Europäische Union

On May 4, the President of the European Council, António Costa, participated in the Meeting of the European Political Community in Yerevan, Armenia.

Am Welttag der Pressefreiheit bekräftigt die Europäische Union ihr entschlossenes Engagement für die Verteidigung der Unabhängigkeit der Medien und der Sicherheit von Journalistinnen und Journalisten als Grundpfeiler der Demokratie, insbesondere als Reaktion auf die zunehmende weltweite Gewalt, die rechtliche Einschüchterung und die Verbreitung von Desinformation.

Weekly schedule of President António Costa, 4 - 10 May 2026.

Der Präsident des Europäischen Rates, António Costa, wird zusammen mit der Präsidentin der Europäischen Kommission, Ursula von der Leyen, die EU auf dem achten Gipfeltreffen EU-Mexiko vertreten, das am 22. Mai 2026 in Mexiko-Stadt stattfinden wird. Präsidentin Claudia Sheinbaum wird Mexiko vertreten.

European Council President António Costa addressed the press following his meeting with the coalition of Mayors on Housing, in Brussels on 30 April 2026. 

Patrice Aminati, die seit 2023 mit unheilbarem schwarzem Hautkrebs lebt, spricht im «WDR 5 Morgenecho» offen über ihre Krankheit, die täglichen Herausforderungen – und offenbart, dass sie teilweise ans Aufgeben dachte.

Written by David De Groot

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered a landmark judgment in case Commission v. Hungary, concerning Hungary’s 2021 law restricting access to LGBTI-related content.

Introduction

The EU has considerable leverage over candidate countries that backslide on the conditions for accession (the Copenhagen Criteria), including respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. However, once a country has joined the EU, the EU institutions have far fewer tools to respond should Member States backslide on core values. This problem is often referred to as the Copenhagen Dilemma. In Repubblika (Case C-896/19), the CJEU found a connection between Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (on accession) and Article 2 TEU, which sets out the EU’s founding values.

The CJEU ruled that Member States may not lower the level of protection of EU values following accession, thereby establishing the principle of non-regression.

Building on that case law, on 21 April 2026, the CJEU delivered its judgment in Commission v. Hungary (Case C-769/22). The judgment is a landmark ruling: the Court found, for the first time, both a breach of Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) (on human dignity), and a self-standing breach of Article 2 TEU (on values of the EU).

Background

On 15 June 2021, the Hungarian Parliament adopted Act LXXIX of 2021 on ‘tougher action against paedophile offenders and amending certain laws to protect children’ (the ‘Propaganda Law’), which curtailed LGBTI+ content, in particular its availability to minors, by introducing Section 6/A into the Child Protection Act.

On 15 July 2021, the Commission launched an infringement procedure concerning the contested act. One year later, on 15 July 2022, the Commission decided to bring the case before the CJEU; the case was formally lodged on 19  December 2022.

In its action against Hungary, the European Commission alleged violations of the Services, Audiovisual Media Services and e-Commerce Directives, as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Additionally, it alleged a self-standing infringement of Article 2 TEU.

The hearing took place on 19 November 2024, with the CJEU sitting as a full court, reflecting the exceptional importance it assigned to the case.

On 5 June 2025, Advocate General Ćapeta issued her opinion, in which she agreed with the Commission, considering that Article 2 TEU imposes certain ‘red lines’, which are determined by the ‘negation of the values’ laid down in Article 2.

Judgment

In its judgment of 21 April 2026, the CJEU considered that the secondary legislation mentioned in the Commission’s action had been violated, as had Articles 1 (on human dignity), 7 (on private and family life), 11 (on freedom of expression) and 21 (on non-discrimination) of the CFR. Concerning Article 1 CFR – the violation of which marked a first – the Court considered that ‘that association [with paedophilia] and that stigmatisation entail a group of persons forming an integral part of a society in which pluralism prevails being treated as a threat to that society meriting special legal treatment, which results in such persons’ social ”invisibility” being established, maintained, or reinforced, in breach of Article 1 of the Charter’ (para. 489).

Concerning Article 2 TEU, the Court first considered, hinting at the Copenhagen Dilemma, that ‘compliance by a Member State with the values contained in Article 2 TEU is a condition for the enjoyment of all the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to that Member State. Compliance with those values cannot be reduced to an obligation which a candidate State must meet in order to accede to the European Union and which it may disregard after its accession’ (para. 523).

As to the types of violations capable of giving rise to a breach of Article 2 TEU, the Court held that:

only manifest and particularly serious breaches of one or more values common to the Member States may give rise to a finding, in the context of an action for failure to fulfil obligations, that there has been a failure by a Member State to fulfil legally binding obligations under Article 2 TEU, such breaches being incompatible with the very identity of the Union as a common legal order of a society in which pluralism prevails. (para. 551)

In the case at hand, the Court held that the contested act:

results in the stigmatisation and marginalisation of non-cisgender or non-heterosexual persons, solely on the ground of their gender identity or sexual orientation, with those consequences being intensified by the fact that that law also makes an association between the fact of not being cisgender or not being heterosexual, on the one hand, and being convicted of paedophilia, on the other, suggesting that non-cisgender or non-heterosexual persons constitute a fundamental threat to Hungarian and European society, an association which is capable of encouraging the development of hateful conduct towards those persons. (para. 554)

The Court continued that

Such stigmatisation and marginalisation, which is tantamount to establishing, maintaining or reinforcing the social ”invisibility” of some members of society, runs counter to the values of respect for human dignity, equality, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as referred to in Article 2 TEU. (para. 555)

The Court, therefore, concluded that

it must be held that the [contested Act] is in breach, in a way that is both manifest and particularly serious, of the rights of non-cisgender persons – including transgender persons – or non-heterosexual persons, as well as the values of respect for human dignity, equality and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as referred to in Article 2 TEU, with the result that it is contrary to the very identity of the Union as a common legal order in a society in which pluralism prevails. (para. 556)

Outlook

The judgment – while ruling that it is indeed possible to establish a stand-alone infringement of Article 2 TEU without a necessary connection with other Treaty provisions – still leaves many questions as to the circumstances under which such a finding can be made.

In March 2025, Section 6/A of the Child Protection Act, introduced by the contested act, was linked to the Act on the Right of Assembly, which prohibits any public events that portray ‘divergence from self-identity corresponding to sex at birth, sex change or homosexuality’. This was considered a Pride ban. In line with the judgment, such a prohibition would also constitute a breach of Article 2 TEU.

In a joint statement, the Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management, Hadja Lahbib, and the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice and the Rule of Law, Michael McGrath, stated that discrimination has no place in the EU. They ‘warmly welcome the ruling. Ours is a Union of Equality, where you can be who you are and love who you want’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Hungary’s anti-LGBTI law and EU values: The CJEU’s landmark Article 2 TEU judgment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

La Croatie veut stocker ses déchets radioactifs à Trgovska Gora, à une encablure de la frontière bosnienne, dans une zone sismique et près d'un captage d'eau potable. La Bosnie-Herzégovine accuse Zagreb de violer les conventions internationales et va porter sa cause devant les Nations Unies.

- Articles / Radio Slobodna Evropa, Croatie, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Une - Diaporama - En premier, Une - Diaporama, Environnement, Relations régionales

La Croatie veut stocker ses déchets radioactifs à Trgovska Gora, à une encablure de la frontière bosnienne, dans une zone sismique et près d'un captage d'eau potable. La Bosnie-Herzégovine accuse Zagreb de violer les conventions internationales et va porter sa cause devant les Nations Unies.

- Articles / Radio Slobodna Evropa, Croatie, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Une - Diaporama - En premier, Une - Diaporama, Environnement, Relations régionales

The agreement between EU co-legislators aims to make it easier for providers to comply with the AI Act, while maintaining its main provisions and risk-based approach.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The agreement between EU co-legislators aims to make it easier for providers to comply with the AI Act, while maintaining its main provisions and risk-based approach.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Hát valami ilyesmit többek közt...

Zord

Written by Tim Peters with Elena Bersani.

The European Parliament is fully committed to ensuring an ambitious EU long-term budget that meets the Union’s many challenges in the years to come. On 28 April 2026, Parliament’s plenary adopted an interim report on the 2028‑2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), with 370 votes in favour, 201 against and 84 abstentions, establishing its mandate for negotiations with the Council. Parliament’s two co-rapporteurs, Siegfried Mureșan (EPP, Romania) and Carla Tavares (S&D, Portugal), steered the report to adoption.

Parliament calls for the MFF to be set at 1.27 % of EU gross national income (GNI), corresponding to €1 789 billion in constant 2025 prices, with an additional 0.11 % of EU GNI (€149.3 billion) for the repayment of debt created by NextGenerationEU (NGEU) above the MFF ceilings. This represents a moderate increase of €175.1 billion in constant 2025 prices (approximately 10 %) compared with the Commission’s July 2025 proposal, to be allocated evenly across the three operational budget headings. The MFF constitutes the EU’s long-term budgetary plan setting a maximum level of spending (‘ceilings’) for each major category of expenditure (‘heading’) in accordance with Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

In its interim report, Parliament maintains its firm opposition to the merging of different policies in ‘one plan per Member State’, warning that it would weaken EU policies, reduce transparency and create unfair competition between beneficiaries. Under heading 1, Parliament calls for separate, sufficient and clearly ring-fenced funding for the common agricultural policy (€385.12 billion), cohesion policy (€274.34 billion), the common fisheries policy and the European Social Fund.

Parliament welcomes the significant reinforcement of the policies included in heading 2, recognising the need to boost the Union’s capacity to act in key strategic areas, such as competitiveness, defence and security, research and innovation, the twin transition, infrastructure, health and crisis preparedness, education and culture. Parliament stresses that the consolidation of programmes in the European competitiveness fund must not reduce transparency or limit its ability to ensure appropriate funding for specific policy objectives. Parliament proposes a total increase of €62.08 billion, including €26.6 billion in additional resources for the European competitiveness fund. Parliament calls for adequate reinforcement of priority programmes under heading 2 and earmarked funding for EU4Health and LIFE-related actions within the fund.

Under heading 3, Parliament requests €21.24 billion in additional resources, alongside clear and separate budget lines within the Global Europe Fund. Parliament underlines that its proposal represents the minimum amount the EU needs to meet its commitments, respond to citizens’ expectations and address major challenges.

Parliament expresses serious concerns that the Commission’s proposals shift key policy and budgetary decisions to Commission work programmes adopted without co‑legislative involvement, and stresses that simplification must not come at the expense of transparency, democratic accountability or Parliament’s oversight role. Parliament warns that the widespread use of financing not linked to costs could hinder proper auditing.

On the revenue side, Parliament reaffirms its strong commitment to introducing new genuine own resources not only for NextGenerationEU debt repayment but also to finance the Union’s enhanced policy ambitions. It is concerned by the absence of progress on the reform of the system of own resources in the Council since 2020, and calls on the Council to unblock the stalemate on a basket of new genuine own resources generating at least €60 billion per year. Parliament emphasises that the new sources should not harm the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises or of Europe as a whole. Parliament considers that the revenue potential of a digital services levy aimed at major digital platforms, an online gambling and betting services levy, the extension of the carbon border adjustment mechanism, and a levy based on a uniform call rate to the capital gains of crypto assets should all be explored as possible solutions if other proposed own resources fail to gain support among Member States.

The European Commission presented its proposals for the 2028‑2034 MFF on 16 July 2025. The Commission proposed a budget of almost €1.8 trillion in commitments over seven years (in constant 2025 prices), corresponding to 1.26 % of EU GNI, including 0.11 % of EU GNI for the repayment of the debt created by NGEU grants.

Following the adoption of its position, Parliament is now ready to start negotiations with the Council. The MFF regulation requires Parliament’s consent for approval, while the sectoral legislation will be agreed under the ordinary legislative procedure. Negotiations with the Council can begin once Member States agree on a common position. Parliament urges a swift agreement to be reached by the end of 2026 to allow for timely adoption and implementation of spending programmes from 1 January 2028.

OVERVIEW OF EPRS PUBLICATIONS ON THE 2028‑2034 MFF PACKAGE: AT A GLANCE NOTES:

• Karoline Kowald and Marianna Pari, 2028‑2034 EU budget: Parliament’s position
• Marianna Pari, 2028‑2034 EU budget: Comparing Parliament’s position with the Commission proposal

LEGISLATIVE BRIEFINGS:

• David Ashton and Pieter Baert, Single market and customs programme
• Bruno Bilquin and Eric Pichon, Global Europe instrument
• Krisztina Binder and Tarja Laaninen, Erasmus+
• Steven Blaakman, Union support for asylum, migration and integration
• Alessandro D’Alfonso, Karoline Kowald and Marin Mileusnic, National and regional partnership plans, European territorial cooperation and EU facility 2028‑2034
• Alessandro D’Alfonso, Marin Mileusnic and Tim Peters, Budget expenditure tracking and performance framework
• Alina Dobreva, System of own resources: Multiannual financial framework 2028‑2034
• Costica Dumbrava, Union support for the Schengen area, European integrated border management, and EU visa policy
• Clément Evroux, Horizon Europe 2028‑2034: 10th EU research and innovation framework programme
• Clément Evroux, Euratom research and training programme for the period 2028-2032
• Alina Georgescu, AgoraEU 2028‑2034: Funding for culture, media and EU values in the new multiannual financial framework
• Mathias Gullentops, Connecting Europe Facility 2028‑2034: Financing EU infrastructure networks
• Issam Hallak, European competitiveness fund
• Karoline Kowald and Marianna Pari, Next long-term EU budget: 2028‑2034 multiannual financial framework
• Gabija Leclerc, Support for associated overseas countries and territories, including Greenland
• Rafał Mańko, Justice programme 2028‑2034
• Rafał Mańko, Pericles 2028‑2034: Exchange, assistance and training for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting
• Vasilis Margaras, ERDF – Cohesion Fund and conditions for EU support to regional policy
• Marketa Pape, European Social Fund 2028‑2034
• Martina Prpic, Union support for internal security
• Nikolina Šajn, Regulation on the common agricultural policy for the period 2028 to 2034
• Frederik Scholaert, Conditions for EU support to the CFP (2028‑2034 programming period)
• Agnieszka Widuto, Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and Decommissioning
• Agnieszka Widuto, Nuclear decommissioning assistance programme of the Ignalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania
• Dessislava Yougova, Union Civil Protection Mechanism: 2028 2034 programming period

INITIAL APPRAISALS OF COMMISSION IMPACT ASSESSMENTS:

• Irmgard Anglmayer, Civil protection, preparedness and crisis response
• Irmgard Anglmayer and Esther Kramer, MFF 2028‑2034: Quality analysis of the Commission’s impact assessments
• Josefina Capdevila Penalva, Regulation establishing Global Europe
• Andriana Efthymiadou, Nationally pre-allocated envelopes
• Dieter Frizberg, Reinforcing competitiveness in the EU
• Esther Kramer, Single Market and Customs Programme
• Nikolaos Sarris, Budget expenditure-tracking and performance framework
• Mari Tuominen, The AgoraEU, Erasmus+ and Justice programmes

MONTHLY DIGEST:

• Balazs Hopp and András Schwarcz, Background information on the post-2027 MFF – April 2026
• Balazs Hopp and András Schwarcz, Background information on the post-2027 MFF – March 2026

FURTHER READING:

• Brief up-to-date state-of-play information on all legislative proposals of the 2028‑2034 MFF package: EPRS Legislative Train Spotlight on 2028‑2034 MFF package
• Legislative observatory, Interim report on the proposal for the multiannual financial framework for 2028‑2034 2025/0571R(APP)
• Website on the EU long-term budget by DG COMM of the European Parliament
• European Commission draft legislative proposals: The 2028‑2034 EU budget for a stronger Europe
• Interim report on the proposal for a Council regulation laying down the Multiannual Financial Framework for the years 2028 to 2034 (COM(2025)0571 – C10‑0000/2025 – 2025/0571R(APP)), adopted by the European Parliament on 28 April 2026 (A10‑0105/2026), co-rapporteurs: Siegfried Mureșan, Carla Tavares.

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Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

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Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Après un débat sur le site Hors-série avec Jean-Luc Mélenchon, la réflexion se poursuit ici, et notamment l'anticipation de ce que serait un pouvoir insoumis. Non pas, certes, pour célébrer prématurément, mais pour creuser plus profondément une indispensable expérience de pensée. Au cas où.

- La pompe à phynance / Élections, Mouvement de contestation, Parti politique, Politique

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Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Quelques heures après le défilé civile et militaire de la commémoration de la fête de l’indépendance le 27 avril, Faure Gnassingbé et une très forte délégation du gouvernement se sont envolés à Bichkek, capitale du Kirghizistan, bien loin en Asie Centrale.

Comme d’ordinaire, on annonce déjà des retombées de cette visite officielle par  des perspectives concrètes de coopération dans plusieurs secteurs stratégiques entre les deux pays.

Les Présidents Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé et Sadyr Japarov ont solennellement présidé , 29 avril 2026 à Bichkek, une cérémonie de signature de plusieurs accords et mémorandums d’entente dans huit domaines à savoir la diplomatie, l’économie numérique, la culture, les investissements, l’éducation, la santé, l’économie et l’agriculture. Ces instruments juridiques témoignent de la volonté commune des deux nations d’inscrire leur partenariat dans une dynamique durable, structurée et mutuellement bénéfique, fanfaronne-t-on. Combien de fois n’a-t-on pas vu , entendu des sornettes de ce genre? Combien de voyages officiels Faure Gnassingbé n’a-t-il pas fait depuis 21 ans qu’il régente le Togo? En quoi ce Togo a-t-il changé?

Figurez-vous,  Faure Gnassingbé est le premier dirigeant togolais à effectuer une visite au Kirghizistan selon les sources offcielles.Cela veut tout dire.S’il y avait quelque chose de précieux dans ce pays  en développement classé 118e selon l’indice de développement humain et le deuxième pays le plus pauvre d’Asie centrale après le Tadjikistan voisin, il ne serait pas le premier à   y mettre pied.

Pour rappel , le Kirghizistan est un pays d’Asie centrale, coincé et sans accès à la mer par  le Kazakhstan au nord, la Chine à l’est et au sud, le Tadjikistan au sud-ouest et l’Ouzbékistan à l’ouest.Il a accédé à son indépendance en 1991 avec la dislocation de l’Union Soviétique.

Et le pouvoir togolais a eu le toupet d’avancer que la rencontre entre le Président du Conseil du Togo et le Président de la République kirghize «ne relève ni d’un simple exercice de communication ni d’un effet d’annonce. Elle marque la continuité d’une doctrine cohérente, patiemment construite, qui positionne le Togo comme un acteur libre dans ses orientations diplomatiques.»

Dans un pays où tout manque cette visite folklorique est une villégiature de plus sur fond de gaspillage des ressources de l’État.

A Emo Kpota à Afangnan,  ville où est né Faure Gnassingbé, la population partage l’eau de rivière avec les animaux. Rien que les frais de missions et les billets d’avion de ces ministres accompagnateurs de M.Gnassingbé en Asie Centrale, auraient pu réaliser plusieurs forages pour soulager les populations qui manquent de tout partout au Togo. 

Honoré ADONTUI

LeCorrecteur

The post Kirghizistan, une villégiature de plus dans le 2ème pays le plus pauvre d’Asie appeared first on Togo Actualite - Premier site d'information du Togo.

A Matapan-foknál elszenvedett vereség sokkolta az olasz haditengerészetet, sokkal inkább, mint a fél évvel korábbi tarantói rajtaütés. Végképp nyilvánvalóvá vált, hogy a Royal Navy úgyszólván minden téren nagy fölényben van a Regia Marinával szemben. Az angolok felderítése, az alkalmazott technológiák, az éjszakai harcban és a légi-tengeri hadviselésben való jártasságuk egyaránt messze felülmúlta azt, amit az olaszok fel tudtak mutatni. Ezenkívül természetesen sokkal jobb volt a vezetésük is, de a Supermarina ezt persze nem tartotta szükségesnek bevenni a levonandó tanulságok közé.

Az olaszok nem próbálták, igaz, nem is tudták volna eltussolni a vereséget. A csatáról kiadott hivatalos közleményben elismerték a három cirkáló elvesztését, bár afféle szépségtapaszként hozzátették, az ellenség is elvesztett legalább egy cirkálót. Ha úgy vesszük, nem is lódítottak nagyot, hiszen a barchinók néhány nappal korábban tették tönkre a York cirkálót, néhány nappal később pedig német bombázók süllyesztették el a Bonaventura cirkálót, tehát az angoloknak is megvoltak a maguk veszteségei, még ha ezeknek nem is volt sok közük a matapáni csatához.

[...] Bővebben!

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Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP