Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Analysen

This chapter assesses the political impact of the Sustainable Development Goals on global governance. We start by discussing the range of expectations for global governance arrangements, considering the stated objectives of the goals. We then assess the early performance of governance arrangements in terms of shifts in policy and practice against these expectations. Our research shows the impact of the Sustainable Development Goals is largely discursive, with limited transformative outcomes on governance practices. The High-level Political Forum, created to assess global progress towards the implementation of the goals, has failed to provide political leadership and promote coherence across the United Nations system. Our research also shows that the Sustainable Development Goals initiated peer-learning among governments and other actors, yet with limited evidence that this has led to structural transformation towards sustainability. As certain ambitions of the Global Goals have been part of ongoing debates in global governance, our review finally highlights that observable changes often reflect long-term reform trajectories that are not causally linked to the launch of the goals.

This paper examines whether heterogeneities in financial development among Vietnamese provinces matter for firm growth in Vietnam. Using a nationally representative firm survey that covers more than 41,000 firms for the period 2009 − 2013, we estimate the impact of provincial financial development on the growth rates of firms by accounting for sectoral differences in growth opportunities. We find that province-level financial development promotes the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per worker of small firms, and reduces the growth rate of the wage-to-sales ratio. Our results imply that firms grow faster in provinces with a higher level of financial development. Moreover, the effect of financial development on growth rates is larger when firms operate in sectors with better growth opportunities.

Social cohesion has recently gained increasing attention in academic and policy circles. Apart from being a necessary feature of stable societies per se, social cohesion is also a key factor for sustainable economic development. One potential means through which social cohesion could foster economic development is by enhancing financial development. In this paper, we examine whether social cohesion is significantly associated with firms’ access to finance in Africa. To this end, we use a recently constructed dataset on social cohesion in Africa, which is based on the Afrobarometer survey and the Varieties of Democracy database. The dataset contains indices for the three pillars of social cohesion – trust, inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good. Combining this dataset with that of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, we build a sample which covers more than 12,500 firms and 27 African countries. Our results show that all three components of social cohesion are positively associated with at least one measure of firms’ access to external finance. In particular, trust – but not inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good – is significantly associated with the likelihood that firms have a checking or savings account, or are financially constrained. When we measure access to finance with respect to having a line of credit or a loan from a financial institution, all the three pillars of social cohesion, including inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good, are related to access to finance. The results are robust to addressing endogeneity concerns using a heteroskedasticity-based identification strategy. Overall, our results suggest that improving social cohesion (e.g. through social protection, education, strengthening civil society organisations) could do more than hold society together; it could also promote access to finance, growth of firms, and thus economic development and job creation.

Deutschland und das Vereinigte Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland (UK) sind im Hinblick auf Ausgaben für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (Official Development Assistance – ODA) die zweit- bzw. viertgrößten Geber weltweit. Bei internationalen politischen Debatten über globale Entwicklung in der Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (OECD), der G7, der G20 und anderen wichtigen Zusammenschlüssen und Plattformen sind die beiden Länder zudem wichtige Akteure. Die Entwicklungspolitik beider Länder hat sich im ersten Jahrzehnt dieses Jahrtausends stark angenähert und es kam zu einer umfangreichen Zusammenarbeit. In dieser Zeit begannen die westlichen Länder die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit als erhebliche Quelle von Soft Power zu begreifen, was sich in steigenden Entwicklungsbudgets und aneinander angeglichenen politischen Ausrichtungen bemerkbar machte. Die Austeritätspolitik im Anschluss an die globale Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise und die Entscheidung des Vereinigten Königreichs 2016, die Europäische Union (EU) zu verlassen, haben die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und dem Vereinigten Königreich im Bereich der Entwicklungspolitik vor große Herausforderungen gestellt. Mit dem Austritt des Vereinigten Königreichs aus der EU hat sich die Zahl der gemeinsamen Maßnahmen und entsprechenden Möglichkeiten für Kooperationsinitiativen verringert. Nach der Hälfte des Zeitraums, der für die Umsetzung der Agenda 2030 vorgesehen ist, richten beide Länder ihre Entwicklungspolitik neu aus und arbeiten daran, ihre künftige Rolle in Europa und ihre globalen Entwicklungsambitionen festzulegen. Dennoch bleiben sie wichtige Partner im globalen Entwicklungssektor. Sowohl das Vereinigte Königreich als auch Deutschland haben ihre entwicklungspolitischen Strategien jüngst als Teil ihrer integrierten Außenpolitik angepasst oder sind dabei, solche Strategien zu erarbeiten. Die Auswirkungen des vor einigen Monaten ausgebrochenen Krieges in der Ukraine machen jedoch Anpassungen dieses Prozesses erforderlich. Es spricht nach wie vor viel für einen regelmäßigen Austausch und eine entwicklungspolitische Zusammenarbeit zwischen beiden Ländern, nicht zuletzt auch durch eine Intensivierung des Dialogs und die Wiederaufnahme gegenseitiger Abordnungen zwischen dem britischen Ministerium für Auswärtiges, Commonwealth und Entwicklung (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office – FCDO) und dem Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ). Vor allem zwei Bereiche bieten gute Perspektiven. Erstens sollten Deutschland und das Vereinigte König-reich eng zusammenarbeiten, um die Agenda der aktuellen G7-Präsidentschaft umzusetzen. Der Schwerpunkt auf Investitionen in Infrastrukturprojekte, der schon während der britischen G7-Präsidentschaft im vergangenen Jahr gesetzt wurde, sollte beibehalten werden. Weitere wichtige Möglichkeiten der Zusammenarbeit bestehen in den Bereichen Gleichstellung und Klimaschutz sowie bei der Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter. Zweitens sollten Deutschland und das Vereinigte Königreich darum bemüht sein, sich im Rahmen der OECD zu engagieren und ihre Rolle als Institution, die mit der Erarbeitung wichtiger Standards für die internationale Entwicklungspolitik betraut ist und ein wichtiges Forum für wechselseitiges Lernen darstellt, zu unterstützen. Da beide Länder wichtige Geldgeber für die globale Entwicklungsfinanzierung sind, ist die Legitimität des Berichtssystems der OECD von wesentlicher Bedeutung dafür, ihren Einfluss im globalen Entwicklungssektor geltend zu machen und einen entsprechenden Beitrag zu leisten.

In striving to achieve the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda, governments have the opportunity to implement their climate and sustainability goals more coherently. Such coherence requires the coordination of interdependent policies across different policy fields, sectors and actors. This paper explores how governments design and implement synergic solutions to concomitantly achieve both international agendas. With the empirical cases of Germany and South Africa, we investigate two independent approaches to the synergic solution of a just energy transition, whereby countries aim to phase out coal as a means to tackle climate change while also ensuring that the achievement of other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is not hindered. Methodologically, we apply a deductive qualitative approach consisting of literature review, semi-structured interviews, and content analysis. To that end, we examine relevant policies and institutional arrangements by applying a combined conceptual framework of energy justice and just transition in both countries. We find major challenges in overcoming environmental, economic and social burdens of the coal phase-out, especially related to jobs and inequality (SDGs 8, 10) and the Water-Energy-Food-Land nexus (SDGs 2, 6, 7, 15). Through the selection of Germany and South Africa, we illustrate how countries with different political, social and economic backgrounds strive to manage such a transition. Our developed framework and case-studies’ findings point towards important considerations when designing just energy transition pathways, such as ensuring inclusiveness in decision-making, thoroughly assessing social, economic and environmental impacts, and adequately coordinating across different actors and the local, provincial and national levels.

Der russische Krieg in der Ukraine hat Auswirkungen auf die Weltpolitik. Russland, China und der Westen wetteifern um Einfluss im Globalen Süden.

If asked in which international arena the great power conflict over global order has become most salient in recent years, most would probably point to the United Nations Human Rights Council or the Security Council. In contrast, the U.N.’s development cooperation has so far been spared diplomatic conflicts of similar intensity. But as China has become more articulate about “building international relations of a new type” which will be less dominated by Western powers and norms and give greater voice to developing states, tensions are rising in this field too. It was a major success for China when in 2019 a Chinese candidate, Qu Dongyu, was elected director-general of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Three years into Qu’s tenure, a worrisome, multi-pronged diplomatic brawl has erupted between FAO leadership and Western members, highlighting the challenging path for China toward a new type of international relations.

Urbanisation offers great potential for Africa’s economic and social development: citizens earn twice as much in large cities compared to rural areas, and young urbanites receive on average between 2.5 and 4 years more education than their rural  counterparts. At the same time, the rapid rise of the urban population is putting a strain on Africa’s cities. While on average, city dwellers have better access to services than their rural counterparts, more than half of all citizens in sub-Saharan  African metropolises live in informal settlements without adequate access to basic infrastructure. Citizens have long demanded participation in urban governance that goes beyond elections in order to voice their concerns. Although participatory  processes have become increasingly evident in many African countries in some cities and neighbourhoods, they are still far from being institutionalised at scale. This policy brief asks why participatory approaches have not been successful thus far and analyses the challenges regarding a political mobilisation of civil society organisations (CSOs), which often face weak and fragmented state institutions. It argues that participatory processes need to be thoroughly embedded in politics in order to move beyond  particularistic gains towards a structural improvement of relations between citizens, CSOs, and local governments.

The governance of ocean and polar regions is among the most relevant challenges in the combat against global environmental degradation and global inequalities. Ocean and polar regions are climate regulators and very much affected by climate change. They are an important source of nutrition for life in and above the sea. At the same time, they are subject to an increasing number of geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. Due to the lasting virulence of many security issues, economic conflicts, legal disputes, new technological developments and environmental crises in global marine areas as well as the intricate overlap of sovereign, semi-sovereign and global commons territories, the relevance of ocean and polar governance is bound to rise: as frontiers both in global competitive strategies as well as most fragile eco-systems whose collapse would have catastrophic consequences. This thematic issue sketches important trends in research on ocean and polar governance, and identifies avenues for future research. In this editiorial, we first provide an overview of governance challenges for ocean and polar regions and their relevance for geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. In a second step, we present the eight contributions that make up the thematic issue by clustering them around three themes: the impact of (re-)territorialisation on governance and the construction of authority, the effectiveness of regimes of ocean and polar governance, and, challenges to norm-creation in ocean governance.

Europe is facing some heat. Literally – with another heat wave grasping the continent – and figuratively with threats to the global order through Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Profound shifts are happening – with political answers too quick for some, and painfully slow when looking at evidence on the ultimate challenge: human-made climate change and its effects. We have seen indicators for disruptive change in the global order before: terrorism (after 2001), a financial crisis (2008), a global pandemic (since 2020), and, after a long build-up, the drastic effects of a climate crisis coming into focus with numerous extreme weather events. This blog is about the future of globalisation, in times of uncertainties and while we find ourselves with multiple challenges in a volatile, if not “reeling global order”. Let’s get to the fundamental then.

Die Weltwirtschaft steuert in Richtung ökologischer Nachhaltigkeit. Aufgrund einer immer stringenteren umwelt- und klimapolitischen Regulierung setzen sich neue nachhaltige Techno­logien und Geschäftsmodelle durch. Diese wiederum verändern Wettbewerbs­bedingungen und Standortvorteile. Kluge Strukturpolitik antizipiert solche Veränderungen; sie lenkt und fördert die heimische Wirtschaft dahingehend, dass sie frühzeitig die Chancen dieses Strukturwandels nutzt. Das gilt auch für die Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungsförderung in der Entwicklungs­zusammenarbeit. Mit einer Fokussierung auf ökologische Strukturpolitik als Entwicklungsmotor könnte die deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ihr in Teilbereichen – z. B. Förderung erneuerbarer Energien, Ökostandards in Lieferketten – bereits angelegtes besonderes Profil weiter ausbauen. Im vorliegenden Impulspapier schlagen wir sieben Themen vor, die in Zukunft ein stärkeres Gewicht bekommen sollten. Diese reichen von der Gestaltung wirtschafts­politischer Rahmenbedingungen (z. B. öko-sozialer Fiskalreformen) bis hin zur Nutzung spezi­fischer neuer Marktpotenziale in Bereichen wie nachhaltiger Stadtentwicklung, Bio­ökonomie und grünem Wasserstoff. Allen Themen ist gemeinsam, dass hier ein beschäftigungswirksamer Struktur­wandel sowie klima- und umweltpolitische Ziele synergetisch miteinander verknüpft werden.

Der russische Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine zeigt, dass das multilaterale System zu schwach ist, um Frieden sicherzustellen. In diesem Interview beurteilt Anna-Katharina Hornidge die Lage. Sie ist die Direktorin des Deutschen Instituts für Entwicklung und Nachhaltigkeit (IDOS – German Institute of Development and Sustainability), das bis Ende Juni Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik hieß. Aus ihrer Sicht stehen wir in einem globalen Konflikt, bei dem irrationale Ansprüche rationale Entscheidungsprozesse behindern. Anna-Katharina Hornidge im Interview mit Hans Dembowski.

Action-oriented summits like the 2018 Global Climate Action Summit and 2019 UN Climate Action Summit, have become a major feature of global climate governance. Their emphasis on cooperative initiatives by a host of non-state and local actors creates high expectations, especially when, according to the IPCC, governments’ policies still set the world on course for a disastrous 2.7 °C warming. While earlier studies have cautioned against undue optimism, empirical evidence on summits and their ability to leverage transnational capacities has been scarce. Here using a dataset of 276 climate initiatives we show important differences in output performance, with no improvement among initiatives associated with more recent summits. A summit’s focus on certain themes and an emphasis on minimal requirements for institutional robustness, however, can positively influence the effectiveness of transnational engagement. These results make an empirical contribution towards understanding the increasingly transnational nature of climate governance.

Nur wenige internationale Übereinkünfte, die von den jeweiligen Zeitgenossen als historisch wahrgenommen werden, sind dies auch in den Augen späterer Generationen. Sie sind stets Produkt und Ausdruck ihrer Zeit, können aber auch über diese hinausweisen, indem sie erwartete und angestrebte Zukünfte verhandeln. Wenn nur wenige Jahre später die Welt schon wieder anders erscheint, versuchen sich dann neu zusammengesetzte Kohorten internationaler Diplomatie am nächsten »historischen« Wurf. Dabei geht allzu leicht das Gefühl für die miteinander verknüpften institutionellen und programmatischen Pfadabhängigkeiten verloren. Ohne das Wissen um bereits früher erzielte Verständigungen und Fortschritte kann aber auch das Bewusstsein für die notwendigen nächsten Schritte schwer gedeihen.

Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine proves that the multilateral system is too weak to safeguard peace. Anna-Katharina Hornidge, the director of the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) – assessed matters in an interview with  D+C/E+Z. According to her, we are witnessing a global conflict in which irrational aspirations are pitted against reasoned deliberation. (Anna-Katharina Hornidge interviewed by Hans Dembowski)

Prof. Dr. Anna-Katharina Hornidge hatte von 2015 bis 2020 eine Kooperationsprofessur zwischen der Universität Bremen und dem Leibniz-Zentrum für Marine Tropenforschung (ZMT) mit dem Schwerpunkt Entwicklungs- und Wissenssoziologie inne. Seit 2020 ist sie Direktorin des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Bonn und Professorin an der Universität Bonn.

In this policy brief, we analyse the direct effects and implications of the war in Ukraine on energy security, industrial supply chains, food security and environmental protection in the EU and in developing countries. Section 2.4 also considers the ramifications of the war on Ukraine’s own environment. We also explore several integrative policy approaches to mitigate these implications, namely policy coherence, social protections measures and international cooperation.
Throughout our analyses, we consider existing and potential policy measures, and in doing so refer to the EGD’s many dimensions. We argue that the EGD is instrumental in setting the EU and its partners on a sustainable path, and key to addressing multiple crises in the short and long term. Moreover, successful implementation of the EGD can help the EU weather the shock of the war, while facilitating sustainable development that leaves no one, and no country, behind.
Key messages:
• The European Green Deal (EGD) is instrumental in addressing some of the implications of the war in Ukraine. It can facilitate an integrated response that considers the global concerns raised by the concurrent geopolitical, health and socio-environmental crises, in both the short term and the long term. The war’s effects on food security, energy security, industrial supply chains and environmental protection should be addressed with due attention to immediate threats, and with a view to speeding up the nascent sustainability transformation in order to avoid exacerbating future disruptions. To achieve this, three approaches are essential: enabling policy coherence between sectors and institutions, designing adequate social protection measures, and advancing international cooperation.
• To simultaneously address energy security and the climate crisis, the energy transition should be accelerated worldwide. Domestically, the EU can ratchet up production of renewable energies, phase-out fossil fuels (including liquefied natural gas (LNG)), and make energy efficiency improvements across all sectors and industries. The EU should avoid response measures that create lock-ins to pathways that are incompatible with the green transition. In parallel, the EU has the capacity to build strong international partnerships to assist other interested countries in their own energy transitions and support them to become key trading partners of renewable energy sources.
• Global supply chains, particularly industrial supply chains, have been disrupted by the war and related sanctions. Ukraine, Russia and Belarus supply much of the world’s key raw materials, such as neon, nickel, aluminium and palladium, and crucial goods, such as iron-derived products and fertilisers. The energy price spike and inaccessible transportation routes have further exacerbated the disruptions. As companies relocate their production and seek new suppliers, the EU should aim to incentivise low-carbon options, boost innovation and material efficiency, and support developing countries in building their own green industries.
• Food security has also been adversely affected by disrupted supply chains. In particular, developing countries reliant on food imports face serious challenges due to record high prices. The EU has already put measures in place to support short-term food security, both domestically and beyond. To mitigate future crises, it should develop long-term measures to transition the EU food system towards sustainability and support the development of resilient food systems in developing countries.
• The war in Ukraine poses a serious threat to global environmental governance, particularly with regard to environmental protection and biodiversity conservation. The war will likely influence supply chain-driven deforestation and ecosystem degradation, in part due to increasing food insecurity. The EU can support effective and smart agriculture to minimise or avoid land conversion for food or energy production, both domestically and in developing countries. In addition, the EU can play an active role in assisting Ukraine in its ever-more precarious environmental situation, and to support neighbouring countries like Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary that may suffer from trans-boundary pollution.
• The war in Ukraine has exposed the urgent need for effective coordination and coherence between EU policy frameworks. To implement the EGD, internal and external trade-offs between core issue areas, such as food and environmental protection or energy and industrial supply chains, and between short-term and long-term effects, need to be minimised. Simultaneously, synergies need to be enhanced. Currently, however, the content and implementation of the EGD still follows a sectoral and siloed approach that contradicts the EU’s policy coherence ambitions. More than ever, the realisation of the EGD’s objectives requires an integrated approach to facilitate efficient alignment with long-term global agendas, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.
• In the short term, social protection can help vulnerable households cope with increases in food and energy prices, through mechanisms like cash transfers, in-kind transfers and subsidies. To promote longer-term resilience, social protection can support the just transition and independence of energy and food systems by way of facilitating structural changes, for example, in terms of employment. This will require increased spending on social protection systems anchored in equity concerns.
• With regards to its international cooperation, the EU still needs to define the goals it seeks to attain under the external dimension of the EGD. These will need to be translated into concrete actions in close dialogue with the EU’s partner countries. Moreover, international cooperation must be aligned to support long-term strategies to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement in a synergistic fashion. This requires a policy space for accountability and learning, through continuous monitoring and evaluation of pertinent international cooperation activities and partnerships. The EU also has the important role of building trust between partner countries and demonstrating international leadership in the face of Russia’s geo-political belligerence.

In this policy brief, we analyse the direct effects and implications of the war in Ukraine on energy security, industrial supply chains, food security and environmental protection in the EU and in developing countries. Section 2.4 also considers the ramifications of the war on Ukraine’s own environment. We also explore several integrative policy approaches to mitigate these implications, namely policy coherence, social protections measures and international cooperation.
Throughout our analyses, we consider existing and potential policy measures, and in doing so refer to the EGD’s many dimensions. We argue that the EGD is instrumental in setting the EU and its partners on a sustainable path, and key to addressing multiple crises in the short and long term. Moreover, successful implementation of the EGD can help the EU weather the shock of the war, while facilitating sustainable development that leaves no one, and no country, behind.
Key messages:
• The European Green Deal (EGD) is instrumental in addressing some of the implications of the war in Ukraine. It can facilitate an integrated response that considers the global concerns raised by the concurrent geopolitical, health and socio-environmental crises, in both the short term and the long term. The war’s effects on food security, energy security, industrial supply chains and environmental protection should be addressed with due attention to immediate threats, and with a view to speeding up the nascent sustainability transformation in order to avoid exacerbating future disruptions. To achieve this, three approaches are essential: enabling policy coherence between sectors and institutions, designing adequate social protection measures, and advancing international cooperation.
• To simultaneously address energy security and the climate crisis, the energy transition should be accelerated worldwide. Domestically, the EU can ratchet up production of renewable energies, phase-out fossil fuels (including liquefied natural gas (LNG)), and make energy efficiency improvements across all sectors and industries. The EU should avoid response measures that create lock-ins to pathways that are incompatible with the green transition. In parallel, the EU has the capacity to build strong international partnerships to assist other interested countries in their own energy transitions and support them to become key trading partners of renewable energy sources.
• Global supply chains, particularly industrial supply chains, have been disrupted by the war and related sanctions. Ukraine, Russia and Belarus supply much of the world’s key raw materials, such as neon, nickel, aluminium and palladium, and crucial goods, such as iron-derived products and fertilisers. The energy price spike and inaccessible transportation routes have further exacerbated the disruptions. As companies relocate their production and seek new suppliers, the EU should aim to incentivise low-carbon options, boost innovation and material efficiency, and support developing countries in building their own green industries.
• Food security has also been adversely affected by disrupted supply chains. In particular, developing countries reliant on food imports face serious challenges due to record high prices. The EU has already put measures in place to support short-term food security, both domestically and beyond. To mitigate future crises, it should develop long-term measures to transition the EU food system towards sustainability and support the development of resilient food systems in developing countries.
• The war in Ukraine poses a serious threat to global environmental governance, particularly with regard to environmental protection and biodiversity conservation. The war will likely influence supply chain-driven deforestation and ecosystem degradation, in part due to increasing food insecurity. The EU can support effective and smart agriculture to minimise or avoid land conversion for food or energy production, both domestically and in developing countries. In addition, the EU can play an active role in assisting Ukraine in its ever-more precarious environmental situation, and to support neighbouring countries like Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary that may suffer from trans-boundary pollution.
• The war in Ukraine has exposed the urgent need for effective coordination and coherence between EU policy frameworks. To implement the EGD, internal and external trade-offs between core issue areas, such as food and environmental protection or energy and industrial supply chains, and between short-term and long-term effects, need to be minimised. Simultaneously, synergies need to be enhanced. Currently, however, the content and implementation of the EGD still follows a sectoral and siloed approach that contradicts the EU’s policy coherence ambitions. More than ever, the realisation of the EGD’s objectives requires an integrated approach to facilitate efficient alignment with long-term global agendas, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.
• In the short term, social protection can help vulnerable households cope with increases in food and energy prices, through mechanisms like cash transfers, in-kind transfers and subsidies. To promote longer-term resilience, social protection can support the just transition and independence of energy and food systems by way of facilitating structural changes, for example, in terms of employment. This will require increased spending on social protection systems anchored in equity concerns.
• With regards to its international cooperation, the EU still needs to define the goals it seeks to attain under the external dimension of the EGD. These will need to be translated into concrete actions in close dialogue with the EU’s partner countries. Moreover, international cooperation must be aligned to support long-term strategies to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement in a synergistic fashion. This requires a policy space for accountability and learning, through continuous monitoring and evaluation of pertinent international cooperation activities and partnerships. The EU also has the important role of building trust between partner countries and demonstrating international leadership in the face of Russia’s geo-political belligerence.

The governance of ocean and polar regions is among the most relevant challenges in the combat against global environmental degradation and global inequalities. Ocean and polar regions are climate regulators and very much affected by climate change. They are an important source of nutrition for life in and above the sea. At the same time, they are subject to an increasing number of geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. Due to the lasting virulence of many security issues, economic conflicts, legal disputes, new technological developments and environmental crises in global marine areas as well as the intricate overlap of sovereign, semi-sovereign and global commons territories, the relevance of ocean and polar governance is bound to rise: as frontiers both in global competitive strategies as well as most fragile eco-systems whose collapse would have catastrophic consequences. This thematic issue sketches important trends in research on ocean and polar governance, and identifies avenues for future research. In this editiorial, we first provide an overview of governance challenges for ocean and polar regions and their relevance for geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. In a second step, we present the eight contributions that make up the thematic issue by clustering them around three themes: the impact of (re-)territorialisation on governance and the construction of authority, the effectiveness of regimes of ocean and polar governance, and, challenges to norm-creation in ocean governance.

The advancement of governance architecture in the Arctic region and dealing with the “Arctic development paradox” have been among the most significant challenges of the circumpolar North for decades. The common denominator of both issues is the growing necessity to frame solutions that credibly and effectively support the Arctic’s social and environmental systems in the face of climate change and globalisation. The current status quo seems deficient, which is why understanding the main impediments is subject to public and academic discussion. This article contributes to these debates by referring to the concept of governability to demonstrate how transregional activities advance the development of more coherent governance in the Arctic. The article explores approaches applied by transregional organisations and cooperation programmes that constitute the governance system in the European Arctic. Specifically, it scrutinises governing interactions developed by the Barents Regional Council and the Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme to overcome the normative trap of the Arctic development paradox. This research follows a semi‐structured, exploratory approach, which facilitates identifying key elements of a structurally and conceptually led response that resounds in each case. Combined with a synoptic literature review, this article answers two questions: First, how do the transregional actors approach the Arctic development paradox in their cooperation strategies and programmes, and to what extent do these approaches differ? Second, what kind of recommendations do they provide to overcome the Arctic development paradox?