counterparts.

China's self-interests are also at stake.

"Part of the reasons for the expanded cooperation with the Houthis is the need to protect Chinese vessels in the Red Sea from attacks, and this level of backing is part of the self-serving agenda at the cost to everyone else," Tsukerman said candidly.

Moreover, the PRC remains dedicated to countering Western interests whenever possible and an increased Red Sea presence and coordination with the Houthis provides an opportunity to put pressure on the U.S., UK, and Israeli shipping industry, militarily and financially, to gather valuable intelligence about its competitors and adversaries, to take advantage of the problems facing Western insurance companies, flagging companies, and the shipping sector to do business in those areas, and to position itself as a new naval power in the Middle East, Tsukerman further acknowledged.

This is the first part in a three-part series on China's growing influence in the Middle East. Thank you to Irina Tsukerman for her insight.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Uncle Sam is getting his rear-end kicked by the Russians and Chinese (heck, even the North Koreans are starting to outdo the Americans) in the all-important realm of hypersonic weapons. Indeed, it’s possible that China is even already creating working defenses against hypersonic weapons (meaning that Beijing is doubling up on success whereas the Americans are still languishing in the design phase).

But a new U.S. defense project between the Department of Defense and contractor Kratos is desperately trying to change that with a new project. Given how key hypersonic weapons are, and will continue to be, the Kratos effort must be assessed. 

Under the rubric of “MACH TB 2.0,” Kratos is attempting to “enhance the United States’ capabilities in hypersonic technology through rapid, affordable testing,” according to Kalif Shaikh at Interesting Engineering, a trade publication. 

Both the Kratos leadership and the top brass at the Pentagon believe that one of the key reasons that the Russians and Chinese have surpassed the Americans in developing a reliable, real-world hypersonic weapons capacity has to do with the extreme costs of hypersonic weapons development and testing. 

In fact, when it comes to testing hypersonic systems, the United States is far behind the curve. Wind tunnels are key elements behind testing hypersonic systems. Guess where the world’s most powerful wind tunnel is for testing hypersonic systems? China.

Kratos is leading a group of powerful defense contractors, including the likes of Leidos and Rocket Lab, all of which are keen on expediting the R&D cycles of American hypersonic weapons. Kratos believes that it can reduce the risks and costs associated with hypersonic weapons development by accelerating the delivery of these systems in the field. One way to do that is by deploying advanced flying testbeds to allow for researchers to assess the efficacy of their hypersonic systems in real-world conditions.

Pentagon insiders (and those at Kratos) do not believe that the United States lacks the fundamentals to achieve parity with both Russia and China in hypersonic weapons. They think the problem is taking all the disparate pieces the Pentagon has been assembling for hypersonic weapons research and development and accelerating those projects. There might be something to this theory. 

After all, hypersonic weapons have been researched since the last part of the Cold War. It’s not really new technology. The Americans, however, did not develop these systems, which left a gap for both Russia and China to fill.

So, it might very well be that this is an application problem rather than a fundamental inability to compete. Of course, the United States is being shown up by its rivals, notably China, in multiple other domains. Yet, the Americans are right to give the Kratos team a chance to see if it can accelerate the American development of hypersonic weapons. If Kratos is right, then the United Statees could achieve real parity with China and Russia in hypersonic weapons in the five years or so.

There are some problems with this outlook. 

Fundamentally, the defense industrial base is broken and the procurement systems for these weapons systems are increasingly corrupt and inefficient. The quest for greater weapons has been hindered by defense firms’ massive profit seeking—even at the expense of national readiness. 

Should the Kratos team be wrong, and the problems affecting America’s hypersonic weapons development are far more fundamental and systemic, then the United States will find itself in a world of hurt, as Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapons threaten the homeland in ways that conventional missiles simply cannot. 

A global arms race is occurring, and the Americans are in the unenviable position of being on the defensive. Hopefully Kratos can help overcome these problems soon. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

In September of last year, it was reported that Russia had launched an astonishing 8,060 drones developed by the long-time Russian ally, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. 

At the time, it was an extraordinary number. The reporting back in September 2024 highlighted the importance that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of all shapes and sizes had for both sides fighting in Ukraine (the Ukrainians use overwhelming numbers of Turkish-produced drones). 

The Iranian drones that Russia loves are the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 one-way attack unmanned aerial systems. In an October 2022 assessment by the Council of Foreign Relations, the bulk of the drones Iran handed over to Russia belonged to the Shahed-136 model. That’s the specific Iranian-built drone we’ll be analyzing here.

Back in March, the Russians signed a licensing agreement with Iran that allowed them to domestically produce these systems. According to a November 2024 report by Iran International, a website that advocates the end of the Islamist regime in Iran, the presence of large numbers of cheaply produced Iranian drones “supercharged Russia’s 1,000-day fight in Ukraine.” 

With Russia now mass producing the Iranian drones indigenously, the Russians will likely continue enjoying the boost that the drones gave their forces when the Iranians first sold the drones to Russia. As the fight over control of the Russian enclave of Kursk, located just across the border from Ukraine has shown, Russian drones are wreaking havoc on the entrenched Ukrainian forces operating there. 

The Shahed-136, also known as “Witness” (or, Geran-2, meaning “Geranium-2” in Russian), is a delta-winged loitering munition designed for long-range attacks. The brilliance of the system lies in its relative simplicity that allows for cheap mass production and lower maintenance costs compared to other, more sophisticated drones. It has a range of a little more than 1,200 miles and can carry a warhead weighing between 88 and 110 pounds. Shahed-136 drones typically have a subsonic cruising speed of 111 miles per hour.

The basic tactics underlying the deployment of these systems involve the saturation of enemy defenses with swarms of cheaply produced Shahed-136 drones, thereby overwhelming an enemy’s air defenses and allowing for the attacking force to achieve dominance over a contested area. Another tactic involves stealthy, surgical strikes, since these drones’ relatively small size and low-flying capability makes it more difficult for defenders to see and defend against them.

Iranian Shahed-136 drones have also been used by the Iranian-backed Houthis in their efforts to terrorize international shipping—and the mighty United States Navy—in the Red Sea and Strait of Bab El-Mandeb. That Tehran is the producer of this specific drone should not surprise anyone. Being a relatively small power under immense international sanctions has meant that the Iranian regime has had to innovate unique asymmetrical warfare capabilities. 

The Shahed-136 is particularly vexing for nations on the receiving end of its attacks. The drone poses significant defensive challenges, as both the Houthis out of Yemen and the Russians fighting in Ukraine have shown. Drones have proven that only layered air defense systems have a chance at reliably countering the threat that drone swarms pose to defenders. 

Such systems, however, are expensive to maintain—especially when compared to the relative cost and the overwhelming lethality of the Shahed-136 drones. What’s more, the risk of Iran proliferating these systems to other actors, particularly non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations beyond the Houthis, is a real complicating factor when it comes to defense.

Iranian weapons designers have already learned a great deal from the experience of their systems in various theaters of global warfare. They are applying those lessons learned to future iterations both of the Shahed-136 and other, more advanced Iranian drones. 

It is obvious that drone warfare will continue to evolve and to increasingly dominate the future of modern warfare. The Iranians understand this. As do the Turks and Russians. We shall see if the Western world truly understands this new reality. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

Almost every president since the end of the Cold War had his foreign policy legacy defined by a war no one could have foreseen. For George H.W. Bush, it was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Bill Clinton sought to deflect Bush’s 90 percent popularity after the successful 100-hour ground war by focusing on bread-and-butter issues. In 1992, Clinton campaign consultant James Carville summarized the strategy with the famous quip, “It’s the economy, stupid.” Clinton genuinely hoped to focus on the economy. He extricated U.S. forces from Somalia following the “Black Hawk Down” incident but found himself drawn first into Bosnia and then more reluctantly into Kosovo. George W. Bush, too, sought to be a domestic president but, after the 9/11 attacks, ordered U.S. forces into Afghanistan and, more controversially, into Iraq. Barack Obama pledged to end “dumb war[s],” but not only remained in Afghanistan and returned to Iraq but then involved the United States in Syria and Libya.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dominated the Biden administration’s foreign policy. Joe Biden did not send U.S. forces into the theater, but he did provide Ukraine with weaponry and other forms of support for their war effort. For all his talk about his genuine interest in Africa, Biden has paid little attention to the world’s deadliest conflict, the civil war in Sudan. He staked out the middle ground in the Israel-Hamas conflict, meddling diplomatically and virtue signaling with humanitarian schemes while otherwise standing largely aloof. Biden also claimed to be “the first president in this century to report to the American people that the United States is not at war anywhere in the world.” However, he omitted U.S. involvement off the coast of Yemen.

While the COVID-19 Pandemic overshadowed Donald Trump’s first term (thanks to a Chinese lab leak), he is correct in saying that he did not involve the United States in new wars. His second term will likely not be so placid.

Several wars loom, all of which could impact Trump’s legacy, whether he chooses to involve himself or not.

After Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Turkish-sponsored Sunni Islamist group that previously aligned with Al Qaeda rampaged through Syria and ended Bashar al-Assad’s dynasty after nearly a quarter-century. Trump celebrated. “I think Turkey is very smart...Turkey did an unfriendly takeover, without a lot of lives being lost,” he said.

Trump’s assessment of Turkey’s wisdom may be premature. While Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Bakr al-Jolani) seeks to win international recognition, he does so less because he has yet to consolidate control and more because recognition will bring access and control over the nearly $400 billion that Syrians will need to reconstruct their country.

The broader issue that could impact the Trump administration is what the new Syrian regime will mean for the Syrian Kurds. Trump may not care about the Kurds personally—he certainly did not hesitate to betray them during his first term—but the stakes are arguably higher. Both Al-Sharaa and Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani are pawns of Turkey; both trade sovereignty and nationalist causes for cash and power. Both will turn on Syrian Kurds to remain in the good graces of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 

In the past, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad was a brake on Turkish ambitions. With him gone, Turkey and its proxies may seek to overrun Syria’s Kurdish regions. The short-term impact of this could be the release of thousands of Islamic State prisoners. They will tip the balance inside Syria toward militancy. They could spread throughout not only the Middle East—destabilizing Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—but also become another tool by which Erdogan could blackmail Europe, as he did with Syrian refugees. It will only be a matter of time until some cross the southern border. What happens in Syria does not stay in Syria.

Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev took advantage of U.S. distraction during the 2020 election to launch an attack on Nagorno-Karabakh, a self-governing and democratic ethnic Armenian territory that Azerbaijan demanded to subordinate itself to Azerbaijan’s direct rule. On November 9, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin imposed a ceasefire sparing about half the region’s territory and enabling 120,000 indigenous Armenians to remain in the rump region. With Putin preoccupied with the Ukraine War and with Secretary of State Antony Blinken signaling moral equivalency and weakness, Aliyev finished the job in September 2023, driving the entire 1,700-year-old Armenian Christian community into exile. Blinken’s refusal to describe that episode as “ethnic cleansing,” preferring instead to describe events in the passive voice as “depopulation,” leads Aliyev to believe he can continue his anti-Armenian jihad. In recent weeks, Aliyev has demanded the European border observation team evacuate and Armenia stop arming itself. His rhetoric about Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan” mirrors the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s quip about Kuwait being Iraq’s “nineteenth province.”

The Caucasus could become even bloodier if Ukraine falls. Since 2018, Armenia has pivoted toward the West. Putin has a long memory. If given the opportunity, he will exact his revenge on Armenia. The same holds true for Moldova, which has also oriented itself increasingly toward Europe and NATO. Russia has already tightened its grip on Georgia. Trump must consider whether he is fine with the reconstitution of the Soviet Union.

Trump would not be the first president to ignore African conflicts, but he may be the first for whom doing so would put the United States at untenable risk. China is no stranger to the continent. In 2017, it opened its first overseas naval base in tiny Djibouti in the Hord of Africa, just a few miles from Camp Lemonnier, where the Pentagon still stations its Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.

During the Biden administration, China consolidated its strategic position without any serious U.S. pushback. Rather than counter China’s economic and military inroads, the State Department often facilitated them.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) may be one of the world’s most dysfunctional states. Still, it nevertheless will be indispensable for the twenty-first-century economy. The lithium-ion batteries (upon which so many technologies depend) require cobalt, tantalum, germanium, and other rare earth elements that the DRC possesses in abundance. Some geologists estimate that Congo’s mineral wealth is worth up to $24 trillion.

China has taken a two-pronged approach to the DRC. It has bribed successive presidents for lucrative and exclusive mining concessions and simultaneously sold high-tech weaponry to support its investment in President Félix Tshisekedi, who now seeks an unconstitutional third term. Meanwhile, U.S. officials still celebrate Tshisekedi as a democrat. Under Michael Hammer, the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa recommended lifting UN reporting requirements on Congolese military purchases, thus injecting an opacity that only benefits Beijing.

Tshisekedi is not an intellectual. He appears to believe that a top-shelf, multibillion-dollar military can buy victory, regardless of his regime’s corruption and general incompetence. Such a dynamic can lead rulers like Tshisekedi to pull the trigger. He has grown increasingly bellicose toward Rwanda, a pro-Western neighbor that has previously fought to protect itself from genocide-era terrorists who now call the DRC home. Anti-Rwanda rhetoric can both distract Congolese from Tshisekedi’s own mismanagement and also serve China’s interests as Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame has taken a balanced approach that has effectively blocked Beijing’s ambitions. If a third Congo War erupts—and odds are it will—Trump will be forced to deal with a conflict that could disrupt the twenty-first-century economy just as much as the Arab oil embargo disrupted the twentieth-century economy.

Chinese interference in the Horn of Africa is an even greater threat. Somaliland, an unrecognized country that is nonetheless the region’s only democracy, also possesses rare earth deposits. It hosts an airfield that, prior to Somalia’s collapse into chaos, was an emergency landing strip for NASA’s space shuttle program, a deep water port that today is one of Africa’s top-ranked facilities, and several hundred miles of strategic coast along the Gulf of Aden. While countries like Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates take a transactional approach between the United States and China, Somaliland stands on principle and openly sides with Taiwan. 

China, alongside the Somali government in Mogadishu, has responded by sponsoring an insurgency in Somaliland’s Sool region. The Biden team bizarrely sided not with democratic, pro-Western, pro-Taiwan, and reasonably transparent Somaliland but rather with Mogadishu and Beijing. If Trump does not side unequivocally with Somaliland and recognize it, expect China to increase its efforts to destabilize the country. Simply put, it is impossible for Trump to stand up to China without working to checkmate its projects in Africa.

The one possible conflict for which Trump’s team recognizes the need for preparation is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Make no mistake: Taiwan is not China. Historically, it has been distinct for most of the last 500 years. Even Mao Zedong recognized that Taiwan was as distinct from China as Korea.

Taiwan, however, is not simply the single island that many Americans picture. It also includes several outlying islands—some in the Taiwan Strait and some further afield. Trump’s advisors must not assume, as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy-designate Elbridge Colby does, that China would “go big” with an immediate effort to conquer Taiwan’s main island. After all, the Taiwan Relations Act does not cover the islands Matsu or Quemoy, the epicenter of the Eisenhower-era Taiwan crises, let alone those further afield like Taiping or Dongsha. 

For Beijing, Chinese “salami slicing” tactics in the South China Sea have been a success. Why should they change them now? Rather than simply address a theoretical invasion of Taiwan proper, Trump needs to determine in advance whether he will stand down should that invasion come in slow motion. After all, if China occupies Dongsha or Matsu absent American pushback, it is conditioning the American public for inaction.

Every president enters office with an agenda, but reality quickly intrudes. Biden allowed problems to fester, and the weakness and vacillation of aides like Blinken only encouraged irredentists and adversaries.

The foreign policy crises Trump does not expect and that his aides hope to ignore will likely define Trump’s legacy in ways he does not now imagine. Trump side-stepped wars in his first administration. He may not be so lucky in his next one.

Michael Rubin is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum.

Image: M2M_PL / Shutterstock.com.

If there is one untold, or completely misunderstood, geopolitical story of the twenty-first century, it is the rise of Turkey as a great power. Possessed of an Islamist political ideology and a commitment to restoring Turkey’s long-dead Ottoman Empire, the country that sits at the “Crossroads of Civilization,” between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, is the only great power that has seen its political power and military strength enhance since the dawn of this century. 

One area where Turkey is showcasing its newfound power and potency is in the realm of indigenous weapons. Turkey is a global leader in drone technology and its Bayraktar TB2 Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) is a perfect exemplar of Turkey’s military technological prowess. The TB2 is known for having reshaped the dynamics of contemporary warfare with its affordability, effectiveness, and adaptability.

Built by Baykar Makina, a Turkish defense contractor for the Turkish Air Force, the Bayraktar TB2 has become a massively popular system both in Turkey’s Armed Forces and as an export model. It has enjoyed extensive service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces as they war against their neighbor, Russia, for control over the eastern portion of Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula (both of which Russia views as its own). 

A common theme of Turkey’s development as a major military technological power is that Ankara is consistently denied access to key American and NATO military assets. And because Turkey is prevented from gaining access to advanced Western technologies, Ankara has endeavored to become militarily self-sufficient. That is precisely what has occurred over the last decade. 

So, again, after the Americans embargoed Turkey from purchasing armed drones (because the West did not want those systems being used by Turkey against U.S.-backed Kurdish fighters in the Middle East), Turkey’s domestic drone industry was catalyzed into action. The TB2 made its initial flight in August 2014. By 2021, the drone had logged over 400,000 flight hours globally. 

Turkey equipped the TB2 with advanced systems allowing for both autonomous and remotely controlled operations. Constructed predominantly of carbon fiber and Kevlar, this V-tail-signature craft has proven itself time and time again over the last decade, meaning that Turkey has become an unmanned aerial vehicle-producing superpower. The TB2 carries a payload of up to 330 pounds.

TB2s integrate electro-optical, infrared cameras, and laser designators (and laser range finders), making these birds a perfect ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) craft as well as effective for targeted strikes.

It has an operational altitude of 25,000 feet and an endurance of 27 hours, meaning that the TB2 can remain over targets for a protracted time, augmenting the user’s real-time battlefield information flow (granting greater situational awareness upon the force deploying the TB2).

Over the years, TB2s have participated in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. They were used to neutralize enemy air defenses on behalf of Turkish-backed elements fighting in war-torn Libya. In the brutal Nagorno-Karabakh war, Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan deployed TB2 drones so well that many believe these systems led to Armenia’s defeat in that conflict. 

As noted above, though, the TB2 drones became most well-known internationally for their use by Ukrainian forces against the invading Russians, giving the TB2 positive press.

In all the conflicts these drones have fought, they have performed brilliantly, making them a key system that Turkey produces. What’s more, the relatively cheap price of individual TB2s (around $5 million), makes these drones an attractive purchase for nations operating under constrained defense budgets.

Nearly twenty-four foreign nations have purchased these drones from Turkey, boosting Turkey’s arms industry as well as Turkey’s national influence and prestige. 

Thanks to the unqualified success of the TB2 program, Turkey has invested in a new round of systems augmenting the capabilities of the TB2. For instance, the even more advanced Bayraktar TB3 has been developed as well as the Akinci, promising greater strike and surveillance capabilities—at affordable rates—than what the legendary TB2 provided.

Turkey has arrived as a great regional power and its indigenous arms industry proves this. It is now only a matter of time before Turkey exerts its power beyond its present borders. Indeed, it has already started enhancing its power in the Middle East. The Bayraktar TB2 (and subsequent drone systems) are but a few of the symbols proving Turkey’s return to greatness. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Flickr.

Boeing is set to move full-rate production (FRP) for its electronic warfare (EW) kit that will be employed on the U.S. Air Force's fleet of F-15E Strike Eagle and F-15EX Eagle II aircraft. On Monday, the aerospace firm was awarded a $615 million Pentagon contract for the F-15 Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS) FRP, which will see the multirole aircraft updated with the kits through the end of 2030.

"This contract provides for procurement of Group A and Group B kits, system engineering program management, and interim contractor support lay-in material," the Department of Defense (DoD) announced.

The EPAWSS was developed in a partnership between BAE Systems and the U.S. Air Force to replace the analog F-15 Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS) and promises to increase the survivability of the F-15 from modern air defense platforms. Initial operational and test evaluations were conducted last year.

"BAE Systems is currently on schedule in support of Boeing's F-15 EPAWSS LRIP [low-rate initial production] activities and is looking forward to supporting Boeing in the FRP [full rate production] phase of the program," Kevin Fournier, EPAWSS program director at BAE Systems, said in a statement, per Breaking Defense.

A highly capable electronic warfare (EW) suite, EPAWSS is an all-digital radar warning, geolocation, situational awareness platform that was developed to aid in the detection and to counter surface and airborne threats in what BAE Systems describes as " highly contested, dense signal environments." It further provides radio frequency (RF) electronic countermeasures (ECM), while it is smaller and lighter than previous EW platforms employed in the F-15. The number of chaff and flare dispensers has also been increased with a full dozen holding 360 cartridges.

"EPAWSS is a leap in technology, improving the lethality and combat capabilities of the F-15E and F-15EX in contested, degraded environments against advanced threats," Explained EPAWSS test director Maj Bryant 'Jager' Baum. "EPAWSS has set the baseline for EW within the fighter community."

The installation of EPAWSS could help deliver on Boeing's efforts to transform the F-15EX into an Air Force version of the U.S. Navy's EA-18G Growler – the EW variant of the carrier-based F/A-18 Super Hornet.

Upgrading the Eagle Fleet

The U.S. Air Force inventory currently includes 218 F-15Es, and according to a December 2023 Pentagon Modernized Selected Acquisition Report (MSAR), 99 of the Strike Eagles will receive the upgrades – while all of the planned 98 F-15EX Eagles IIs that the service is acquiring will be equipped with the EPAWSS.

The numbers are a significant reduction noted in an April 2022 Select Acquisition Report (SAR), which stated that the procurement quantity would include "217 F-15E and 144 F-15EX aircraft." However, the Air Force scaled back on the upgrades citing the high costs. The totals could still be adjusted depending on how many F-15EXs the Air Force ends up acquiring, while it is also likely the oldest F-15Es (with the most flight hours) won't receive the enhancement given that their remaining service life.

"Used 34 years as a hybrid number for life-cycle since EPAWSS on F-15E has a 24 year while F-15EX has a 44 year life-cycle expectancy," the DoD's MSAR stated.

The work will be carried out at Boeing's facility in St. Louis, Missouri, and by BAE Systems in Nashua, New Hampshire. It was not stated how the work would be divided, but it is likely that Boeing would handle the installation of the EW suite in all of the F-15EX aircraft.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

At the tail end of 2024, two new Chinese stealth fighter demonstrators were revealed. The separate designs put forth by manufacturers Shenyang and Chengdu stunned aviation buffs and military experts alike. Both airframes featured qualities that would make them stealthy, high-performance next-generation platforms. While additional information surrounding these planes has yet to be publicized, their overall design falls in line with what experts have already assumed about China’s future aerial objectives. One of the combat aircraft depicted in leaked videos of the flights is likely a successor to the PLAAF’s current fifth-generation program. The Chengdu J-20 is widely considered to represent one of the most formidable jets of its kind to ever fly the skies. The “Mighty Dragon’s” design, from its fuselage shape and engine intake shape to its paint design and stealth, mirrors the American-made F-22 and F-35 platforms. If a full blown war were to erupt over the South China Sea, the J-20 platform would undoubtedly lead the PRC’s aerial strategy.

A brief overview of the J-20 platform

When the J-20 was first introduced to service, China became the second country ever to release a fifth-generation stealth aircraft. The aircraft was initially endorsed by the PLAAF in the early 2000’s and entered service in 2017. By 2019, considerable numbers of J-20s became operational. Initially, the fifth-generation platform flew with Russian AL-31 engines. The PRC later turned to its domestically produced WS-15 engine, an important transition as the Chinese engine is remarkably more capable than the Russian import as it allows the J-20 to enter a super cruise regime while unlocking the supermaneuverability granted by thrust vectoring.

Specs & capabilities- how does the J-20 compare to its American near-peers?

In terms of capabilities, aviation buffs believe that the J-20 features a sensor suite that parallels the F-35’s Electro-Optical Targeting System. The twinjet all-weather Mighty Dragon has a reported range of 1,200 miles, a servicing ceiling of 55,000 feet and a maximum speed of Mach-2.55. While these characteristics make the Chinese fifth-generation jet a formidable threat to its American near-peers, the extent of the jet’s capabilities remains unknown. A research fellow for airpower and technology at the United Kingdom-based Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security called the Mighty Dragon “a qualitatively greater threat than any previous non-Western combat aircraft.”

The race to produce sixth-gen platforms is underway

In total, the PRC plans to increase production of the J-20 to match and even exceed the number of American-made Raptors in service today. If the Mighty Dragon reaches this production goal, the potential for incursions over Taiwan will heighten. The PRC remains steadfast in its ambition to seize control of this First Island Chain Nation in the near future. In addition to acquiring more J-20’s, China’s military is prioritizing the production of sixth-generation platforms. The upcoming H-20 Xi’an stealth bomber is Beijing’s counter for the American-designed B-21 Raider. China is also working to develop a next-gen fighter program as made evident by the recent flights of stealth fighter demonstrators.

Maya Carlin is a National Interest security contributor, an analyst with the Center for Security Policy, and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. 

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

China is reportedly developing two stealth bombers: the H-20 strategic bomber and the JH-XX tactical bomber. If China is capable of finishing either project, the military implications for the region could be significant, giving China a tool that to date only the Americans have ever possessed.

The Stealth Bomber

Only one country has ever developed and fielded a stealth bomber – the US and their B-2 Spirit. And when the B-2 was first delivered, in 1993, the aircraft was a legitimate game changer. Suddenly, the US possessed the ability to fly undetected, across enemy lines, and deliver either nuclear or conventional ordnance; the B-2 added another layer of sophistication to the US’s nuclear triad, which constituted the US’s nuclear deterrence strategy.

Times have changed, however. The B-2’s stealth technology is no longer cutting-edge; it’s radar cross section is no longer as impressive. Air defense systems have grown more sensitive, challenging the B-2’s ability to operate undetected. Accordingly, the Air Force is working on an updated stealth bomber, the B-21, which will presumably feature a smaller RCS.

Respect is still due: The B-2 was ahead of its time; over thirty years later, no nation has offered an equivalent technology. But now China is reportedly working to do just that, with not one stealth bomber but two.

China’s Efforts

Little is known about the Chinese efforts to field a stealth bomber. Details are exceedingly scant. But what is understood is that the H-20 project will offer a strategic option while the JH-XX will offer a tactical option. What does that mean? The H-20 will have a larger combat radius, perhaps upwards of 5,000 miles, and will feature advanced radar systems like the AESA. The H-20 would serve in a similar capacity as the B-2, giving the Chinese a credible method for delivering nuclear weapons via air, hence creating a credible nuclear triad.

The JH-XX meanwhile can be expected to have similar features but will be a smaller, regionally focused bomber that may include fifth-generation fighter technologies i.e., thrust vectoring, data fusion, network connectivity, supercruise, and an internal weapons bay. Granted, that’s not much to go on. Yet, the existence of the project has been confirmed through official channels; according to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2019 China Military Power report, “The PLAAF [ People’s Liberation Army Air Force] is developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets…stealth technology continues to play a key role in the development of these new bombers, which probably will reach initial operational capability no sooner than 2025.”

The report added that the JH-XX “will have additional capabilities, with full-spectrum upgrades compared with current operational bomber fleets, and will employ many fifth-generation fighter technologies in their design.” That’s not a lot to go on. The significant takeaway is simply that the Chinese are working on a stealth bomber, an ambition that is consistent with Xi’s overarching ambition of enhancing Chinese military prowess and revisionism.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Russian state media reported that an airstrike was carried out on Wednesday in the Ukrainian-occupied Kursk region involving a Sukhoi Su-34 (NATO reporting name Fullback). The fighter-bomber launched guided glide bombs at ground targets, while it was escorted by a Sukhoi Su-35S (NATO reporting name Flanker-M).

"The crew of a Russian Aerospace Forces Su-34 multi-role supersonic fighter-bomber delivered a strike on a cluster of Ukrainian military manpower and armored and motor vehicles near the border in the Kursk Region," the Russian Ministry of Defense said in a statement to Tass.

"After completing the combat mission, the entire group successfully returned to the base airfield. According to the intelligence report, the targets were successfully hit," the Defense Ministry added.

The airstrikes were allegedly carried out on a "Ukrainian stronghold," and the Kremlin claimed multiple Ukrainian personnel were killed and several vehicles destroyed. Kyiv has not commented on the strike or confirmed that it suffered any losses.

Replenishing the Losses

It was just weeks ago that the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), a subsidiary of the military-industrial conglomerate Rostec, announced that it had delivered a new batch of Su-34s multirole fighters to the Russian Aerospace Forces.

UAC didn't state how many fighters were delivered in the latest consignment, but it has been reported that Moscow's rate of attrition has been outpacing production throughout the ongoing conflict. Last month, Stavros Atlamazoglou, writing for The National Interest, cited Oryx open-source data that found thirty-seven Su-34s had been to that point.

Russia was believed to have around 163 operational Su-34s at the start of the conflict nearly three years ago. Though the Kremlin didn't confirm the loss of one in October, Russian military bloggers (mil-bloggers) acknowledged that a Su-34 was shot down by an American-made F-16 Fighting Falcon. It marked the first successful air-to-air kill involving the F-16 in Ukraine.

Russia's Fullback

The Sukhoi Su-34 multirole strike aircraft is a twin-engine, twin-seat, all-weather supersonic medium-range fighter-bomber, initially developed for the Soviet Air Forces in the 1980s. A derivative of the Sukhoi Su-27 (NATO reporting name Flanker), the Su-34 was developed to operate in all weather conditions and conduct attack, bombing, and fighter missions.

The development of the aircraft was one of the Kremlin's many programs that were forced on the backburner following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis that followed. The Su-34 program was only revived in earnest in the early 2000s, with eight pre-production aircraft built for trials and evaluations. The aircraft formally entered service in 2014 – although there are reports that the strike aircraft was employed during the Russo-Georgia War of 2008.

As Atlamazoglou further emphasized, the aircraft was designed with "an enhanced cockpit with additional armor to withstand anti-aircraft ground fire," while it also is equipped with "advanced electronic warfare countermeasures to jam or defeat enemy anti-aircraft missiles." The Su-34 is capable of reaching Mach 2 (approximately 1,500 miles per hour) and is able to carry 18,000 pounds of ordnance on its 12 hardpoints. It can conduct air-to-air attacks beyond visual range (BVR), but also be employed in a fighter-bomber role – which appears to be how the Kremlin is now mostly using the aircraft.

Though it can strike targets up to 160 miles away, that doesn't seem to be far enough for the fighter-bomber to avoid hostile air-defense fire, or enemy aircraft as noted in the October encounter with the F-16.

Thus while the Su-34 remains among Russia's most capable multirole aircraft, and it has been widely used in the ongoing war, it clearly isn't invincible. The question now is whether Russia will be able to replace the losses – especially as Ukraine is to receive additional F-16 Fight Falcons and French-made Mirage 2000s.

The Su-35S

As previously reported, the Sukhoi Su-35 has been touted as one of the most advanced 4++ generation aircraft systems, combining many fifth-generation elements. It is also a heavily upgraded derivative of the Su-27 aircraft and was originally intended for export.

As UAC failed to initially find foreign buyers, the Su-35S first entered service with the Russian Aerospace Forces in 2014 and made its first combat deployment in Syria in 2015 – where it was employed to provide cover for other Russian aircraft on bombing missions.

While sharing broadly the blended wing-body design of the Su-27, the Su-27M/Su-35S can be visibly distinguished from the basic version by the addition of canards, which are small lifting surfaces, ahead of the wings. The Su-35's large and powerful Saturn AL-41F1S engines provide it the ability to supercruise for a long time, while it can reach supersonic speeds without using an afterburner.

The engines are also noted for employing three-dimensional thrust vectoring, which makes the Su-35 very maneuverable. Currently, it is the only production fighter to use two-plane thrust vectoring nozzles.

Designed primarily to be an air superiority fighter, the Su-35 has secondary air-to-ground capability and can carry an enormous amount of weapons. It has 12 wing and fuselage hardpoints, which allow for it to carry ordnance with a maximum weight of up to 8,000 kg (17,630 pounds), including a variety of air-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-radiation, and anti-ship missiles, as well as a number of TV, laser-, and satellite-guided bombs. The Su-35's armament also includes a GSh-30-1 30mm autocannon with 150 rounds.

The multirole aircraft can further be equipped with an electronic warfare pod, which provides it with powerful jamming capability. It has been reported that its advanced jammers can reduce the performance of enemy radars, and can blind onboard radars found on missiles, notably the AIM-120 AMRAAM.

Russia is reported to have around 120 Su-35s in service, while at least six are believed to have been lost in the fighting in Ukraine. It would seem that the Su-35S may have a new role – namely protecting the Su-34 when it carries out its ground attacks.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Even one of the greatest weapons of mass destruction has what could be described as a "shelf life." On Tuesday, the United States Department of Energy announced that its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) had completed a program to keep the B61-12 nuclear bomb in service for decades to come.

The B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) was initiated in 2008, with a specific focus on upgrading the family of B61 gravity bombs, "which are deployed from U.S. Air Force and North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) bases." The latest modification of the original bomb, the B61-12 is a twelve-foot-long, approximately 825-pound, air-launched nuclear gravity bomb that utilizes an inertial navigation system (INS) to make a precision strike on a target.

According to NNSA, the B61 has already been in service for more than five decades, yet remains both "the oldest and most versatile weapon in the enduring U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile." The B61-12 LEP is meant to further extend the service life of the bomb stockpile by at least another 20 years. That will include refurbishing, reusing, and if necessary even replacing some of the nuclear and non-nuclear components.

As a result, instead of entirely fresh ordnance, the B6-12s are a combination of new and refurbished components from earlier variants including the B61-3, B61-4, B61-7, and B61-10. On December 18, 2024, NNSA completed the Last Production Unit (LPU) of the B61-12 LEP – the culmination of an effort that began almost 20 years earlier.

"Completing the B61-12 on schedule is the latest example of what we've been saying for several years now: NNSA is delivering capabilities at the pace and scale needed by our Department of Defense partners and our deterrence requirements," said Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby. 

The total cost of the program was reported to be approximately $9 billion.

Upgrades to Continue

The B61-12 LPU came three years after the First Production Unit (FPU) was achieved in November 2021, and 17 years after its design and development was first initiated.

"NNSA's program managers and experts from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, the Pantex Plant, the Savanah River Site, the Y-12 National Security Complex, and the Kansas City National Security Campus worked in close collaboration with NNSA on the design, development, qualification, and component production," the Department of Energy explained.

"Completion of the last B61-12 testifies to the successful collaboration we've had with our U.S. Air Force and Department of Defense partners. The momentum built through B61-12 production and delivery will continue into delivery on the other six active weapons modernization programs and on additional programs that will become active in the coming years," explained Dr. Marvin Adams, deputy administrator for Defense Programs at the DoE. "Achieving LPU in FY 2025 demonstrates our ability to execute, not only to our partners and stakeholders in DoD and Congress but also to our adversaries and allies. This demonstration is itself a contribution to deterrence and assurance."

Even as the B61-12 LEP has reached its end, NNSA will look to the B61-13, which will further build on this last upgrade effort. It is scheduled to reach its FPU in the department's fiscal year 2026 (FY26).

An Air-Launched Nuclear Weapon

The B61-12was first integrated with the U.S. Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle, where it is carried externally, and the weapon is also being certified to be carried on the Air Force's B-2 Spirit strategic bomber, as well as the F-16C/D fighter.

Last March, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) confirmed that the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II achieved its nuclear certification to carry the gravity bomb in October 2023, becoming the first fifth-generation nuclear-capable aircraft. With that certification, the conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant stealth fighter further became a "dual-capable" aircraft able to carry both conventional and nuclear weapons internally.

However, it was noted at the time that the F-35A can only carry the upgraded B61-12 variant – but that is essentially a moot point now that the program has reached its LPU. In addition, the certification did not extend to the stealth jet's sister variants, the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B and carrier-launched F-35C. It remains unclear if and when those variants could receive the certification – and as the F-35A can carry the current variant, it is expected it will be certified for the B61-13 as it enters service.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Uncle Sam is getting his rear-end kicked by the Russians and Chinese (heck, even the North Koreans are starting to outdo the Americans) in the all-important realm of hypersonic weapons. Indeed, it’s possible that China is even already creating working defenses against hypersonic weapons (meaning that Beijing is doubling up on success whereas the Americans are still languishing in the design phase).

But a new US defense project is desperately trying to change that. This author remains highly skeptical about the endeavor. Given how key hypersonic weapons are, and will continue to be, the effort by the Defense Department and the defense firm known as Kratos, must be assessed. 

Kratos Saves the Day?

Under the rubric of “MACH TB 2.0” Kratos is attempting to “enhance the United States’ capabilities in hypersonic technology through rapid, affordable testing,” according to Kalif Shaikh at Interesting Engineering, a trade publication.

Both the Kratos leadership and the top brass at the Pentagon believe that one of the key reasons that the Russians and Chinese have surpassed the Americans in developing a reliable, real-world hypersonic weapons capacity has to do with the extreme costs of hypersonic weapons development and testing. 

In fact, when it comes to testing hypersonic systems, the United States is far behind the curve. Wind tunnels are key elements behind testing hypersonic systems. Guess where the world’s most powerful wind tunnel is for testing hypersonic systems? If you guessed the United States, you’d be wrong—it’s actually in China. 

Kratos is leading a group of powerful defense contractors, including the likes of Leidos and Rocket Lab, all of which are keen on expediting the R&D cycles of American hypersonic weapons. Kratos believes that they can reduce the risks and costs associated with hypersonic weapons development by accelerating the delivery of these systems in the field. One way to do that is by deploying advanced flying testbeds to allow for researchers to assess the efficacy of their hypersonic systems in real-world conditions.

Is the Problem Fundamental or Can It Be Resolved Quickly?

Pentagon insiders (and those at Kratos) do not believe that the United States lacks the fundamentals to achieve parity with both Russia and China in hypersonic weapons. They think the problem is taking all the disparate pieces the Pentagon has been assembling for hypersonic weapons research and development and simply accelerating those projects. There might be something to this theory. 

After all, hypersonic weapons have been researched since the last part of the Cold War. It’s not really new technology. The Americans, however, ignored the need to develop these systems which left a gap for both Russia and China to fill.

So, it might very well be that this is an application problem rather than a fundamental inability to compete. Of course, the United States is being shown up by its rivals, notably China, in multiple other domains. Yet, the Americans are right to give the Kratos team a chance to see if they can simply accelerate the American development of hypersonic weapons. If Kratos is right then the US could achieve real parity with China and Russia in hypersonic weapons in the five years or so.

There are some problems with this outlook. 

Fundamentally, the defense industrial base is broken and the procurement systems for these weapons systems are increasingly corrupt and inefficient. The quest for greater weapons has been reduced to little more than massive profit motive by defense firms—even at the expense of national readiness.

Should the Kratos team be wrong, and the problems affecting America’s hypersonic weapons development are far more fundamental and systemic, then the United States will find itself in a world of hurt, as Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapons rise that can threaten the homeland in ways that conventional missiles simply cannot. 

A global arms race is occurring, and the Americans are in the unenviable position of being on the defensive. Hopefully Kratos can help overcome these problems soon. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Recent geopolitical developments in the Middle East prove true Vladimir Lenin’s infamous quote that, “There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.” That’s because about a month ago the entire geopolitical framework that has existed in the Mideast for decades was completely upended in a relatively short amount of time. 

For the first time since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which loosed the Islamic Republic of Iran from its strategic box, the Iranians have been placed on the defensive and their overall strategic position in the region is utterly crumbling. 

As a result of these incredible actions in just a little more than a month, Iran is desperately flailing about in a spasmodic attempt to restore its unstable regional security situation. Recent days have seen pronouncements about rapid Iranian nuclear weapons development meanwhile since last month news about Iran’s mysterious drone mothership has slowly leaked out to the West. 

Earlier this week, Iran’s state-controlled Channel 3 made an ominous prediction that, “In the coming hours, the world will witness unusual scenes and developments.” 

No one knows for sure what that means. It is likely just another desperate act from a regime that, let’s face it, is about to feel the squeeze from the incoming Trump administration if President-Elect Donald Trump’s running commentary on Tuesday, January 7, about Iran and the hostages being held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip are any indicator. 

A Drone Mothership is Born

Regardless, Iran is clearly doing everything in its power to restore its unstable and rapidly deteriorating security situation. An area that should cause some alarm among Western security officials is Iran’s drone carrier, the Shahid Bagheri. This vessel is a modified container ship. Specifically, it is an augmented 24-year-old container ship named the Perarin. The ship was transformed at the Iran Shipbuilding & Offshore Industries Complex Company near Bandar Abbas in Iran.

Significant structure modifications were needed to make the old container ship into a weapon of war. An angled flight deck and a specialized ski-jump takeoff ramp were installed on the boat. Of course, the ship retains its original superstructure. Angled decks for launching and recovering drones was, therefore, necessary. Those modifications included white markings to guide flight operations, indicating that the Iranians are serious about precision in their onboard drone operations. 

Designed to carry a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including medium-range altitude, long-range endurance drones, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) drones, and one-way attack drones, the vessel’s capacity suggests she will carry a significant and lethal array of drones. One can assume what kind of drones will be present onboard this ship, but the Iranians have been characteristically mum about the details. Although, the fact that there is a ski-jump ramp indicates the likelihood that the Iranians plan on launching jet-powered drones and/or heavier, longer-range systems from this boat. It’s a significant force multiplier.

The Shahid Bagheri apparently left its port the week of November 12. Its whereabouts are not publicly known (it is very likely that US intelligence has a clear understanding of where this boat is, though). The ship is a perfect example of Iran’s method for keeping up with larger military powers that are competing with the Islamic Republic. By taking existing civilian technology, like the container ship, and converting it into a relatively cheap drone carrier, the Iranians just enhanced their naval power projection significantly on the cheap. 

A Master of Asymmetrical Warfare on the High Seas

By having the Shahid Bagheri (other drone carriers are under construction, too), the Iranian Navy can engage in destabilizing military operations against international shipping passing through the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb, and the Red Sea. 

Shahid Bagheri’s role in asymmetrical warfare will be crucial for keeping Iran in the great geopolitical game, especially in light of its recent bad luck at the hands of Turkey and Israel in places like Syria. 

There are, of course, downsides to this jerry-rigged vessel. While it is insanely cheap and gives the Iranian Armed Forces significant capabilities boost, the vessel was not originally designed as a military ship. Therefore, there are inherent limitations to the ship. This is especially true in light of Iran’s serious lack of protective escorts for the drone carrier. 

Beyond that, though, this ship is relatively easy to spot and track for most modern intelligence agencies. So, its threat is likely still limited. Indeed, it was tracked as it left its homeport by the civilian Western satellite firm, Maxar Technologies. 

Where Shahid Bagheri can do the most amount of damage is in the waters surrounding the Middle East. If, however, Tehran gets it in its head that this boat can be used to project military power across distances, such as the Atlantic Ocean, they would find whatever advantages the ship gave their navy utterly negated.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Few remember the Vought A-7 Corsair II. The Navy attack jet simply lacked the cultural presence to make any sort of staying impact – despite serving for one quarter century. The reason, I suspect, is because the A-7 was quite ugly.

Making an Impact

While the average member of the public may not track military aircraft, most seem to have a general awareness of the basics. Many aircraft gain some mainstream traction either through their use in entertainment, or through some sort of policy/budgeting debate. The F-14 and F/A-18, for example, were featured in the Top Gun franchise and resultingly gained presence amongst the general public. To a lesser extent the A-6 gained exposure through Flight of the Intruder; the F-16 through Iron Eagle. Other aircraft, like the B-1, the A-10, and the F-35, were in the news frequently—thanks to development or budgeting debates—enough to have become somewhat recognizable. Still, other aircraft simply serve before being decommissioned and, ultimately, fading entirely from the public’s conscious. The A-7 is one such aircraft.

As a quick aside, the A-7 was featured in a film, The Final Countdown, starring Kirk Douglas and Martin Sheen, albeit in a limited role.

Anyways, the A-7 was a capable aircraft, despite its lack of cultural staying power. Carrier-compatible, the A-7 entered service in 1967, at the beginning of the Vietnam War, as an intended replacement for the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk. The A-4 stayed in service, however, meaning that the A-7 never did serve as a direct replacement for the A-4. Nevertheless, the A-7 was integrated into the Navy as a valuable attack aircraft.

The distinguishing performance feature of the A-7, perhaps, was its subsonic flight speed. In an era where jets were being made to push the speed envelope, to break the sound barrier, the A-7 was designed to fly about as fast as a commercial airliner. The reason: subsonic jets could be made smaller and cheaper and were simpler to maintain.

Derivative of a Gunfighter

The A-7 was derived from Vought’s F-8 Crusader, a single-engine, supersonic, air superiority jet that was known as “The Last of the Gunfighters.” The F-8 was first flown in the 1950s, and served with the US Navy until 1976. The A-7 would adopt the general layout of the F-8, only shorter, with a stubbier nosecone—making for an ungainly appearance. Yet, despite the A-7’s appearance, the jet would perform admirably. Notably, the A-7 could perform rapid aileron rolls, even when weighed down with its impressive six-ton payload, which happened to make for double the payload capacity of the A-4. In addition to a massive payload capacity, the A-7 had impressive range—again double that of the A-4—making the A-7 an effective candidate for bombing missions.

The pilots noted that the A-7 was easy to fly, with excellent forward visibility. Although the jet was not perfect, lacking stability on crosswind landings, suffering from poor stopping performance, and lacking adequate thrust (which would later be addressed with an upgraded TF30-8 engine). The pilots also gave the A-7 a nickname, perhaps the most enduring feature of the now-obscure aircraft: “SLUF,” which stands for “Short Little Ugly F****.”

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

After the collapse of the Assad regime, the current sanctions laws are in desperate need of reform. The Syrian people have long suffered from the effects of blanket economic restrictions that crippled the economy and gave rise to widespread black-market activity and cronyism. The broken licensure system hindered humanitarian operations and paralyzed essential infrastructure in the energy, health, and education sectors. At the same time, targeted sanctions, colloquially known as “smart” sanctions, were actively evaded using a complex network of shells that Assad publicly boasted about for years.

World leaders—particularly in the United States and Europe—should devise a sanctions reform strategy to address these issues. The U.S. Treasury’s issuing of General License 24 (GL 24) is a first step towards reforming sanctions, signaling to regional partners and Syrians a shift in policy while supporting the reconstruction of Syria post-Assad. For the incoming Trump administration, it is key to any new Middle East security architecture, especially as the outgoing administration expands its military footprint through Operation Inherent Resolve, which has long followed a misguided “by, with, and through” defense policy in Syria and Iraq.

The Assad regime was one of the first members of President Jimmy Carter’s list of states sponsoring terrorism published in 1979. However, it was not until the Syria Accountability Act of 2003 that Washington ramped up sectoral sanctions. With Assad’s intransigence and continued regional destabilization, the Bush administration issued executive orders that extended export controls to cover the transportation, banking, and telecommunications sectors. This included listing the Commercial Bank of Syria as a primary money laundering entity, bringing correspondent banks and Exim operations to a halt. Executive Orders 13441 and 13460 reinforced these initial sanctions, leading to a first wave of capital flight and foreign direct investment.

As the Syrian uprising spread in 2011, the scope of trade restrictions expanded to include the central bank and energy sector, forcing foreign firms to declare force majeure and halt production-sharing agreements. Those contracts were a major source of ill-gotten gains as Assad’s investment funds, like Al-Mashreq, were actively used to divert oil revenue and enrich his family. The regime’s persistent collocation of its criminal regional enterprise to official government institutions resulted in a complex web of export controls under the broad aegis of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act. In 2017, the U.S. Congress introduced the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which aimed at protecting civilians from Assad’s criminal enterprise.

A deluge of terrorism-related sanctions has also applied to multiple military factions in Syria since 2012. Some of the designations are multilateral, issued by the United Nations Security Council, such as Resolution 2253. Others are unilateral U.S. designations under the authority of Executive Order 13224, such as the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation for entities and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) for individuals—including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa. Notably, GL 24 draws a thin line authorizing HTS-related transactions for public services while banning military transactions.

In general, terrorism sanctions require an audit and a potential remedy through a step-for-step model. As the designations are aimed at national security, they should not be extended to the Syrian economy at large, nor should they constitute a barrier to the express issuance of sanctions waivers.

Historically, the Biden administration did not ramp up pressure against the regime and signaled that sanctions are reversible. According to sources who spoke on background, Biden’s National Security Council (NSC) actively blocked reform to Syria sanctions by pressuring Congress to freeze all Syria-related bills, especially in 2024. The subsequent delays in the U.S. Congress to update and advance Syria legislation caused friction in the bipartisan agreement against the Assad regime.

The administration did not enforce multiple bills that had passed through previous National Defense Authorization Acts. Officials also ignored existing IEEPA law requiring sanctions evaders to face civil or criminal penalties. As a result, Assad hid his assets as the Ultimate Beneficiary Owner, using nominee shareholders to pierce the U.N. procurement system and buy time for the ten-year sunset clause on penalties to lapse. It took two years for the U.S. treasury to close the controversial 50 percent loophole that Bashar al-Assad’s wife, Asma, abused.

On Captagon, Secretary Blinken deflected requests to designate the regime as a major illicit producer and transit state despite the large body of evidence. The designation would have stripped Assad of revenue, stopped him from procuring precursor chemicals, and given jurisdiction to the U.S. judiciary and Drug Enforcement Agency. The U.S. Department of State also missed an opportunity to reveal Assad’s net worth by limiting its reporting to open-source information. The State Department’s Office of Sanction Coordination hesitated on the Arab gas project and sent mixed messages until it was stalled. Ultimately, regional geopolitics focused on flawed security considerations dominated U.S. Syria policy every time.

On Caesar, the White House has been treading water in reform and renewal. The Caesar code goes well beyond sanctions, requiring accountability and elimination of chemical weapons. It contains economic recovery provisions that facilitate USAID assistance. Hence, it represents a roadmap for transitional justice supported by Syrians. After the collapse of the regime, Caesar’s secondary sanctions are effectively moot as the extraterritorial reach to deter Assad’s re-normalization is no longer applicable. In addition, the names of regime war criminals need an update and expansion as part of a broad legal redefinition of the government of Syria.

Despite the embedded exemption for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the scope of the authorization is limited. While GL 24 authorizes energy-related transactions essential to early recovery, it is limited to donations and requires special licenses for commercial exports. Hence, the current Export Administration Regulations (EARs) enforced by the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) still constitute a significant barrier to stabilization and reconstruction.

A series of waivers are necessary for NGOs to achieve aid localization and overcome procurement hurdles. According to humanitarian stakeholders, the World Health Organisation, and the United Nations, the situation in Syria is dire. Hence, the general license was warranted and supported by precedent. It will help reverse derisking and overcome ambiguous compliance issues, especially as humanitarian organizations are often stretched in human resources and face clearance hurdles that delay their operations. That said, it is not a perfect or permanent solution.

Wider sanctions reform serves multiple purposes. First, it alleviates the compliance concerns of regional states and companies for an emergency crisis response. Second, it allows USAID to increase its assistance to the Syria Recovery Trust Fund and provide paired expertise for capacity building. This would help implement vital International Humanitarian Law modalities like Cash and Voucher Assistance for Internally Displaced Persons. Third, it would align the U.S. policy stance with regional and international partners who signaled their readiness for speedy humanitarian assistance at scale.

Ultimately, the warped worldviews held by the White House NSC, colored by frustrations from the Obama era, complicated the Syria crisis and prolonged Assad’s control. The incoming Trump administration is left with the tall task of sanctions reform. This will entail restructuring the U.S. deployment in Syria and Iraq, as well as redefining the legal definition of the government of Syria under ambiguous circumstances. However, before embarking on such a wide regional realignment, an urgent disaster response is needed from the United States and the West, given their roles as the largest humanitarian donors to Syria.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him on X: @langloisajl.

Abed Al-Thalji is a policy analyst focused on Sanctions & Foreign Affairs. He holds an MSc. in International Trade from Gothenburg University’s School of Business, Economics, and Law.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Arab nationalism is, for all practical purposes, dead. The so-called “Arab World” has lost its unifying concern, Israel, and its outside support. It has disintegrated into geopolitical blocs, with three major non-Arab powers, Turkey, Iran, and Israel, competing for domination of the Levant region. Indeed, the heyday of twentieth-century Arab nationalism, when Egypt sought to unite the Arab people and Arab nationalist movements dominated the politics of the region, has been long over.

Egypt gave up its role as the leader of the Arab World after the signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978, just before Iran emerged as the prime revolutionary force in the region. In 1991, the radical Arab regimes lost their key global backer, the Soviet Union, and the region came under American hegemony.

In the aftermath of the disastrous U.S.-led Iraq War, today’s Middle East looks very different, including in terms of its place in the international system. The United States has begun to disengage from the region in the aftermath of the Iraq War, and Russia has ceased to be a Middle Eastern power after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Regional powers are now in charge,

In a way, much of what has been referred to as the Levant, a sub-region that borders the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to the west and Iraq to the east, has been balkanized with Iran, with its hegemonic objectives, Israel, led by a nationalist government, and Turkey, whose leader daydreams about reviving the Ottoman Empire, maintaining spheres of influence.

In that context, the Arab Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, are playing a secondary role in this new balance of power. In 1973, they assisted their Arab brethren in their attack on Israel. Now, they are cooperating with Israel to contain Iran.

Israel’s sphere of influence includes, in addition to the West Bank and Gaza, also the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, much of southern Lebanon, and Syria’s Golan Heights and Mount Hermon.

After the loss of its proxies in the Gaza Strip (Hamas) and Syria (Assad), Iran still maintains its influence in Lebanon through the weakened Shia Hezbollah group and in Iraq through its Shia allies and regards Israel as its chief strategic rival in the region.

Turkey, like Israel, has been a beneficiary of the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, hoping that the Islamist regime in Damascus would embrace it as a military and economic patron, which it probably would.

Turkish Armed Forces and its ally, the Syrian National Army, have occupied areas of northern Syria since the Syrian Civil War, a mini-state under the dual control of the local council and Turkish military administration.  

At the same time, Turkey has been concerned over what it sees as the threat of Kurdish nationalism in Syria, where during the Syrian Civil War, the Kurds established the Autonomous Administration of North and East of the country backed by the United States.

The Kurdish population of Syria is the country’s largest ethnic minority, the majority of whom were originally Turkish Kurds who crossed the border during the twentieth century and are concentrated around the Syria-Turkey border. Many of them seek political autonomy for what they regard as Western Kurdistan, similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq.

From that perspective, both Turkey and Israel face a challenge from two stateless peoples, the Kurds in the case of Turkey and the Palestinians in the case of Israel, who seek political independence.

Yet both Ankara and Jerusalem insist that full political independence for those people would pose an existential threat to them. At best, both peoples have been offered a limited form of political autonomy.

And then there is the large Druze minority in Syria as well as Assad’s sect, the Alawites, that had ruled Syria during his regime. One can expect continuing ethnic and sectarian tensions in the country in the coming years that may involve the Israelis (on the side of the Druze), the Iranians (on the side of the Alawites), and the Turks (on the side of the Sunni majority).

At the same time, President-elect Donald Trump, who may come under pressure from Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to join Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear military facilities, would probably decide to refuse the invitation to inject U.S. military forces into the region and its many conflicts.

And if the Iranians end up acquiring a nuclear military capability, it is more likely than not that the Turks would have to consider the nuclear option as well, raising the specter of a mutually assured destruction (MAD) posture involving three regional powers.

Leon Hadar is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the National Security Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Drone warfare has utterly transformed the face of warfare in this century. No longer is it about how many tanks an army has or how many aircraft carriers a navy can maintain, it’s all about rapid maneuverability, stealth, affordability, and mass. Both the Russians and Ukrainians have proven this with their drone-swarming techniques that the two armies regularly use against one another in the ongoing Ukraine war. 

Now, this philosophy is migrating to the sea. 

We live in a time when the power projection capabilities of the United States Navy, notably in the all-important Indo-Pacific, are under constant strain. This is in part due to the development of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems by American rivals. The U.S. Navy is further strained, though, by the domestic woes of a sclerotic U.S. defense industrial base and an increasingly cash-strapped U.S. government that is both unable to fund the systems the Navy wants and is unable to fundamentally adapt to the new multipolar strategic environment.

Yet, thanks to some innovative design concepts of the United States military’s research arms, the Navy is slowly starting to embrace the idea of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs). Going back to 2017, the Navy began developing what has become known as the Orca. This is a multi-mission platform designed for a multiplicity of important mission sets, ranging from surveillance to undersea cargo delivery, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, mine clearing, and strike missions. 

The Orca is considered an “Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle” (XLUUV).

Boeing is building this system for the Navy. It is based on design architecture from Boeing’s earlier Echo Voyager, meaning that the Orca was built with modularity in mind. (This modularity is key for Orca’s multi-mission capabilities. It means that Orca has a plug-and-play design). Its modular payload means that Orca is capable of adding up to 34 feet in length and can host an eight-ton payload. Again, this is a key tenet of a multi-mission platform like the Orca. 

In fact, Orca is essentially meant to be a drone mothership. Its cargo hold has a capacity of 2,456 cubic feet, meaning it can bring with it multiple other, smaller unmanned vehicles or drones. Orca is the apotheosis of network-centric warfare. She represents a true transition from the warfare of yesteryear to something entirely new today. A new kind of warfare that is more devoid of the human element than at any time before. 

Sure, this reduction of the human elements ensures U.S. sailors are better protected from dangerous missions. At the same time, though, many people should be concerned that removing that human element from combat could have unintended ethical complications. What’s more, it might ensure that warfare is more likely to occur amongst the great powers using these systems.

Orca itself is powered by an advanced hybrid diesel/lithium-ion battery system that enables the vehicle to operate submerged for extended periods, recharging via diesel vehicles when surfaced. 

Since this is still an experimental vehicle, it is unlikely that the Orca will be the Navy’s final XLUUV design. Its top speed right now is reported to be at nine miles per hour (so she isn’t a speed demon), but its typical operational speed is likely to be slower at just shy of four miles per hour. Orca has an impressive projected operational range of around 7,480 miles.

Boeing delivered its first Orca to the Navy in December 2023, meaning that the program had shifted from development testing to operational capability. The vehicle’s autonomous nature means that it can be deployed easily from a friendly pier and navigate on its own to its destination completely free of human involvement. This makes the Orca a relatively simple (and, therefore, cheap) platform because its logistical footprint is as small as its overall operational footprint. 

One of the promises of developing autonomous systems was that they would be cheaper than their manned counterparts. For the Navy, with its complex platforms, such as the aircraft carrier, this seems like a smart move.

Yet, Orca went about 64 percent over budget, according to the Government Accountability Office, thereby continuing a dangerous trend, especially for the Navy, of all new Pentagon platforms going over their intended budgets. What’s more, like the manned counterparts to Orca, the Orca program ran over its allotted timeline by about three years. 

Unlike many of those manned Navy platforms that have gone over budget and time, however, the Orca’s sea trials have proceeded apace with no complications whatsoever. Indeed, the testing phases for this XLUUV have been successful in proving the vehicle’s endurance, functionality, and the reliability of its autonomous systems. 

Make no mistake, unmanned systems will be an important way for the Navy to cut down on its costs. The hard lessons learned from the Orca program will be applied to future unmanned undersea vehicles. 

Eventually, the Navy will have an impressive fleet of these drones that will serve as critical force multipliers and help to protect the costlier manned warships and submarines of the fleet that are increasingly under the threat of enemy A2/AD systems.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

America’s sixth-generation stealth bomber is closer to full-scale production.

According to reports, three B-21 Raider prototypes are actively participating in flight testing, propelling the program forward.

At least three B-21 Raider prototypes are participating in flight testing as part of the program’s initial steps to an operational fleet.

Revealed in 2022, the B-21 Raider is moving at a fast pace. Northrup Grumman, the manufacturer, is conducting the initial flight testing for the program. Data gathered during this phase will be used in the subsequent production of the B-21 Raider fleet.

All in all, the new stealth strategic bomber has been in production for over a decade, and the Air Force wants an operational capability before the decade is out. In addition to flight testing, the prototypes are testing new technology on board the B-21 Raider.

The B-21 Raider is designed to cement the U.S. Air Force’s global strike capability. The U.S. military already has superior strategic bombing capabilities with its fleet comprised of the B-1 Lancer, B-2 Spirit, and B-52 Stratofortress (and potentially the F-117 Night Hawk for some niche missions). The addition of the B-21 Raider in place of the B-2 Spirit will ensure that the Air Force’s global strike capabilities remain cutting-edge.

However, the additional capability won’t come cheap. Although Northrup Grumman and the Air Force are still haggling over the price of the new stealth bomber, it is likely that each B-21 Raider will cost between $600 and 750 million. That is an extremely high price tag and the equivalent of about six F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jets. And yet, it is up to $1.4 billion cheaper compared to the B-2 Spirit it will be replacing, which costs an astronomical $2 billion per aircraft.

The Pentagon has been careful about releasing information on the stealth strategic bomber’s actual capabilities. Back in 2022, when Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin unveiled the aircraft during a ceremony, he provided some intel on the aircraft’s bomber capabilities, low-observability, and durability.

“Let’s talk about the B-21’s range. No other long-range bomber can match its efficiency. It won’t need to be based in-theater. It won’t need logistical support to hold any target at risk,” Austin had said.

As a strategic bomber, the B-21 Raider will need to fly thousands of miles to reach targets deep inside a near-peer adversary’s territory. It needs to be efficient with its energy consumption while retaining its stealth characteristics.

“Let’s talk about the B-21’s stealth. Fifty years of advances in low-observable technology have gone into this aircraft. And even the most sophisticated air-defense systems will struggle to detect a B-21 in the sky,” the outgoing Secretary of Defense had added.

The U.S. military is a leader in stealth technology and already has three stealth aircraft in active service, more than any other country: the F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightning II, and B-2 Spirit.

Finally, Austin gave some information on the B-21 Raider’s durability. An aircraft that can’t fly because of maintenance issues is not very useful. “Let’s talk about the B-21’s durability,” he said. “You know, we really don’t have a capability unless we can maintain it. And the B-21 is carefully designed to be the most maintainable bomber ever built,” the Pentagon’s top official added.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Shutterstock.

Video game publisher Tencent was one of several Chinese companies that the United States Department of Defense (DoD) claimed had links to China. On Tuesday, the Pentagon announced it had added dozens of Chinese-based firms – including Tencent, battery maker CATL, AI firm SenseTime, ChangXin Memory Technologies, Quectel Wireless, and drone maker Autel Robotics – to the list of " Chinese Military Companies" (CMC).

The DoD's list is updated annually and now includes 134 companies.

While not officially banned in the United States, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)  2024 bans the DoD from working with any of the designated companies beginning in June 2026. According to a report from Nikkei Asia, the inclusion on the list is also "a blow to the reputation of affected companies and represents a stark warning to U.S. entities and firms about the risks of conducting business with them."

Tencent – A Gaming Giant

The Shenzhen-based Tencent was founded in August 2003, and it currently owns shares in more than 600 companies in the electronic entertainment sector. It fully controls Riot Games, maker of League of Legends, and Grinding Gear Games, creator of Path of Exile; while it has partial ownership of Epic Games and Ubisoft.

Tencent's Hong Kong-traded shares fell 7.3% on Tuesday following the DoD's announcement.

"As the company is neither a Chinese military company nor a military-civil fusion contributor to the Chinese defense industrial base, it believes that its inclusion in the CMC List is a mistake," Tencent said in an announcement to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, per CBS News.

Tech Firms Links to Beijing

It isn't uncommon for any and all Chinese firms to end up on such blacklists, in no small part due to Beijing's military-civil fusion (MCF), which encourages private firms to partner with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The goal is to achieve a world-class military by 2049 or earlier.

As the Foundation for Defense of Democracies explained, "This law and associated regulations require Chinese private firms to permit Beijing direct access to their data and mandates their cooperation in protecting Chinese national security interests. This process ensures that the PLA and other elements of China's security and intelligence services can dramatically expand the scope of their reliance on China's civilian economy to bolster their strength and challenge the United States more effectively."

This is why a video game publisher, one that has ties to international studios is suddenly on the DoD's CMC list.

"The core concern with companies like Tencent is that it can conduct surveillance and intelligence opens by gathering large amounts of data on large amounts of players," Dr. Matthew Schmidt, professor of national security and political science at the University of New Haven, told The National Interest.

"It's a game of probabilities. 99% of players are uninteresting targets, but in a population of many millions you'll find some good fish to hook," Schmidt said.

Game Chat Monitored

Video games that are hosted online can record vast quantities of data – including messages between players. That may not seem significant, but Schmidt explained the problem is far deeper than meets the eye.

"They can monitor personal messages between players, use that data to analyze political views and establish any relationships those players may have to classified information or to people with classified information, and create target lists for espionage," Schmidt continued.

The game publisher even has the ability o track movements as people log on to play the game or send messages from different destinations.

"These are the kinds of things that would allow the Chinese military's intelligence branch to gather the back-end information that supports targeting people they exploit based on the information gathered from chats and what that info gives them about other platforms and movement patterns to build the social network diagrams that help Chinese agencies focus on the most likely people they could exploit for access to information," Schmidt continued. "It's the same thing the U.S. does in reverse."

Many companies gather this kind of information and could do this kind of analysis if they wanted. The DoD is especially concerned when it involves China due to MCF.

"Remember the axiom of the Internet Age: if you don't know what the product is they're selling, you're the product. That is, the data you generate when you use Facebook or X/Twitter is where the value is because it allows companies that do sell things to target you," Schmidt told The National Interest. "It's the same science; it's just that one organization targets you for espionage, the other for marketing. The end goal is different, but the process is basically the same."

Gaming Could be a Voter Issue

Even today, video gamers are dismissed as teenage boys in their bedrooms or basements—but it is a multi-billion dollar global industry. The question will be how to balance the economic interests in supporting the digital economy with political interests and not anger millions of constituents by obstructing the digital services they want, and the legitimate security concerns of the government.

"To the generations now of voting age, gaming isn't a fringe issue, it's becoming a core political concern," suggested Schmidt.

Just as we have seen with TikTok, many Americans are less concerned with security and more focused on being able to use the app they've come to love. Gamers could be even more passionate if they were to lose access to League of Legends or the next big hit that Tencent brings to market.

"We haven't figured out the balance yet, and I'd suspect the elder statesmen in power now won't be the last word. My kids fight for more screen time and the ability to play games I ban, every day," Schmidt added. "Someday they'll be power and, as they remind me, they'll let their kids play whatever they want."

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.