Defence`s Feeds

The existing structure of law enforcement and prevailing views of terrorism are officially antiquated. Decentralisation, destabilisation and insurgent methodology using mixed techniques in multiple sites, simultaneously are the hallmarks of the new wave of terrorism Europe is grappling

The idea for a European 'white book' on defence is again gaining traction, but Sven Biscop argues that it must become an integral part of the work on an European Global Strategy if it is to meet its full potential.

The post Out of the blue: a white book appeared first on European Geostrategy.

The Afghan government, much to its chagrin, has found itself embroiled in a controversy that has direct links to the 2010 Kabul Bank scandal. On 4 November 2015, a small group of high-level government officials presided over the stone-laying ceremony of a new and ambitious township called Smart City. What was meant as a good news story spectacularly blew up in the government’s face, when it turned out that Khalil Ferozi – one of the main perpetrators of the plundering of the Kabul Bank, convicted for embezzlement and money laundering – was both shareholder and guest of honour. Since then it has become clear that the agreement with Ferozi was linked to a loan recovery policy that was both authorised by the Cabinet and backed by the president. The question now is how much the president was aware of the details of the deal and the extent to which corners were being cut, and whether he intends to continue along the same lines. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert takes a forensic look at the affair so far.

I. The Smart City signing ceremony; an unpleasant surprise

Smart City (in Dari alternatingly called Shahrak-e Hoshmand and a phonetic rendition that reads like “Esmart Siti”) was to be built along the Kabul Airport road, next to Shahrak-e Aria – a collection of eye-catching white apartment blocks with red roofs. It is one of several shahraks or townships – literally small cities – that are being built around Kabul to provide housing for a growing middleclass. (An average three-room apartment in Shahrak-e Aria, according to this article, costs 140,000 USD).

The stone-laying ceremony on 4 November 2015 was attended by the Minister of Urban Development Sayed Saadat Mansur Naderi; the president’s Special Adviser on Good Governance (recently elevated to vice-presidential level) Ahmad Zia Massud; and the president’s Legal Adviser Abdul Ali Muhammadi. All three spoke, praising the initiative as an important step forward. Zia Massud described the project as “very valuable,” as it would bring the government a lot of profit, and introduced Khalil Ferozi as one of the shareholders. Legal Adviser Muhammadi explained how the Kabul Bank clearance committee was pursuing different ways to recover the bank’s loans and that this project was the best way to do it. The presence of Khalil Ferozi was treated, not just as a normal occurrence, but as a highly positive sign.

Urban Development Minister Naderi gave details of the project, proudly referring to Smart City as the first shahrak in both the country and the region that would be built according to modern and international standards. It would, according to a post on the ministry’s Facebook page, house 8000 families in three, four, or five-room apartments built according to 15 different “international designs.” The township was to have its own facilities, such as shopping centres, mosques, kindergartens, offices, parks and clinics.

Naderi then presided over the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Khalil Ferozi, who was providing the land for the project, and a representative of the Nabizada Wardak construction company, that would be in charge of the actual building. (1) The officials and other dignitaries who were present at the ceremony (see pictures here) did not seem to think they were involved in anything untoward.

The initial investment in the project, it was announced, would start at 95 million USD, while the total amount of money involved was expected to reach an estimated 900 million USD. It is not clear, though, where the initial sum was going to come from and whether this figure also included the value of Ferozi’s land. Although reporting so far has focused on the two main shareholders – Khalil Ferozi and the Nabizada Wardak construction company – there has been some buzz within Afghanistan’s wider business community, in particular among businessmen with prior links to the Kabul Bank shareholders, about the possibility of joining the project and making some money. The current going rate for real estate, according to one source, is around 1000 USD per square metre, while the cost of building is estimated at 400 USD per square metre. Even if these figures are optimistic, the prospects for profit seem huge – provided that the apartments sell. The government was slated to receive 50 USD for every square metre, in tax.

Although some of the national coverage was initially very bland, and probably based solely on the provided press releases, (2) the story soon broke with scathing headlines. The New York Times and The Guardian opened with respectively “Afghan Businessman Convicted in Kabul Bank Fraud is Still Free to Make Money” and “Afghan government signs huge property deal with shamed ex-banker.”

The rest of the government seemed to have been caught off guard, both by the ceremony and its fall-out. Insiders in the Palace described scenes of stunned disbelief and exasperation when the news broke. The question on everybody’s mind, of course, was whether the president had known about the deal and, and – whether he had or had not – how it could possibly have happened.

II. The problems with the Smart City arrangement

Criticism against the deal was swift and stinging. The collapse of Kabul Bank had been the biggest financial crisis to hit Afghanistan and a major embarrassment for the government, starkly illustrating the entanglement of money, power and impunity. As details of the Kabul Bank scandal emerged, in 2010 and the years that followed, it became clear that the bank’s leadership had over the years plundered the bank through a system of double-bookkeeping that allowed them to give huge illegal loans to the bank’s shareholders, as well as gifts and payments to a large number of politicians. (The lists of shareholders and debtors have been made public; those of the recipients of gifts and other largesse have not).

The total amount of debts owed to Kabul Bank was a whopping 982.6 million USD. Over 92 percent of these loans were handed out to nineteen individuals and businesses, ultimately benefiting twelve individuals. Ex-Chairman Sher Khan Farnod and ex-deputy chairman Khalil Ferozi were among the largest debtors and were both sentenced to five years imprisonment for money laundering and ten years for embezzlement in November 2014 (however, according to Afghan law only the longest prison sentence will be enforced.) The other shareholders and recipients of illegal loans were not prosecuted, although they were instructed to repay their loans. (For an earlier AAN analysis of this “exercise of containment” see here). The shareholders included Mahmud Karzai, brother of former president Hamid Karzai, and Hassin Fahim, brother of former vice-president Qasim Fahim.

Businesses that owe the Kabul Bank money, according to the MEC public inquiry, include Gas Group (121.2 million USD), Pamir Air (88.9 million USD), Zakhira (22.9 million USD), Kabul Neft (21.5 million USD), Hewadwal corporation (15.5 million USD), Gulbahar Towers (16.8 million USD), and Ariana Steel (1.5 million USD).

The Kabul Bank saga cost the Afghan state a lot of money. To prevent the collapse of the country’s financial system and to restore consumer trust, the government provided the bank with an 825 million USD lender-of-last-resort instrument, funded from its central reserve. This money is now slowly being repaid from Afghanistan’s annual budget; for instance in 2014 the government paid approximately $67 million, or 1.35 per cent of the year’s operating budget. Moreover, the New Kabul Bank is still operating at a loss (7.4 million USD in 2013, with an accumulated loss of 46.8 USD million at the end of December 2013 and possibly up to 65 million USD by August 2015). This is being paid for by the Afghan government, as part of its commitment to sell the bank with a clean balance sheet.

Tackling the Kabul Bank case had been one of President Ghani’s campaign promises and has long been upheld as one of the early (and few) tangible of achievements of this government in the much needed fight against corruption. The government in its own September 2015 ‘self-assessment’ document for the Senior Officials Meeting described how “[i]mmediate action on the Kabul Bank case broke the aura of impunity that had surrounded high level malfeasance.”

So to then find senior government officials organising and celebrating the inclusion of one of the architects of the scandal in what was probably going to be a highly profitable partnership, while condoning the obvious flaunting of a prison sentence, was embarrassing to say the least. Moreover, Farnod, Ferozi and their business partners, had squandered large chunks of the bank’s money through big and imprudent investment schemes, including in real estate. So it was also awkward that Ferozi would be allowed to earn back his debts in ways that resembled how he had made them in the first place. And all of this while presumably making a handsome profit, in a shareholder arrangement that seemed to carry no personal financial risk whatsoever.

Apart from the optics, there were obvious legal problems with the Smart City arrangement, as many commentators have pointed out. There is of course the issue that the executive should not interfere with a court’s verdict, by overturning or modifying a prison sentence. Although the president under certain circumstances can pardon a criminal, prison convictions for administrative corruption are exempted (article 350 of the criminal code). Legal adviser Muhammadi – who has since been suspended from his job – argued that Ferozi had not been released, but that he was simply being given a kind of leave that every prisoner is entitled to when needing to take care of private business. However, it is clear from other reporting that Ferozi had already been allowed out of prison for quite a while, at least during the day. (3)

Moreover, according to the procurement law, contractors with the government need to be of clean background and not have been convicted for a crime. There is also some debate whether article 113 of the criminal code applies, which says that a person who is sentenced to “long imprisonment” of more than ten years is not allowed to make contracts with or receive privileges from government institutions, nor are they allowed to manage assets and properties. Ferozi, depending on how one counts, was sentenced to exactly ten years. (4)

The move, of course, left people wondering whether bribes were paid and to whom. Several MPs claimed to have information, although they have not provided details. On 11 November 2015 members of the Wolesi Jirga complaints commission claimed a seven million USD bribe had been paid to allow the project happen and to release Ferozi from jail (the recipients were not specified). Similarly, on 15 November 2015 the Adalat wa Towsea daily quoted an unnamed MP who said minister Naderi had told them in a private chat that Zia Massud and Muhammadi had received bribes from Ferozi of respectively 2.5 million and 1.8 million USD. None of the allegations have so far been substantiated with evidence.

This is, incidentally, not the first time Ferozi has been subjected to a very lenient interpretation of ‘detention’. Under Karzai, both Ferozi and Farnod could often be found in the capital’s upscale restaurants, meeting friends and business partners under the guise of trying to recover their money so they could pay back their debts, even though they had been arrested and were supposed to be detained.

III. How the government reacted

The government’s reaction to the Smart City outcry came in instalments and suggests the president has been uncomfortably caught between the wish to still be seen to be firm and decisive, and the need to tread carefully. The question, of course, is why the caution?

The first formal reaction came from deputy presidential spokesman Sayed Zafar Hashemi on the day after the ceremony. He reiterated the president’s commitment to recovering the Kabul Bank debts and referred specific questions on the ceremony to the three officials involved, thus leaving it to them to defend the arrangement. Minister Naderi sought to reassure critics, by stressing that Ferozi’s activities would be closely monitored and that no untoward deal had taken place: “We are monitoring the project and there is no reason to be worried about it,” he said. Legal Adviser Muhammadi, in an interview on Tolo TV on the evening of the ceremony, argued that Ferozi had been neither forgiven, nor freed, but that this was the best way to recover the Kabul Bank’s money. He then proceeded to explain the mechanism, based on a government directive, through which the debtors were allowed to repay their loans in instalments over a period of one to seven years.

Muhammadi further defended the fact that the government had not simply taken the land from Ferozi, saying there had been no Cabinet instruction to do so and that whoever was ready to hand over their assets would be allowed to invest them. “What would the government do with 68 jerib of land,” he asked. “Why take it, if Ferozi can change it into money?” He added that Farnod, the former Kabul Bank chairman, would also be allowed to do so if found ready. Ali Akbar Zhwanday, president Ghani’s private-sector adviser, when asked by the New York Times, sided with Muhammadi saying that given the country’s economic hardships, allowing Ferozi to work and pay his debts and his hefty tax bill was a good idea. “What is better: for him to die in prison, or to pay back the money?” Zhwanday asked. (5) Ferozi himself also defended the deal, while speaking to Reuters by phone from prison. He said the project had already raised 14 million USD in debt repayments and, if it went ahead, would raise $75 million for the government. “The land belongs to me but if the government wants to sell it, they have the authority. But if they let the company build the township, from the money I earn, I will pay Kabul Bank’s loan back,” he said.

On 7 November 2015, the Palace released a statement containing several presidential decisions. It was framed in legal language and started by staking out those parts of the policy that the government presumably wishes to salvage: it reiterated the government’s commitment to recover the loans by all possible and legal means, and noted that the MoU was signed based on legal advice from the Kabul Bank clearance committee and the good will to expedite the loan collection process. It then described four decisions, based on what it said had been an urgent and thorough review of the project: (a) the court’s verdict on Ferozi is “unalterable and binding;” (b) the MoU is considered null and void; (c) the Kabul Bank clearance committee should review whether Ferozi’s land can be handed over to the Kabul Bank; and (d) the Attorney General’s office should report on the full enforcement of the court’s verdict.

It then took the Palace another ten days to decide whom it wished to hold responsible, at least for the moment. On 18 November 2015, it issued another statement (full Dari text here, English version not yet posted) in which it suspended legal adviser and head of the Kabul Bank clearance committee Muhammadi until further notice and relieved him of all responsibilities relating to the Kabul Bank loan recovery.

The president, in the same statement, tasked a delegation to review the evidence with regard to the “unlawful way” the Kabul Bank loan recovery had been managed; two members are mentioned: Seyed Ghulam Hussein Fakheri, head of the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO) and Muhammad Yassin Osmani, member of the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC). (For details on the different ways in which these two organisations, that have had a troubled relationship in the past, have viewed the Kabul Bank case, see here). The statement again reiterated that although the MoU was no longer valid, the process of loan recovery would continue.

IV. The clearance committee and its encouragement mechanism

The inquiry team will probably need to tread carefully, given that both Urban Development Minister Naderi and Legal Adviser Muhammadi have consistently argued that they were implementing a Cabinet-approved government policy – while blaming each other for what went wrong (Zia Massud, incidentally, has remained very quiet). Palace communications further suggest that the Smart City arrangement – and presumably other arrangements that are now slowly coming to light – was directly inspired by a preoccupation with loan recovery which seems to prioritise debt collection over punishment. What is less clear is whether the details of the deal itself were authorised and at what level.

Originally the Kabul Bank receivership together with the Attorney General’s Office were responsible for recovering the squandered loans, but when progress remained slow President Ghani apparently decided to take firmer control and established the Kabul Bank clearance committee (komite-ye tasfiah in Dari). Its establishment in March 2015 was not formally announced, nor does its composition seem to be public knowledge, but a report of the first three-monthly meeting, chaired by the president himself, appeared on the Palace website in June 2015. The report explains that the committee had been tasked with “expedit[ing] inquiry into the case of Kabul Bank based on a specific procedure” and mentions a one-week deadline for those who had not paid their debts in the preceding three months. Those who failed to clear their accounts within that deadline would be banned from leaving the country and referred to the Attorney General for prosecution.

The specific procedure referred to is the so-called ‘encouragement mechanism’. It has been alluded to and explained by legal adviser Muhammadi on various occasions in the media and on his Facebook page. (6) Under this mechanism Kabul Bank debtors were given the opportunity to either repay their loans in full in exchange for a significantly decreased interest rate (around 0.5%), or to negotiate a phased timetable for the repayment (against an interest rate of around 3.5%). Senior economic adviser and former finance minister (now slated to become Afghan ambassador to Pakistan) Omar Zakhilwal appears to have been at the origins of the scheme, but over time Muhammadi became the main person responsible.

One of the main points of contention now appears to be whether the scheme as described could have extended to Ferozi and Farnod, as, unlike other debtors, their obligation to repay their loans with interest and an added-on fine had already been established by the court in their conviction.

Muhammadi, in the meantime, continues to maintain he has done nothing wrong, stating that he simply implemented a Cabinet-sanctioned policy. He has also maintained he knew nothing about the deal with Ferozi, but that, at least, has been proven untrue. After Muhammadi again blamed the minister of urban development Naderi for the deal, the minister hit back on 10 November 2015 revealing that Muhammadi had sent three letters to his ministry, urging him to grant the license for the township. (For more detail, see here). At least two of these letters have since been leaked to the press and at least one of them includes an explicit reference to a contract signed between Ferozi and Nabizada Wardak. (7)

So far Muhammadi has been the only one who has been publicly singled out as being responsible for what the Palace has referred to as mismanagement of the clearance initiative and/or a misinterpretation of the law.

V. Where to go from here

Tackling the continued fall-out from the Kabul Bank scandal is obviously not just a financial matter, it was also symbolically very important. In the run-up to the joint Senior Officials Meeting in September 2015, the Afghan government described decisive action on the Kabul Bank scandal as a “top signalling priority.” During the meeting itself the president said the actions he had taken had made the Kabul Bank “no longer a symbol of impotence, but a symbol of resolve.” This makes it extra painful that the government has now been caught in cahoots with the Kabul Bank defaulters by facilitating the repayment of their loans and fines, and providing opportunities for them to play with new investments and, presumably, amass new wealth practically risk-free.

This has come into even more stark relief with the recent reports that Smart City was not the only possibility being explored to help Ferozi repay his loans. On 18 November 2015, Khaama Press disclosed yet another leaked letter from Muhammadi. In this one he was said to have asked the Ministry of Finance to instruct all government institutions to purchase their gas from Gas Group during the winter season. Gas Group, as mentioned before, was one of the largest recipients of illegal Kabul Bank loans. The company was established in 2006 by Hassin Fahim, brother of the late former vice-president Qasim Fahim, and later taken over by Farnod and Ferozi. (For details see here, p 39-44). According to Muhammadi’s letter, Gas Group had recently resumed operations based on an agreement with the Kabul Bank clearance committee; the revenue from the company’s operations would flow into the account of the Kabul Bank loan department to cover Ferozi’s loans. (An illegible picture of the letter can be found here). A handwritten instruction at the bottom of the letter apparently states that copies of the document(s) should be sent to the Kabul Bank clearance committee and the Office of Administrative Affairs, which – if this is an original addition – strongly suggests that the revival of Gas Group was a move authorised at the highest level.

The government, or parts of the government, seems to have decided that if it is spending money on fuel anyway, it might as well do so in a way that makes the money flow back into its coffers. It is, however, a roundabout way of dealing with the problem. More importantly, it lets Ferozi – and other defaulters – off the hook and gives them privileged treatment. Such a directive to buy only from Gas Group, is, in fact, reminiscent of the monopoly that the Kabul Bank used to have with regard to the payment of government salaries – thus making this government look a lot more like the previous one than it would like to admit.

In terms of which details were known when, it seems highly unlikely that the president was not aware of the Smart City project and the Gas Group plans at all – given the amount of attention he has paid to the Kabul Bank case and his propensity to micro-manage portfolios he considers crucial. It is of course possible that details were held from the president or were misrepresented, or that those involved had misinterpreted the limits of the authorised policy (or misjudged the damaging effect of a festive ceremony). But it is also possible that the president knew and is now trying to separate himself from the most damaging fallout. All in all, the attempts to help revive Ferozi’s businesses seem to illustrate a broader willingness on the part of the government – possibly all the way up to the president – to consider partnerships with tainted businessmen and to welcome their ‘black money’ if they are willing to invest.

 

(1) Nabizada Wardak does not seem to be a well-known company. It has a Facebook page, but the website listed there is inactive. The company is headed by one Abdul Bari Wardak and has been awarded government contracts before, including, in 2012, a contract for the construction of the Doshi to Pol-e Khumri part of the northern ring road.

(2) On the bland side, Khaama opened with “Foundation stone of a modern city laid in Kabul.” Wadsam had “A modern city called ‘Smart City’ to be built in Kabul.” Both articles focused purely on the inauguration, while ignoring the presence of Ferozi. Tolo News, on the other hand, had “Kabul Bank Defaulters Now Partner to Government Projects,” and the next day “Criticisms Spark After Kabul Bank Criminals Allowed To Enjoy Business.” Pajhwok, opened with “Bank fraud convict Ferozi invests a fortune in housing scheme” and explained that Ferozi’s release “had become possible in line with the court decision and his signing of the agreement to pay back the bank loan.”

(3) See for instance this New York Times article,  and also the reporting by US anti-corruption watchdog SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) in October 2015, noting that:

Despite a presidential order, a special oversight committee, and President Ghani’s claims of taking “decisive action” in holding accountable those responsible for the Kabul Bank theft, Kabul Bank’s ex-CEO Khalil Ferozi was reportedly released from prison this quarter at behest of high-ranking Afghan government officials after serving only a fraction of his 10-year sentence. This was ostensibly done to enable him to more easily liquidate and transfer assets and properties to the government to help satisfy his debts. (p 169-70).

(4) Khalil Ferozi and Sher Khan Farnod were both sentenced to five years imprisonment for money laundering and ten years for embezzlement. However, according to Afghan law such prison sentences run concurrently, so both should serve ten years.

Muhammadi has tried to argue that the real problem had to do with the interpretation of article 113 (and that that, the cabinet’s decision to find creative ways to expedite the return of the embezzled money was still sound and unchanged). He blamed Naderi, saying: “What the Ministry of Urban Planning did was a mistake, not what Ferozi did,” claiming that the ministry should have been aware of the legal prohibitions.

(5) Zhwanday is co-founder, shareholder and ex-vice-chairman of Afghanistan’s Azizi Bank and is another banker with roots in the hawala system. Zhwanday was part of the consortium, MTZ, that in February 2013 made the only remaining bid for the New Kabul Bank. The bid was rejected, according to a finance ministry official, because it was “not consistent with the current banking system.”

When the New Kabul Bank was re-advertised in September 2013, two firms bid on the bank, but neither ended up buying. A new bidding process was announced on 28 October 2015.

(6) See for instance in this article, dated 1 July 2015: “Abdul Ali Muhammadi, legal advisor to the President, said on Sunday that $437 million of the total $987million stolen from Kabul Bank had been recovered, but $578 million remained unpaid. According to Muhammadi, 24 individuals involved with the scandal have cleared their debts with the bank while 21 others have pledged to pay their debts to the bank. He added that the government has developed a persuasive procedure for collecting the money, saying that properties of those who have failed to commit for clearing their debts will be sold for clearing their debts with Kabul Bank.”

(7) A copy of one of the letters can be found here; and an illegible photo of a second letter can be found here. The first letter references a contract between Khalil Ferozi and Nabizada Wardak that was signed on 1 September 2015 (and thus preceded the annulled MoU of 4 November 2015). This is potentially interesting, given that, according to the president’s statement of 7 November 2015, the MoU was null and void because it was “not binding,” failed to “carry the legal weight of a contract” and had an inherently weak legal basis. This leaves one wondering whether this means that behind the annulled MoU, there might still be a contract that the government may want to revive in the future.

(8) Advisers close to the president who have been accused of involvement in the Kabul Bank scandal include, among others, former finance minister and current Economic Adviser to the president Omar Zakhilwal (see here, here and here) and current Senior Good Governance Adviser Ahmad Zia Massoud (see here and here).

American AGM-114 Hellfire Anti-Tank Guided Missile

The European Defence Agency together with EuroDefense Deutschland co-organised a conference entitled “Unmanned Maritime Systems – A Key Enabling Technology for the 21st Century Navy”, held at the Representation of Schleswig-Holstein in Berlin.

 

The conference featured participants from thirteen different nations and had ninety attendees. The conference consisted of three different panels which addressed the pertinent and topical questions in relation to the development and adoption of Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS).

In his opening remarks, Rini Goos, the Deputy Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA), highlighted the role the EDA plays in the development of capabilities and that the EDA “is the place to go for Member States who are keen to develop defence capabilities through cooperation”.

Rear Admiral Kähler, the Chief of Staff at the German Naval Command, provided an opening keynote speech. His address set the tone for the conference, as it outlined the importance of UMS and the need for European cooperation, but, additionally, it contained a word of caution, in that we must not neglect the need for internal and external investments in a time of shrinking budgets. In the broader Unmanned Systems environment, he asserted that many of the technological developments are dual-use in nature, and there are many complimentary features between the civil and military sides. 

The conference panels proceeded to address three broad areas relating to UMS, namely the operational concerns on the adoption of UMS, the need for multinational cooperation in overcoming complexity and, finally, a focus on the challenges facing the wider adoption of UMS in terms of classification, safety and regulations. 

An interesting theme consistent throughout the conference related to the next steps on the use of UMS. It was emphasised that the current focus of UMS in the area of mine countermeasures is very much a first step and not the end point in itself. Navies must continue to innovate and accept new technologies and this often requires a cultural shift. As Dr Heiko Borchett outlined in his presentation, innovation requires a level of risk tolerance and acceptance, and that it is only by the wider adoption of UMS that we can ensure confidence and reliability in these systems and shift the debate from men vs machine, but rather focus on the men-machine and machine-machine collaborative aspects that will open the door on future uses. 

This lead into the second panel discussion, moderated by the EDA Project Officer for Naval Systems, Paul O’Brien. This panel focussed upon some of the areas addressed in the EDA Unmanned Maritime Systems programme, which consists of fifteen coordinated projects and has a monetary value of €56 million. The conference participants were informed of the ongoing efforts to develop technologies to meet the capability requirement for Maritime Mine Countermeasures. 

The Capability Armament and Technology Director, Peter Round, moderated the third panel, which focused on the challenges facing the wider adoption of the UMS. This had a particular focus on regulatory aspects and legal classifications. 

The conference concluded with a speech from the Cypriot Minister of Defence, Mr Fokaides who provided an overview of the security considerations in the Eastern Mediterranean. In particular, he outlined the importance of the recent discovery of natural resources in the area and stated that these could act as a catalyst for political solutions. He further asserted that UMS technologies and the civil-military dimension have an important role to play.

 

More information:

• Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS) research

Slovak Zuzana 2 Self-Propelled Howitzer

Our contemporary political compact is premised on jobs and growth.

It’s the economy, stupid.. as Clinton so aptly put it.

And to be get elected parties need to be convincing on (and then deliver to get re-elected) economic prosperity, opportunities for future generations to get in on this prosperity, and the sorts of economic safety nets to encourage risk taking entrepreneurialism and yet to disincentivise idleness and work avoidance.

This was a tried and tested model that saw switches in the government of the time dependent largely on how successful they were in delivering jobs and prosperity, selling a vision and maintaining party unity. Such a focus has narrowed the pool of people coming into politics. They no longer needed to be former soldiers, or people with substantial experience in industry, the unions or other areas outside of narrow-band economic politics. It was said of Major, and Blair that they were the first Prime Ministers without direct experience of a war – the inference being that this sort of experience is vital for governing a state. Coupled with this was the European Union that had single-handedly delivered an unprecedented period of peace in Western Europe and relative economic prosperity and successfully sold (and kept selling) a vision of social and economic liberalism that was attractive to a wider set of European nation states. The EU was and is a technocratic set of organisations , geared to the business of developing and deepening a complex single market across many states: a primarily economic activity. So,in that frame the free movement of people makes perfect sense. And that the vast majority of European states soft pedaled their security and intelligence spend looked unproblematic: the capable states would keep their spending up, and the American umbrella would deliver a lot of the rest.

Only the twin problems of a refugee crisis bringing tens of thousands of people from an active war zone into societies focussed only, or mostly on jobs and growth, and the problems of attacks on the West are not economic problems. They are not – in the main – economic problems. Although the economic aspects of these problems are – in turn – security problems, or will quickly become so. So, the Generation X of special advisors and their political masters have a problem that they are ill-equipped to understand let alone deal with. The SDSR, which is now imminent, will be the first major test of this government’s ability to demonstrate that they understand the contemporary security environment. The SDSR rumour mill suggests that the government might have understood enough to increase some elements of the security budget, but the devil will be in the many details. (Another post will be forthcoming when it’s published). But the balance of politics is shifting. It is about the economy. It is also about jobs and growth. But the political class has successfully ballsed that up, over the last 7 or so years. And so for several reasons the politics is shifting to it being mostly about security.

As a instinctive europhile, it is with sadness to say that the European project is not currently fit for purpose following this shift. It is with slightly less surprise that we can currently observe that the political and special advisor class are not fit for purpose either. And as for the Labour Party… well.. if they don’t get with the shift pretty quickly they’ll be electoral toast. The hoohah today about the Shadow Chancellor and ‘that alleged leaflet’ makes the point better than a 1000word essay ever could.

Rapid adaptation is required. Politics has gone Darwinian and the electorate will turn unforgiving very soon.

A high level conference to discuss maritime security issues explored challenges arising from the European Union’s Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and its associated Action Plan. The benefits and opportunities for further cooperation also provoked much discussion between the stakeholders and national subject experts who attended.

The Maritime Security Conference, conducted by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus and the European Defence Agency (EDA), in the framework of the Luxembourg Presidency of the EU Council, was held in Cyprus from 11-13 November.

The need for a rapid and coherent EU response to the migrant crisis brought added emphasis to the discussions – only reinforced by the symbolism of hosting the event in a Mediterranean venue. Furthermore, the focus of the topics addressed, such as implementation of the EUMSS, the protection of strategic maritime infrastructure and sea-lines of communication, and the protection and development of ocean wealth, were of high interest to attendees.

“For the EDA, the EUMSS was the platform to plug-in its ongoing activities and, where appropriate, to adapt existing initiatives or develop new ones. In the revised Capability Development Plan, ‘Maritime Patrolling and Escorting’ and ‘Maritime Surveillance’ are two priority actions,” said Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency, who was one of the key speakers at the conference and a participant in a panel discussion on the EU Maritime Security Strategy.

Peter Round, EDA Capability, Armaments and Technology Director, moderated three panel talks and chaired a round table discussion in which high level stakeholders shared their maritime security challenges and opportunities. “European prosperity, like any economic centre in our global economy, is based on successful exploitation of the sea and, at times, the ability to exert control through the use of force. A reduction in our level of ambition from Open Seas to the Littoral could bring about ‘sea blindness’, shrinking Europe’s sea-going vision to what could be termed a ‘coast guard function’. I’d far rather see us aspire to a ‘sea guard function’ to ensure our ongoing freedom of manoeuvre on the High Seas – i.e.: Sea Power,” he said. 

Additionally, the conference included a session dedicated to research and technological aspects of the EUMSS which encompassed the local academic and research communities. 

 

More information: 

• News "EDA Continues Mine Counter Measures Activities - Two Maritime Conferences on the Way" (19 October 2015) 

Investment in research and innovation is at the heart of ensuring a competitive and efficient European defence and technological industrial base. An important step has been taken today with the agreement the European Commission and the European Defence Agency (EDA) signed to dedicate €1.4m to finance a limited number of concrete projects on emerging technologies in defence as well as activities linked to certification for military and civil uses.

Jorge Domecq, EDA Chief Executive, said: “Research and Technology is key for defence. The Pilot Project should add value to the ongoing collaboration in research of the Member States. It prepares for bigger initiatives such as the Preparatory Action for Defence Research that will focus on European priorities and address areas where the Member States can no longer act alone and where critical mass needs to be maintained. As such the Pilot Project is an important step towards Europe’s future defence capabilities and a strong and competitive Industrial base.”  

This agreement follows an initiative of the European Parliament and is a first agreement between the European Commission and the European Defence Agency. 

The European Defence Agency will provide its expertise and will run the projects on behalf, and in close cooperation, with the Commission. 

The EDA Steering Board tasked the Agency to support Member States in the setting up of the Commission’s Preparatory Action and recently adopted the modalities of implementation by EDA for the Pilot Project.

More information:

• Press release Communication COM(2013)542 "Towards a more competitive and efficient Defence and Security sector"
• PDF European Council Conclusions June 2015
• PDF European Council Conclusions December 2013

During the third Helicopter Tactics Instructors Course (HTIC), aircrew members from across Europe were working hard to master their skills. With successful delivery of the ground and simulator phase at RAF Linton-on-Ouse in the UK, and the phase at Vidsel test range near Lulea in northern Sweden, twelve student instructors from Austria, Germany, Sweden and the UK graduated from the course with Bronze or Silver HTI qualifications, corresponding to their experience and skills level.

It was the first case that the HTIC was delivered under an EDA Category B Programme with its own approved Programme Arrangement signed in March 2015 by Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

The HTIC as a multinational tactical training course involved four helicopter types: Austrian Kiowa, Swedish Air Force Blackhawk and NH90, Chinook from the UK. It engaged more than one hundred military and civilian staff, and included more than two hundred hours of live flying.

The aim of HTIC is to teach experienced helicopter aircrew how to instruct tactics in the air and on the ground. It covers topics such as fighter jets evasion, electronic warfare against surface to air radar threats, convoy escort, vehicle check points and operating in the low-tech threat environment.  

A wide range of assets to provide the correct learning environment were required. The excellent support was provided by the Swedish Armed Forces with their Gripen fighter jets from 211 and 212 Squadron, the SK60 trainer aircraft and the ground-based radar defence systems as well as by the UK with their Hawk aircraft from 100 Squadron.

For the first time, the Staff Instructors included graduates from the previous courses. The two returning Swedish Instructors prove that the course can be self-sustaining and is able to achieve its aim of developing an internationally recognised cadre of tactics instructors who, in turn, can continue to deliver courses in the future. 

The HTIC is a high-value, intensive course that forges close links between all participants, creating a tight-knit community. Experience and knowledge are shared openly and honestly, and working on the principle of adopting best practices, continual improvement and standardisation serve as a constant theme. Everyone works together, harmonising tactics, techniques and procedures, with ever closer interoperability being the final goal. Through this international training, crews prepare for the coalition operations for the future. They train the way they fight so that they can fight the way they have trained – together! 

More information: 

• Helicopter Initiatives project page
• News "Third helicopter tactics instructor course launched" (2 September 2015) 
• The EAATTC15-3 factsheet is available here
• More information on the EATF is available here 

The public hearing will present an overview of the current CSDP partnerships with third countries and organisations, the possibilities of evolution and general tendencies.
Location : Altiero Spinelli 1G-2
Programme
Programme
Presentations
Presentation by Rory Keane, Head of the UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security, Brussels
Presentation by Prof. Dr. Joachim A. Koops, Dean of Vesalius College & Director, Global Governance Institute (GGI)
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Consider a group of cavemen leaving the cave to go hunting a dinosaur. The dinosaur is bigger, stronger and faster. Death is certain for the cavemen and yet with spears and rocks the dinosaur is felled – the team splitting into three groups and surrounding the dinosaur without a

In the aftermath of the November 13 attacks in Paris, one is left to wonder if these incidents, happening as they did in the midst of the worst humanitarian crisis of the century, were by accident or design. Millions of refugees have been fleeing the Middle East and North Africa h

We are currently conducting some research exploring the current use and future applications for additive manufacturing (AM) processes in the defence and aerospace sector.<

The decline (by almost a fifth) in the area of land in Afghanistan planted with opium poppy in 2015 came as a surprise to many. Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan had been on the rise since 2010, when an opium poppy blight halved opium production and triggered a subsequent hike in opium prices. However, the decline is largely due, it seems, to natural causes – crop failure in the traditional opium-growing heartland of the south – and market fluctuation, rather than anything the government or outside agencies have done. Moreover, the trend was bucked in areas of the north and west, where farmers, especially those living in insecure areas, have been putting more land under poppy cultivation. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica, who has been scrutinising the 2015 UNODC Opium Survey, reports.

The amount of land under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan fell by 19 per cent in 2015 compared to the record high of 224,000 hectares in 2014. (1) These figures can be found in the 2015 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Opium Survey Executive Summary released on 14 October 2015. The most significant reason for the drop in cultivation appears to have been repeated crop failures in the south and southwest regions of Afghanistan where, traditionally, most of country’s illicit crop has been cultivated. Poor harvests driven by drought and mono-cropping which exhausts the soil and encourages diseases and pests, especially poppy blight, led farmers to sow less of their land with poppy this year than last (see Afghan opium expert David Mansfield’s analysis here) and previous AAN reporting on this from 2010.

Cultivation in the southern region decreased by 20 per cent. In Helmand alone, reported UNODC, cultivation dropped to 86,400 hectares, from the previous year’s 103,240 hectares apparently and in Kandahar, there was a larger relative decrease in cultivation, of 38 per cent (2).

The opium market in Afghanistan does not necessarily play by the standard economic rules when it comes to demand, supply and prices affecting farmers’ planting decisions. In 2014, for example, UNODC thought that the demand for ready cash from those competing in the presidential and parliamentary elections was one reason why cultivation was so high. Opium is also different from other crops because as well as providing an income, when it is dried it can be stored for several years, so also functions as capital and savings. Nevertheless, price and supply do still matter. One key factor behind the reduced cultivation this year, according to the UN and other observers, was the large amount of opium stockpiles.

UNODC also cited increased eradication of poppy crops this year as having reduced the area under cultivation. 40 per cent more land was reported eradicated – from 2,700 hectares in 2014 to 3,760 hectares in 2105. However, that is still a tiny percentage of the overall area under cultivation.

UNODC Regional Representative for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries Andrey Avetisyan also said there had been better coordination in the most insecure areas, which led to more eradication in 2015. This was especially the case, he said, during “the spring offensive in Helmand’s Sangin district where, after [Afghan army] operations, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan forces eradicated the opium poppy fields immediately.” However, on the seizures side, there has been something of a decline since 2013. The Counter Narcotics Police carried out 3,243 law enforcement operations in 2013, compared to 2,734 operations in 2014 (4) and, by the end of September 2015, had carried out just over 2,000 operations.

A bad harvest

Not only was less land planted with poppy this year, but what was grown had a lower yield. The average opium yield fell to 18.3 kilograms per hectare in 2015, a 36 per cent decline, compared to 28.7 kilograms per hectare in 2014.

Together with the lower opium cultivation, this meant opium production (5) in Afghanistan in 2015 was almost half (48 per cent) of what it had been in 2014; UNODC estimated a 2015 harvest of 3,300 metric tons compared with 6,400 metric tons in 2014.

AAN compared UNODC’s opium yield estimates for the last six years by analysing the data from the annual Afghanistan Opium Surveys in the period of 2009 to 2015. The chart below shows a trend of a gradual decrease in the opium yield over this period. According to a UNODC crop-monitoring expert, the decrease is due to “less rotation of crops in the fields over a period of several years.” This lack of rotation resulted, he said, in poppy plants producing fewer bulbs in 2015 (instead of six to seven on average, this year there were only three to four per plant). UNODC also reported a lower density of crops in the fields. Satellite images clearly show visible patches of soil in some fields that further contribute to a lower yield per hectare. The UNODC expert explained “the decrease of approximately 40,000 hectares could also be [due to] fields left unsown for the crop rotation [being left fallow].”

That lower yield was seen even in Kandahar where (as reported by Associated Press in May 2015), traders had distributed genetically-modified poppy seeds to farmers just before the planting season (in parts of Kandahar and Helmand poppy is planted twice a year). These seeds were supposed to boost the yield and shorten the growth cycle of the plants. According to a UNODC crop expert, the seeds originate in China where legal opium poppy cultivation is undertaken for pharmaceutical use, as is the case in over a dozen countries. “The genetically modified seeds shorten the growth cycle of the plant – to one to two months, instead of five to six months,” the UNODC expert told AAN, “but the resin production is pretty much the same as with the Afghan seeds.” (3)

Average Opium Yield. Table: AAN (based on UNODC Opium Survey Data 2009-2015)

Opium cultivation and insecurity on the rise in the north and west

The national decline in opium cultivation and production was, however, bucked in parts of the north and west. In 2015, farmers in eight provinces (Kabul, Kunar, Baghlan, Faryab, Sar-e Pol, Uruzgan, Badghis and Ghor) sowed more opium than in the previous year. In the north, Faryab and Sar-e Pol had significant increases in cultivation, up by 451 per cent and 70 per cent respectively, while, in the west, Badghis and Ghor’s cultivation increased by 117 per cent and 249 per cent respectively.

Several factors may have been causing this rise. There is a well-documented correlation between insecurity (both physical and human/livelihoods insecurity) and poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, including, for example, by David Mansfield. The reason for this is that opium is a low risk crop (unless repeated mono-cropping has led to failed harvests) in a high-risk environment. It is a natural choice for farmers living with an insurgency.

Looking at insecurity patterns in northern and western provinces where the cultivation has significantly increased, AAN compared district level cultivation and security incidents using data provided by UNODC and an independent organisation observing the security situation in Afghanistan. Quantitative analysis confirmed the correlation between increased insecurity and an increase in poppy cultivation, except in the case of Sayyed district of Sar-e Pol province and Lal wa Sarjangal district of Ghor province.

In Faryab’s Qaisar, Gurziwan and Kohistan districts, where the UNODC data showed a significant increase in cultivation, 360 incidents involving armed opposition groups, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and/or criminals in the period from October 2014 to September 2015 had been recorded. The data set shows that these incidents in the three districts constituted a third of all reported incidents in all the 14 districts of Faryab province. As reported by AAN in April 2014, the Taleban had stormed parts of Qaisar district, occupied villages and swept Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) out of their checkpoints. (See AAN previous reporting on rising insecurity in Faryab, in 2014 here and in 2013 here).

For Sar-e Pol province, UNODC recorded a significant increase in poppy cultivation in the district of Sayyad. (6) AAN has previously reported on the Taleban establishing footholds in far-flung areas of Sayyad and Kohistanat districts (see AAN 2015 report here). In Sayyed district, which did not show a significant increase in insecurity, there are indications that the Afghan Local Police (ALP) are themselves involved in cultivation. In a phone interview, a provincial council member from Sar-e Pol told AAN, “This year’s government plan to eradicate opium poppy fields was prevented by the local ALP commander and his sub-commanders, who are supporting the farmers who are growing illicit crop and are protecting them from the government.”

Shifting to the north-western province of Badghis, UNODC data shows three out of its eight districts had a significant increase in poppy cultivation. At the same time, the number of incidents in these districts (Ghormach, Qadis, Ab Kamari) made up a little over half (55 per cent) of the total number of incidents reported for Badghis over a one-year period. The majority of these incidents were related to the armed opposition. (7) The cultivation in Badghis has been steadily on the increase since 2009, reaching a high of over 12,000 hectares this year.

A prominent elder from Badghis described to AAN how farmers had enjoyed “capacity building” in how to grow and harvest poppy in recent years: labourers travelling south to work had brought back skills to their home province. He also blamed the increase in cultivation on the classic dilemma facing farmers in an insurgency-plagued province: try to get non-opium produce to faraway markets (in Herat or Mazar) through insecure areas or wait for the opium traders to come to the door who will buy your harvest from you directly.

In the province of Ghor, a significant increase in opium poppy cultivation was recorded in half of the districts of the province, namely in Chaghcharan, Dawlatyar, Lal wa Sarjangal, Pasaband and Taywara. Since 2012, when Ghor lost its poppy-free status (8), opium poppy cultivation in the province has been steadily on the rise (see previous AAN reports from 2013 here and here). According to available security data, from October 2014 to September 2015, 144 incidents (or 44 per cent of the total number of reported security incidents) in Ghor were recorded in these five districts. (9)

What to plant next year?

Farmers and traders usually wait for the price spike that generally occurs in the autumn before they sell their stocks. By September, however, the farm-gate and traders’ prices of dry opium had already started to increase. The farm-gate price for a kilogram of dry opium was 155 US dollars and the traders’ sale price was 164 US dollars for the same unit that month. Both had increased by 12 per cent compared to the same period in 2014, according to the Afghanistan Drug Price Monitoring Monthly Report, which is jointly compiled by the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics and UNODC Kabul and published in September 2015. If prices continue to rise, this could trigger a new increase in cultivation next year. However, we may see fluctuations in prices in the coming months, says UNODC, given the increased number of security forces along the Tajik-Afghan border who could disrupt regular smuggling routes.

The decline in cultivation and production this year should make no-one too hopeful that this year’s figures represent the start of a downward trend. Opium poppy is an annual crop so trends need to be measured in longer time periods.

Opium poppy also remains easily Afghanistan’s most valuable export crop. (10) The net export value of last year’s opium harvest was estimated by UNODC at 2.7 billion US dollars or 13 per cent of nation’s licit GDP. This figure is especially large compared to other agricultural exports, dwarfing the second most valuable agricultural export – dried fruit and medicinal plants; in 2014, for example, these were worth only 234.7 million USD (according to the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industries, quoted in the UN Secretary General’s February 2015 report). Opium exports also dwarf Afghanistan’s total legal exports: in 2014, these were valued at just 571 million USD.

Poppy cultivation and opium production may have decreased this year, but, by itself, this gives little reason for optimism. As head of UNODC Avetisyan put it, “One year’s result is not a trend.”

(1) In 2015, the area of opium cultivation amounted to 183,000 hectares.

(2) UNODC warns that due to methodological changes, the actual extent of change (increase/decrease) needs to be taken with caution, especially in Badghis, Kandahar, Nangarhar and Zabul, “which were particularly affected by the shift to the new methodology” (see page 6 of Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Executive Summary).

(3) The price of Chinese seeds is seven to ten times higher than that of Afghan-grown ones. According to the Afghanistan Drug Price Monitoring Monthly Report in September 2015, the price for a kilogram of Afghan-grown poppy seeds was 39 Afghani (about 0.60 US dollars) in Kandahar.

(4) In 2014, the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan operations resulted in seizures of 4,146 kilograms of heroin, 6,361 kilograms of morphine and 69,169 kilograms of opium. Moreover, a total of 45 heroin-manufacturing laboratories were dismantled (UN Secretary General Report on Afghanistan A/69/801*–S/2015/151* available here).

In 2013, the counter-narcotics police had conducted 3,243 operations, seizing 7,157 kilograms of heroin, 23,979 kilograms of morphine, 115,650 kilograms of opium and dismantled 71 heroin manufacturing laboratories. (UN Secretary General Report on Afghanistan A/68/789–S/2014/163 available here)

(5) UNODC only reports ‘potential’ opium production per year, thereby acknowledging the limitation in its estimation formula: as it is an illicit crop, getting accurate figures is not so easy.

(6) According to available security records, only some incidents, as few as eight, were recorded in the period from October 2014 to September 2015. Of these eight incidents, two were crime-related, one was initiated by the Afghan National Security Forces, while the remaining five involved the armed opposition.

(7) Statistics based on the data set provided by an independent organisation observing the security situation in Afghanistan for the period October 2014 to September 2015.

(8) A province is defined as ‘poppy-free’ by UNODC when there are less than 100 hectares of poppy cultivation.

(9) Only three incidents were reported in the district of Lal wa Sarjangal in Ghor province in the period October 2014 to September 2015. A safe district, nonetheless, it has shown a rise in poppy cultivation.

(10) 90 per cent of world illicit opiates are still produced in Afghanistan. Opiates are a common name for opium and its derivatives morphine and heroin. It was estimated that 52 per cent of Afghan opium is converted into heroin or morphine within Afghanistan, according to the UNODC Opium Survey 2010.

Swiss / German SIG Sauer P226 Pistol

Ministers of Defence today met in the European Defence Agency (EDA) Steering Board, under the chairmanship of Federica Mogherini as the Head of the Agency. The EDA presented progress on the four capability programmes and initial roadmaps for potential future cooperative programmes: Biological Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (Bio-JDEAL), medical evacuation and anti-tank weapons. Minister of Defence also discussed the three year planning framework detailing the Agency’s work plan and priorities for 2016-2018 as well as the resources required to support this.

 

Three Year Planning Framework and 2016 General Budget

Federica Mogherini in her capacity as Head of Agency invited the Steering Board to approve the 2016 EDA General Budget of €33.5m. 

Approval of the EDA budget requires unanimity. Despite very positive feedback by Member States on the work and support by the Agency, there was no unanimity on the increased budget. Instead, the budget will remain at this year’s level – €30.5m (zero growth).

 

Implementation of Key Taskings and Next Steps

Ministers of Defence welcomed the progress achieved in the four capability programmes: Air-to-Air Refuelling, cyber defence, governmental satellite communications, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems.

Given the increasingly volatile and challenging security environment in and around Europe it is equally important that other critical capability priorities as identified in the Capability Development Plan also be addressed. Potential future cooperative activities require guidance to avoid fragmentation, focus future investment and give clarity to defence industry.

Ministers of Defence have today adopted the initial roadmaps for potential future cooperative programmes as proposed by the Agency: Biological Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (Bio-JDEAL), Medevac and Anti-Tank Weapons.

Bio-JDEAL: The proliferation of biological agents means the biological threat to Member States’ forces employed on operations remains real. Furthermore, the use of biological weapons or devices, particularly by non-state actors, can have a disproportionate effect on morale. Enhancing CBRN capabilities in operations has been outlined in the Agency’s Capability Development Plan as a priority action.

In order to counter these threats and assess the risk of exposure, a biological laboratory which could be deployed at short notice by a Member State would be able to:

• Conduct unambiguous in-theatre biological threat identification;
• Provide threat information to Command, enhancing the protection of EU forces and local populations and thus limiting casualties;
• Maintain Member States’ freedom of movement and action.

Following today’s approval, the roadmap foresees start of the expert group’s work still this year with a view to producing a Common Staff Target by the end of 2016 and a possible project launch by the end of 2017.

So far, eight Member States (Luxembourg, Slovakia, Romania, Germany, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Spain, Italy) and Norway have expressed interest in this project.

 

Medevac: Effective medical evacuation is a fundamental requirement for any military operation. Cooperation, interoperability, as well as common training, is paramount for Member States to constitute reliable MEDEVAC capabilities. As with the previous proposal, enhancing this capability is a priority action of the Capability Development Plan which was endorsed by Member States.

Following Minister’s endorsement, the work will start with a study on “Interoperability in Forward Aeromedical Evacuation with Rotary Wing” which will be launched this year. Based on the outcome of the study, the Agency will make proposals on possible interoperability activities and training.

This work builds on interest shown by seven Member States (Luxembourg, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Austria, Finland, Germany, the Czech Republic and Italy).

 

Anti-tank weapons: Anti-Tank capabilities are still of fundamental importance in the context of National security strategies. Some Member States still have in service equipment designed in the late 1970s which will become obsolete in the near future; they will need to consider upgrade or replacement of their systems. Others are willing to address the anti-tank weapon gap by developing new capability requirements potentially through joint procurement programmes.

To move ahead quickly, the Agency will together with Member States evaluate possible urgent requirements for commercial off-the-shelf solutions still in 2015. This project represents also a quick win opportunity for Pooling & Sharing.

Anti-tank is a domain where work will build on interest shown by nine Member States (Estonia, Romania, Finland, Sweden, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Greece, Latvia) and Norway.

On 16 November 2015, the European Defence Agency (EDA) conduced its Annual Conference to address most up-to-date questions on the condition of European defence, and to propose a way ahead in various defence-related areas.  

Hosted at the Brussels’ Albert Hall, the conference gathered about 400 frontline leader and decision-makers in European defence from the worlds of military, politics, industry and academics. The conference began with one minute of silence to pay tribute to the victims of terror attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. 

Welcome speeches 

Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive urged for more cooperation in defence: “it needs to be part of our DNA,” and the necessity to underpin a political will by actions: “We will only be able to adequately respond if the Union’s foreign policy ambitions are backed by the right defence capabilities at the right time, supplied by a globally competitive and technologically advanced industrial base in Europe.”

Elżbieta Bieńkowska, the European Commissioner for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and Small Medium Sized Enterprises (SME), a keynote speaker, stressed that Europe is able to provide security and contribute to international peace and stability. She underlined the importance of synergies between defence and industry. She also presented the EU Commission’s  approach to defence, the work plan to follow as well as some ideas for stimulating defence research. Among other things, she insisted on reversing declines in spending to stimulate research: “European funding of research priorities can be a strong tool to bring all relevant actors together.”

Roundtable talks on defence capabilities 

During the first roundtable discussions Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, General Mikhail Kostarakos, (designate) Chairman of the EU Military Committee, Giovanni Soccodato,  Executive Vice President Strategy of the Markets and Business Development at Finmeccanica and Daniel Koštoval, Deputy Minister for Armaments and Acquisition of the Czech Republic, shared their ideas on how to improve EU defence capabilities. 

Among the conclusions of the vivid discussions, there was a need formulated to noticeably increase defence cooperation and restrain from spending in national isolation on defence capabilities. The lack of a proper political guidance as well as too much of a national focus were recognised as prime reasons for a too slow-paced progress in terms of cooperative capabilities development. A financial aspect and a popular phrase “doing more with less” was considered outdated by the speakers who underlined the gravity of European defence capabilities. In this context, a new financial instrument, the VAT exemption for EDA-led programmes and projects, was accessed positively.

Second part of the conference

The second part of the conference initiated Conrad Bruch, Director of Defence at the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Luxembourg, who took the floor on behalf of Etienne Schneider, Vice-Minister, Minister of Economy & Minister of Minister of Defence: “We welcome work on a global strategy that will encompass all the tools at our disposal to create a stronger and more secure Europe,” he said. He also emphasised that closer cooperation is necessary to avoid threats and challenges to “come closer”, and gave examples of  Luxembourg’s involvement in cooperative projects and missions. 

Special addresses 

The highlight of the annual conference were two special addresses delivered by Federica Mogherini, Head of the European Defence Agency, High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, and Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General. Both prominent guests emphasised solidarity, partnership of the EU and NATO as well as the need to stand united to face the current threats. The both condemned the terrorist attacks conducted on 13 November 2015 in Paris. “We will strengthen our resolve,” Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, stated. 

“We cannot afford to act without a rational strategy and a vision what we want to achieve and how we want to get there,” said Federica Mogherini about a global strategy for Europe that is currently being prepared. As she admitted, defence and security will be part of each chapter. Federica Mogherini also stated that the EU is a security provider for many and it is ready to mobilise all the instruments, including the military ones. She reassured the need to cooperate with the EU neighbours and emphasised the relations with NATO.  “There is no security without defence, there is no defence without capabilities and no capabilities without industry,” said Federica Mogherini addressing the capability dimension of defence and stressed the important role of the European Defence Agency when it comes to deepening cooperation and capability development. 

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General stated that “security is interconnected” and reassured that both organisations are determined to develop closer cooperation. He also listed possible areas for stronger partnership, including countering hybrid threats or helping partners in neighbourhood. “We share the same values and commitment to freedom, democracy and human rights. Those valued are under threat; this is what we saw in Paris on Friday. Those values must be defended by us. That is why we work together and that is why we will take our cooperation to the next level: not just side by side but also hand in hand,” said Jens Stoltenberg about the EU-NATO partnership.  

Roundtable talks on defence research

The second and also the last panel discussion of the Annual Conference brought defence research on the agenda. Recognised as a key factor for capability development, defence research funding has experienced a significant decrease in the recent years. Along with the Preparatory Action, the EU might finance defence research for the first time in history, which may steer research development. 

The experts – Michel Barnier, Special Adviser to the European Commission President on defence matters, Antoine Bouvier, President & Chief Executive Officer of MBDA Millie Systems, Ana Gomes, Member of the European Parliament and Tassos Rozolis, Chief Executive Officer of AKMON and Chairman of the Hellenic Manufacturers of Defence and Security Material Association – discussed the requirements to set the level of ambition in Research & Technology and to define a way ahead. They also stressed the need to translate political will into concrete programmes and procurements in order to help a strong European defence industry base to develop. Ideas of balancing the co-existence of Small Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and big players as well as the implications of dual-use technologies were also widely discussed. 

A final word

"There is no alternative to defence cooperation," said Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive, in a summary for this year’s Annual Conference. He also underlined the necessity of better spending of available resources and supporting industry in order to develop a strong European industry base.  

More information 

• EDA website on Annual Conference 2015 
  
  
  
  

More than 400 participants attended this year's EDA Annual Conference. High-level speakers shared their vision on European defence cooperation. Several of the speeches are now available here below.

Elżbieta Bieńkowska, European Commissioner responsible for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs opened the conference with a keynote speech underlining the importance of synergies between defence and industry. 

Federica Mogherini, Head of the European Defence Agency, High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission and Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary-General of NATO delivered special addresses emphasising among other things EU-NATO complementarity and partnership in facing common challenges.

You can access their speeches as well as the welcome word of Chief Executive Jorge Domecq via the links below.

More information:

• News "The first part of EDA Annual Conference" (17 Nov 2015)
• News "EDA Annual Conference: the second part" (17 Nov 2015)
• PDF "Welcome words by Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Opening keynote speech by Elżbieta Bieńkowska, European Commissioner" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by HR/VP Federica Mogherini" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg" (17 Nov 2015)
• EDA Annual Conference 2015

In this interview, Anthony Bargar,Cyber Security Specialist at US-based Sypris Electronics, discusses the best ways to upskill cyber teams and detailing the current demand for cyber security solutions. He also explains the evolving nature of cyber threats facin