Defence`s Feeds

Those providing health care in contested areas in Afghanistan say they are feeling under increasing pressure from all sides in the war. There have been two egregious attacks on medical facilities in the last six months: the summary execution of two patients and a carer taken from a clinic in Wardak by Afghan special forces in mid-February – a clear war crime – and the United States bombing of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in Kunduz in October 2015, which left dozens dead and injured – an alleged war crime. Health professionals have told AAN of other violations, by both pro and anti-government forces. Perhaps most worryingly, reports AAN Country Director Kate Clark, have been comments by government officials, backing or defending the attacks on the MSF hospital and Wardak clinic.

Summary Executions in Wardak

The clinic in Wardak that was targeted in February 2016 was run by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. It was founded in 1980s, one of the NGOs that emerged in response to the Soviet invasion. It currently has more than 5000 staff, almost all Afghan, and works in 14 provinces, running large education and health programmes. It has run this clinic in Tangi Sayedan in Daimirdad district of Wardak province for more than fifteen years. The clinic has 10 beds and 23 staff, including a doctor and a midwife. It is the only medical institution in the area: the nearest hospital is a one and a half to two hours drive away.

According to the Swedish Committee (with many details also confirmed by UNAMA), at about two in the morning on 18 February 2015, staff at the clinic found themselves in the middle of an operation by Afghan government and international forces to clear Taleban from the area which included the use of air strikes. Afghan special forces raided several homes, including two belonging to clinic staff – an ambulance driver and a cook. Members of their families were tied up.

After that, Afghan forces, including Afghan women soldiers, entered the clinic itself where they beat staff, accusing them of “treating Taleban.” They searched the various buildings on the compound, including the specially built quarters of the midwife and her husband. When they entered the men’s ward, they dragged out two of the patients – one, staff said, who was under 18 – and a boy who was looking after them. They took them to a nearby shop. Twenty minutes later, staff said, they heard gunshots. The three had been killed. (1)

Staff also reported that when the special forces had finished searching the clinic, they forcibly took the doctor from the clinic to use as a shield when they searched nearby buildings.

As the military operation came to an end, the various forces on the ground gathered together and a helicopter landed and picked them up. Both the Swedish Committee and UNAMA reported witnesses saying the foreign forces were involved in the wider operation, but did not enter the clinic. These witnesses included two medical staff who said English was spoken and that some of the soldiers had been wearing ‘foreign’ uniforms. The US military is the only international force with a combat operation in Afghanistan. It seems most likely the foreign soldiers were American Special Operations Forces, who have previously been known to conduct operations in the area. However, this has not been confirmed.

The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan has reported a drop in the numbers of patients coming to the clinic since the raid. People “dare not seek medical care,” said Country Director Jorgen Holmstrom.

NATO told AAN the Afghan government was conducting an investigation (although the deputy presidential spokesman could not confirm this). NATO also said it was conducting a “preliminary inquiry.” It is not clear why NATO, which has a non-combat mission, Resolute Support, would be answering for or indeed investigating what would appear to have been an operation involving the US military in its ‘can be combat’ Freedom Sentinel Mission, but such fudging of the two missions has been apparent from January 2015 when they were launched (see AAN analysis here).

Government reactions

Afghan government reactions to the news of the Wardak killings came largely at the provincial level, from officials who saw no problem in those they believed were Taleban – wounded or otherwise – being taken from a clinic and summarily executed. Head of the provincial council, Akhtar Muhammad Tahiri, was widely quoted (for example here), saying: “The Afghan security forces raided the hospital as the members of the Taliban group were being treated there.” Spokesperson for the provincial governor, Toryalay Hemat, said, “They were not patients, but Taliban,” and “The main target of the special forces was the Taliban fighters, not the hospital.” Spokesman for Wardak’s police chief, Abdul Wali Noorzai, said “Those killed in the hospital were all terrorists,” adding he was “happy that they were killed.”

Yet, the killings were a clear war crime. The Laws of Armed Conflict, also known as International Humanitarian Law, give special protection to medical facilities, staff and patients during war time – indeed, this is the oldest part of the Geneva Conventions. The Afghan special forces’ actions in Wardak involved numerous breaches: forcibly entering a medical clinic, harming and detaining staff and killing patients. (2) The two boys and the man who were summarily executed were, in any case, protected either as civilians (the caretaker clearly, the two patients possibly – they had claimed to have been injured in a motorbike accident) or as fighters who were hors d’combat (literally ‘out of the fight’) because they were wounded and also then detained. (3) Anyone who is hors d’combat is a protected person under International Humanitarian Law and cannot be harmed, the rationale being that they can no longer defend themselves. It is worth noting that, for the staff at the clinic to have refused to treat wounded Taleban would also have been a breach of medical neutrality: International Humanitarian Law demands that medical staff treat everyone according to medical need only. (4)

That the Wardak provincial officials endorsed a war crime is worrying enough, but their words echoed reactions from more senior government officials to the US military’s airstrikes on a hospital belonging to the NGO Médecins Sans Frontières on 3 October 2015. Then, ministers and other officials appeared to defend the attack by saying it had targeted Taleban whom they said were in the hospital (conveniently forgetting that, until the fall of Kunduz city became imminent when the government evacuated all of its wounded from the hospital except the critically ill, the hospital had largely treated government soldiers). The Ministry of Interior spokesman, for example, said, “10 to 15 terrorists were hiding in the hospital last night and it came under attack. Well, they are all killed. All of the terrorists were killed. But we also lost doctors. We will do everything we can to ensure doctors are safe and they can do their jobs.” (5)

MSF denied there were any armed men in the hospital. However, even if there had been, International Humanitarian Law would still have protected patients and medical staff: they would still have had to have been evacuated and warnings given before the hospital could have been legally attacked (for more on this, see AAN analysis here).

Earlier this month there was another government raid on an NGO medical clinic, this time by the NDS in Baghlan province on 6 March. Members of the NDS questioned staff as to why they were operating in ‘Taleban territory’ and confiscated several items of medical equipment and material. The NGO, which has permission from the Ministry of Public Health to operate the clinic, spoke to ministry officials and others and succeeded in getting an assurance from the NDS that they would be allowed to continue operating. As of now, however, the confiscated medical equipment has still not been returned.

What the health providers say

AAN has spoken to a number of heads of agencies who provide health care in contested areas to try to gauge how the situation on the ground was (they spoke on condition of anonymity). All said it was worsening. “General abuses against medical staff and facilities are on the rise from all parties to the conflict,” said one head of agency, while another said, “We have a good reputation with all sides, but we have still had threats from police, army and insurgents.” The head of a medical NGO described the situation as “messy, really difficult”:

All health facilities are under pressure. We have had some unpleasant experiences, The ALP [Afghan Local Police] are not professional, not disciplined. If the ALP or Taleban take over a clinic, we rely on local elders [to try to sort out the situation]. We are between the two parties.

He described the behaviour of overstretched Afghan special forces as “quite desperate,” adding, “They are struggling, trying to be everywhere and get very excited when there’s fighting.” Most of them, he said, were northerners speaking little or no Pashto, which can make things “difficult for our clinics in the south.”

The head of another agency listed the problems his staff are facing:

We have seen the presence of armed men in medical facilities, turning them into targets. We have seen violations by the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces], damage done to health facilities that were taken over as bases to conceal themselves and fight [the insurgents] from. We have seen checkpoints located close to health centres. Why? So that in case of hostilities, forces can take shelter in the concrete building. We have seen looting. We have seen ANSF at checkpoints deliberately causing delays, especially in the south, including blocking patients desperately needing to get to a health facility. We can never be certain that [such a delay] was the cause of death, but we believe it has been.

He said his medical staff had been threatened by “ANSF intervening in medical facilities at the triage stage, forcing doctors to stop the care of other patients and treat their own soldiers, in disregard of medical priorities.” Less commonly, but more dangerously for the doctors themselves, he said, was the threat of Taleban abduction. He described a gathering of surgeons in which all reported having been abducted from their homes at least once and brought to the field to attend wounded fighters “with all the dangers you can imagine along the road.” He said the surgeons were “forced to operate without proper equipment and forced to abandon their own patients in clinics because the abduction would last days.”

Locally, medical staff often try to mitigate threats from both government forces and insurgents by seeking protection first from the local community. One head of agency described their strategy:

When we open a clinic, our first interlocutors are the elders. Everyone wants a clinic in their area, but we decide the location and make the elders responsible for the clinic… They have to give us a building – three to four rooms. All those who work in the clinic – the ambulance driver, the owner of the vehicle, everyone – come from the area. We also need the elders to deal with the parties… If the ALP or Taleban take over clinic, we always start with the elders [who negotiate with whoever has taken over the clinic].

However, this tactic puts a burden on community elders who may not be able to negotiate if the ANSF, ALP or insurgents are also threatening them.

Dealing with the government…

In terms of threats from the ANSF, agencies also lobby in Kabul to try to ensure forces in the field respect their medical neutrality. Results are mixed. One field coordinator said everyone at the higher levels talks nicely about International Humanitarian Law, but the “fine words” do not translate into respect for medical facilities by the ANSF in the field. Another reported improvements in getting the wounded through checkposts – where there had previously been long delays – after the Ministry of Interior issued a letter to police and ALP to respect the wounded and not block or delay medical transports. The head of a health NGO, however, said the ANSF were still blocking the movement of patients and medical supplies and detaining medical staff at checkposts. Another country director said, “Lots of support from provincial police commanders has led to a decrease in incidents” in one province they worked in, while in another, the problems continued.

Getting clear top level support for medical staff working in areas of conflict should not be too difficult, given that three of the four ministries and agencies are led, or have been led until recently, by former humanitarians. Massum Stanakzai, acting minister of defence, used to run one of the largest Afghan NGOs, AREA; it was the first agency to start mapping civilian casualties, in early 2002. National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar was with Norwegian Church Aid and the International Rescue Committee. Both men were also members of the steering committee of ACBAR, the body which brings together and represents NGOs working in Afghanistan. Former NDS chief, Rahmatullah Nabil (who stood down in December 2015) used to work with the UN’s refugee agency, the UNHCR. It is scarcely imaginable these men would not know about the ANSF’s legal duty to protect medical facilities and respect medical neutrality.

Yet, there was a general feeling among the health providers AAN spoke to that some members of the government and ANSF do actually believe wounded Taleban in clinics are lawful targets and that clinics and doctors should not be treating them – and if they are, these are good places to find Taleban. One provider said government officials had discussed with them the possibility of “locating two people in emergency places and triage areas to check and control the identities of patients and arrest armed opposition.” The consequences of such a move would, he said, be to “deter patients from coming for treatment or [encourage them] to leave at the ‘stabilisation stage’ [rather than wait for a medical discharge].” He also said it would increase the likelihood of surgeons being abducted to treat wounded fighters.

Having soldiers or police posted inside clinics – like putting checkposts near them – would inevitably taint the perception of a medical provider’s neutrality; it is this neutrality that forms the basic protection for health workers, allowing them to work in the most contested areas because they are known to accept wounded members of any armed force or group. Members of the general population might also be deterred from seeking treatment if they fear being mistaken for a Taleb or being detained in order to put pressure on a relative who is identified with the Taleban. A drop in general patient numbers, for example, was seen in the aftermath of the Wardak killings.

… and international forces

All of those who spoke to AAN said they had also been deeply alarmed by the US airforce’s bombing of the MSF hospital in Kunduz in October 2015, which killed 42 and injured 43 people at the hospital – staff, patients and caretakers. The US has claimed the attack was a mistake, but health providers said they found the US explanation – a long series of human and technical errors – “unbelievable.” They wondered if a ‘real’ explanation of the attack would ever be forthcoming. The US has still not released a promised redacted version of its internal investigation which was completed in November 2015. Both MSF and UNAMA continue to call for an independent, transparent investigation. AAN has also questioned  the US explanation and pointed out that, even though the US denied the air strike on the hospital was intentional, its account still points to breaches of International Humanitarian Law.

The health providers found two aspects of US strike on the hospital particularly alarming. Firstly, the US had targeted the hospital despite having its GPS coordinates. Secondly, the point of contact the military had given MSF proved useless in stopping the air strikes when they were underway. Not surprisingly, they feared more bombings of medical facilities. Some were now working harder to try to find the right contact within the US military, but reported difficulties. They explained that what used to be a fairly transparent system – under ISAF and the US military’s counter-terrorism Enduring Freedom mission – now feels opaque and obstructive.

The statistics

The experiences of health providers – clinics overrun and used as military bases, clinics raided, ambulances delayed, doctors abducted and staff threatened – are backed up by the gathered data. UNAMA tracked an increase in attacks and other “conflict-related incidents” deliberately targeting medical facilities and staff in 2015 – from both pro-government and opposition forces. There was an increase in searches, threats and intimidations against health workers by pro-government forces in 2015 compared to 2014. Those searches included ones by Afghan special forces supported by international military forces on clinics in Helmand and Logar provinces.

Incidents in 2015 perpetrated by what UNAMA calls ‘anti-government elements’ saw a 47 per cent increase compared to 2014, 31 incidents compared to 14. Helping push the numbers up on the ‘anti-government’ side were the actions of Daesh, which has pursued a campaign against clinics and medical workers in areas under its control in Nangarhar (over the past 10 months, these have included parts of Kot, Achin, Nazian, Deh Bala and Bati Kot districts). The number of incidents in Nangarhar, most of them perpetrated by Daesh, represented nearly one third of all attacks and threats against health and health-related personnel in 2015 by all parties to the conflict. In November of that year, Daesh ordered the closing of public health clinics and schools and, according to David Mansfield, told healthcare professionals and teachers that, although they could work privately, they would be punished if they accepted a government salary. UNAMA reported 11 clinics having to close after threats and intimidation of staff, looting of medical equipment (seven incidents) and the extortion of a month’s salary (three incidents).

As Mansfield put it, Daesh has breached the normal Afghan ‘rules of war’:

… Daesh are understood [by Nangarharis] to have broken local mores with their brutality and their failure to recognise the needs of the local population, including with the closure of schools and clinics, and their prohibition of the production and trade of opium and marijuana.

In response to Daesh, the Taleban in Nangarhar have reacted with a pragmatic attempt to distance themselves from the new group, trying to portray themselves as ‘community minded’ by supporting clinics, schools, NGOs and opium production, building roads and even, says Mansfield (AAN has reporting of this in Khogiani district following the recapture of areas by the Taleban from Daesh), easing off their usual threats against families with members in the ANSF. Generally, although the Taleban have targeted other government workers, especially those in the justice sector and sometimes also the education sector, clinics and medical staff have been exempted from their range of targets.

The long view 

Afghans have seen a great deal of brutality since 1978, but generally the parties to the various phases of the conflict have respected health professionals and recognised that targeting them is self-defeating – because their fighters or soldiers or the civilians they claim to represent also need treatment. The deliberate, systematic targeting of health professionals and facilities has only really been seen by Soviet and PDPA government forces in the 1980s. They targeted those giving health-care in mujahedin-controlled areas, in the belief that anyone treating ‘the enemy’ was also the enemy. At the time, the ICRC was forbidden from treating victims of the conflict in Afghanistan and had to establish surgical hospitals in Peshawar and Quetta with facilities at the border that they transported patients from. As the United Nations Mapping Report, which brings together all published war crimes reporting on the Afghan conflict before 2002, said, “Many victims, of course, never reached those border posts [and] died or were permanently disabled due to the lack of swift, on-the-spot treatment.” Afghan doctors and foreign NGOs did establish clinics in rural areas held by the mujahedin, but state and Soviet forces sought to arrest doctors and destroy health facilities: the UN Mapping Report describes the destruction of eleven clinics and hospitals in a series of largely air attacks in 1980, 1981 and 1982. (6)

Speaking to those who worked in the humanitarian sector in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s, all said that, apart from the Soviet occupation, incidents against health workers and facilities had been surprisingly rare. A former director of the Swedish Committee, Anders Fange, who worked in Afghanistan from the 1980s to the 2000s, remembers staff at clinics which his NGO supported being killed and detained by government and Soviet forces. “We had no such problems with the mujahedin,” he said. In the 1990s during the civil war and what he called “the Commanders’ Rule,” he said clinics were largely undisturbed. He remembered a few occasions when Hezb-e Islami tried to take over clinics – mainly in Wardak and Ghazni provinces – and a few hijackings by rogue commanders of cars carrying medicine and equipment for clinics. Given that this was a particularly brutal period with fragmented commands and territories, the list of incidents is remarkably short.

During the late 1990s and before 2001, Fange said there were some problems in Northern Alliance areas with corruption and theft – mostly sorted out, he said, after appeals to Ahmad Shah Massud. “We never had problems with the Taleban – over girl schools sometimes, but not clinics. They even allowed female doctors, providing ‘Islamic principles’ were followed.”

There were always events outside the norm. The Taleban air-force, (7) for example, bombed the hospital in Yakowlang, Bamyan province, on 6 June 2001, the start of their ‘scorched earth’ campaign against Hezb-e Wahdat and civilians who were assumed to support them because of a shared ethnic or sectarian identity (Hazaras and Shia Sayeds). There was also Hezb-e Wahdat’s takeover of ICRC buildings in Mazar-e Sharif to fire at Jombesh positions in adjacent buildings; this was during intra-factional fighting in Mazar in 1998 (involving Wahdat, Jombesh and Jamiat-e Islami). (8) However, such incidents have been relatively rare. (9)

How bad is it today?

Afghanistan is not at the point where health facilities are being systematically and deliberately targeted. This is not Syria or Yemen where hospitals have been bombed and medical neutrality trampled – what MSF has called fighting wars as in “barbarian times.” (It has reported 14 attacks on medical facilities in Syria since the start of 2016 and 94 airstrikes and shelling on facilities it backs in 2015; in Yemen, in the past five months, MSF has had two hospitals, a mobile clinic and an ambulance attacked.)

Yet, for those on the ground in Afghanistan, the situation is already alarming enough. Moreover, as Swedish Committee Country Director Jorgen Holmstrom explained, finding an effective, appropriate response to an atrocity like the killing of the patients and carer in Wardak is difficult, throwing up ethical dilemmas for a health provider:

We are different from other sectors. [The Swedish Committee] is the sole provider of health services in many districts and, with this, we give the right to life. There are other rights, like the right to education, but if we have threats to our schools, we can negotiate and live with lengthy waits [keeping schools closed until the threat is sorted out]. However, we can’t threaten to shut down our clinics.

Because of what they do, health workers feel they have little to no leverage over those with weapons; they are reliant on the ANSF, international military and insurgents to let them get on with their work and respect their humanitarian neutrality. They would like clear statements from the government that medical staff and clinics are protected and clear orders to ANSF field commanders to do this. They would like an end to the taking over of clinics by both government forces and the Taleban. They would also like to see accountability for those violating International Humanitarian Law. At the moment, said one provider, “We see that [violations] are not seriously addressed and are recurring too frequently for the satisfaction of anyone providing or seeking medical attention in this country.”

 

(1) A fourth person was killed in an air strike that night, hence the confusion over numbers in some of the news reports (some had reported four people summarily executed).

(2) The ICRC’s  database of customary international humanitarian law is “a set of unwritten rules derived from a general, or common, practice which is acknowledged as law.” All of the rules below apply in international and (as the war in Afghanistan is classified) non-international conflicts. The original legal sourcing can be found on the website. The rules applicable to medical personnel and facilities include:

Medical personnel (Rule 25), medical units (Rule 28) and medical transports (Rule 29) “exclusively assigned to medical duties must be respected and protected in all circumstances. They lose their protection if they commit, outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy.”

ICRC also gives these rules for the protection of the “wounded, sick and shipwrecked”:

“Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an engagement, each party to the conflict must, without delay, take all possible measures to search for, collect and evacuate the wounded, sick and shipwrecked without adverse distinction.” (Rule 109). The wounded, sick and shipwrecked must “receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention required by their condition” and with “no distinction… made among them founded on any grounds other than medical ones” (Rule 110). Each party to the conflict must also take “all possible measures to them against ill-treatment and against pillage of their personal property.”

(3) Rule 47 of the ICRC database of customary international humanitarian law says:

Attacking persons who are recognized as hors de combat is prohibited. A person hors de combat is:

(a) anyone who is in the power of an adverse party;

(b) anyone who is defenceless because of unconsciousness, shipwreck, wounds or sickness; or

(c) anyone who clearly expresses an intention to surrender;

provided he or she abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape.

(4) Rule 110 from the ICRC Customary Law data base says: “No distinction may be made” when treating the wounded “on any grounds other than medical ones.” Rule 26  also says that “Punishing a person for performing medical duties compatible with medical ethics or compelling a person engaged in medical activities to perform acts contrary to medical ethics is prohibited.”

(5) Far from condemning the attack, several senior officials explained the strike in ways that sounded like justifications. Acting Defence Minister Massum Stanakzai, for example, told Pajhwok there had been “armed Taleban” in the hospital, “who used it and civilians as a shield so that they could attack the civilians and security forces.” He told the Associated Press:

“That was a place they wanted to use as a safe place because everybody knows that our security forces and international security forces were very careful not to do anything with a hospital,” …adding that a Taliban flag had been mounted on one of the hospital’s walls.… Stanekzai insisted that “the compound was being used by people who were fighting there, whether it was Taliban or ISI or whoever they were,” referring to Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency, long accused by Kabul of supporting the Taliban. “If the fighting was not coming from there, that kind of a mistake will never happen.”

National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar sidestepped a question as to whether the strike on the MSF hospital had been intentional or a mistake. Instead, he placed blame for the attack on Taleban whom he claimed were in the hospital. He also, somewhat bizarrely given that MSF had given their coordinates to the US military and the hospital was a well-established landmark in Kunduz, said the hospital was not well-known (AAN translation –the minister’s comments on MSF come at about 7 minutes in:

It’s not fair to say that they have intentionally bombed civilians or a hospital or a school. Both they and our soldiers are united in our complete commitment to humanitarian law. According to humanitarian law, it’s a war crime. Definitely, it was not intentional. If anyone was intentionally involved in this, it was the terrorists who used the hospital as a base [to fight from] or as a human shield. Unfortunately, at that time there was not complete awareness that it was a hospital.

(6) The UN Mapping Report lists the following attacks by Afghan government or Soviet forces:

– September 1980, an MSF hospital in the “particularly deprived region” of Yakowlang, Bamyan, was looted and destroyed by Soviet troops in September 1980. MSF reported: “There is not a single usable capsule or pill. All that remain, scattered all over the floor, are the medical records, with a file on each patient”;

– Autumn 1980, a small hospital in Laleng west of Kabul was attacked;

– Early 1980, three small hospitals operated by Médecins du Monde were bombed

– 5 November 1981, MiG-27s and armored helicopters bombed the hospital of Aide Médicale Internationale in the Panjshir valley, razing the stone building to the ground;

– 5 November 1981, MI-24 helicopters razed the hospital of MSF in Jaghori, Ghazni;

– November 6 1981, three helicopters destroyed a dispensary of Aide Médicale Internationale in Nangarhar province;

– November 1981, the MSF dispensary in Waras in Hazarajat was attacked;

– 14 March 14, 1982, a new hospital established by MSF in Jaghori, Ghazni was bombed.

One of the doctors working in the Panjshir, Dr Laurence Laumonier of Aide Médicale Internationale, told Human Rights Watch (quoted in the UN Mapping Report): 

“After the first time they bombed our hospital in Panjshir,” “I went to see (Panjshir Valley resistance Commander Ahmad Shah) Massoud. I told him we were going to make another hospital and put a red cross on the roof, so they would be sure to know it was a hospital. He told me I was crazy, it would just make it easier for the Russians to bomb it. But I did it anyway, and then the helicopters came and bombed it.”

(7) After the fall of Kabul to the Taleban in 1996 and up till the fall of the Taleban in 2001, both Ahmad Shah Massud and the Taleban had remnants of the old PDPA air force.

(8) Both incidents are described in “Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001 Documentation and analysis of major patterns of abuse in the war in Afghanistan 2005” by the Afghanistan Justice Project. The ICRC incident is on page 108, the Yakowlang bombing on page 150.

(9) The words of one of the health providers AAN spoke to whose agency is working in the east today spoke about possibly changing mores. He said his agency had been working in Afghanistan for 30 years and, during that time, NGOs had become “part of the landscape.” Afghans, generally “know NGOs very well,” he said, but his agency was now “facing a new generation of those claiming to be commanders who don’t know about humanitarian principles.” He was particularly worried about the Tahrik-e Taleban-e Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taleban who were driven over the border after the Pakistani operation in North Waziristan in the summer 2014. “These guys are not so likely to speak to us,” he said. “Every time, there’s an abduction of one of our staff, we hope it’s not the TTP.”

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The US Marine Corps (USMC) has conducted a test flight of its second CH-53K helicopter, as part of its CH-53K King Stallion heavy lift helicopter programme.

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The sixth edition of the Personnel Recovery Controller and Planner Course (PRCPC), a project initiated and supported by the European Defence Agency (EDA), was organised and hosted for the third time by Sweden in Karlsborg from 29 February to 11 March 2016. 

Instructors from Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden shared their knowledge and experience of Personnel Recovery (PR) matters with a group of students coming from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. The main focus of the course was to train staff officers in supporting their commanders in PR related issues. The course is designed for personnel who man personnel recovery positions in tactical operation centres (TOCs), personnel recovery coordination cells (PRCCs) or joint personnel recovery cells (JPRCs). Overall, it is acknowledged that PR capabilities in Europe benefitted through the increased number of trained personnel available to support our future operations and missions.

Personnel Recovery

Personnel Recovery is usually defined as the sum of efforts needed to recover isolated civilian or military personnel. Certainly, PR is a vital element of modern operational planning as it provides a security net for deployed personnel. Most importantly, it boosts morale and acknowledges national as well as European Union responsibilities to effect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel deployed in the context of Crisis Management Operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Next Course

The next EU PRCPC will take place at the European Personnel Recovery Centre (EPRC) at Poggio Renatico Air Base (Italy) from 4 to 15 April 2016.

Background

The EDA PRCPC project was established on 30 May 2013 as an EDA Category B project under the lead of Sweden. As of today, it includes six contributing EU Member States (cMS): Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden. On 31 May 2015, the cMS agreed to extend the PRCPC Cat B project until 30 May 2017. The EPRC is a potential candidate for the continuation of the project.

 

More information:

• News 5th edition of Personnel Recovery Controller and Planner Course (PRCPC) (15 Dec 2015)

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Around 80 experts participated in the EDA Hybrid Threats Table Top Exercise (TTX) which took place at EDA premises in Brussels over three days. The event gathered participants from Member States, representatives from the European Commission (DG Grow, DG Energy, DG Move, DG Home, DG Echo), the European External Action Service (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, EU Military Committee,  EU Military Staff), CERT, ENISA, and Europol, as well as observers from NATO.

The objective of the TTX was to identify and analyse implications of hybrid threats for European military capability development. Is anything new required from the military? Which priority actions are affected in the hybrid context? These questions were tackled through discussions and exchanges placed in the context of a generic scenario and planning situations developed specifically for this exercise.

The exercise was concluded today with a VIP visitors’ day where main take-aways from the working sessions were presented. As part of this concluding session, Dr Javier Solana delivered a special address highlighting the necessity for EU Member States to act collectively in this newly emerging security environment, making use of the toolbox we have available on an intergovernmental level.

Final findings and recommendations derived from the TTX will be delivered at the Ministerial Steering Board in April. A second TTX is planned in June, will take a more detailed look into the different capability areas where shortfalls and vulnerabilities have been indicated.

More information:

• News "Countering Hybrid Threats: “Capabilities need to be used in a more coherent and comprehensive manner” (Jorge Domecq)" (4 Mar 2016)
  
  

Presentation by Shingo Yamagami, Director General, Japan Institute of International Affairs
Presentation by Vineta Mekone, NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Mikk Marran, Director General of Estonia's spy agency Teabeamet, the equivalent of Britain's MI6, warns in the organisation's first ever Annual Report, released on 9 March, of new risks of attacks in the region and conflict with Russia. The greatest dang

In Helmand in the second half of 2015, the ‘dominos’ started to fall, with successive areas of the province coming under Taleban control. During the United States surge, a line of ‘chiefdoms’ was created, where Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Local Police (ALP) and militia commanders managed to consolidate control of local areas. In 2015, these came under pressure and were overrun by the Taleban one by one. Ghost soldiers in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and some disastrous redeployments of key ANP and ALP commanders have weakened government defences while, at the same time, the Taleban have introduced a new military formation, well-equipped and mobile commando-like ‘qet’a’ units. AAN guest author, Rahmatullah Amiri* examines why so much of Helmand has fallen to the Taleban in the last year.

AAN’s first dispatch on Helmand looked at the background to the current crisis, focussing on provincial power dynamics on the government side, the rise of the ALP and militias in key districts and the British deployment, US surge (when 11,000 US troops were sent to Helmand to crush the insurgency – half of all the extra troops) and withdrawal.

The Taleban counter-attack

The Taleban’s post-surge return started in Helmand’s northern areas: in Kajaki, the Qala-ye Gaz area of Gereshk (where the Taleban had had a stronghold for years due to support from the local Ishaqzai tribe), the Malmand area of Sangin (which the Taleban never lost control of, even during the surge), and some areas of northern Musa Qala.

From the north, they targeted Musa Qala’s district centre, which they considered the main threat to them and an important prize to be won. Their first success came in April 2012 when a group of suicide bombers attacked the formidable district police chief, Kumandan Koka, inside the main police station, injuring him seriously and forcing him to leave his post. At the time, local communities did not see any immediate impact on security. In particular, the presence of foreign troops and their role in planning and executing attacks on the Taleban masked the impact of Koka’s absence. His brother, Haji Dost Muhammad, took over his position as police chief. In 2013 and 2014, the Taleban were able to make gains in some areas of the district, but the ANA and ANP’s strong presence across northern Helmand still kept them in check.

It was in mid-2014 that the Taleban carried out their first major attacks against key bases in Musa Qala district. They were unable to capture any. They used up the ammunition for the larger weapons they had captured during those attacks and were running low on supplies and this forced them to change their approach; they started to concentrate on smaller government outposts. They also set their eyes on Nowzad, located to the west of Musa Qala, as it appeared to be an easier target, with the ANP and ANA less strongly entrenched there. The Taleban captured a few key check posts in the Muzrabad area connecting Musa Qala with Sangin district. The Taleban were able to move freely in most of the areas of Musa Qala and could easily advance into other parts of Sangin. In late 2014/early 2015, the Taleban, approaching from Zamindawar in northern Kajaki, crossed the Helmand River and captured the small sliver of southern Kajaki district that was still under the control of the government – with the exception of the district centre. The Taleban used this area south of the Helmand River to connect its fighters with other areas they already held in Musa Qala and Sangin. This led to their first consolidation of territorial control in that part of the province. Now in the north, only Nowzad was still under government control, but small-scale attacks continued in April and May 2015 across the district.

In summer 2015, the Taleban managed for the first time to come dangerously close to taking the district centre of Sangin, which lies to the south of Musa Qala and Kajaki in the north-east of Helmand province. However, their first major victory came on 28 July 2015 when Nowzad’s administrative centre fell to them. In this attack, the Taleban captured an enormous amount of weapons, ammunition cache and vehicles. Word of mouth spread across many areas of northern Helmand about this victory, and within days, the Taleban were gathering in the desert to prepare for a major offensive against Musa Qala centre.

First, in mid-June 2015, the Taleban attacked one of the key bases of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in the district, which is located only one mile away from the district centre. During this attack, the Taleban managed to kill 19 soldiers. This attack, along with the capture of the Nowzad weapons cache, drained ANSF morale, especially the ANA’s.

On the night of 18 June 2015, the Taleban attacked Musa Qala district centre. Most of the troops involved in its defence were ANP. According to a policeman who survived, an ANA commander had suggested a tactical retreat to police chief Dost Muhammad when the Taleban closed in on the main bazaar. He rejected this and accused the ANA commander of not wanting to fight the Taleban. During the attack, the police chief and his deputy Khaksar were shot and injured and had to retreat to Lashkargah. Troops however remained in the ANA main base, known as ‘Roshan Tower’ (it has since been given up, on 21 February 2016, as part of what was called a tactical retreat). The rest of the ANP then retreated so quickly that some policemen were left behind and were either captured or killed by Taleban.

Lack of coordination on the government side and a failure to recognise the significance of previous minor Taleban successes or prepare for a larger onslaught had contributed to the Taleban being able to capture Musa Qala district centre. (See AAN’s then first analysis of this event here.) Haji Dost Muhammad and Khaksar were removed from their positions by Kabul due to their retreat. Their homes were searched after an accusation that they had collaborated with the Taleban and enabled the fall of the district. The Taleban’s capture of Musa Qala also meant they captured more weapons, equipment and ammunition. They thereby replenished their resources.

An attempt by ANA and ALP to recapture the district centre within a week of its fall was unsuccessful and they had to retreat into the main ANA base, which is separated from the district centre by the bed of the Musa Qala River. The riverbed was slowly filling with water after heavy rains in the mountains, which meant another attempt to recapture the district centre became far trickier. The danger was that, if the Taleban counter-attacked, the only way back would be through the now dangerous river. The ANSF advanced from their base, but in order to avoid being trapped on the district centre side of the river left the bazaar area even before the Taleban could try to repel them. Afghan special forces, who arrived a few days after the initial attempt by the ANA and ALP to retake the district centre, had to face an intense two-day fight with the Taleban forces. After the arrival of reinforcements for the Taleban, they were able to force the Afghan special forces out of the bazaar area of Musa Qala.

The patchwork of small chiefdoms controlled by ALP and militia commanders who might each only control a small pockets of population in a manteqa (a small area within a district), where they had recruited and lead local fighters against the Taleban during the surge were coming under threat. The chiefdoms were like dots along a line, from Musa Qala in the north to Gereshk on the ring road and onwards to Marja, forming a more or less continuous corridor of territory that was mostly under pro-government forces’ control. However, in the second half of 2015, these small chiefdoms were overrun one by one.

There were weaknesses on the government side; estimates that 40 per cent or more of the official number of soldiers and police only existed on paper have been made (see here  and here). ‘Ghost soldiers’ were no defence against the Taleban. One US general described the 215 Maiwand Corp as displaying “a combination of incompetence, corruption and ineffectiveness.”

The weakness – and in many places, effective absence – of the ANA was not the only problem. After the surge and particularly after the security transition and withdrawal of foreign forces, the Taleban enjoyed greater freedom to rebuild and expand their networks. Without the threat of air attack, they could now mass in ways that had been perilous before. The insurgents became increasingly able to carry out quick, decisive strikes in strategic areas, intimidating the ALP and small militia commanders who often saw their fighters fleeing their check posts when the Taleban advanced. However, another new strategy introduced by the Taleban in mid-2015, a way of organising their fighting men, also seems to have made a crucial difference on the battlefield.

From mahaz to qet’a: the Taleban’s new strategy

Right after Akhtar Muhammad Mansur took over as the de facto leader of the Taleban following Mullah Muhammad Omar’s secret death in April 2013, he started looking at ways to restructure the Taleban’s military organisation. Up until then, the movement’s forces had mainly been based on the mahaz (front) system. Each mahaz was locally mobilised by a commander and was part of a multi-level hierarchy of district and provincial commanders, ultimately falling under the movement’s military commission. A mahaz in Musa Qala could have about five commanders, with 10 to 30 fighters each. So, a mahaz could have anywhere between 200 and 1000 men in one area. Not all of these would go to the frontline to fight at the same time. For any major Taleban offensive, each mahaz would be asked to contribute men. After the operation, the fighters would go home to their own areas. This approach was often not very effective and was rather expensive to equip and maintain. It meant that there were more men equipped to fight than were participating in the fighting at any one time. It has some advantages in the long run, for example being able to get fresh fighters in rotation. Overall, however, it is costly and inefficient.

The fronts have now been supplemented with a new, more permanent, military-like structure – the qet’a (unit in Dari, Pashto and originally in Arabic). The mahaz system was not entirely dismantled, but it has become less influential as qet’as were assigned to critical districts and areas in addition to the mahaz fighters already present. The long-term plan appears to be to roll the qet’a system out across the entire country. However, right now, only provinces with contested districts seem to have qet’as already in place.

The qet’a system is based on groups of up to 220 fighters with sub-groups of 20 men who operate together. Unlike the mahaz fighters, those in the qet’a are more mobile, often better trained and equipped, and are shifted around within a province or even between provinces to wherever they are most needed. The training is organised on a rotating basis, with 20 fighters at a time receiving a few weeks’ instruction on military strategy and the use of arms, so that when the Taleban capture ANSF weapons or equipment, they are familiar with their use.  The training camps are reportedly mostly around an area called Qala-ye Gaz, an Ishaqzai stronghold in Gereshk district. The current deputy shadow provincial governor, Muzamil, an Ishaqzai from the area is actively supervising operations and training.

Qet’as had been seen even before Nowzad was captured in June 2015 – six to seven qet’a came from other districts of Helmand fought alongside the local mahaz there. According to local sources in Musa Qala, it took the Taleban three days and 800 fighters to capture Nowzad. The Taleban were able to gather a lot of weapons and other equipment, which allowed them to continue fighting in other areas. Members of local ANP forces interviewed for this report mentioned that the Taleban now have ‘Darazkof’ guns – a type of Russian-made sniper rifle officially known as Dragunov, which, along with RPGs and other weapons, they had captured from the ANA. According to the source, the Taleban had not only captured these weapons, but also trained some of their fighters to use them well. With sniper rifles in their arsenals, the Taleban have been able to target ANA bases at long-range by taking out the guard posts on the towers. News of this new tactic by the well-trained qet’as spread quickly among the local population and the ANSF. Famous as ‘sra qet’a’ (Pashto for ‘red unit’), these special sniper groups have had a huge impact on the morale of the ANSF as they feel more vulnerable. Another sign that the qet’as are more organized are that some wear uniform-like outfits, as opposed to traditional local clothing.

Furthermore, in some areas, after the capturing ANA and ANP bases and check posts, the qet’a have been asking locals to dismantle these bases, for example in Marja, as seen here. This systematic dismantling (which the mahaz did not do) prevents the ANSF from being able to quickly re-establish themselves in an area after an initial defeat; the option of quickly re-taking a post is no longer available to them.

The qet’a played a major role in the capture of Musa Qala on 26 August 2015. The fighting brought in units not just from this district, but also from across the province and even from neighbouring Kandahar. Overall, a local source told AAN, at least 2000 fighters from Baghran, Marja, Nadali, Sangin and Gereshk and from outside the province participated in the fight. After they captured Musa Qala, and as the Taliban were advancing on Gereshk and Lashkargah, the stories of the powerful qet’as spread. While many of the tales were exaggerations, they were very effective in dampening the morale of the ANSF fighters.

Given their success in Helmand, the qet’as are now spreading and the Taleban is using them strategically in Kandahar, Zabul and Kunduz – or at least these are the provinces were their presence could be confirmed through interviews with the local population. The Mansur group is behind the qet’a system, thereby, also using this new strategy to prove themselves on the battlefield.

The introduction of the qet’a system in Helmand has not gone completely smoothly, though. The Ishaqzai tribe, that was the leading force in planning the capture of Nowzad in 29 July 2015, captured many items, including weapons, which were collected and brought to the local Taleban leadership. There, these items would be ‘sold’ by the fighters to the leadership. The money received in exchange would then be distributed among the fighters who had participated in the attack. The qet’a fighters from Musa Qala, who had come to support the local mahaz, felt they did not get their fair share. (In the Taleban’s Code of Conduct, or Layha, the section on distributing ‘booty’ is long and complex, suggesting how important and divisive this can be.)

The problems over booty may be a sign of an emerging rivalry between mahaz and qet’a groups. The switch to the new system has upset most of the mahaz leaders who feel bypassed because now almost all the power is concentrated within the new groups – from the qet’a commander down to its fighters. While the new system has proven effective for capturing territory, it marginalises and antagonises the traditional mahaz leaders. Switching to this more conventional military system also runs the risk of defeat by more conventional warfare tactics. The mahaz system was far less vulnerable to air strikes, for example, as only a few fighters from each mahaz would go to the front lines at any one time.

Without US close air support, the ANSF have been more vulnerable to the qet’as. However, air support available to the ANSF is growing again, both from Afghanistan’s own fledgling air force and from the US. This may make it more difficult for the Taleban qet’as to remain successful in the long run.

Counterstrategy: Organising local ‘uprisings’ – ALP commanders

As a reaction to so much of Helmand falling to the Taleban, members of parliament from the province devised a new plan to try to hold back the tide. The new plan looks very much like an old one: arm local communities so that they can become able to defend themselves and their homes. Only the name changes, from ALP to patsunian (uprising forces). With this, Helmand has followed in the footsteps of Ghazni and Kandahar where similar engagements with local communities in critical districts have taken place since 2012 (see AAN reports on Ghazni and Kandahar).

The initiative started in November 2015 in Nawa district in central Helmand. The majority of the local population there are from the Barakzai tribe and have traditionally backed the government. Hundreds of weapons were distributed to newly-hired civilian ‘community forces’, with around 400 men joining the new force. The aim was that they would protect their district, given the inability of the ANSF to do so. Abdul Wadud Popal, a member of parliament from Helmand, appeared to support the initiative, which might also have been, in effect, an attempt to protect Lashkargar.

The government soon expanded this new initiative into Musa Qala. There, the plan was to re-arm the former police commander Haji Dost Muhammad and his former deputy Khaksar who had lost their jobs after the fall of Musa Qala in June 2015. Despite the earlier mistrust of them, Musa Qala presented too much of a challenge to find other leaders, from within or outside the district, to take over the position. Haji Dost Muhammad and Khaksar remained the only key actors who were perceived as being able to operate in the area and effectively stand against the Taleban.

A blow by blow account of how areas and districts came to fall in late 2015 and early 2016

What follows is a detailed account of the ‘dominos’ falling to the Taleban largely since the summer of 2015, taking into account the new Taleban qet’a tactic and the formation of uprising groups. In some cases, we start telling the story a little earlier so that the narrative locally makes sense.

Closing in on Gereshk

Gereshk, the second most populous district in the province, had been relatively secure, but the Taleban had a lucky break there in spring 2015. At the time, they were still ramping up their campaign for control of Nowzad and Musa Qala to the north when, on 1 April, an IED hit the local Greseshk strongman, Commander Hekmatullah, as he drove to a check post. Hekmatullah had often been referred to as the ‘Razeq of Gereshk,’ an allusion to the powerful police chief of Kandahar province who, with ruthless means, had established some sense of security in the city and surrounding areas. Hekmatullah was known for frequently leaving his headquarters in order to go out to fight the Taleban along with his troops. This was also the case on the fateful day in April: he had been on his way to the Zanbuli area (more on this below) to avert a possible Taleban tunnel attack against a post. The ALP later discovered that preparation had indeed been made for such an attack.

Hekmatullah (or Hekmat as he was commonly known) was a Barakzai from the Malgir area of Gereshk and the son of one of the four original strongmen of Helmand, the former army chief turned MP, Ma’alim Mir Wali. Similar to Razeq in Kandahar, Hekmat was known to have complete authority over his men and knew Gereshk like the back of his hand.

In his five years as Gereshk police chief, Hekmat had been able to set up a well-established security cordon around Gereshk’s district centre. He was a graduate of the police academy,but this was not the key to his success, which lay partly in that he was allowed to make decisions with regards to security on his own; he had the political support of his father and had gained the trust of the Ministry of Interior.

According to local interviewees, Hekmat understood that effective leadership of troops is the most important factor in keeping the Taleban out. He preferred to work with local troops and sub-commanders and even ALP commanders, as he knew that they would be dedicated to the protection of the district and treat the local population well. Gereshk became one of the few districts in Helmand where the government actually controlled areas outside the district centre. This included densely populated areas such as the Deh Adam Khan and Malgir manteqas, in the irrigated ‘green zone’ along Helmand River. The ability to control the district was due to Hekmat having set up a network of sub-commanders on the manteqa level. Most notably, Hekmat could rely on Muhammad Wali in Malgir, some 15 kilometres to the southwest of the district centre, and Kamal Aka in Deh Adam Khan, only a few kilometres from Gereshk centre to the east. Kamal Aka had taken up arms against the Taleban after they first threatened him and later kidnapped his son. He kept security well, people said, and did not interfere in their business.

The Taleban tried to capture Malgir four times in 2015. This densely populated agricultural area is strategically important, not only for Gereshk, but for the entire province. It lies on the major southern access road to Gereshk district centre and is also connected to the Babaji area, which is part of Lashkargah district. It is also close to Nadali district. Full control over Gereshk district would give the Taleban access to Kandahar’s Maiwand district (opening up a continuous route between northern Helmand via Maiwand that would allow access to Pakistan. However, the immediate priority for the Taleban appears to have been to get into a position to threaten Lashkargah from the Babaji area.

Hekmat’s local man, Muhammad Wali, had been able to keep the Taleban out of the entire Malgir area. After Hekmat’s death, however, Gereshk’s new police chief, Ismail (by tribe, a Seryani, and from Malgir), switched Muhammad Wali from his post in Malgir to Gereshk district centre. Ismail is the cousin of Ma’alem Mir Wali: Hekmat had been Ma’alem Mir Wali’s son (see our first dispatch on Helmand for details of the strongmen), so Ismail had, in effect, ‘inherited’ the district police chief post when Hekmat was killed.

Muhammad Wali, who was known for his charismatic leadership, was reluctant to leave Malgir where he had been head of the police for almost five years. Local people reported Ma’alem Mir Wali deliberately removed him from Malgir to help his cousin, Ismail, the new district police commander, because he thought some of the ANP and ALP commanders might not listen to Ismail in the same way as they had listened to Hekmat because he was new to the position.

So, at a critical time, Malgir got a new police commander, a man by the name of Naser. Before being assigned to Malgir, Naser had been serving as commander of Spina Posta (Spina check post) on the ring road. He had been appointed to this lucrative position because Hekmat was his relative. After 2009, all the trucks that used to take workers and supplies to the international military Shorabak Base were taxed at this check post. Some say that Naser would make thousands of Afghanis (hundreds of dollars) everyday from illegally taxing the trucks.

The Taleban had failed to take Malgir repeatedly in 2015, but within one day of Naser’s arrival in Malgir, they attacked, and within two days, in mid-October 2015, the Taleban had captured all the posts in the Malgir area. Naser and his men fled to check posts along the main Boghra Wiala (irrigation canal). Even these, they subsequently lost.Today, about 99 per cent of Malgir is under Taleban control; the exceptions are the few check posts between Spin Masjad and Gereshk Bazaar (a distance of roughly 10 kilometres).

One reason for the swift fall was that the new commander, Naser, was not as close to his men as Muhammad Wali had been. Muhammad Wali had supported the checkposts under his command with anything they needed and there was efficient coordination in the defence of the area. The morale of the police was high. While Naser knew the terrain, he was not prepared on day one to lead his men as Muhammad Wali had done. Secondly, and more importantly, Naser came to the job just when the Taleban had probably become too strong for the government to deal with it because of the new qet’a system. It may be that even if Muhammad Wali had not been replaced, Malgir would have fallen.

The next area to come into the sights of the Taleban was Kamal Aka’s ‘chiefdom’ in Deh Adam Khan. Kamal, a local Barakzai, used to be the mirab (water manager, a well-respected job) of the Deh Adam wiala (irrigation canal). One of Kamal’s sons was a Taleban group commander, so many in the area had thought Kamal to be pro-Taleban, but apparently he had no direct connection with them. However, in 2012, for unknown reasons, his son came into a conflict with his fellow Taleban who beat him up. Kamal went after his son’s enemies, detained a couple of them and tied them to a tree, publicly shaming them. The Taleban moved to take revenge, attempted to detain Kamal and attacked his house, but his large family was able to defend the compound. From there on, Kamal launched a private campaign against the Taleban. The community approved of it, as it was a matter of personal honour, not a fight for political or ideological reasons.

During those events, Commander Hekmat (then still alive) repeatedly approached Kamal Aka with an offer to join the ALP. A similar offer came from the Taleban. But a reconciliation attempt with the Taleban failed, and when Kamal lost a brother in renewed fighting, he finally gave in to Hekmat. In 2013, Kamal was appointed head of ALP in the Deh Adam Khan area where he enjoyed the full support of the local communities who had asked him to secure the area.

Closing in on Lashkargah

In the third week of October 2015, right after the Taleban’s capture of large areas of Malgir, the area of Babaji, considered a suburb of Lashkargah city, was successfully attacked by the Taleban. The fall of Babaji was a direct consequence of the fall of Malgir as the two areas share a border – once Malgir had been taken, the Taleban were able to move on Babaji. As Kamal had proven himself a skilled commander, he was ordered by the provincial chief of police of Helmand to go to Babaji to help recapture the area from the Taleban. After initially blocking further Taleban advances and helping secure safe passage for dozens of ANSF under siege, Kamal made a tactical retreat from the area and returned to Deh Adam Khan in late November 2015; in the meantime, in his home area, the Taleban had received enforcements in the form of more qet’as. As of early March 2016, when this dispatch was posted, Babaji was heavily contested. ANSF has been making continuous attempts to retake the area, as the Taleban still appeared to be in control of significant parts of the area.

On 19 December 2015, Kamal Aka had still been able to repel a large Taleban attack on Deh Adam Khan, but his forces suffered many casualties. The situation deteriorated. Kamal Aka had to send his family to Gereshk centre and finally he also had to give in. Kamal Aka knew he would not get any support from Gereshk centre, as he had already experienced this during the first Taleban attack in October. Furthermore, he knew that the few good men he had left would not be able to stand against the Taleban and he was not able to sacrifice any more men – especially if there was no support from the government. Rather than being defeated in battle, he and his men chose to retreat and give up the area – after they were able to evacuate anyone who wanted to flee from the approaching Taleban. Deh Adam Khan fell to the Taleban on 15 January 2016. With Deh Adam Khan under Taleban control, the Afghan government lost an important rural area of Gereshk under the control of their forces. In order to prevent the Taleban to encroach further in the direction of Gereshk district centre from the Deh Adam Khan area, the ANSF established a chain of check posts. On 10 March 2016, the Taleban attacked this chain of check posts know as the Deh Adam Khan front and captured at least one of these key check posts. Some Taleban forces were able to advance to the outskirts of the Gereskh district centre. This has already caused hundreds of families to flee the area, fearing that the ANSF are not able to fight back the Taleban anymore.

The Taleban in Zanbuli

Zanbulai is an area that has never been completely under government or international military control and, since 2006, has seen some of the most intense fighting in Gereshk district. One of the main reasons for this is that it borders Mirmandaw, which is only separated from the Qala-ye Gaz area by the Helmand River and is one of the main insecure areas of Gereshk, never having fully come under government control. Similarly, Qala-ye Gaz , despite numerous operations by international forces in the area, has always remained a Taleban stronghold. The majority of residents of Qala-ye Gaz are Ishaqzai and well-connected with their fellow tribesmen across the district border in Sangin. Since the emergence of the qet’a system, Qala-ye Gaz has become the location of one of the Taleban training camps.

Zanbulai is an area that has never been completely under government or international military control and, since 2006, has seen some of the most intense fighting in Gereshk district. One of the main reasons for this is that it borders Mirmandaw, which is only separated from the Qala-ye Gaz area by the Helmand River and is one of the main insecure areas of Gereshk, never having fully come under government control. Similarly, Qala-ye Gaz , despite numerous operations by international forces in the area, has always remained a Taleban stronghold. The majority of residents of Qala-ye Gaz are Ishaqzai and well-connected with their fellow tribesmen across the district border in Sangin. Since the emergence of the qet’a system, Qala-ye Gaz has become the location of one of the Taleban training camps.

Two villages in Zanbulai, which had ALP units, established with the help of foreign forces, did continue to fight alongside the ANSF in the area. Two commanders, Khalifa and Baqi Mama, were in charge of these villages. The Taleban began their offensive against the two villages on 17 December 2015. During this attack, the Taleban did not only target the ALP fighters, but reportedly deliberately aimed munitions at the local population – inflicting significant civilian causalities. According to local interviewees, the Taleban killed many children, women and elderly men as well as the ALP fighters. Local interviewees believed the Taleban wanted to ‘teach the community a lesson’ to show other communities what happens when they collectively join the ALP. Right before and during the attack, some families fled the Makatab area of Gereshk city, where they are still staying.

Commander Khalifa was killed during the initial attack, but Baqi Mama managed to hide when Taleban captured the villages on 18 December 2015. The following day, according to local interviewees, foreign special forces (reportedly American) carried out a night raid in the area and managed to rescue him and other ALP soldiers who were hiding. Zanbulai is still very much under Taleban control. Together with the attack from the Deh Adam Khan area (see above), the Taleban also advanced towards Gereshk district center from the Zanbulai. However, as of 11 March 2016, the Taleban forces are still fighting to break through to Gereshk centre from the direction of Zanbulai.

When this dispatch was published, ANSF were trying to defend Gereshk on several fronts: Deh Adam Khan and Zanbulai, but also from the direction of Spinmasjid (where the last few checkpost under ANSF were also lost to the Taleban in the beginning of March). Gereshk district center, the second largest populated area in Helmand, is now under greater threat than ever before.

Marja

Marja district also in central Helmand came under pressure after the collapse of Malgir in mid-October 2016, one of the key areas of Gereshk, which neighbours Marja to the north-east. The Taleban had initially planned to take Nadali district first, however, when one of the key commanders from Marja was killed (see below), the Taleban used this opportunity to focus on the presumably now less well-defended Marja district first.

Marja is one of the areas of Helmand, which foreign forces lost many lives and spent millions of dollars regaining control of from the Taleban. It was chosen as the first operation of the surge, in February 2010 and was supposed to be a model for other contested areas in the battle to win communities’ ‘hearts and minds’.

The key local figure in charge of Marja’s defence was Haji Muhammad Asef, from the local Wardak tribe and a former mujahed. He also was active in the District Development Assembly, in which the various elected Community Development Councils come together. When the surge started in late 2009, US forces tried very hard to convince Haji Asef to join the ALP. He refused – until his relationship with Taleban turned sour. In 2011, armed Taleban came to Haji Asef’s area and, by chance, encountered a group of US soldiers. The insurgents asked Haji Asef to hide their weapons, but he refused as he assumed the US soldiers had observed his interaction with the insurgents from afar. Indeed, shortly after the Taleban left the area, the US soldiers retrieved the weapons that the Taleban had dumped, leading to Taleban accusations that Haji Asef had informed on them.

A few weeks later, the insurgents kidnapped Haji Asef’s son. After an attempt to release him through local leaders failed, Haji Asef gathered his relatives, armed them, went to a village where a few Taleban families lived and took some of them hostage himself. When his son managed to escape from the Taleban, Haji Asef also released his hostages, but he eventually also joined the ALP.

Due to his leadership skills, Haji Asef then became head of all ALP units in the district. But as Marja is the home of many different Pashtun tribal groups, naqelin settled there decades ago as a result of the HAVA irrigation scheme, the units were more difficult to unite under a single tribal elder than those in the more homogenous communities in other areas of Helmand. Hence, local ALP commanders under Haji Asef’s command were in charge of the various areas with their distinct communities. The ALP commanders managed to keep the Taleban out of the densely populated areas, but never managed to completely defeat them in the Sistani desert to the west of the population centre. Despite the millions of dollars invested in projects and one of the biggest military operations since the invasion of US forces. Throughout 2013 and 2014, the Taleban initiated many attacks from the desert areas, but failed to make significant gains.

After government officials observed that the ALP in Marja were able to keep the Taleban at bay over a long period of time, they became overconfident and assumed that the local fighters could continue the defence without their commander. In a move similar to the disastrous redeployment of Kamal Aka from Deh Adam Khan to Gereshk, Haji Asef was called, in mid-August 2015, to help fight the Taleban in Nadali district in order to prevent an attack on the direction of Lashkargah. He then came under Taleban attack. During this fighting, his vehicle was shot at and he was injured and died on the way to the hospital. His son was appointed in his place, but did not have the same authority over his fighters.

One week after Asef’s death, the Taleban launched a major attack on the Sistani area of Marja, which is located at the edge of the Sistani desert to the west of the populated areas of the district. Commander Firoza was in charge of this area but, without Asef’s support, had to retreat. The Taleban captured the area and burnt her house. Another part of Sistani, known as Block 9, which was under the authority of another commander, Moto Khan, also fell within days.

After Haji Asef’s death, coordination between the various ALP sub-commanders in Marja broke down and the Taleban met no further significant resistance. ALP members from the area told AAN that the ANP and ANA did put up any fight – many of then offered no resistance and simply retreated. Some interviewees said they believed the ANA had not been able to intervene to fight alongside the ANP and ALP because they were waiting for orders. In the end, the majority of the fighting was done by the ALP units, which had been set up by the foreign forces. Once these ALP units had to face the Taleban attacks alone, they crumbled one by one. It seems the majority of the communities in Marja had only sided with the government or joined the ALP because, during times when there was no fighting, it looked a reasonable economic bet: they would receive development projects and also a salary from the foreign troops. However, the men enrolled in the ALP program had never been tested before in fighting the Taleban.

Another reason why some areas of Marja fell without a fight was the success of Taleban propaganda in promoting the ferocity of the ‘Sra Qet’a’ (the ‘red unit’) who fight under the threatening slogan: “Be captured or die!” Apart from spreading propaganda by word of month, the Taleban used mosque loudspeakers to urge ANSF members to desert their units. According to local interviewees, this propaganda has been particularly strong in Nadali, Sangin and Marja, where the announcements included the following: “Leave your weapons and your positions and come to us and we will forgive you.” This propaganda was in some areas underscored by Taleban snipers reportedly shooting at ANP watch towers with precision weapons – killing several ANP with shots to the head from a distance. Apparently, the sniper rifles had been captured during the takeover of ANA bases in Helmand and the qet’a members had received training on how to use them. ALP members, presumably in the greatest danger, were also encouraged to desert their units with the promise of safe passage. Many of the ALP foot soldiers were told by the Taleban to disappear from their ALP units without saying a word, turn off their phones and either leave the area or return to their homes.

Since November/December 2015, the Taleban have gained significant influence in Marja, in particular, in terms of moving through the district and attacking ANSF positions in most areas, the exception being the few kilometres of road connecting the district centre with Lashkargah (from the Bolan area to the Kemp area), the district centre and some other areas. Since the beginning of February 2016, the Taleban have also been able to tax local communities. Although many locals had already left the district, Taleban have been able to collect 30 to 40 million Pakistani rupees (about 281,000 to 381,000 US dollars) from local residents as tax of their lands (estimate published on Salam Watandar website no longer accessible). These funds support the insurgency fighters in Marja and the rest of the province, allowing the Taleban to continue to try to chip away at the last areas of the district still held by the government.

Nadali

Whereas lack of coordination and cooperation between the various ANSF troops, the ALP, the local community and the government led to the fall of Marja, in Nadali, which came under attack first, the situation has been different. The network of commanders and elders collaborated with the ANSF to ensure that the little chiefdoms in Nadali remained intact and could therefore contribute effectively to the defence of the district as a whole. After the fall of Marja, the Taleban wanted to storm Nadali district centre, but since the Nadali chief of police coordinated with all the local commanders ahead of the Taleban attack, government forces were able to withstand the attacks (coming from two directions, from Marja in the north and from desert areas to the west). However, the Taleban have managed to menace government-controlled areas.

It was in late October 2015 that the Taleban turned their attention to Nadali for the first time. At this point, they were not trying to capture Marja, because they knew communities there would not offer any support, while, they believed, a few villages in Nadali were sympathetic. In late October 2015, they planned an attack on the Loya Manda area of Nadali. Overnight, they sent fighters from several different directions and in the morning, launched attacks on ANP, ALP and ANA check posts in a coordinated effort. They were able to capture this area. The ANSF left in a tactical retreat – after experiencing heavy casualties with 17 men dead.

After Loya Manda, the Taleban also managed to capture Kofaka, which borders the, by then, already Taleban-controlled Babaji suburb of Lashkargah. In addition, Taleban captured the nearby villages of 31 Gharbi (where Haji Mohammad Asef from Marja was killed) and 31 Sharqi (these names make reference to the block set up of the area), located eight kilometres to the northeast of Nadali district centre. Next, the Taleban attacked the Changir area to the north of 31 Gharbi and 31 Sharqi. Then, after first capturing the Domandi area they reached Shawal to the northwest of Nadali district centre. They were able to consolidate their control in Shawal. By the beginning of November 2015, the Shawal and Changir area represented the new front line.

One of the key commanders of Shawal is Muhammad Sadiq (an Ishaqzai from Nadali) who is in charge of two out of the three sub-divisions in the area. Despite only being 28 years old, Muhammad Sadiq is recognized as a great fighter, as he has been fighting the Taleban almost every night for the last four months. The person controlling the third area is Nasim, a Nurzai from Nadali. He has approximately 15 men under his command. He has also been fighting the Taleban for the past three months. His brother was Hayat Khan, who had six ANP check posts in another area in Nadali, but was killed in an IED attack six months ago. Muhammad Sadiq and Nasim worked closely with the local head of the district council, Nabi Khan (a Sulaimankhail from Zarghoun Kalay). In addition, Nabi Khan also supported these two commanders. They are considered the heroes of Nadali for their efforts in pushing back against the Taleban front line because although both commanders are from the district, their home villages are not in the areas where they have been fighting so successfully. The local populations in Shawal and Changir (known locally as the north front), but also in the other areas listed below, are reportedly very concerned about what would happen if any of the commanders get killed. This would certainly mean that the areas would then fall to the Taleban, a local respondent stated, as there would not be enough time to find another commander to take over the defense.

To the west of the Nadali district centre, the ANSF have been fighting to keep the Taleban out for the last four months. This fighting has taken place along a 72 kilometre long front line, which has been a focus of the Taleban offensive. The main areas under attack have been Nurzai Kalay, Cha Mirza, Shin Kalay, Khoshal Kalay, and Sayed Abad Kalay along the western edge of the populated area of the district. The following militia commanders have been fighting to keep the Taleban at bay:

–  Nurzai Kalay’s defence is lead by Commander Wakil Bor Muhammad, a Nurzai from Cha Mirza with ALP and ANP under his command.

– The large area of Shin Kalay has two famous commanders, Jamal and Nisar, both Khorati, who coordinate with the ALP and ANP.

– In Khoshal Kalay, Shakir, a Nurzai is the commander of ANP and ALP.

– In Sayedabad, Waikil Ghulam Shakhi, a Hazara, is in charge of protecting the area with his own men.

So far, these commanders have tried to do their best to ensure they can hold the entire 72-kilometre front, while also protecting the district on the Marja side. However given that fighting has been going on for more than three months now, there is concern that a decisive push from the Taleban might be able to take down the government’s fatigued lines of defence. According to the head of the Nadali shura, Nabi Khan, if these commanders do not receive some support, there is a very strong likelihood that the district will fall into the hands of Taleban. Nabi Khan said that, officially, the battalion of ANA soldiers in his area should number 772, but currently there are no more than 274 soldiers. The ANA also has approval for 59 tanks or armoured vehicles; now, the locals think there are no more than 11. The ANA is operating mostly independently of the local commanders, local people said, and does not coordinate with the ALP and ANP. This has also led to the fear that, if there is a serious attack, the ANA will not support local fighters on the ground.

Sangin 

Sangin is home to two main tribes, the Ishaqzai and Alekozai. The Ishaqzai has never been part of the post-2001 government because Amir Dado immediately took control of the entire district. The Ishaqzai, feeling completely marginalized by this exclusion from politics and by extension access to resources (including the drugs trade), hence stood against the government. At the same time, very few development projects have been completed in Sangin district compared to the other districts further south – in part, because Taleban have been in control in the areas around Sangin since 2006.

According to local interviewees, Sangin has never had an important pro-government strongman other than Amir Dado. Since he was assassinated in 2009, there has been nobody to take his position – as Sangin’s local Ishaqzai are not pro-government at the best of times. Even during the surge, but afterwards as well, Sangin (like Musa Qala) faced a lot of resistance from pockets of Taleban, especially in the Sarwan Qala area, due to its proximity to Kajaki district. It is an Alekozai area in the north of the district and saw fighting between 2012 and 2014. Sarwan Qala borders Musa Qala to the west, Sangin to the south (1) and the Zamindawar area, of Kajaki district (only separated by the Helmand River) to the north. During the surge, US forces never cleared Zamindawar. So the Taleban – crossing the river in boats – could use the area to attack Sarwan Qala from. By 2013, the Taleban were slowly advancing on Sarwan Qala. The ANA and ALP (mostly Alkozai) were fighting back hard, but the Taleban were continuously trying to take the area. In late 2013, they were able to capture some of the checkpoints in Sarwan Qala and, at the beginning of 2014, the area was captured by the Taleban. (2) This area, along with the Malmand area (about 10 kilometres to the southeast of the Sangin district centre) been one of the most insecure in the district. In Malmand area, the mostly Ishaqzai population, marginalised early on after 2001, have been belligerently anti-government since.

The main road connecting Sangin with the southern areas of Helmand is now the dividing line between the Taleban and the ANSF forces. On the road, between the areas of Haji Fateh Muhammad to Shakar Shela in northeastern Sangin, there are ANA checkposts. These checkposts are mostly on the desert side to the west and are therefore more difficult to attack undetected. On the other side of the road, to the east, the Taleban control the villages.

While strategic in a sense that taking Sangin would create a connection to southern Helmand, for the Taleban it has more of a symbolic value, as it is one of the districts where foreign forces lost a lot of lives. While the Taleban already have large parts of the district under their control, they want to push government forces out the rest and add Sangin to ‘their’ districts. This would provide them with much more coherent territory, which might be easier to hold. Sangin’s opium harvest could also be taxed and control taken over other aspects of the drug trade.

Other areas in central and southern Helmand

Nawa is very populous and green in terms of orchards and fields – they can provide cover for Taleban fighters, especially as the spring and summer seasons are approaching. As the area is densely populated, the ANSF also finds it difficult to use air support or heavy artillery to recapture the areas already under Taleban control and keep the remainder of the district under their control.

At the moment, the Taleban are mainly focusing on consolidating their grip on the districts in the centre of Helmand, in particular those needed to launch a possible attack on Lashkargah.

Further south there is Gramsir, which presents an easier terrain for manoeuvre for the ANSF when compared to Nadali, Marja and Nawa. It is a flat, desert district, without a sizable population, presenting few places for insurgents to hide. According to a recent New York Times article focusing on the district, Gramsir is peaceful and government-controlled; it seems the huge benefits of the drug trade accruing to local officials there means the Taleban know they would face fierce resistance if they attacked. On the other hand, southern Dishu has been in the hands of the Taleban since early 2015. The district of Khanashin, north of Dishu district in the southwest of Helmand province, was reclaimed from the Taleban in the second half of December 2015.

Lashkargah under siege

When the Taleban took control of most of Gereshk and parts of Nadali, they also partly surrounded Lashkargah, the provincial capital of Helmand. With Babaji, they actually already have a foot in the city, as it is part of Lashkargah’s fourth nahiya (precinct), in other words, a suburb. According to reporting from locals, the residents of the provincial capital are able to hear the fighting in Babaji at night. So far, though, the government holds Lashkargah, which means supply routes between it and Kandahar are still open. Local interviewees have commented that, as long as the Kandahar-Lashkargah road is open and there is an ‘escape route’, residents will still be willing to stay put. However, their concerns are mounting. While many families from the districts around Lashkargah have moved into the city to take refuge from fighting, so far, few families have left Helmand completely, although some have parts of their extended families to live with relatives in Kandahar as a pre-caution. People still believe, or more accurately hope, that the government will not let Lashkargah fall into the hand of Taleban.

The Taleban’s extensive control over central Helmand has not only given them freedom of movement – although the recent redeployment of American and a handful of British forces might limit this to some extent – but also opened up supply routes for them to and from Pakistan. The main route connects the Taleban in northern Helmand with the Band-e Timur area of Maywand in Kandahar province and then south to Pakistan. (The specific route from Maywand district of Kandahar into northern Helmand would be as follows: from Maywand to Khoshkawa of Lashkar Gah, Gereshk, crossing the Helmand River, then to Malgir area, to Shroaw Dasht (still in Gereshk) and then on to Musa Qala, Nowzad, Kajaki or Baghran.)

What has saved Lashkargah from falling so far is that the ANSF are still able to hold crucial parts of Nadali and Nawa. However, the increased recent fighting in Nadali is already an indication that the Taleban are trying to extend their influence to this area as well. If Nadali fell, it would be difficult for Nawa to withstand a strong Taleban attack, even though the local Barakzai tribe is pro-government and had additional police forces sent to defend it in November 2015.

For the government, Lashkargah’s Achilles’ heel remains its supply route. The road connecting Lashkargar to the ring road at Gereshk is the only major lifeline for the provincial capital. If the Taleban were able to cut off the ring road or just the road connecting it to Lashkargah, this could seal the fate for the provincial capital. Furthermore, the ring road is also used to supply the Shorabak Airbase (the old Camp Bastion), where the 215 Maywand Corps is stationed. However, one needs to consider that taking all of Gereshk, in particular the main roads would be difficult as these areas are flat, with little cover, so that Taleban would have to make themselves visible and vulnerable to air attacks if they were to launch any sort of strong ground attack.

Conclusion: Summary of the main points

– The drug economy in Helmand continues to be a basic driver of conflict.

– The harsh and exclusionary way provincial elites governed after 2001 stoked resentment among parts of the population, helping the Taleban re-emerge in the mid-2000s. That re-emergence coincided with the removal of those elites, which created a power vacuum and helped the insurgency gather strength.

– The Afghan government, the British and, later, during the surge, US forces attempted to clear areas of Helmand from the Taleban. In part, this was done by establishing ‘community defence mechanisms’ – militias in the early days and later ALP. The Taleban were pushed back during the US surge, but retained a presence in the north of the province, including Baghran, most of Kajaki and Musa Qala.

– In the wake of the withdrawal of international forces in late 2014, the Taleban have managed to advance into northern and central Helmand.

– With the Taleban sending in new commando-like qet’as, local ALP forces and the ANSF have crumbled in many places. The government saw several severe setbacks and losses of districts in the second half of 2015.

– The lack of coordination between the various ANSF, ALP and those in charge of the ‘chiefdoms’, ill-fated strategic decisions to re-deploy successful local ALP commanders to other areas and a weak ANA corps has undermined the defence.

– With the ‘strategic retreat’ of ANSF troops from Musa Qala and Nowzad on 21 February 2016 and the loss of the suburb of Babaji of Lashkargah to the Taleban in October 2015, the situation on the ground for Afghan government forces became problematic, even with the deployment of fresh foreign forces supporting them.

– In the meantime, the Taleban have been able to hold and even expand their level of control in various districts across Helmand, aided by the effective use of the qet’as and of weapons, ammunition and equipment looted from captured ANSF bases. Land and drug trade taxation in areas under their control has ensured full coffers.

– As of March 2016, the stakes are high both for the ANSF and the Taleban: the Taleban, especially its qet’as, are vulnerable to the increased international military presence and an increased government focus on Helmand in terms of troops and resources.

– The insurgency needs to be able to advance in Nawa and Nadali if it is to have an opportunity to make a decisive strike against Lashkargah. The ANSF, however, having retreated from Musa Qala and Nowzad, need to focus on securing central Helmand in order to not lose Lashkargah. While international forces might bolster the ANSF in the short-term, the questions will be whether they will coordinate effectively with the ANSF to leverage their mutual strength, whether the ANA will coordinate with the ALP and ANP, and whether remaining ALP commanders can remain strong in their areas. There is also the question of whether the 215 Maiwand corps, now under new leadership, can actually be revived so it becomes a decent fighting force. The political will of the government to ensure that the ANSF can push back in Helmand, even at a high cost, will also be a key factor to watch.

 

Edited by Lenny Linke, Kate Clark and Thomas Ruttig 

*Rahmatullah Amiri is a researcher and freelance journalist based in Kabul, focusing on security and humanitarian issues.

 

(1) The geography of Sangin district has also contributed to its never having been fully controlled by the government. It is surrounded by three districts of Helmand province and Ghorak district of Kandahar province (which had also been under Taleban control for many years and which the Taleban said it had retaken again in 2015. Sangin borders the Zamindawar area of Kajaki, which has also never been fully cleared of Taleban. In addition, fighters from Kajaki were mostly fighting in Sangin, because there has been little fighting in Kajaki district – because Zamindawar has only one major fighting front, the district centre of Kajaki. Therefore, Taleban fighters from Kajaki cross – with ease – into Sarwan Qala of Sangin to support the local Taleban there. To the south, Sangin also borders the two most insecure areas of Gereshk district, Qala-ye Gaz and Mirmandaw area. These are strongholds for the Taleban and local Taleban from there can also easily come and attack Sangin district centre.

(2) Local interviewees told AAN that, in Sangin, even those fighting for or supporting the government have never actually received the support they needed, not only in terms of financial support, but also extra troops. Sometimes, they said, the Taleban would outnumber the security forces, but there were no reinforcements for days, or even weeks. People said they felt abandoned by the central and provincial government.

British L7A1 General Purpose Machine Gun

The rapid fall of entire areas of Helmand to the Taleban during the second half of 2015 and early 2016 has left the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) scrambling to hold the line and try to push back, and led to international forces deploying troops to the province. Guest author Rahmatullah Amiri* brings a special two-part look at Helmand. In part 1, he maps out which areas government and Taleban forces are holding, before looking at the background to the crisis, mapping out the demographics and economies of the districts and key players in the province. In this dispatch, he takes the Helmand story to the end of 2014 and the handover of security to Afghan forces, assessing the impact of predatory elites, British deployment, the United State’s surge aimed at ‘degrading’ the Taleban, and the creation of Afghan Local Police (ALP).

In AAN’s second dispatch on Helmand, Rahmatullah Amiri will track how and why areas and districts have fallen to the Taleban. He will assess a new Taleban military tactic – the use of commando-like units called qet’a ­– and look at some disastrous tactics on the government’s side and its eventual return to an old strategy – setting up new ‘community defence forces’ in the small chiefdoms.

Control over the districts in Helmand is currently as follows, moving from north to south:

Schematic map of Helmand’s districts (Marja is still part of Nadali) (Source: Wikipedia) – Click on the map to enlarge

– Baghran in the far north is completely under Taleban control and has been so for the past ten years;

– Only small parts of Musa Qala are under government control. Although, on 26 August 2015, it was captured entirely by the Taleban, the ANSF was able to take some areas back in December 2015. The district centre has been under Taleban control since 20 February 2016 when ANSF withdrew from it;

– In Kajaki in the northeast, only the district centre and the dam located close to the district centre are still somewhat under the control of the ANSF; their elevated location has made it difficult for the Taleban to gain ground in the area, despite many attempts.

– Nowzad in the northwest is completely under Taleban control. The government did control the district centre (1) until 20 February when ANSF forces withdrew from the district completely;

– The district centre of Washir in the northwest is still somewhat under government control as well as parts of the ring road crossing the district. The ANSF is able to control this part of the ring road (as well as its connection to the district centre) during the day, but at night, the Taleban are mostly in control of the area;

– Only some parts of Sangin district are under government control. The areas to the north, northeast and west of the district centre are held by the Taleban control. While the district centre and the bazaar area are still held by the government, they are highly contested. Recent clearance operations around the Sangin part of the ring road have, at least for now, marginally improved access to the district centre.

– Nadali in central western Helmand is about 80 per cent under government control;

– In Gereshk, also known as Nahr-e Seraj district, in central Helmand, government control is limited to some parts of the district, including the district centre, the ring road, the bazaar and the main ANA base. (Read an earlier AAN analysis of the area here). Some of the remaining areas are loosely under Taleban control and are being used to stage operations. Some areas, which have little value for the Taleban or the government, are not controlled by either side. Troops withdrawn from Musa Qala have been ordered to reinforce Gereshk. This month (March 2016), the Taleban have made progress in controlling the Baloch area in southern Gereshk, which is only about four kilometres from the provincial capital;

– Parts of Marja, in central Helmand, are under government control, most notably the district centre and areas around it. The Taleban are in control of the southern areas of the district, but are also operating in many of the remaining areas of the district, especially those close to Nadali. Overall, this district remains highly contested in many areas, with the Taleban attempting to wear down the ANSF, without holding fixed positions themselves.

– In Nawa (also known as Nawa-ye Barakzai), also in central Helmand, the government controls the majority of the district. The Taleban are mostly in control of the southern areas along the border with Marja, but have also been attacking check posts in other areas. The strong ANP and ALP presence, along with little support for the Taleban from the local population, has made it difficult for the insurgents to gain more control of this district.

– Lashkargah, comprising the city, which is also the provincial capital, as well as surrounding rural areas, is still more or less controlled by the government. A notable exception is the Babaji suburb in the north of Lashkargar in the direction of Gereshk, which was taken by the Taleban on 20 October 2015. It has since become heavily contested in recent weeks;

– The southeast – comprising Gramsir district – is mostly under government control;

– In the southwest of Helmand, only the district centre of Khaneshin, also known as Reg, is under government control, while Dishu district is completely under Taleban control, except for the check posts along the border with Pakistan.

An overview

The continuous fighting in Helmand has taken a significant toll on the ANSF. Hundreds of causalities, among them one high ranking ANSF commander and several international troops, have been reported, as well as significant losses also from soldiers deserting their posts or surrendering to the Taleban. Losses to the Taleban are unknown.

Just over one year after security for the province was handed over by ISAF to the Afghan government and the last British troops left Helmand, US and British special forces were again deployed there (10 British and several hundred American troops). The media have read it as a significant move: “It will be the largest deployment of American troops outside major bases in Afghanistan since the end of the NATO combat mission in 2014,” reported The New York Times. Resolute Support spokesman US Army Colonel Michael Lawhorn did not want to discuss whether troop numbers were up or down:, for security reasons, he said “specific troop levels cannot be discussed.” He said the deployment was part of “a regularly scheduled rotation to replace another unit” and that “RS [Resolute Support] are conducting a train/advise/assist mission in Helmand, just as throughout Afghanistan.” However, US forces, which can take a combat role under the US military’s counter-terrorism mission, Freedom’s Sentinel, have found themselves increasingly drawn into combat in Helmand as ANSF forces have crumbled. There have been air strikes and US Special Operations Forces on the ground, in support of the ANSF. The deployment of several hundred foreign forces, however, cannot turn the clock back: the fight in Helmand is now almost completely Afghan versus Afghan.

Underlining the seriousness of the situation for the ANSF, Kabul has replaced several leading ANA commanders. The Afghan army’s 215 Maiwand Corps had been found to be very short on men – possibly only 40 per cent of their stated number (see here and here). Its problems went even deeper than ‘just’ ghost soldiers. US Army Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, head of public affairs for the U.S.-NATO mission has spoken of “a combination of incompetence, corruption and ineffectiveness.” AAN was also told that some soldiers in the ANA had been deployed to Helmand for eight years: it is a place that the better connected in the army are keen to avoid. Shoffner said the corps commander had been replaced, along with “some brigade commanders and some key corps staff up to full colonel level.” Abdul Jabbar Qahraman was appointed as ‘operational commander’ of all Afghan forces in Helmand on 27 January 2016.

Afghan national police have also been fighting on the multiple frontlines in the province – and, less well-equipped and more exposed as they often stay at checkposts, rather than being in their barracks when not fighting – have been taking higher casualties than the army. General Abdul Rahman Sarjang, the Helmand provincial police chief, told the Associated Press the Afghan security forces were “exhausted” and in dire need of reinforcements, and that a lack of coordination between the army and police was hampering their ability to fight.

At the same time, an increasingly better equipped Taleban have been stepping up their game. The capture of a dozen or more check posts and bases belonging to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), as well as Afghan Local Police (ALP) strongholds in the last six months has also meant the capture of significant amounts of weapons, ammunition and other equipment, including an estimated 50 to 100 US-made armoured ‘Humvee’ vehicles. The Taleban are reportedly using them in their current operations.

Before looking at the background at to how this crisis emerged in more detail, we thought it useful to have some information on the demographics, geography and economies of Helmand’s districts.

Short districts profiles

Helmand’s northernmost districts – Baghran, Kajaki and Musa Qala – share similar demographics. 98 per cent of their population belongs to one tribe, the Alizai. The populations of Marja and Nadali further south, however, consist of a mix of tribes, including Nurzai, Ishaqzai, Alizai, Alekozai and several other smaller ones. The mix is the result of a large-scale irrigation and agriculture project of the 1940-70s, mainly funded by USAID, the Helmand and Arghandab Valley Authority (HAVA), which created new arable land to which Pashtuns from other regions of the country were brought and settled on. (2)

From a strategic point of view, Musa Qala, with its relatively large population and large bazaar, is the heart of northern Helmand. It is one of the major hubs of the opium trade with the harvest from Baghran and Kajaki sold there. The Musa Qala bazaar is one of the biggest drug markets nationwide and attracts key drug traders and smugglers. Many of the main leaders in northern Helmand for the last forty years have come from Musa Qala, in particular, from the Alizai tribe. They include the Akhundzada family who controlled the bazaar before the Taleban and again, after 2001.

Sangin, which borders Musa Qala to the southeast, is the other large centre for drug trade and smuggling. This place has been home to the majority of drug traders and smugglers dealing with the harvest of the farmers from Kandahar and Uruzgan provinces. From Sangin, the harvest would be taken to Iran and Pakistan. This practice continued during the Taleban government and also after 2001. Since the insurgency began, this district has been of strategic importance for the Taleban, not only because of drug smuggling routes, but also because it is considered a crucial part of a corridor connecting the Alizai dominated districts in the north with the rest of the province. The road connecting the Kajaki Dam in the north and the provincial capital Lashkargah in the south also runs through Sangin. Furthermore, it has a significant population of Ishaqzai, who are considered one of the most religiously conservative tribes across Afghanistan. (The new Taleban leader Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur belongs to it.) During the Taleban era, the Ishaqzai tribe was mostly in control of Sangin, but post-2001, the Alekozai, the other large tribe in the district, have dominated again.

Nowzad is also home to a large Ishaqzai population, making up almost 50 per cent of the entire district’s inhabitants. It borders Farah province to the west and Washer district of Helmand to the north, which, together with its isolated location and lack of security force presence has made it an ideal transit point for drug smugglers for the past 10 years.

Kajaki has a relatively small population compared to most other districts in the province. However, it is strategically and economically important because of its hydro-electric power station, which was built in the 1950s with US support as part of the HAVA project (see a short history here). Since 2004, the Taleban have had a strong grip on the Zamindawar area north of Helmand River, which covers approximately 90 per cent of the district. This area has been used as a launching pad for operations south of the river, which comprises the small area held by the government, which includes the district centre as well as the Kajaki dam. (3)

Gereshk district is the second most populated area in Helmand after Lashkargah, and its district centre is the second biggest city after the provincial capital. Gereshk is in a highly strategic location; it connects northern and central Helmand and is also on the main route through Helmand in the east-west direction. The ring road passes through this district, coming from Kandahar in the east and passing on to Herat in the northwest. Whoever controls this district, and this part of the ring road, controls the trade route between Kandahar and Herat.

Unlike most other districts in the province, Marja, together with Nadali (which it used to be part of) is mostly inhabited by naqileen, Pashtun migrants who settled in the area from other parts of Afghanistan after the Kajaki dam project was built. Maintaining security in Marja has special significance due to its proximity to Lashkargah. However, it also became iconic when, in February 2010, it was selected by the US military to become a ‘poster boy’ for counter-insurgency and the surge (the deployment of tens of thousands of extra US soldiers sent to defeat the Taleban). After US soldiers seized Marja, it was to become a model of good governance. Currently, only small parts of the district are under government control.

The roots of the crisis

Like almost everywhere in Afghanistan, a brief look at past events is crucial to understanding why the current situation looks as it does.

Helmand after the fall of the Taleban government

As in neighbouring Kandahar and indeed, most of the rest of the country, Helmand saw a return to local strongmen rule after the collapse of the Taleban regime in 2001. Some of those strongmen had earlier ruled the area, commanding mujahedin fronts during the fight against the Soviet occupation (1979-89), while others were relative newcomers. Their apologists claim they had led the ‘resistance’ to the Taleban. In reality, none was present in Helmand at the time of the fall of the Taleban, but rather drove across the border from Pakistan once the Taleban had gone. Then the mujahedin commanders and prominent elders with roots in the province split up Helmand amongst themselves. In the days after the installation of the new government in Kabul in late 2001, the strongmen went to the capital to lobby the newly appointed Hamid Karzai and then returned with appointment letters.

The four strongest among them, who were also from the four most important tribes in the province, divided the key posts – governor, police chief, army chief and NDS boss – among themselves, as well as control over the various districts of the province. This included control over patronage and associated resources, most notably the drug trade, but also ‘local security,’ meaning areas where militiamen employed by each of the powerbrokers had control. This provincial balance of power lasted until about 2005.

The four strongmen were: Abdul Rahman Jan, a Nurzai from Marja who became the province’s police chief, Dad Muhammad (better known as Amer Dado), an Alekozai from Sangin district, who became head of NDS, Ma’alem Mir Wali, a Barakzai from Gereshk who became the commander of the local army division and, most importantly, Sher Muhammad Akhundzada from the Alizai tribe, subtribe Hasanzai, who got the provincial governorship. (4)

Sher Muhammad’s father, Muhammad Rasul Akhundzada, had been the patriarch of the Akhundzadas. Before his assassination in in 1990, he had been the single strongest mujahedin commander in Helmand, fighting with Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami. Under his reign, Helmand became the most prolific poppy growing area on earth. Another son, Amir Muhammad Akhundzada, was ‘appointed’ district governor for Musa Qala, the family’s old heartland and opium trading hub, in 2001 (he became deputy governor of Helmand in 2006).

In contrast, post-2001 police chief Abdul Rahman Jan emerged as a strongman without a prominent family background. A Nurzai originally from Nowzad, he gained prominence in Helmand as a commander of a tribal militia recruited from his Nurzai tribe during the mujahedin government of the mid-1990s (first fighting for Jamiat-e Islami and later switching to another faction). After the Taleban lost power in Helmand in 2001, local militias and their commanders tried to divide up the areas of control – Abdul Rahman Jan was able to claim Marja (then still the district capital area of Nadali).

Ma’alem Mir Wali, a Barakzai from Gereshk, started out as a student at Kandahar University before joining Hezb-e Islami, when the Soviets invaded, and becoming one of its main commanders in Helmand. After briefly joining Najibullah’s National Reconciliation Program, he returned to Hezb-e Islami in 1992 and was the provincial governor of Helmand until 1993. When Lashkargah fell to the Taleban, he had to flee the province and fell in with the patronage network of Ahmad Shah Massud. After his return post-2001, he became commander of the 93rd Division, which was dismantled in 2003 – with some of the militias that were part of that division joining the then re-emerging Taleban.

Amer Dado, an Alekozai from Sangin district affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami, became the head of NDS in Helmand after the fall of the Taleban. His brother Juma Gul was appointed Chief of Police of Sangin.

Allegations of abuses by these strongmen were legion and included illegal arrests and torture, all aggravated by the marginalization of ‘out’ tribes who saw their poppy crops selectively eradicated and government ranks packed out by their rivals. “Karzai’s cronies were antagonising many communities,” wrote Antonio Giustozzi. (5) “People were driven into the arms of the Taleban. The insurgents did not have to do much, except approach the victims of the pro-Karzai strongmen and promise them protection and support.” Fundamental to much of the violence also was – and still is – the drug economy. Its importance is “hard to overstate,” wrote Tom Coglan, “as a driver for rampant corruption, instability, and violent competition within Helmand Province and the south as a whole.” (6)

All three of the remaining four strongmen lost their posts ahead of the British deployment in 2006, part of Phase 3 of ISAF expansion. The UK had made ‘cleaning up’ the leaders of the provincial administration a precondition of their deployment because of the allegations of their involvement in the drug trade and other wrongdoings. President Karzai gave in to these demands, albeit only very reluctantly, particularly to losing Akhundzada whom he considered a key ally (he was only finally removed after nine tons of opium were discovered in his office). After this removal from the post of provincial governor, Karzai appointed him a senator and made his younger brother Amir Muhammad the deputy governor of the province. However, Sher Muhammad’s move to Kabul resulted in the family losing a lot of their control in Helmand. He reacted recklessly to his demotion, reportedly sending about 3000 of his men over to the Taleban. Amer Dado and Mir Wali both became MPs in the 2005 elections. Amer Dado was killed in an IED attack in 2009.

Changing tides – the British deployment and the US surge

The British did not realise when they deployed to Helmand in 2006 that they were taking over a province where trouble had long been brewing. Removing the strongmen also eliminated the source of much of the resentment, which was driving the province towards insurgency, but also the means of containing it. Until Sher Muhammad’s removal, the security in the province had mostly been based on agreements with the various local militia commanders and their men.

Once the British had taken full command over Helmand in March 2007, the security situation started to unwind rapidly. Militia commanders – allies of the former governor – stayed at home. The newly arrived British troops were unable to fill the power vacuum, which opened up opportunities for the Taleban to start testing the British by launching attacks in various districts. Often they found little resistance.

In fact, the Taleban had already slowly started bolstering their position before the British arrived. In early 2006, the Taleban solidified their control of the northernmost district of the province, Baghran, where they had remained unbothered since 2004 and launched a series of offensives on Musa Qala district centre throughout the summer 2006. This siege of Musa Qala ended on 13 October 2006 with a deal that ceded the district to the Taleban and allowed the besieged foreign troops to evacuate the area. (7)

The new provincial governor, Muhammad Daud, fearing these initial attacks were a sign of more to come, immediately requested that the foreign forces spread out across the districts under threat. With Karzai’s backing, he proposed that the troops should engage the Taleban in Nowzad, Sangin, Musa Qala and Kajaki. These demands were partially met, but despite an increase in British troops from 3,300 to 7,000 in 2007, they soon proved overstretched (as repeatedly lamented in the British press, unable to contain the Taleban’s slow but steady progress.)

In order to stem the Taleban tide, a US battalion was transferred to Helmand in spring 2008. Within one year, another 11,000 US troops had come to Helmand as part of the surge, President Obama’s attempt to smash or at least ‘decapitate’ and weaken the insurgency before the withdrawal already scheduled for the end of 2014. Those troops represented more than half of the overall 21,000 surge troops, indicating how important a focus Helmand was in the Afghanistan-wide fight. Surge troops were also involved in a new strategy of ‘kill/capture’, where insurgent leaders were targeted for assassination or detention (see AAN assessments of this strategy here and here).

The increased presence of US and British forces, as well as of Afghan National Police (ANP), was used to launch a series of large-scale operations to secure the province ahead of the presidential election in the summer of 2009. As a result, the Taleban were pushed back from many areas, most notably from Marja (some of these areas were later re-taken by the Taleban, including parts of Marja). Given its relatively central location and its population of naqelin, the town was not at the centre of Helmand’s tribal politics or one of the major strongholds of the Taleban. In 2012, many Taleban commanders in Helmand who had gone to Pakistan for the winter, decided to not even come for the summer ‘fighting season’ because of the risk of being killed or captured by international or Afghan government forces.

Alternative approaches to reducing the conflict in Sangin by local people (and involving the British to some extent), failed, largely because of US suspicions and intent to pursue a ‘kinetic’ approach to the insurgency. As AAN reported (for a detailed look at this, see here), ISAF “repeatedly squandered the chance to build a durable political settlement in the district, including bombing a meeting of Taleban [in 2010] while they were discussing going over to the government” and the US’s detention of a key religious figure in 2011 who had also been trying to persuade Taleban to come over. The ‘what might have beens’ following on from a political settlement in Sangin, one of the most difficult and significant districts in Helmand, are many.

As it was, the last and most significant push north of the surge was made into Musa Qala where the Taleban still controlled small parts of the district, mostly desert. Baghran district, and the Zamindawar area of Kajaki remained beyond the reach of the surge. It could be judged that the Taleban were cornered in these areas – or that they provided a safe haven for displaced Taleban and enabled their rise after the surge troops left. While the surge had succeeded in securing the western part of central Helmand, it had done little to eliminate the Taleban from the far north of the province.

New approaches to local security: the chiefdoms

Apart from fighting and pushing back the Taleban, the surge also brought a new approach to local security – the US military, especially Special Operations Forces, focussed on setting up small units of ALP or supporting local militias in areas perceived to be most vulnerable to Taleban attacks. In the areas from where Taleban had recently been ousted, a variety of young ANP and ALP commanders established patchworks of small chiefdoms – controlling small pockets of populations, often only at manteqa level (a small area within a district, usually within a valley, along a major irrigation canal or encompassing a particular ethnic group, tribe or sub-tribe). Those commanders were tasked with recruiting and leading fighters in local communities against the Taleban.

These chiefdoms were like dots along a line – from Musa Qala in the north to Gereshk on the ring road and onwards to Marja – and formed a more or less continuous corridor of territory that was mostly under pro-government forces’ control. In effect, they created a barrier to prevent the Taleban from pushing further south. This more systematic setting up and engaging of small local commanders in specific areas signified a final break from the rule of the former strongmen, who no longer had enough control of critical areas for the Afghan government to be able to rely on them.

One example of a significant commander coming to prominence in these years was a man called Abdul Wali – usually known as Kumandan (commander) Koka. He already had a militia background in Musa Qala and had been the district chief of police (2001-2002), before being detained by US forces and spending 14 months in Bagram. Once out, he returned to the fight and by 2006, although on paper only an ordinary policeman was, in effect, the man whom the Taleban had to beat in Musa Qala. Several times that year, they tried to capture the district from him, but failed to do so. In recognition of his fighting ability, in December 2007, he was appointed chief of police of Musa Qala district. Koka, an Alizai like the Akhundzadas, had strong support from local communities due to his ability to fend off the Taleban. At the same time, he also enjoyed political support from the Akhundzadas who made sure he was able to operate as he wanted and was not threatened by local power politics, including attempts to replace him. Sources close to the Taleban interviewed by the author considered Koka a formidable opponent and developed a significant respect for him. They were keen to kill him as they saw him as the primary obstacle to capturing the district. In April 2012, Koka suffered grievous injuries and was no longer able to go onto the battlefield.

Apart from Koka, at least five other commanders emerged in the various districts during the surge years: Hekmatullah, the son of Ma’alem Mir Wali, the Barakzai from Geresh who had become chief of the provincial army division in 2001, (ANP district commander, Gereshk) with his sub-commanders, Abdul Wali (ANP) and Kamal Aka (ALP); Haji Muhammad Asef (ALP) with his sub-commanders in the various areas of Marja, including Haji Baz Gul, from the Dawtani tribe, a famous female commander, Firoza, also known as Haji Nanai (from Sistani in Marja) and Haji Moto Khan (Nurzai from Sistani area).

Towards the end of the surge and as international ‘boots on the ground’ support for the ANSF started to draw down, this initially rather solid arrangement began to crumble. Funds started to run out for the economic incentives such as projects, which were meant to keep these areas’ populations standing against the Taleban. (8) People also started to slowly realise that the ALP were actually meant to fight the Taleban – and often without government troops’ back-up. In Marja where the US forces had set up militias between 2010 and 2012, many community members joined because they were poor or for other incentives. (9) When the US forces left, half of the 800 militia members were disarmed, the remaining integrated into the ALP.

The last of the US surge troops left Afghanistan in September 2012 and the US military and ISAF strategy turned to building up the ANSF as they prepared to hand over responsibility for security to Afghan forces. The last British and US troops left Helmand on 27 October 2014. General Sher Muhammed Karimi, speaking at the handover ceremony, called Helmand “the toughest province in Afghanistan.” More than 350 Marines and 400 British troops had been killed in the province, he said, and 700 members of the Afghan forces had already been killed in Helmand that year.

By the end of 2014, the bulk of foreign forces had left Afghanistan. ISAF became RS – Resolute Support – a strictly non-combat ‘train, assist and advise’ mission. The US kept its options more open, with troops both in Resolute Support and the new US counter-terrorism mission, Freedom’s Sentinel (which replaced Enduring Freedom), but its footprint was tiny compared to earlier years (10). Practically speaking, responsibility for security in Helmand and in the country as a whole was in Afghan hands.

The questions now would be: how would the Taleban be able to rebound after the surge, how strong was the Afghan state and its forces after the handover of security, and were the local security structures – the ALP and local militias – prepared to shoulder the bulk of the job of defending the population? These questions will be looked at in part 2 of AAN’s special reporting on Helmand “The chain of chiefdoms unravels.”

Edited by Lenny Linke, Kate Clark and Thomas Ruttig

 *Rahmatullah Amiri is a researcher and freelance journalist based in Kabul, focusing on security and humanitarian issues.

(1) The district centre of Nowzad was moved because it was in a location that made it difficult to defend. The new location of the district centre has been moved closer to Camp Bastian and Lashkargah.

(2) The project was started by the Japanese in the 1930s, although on a much smaller scale, with the restoring and expanding of the old irrigation system around the Boghra Canal. The US efforts are well documented in Mike Martin’s An Intimate War: An Oral History Of The Helmand Conflict 1978-2012 and in Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s Little America.

(3) Afghan, British and American troops have all tried to regain control over the area but failed to do so. This included, in the summer of 2008, what was described as the biggest British-led ‘route clearance operation’ since World War II, with nearly 5000 ISAF and Afghan troops trying to transport components for a new turbine to the dam. The mission was touted as a plan to provide an estimated 1.7 million people with electricity, fuel local agriculture and industry. However, mending the turbines was never going to be enough by itself to bring the electricity. The project was a known failure from the start. (See previous AAN dispatch here).

(4) The Akhundzadas had been ruling Musa Qala, the heart of northern Helmand, since the coup in 1978. They were pushed out by the Taleban in the 1995. The killing of Akhundzada‘s father and a brother in an ambush in Pakistan in 1990 is often attributed to his main rival party in the area, Hezb-e Islami.

(5) Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, Hurst 2007, p 60.

(6) Tom Coghlan, “The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History”, in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban, Oxford University Press, 2012 p 149.

(7) The ‘Musa Qala agreement’ – an attempt by the British to pacify the district, but undermined by the US – was, as described by AAN in an earlier dispatch “a local peace agreement with the Taleban to stop the fighting (or end the practical siege the British troops were facing in Musa Qala) and open it up for development activities that would also include the Taleban. Such a ‘protocol’ was proposed and then mediated by Musa Qala tribal elders. This came finally into force on 7 September 2006. It held for 142 days [and broke down] because the British, the provincial and the Kabul government and the Taleban were not the only actors in that area. US troops were also operating in Helmand, and the government in Washington at the time still rejected all political dealings with the Taleban; this only changed at the very end of the Bush administration. There were also opponents of the agreement in the Afghan administration.”

(8) The British, Americans and others, both military and civilian, were involved in a variety of projects of all sizes to boost local development and incentivise an economy independent of the poppy cultivation. The most prominent projects were the Helmand Food Zone and the upgrade of the Kajaki Dam.

(9) Some of those who joined the ALP later reported they had felt coerced, as a refusal risked making them suspect in the foreigners’ eyes as possible Taleban supporters.

(10) There are 13,195 Resolute Support NATO troops deployed in Afghanistan, of which 6,839 are American. In total, the US has deployed 9800 troops which would suggest 2761 of those belong to the ‘can be combat’ Freedom’s Sentinel mission. However, some US forces also appear to switch back and forth between commands.

American F-16V "Viper" Lightweight Multi-Role Fighter