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Chinese Taian HTF5680 12x12 Special Wheeled Chassis

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The first European Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Course (EATTC) of 2016 drew to a close on 25 February with the graduation of both day and night qualified aircrews from Belgium, Spain, Germany and Poland. 

The new dual track course was hailed as a complete success, with all training objectives achieved to reach the graduation standard but, perhaps more importantly, by the crews themselves who had found the course both challenging and enjoyable. The opportunity to mix with crews of different nationalities, operating different aircraft in the same role offered an additional dimension to the event and added greatly to improved interoperability envisaged in the sponsoring 20-nation European Air Transport Fleet (EATF) programme.

The next course will run in Orléans in France over the period 22 May - 3 June 2016.

More information:

• News "Airlift tactics training with focus on night flying" (16 Feb 2016)
• EAATTC16-1 factsheet 
• Flickr album with pictures from the event

Read the Restricted report about EUNAVFOR MED (Wikileaks), Brussels, 28 January 2016
>>>
Dear Dr. Turke good morning,
according to your request I need to underlined that the number are not fixed but changeable due to the situation. We can normally count on around 160 people in the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) in Rome and around 60 personnel acting for the staff of the Force Commander on board ITS CAVOUR (the flagship).
The total of EUNAVFOR MED personnel is around 1460, depending on the assets involved.
On the occasion I invite you to follow us on our website (www.eeas.europa.eu/eunavfor-med)and the related social media.
Regards.

Antonello de Renzis Sonnino

(EUNAVFOR Med logo)
CAPTAIN Antonello de Renzis Sonnino
Spokesperson and Chief of Media Cell

Tag: EUNAVFOR MED

American M240 General Purpose Machine Gun

As the introduction to a five-part series on what the EU Global Strategy should say on defence, this article outlines the major issues and sets the context for the EU's level of ambition.

The post European strategy, European defence and the CSDP: food for thought appeared first on European Geostrategy.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the US – the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) – are pushing to open a new chapter in the ongoing search for a peace process for Afghanistan. The group has now met for the fourth time, although direct talks with the Taleban have yet to begin. Earlier this week, it issued an ultimatum to the Taleban to come to the negotiating table with the Afghan government by early March 2016, or face the military heat. At the same time, the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) was revamped so that it could “more effectively” support the envisaged process. This approach, however, risks once again derailing talks before they have even begun. AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig takes a closer look.

For the past months, Afghanistan and its three partners in the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) – US, China and Pakistan – have been trying to force a breakthrough by creating a viable Afghan peace process. The current drive is partly fuelled by a desire within the US administration to gain as much ground before the next US elections, and partly by the recurring hope that Pakistan may now be more amenable to peace between the Taleban and the Afghan government. The initial drive for renewed talks came from the new Afghan government. The current focus in the process is, in the first instance, to bring the Taleban to the negotiating table and get them to agree to direct talks with the government in Kabul – without which a genuine peace process would be difficult to imagine.

An invitation-cum-ultimatum and a ‘road map’

Following the fourth meeting of the QCG, which took place on Tuesday (23 February) in Kabul, the four participants issued an “invitation” to “all Taliban and other [armed] groups to participate through their authorized representatives in the first round of direct peace talks with the Afghan government expected to take place by the first week of March 2016.” (The emphasis on “authorised representatives” is meant to ensure that the insurgent delegation does not permanently need to go back to consult its leadership for decisions, which also can be a delaying tactic.) Pakistan has agreed to host these talks in Islamabad.

This ‘invitation,’ which bears all the hallmarks of an ultimatum given the very short deadline, was part of a stern five-paragraph joint press release (the statement of President Ghani is here) published by the Afghan foreign ministry after the QCG meeting. It was preceded by some posturing in the meeting’s opening statement by Afghan foreign minister Salahuddin Rabbani, in which he said that his government would welcome any group joining the process, but that

…those elements of the armed groups who continue to refuse to join the peace talks, and continue the path of violence must realize that our message to them is clear: our brave security forces will not hesitate in their resolve to fight them resolutely, wherever they are, to stop them from committing terror, violence and bloodshed.

Kabul’s approach seems to be based on the – unpublished – roadmap for the envisaged peace process (see press release here) agreed upon by the QCG’s members during their previous meeting in Islamabad in early February, which, according to participants, determines “parameters of shared responsibilities.” It tries to capitalise on the split in the Taleban insurgency that showed when Mullah Muhammad Mansur officially took over as new leader following last year’s announcement of the death of the movement’s founder-leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and a dissident faction emerged under Mullah Muhammad Rassul. (See AAN’s analysis of these developments here.) Currently, it tries to drive the wedge even deeper, using the emergence of further, smaller splinter group, related or unrelated to the dissidents. (See for instance the media reporting on Taleban infighting in Paktika here and in Faryab here.)

Analytically and practically, the roadmap envisages that the Taleban be divided into those considered to be ‘conciliatory’ and ‘irreconcilable.’ President Ghani, in a press conference on 31 December 2015, had already set the tone for this (quoted here) when he said: “It is obvious that there are groups of Taliban, not a unified movement. The fundamental issue here is the choice: choose peace or terrorism. There will be no tolerance for terrorism.” (1) Abdul Hakim Mujahed, a former Taleban diplomat now on the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC), made this approach even clearer in an interview, where he said that those deemed irreconcilable will be fought. As he put it:

The road map is being prepared to combat the Afghan insurgency and bring peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. Certainly all four countries [on the QCG] will cooperate with each other to combat the insurgency.

The strategy of seeking to widen the split among the Taleban is apparently based on two hopes. Firstly, that either Pakistan, with China’s prompting, will succeed in bringing the Taleban mainstream faction of Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur to the Islamabad talks or, alternatively, persuade other groups (for example Rassul’s faction or Hezb-e Islami) to join the talks. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s faction, Hezb-e Islami, has been holding direct talks with the Afghan government for years (AAN’s analysis here) in an attempt to increase its political standing and might take up the QCG’s offer. (Many other Hezbis joined the post-2001 political system either individually or in groups, registered a political party, secured several cabinet positions and one of their leaders is deputy to the CEO. Its armed wing, however, has failed so far to come to an agreement to end its armed campaign.) If some groups joined the talks, it could prompt some of the more mainstream Taleban to join the bandwagon of peace talks.

Mullah Muhammad Rassul’s dissident Taleban faction, though, has also adopted the position that it would be ready to engage in peace talks only after the departure of all foreign troops (here in Dari).

Secondly, the strategy seems based on the premise that Pakistan would start clamping down on ‘irreconcilable’ Taleban even if hitherto it had considered many of them allies or assets. According to the New York Times earlier this week, “officials close to the talks process” (it is unclear of which government) said “Pakistan’s representatives had earlier given assurances that violence will be noticeably reduced in coming weeks” and that the Taleban might even refrain from announcing their ‘spring offensive’ this year. (That being said, there has been virtually no lull in fighting over the winter. Many Taleban fighters were ordered to stay in their province and not to retreat to their shelters in Pakistan.) This aim – the reduction of violence in Afghanistan – had been established at the QCG’s second meeting in Kabul in January 2016 (see statement here).

The question remains, however, as to whether such a shift in behaviour would fit into Pakistan’s long-term regional strategy. Until now, the Taleban have been seen as its strongest card in the regional power play with regard to securing influence in post-withdrawal Afghanistan. It seems unlikely that Pakistan would discard the Taleban while bilateral relations remain dominated by mutual mistrust and accusations of supporting or harbouring each other’s armed insurgents. There are also unsolved issues, such as the open border question.

The Afghan government used the opportunity to restate its main red lines for the envisaged peace talks. In his speech introducing the revamped High Peace Council on the day of the QCG meeting, President Ashraf Ghani urged the Taleban to end their armed campaign, to “join the caravan of peace” and to choose “political participation” under “our constitution.” (2)

The second decision of the fourth QCG meeting was to set up a joint Afghan-Pakistani working group to mobilise support of ulema (religious scholars) from both countries for the “peace and reconciliation process, including through Fatwas against the ongoing senseless violence.” In this way, the Afghan government is trying to flank the talks with activities that aim to build a constituency for peace. It is also trying to take the moral high ground, presenting itself as the party that pushes for an end to the conflict, giving the other side the choice of whether to join or be sent to the warmonger’s corner.

The Taleban reaction

The Taleban, in their first response to the QCG statement issued by the spokesman of their political office in Qatar to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, said they were “unaware of plans for talks.” The Taleban spokesman, Muhammad Naim Wardak, added that they had not changed their position regarding the conditions under which they would be ready to join a peace process, as announced at the second Pugwash meeting in Doha on 23 January 2016 (see the organisation’s rendering of the results here; the Taleban’s version is here). The conditions include the withdrawal of all foreign troops, official recognition of the Qatar office, the removal of the Taleban from the UN sanctions list, a halt to the “arrest and elimination” of Taleban fighters, the release of Taleban inmates from prisons, and a stop to what they call “anti-Taleban propaganda,” including labelling them as “terrorists.” (The Qatar office has been tasked both by the old and the new Taleban leadership to act as the movement’s sole intermediary.) Diplomats in Kabul have interpreted this list of Taleban demands as a hardening of their position in comparison to what they said at the first Pugwash meeting in May 2015 (see AAN’s take on this meeting here).

To date, the insurgents have officially rejected engaging in direct talks with the Afghan government, as they first insist on holding negotiations with the US regarding the full withdrawal of all foreign military forces. Their official position is that ‘intra-Afghan talks’ would only be possible following this withdrawal (the date of which has now been postponed due to the extension of Mission Resolute Support beyond the end of 2016).

There has been one major exception, though. In the Murree talks in July 2015, Taleban representatives did in fact sit down for talks with officials from Kabul for the first time. These talks were quickly abandoned, however, mainly due to the news of Mullah Omar’s death which came out in the middle of the sessions and the break of confidentiality about the talks (read AAN analysis here). The Taleban also sat in the same room with Afghan government representatives in lower key events not directly related to Afghanistan, such as in a March 2015 peace seminar in Oslo. This might serve as some indication that there may be some political posturing involved and that the ‘preconditions’ could become negotiable once a degree of trust has been established, after the many failed attempts at getting talks underway.

There are two elements in the invitation issued by the QCG that may well be off-putting to the Taleban. First, there is the tone, which is one of an ultimatum, when in fact the Taleban are making steady territorial gains in parts of the country where the most intensive fighting is taking place. In the strategically important province of Helmand, for example, the Taleban have recently forced the ANSF to beat a ‘tactical’ retreat from at least one district (see a media report here; an AAN analysis of the Helmand situation is forthcoming). Furthermore, they are still capitalising on their temporary takeover of Kunduz, where a dangerous situation continues (see AAN’s analysis here). Sources from various provinces told AAN how this victory has boosted the local Taleban’s morale. Secondly, they might be suspicious – given the experience of the Murree talks – that Pakistan’s role as host for the newly envisaged talks would once again mean that Pakistan will determine who should sit at the table on the Taleban’s behalf.

Finally, the early March deadline for talks seems unrealistic. The QCG Four might well end up talking with only a few marginal groups (or delaying the timeline).

It is unlikely that the short deadline set by the QCG will in the short run bring about the longed-for reduction of violence in Afghanistan, as expressed by the officials quoted above. It therefore remains to be seen whether, if the talks do not commence by early March, the ANSF can make good on Kabul’s strong rhetoric and significantly increase their pressure on the Taleban in the spring, thereby turning the military tide and re-taking the initiative in the war. In all probability, this is doubtful, according both to the US special inspector’s latest assessments (highlighting the ANSF’s five main challenges including “questionable force strength numbers” and ”uncertain long-term sustainability”) and to what Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, interior minister until recently, said about the Afghan police – that there were “imaginary units,” “networks of financial and political corruption“ and “large quantities of untraceable ammunition” undermining its fighting capability. The alternative would be to extend the deadline of the ‘invitation’ for talks and in the meantime keep the QCG’s member-states’ political pressure on the Taleban up.

President Ghani and CEO Abdullah present the revamped HPC. Photo: Presidential website.

A reformed High Peace Council?

The QCG’s statement and the Taleban’s reaction almost overshadowed the fact that, after months of deliberations, a new composition for the High Peace Council (HPC) was announced (see the composition of its leadership bodies in the annex). Former HPC foreign affairs representative, Ismail Qasemyar, who continues to speak for the council, confirmed to AAN that the number of its members has been reduced from 70 to 50. A full list of those members, however, was not available at the time of writing.

The first mention of how the HPC had been revamped came late on 21 February 2016 via a post on Twitter by the deputy spokesman of the CEO, somewhat prematurely it seemed. The Palace took its time and only confirmed the news two days later in a press conference (statement in Pashto here; as yet unavailable in English), on the day of the QCG meeting.

The HPC top post went, as the Kabul rumour mill had indicated for a long time, to veteran mujahedin leader Pir Seyyed Ahmad Gailani. (3) The Pir still commands a lot of respect, also as the leader of an important Sufi order that includes the Taleban among its followers. He is, however, ageing and it is expected that his role will mainly be a symbolical one. His son, Seyyed Hamed Gailani – who also runs the Gailanis’ political party, Mahaz-e Melli Islami (English: NIFA) – may end up running the everyday work of the council on his father’s behalf, although his name has not yet been mentioned for any official role within the council.

The HPC also has six new deputy heads. There is Haji Din Muhammad, a key Ghani supporter and eastern Pashtun. As head of the 2009 presidential campaign for then president Hamed Karzai and with a key role in the current president’s 2014 campaign, he helped establish contacts that kept the insurgency relatively quiet on those elections days in parts of the country. The other five deputies are former Vice President Abdul Karim Khalili (a Hazara, currently without a government position); three religious scholars, respectively Mawlawis Abdul Khabir Uchqul (an Uzbek), Abdul Karim Khuddam (a Turkmen) and Atta ur-Rahman Salim (a Tajik) and Habiba Sarabi, the former Women’s Affairs minister and first female provincial governor (for Bamian, 2005-13; she is also a Hazara). Khuddam and Salim represent Jamiat-e Islami, Khabir was deputy chairman of the Jombesh party and Khalili leads his own wing of the Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami.

There are two women on the new HPC Executive Board of Advisors: Sadeqa Balkhi, a former minister and serving member of the Afghan Senate, and Hasina Safi, director of the Afghan Women’s network. Both women participated in a landmark meeting in Norway in the middle of 2015 – the first where Afghan women activists and Taleban representatives directly exchanged views (see here and here). The other four advisors are Mawlawi Abdul Hakim Mujahed, a former Taleban diplomat and deputy HPC head; Mawlawi Attaullah Ludin, former governor of Nangarhar and member of Hezb-e Islami’s legal wing; and two of the council’s spokesmen, Ismail Qasemyar and Farhadullah Farhad.

Much like the old council, the focus in appointing the HPC’s new leadership and advisory board seems to have been more on balancing the major ethnic groups and political factions, than on gathering a strong team of negotiators. (Read AAN’s take on the initial HPC in 2010 here.)

The CEO’s spokesman who initially broke the news told AAN “these appointments will help [the] competence [and] effectiveness of the HPC at a time when we are preparing the [first] round of direct peace talks.“ President Ghani later said the council’s task was “to meet soon to set out a priority framework” according to which the government “will take action.” Given these comments and the fact that the Taleban never recognised the council (which they deem to be too close to the government to be a viable partner in negotiations), (4) and taking into account how the HPC has functioned in the past, it does not seem likely that it will play a central role in peace talks, should they take place. The way the quadrilateral negotiations have been conducted until now also points to the fact that the ultimate negotiation team will very likely not come from the HPC, or would only include a few individual members.

If indeed the HPC remains a side-show in the peace process, its re-launching was probably mainly designed to serve as another symbol that a peace process is finally taking off, and also to tick a box on the list of benchmarks agreed upon between the Afghan government and the international community (see here, in the annex). It also ensures that a number of influential figures are kept on board in well-remunerated positions. This in turn implies there is a danger that, with its still large membership, the HPC will continue to be used as a cash cow. Qasemyar was recently quoted in a government-run newspaper as saying that he expected the impending changes within the HPC to bring with them a resumption of international funding.

On a more positive note, ethnic and social groups that suffered the most at the hands of the Taleban regime are now better represented in the various HPC’s leadership bodies: there are two Hazaras (one is a woman) and three women. This seems to be a direct response to demands from civil society as well as segments of the international community. These groups harbour the most fears about repercussions of a possible return of the Taleban to power as a result of the envisaged negotiated settlement. Even if the council is no more active than its predecessor, with its new members, and particularly the women, it could potentially serve as a warning bell in case the government negotiators threaten to compromise too much  – provided, of course, they are listened to.

The NUG’s attempt to take the moral high ground in the peace talks would have been more convincing had it managed to end its quarrels over cabinet and provincial governor posts, or been more transparent regarding its progress on fighting corruption, improving the country’s socio-economic situation and creating jobs – not least as it needs to stem the continuing flow of refugees from the country.

 

(1) Former Taleban diplomat Abdul Hakim Mujahed, who remains a key member on the new HPC, expressed a somewhat different notion when speaking to web-based magazine The Diplomat in February:

First of all, we hope that all the factions of the Taliban will come under one leader. If this can’t be, we hope that the four countries [in the QCG] will call all of them to the negotiations. They will try not to exclude anyone and to avoid the mistake that was committed in 2001, when the Taliban movement was excluded from the peace process. We have to learn from the failures of the past and understand why the earlier efforts could not yield any results.

(2) A Pashto transcript of the president’s speech can be found here. No English translation is yet available. The text of this dispatch quotes a short English version of the speech that was diffused from the Palace’s twitter account.

(3) Gailani’s main competitor for the top HPC post was former interim president Hazrat Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, who led the first, heavily funded but largely ineffective and corrupt ‘reconciliation and reintegration’ programme, known by its Dari abbreviation PTS (Program-e Tahkim-e Solh/Programme for Strengthening Peace). The PTS was established by President Karzai in 2005 and replaced by the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP). The HPC was set up as part of the APRP. Details on the APRP’s donors here.

(4) The Taleban even considered the HPC members ‘legitimate targets’ in their fight. The council’s first chairman, Ustad Borhanuddin Rabbani, was killed by a Taleban assassin in 2011 (the first of a series of five AAN dispatches on this topic here). Rabbani’s successor (as acting HPC head), Arsala Rahmani, a former Taleban minister, was also assassinated a year later (AAN analysis here). President Ghani mentioned in his inauguration speech for the council’s new set-up that also at least 40 of its provincial officials have been murdered.

 

Annex: The new HPC leadership:

Chairman:

Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gailani

 

Deputy chairs:

Abdul Karim Khalili (Senior Deputy Chairman)

Habiba Sorabi

Haji Din Muhammad

Mawlawi Abdul Karim Khuddam

Mawlawi Abdul Khabir Ushqul

Mawlawi Atta ur-Rahman Salim

 

Executive Board of Advisors:  

Abdul Hakim Mujahed

Mawlawi Attaullah Ludin

Sediqa Balkhi

Hasina Safi

Ismail Qasemyar

Farhadullah Farhad

 

HPC Secretariat:

Muhammad Ayub Rafiqi (head, based in Kandahar)

Farhadullah Farhad (deputy head)

Dr. Faruq Bashir (deputy head)

Brazilian Taurus PT 24/7 Pistol

Belgian FN FNX Pistol

American Douglas A-4 Skyhawk Carrierborne Attack Aircraft

This week, the Group of Personalities issued its report on the Preparatory Action for CSDP-related research. Convened by Commissioner Elżbieta Bieńkowska, the group consists of key personalities from European industry, government, the European Parliament and academia. In its report, the group now made recommendations for a long-term vision for EU-funded CSDP-related research which can boost European defence cooperation. 

These recommendations address the overall scope and governance of future EU-funded CSDP research and highlight possible collaboration and coordination mechanisms. The overarching goal of the Preparatory Action and CSDP-related research is to create a framework that would facilitate a collaborative approach to defence among the Member States.

Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and an alternate to High Representative, Vice President and Head of the Agency Federica Mogherini, in the group, underlines, “The Preparatory Action on CSDP-related research is a pivotal instrument in support of Europe’s strategic autonomy: it will reinforce our collective military freedom of action by fostering defence cooperation. The establishment of such a European instrument can contribute to translating our level of ambition into action. The Preparatory Action can become a catalyst for European cooperation in key capability areas by breaking down the barriers and overcoming the disincentives to cooperation that exist today.”

Against the background of shrinking defence R&T budgets with negative long-term effects on capability development and industrial outlook, the report acknowledges that an EU-funded Defence Research Programme (EDRP), complementary to national R&D, may help fostering cooperation, ensuring European security and supporting the European defence technological and industrial base. 

In the report, the Group of Personalities highlight the importance of close cooperation between governments (as sole customers), industries (as main suppliers) and R&T organisations for the success of the Preparatory Action. At the same time, the report describes the EDA as “the only EU body with the mandate to define collective defence capability and research priorities and support defence cooperation”. It is “therefore the most logical and appropriate vehicle to identify and review priorities in this domain”. 

Commenting on this last point, Jorge Domecq says, “The Preparatory Action combined with the active role of EDA upstream, meaning in its preparation, and downstream, in its implementation, could lead to a more systematic cooperation in Europe.”

 

More information

• Download the report here (EUISS website)

Greetings dear CCLKOW readers and discussants. This week’s post differs from the norm in that it is not necessarily short term discussion based. Rather, like last’s week’s piece from Company Command, its aim is about the longer term conversational arc for the series. In this case the focus is specifically on the matter of professional military education. There are no particular questions posed, discussion in this case being driven by recommendations and interest. 

 

I have been interested in professional military education for as long as I have been in military history and defence affairs. Its content interests me in detail and for its expression of policy and intent. I have worked across various parts of it in the US and now here in the UK. My thesis research relied upon its 19th and 20th century emergence as a key piece in the development of the logistics of industrial warfare. I have also sat in as a student in much of a standard war college course. In sum, it is a critical  junction of scholarship, practice, and policy, as important to security and defence as it is to research.

For the purposes of this blog, when I speak of professional military education (PME) I mean the schoolhouses of the field grade ranks. The modern military school system which comes under this umbrella was borne of an era in which the operations of the line units exceeded the direct control of the army or campaign commander. War’s complexity increased first in the Napoleonic Wars as the nation in toto could be leveraged to increase manpower. This was followed by the complexity which the increasing mass that industrialisation enabled. To meet the widening spectrum of subject matter competencies which modern warfare required, PME evolved early to comprise a mix of academic and military subject matters. By the end of WWI, the educational scheme which an American or a British practitioner would generally recognize today had taken form, even as it continues to modify and reform itself according to changing needs.

If we are faced with an evolving character of warfare, it seems only fitting to examine the contours of the education which is meant to sustain the martial intellect. As such, it is my interest to bring more pieces on issues relevant to PME to CCLKOW and Kings of War. While I have some ideas in mind and plans in place, I would like to hear from a wider audience the PME topics and issues of concern. And so, this week’s discussion is a response to a that simple request.

Give a thought and add your views on Twitter at #CCLKOW.

The acute migration crisis in the Mediterranean Sea has brought the issue of search and rescue (SAR) – both military and civilian – starkly to the fore over the last 12 months. More investment is needed in platforms, equipment, personnel, and training. But more than that, t

The LAV Demonstrator 8x8 combat vehicle was displayed at IAV 2016 with remote weapon station for small caliber m

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (JDEAL) was delivered to Soesterberg, the Netherlands at end of last week. The deployable laboratory was financed through the European Defence Agency and is now ready for deployment to operations to counter-IED threats on the request of the JDEAL Contributing Members.

JDEAL was facilitated by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the lead nation The Netherlands. The JDEAL programme is now counted as a fully operational training facility and a deployable capability. Moreover, JDEAL is now seeking to acquire a second deployable capability.

JDEAL also makes use of equipment and knowledge gained from the EDA-developed Counter-IED Technical Exploitation Laboratory (MNTEL) which was previously deployed with ISAF in Kabul.

The laboratory works across the entire spectrum of technical IED exploitation. This includes detailed visual examination and high quality image capture; technical exploitation reporting; biometric analysis (latent finger print recovery); electrical circuitry (primarily radio parts); document and media recovery (focused on the mobile phones often used as IED triggering devices); chemical analysis; mechanical exploitation as well as other materiel exploitation.

Major Geert-Jan Verkoeijen, JDEAL Manager in Soesterberg, and his team received the deployable facility on 10 February. Major Verkoeijen answers to three questions on the laboratory and possible future deployment here below.

 

• What does the Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (JDEAL) mean for C-IED capability in Europe?

JDEAL is an EDA Cat B project that started in September 2014 for the duration of three years. After the opening ceremony, on 4 November 2014, JDEAL has proven to be a good example for how cooperation between European nations can be arranged. The gained experience so far shows that it takes time to change, adapt current approaches, doctrines and even processes on (C-IED) technical exploitation. In some cases we see and experience that we don’t  have this time. In my opinion the JDEAL concept can be seen as an example in current European political-military discussions: the current review of the ‘C-IED concept in EU-led military operations’ could benefit of the lessons identified and learned or even the cooperation approach as a whole.

The JDEAL concept is already used in other cooperation developments, thus, this is a huge compliment for what we have achieved so far. In case the JDEAL concept is used for future cooperation plans, the main and most important issue is commitment. With commitment and willingness it’s ‘easy’ to start in a short time. This JDEAL concept approach (could) benefit future decision making processes and eases supporting but ‘mandatory’ issues like budget, equipment and personnel.

After executing several JDEAL basic courses we enter now the ‘next’ stage in the project. On 10 February we received our deployable laboratory in Soesterberg. JDEAL is now in the position to fulfill and execute its main tasks: (1) execute trainings, (2) deploy the laboratory and (3) maintain knowledge & research developments. JDEAL can contribute to trainings, operations and discussions related to our specific C-IED technical exploitation work field.  Either way JDEAL demonstrates that ‘pooling and sharing’ of capabilities and capacities are beneficial for contributing countries. This knowledge will be used for the discussion, the continuation of JDEAL after 2017.

 

• How do you see the readiness of the staff and laboratory for deployment?

The challenge is to create a pool of experts that fulfills continuation in future deployment(s). This pool must consist of military staff who are able to use the available equipment, material and procedures. Importantly, the staff has to work in a team. Right now we don’t have a deployment or mission and it’s difficult to anticipate needs and consequences. In my opinion JDEAL is flexible and modular enough to adapt and fulfill  future needs. From this perspective JDEAL is in the position  to influence the decision making process. Before the actual deployment JDEAL analyses with the lead-nation how to support the deployment. JDEAL is able to prepare and execute the necessary means for deployment and make sure that the assigned crew is trained by the JDEAL permanent staff.

The delivery of the first deployable laboratory JDEAL allows us to focus on the possible operational consequences of getting deployed in the upcoming months.  We are now preparing for the C-IED training exercise ‘Bison Counter’ in Sweden (August 2016). The Bison Counter ’16  exercise will also be a test for the technical exploitation ‘chain’ and JDEAL will benefit also from the knowledge/ procedures  of operational units and collection / level 1 tactical exploitation. This exercise will connect the several technical exploitation steps. 

 

• When do you see the first opportunity for the laboratory for deployment?

As stated in the JDEAL Programme Arrangement the contributing members states can claim the deployable facility. Now we have the deployable laboratory I can imagine (my assumption) that nations are considering JDEAL deployment. The JDEAL permanent staff has the challenge to make sure that when the time comes, we are ready to support the lead nation.

 

More information:

• Counter IED project page

The objective for the cyber situation awareness package (CySAP) is to provide commanders and other decision-makers with information to develop a clear understanding of the cyber-attack threat landscape.  Also, it aims to equip them with the tools (competent personnel, effective procedures and technology platforms) to manage risks during the planning and conduct phases of a military operation. This will improve the resilience of military information infrastructure and other networked systems in the event of a cyber-attack. 

The official endorsement of the Business Case by EDA Steering Board on the 12 February 2016 and the military requirements based on the Common Staff Requirement on the 27 November 2015, marks the initiation of an ad hoc project through the negotiation of a Project Arrangement. 

The project will be carried out under the EU Pooling & Sharing agenda and aims to develop a modular capability within the goal ‘to mitigate the risk of a cyber-attack on Communications and Information Systems and other network capabilities used within the planning and conduct of CSDP operations’.  

The agreed milestones will progress through simultaneous activities comprising:

• Requirements and Architecture Development by 2016
• Definition of work package options within a Programme Arrangement by 2017

Background 

The EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, as adopted by the Council on 18 November 2014, states that “Cyberspace is often described as the fifth domain of military activity, equally critical to European Union (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) implementation as the domains of land, sea, air, and space. The successful implementation of CSDP has been increasingly dependent on the availability of, and access to, a secure cyberspace. Robust and resilient cyber defence capabilities are now required to support CSDP structures and CSDP missions and operations”. 

More information:

• Cyber defence programme

 

Russian RPG-16 Anti-Tank Grenade Launcher

The NATO Allied Maritime Command based began the submarine warfare training exercise Dynamic Manta 2016 (DYMA 16) off the Sicilian coast in Italy on 22 February. The submarines, surface vessels, aircraft and personnel from eight NATO nations are converging on the central Mediterranean