Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Briefing Paper

Die deutsche Entwicklungshilfe steht auf dem Prüfstand. Experte Klingebiel hält die aktuelle Debatte für falsch. Entwicklungspolitik sei ein ganz wichtiges Instrument, um internationale Agenden mitgestalten zu können.

COVID-19-induced return migration occurred as an unanticipated course of action due to the pandemic’s adverse impact on migrant workers. The pandemic has undeniably increased the volume of return migration. This chapter, however, cautions against a covidization of return migration and argues that while the pandemic is currently the main reason cited, return migration even when migrants had not met their migration goals had been going on before the outbreak of COVID-19. The chapter uses a gendered lens to discuss the reasons for pre-COVID-19 return migration to a country, Zimbabwe, where people are desperately looking for ways to emigrate due to persistent economic hardships. For many Zimbabweans who have lived through the country’s long-drawn-out socio-economic and political difficulties, migration has become the most viable option. Yet, some of the Zimbabweans who managed to leave the country have returned to the essentially unimproved situation, thus raising questions as to why migrants would return when they have not met the goals of migration and the reasons for migration persist. The chapter shows that return migration is not necessarily influenced by improvement in factors that led to migration but may be an outcome of disappointment with circumstances in the destination country. The reasons for migration still play a role in return migration when migration to destination countries fails to meet migrants’ expectations that motivated migration in the first place. In this respect, return occurs due to multiple reasons that may be linked to both the origin and destination countries. The lack of better economic prospects in destination countries and ensuing gendered socio-cultural and psychological challenges both diminish the appeal of the specific destination country such that return becomes the best option.

Wer Ziele hat, muss diese auch messen können. Doch wie genau geschieht das bei so weitreichenden und umfassenden Vorhaben wie den 17 Zielen für nachhaltige Entwicklung (Sustainable Development Goals, SDGs)?

Bonn, 22.01.2024. Das Jahr 2024 tritt kein leichtes Erbe an. Der russische Angriffskrieg in der Ukraine zieht sich in die Länge. Der Krieg zwischen Israel und Hamas im Gaza-Streifen droht sich auf die Großregion des Nahen Ostens auszubreiten. Konflikte in Äthiopien, Jemen und der Sahel-Region destabilisieren Gesellschaften. Gleichzeitig tragen Schuldenkrisen in zahlreichen Niedrig- und Mitteleinkommensländern sowie die Klima- und Biodiversitätskrise zu fehlender sozialer Absicherung bei. Die resultierende Angst ist Nährboden autoritärer Parteien und Systeme.

Neben diesen Krisen birgt 2024 aber auch das Potential für Veränderung und Richtungswechsel: Es ist Wahljahr in über 70 Ländern, hiervon über 40 Demokratien. Mehr als 4,2 Milliarden Menschen, über die Hälfte der Weltbevölkerung, werden im Laufe des Jahres aufgefordert sein, zur Wahl zu gehen. So auch in einigen der bevölkerungsstärksten Nationen: Indien, den USA, Indonesien und Südafrika. Auch die Europäische Union wählt. Zählt man Wahlen auf kommunaler oder Provinzebene, wie in Brasilien, oder Wahlen in Autokratien wie Russland hinzu, so tritt ein Großteil der Bevölkerungen der seit dem 1. Januar 2024 erweiterten BRICS-Staatengruppe, ebenso wie die Wähler*innen im ‚alten Westen‘ – der USA und der Europäischen Union – an die Urnen. Der Startschuss fiel mit der Wahl in Bangladesch am 7. Januar, gefolgt von der Wahl in Taiwan am 13. Januar.

Eine von vielfältigen Krisen gebeutelte Weltgemeinschaft wählt - wenn auch unter unterschiedlichen Bedingungen. 2024 wird somit zeigen, welche Formen von Kooperation und Konkurrenz die Ausgestaltung einer multipolaren Weltordnung in Zukunft prägen werden. Es gilt, Dialog, gemeinsame Interessen und Zusammenhalt innerhalb und zwischen Gesellschaften und Weltregionen zu fördern und den Krisendynamiken im Sinne eines globalen Gemeinwohls beharrlich entgegenzutreten.

Zwei Ziele sollten im Jahr 2024 unser Handeln besonders leiten: Frieden und Demokratie.

Kriege beenden, politische Konfliktlösungen suchen: Ob in der Ukraine, dem Gaza-Streifen oder in der Sahel-Region – das Einstellen der militärischen Auseinandersetzungen und das Verhindern weiterer Ausbreitungen der Konflikte muss politische Priorität haben. Europa und Deutschland sollte ihre Unterstützung der Ukraine – auch unabhängig von den USA – aufrechterhalten und ausbauen sowie die EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen vorantreiben, während die Ukraine unabhängige und freie Wahlen sicherstellt. Im Gaza-Streifen sollte die internationale Gemeinschaft die beteiligten Akteure darin bestärken, der Gewalt ein Ende zu setzen und den Dialog zwischen Israel und Palästina für eine Zwei-Staaten-Lösung aufzunehmen.

Rechtsruck verhindern, Demokratien stärken: Die anstehenden Wahlen in den USA, der EU, Indien, Indonesien und Südafrika, sowie in der Türkei, Pakistan, Senegal, Ghana oder Mexiko entscheiden, ob die seit Jahren voranschreitenden Autokratisierungsprozesse und die Unterwanderung demokratischer Praxis zunehmen oder ausgebremst werden. Es bedarf dringend der Stärkung nicht-polarisierender Kräfte sowie multilateraler Systeme, der Anerkennung der Menschenrechte und des Einhaltens des internationalen Völkerrechts.

Deutschland, Europa, wir alle sollten uns unermüdlich für Frieden, Stabilität und eine freiheitliche multilaterale Ordnung einsetzen. Sowohl durch den sozialgerechten und klimastabilisierenden Umbau der Wirtschaftssysteme als auch im Schulterschluss mit strategischen Partnern aller Kontinente, die für das globale Gemeinwohl und eine nachhaltige Zukunft stehen.

Sozialgerechter & klimastabilisierender Umbau von Wirtschaftssystemen: Die Einigung auf eine „Abkehr von fossilen Brennstoffen“ im Kampf gegen die Klimakrise auf der COP28 im Dezember 2023 in Dubai und die Wiederbestätigung der Agenda 2030 im September 2023 in New York benötigen nun der rasanten Umsetzung, unterstützt durch die Reformen der Internationalen Finanzinstitutionen und eine massive Privatkapitalmobilisierung. Besondere Unterstützung ist notwendig für hochverschuldete Niedrig- und Mitteleinkommensländer.

Allianzen: Europa und Deutschland sollten gezielt Allianzen und Partnerschaften ausbauen – auch unabhängig von den USA und besonders mit Ländern Afrikas, Asiens und Lateinamerikas, die sich dem globalen Gemeinwohl entlang der Agenda 2030 der Vereinten Nationen und dem Pariser Klimaabkommen verpflichten. Gerade die Wahlen in den USA, Indien, Südafrika und Indonesien werden, wie auch bereits in Taiwan, hier richtungsweisend sein.

Das Jahr 2024 steht für Krisen und Kriege, sowie für Wahlen und einen möglichen Richtungswechsel. Dialog, politische Konfliktlösung und das Stärken bi-, tri- und multilateraler Kooperationen für eine freiheitliche und friedvolle globale Ordnung benötigen höchster politischer Priorität. Wir brauchen eine Weltinnenpolitik für globales Gemeinwohl.

The mushrooming of trade agreements and their interlinkages with environmental governance calls for new research on the trade and environment interface. The more than 700 existing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) include ever more diverse and far-reaching environmental provisions. While missed opportunities remain and harmful provisions persist, numerous environmental provisions in PTAs entail promising potential. They promote the implementation of environmental treaties and cover numerous environmental issues. New concepts, data, and methods, including detailed content analysis across multiple institutions, are needed to explain these interlinkages and understand whether and how PTAs with environmental provisions can contribute to tackling global environmental challenges. Making use of the most extensive coding of environmental provisions in PTAs to date and combining quantitative data with qualitative analyses, this Element provides a comprehensive yet fine-grained picture of the drivers and effects of environmental provisions in PTAs. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Despite the growing demand for gender-disaggregated statistics on poverty, there is no cross-country evidence of gender disparities in poverty because poverty – both monetary and multidimensional – is measured at the household level. This paper contributes to filling this gap, by using two novel individual-level indices of multidimensional poverty. Relying on recent data from 83 low- and middle-income countries, it finds that almost everywhere female poverty exceeds male poverty. In the median country, female poverty is between 57 and 76 percent higher than male poverty. Moreover, our calculations indicate that around 54 percent of the multidimensional poor are women: this percentage grows up to 63 percent if we focus on the extreme poor. Gender disparities in poverty are especially higher in the MENA and South Asia region, in rural areas and are mostly driven by disparities in employment. Finally, the paper shows that the majority of countries experienced an increase in the female/male multidimensional poverty ratio. In brief, we show that poverty is predominantly a female problem and that over the last two decades there has often been a feminization of poverty.

Current research on how energy vulnerability impacts the meaning of ‘home’, especially for those in marginalised groups, is limited. This research adds to the understanding of how high energy prices affect one of the most vulnerable sections of society: those at risk of or with experiences of homelessness. Through 15 in-person interviews with social housing tenants in Ireland who have recently exited homelessness, we find that high energy prices continue to affect the psychosocial benefits associated with ‘home’ in three different ways: 1) the constant pressure of monitoring energy expenses and lifestyle adjustments; 2) navigating the uncertainty of energy expenses and; 3) the impacts of negative emotions like stress and anxiety induced by high energy prices on tenants' fragile state of mental health and wellbeing. Based on the findings, we argue that living with high energy prices continues to interfere with the meaning of ‘home’ in an already vulnerable cohort, leading to deep senses of ontological insecurity. Therefore, specifically designed policy support is required to address energy vulnerability in people exiting homelessness, as ontological insecurity affects their mental and physical wellbeing, jeopardising their chances of a permanent transition from homelessness. Our findings indicate that perhaps a dual financial and social support system is needed to address the specific energy needs of vulnerable groups, that would provide intensive guidance for them as they settle into new routines and responsibilities. Policies to solve homelessness can be more impactful if they adequately address energy affordability-related challenges while a person transitions from homelessness.

Equal access to reliable information is essential for democracy and social cohesion. The rise of information pollution, particularly in digital spaces, poses significant challenges to democratic societies worldwide. While extensive research has focused on its impact in developed, English-speaking democracies, there is a gap in understanding its effects in younger democracies, conflict zones, and less developed contexts. This study fills that gap by analysing Mexico as a case study. Based on interviews with Mexican media professionals, public sector officials, academics and human rights defenders, the study provides insights on the root causes of the problem and and strategies to combat information pollution, safeguard democracy, and promote social cohesion, underscoring the urgency of proactive measures both within Mexico and on a global scale in Mexico, information pollution significantly threatens the country's social cohesion and democratic principles. Structural conditions like poverty, inequality, violence, corruption, and media landscape issues enable societal vulnerability to digital information pollution. Factors directly driving information pollution include the exploitation of digital spaces by drug cartels, divisive narratives against marginalised groups, an increasingly media-hostile environment as well as the incumbent government’s post-factual approach to reality and politics. Information pollution has fostered a polarised discours, contributed to eroding trust in traditional media and amplified identity-based societal cleavages. It weakens the deliberative, participatory and liberal dimensions of democracy dimensions by decreasing the quality of public debate, damaging civil society watchdog roles, and reducing government transparency and accountability. Recommendations for Mexico encompass enhancing public resilience to information through civic education and targeted communication campaigns, empowering media capacity, and fortifying an open data culture in the Mexican public sector. Internationally, efforts should address elite-driven information pollution by reinforcing independent accountability institutions and leveraging diplomatic and economic incentives against leaders attacking these institutions.

The work aimed to analyse the sustainability efforts – the greening – of five industry sectors in Brazil: aluminium, chemical, steel, cement, and oil and gas. These sectors were chosen because they are the industries with the highest carbon emissions. The research sought to verify the sustainability measures adopted by business and industry actors, with special emphasis on the use of Voluntary Sustainability Standards and ESG values. In order to verify the information provided by the companies, the documents that informed the measures taken by the companies and the numbers supporting their results were always sought out and explained in the text. The conclusions were that the sectors, guided by industry associations, have adopted a broad set of sustainability measures. The results of these measures, however, sometimes lack proof and sometimes lead to sporadic conduct, contrary to the precepts of environmental and social sustainability.

Resumo (Portuguese)
O trabalho teve como objetivo analisar os esforços de sustentabilidade de cinco setores da indústria brasileira: alumínio, químico, aço, cimento e petróleo e gás. Os setores foram escolhidos por serem altamente poluentes. A pesquisa buscou verificar as iniciativas de sustentabilidade dos setores, com especial ênfase no uso de normas voluntárias de sustentabilidade e de padrões ESG. A fim de comprovar a veracidade das informações prestadas pelas empresas, buscou-se sempre a identificação de documentos que formalizassem as ações das empresas e de números que comprovassem seus resultados. As conclusões foram que os setores, orientados por suas associações, adotam um conjunto amplo de medidas de sustentabilidade. Essas ações, entretanto, por vezes carecem de comprovação de resultados e não impedem a adoção esporádica de condutas contrárias aos preceitos de sustentabilidade ambiental e social.

The political changes in the international system in recent years have been profound. One decisive factor is the enormously increased role of actors from the Global South. India is of outstanding importance in this respect: the country itself is a  central shaper of international relations, it challenges unjust global governance structures, it uses its opportunities to act as the Voice of the Global South and, last but not least, it is a sought-after partner. All this is more than evident in 2023, when  India is using and shaping its G20 presidency very purposefully. India is doing a lot to put development issues on international agendas, including the agendas of Western actors. Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) can rightly  claim to be a major player and contributor in this context. With tremendous dynamism, it covers an enormous range of topics. It combines elements of a think tank with those of a do tank in an astonishing way (Klingebiel et al. 2023): Analysing, designing concepts, but using a hand on approach, for example when it comes to offering training programmes for people from other developing countries.

Die Zusammenhänge zwischen Friedens- und Entwicklungsprozessen und die Arbeit an dieser thematischen Schnittstelle sind immer komplexer geworden und werden unter dem Stichwort des „Development-Peace-Nexus“ diskutiert. Trotz der Versuche die verschiedenen Arbeitsbereiche zu harmonisieren und besser abzustimmen, folgen diese in der realpolitischen Praxis nicht immer einer stringenten Logik. Dies ist auch aufgrund der vielen sich inhaltlich überschneidenden Akteure eine Herausforderung.

መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች በቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና (ቴሙትስ) አማካኝነት የሥራ ዕድሎችን እና
ምርታማነትን የማሳደግ ከፍተኛ ምኞት አላቸው። ሥልጠናው በዋናነት የሥራ ገበያው የሚፈልገውን ሙያ
በማስተማር ብቃት ያለው የሰው ኃይል አቅርቦትን ማመቻቸት ይጠበቅበታል። እነዚሁ አካላት የቴክኒክና ሙያ
ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከሥራ ስምሪት ባሻገር አካታችነትን፣ የፆታ እኩልነትን እና ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን (social
cohesion) በኅብረተሰቡ ውስጥ እንደሚያሻሽል ይገምታሉ።
የሥራ እድል ተደራሽነት ፤ ማኅበራዊ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ውህደትን በማጎልበት እንዲሁም ተፈናቃዮችን መልሶ
በማቋቋም ረገድ ወሳኝ ሚናን ይጫወታል። በስደት ረዥም ጊዜ መቆየት እና ወደሶስተኛ አገር የሚደረጉ የቋሚ
መፍትሄ እድሎች ማሽቆልቆል፤ የስደተኞች የመጀመርያ መዳረሻ አገሮች ውስጥ ማኅበራዊ ውህደት (local
integration) ፍለጋን አነሳስቷል። ባለፉት አስርት ዓመታት የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከፍተኛ ትኩረትን
የሳበው ከዚህ አንፃር ነው።
የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና የእነዚህን መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች ምኞቶች ያሟላ ነው? በአጠቃላይ
በቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ላይ ያሉ ተጨባጭ ማስረጃዎች ውስን እና በአብዛኛው ወጥነት የሌላቸው
ናቸው። ከሥራና ከገቢ አንፃር ሲታይ ትንሽ አወንታዊ ውጤት እንዳለ መረጃዎች ቢጠቁሙም በአብዛኛው ውጤቶች
የሚታዩት ከመካከለኛ እስከ ረዥም ጊዜ (Medium and long term) ሲሆን፣ በአጠቃላይ ፕሮግራሞቹ ለረጅም ጊዜ
ሥራ አጦች በተሻለ ሁኔታ ይሰራሉ። ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና በማኅበራዊ ትስስር ዙሪያ
ሊያመጣ የሚችለውን ውጤት በተመለከተ ትልቅ የእውቀት ክፍተት አለ። በፖሊሲው ከተቀመጠው የገንዘብ
መጠን እና ከሚጠበቀው ከፍተኛ ግምት አንፃር፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና የተቀመጠለትን ዓላማ እንዴት
እንደሚያሳካ መረዳት አስፈላጊ ነው።
በዚህ የፖሊሲ ምክረ ሃሳብ በጀርመን ዓለም አቀፍ ትብብር ኤጀንሲ (ጂአይዜድ) አማካኝንት በኢትዮጵያ
የተተገበረውን ሁሉን አቀፍ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ጥናት ውጤት አቅርበናል። በዚህ ፕሮግራም ስደተኞችን
ተቀባይ ሀገር ነዋሪዎች እና ስደተኞች በጋራ ስልጠናውን የተከታተሉ ሲሆን፣ ዓላማውም ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን
ማጎልበት እና የሥራ እድሎችን ማመቻቸት ነው።
የጥናቱ ውጤቶቹ እንደሚያመለክቱት፣ በማኅበራዊ ትስስር በኩል የታዩ ተፅእኖዎች በብዙ ገፅታ ጥሩ ቢሆኑም፣
ከገቢ እና ከሥራ እድል አንጻር ውጤቶቹ ዝቅተኛ እና የተወሰኑ ግለሰቦች ላይ ያተኮሩ ናቸው። አሃዛዊ እና አሃዛዊ
ያልሆኑ (quantitative and qualitative) ማስረጃዎች የሚጠቁሙት ስልጠናው የማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሳደግ
እንደሚረዳ ነው፡፡ ከፕሮግራም ዲዛይን ወይም ከአፈጻጸም ችግሮች በላይ እንደ የሥራ እድሎች ውስንነት፣ የሕግ
ማቆዎች እና የፆታ እኩልነትን መሰረት ያደረገ እድል ያለመኖር እና የመሳሰሉ በመዋቅራዊ ችግሮች ስልጠናው
በስራ እድል ፈጠራ በኩል ውጤታማ እንዳይሆን ዋና መሰናክል ሆነው ይታያሉ።
የጥናቱ ዋና ዋና ምክረ ሃሳቦች፥

•  የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) ሲታቀድ ጥንቃቄ በተሞላበት ጥናት ማለትም፤ ከጉልበት

ገበያው አቅም እና ከህግ ማእቀፉ አንጻር በበቂ ሁኔታ መታየት አለበት፡፡ በተለይ የሥራ እድሎችን
ከመፍጠር አንጻር ይህ በጣም ወሳኝ ነው፡፡

• ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል ፤ አካታች የሆነ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና ውጤታማ መሣሪያ ሆኖ

ይስተዋላል። ነገር ግን ማኅበራዊ ትስስር ፣ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እንደ ተጨማሪ ውጤት ብቻ ሳይሆን
የስልጠናው ዋና ዓላማ ሆኖ የሚውሰድ ከሆነ፤ “ሌሎች የተሻሉ አማራጮች አልነበሩም ወይ?” የሚል
ጥያቄ ያስነሳል፡፡ በተለይ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እና ከገቢ አንጻር በተያያዘ ባለን ማስረጃ መሰረት ጥያቄውን
የበለጠ አስፈላጊ ያደርገዋል።

•  አካታች የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) መርሃ ግብር የሚያመጣውን ለውጥ በተመለከተ፣ ሰፋ ያሉ

ተጨማሪ ጥናቶችን ይፈልጋል። መሞላት ካለባቸው የእውቀት ክፍተቶች መካከል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ሥልጠና
በስደተኞች ላይ የሚያሳድረው ተጽዕኖ፣ ሊያስከትል የሚችለውን አሉታዊ እና አወንታዊ ተጽዕኖ፤ ሊያስከትል
የሚችለው ማኅበራዊ ተጽዕኖ፣ እንዲሁም በፆታ በኩል እና ከመካከለኛ እስከ የረዥም ጊዜ ያለው የሥራ እድል
ፈጠራ እና ገቢ ላይ የሚኖሩት ውጤቶች ይገኙበታል።

In pursuit of employment opportunities and increased productivity, governments and donors have the highest ambitions for technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems. Most prominently, TVET is expected to facilitate access to employment and a qualified workforce by offering its graduates skills that the labour market demands. Beyond its employment impacts, TVET supporters also anticipate that it will improve societal outcomes such as inclusion, gender equality and social cohesion.

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and to foster socio-economic integration. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement opportunities have spurred the quest for local integration in countries of first asylum. It is in this context that TVET has gained additional salience in the past decade.

Does TVET live up to these promises? Overall, systematic empirical evidence on the impact of TVET is limited and often inconsistent. In terms of employment and income, evidence suggests that there is a small positive effect, but time plays an important factor. Often, impacts are only seen in the medium- to long-term, and in general, programmes tend to work better for the long-term unemployed. Evidence of societal effects is even more limited; there is a large gap of knowledge on the potential social cohesion impacts of TVET. Given the amount of funding and the high expectations found in the policy discourse, it is essential to better understand if and how TVET measures contribute to achieving their self-declared goals.

In this brief, we present the results of an accompanying research study of an inclusive TVET programme implemented by the German development cooperation organisation Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Ethiopia. In this programme, host and refugee participants are jointly trained, with the explicit goals of fostering social cohesion and improving employment opportunities.

The results indicate that while the social cohesion effect seems remarkable on several dimensions, the income and employment effect is at best weak and materialises only for specific groups of individuals. Qualitative and quantitative evidence supports the validity of the approach to achieve social cohesion. More than design or implementation problems, the lack of stronger employment effects appears to be driven by structural context conditions like limited labour market absorption capacity, legal work permission constraints, gender barriers and similar hindering factors.

We derive the following main recommendations from the analysis:

• TVET measures need a careful context analysis (including labour market capacities, legal work barriers) to ensure that the necessary conditions for TVET to succeed are in place. This is particularly relevant in terms of employment effects, which appear to be elusive.
• Inclusive TVET measures seem to be an effective tool to improve social cohesion. However, if social cohesion effects are valued not just as an “add-on” to employment effects but as primary goals, the question arises if alternative interventions might be more efficient. This question is particularly salient given the modest evidence regarding employment and income effects.
• The evidence base of the impact of (inclusive) TVET programmes needs to be expanded. Knowledge gaps that need to be closed include TVET’s impact on displaced populations, its potential societal effects, differential gender effects, and medium- to long-term employment and income effects.

Development finance is at a turning point, as the macroeconomic environment has changed profoundly and the financing gap for low- and middle-income countries has widened. The events that led to this new situation are the multiple crises that the global economy is facing, such as the climate crisis, the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine. As a result, interest rates have risen sharply over the past year and are not expected to decline anytime soon. High interest rates further restrict low- and middle-income countries’ access to international financial markets by making borrowing more expensive. At the same time, debt levels in several countries are rising to levels that are almost impossible to repay. Poorer countries find themselves in a trap where financing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) becomes a distant goal for them.
To “get back on track” in financing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, a number of reform proposals have been put forward within several processes and initiatives, including the Financing for Development (FfD) process, the Bridgetown Initiative and the Macron-led Paris Summit. Despite being initiated by different actors, these proposals all highlight the importance of reforming the international financial architecture in view of the changed macroeconomic environment. The Hamburg Sustainability Conference in June 2024, the United Nation’s Summit of the Future in 2024 and the next FfD Conference in 2025 should be used to strengthen and accelerate ongoing reform processes and come up with new, innovative and bold proposals to reshape development finance in these challenging times. Against the background of the multiple crises and its effects, our key recommendations for the reform of development finance are as follows.
First, new initiatives and frameworks are needed to provide urgent debt relief and restructuring for highly indebted countries. The international community should promote a reformed G20 Common Framework for debt restructuring and discuss a green Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)-like initiative for debt relief for low-income countries as a solution on a case-by-case basis, integrating short-term shock remedies with long-term sustainable development finance. Debt and climate risks should be addressed simultaneously by better incorporating climate risks in debt sustainability analyses conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and by considering the volume of investments in climate adaptation because these investments reduce the risks associated with climate change.
Second, tax revenues – the most important source of development finance – need to increase and countries need to expand their fiscal space by reforming their tax administrations and policies. Building fiscal buffers can help countries to become more resilient to future crises. In the short run, eliminating unnecessary tax expenditures such as fossil fuel subsidies is the lowest-hanging fruit to increase tax revenues, while in the long run, more green fiscal reforms (e.g. carbon pricing and environmental taxes) are needed, as well as more effective international tax cooperation. In addition, donor funds should be increased to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to tax and customs administrations.
Third, the Development Assistance Committee member countries should at least halve the gap between their current contributions and the official development assistance (ODA) contribution target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income by 2026, and reach the full attainment of the target by 2030. In particular, donors need to provide ODA in addition to (not as a substitute for) climate finance and channel more ODA to the poorest countries. In this regard, donors should report climate and development finance separately to mitigate the risk of over-reporting.
Fourth, we recall the need to reform multilateral development banks (MDBs). The multiple crises have made the role of MDBs in closing the development financing gap even more important than before. As attracting private capital is becoming more difficult for low- and middle-income countries, MDBs should harness their proven ability to leverage private finance for financing the SDGs. MDBs should substantially increase their lending capacity, for example by lowering their equity to loan thresholds and raising additional capital from shareholders or private investors. MDBs should be reformed to include in their vision the provision of global public goods, such as tackling the climate crisis and preparing for pandemics. Development banks and private creditors should include clauses on natural disasters and pandemics in their financing instruments.

The social fragmentation of societies is one of the greatest challenges for peace, democracy and human rights worldwide. For some years now, observers have been witnessing ever-stronger tendencies towards social division, also in Western societies, which had been believed to be united for so long. Rising inequality, the rejection of previously shared values and growing scepticism towards public institutions suggest that social cohesion is at risk. Against this background, it seems more important than ever to understand what factors hold a society together – and when such cohesion is most vulnerable. Protecting and strengthening social cohesion has therefore become an objective of many activities at the local, national and international levels, and academics have started to develop methodologies on how to measure social cohesion (see, with further references: Leininger et al., 2021).
This paper aims:
• to give a systematic overview of the literature on African concepts of social cohesion;
• to introduce the discourse around African concepts and to see which relevant concepts of social cohesion can be located in African societies;
• to analyse in more detail some key African concepts and their core elements and to see which conceptual dimensions and insights on determinants of social cohesion differ from the mainstream, while inviting scholars to add further to this listing; and, in particular
• to gain a better understanding of the academic discourse on social cohesion in Africa by analysing the concepts, determinants, origins and context of social cohesion theories as well as the risk of Western bias in identifying concepts for social cohesion in the African context.
One of the questions that inspired the present research project is how we could better understand which relevant concepts of social cohesion in African societies are particularly emphasised by African scholars and how “Western” concepts of social cohesion relate to the various African academic approaches to the topic. Further research questions that were raised in the context of the present paper are:
• How can traditional knowledge and African social theories contribute towards contextualising the debate on social cohesion in Africa?
• What are the key aspects of the concepts of social cohesion in selected African countries, and how can these be analysed?
• How did pre-colonial societies in Africa understand social cohesion, and what insights can be gained from this?
Methodologically, we identify and analyse concepts within the African context in order to gain insights into basic elements of social cohesion. This literature review draws on different sources such as ethnophilosophy, political philosophy, religion, culture, economics and international discourses. This literature review is the first part of an assessment of concepts of social cohesion in Africa. It is followed by a systematic comparison of social cohesion concepts in specific African countries.
The academic benefit is to identify the current state of research on social cohesion in Africa, to identify the need for further research and to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon of social cohesion. In addition, we aim to deliver developmental value through these publications by helping decision-makers come to evidence-based decisions and synthesise as well as make use of scientific evidence for development practice.

The evidence generated and used in development cooperation has changed remarkably over the last decades. When it comes to the field of democracy support, these developments have been less significant. Routinised, evidence-based programming is far from a reality here. Compared to other fields, the goals of the interventions and assumed theories of change remain underspecified. Under these circumstances, evaluating and learning is difficult, and as a result, evidence gaps remain large and the translation of evidence into action often unsuccessful. This is particularly dramatic at a time when this field is regaining attention amid global autocratisation trends. In this article, we analyse the specific barriers and challenges democracy support faces to generate and use evidence. Furthermore, we identify evidence gaps and propose impact-oriented accompanying research as an evaluation approach that can make a significant contribution towards advancing the evidence agenda in this field.

Deutschland sei den Vereinten Nationen (VN) beigetreten, so damals Willy Brandt vor der VN-Generalversammlung, um „auf der Grundlage unserer Überzeugungen und im Rahmen unserer Möglichkeiten […] weltpolitische Mitverantwortung zu übernehmen.“ Wird Deutschland 50 Jahre später diesem Anspruch gerecht? So grob scheinen die Parameter zu stimmen, Deutschland ist zweitgrößter Beitragszahler zum VN-Entwicklungssystem. Ein näherer Blick darauf, wie Deutschland die VN-Politik im Bereich nachhaltige Entwicklung bespielt, liefert jedoch ein ambivalentes Bild. Deutschland agiert in den VN oft eher unauffällig, auch dort, wo es Initiativen ergreift. Als Mittelmacht könnte und sollte Deutschland stärker engagiert sein, gerade in geopolitisch zunehmend schwierigen Zeiten. Statt die VN im Wesentlichen als Partner für die Umsetzung von Nothilfe und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu sehen, sollten die VN stärker als Institution und Plattform für eine globale Nachhaltigkeitskooperation genutzt werden, wie dies auch vom globalen Süden stärker eingefordert wird.

What triggers municipalities to engage in revenue bargaining with citizens and what strategies do they use? These questions are explored here based on a comparative case study design in Mozambique which include more than 100 interviews with representatives from public administration, political institutions and civil society in 11 municipalities. The results indicate that there are two particularly strong triggers for municipalities’ efforts to engage with citizens in revenue bargaining: the unreliability of the fiscal transfer system and political competition. Furthermore, in terms of strategies the results show that municipalities’ outreach activities remain predominantly unidirectional and limited, whereby they are largely unsuccessful in engaging revenue providers broadly in a bargaining process. Also, some doubts arise concerning ownership and sustainability of initiatives when they appear to be driven by external actors, in particular by donors. Finally, civil society organizations are identified as generally too weak to play an essential role as third party supporting and coordinating revenue providers’ voices. Overall, the results provide insights into the predisposition of government to conduct revenue bargaining, but also point to the preconditions required for meaningful revenue bargaining to emerge and influence the definition of new fiscal contracts.

Bonn, 20. November 2023. Der Krieg in Gaza, den die Hamas am 7. Oktober begonnen hat, wird wahrscheinlich keinen Sieger haben. Nur ein sofortiger und andauernder Waffenstillstand kann das Leiden der Zivilbevölkerung beenden und die Freilassung der Geiseln ermöglichen. Die Planung für die Zeit danach muss jetzt beginnen, damit sich ein solch schrecklicher Krieg nicht wiederholt.

Dazu bedarf es einer politischen Lösung, um die gegenseitige Gewalt im Nahostkonflikt zu beenden, und eines intensiven Staatsaufbauprogramms für Palästina. Die Vereinigten Staaten als Israels wichtigster Beschützer und Sponsor werden beide Prozesse unterstützen müssen. Auch die europäischen Regierungen und die EU haben eine wichtige Rolle zu spielen.

Politisch gesehen hat der Gaza-Krieg die Szenarien für die künftigen israelisch-palästinensischen Beziehungen in den Mittelpunkt gerückt. Paradoxerweise hat der Krieg die Zwei-Staaten-Lösung wahrscheinlicher gemacht, während Ein-Staaten-Szenarien zunehmend unrealistisch erscheinen.

Israelische Extremisten träumen schon lange von einer Einstaatenlösung, bei der die Palästinenser aus dem Gazastreifen und dem Westjordanland nach Ägypten und Jordanien vertrieben würden. Diese Position hat sich in den letzten Jahren in Israel immer mehr durchgesetzt, da ihre Befürworter sogar der Regierung angehören. Abgesehen von den moralischen und rechtlichen Implikationen, die Zerstörung Palästinas liegt nicht im Interesse Israels. Ägypten und Jordanien haben eine klare Haltung zu den palästinensischen Flüchtlingen, und israelische Versuche, sie auszuweisen, würden ihre Friedensverträge gefährden. Jegliche Hoffnung auf eine Normalisierung der Beziehungen zur arabischen Welt würde zunichte gemacht, und die langfristige Sicherheit und Unabhängigkeit Israels wäre grundlegend gefährdet. Außerdem würde ein solcher Schritt große Proteste in den westlichen Ländern auslösen und damit die Unterstützung der westlichen Regierungen für die Sicherheit Israels und sogar dessen Legitimität gefährden.

Die andere, von Liberalen erträumte Einstaatenlösung, bei der Juden, Muslime und Christen in einer multiethnischen Demokratie zusammenleben, ist noch unwahrscheinlicher. Der Gaza-Krieg hat die jüngsten Forderungen nach einer säkularen Demokratie als hoffnungslose Utopie erscheinen lassen. In jedem Fall hat die demografische Realität der wachsenden palästinensischen Bevölkerung Debatten darüber ausgelöst, ob der jüdische Staat und die Demokratie in dem von Israel kontrollierten Gebiet vereinbar sind.

Der Gaza-Krieg hat auch gezeigt, dass das derzeitige Szenario, in dem Israel die palästinensischen Gebiete besetzt hält und die Grenzen, die Bewegungsfreiheit, die Einkommensquellen und die Wohnungen der Palästinenser kontrolliert, unhaltbar ist. Es sieht allmählich nach einer Minderheitenherrschaft Israels über eine größere palästinensische Bevölkerung aus, die zunehmend auf Repression angewiesen ist. Der Besatzung ist es nicht gelungen, die Palästinenser zu unterwerfen, sondern sie hat ein Umfeld geschaffen, in dem eine terroristische Organisation wie die Hamas gedeihen könnte und sich zu einer ernsthaften Bedrohung für Israel entwickelt hat.

Alles, was bleibt, ist eine Zweistaatenlösung in den Grenzen von 1967, wie sie in den Osloer Abkommen von 1993 vereinbart wurde. Dafür müssen die israelischen Siedler das Westjordanland verlassen. Andere Streitpunkte, einschließlich des Status von Jerusalem als heilige Stadt für alle Nachkommen Abrahams, müssen einvernehmlich gelöst werden.

Den Vereinigten Staaten kommt die Hauptrolle bei der Aushandlung einer Zweistaatenlösung zu. Europa wird aufgrund seiner Nähe und seines Wohlstands eine wichtige Rolle dabei spielen, dass diese Lösung Bestand hat. Die meisten EU-Mitgliedstaaten unterstützen das Szenario, auch wenn dies heute in weiter Ferne zu liegen scheint.

Immense Anstrengungen sind nötig, um langfristig den Staatsaufbau und damit den Frieden zu sichern – und der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik kommt dabei eine wichtige Rolle zu. Eine internationale Entwicklungskonferenz über die Zukunft Palästinas sollte so bald wie möglich stattfinden. Es muss eine Reihe von Prioritäten vereinbart werden. Am dringlichsten ist eine Strategie zum Aufbau einer palästinensischen politischen Führung und von Regierungsinstitutionen, wahrscheinlich unter Aufsicht der UN. Weiter sind Pläne für den Wiederaufbau, die Infrastruktur und Investitionen erforderlich, einschließlich der physischen Verbindungen zwischen dem Gazastreifen und dem Westjordanland, der Unterstützung des sozialen Zusammenhalts nach dem Konflikt und für die wichtigsten Wirtschaftssektoren, auch mit Hilfe eines neuen Handelsabkommens mit der EU. Finanzmittel müssen bereit stehen und Partner aus dem öffentlichen und privaten Sektor im Westen, in Asien und in der arabischen Welt mobilisiert sein.

Keine dieser Bedingungen für eine politische Zweistaatenlösung und einen Staatsaufbau für Palästina ist neu oder radikal. Sie spiegeln bestehende Verpflichtungen Israels, der Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde, der Vereinigten Staaten, der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten sowie der arabischen Nachbarn Israels wider. Der Gaza-Krieg hat gezeigt, dass diese Verpflichtungen den einzigen vernünftigen Ausweg aus der Gewaltspirale zwischen Israelis und Palästinensern bieten. Es ist an der Zeit, dass die europäischen Regierungen und die EU Israelis und Palästinenser dabei unterstützen, eine Zweistaatenlösung zu verwirklichen.

Does the length of time passing between elections and the announcement of elections results increase the risk of post-election violence? The declaration of official election results is a crucial moment in the electoral cycle. When electoral management bodies (EMBs) take longer than expected to announce official election results, it can signal to the opposition that the election is being stolen. Following this logic, this paper argues that the length of time between elections and the announcement of the official results acts as a signal of possible voter fraud, thereby increasing incentives for post-election violence. Hence, the paper hypothesises that a long length of time between elections and the announcement of official results increases the risk of post-election violence. This hypothesis is examined with an original dataset of election results declarations in African countries from 1997 to 2022. After controlling for important confounders that could influence delays in reporting and violence, the article empirically demonstrates that a longer length of time between elections and the announcement of official election results increases the risk of post-election violence. In doing so, this paper makes a significant contribution to studies of elections, and electoral violence. Its provision of a new dataset on election results declarations in African countries is also a significant contribution.