Diplomacy & Crisis News

TNI Staff

Security, World

Buying a fighter is less about aircraft performance or even military requirements than pure simple geopolitics. Buying a jet means you as a military are tying yourself into a strategic alliance with another country and its hardware.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The F-35 will continue to dominate the skies - but the F-15, particularly with its impressive upgrades pack, isn't going anywhere.

Editor's Note: This article was first published several years ago. In the time since, the United Arab Emirates has requested to purchase F-35 fighters, though the contract has not yet been approved.

When the Boeing F-15A first flew in July 1972, the Eagle was the ultimate air superiority fighter. Fast, high-flying, agile and built around a massive APG-63 pulse-doppler radar, the Soviet Union had nothing that could match it. Overtime, McDonnell Douglas—the F-15’s original manufacturer before its merger with Boeing—adapted the airframe into a potent multirole fighter that eventually became the F-15E Strike Eagle. While both the air superiority oriented F-15C and the strike-oriented F-15E will remain in service with the U.S. Air Force for decades to come, by far the most advanced current version of the Eagle has been ordered by Saudi Arabia. But will that be enough compete with Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter?

Saudi Arabia has ordered some 84 new-build F-15SAs and 70 upgrade kits to retrofit their existing Strike Eagles to the new standard. When the massive $29.5 billion contract was signed December 2011, it was the largest foreign military sale in the history of the United States. In the ensuing years, Boeing has developed and tested the upgraded jets, which are powered by General Electric F110 engines rather than Pratt & Whitney F100s. The company is finally starting to get ready to deliver the aircraft. The first of the new jets rolled out of the Boeing plant in Saint Louis, Mo., earlier this earlier in April.

Perhaps the single most significant upgrade found in the F-15SA package is a fly-by-wire flight control system—previous versions of the Eagle used a hybrid computer augmented stability system. The addition of the fly-by-wire system allowed Boeing to reactivate the F-15’s two dormant outboard wing hardpoints that had always been present, but never used. The problem previously had been stability differences induced by carrying weapons on stations one and nine.

Additionally, the F-15SA is equipped with the advanced APG-63 v.3 active electronically scanned array (AESA)—though, potentially, future customers might order the more capable APG-82 that is being retrofitted to U.S. Air Force’s own Strike Eagles. The F-15SA is also equipped with BAE’s advanced Digital Electronic Warfare System (DEWS), which has digital radio-frequency memory jamming capability.

The new digital system looks across an entire frequency band continuously rather than scanning through a frequency band—which means that even low probability of intercept (LPI) signals might be detected (radars on stealth fighters like the F-22 and F-35 use LPI techniques to try mask their emissions for electronic support measures suites). Further, its interferometric antennas can generate far more accurate bearing measurements than the current system.

The DEWS’ performance is probably comparable to the F-22’s or F-35’s electronic support measures suites since it is based on those systems. It’s head and shoulders better than anything currently fielded by the U.S. Air Force’s own Strike Eagles. U.S. Air Force jets won’t have anything comparable until the Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System (EPAWSS) is fielded.

The F-15SA is also equipped with Lockheed Martin’s AN/AAS-42 infrared search and track system. And all of that information from the radar, infrared search and track and the electronic warfare system are fused together—similar to the F-22 and F-35—into a coherent picture. That picture is displayed on large-format color displays that are similar to those found on the F-35—in both the front and rear cockpits. Both aviators are equipped with the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System. Taken together, the F-15SA is an extremely formidable multirole fighter—possibly the single best fourth generation fighter the United States has ever produced.

But is that enough to compete with the F-35 on the open market place? Longer-term, it looks like the F-35 will be the dominant player on with fighter market—at least in parts of the world aligned with the West. Stealth is a major selling point with the inevitable proliferation of advanced Russian and Chinese-built surface-to-air missile systems. Further, the F-35 has the backing of the United States government—which is a huge trump card for the program. In the short-term, Boeing may have opportunities to sell the F-15 to wealthy customers who need a very capable long-range jet and who can afford the Eagle’s hefty price tag. Those customers are likely to be in the Middle East or Asia—nations that are not likely to be cleared to receive the F-35 in the near term.

But one also has to remember that buying a fighter is less about aircraft performance or even military requirements than pure simple geopolitics. Buying a jet means you as a military are tying yourself into a strategic alliance with another country and its hardware. For many nations, making sure they are able to tie seamlessly into the Pentagon’s forces is of paramount importance. So even if you buy American, unless it’s a variant operated by the U.S. military, you might end up with an expensive boutique fleet with a lot of expensive maintenance bills.

Image: Reuters.

Charlie Gao

Security, Russia

While the Su-57 is fast, it does represent a step backward in speed compared to the MiG-31.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The MiG-31 is the standard long-range interceptor of the Russian Air Force.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’ s Air Defense Forces (VPVO) needed a series of heavy interceptors to patrol its massive borders. Most regular “light” fighters like the early MiGs were not up to the task, as they lacked the range and speed to intercept to rapidly climb and intercept supersonic American bombers, who were expected to zoom over the Arctic to drop bombs on the Soviet Union.

As a result, a specialized class of aircraft was created for this purpose. The first was the Tupolev Tu-28 and Tu-128. These aircraft would lay the template for later interceptors: they were large for good endurance, fast, and were armed solely with missiles.

This design was obsolete from the time it entered service in the 1960s, as the B-58 Hustler that was in service at the time could outpace it. However, the MiG-25 “Foxbat” was also in development at the time. This aircraft would go on to become the definitive interceptor of the VPVO.

Blisteringly fast and armed with the massive R-40 air-to-air missiles, the Foxbat stood ready to defend the Soviet Union’s borders against all threats. Its airframe also saw adaptation into more tactical roles, photo reconnaissance and strike versions of the MiG-25 were created for the Soviet Air Force (VVS).

In the 1980s, the MiG-25 was followed up by the MiG-31, which added in a second weapons systems officer on all models and increased the flight performance, radar and weapons of the craft. Early versions also featured a cannon, but this was quickly deleted once it was determined that such extras were not necessary on a pure interceptor.

Nowadays the MiG-31 is the standard long range interceptor of the Russian Air Force (the VPVO was merged with the VVS in the 1990s) and is expected to serve into the 2030s. A “mid-life upgrade” of the MiG-31 is currently being procured: the MiG-31BSM. This modification integrates many new strike weapons onto the MiG-31 and modernizes most systems. The MiG-31 was also chosen as the primary carrier aircraft for the Kinzhal hypersonic missile.

But in August 2018, Russian outlets announced that experimental design work was beginning on a next generation pure interceptor that is meant to replace the MiG-31. Following the naming convention of Russia’s other next generation aircraft projects (PAK (XX)), the new interceptor project is called PAK DP, or Prospective Aviation Complex Long-range Interceptor.

The continuation of a line of dedicated interceptors is interesting because the existing PAK-FA/Su-57 fighter in many ways could fulfill the same role as the MiG-31. It has a highly advanced radar, it can supercruise (maintain Mach 1+ flight without the use of afterburners), and it could be armed with long range air-to-air missiles.

While the range is less than a MiG-31, air-to-air refueling can make up the gap. But since the capabilities as they stand are so similar, why the need for a separate airframe? Sukhoi fighters have also served in the interceptor role before, the Su-27P variant of the Flanker was meant explicitly for the VPVO. There are a couple reasons why the Russian government still considers the PAK DP to be necessary.

The first is that the PAK DP might build off the multirole nature of the earlier MiG-31 and MiG-25 conversions. An aircraft close to the original conception of the F-111 could be in the cards for Russia in the PAK DP: something that can carry a ton of long-range missiles and also perform strike with a wide range of munitions (including hypersonic ones)while moving very fast.

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Another possible reason is that Russia wishes to keep the heritage of MiG alive within United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). Since Sukhoi has done the majority of the design work and has had its name attached to the PAK FA (in the Su-57 designation), MiG needs a next generation project of their own to work on. The MiG-35, while advanced, is still not of the PAK family of next-generation craft and MiG not have an aircraft to work on in the future.

The last reason is that the VVS might want to future proof their interceptor force against future developments in UAV technology. While the PAK FA is fast, it does represent a step backward in speed compared to the MiG-31. While the SR-71 Blackbird is retired, UAVs incorporating some of its technology may come online in the future. Russia might need a plane that can really push the limits of speed to intercept them and keep its airspace safe.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. This first appeared in August 2018.

Image: Wikipedia.

Le nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère (n° 4/2020) va paraître (J-5) ! Il consacre un dossier spécial au Brexit dont l’échéance finale approche, et un Contrechamps à la Méditerranée, avec un focus notamment sur la Turquie.  Et comme à chaque nouveau numéro, de nombreux autres articles viennent éclairer l’actualité : les effets du COVID-19 en Afrique et en Amérique latine, les agricultures africaines, les enjeux de la Conférence d’examen du TNP, la politique russe de l’Inde…

Envie d’en savoir plus ? Cliquez sans plus attendre sur cette vidéo !

How power will—and won't—reshape Chinese ambitions.

One of the most famous censored pieces of literature in the post Second World War era is Dr. Zhivago, a work by author Boris Pasternak about the life of a family during the Russian Revolution in the early part of the 1900s. Smuggled out of the USSR and taken to Italy for publishing, the story is critical of the early Soviet era, and resulted in it being banned during the Soviet era at the same time as earning international acclaim. The story focuses to some degree on the rapid collectivization of Russian society at the time of the Revolution from the perspective of a Doctor in Moscow. When his home is filled with other citizens and their family receive veiled threats by newly minted government Commissars, they make they journey to their Dacha, or second home in the far east of Russia. Dealing with the onset of Communism in a more contested part of the country, the Doctor and his family fight to survive in the reality of the new regime.

Much of the criticism from inside of the Soviet Union, one registered only by the government and hidden from the citizens of the Soviet state, was that Dr.Zhivago shows the Soviet system in a negative light. The reality was that tyranny was a large part of life in Russia at the time and still existed at the time the book was published. A true account of what life may have been like in the process of collectivization of the nation had to be censored, as the truth, that of a loss of rights and often life would undermine their political power.

There are many lessons to be learned from the Doctor and author Pasternak as well, mostly aimed at how free societies should repel any movements towards a Soviet style system, and how that style of top down government control can easily turn into a tyranny. These lessons are as relevant today as ever, and while no system is perfect nor can claim that justice is always paramount in the application of the law, the ability to fight and seek justice without the threats of violence or being ostracized from society needs to be preserved in order to have a free society with free citizens. The alternative, according to Pasternak, is always bad for individual citizens. When power is held by a few, it will never be equally distributed in a system that allows a concentration of that power. In Pasternak’s experience, Absolute Power certainly Corrupts, and the best of us are not able to protect ourselves, our family or even our lives.

If you live in a place where a large entity or corporation has disproportional power, you must take steps to create equality of justice. If your government wants to take more control of you without precedent or for the valid public good, you must take steps to ensure your voices are being heard. If you take the time to vote, but your government does things to limit your voice or your elected representative’s vote in your legislature, parliament, congress or local council, you must acknowledge it and demand your democracy remains sacrosanct. If your news and media is censored to protect any government and similar actions as those above, then they are not media, they are an arm of a system to protect those from being accountable to equality and justice. Tyranny always produces a strong response in the long term, as those without a democracy, justice or freedom have nothing to lose. Those who have freedoms but claim they have nothing to lose are often those who are seeking power, not equality nor justice, and not for the individuals of their community.

/ France, Parti politique, Communisme, Politique, Marxisme - Politique / France, Parti politique, Communisme, Politique, Marxisme - Politique

The intelligence committees should do their jobs.

/ Russie, Turquie, Géopolitique, Relations bilatérales, Histoire, Relations internationales, Diplomatie, Frontières - Europe / Russie, Turquie, Géopolitique, Relations bilatérales, Histoire, Relations internationales, Diplomatie, Frontières - Europe

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2020). Michaël Ayari propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Aaron Y. Zelin, Your Sons at Your Service: Tunisia’s Missionaries of Jihad (Columbia University Press, 2020, 400 pages).

Cet ouvrage est indispensable pour quiconque s’intéresse à l’étude du djihadisme et cherche à comprendre pourquoi autant de Tunisiens, pourtant réputés pacifiques et vivant en démocratie depuis 2011, ont, entre 2012 et 2019, grossi les rangs des groupes islamistes armés, notamment en Irak et en Syrie.

Aaron Y. Zelin livre ici une somme considérable d’informations difficilement accessibles. Outre son examen quasi exhaustif de la littérature en langue anglaise et arabe sur la question, l’auteur a archivé près de 18 000 documents informatiques sur l’organisation salafiste-djihadiste tunisienne, Ansar al Charia Tunisie (AST) : communiqués, enregistrements audio et vidéos, essais, analyses, photos sur les réseaux sociaux. Il a également effectué plusieurs séjours de terrain en Tunisie au cours desquels il a rencontré des militants d’AST ainsi que des combattants étrangers tunisiens de retour de Syrie.

En dépit de sa richesse, l’ouvrage souffre d’un certain nombre de défauts qui peuvent rendre sa lecture laborieuse. L’introduction, assez théorique, tente d’insérer de manière artificielle la recherche dans un champ académique (la sociologie des mouvements sociaux). L’auteur y déploie quelques concepts, qu’il perd par la suite. La tendance est à noyer le lecteur sous un flot d’informations précises mais souvent peu utiles, tirées de fiches élaborées par des juges d’instruction et des spécialistes du renseignement. Le livre pèche ainsi par un mélange des genres, entre travail académique (l’ouvrage est tiré d’une thèse de doctorat) et expertise antiterroriste.

En outre, l’auteur a tendance à omettre systématiquement les travaux francophones sur la Tunisie et à se positionner en surplomb par rapport à son objet d’étude. Peu de place est laissée à l’accidentel dans l’itinéraire des djihadistes tunisiens et la constitution de leurs réseaux. Tout semble faire écho à une logique inéluctable, et le contresens anachronique n’est pas loin, notamment lorsque l’auteur surestime le rôle international de certaines figures djihadistes tunisiennes des années 1980-2000, simplement parce que ces dernières sont influentes dans l’AST et l’État islamique dans la seconde moitié des années 2010.

Enfin, l’auteur recourt à des sources disparates, à la fiabilité variable. Il tend à baser des points essentiels de son argumentaire sur des sources discutables (comme des informations fuitées de l’État islamique, ou des communiqués du ministère de l’Intérieur tunisien), ce qu’il fait oublier par ailleurs en s’attardant sur des détails tirés de sources de première main de qualité, lesquelles n’apportent que peu à la réflexion, mais montrent qu’il connaît le sujet mieux que quiconque…

La prétention historiographique est ainsi quelque peu excessive, d’autant plus que nombre d’éléments sur le sujet sont loin d’être déclassifiés. Il est difficile de décrire avec autant d’assurance le djihadisme des années 1980 et des années 2010, ce que l’auteur fait pourtant, comme si son travail de recherche avait pour ambition de clôturer définitivement la question des Tunisiens et du djihad.

En dépit de ces faiblesses, cet ouvrage vaut le détour : près d’une décennie de recherches extrêmement chronophages est ici généreusement livrée, au spécialiste comme au non spécialiste. La lecture de ce livre dense et passionnant devrait susciter quelques vocations « djihadologistes ».

Michaël Ayari

>> S’abonner à Politique étrangère <<

 

À quoi pourrait ressembler la politique étrangère de Joe Biden ?5 novembre 2020, 21:01 CET •Mis à jour le 8 novembre 2020, 08:39 CET
ARTICLE PATU DANS The ConversationAuteurs

1. Frédéric Charillon

   professeur de science politique, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)

2. Patrick Chevallereau

   Consultant international sur les questions de défense et de sécurité. Chargé de cours à l'Université Clermont Auvergne, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)

Déclaration d’intérêts

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

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Voir les partenaires de The Conversation France

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À quoi ressemblera la politique étrangère d’une Amérique post-trumpienne, avec Joseph Biden et Kamala Harris à sa tête ? Assistera-t-on à la fermeture d’une parenthèse baroque et tumultueuse, pour retrouver la « vie internationale d’avant » ? Verra-t-on se bâtir un nouveau socle pour une nouvelle diplomatie américaine ?

L’après-Trump, du point de vue de l’action extérieure américaine, pose d’abord beaucoup de questions. En la matière, le 46e président devra tenir compte d’une nouvelle donne, inédite aussi bien du point de vue intérieur américain que du point de vue international.

Si Joseph Biden, contrairement à son prédécesseur, est un connaisseur des questions mondiales, sa tâche ne sera pas aisée pour autant.

Les questions

La première interrogation qui vient à l’esprit a trait à l’importance des dégâts causés par un Donald Trump qui a fait évoluer les fondamentaux en quatre ans. Ces dégâts sont-ils réparables ? Suffisamment pour permettre à Biden de se replacer dans la ligne de la « retenue » propre aux années Obama ? L’ancien président (2009-2017) avait amorcé un retrait de la scène mondiale, avec un moindre recours à l’intervention militaire, des discours d’apaisement (à West Point en mai 2014), le choix de ne pas frapper le régime syrien en août 2013, ou des concepts novateurs, comme le « leadership from behind » en Libye, en 2011. Il s’était efforcé de donner une cohérence à l’action extérieure américaine. Cohérence parfois jugée trop intellectuelle, et mal comprise de ses principaux alliés, mais cohérence quand même, surtout comparée à l’action erratique et impulsive de son successeur.

Autre question majeure : qui entourera Biden sur les dossiers internationaux ? Le long parcours politique du nouveau président lui confère une expérience rare. Il a notamment présidé la commission des Affaires étrangères du Sénat. On peut imaginer auprès de lui le retour de noms connus : Antony Blinken, Susan Rice, Michelle Flournoy – peut-être comme secrétaire à la défense –, Samantha Power, Elisabeth Sherwood-Randall mais aussi William et Nicholas Burns… Autant de penseurs chevronnés de l’action extérieure démocrate. Les sénateurs auront également leur importance : Bob Menendez – la vieille garde –, mais aussi Chris Murphy ou Chris Coons (issu de la « Delaware connection » et qui pourrait devenir secrétaire d’État). Il ne faut pas exclure non plus l’inclusion d’une partie du cercle de l’ancien sénateur républicain John McCain, disparu en 2018 : les équipes ont travaillé ensemble, une estime mutuelle bipartisane existe. Julie Smith et Jeff Prescott, anciens Deputy National Security Advisors de Biden lorsqu’il était vice-président, pourraient revenir.

Y a-t-il des courants identifiables parmi eux ? Un débat existe entre « restaurationists » et « reformers » – partisans de restaurer la politique étrangère traditionnelle ou, à l’inverse, de prendre un nouveau départ –, notamment sur la question d’un découplage avec la Chine, sur l’alliance avec les démocraties et sur la promotion internationale des normes libérales. Un courant progressiste au parti démocrate, plus enclin à la rupture (notamment dans un sens plus environnementaliste, ou plus porté vers le Sud que vers les alliés traditionnels des États-Unis, comme la vieille Europe), et centré autour des personnes de Bernie Sanders et Elisabeth Warren, peut également se faire entendre. Enfin, l’ancien candidat aux primaires démocrates Pete Buttigieg est l’une des figures réformatrices montantes, qui avait surpris par son charisme lors des primaires : certaines rumeurs l’annoncent comme possible ambassadeur aux Nations unies.

Drnière interrogation, et pas des moindres : quelle sera l’influence de la vice-présidente Kamala Harris, membre de la commission du renseignement au Sénat ? Sur quels dossiers internationaux aura-t-elle la main ? Comment voit-elle l’Europe (elle qui vient de la côte ouest), le Moyen-Orient, le monde émergent (elle qui a des origines indiennes et caribéennes) ? L’âge de Joseph Biden (78 ans) donne naturellement à la vice-présidence une importance inédite : Kamala Harris pourrait être amenée à poursuivre l’action du président dès la fin du premier mandat, voire terminer celui-ci si le titulaire connaissait des problèmes de santé.

Le contexte : une Amérique abîmée, un monde transforméLire la suite dans The Conversation

By Pavlo Klimkin and Andreas Umland

Once the Kremlin is persuaded that Joe Biden will become the US’s next president, it may go for the jugular. Already today, not election manipulation, but triggering civil conflicts in the United States could be the main aim of Moscow’s mingling in American domestic affairs.

Over the last 15 years, the Kremlin has played with politicians and diplomats of, above all, Russia’s neighbors, but also with those of the West, a hare and hedgehog game, as known from a German fairy tale. In the Low Saxon fable’s well-known race, the hedgehog only runs a few steps, but at the end of the furrow he has placed his wife who looks very much like him. When the hare, certain of victory, storms in, the hedgehog’s wife rises and calls out to him “I’m already here!” The hare cannot understand the defeat, conducts 73 further runs, and, in the 74th race, dies of exhaustion. 

Ever since Russia’s anti-Western turn of 2005, governmental and non-governmental analysts across the globe have been busy discussing and predicting Moscow’s next offensive action. Yet, in most cases, when the world’s smart “hares” – politicians, experts, researchers, journalists et al. – arrived with more or less adequate reactions, the Russian “hedgehogs” had already long achieved their aims. Such was the case with Russia’s invasion of Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, “little green men” on Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014, hackers inside Germany’s Bundestag in 2015, bombers over Syria since 2015, cyber-warriors in the US elections of 2016, or “chemical” assassins at England’s Salisbury in 2018. 

Across the world, one can find hundreds of sensitive observers able to provide sharp comments on this or that vicious Russian action. For all the experience accumulated, such insights have, however, usually been provided only thereafter. So far, the Kremlin’s wheeler-dealers continue to surprise Western and non-Western policy makers and their think-tanks with novel forays, asymmetric attacks, unorthodox methods and shocking brutality. More often than not, Russian imaginativeness and ruthlessness become sufficiently appreciated only after a new “active measure,” hybrid operation or non-conformist intervention has been successfully completed.

Currently, many US observers – whether in national politics, public administration or social science – may be again preparing to fight the last war. Russian election interference and other influence operations are on everybody’s mind, across America. Yet, as Ukraine has bitterly learnt in 2014, the Kremlin only plays soft ball as long as it believes it has some chance to win. It remains relatively moderate as long as a possible loss will – from Moscow’s point of view – only be moderately unpleasant. Such was the case, during Russia’s interference into the 2016 presidential elections in the US.

The Ukrainian experience during the last six years suggests a far grimmer scenario. At some point during the Euromaidan Revolution, in either January or February 2014, Putin understood that he may be losing his grip on Ukraine. Moscow’s man in Kyiv, then still President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych (though very much assisted by Paul Manafort), may be kicked out by the Ukrainian people. As a result, Russia’s President drastically changed track already before the event. 

The Kremlin’s medal awarded to the anonymous Russian soldiers who took part in the annexation of Crimea lists the date of 20 February 2014, as the start of the operation to occupy a part of Ukraine. On that day, pro-Russian Ukrainian President Yanukovych was still in power, and present in Kyiv. His flight from Ukraine’s capital one day later, and ousting, by the Ukrainian parliament, on 22 February 2014, had not yet been clearly predictable, on 20 February 2014. But the Kremlin had already switched from merely political warfare against Ukraine to preparing a real war – something then largely unimaginable for most observers. Something similar may be the case, in Moscow’s approach to the US today too. 

To be sure, Russian troops will hardly land on American shores. Yet, that may not be necessary. The possibility of violent civil conflict in the United States is today, in any way, being discussed by serious analysts, against the background of enormous political polarization and emotional spikes within American society. As in Putin’s favorite sports of Judo – in which he holds a Black Belt! – a brief moment of disbalance of the enemy can be used productively, and may be sufficient to cause his fall. The United States may not, by itself, become ripe for civil conflict. Yet, an opportunity to push it a bit further is unlikely to be simply missed by industrious hybrid warfare specialists in Moscow. And the game that the Russian “hedgehogs” will be playing may be a different one than in the past, and not yet be fully comprehensible to the US’s “hares.”

Hillary Clinton was in 2016 a presidential candidate very much undesired, by Moscow, as America’s new president. Yet today, a democratic president is, after Russia’s 2016 hacking of the Democratic Party’s servers and vicious campaign against Clinton, a truly threatening prospect for the Kremlin. Moreover, Joe Biden was, under President Obama, responsible for the US’s policy towards Ukraine, knows as well as likes the country well, and is thus especially undesirable for Moscow.

Last but not least, Moscow may have had more contacts with Trump and his entourage than the American public is currently aware of. The Kremlin would, in such a case, even more dislike a Biden presidency, and a possible disclosure of its additional earlier interventions, in the US. The stakes are thus higher, for the Kremlin, in 2020 than in 2016. If Trump has no plausible chance to be elected for a second term, mere election interference may not be the issue any more. Moscow may already now implement more sinister plans than trying to help Trump. If Putin thinks that he cannot prevent Biden, the Kremlin will not miss a chance to get altogether rid of the US, as a relevant international actor.

 

Pavlo Klimkin was, among others, the Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany in 2012-2014 as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in 2014-2019.

Andreas Umland is a researcher at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future in Kyiv and Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm.

https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/20/10/2020/preparing-mayhem

Cai Xia, one of the CCP's fiercest critics, chronicles her political awakening for the first time.

The United States has much to learn from grassroots action abroad.

/ Chine, Organisation internationale, Diplomatie, Relations internationales - Asie / Chine, Organisation internationale, Diplomatie, Relations internationales - Asie

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Donald J. Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign asked serious questions in unserious ways. His administration never answered them

In 2016, the United States faced a wide range of serious foreign policy questions. The United States had not readjusted key frameworks for ten or twenty years or more. Candidate Trump used populist rhetoric, pledging to “build a wall” to restrict immigration and to “drain the swamp” of Washington’s elite, globalist ecosystem. Claiming to be a peerless negotiator, he promised to protect Americans from corruption, free trade, China, immigrants, ISIS and “radical Islam,” to move its Israel embassy to Jerusalem, to restore an era of coal- and steel-based economic growth, and to “Make America Great Again.” Enough swing-state voters were willing to take a chance on the outsider to defeat Hillary Clinton.

The questions Trump raised – however inarticulately – were real. Trade and technology created massive wealth for some Americans but had cost the U.S. millions of manufacturing jobs. Economic inequality rose from the 1970s to mid-1990s: twenty years later the Gini coefficient in the U.S. remained higher than in Germany, France, and the UK. President Trump demanded replacing NAFTA with a new agreement and engaged in an on-again, off-again trade dispute with China.

By 2016, Congress had failed for a decade to fashion comprehensive immigration reform to update the 1986 law. Trump promised to limit migration from Mexico and Central America. He added a “Muslim ban,” suspending the U.S. refugee program and nearly all immigration from seven Muslim-majority counties.

By 2016, China and Russia were formidable diplomatic opponents. China’s economic growth over four decades empowered it to make expanding maritime claims and transcontinental “Belt and Road” plans. Russia had transformed from a defeated, de-industrializing weak democracy to an increasingly confident, assertive, autocratic power. It was active in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria and menacing elsewhere, including in the U.S. elections via social media. Trump seemed to admire strongmen like Putin and Xi even as he armed Ukraine and contested China’s trade policies. Putin’s 2018 re-election and Xi’s claim to office for life indicate continuing challenges to the U.S. instead of new cooperation.

Nuclear proliferation, especially in Iran and North Korea, remained key concerns. Trump took the U.S. out of President Barack Obama’s Iran nuclear deal as promised, but also held high-profile summit meetings with Kim Jong-un. Iran’s economy remains under economic pressure, and in January 2020, the U.S. killed a leading Iranian general, Qasem Soleimani. Meanwhile, no landmark agreements were reached with the DPRK.

Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Paris climate accord. He had campaigned on restoring jobs in coal and steel industries. He promoted fracking, as Obama had, but without the concerns for advancing new energy technologies to reduce climate change.

Despite pledges to end the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the core issues remain unsolved. Afghanistan and Iraq continue to have unstable political, economic, social, and security environments. Each still suffers from its own brands of corruption, violence, and limits on freedom. After nearly 20 years, neither government is fully in control of its territory and neither seems on a path to steady improvement. More than 7,000 U.S. military forces have been killed in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with terrible numbers of Afghanis and Iraqis. Thousands of U.S. troops are still stationed in these countries, though with plans to continue to reduce their number.

In 2015 and 2016, refugee flows from Syria and elsewhere surged into Europe. EU democracies came under economic and political pressure, with right-wing (and some left-wing) populist parties gaining in popularity. The UK voted for “Brexit” to leave the EU. Trump’s NATO policy seemed rooted in other members “paying their fair share.” NATO members in the east were concerned about Russia intentions while some members, but not NATO as an organization, assisted Turkey in Syria.

More broadly, democracy was increasingly challenged around the world. Freedom House warned that “In every region of the world, democracy is under attack by populist leaders and groups that reject pluralism and demand unchecked power.”

Problems at home continue. The President presided over three years of economic growth from 2017 through 2019, with solid performance in GDP, income, and especially unemployment rates. U.S. public debt as a percentage of GDP remained relatively stable, totaling just over 100% of GDP, even after the 2017 tax cuts.

But other worries remained. Congressional Republicans failed to repeal or replace Obama’s Affordable Care Act, as they had promised/threatened for years. About 28 million Americans remain uninsured, while many more face the rising costs of insurance premiums and prescription drugs. The dramatic video of a white police officer killing of a handcuffed black man in Minnesota, in the context of a national economic crisis and global pandemic, sparked peaceful and violent protests around the country. The President promised law and order but failed to lead a credible and effective government response to the calls for reform or to the economy and pandemic. The Covid-19 death toll climbed throughout 2020, while millions of children were kept out of school, unemployment rates skyrocketed, and usual medical care like coronary and cancer screenings were missed.

“Threat to democracy.” Trump was seen as respecting autocratic and populist rulers like Xi, Putin, Kim, Brazil’s Jair Bolsinaro and the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, while criticizing the U.S.’s democratic allies and their leaders. Trump’s statements and policy proposals were seen as a genuine threat to American democracy by scholars, pundits, and political opponents – and by some in his own party, enkindling groups like the Lincoln Project and Republican Voters Against Trump. Trump’s tweets and speeches were characterized as misogynist, racist, xenophobic, and more. Promoting suspicion of electoral integrity and the peaceful transfer of power was seen by some as anti-American, unconstitutional, and un-democratic. Trump was impeached for embedding campaign politics into a foreign policy negotiation.

All this worsened the enduring difficulties of the two parties working together. They were unable to find common ground, or even to seek it. Obama signed the Paris climate accord and the Iran nuclear deal without offering either to the Republican Senate for ratification. Trump promptly led the U.S. out of each deal on his own. Obama authored immigration leniency in DACA instead of forging bipartisan immigration legislation with the Congress. Trump followed with a “Muslim ban” and increased family separations. Federal failures during the Covid-19 pandemic – between Democrats and Republicans in Congress and within in the executive branch itself – harmed the nation’s public health and economy and lowered global esteem for the United States.

What’s Next?  As a hotelier, television star, presidential candidate, president, and Covid survivor, Trump has always exuded extreme confidence. His 1987 bestselling autobiography, The Art of the Deal, offered this insight:

“You can’t con people, at least not for long. You can create excitement, you can do wonderful promotion and get all kinds of press, and you can throw in a little hyperbole. But if you don’t deliver the goods, people will eventually catch on.”

Trump faces former Vice President Joe Biden in the presidential election November 3. Early voting is already underway, with record turnout so far. The serious foreign policy questions the U.S. faced in 2016 remain.

 

Photo: Donald J. Trump at the 2016 Republican National Convention  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Trump_accepts_nomination.jpg (public domain) from VOAnews.com

 

This article is the English version of : Joao Augusto de Castro Neves and Bruno Reis, « Brésil : plus dure sera la chute », published in Politique étrangère, Vol. 81, Issue 3, 2016.

Brazil is experiencing one of the worst political and economic crises in its recent history – and certainly the worst since the return of democracy in the mid-1980s. Darling of the new global economic order for much of the last decade, Brazil has fallen off the pedestal of punditry in the past few years. Broadly speaking, this bout of pessimism is partly due to the recurrent habit among international relations pundits and market commentators of viewing the world in terms of an inexorable – and even faster – power transition among major powers (or major markets). Until recently the BRICS were construed as the building block of a new global order and a good place to put your money. Now, following the ebb and flow of the financial markets, it appears it is time for other acronyms to have their fifteen minutes in the spotlight.

On the economic side, Brazil is facing the deepest recession in many decades (the country’s GDP has decreased nearly 10% in the last four years), a sky-rocketing unemployment rate and a significant fiscal deficit, among other macroeconomic imbalances. From a political perspective, the country is dealing with a presidential impeachment process, a massive corruption scandal reaching the entire political class, and recently faced an unexpected wave of protests on the streets of Brazil’s largest cities, with millions of citizens decrying the unresponsive – and occasionally irresponsible – political class.

Those events have led the political system to a state of near-paralysis, and emphasize the political class’ incapacity to respond effectively to the many challenges that the country currently faces.

Paradoxically, and therefore making this scenario even more challenging, just a few years ago Brazil was experiencing one of its most “dynamic” periods of its history – a “Chinese” rate of GDP growth (7.5% in 2007); massive social development with millions of citizens rising from poverty and joining the consumer market; and the most popular president in the country’s history (former President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva reached a 73% approval rating in 2010).

So, what happened to Brazil? What went wrong and how and why has the country’s political and economic situation deteriorated so quickly? Where is Brazil heading? Beneath the ever-changing and tenuous layers of tea leaves used to foretell geostrategic scenarios or suggest promising investment opportunities lies a much more complex story of a country that has had its share of boom-and-bust cycles. Whether Brazil is undergoing yet another one this time around demands a more insightful examination of recent political and economic events. Uncovering some of the factors behind these events may allow us to have a clearer view of the country’s trajectory. To try answering these questions, we will contextualize what is happening in Brazil within a broader scenario, in what we call the rise and fall of Latin America’s political supercycle.

The end of the commodities boom

Some of Brazil’s recent woes – and slightly less recent successes – are not unique to the country. Such issues stem from a broader economic and political process that affected many natural-resource-rich nations in the so-called emerging world, particularly in Latin America, in the last decade or so. […]

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