European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig,

© Firn / Fotolia

Brexit talks between the EU and the UK had reached a standstill in spring 2019, with the House of Commons refusing to vote in favour of the negotiated withdrawal agreement, including a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. The new UK government led by Boris Johnson, who came into office on 24 July, made a priority of finalising preparations for leaving the EU without a deal on 31 October 2019, unless the EU was willing to renounce the ‘backstop’ included in the Protocol. However, the EU continued to restate its opposition to removing what it considered a legally operational safety net that would prevent a future hard border on the island of Ireland, in the absence of concrete proposals from the UK. At the beginning of October 2019, the UK government sent its proposals on revising the above-mentioned protocol, which were received with a measure of concern by the EU and other stakeholders. Discussions aimed at bridging the gap between the UK and EU positions were stepped up and, after a series of concessions, the EU and UK announced they had reached a revised withdrawal agreement, which was then immediately endorsed by the European Council on 17 October 2019.

With only days to go until 31 October 2019, the date on which the UK is set to leave the EU, completing the ratification procedures to allow the withdrawal agreement’s entry into force on 1 November is going to be a challenge. Whereas on the EU side no major obstacles are foreseen, in the UK, the House of Commons decided on 19 October to withhold approval for the revised deal until Parliament passes the related implementing legislation. Required by law to send the EU a request for an extension of the Article 50 period until 31 January 2020, the UK Prime Minister is nonetheless still aiming to fulfil all the necessary steps for the ratification of the withdrawal agreement to allow its entry into force on 1 November. This is also the stated aim of the European Union, although if the European Council were to decide in favour of granting an Article 50 extension, following the UK request, that decision would have to be taken before the end of October.

Read this briefing on ‘The revised Brexit deal: What has changed and next steps?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Izabela Bacian with Fernando Hortal Foronda,

© Fotolia

Leaders of the 27 EU Member States (EU-27) endorsed the agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) with a revised Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, as well as a revised political declaration on the framework of the future EU-UK relationship. They invited the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council to take steps to ensure the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement by 1 November 2019. Following postponement of the House of Commons vote to approve the deal, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, will consult the EU-27 Heads of State or Government as to whether to agree to the request he received on 19 October for an extension of the Article 50 negotiation period to 31 January 2020.

1. UK Withdrawal Agreement

On 17 October 2019, the European Commission and United Kingdom reached agreement at negotiators’ level on a revised Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland and a revised political declaration on the framework of the future EU-UK relationship. Both were endorsed by the European Council (Article 50) at its meeting later the same day. The revised Protocol provides a legally operative solution that avoids a hard border on the island of Ireland, protects the all-island economy and the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement. Contrary to the previous solution (the ‘backstop’), the revised Protocol no longer presents an insurance policy that applies unless and until the EU and the UK conclude a subsequent agreement that replaces it in part or in full. Instead, the agreed solution will continue to apply unless it fails to receive the democratic support of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Throughout the three-year long negotiations, several proposals have been made to address the unique situation on the island of Ireland and avoid the creation of a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. These have included proposals under which Northern Ireland would remain part of both the single market and the EU customs union, or more recently where the whole of the UK remained part of a single customs union with the EU.

The latest proposal, agreed on 17 October 2019, (detailed in Box 1) is based on four main elements: 1) Northern Ireland remains aligned to a limited set of EU rules, notably relating to goods, and will still apply the Union Customs Code for goods entering its territory. There will be no checks on goods at the border or on the island; 2) Regarding customs duties, Northern Ireland remains within the UK’s customs territory. Differentiated treatment would be applied between goods entering Northern Ireland headed for its market and goods bound for the EU market, with the latter paying EU tariffs; 3) To maintain the integrity of the single market and avoid distortions of competition, Northern Ireland will remain under EU rules for value added tax (VAT), while the UK will collect the VAT; and finally, 4) To ensure long-term democratic support for the application of relevant EU rules in Northern Ireland, the consent of the Northern Ireland representatives will be required after an initial four years following the entry into force of the Protocol (after the end of the transition period, in theory December 2020). Consent will be required periodically to extend the arrangements: where that consent has previously been given with a cross-community majority, eight years thereafter, but where only a simple majority has been found, four years thereafter. Should consent not be given, the arrangements would cease to apply to Northern Ireland two years later.

Issue Revised Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement The Protocol provides a legally operative solution that avoids a hard border on the island of Ireland, protects the all-island economy and the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement in all its dimensions. Regulatory compliance for goods Northern Ireland will remain aligned to a limited set of rules related to the EU’s single market in order to avoid creating a hard border on the island of Ireland. This will concern legislation on goods, food safety and animal and plant health measures (sanitary and phytosanitary), rules on agricultural production and marketing, VAT and excise in respect of goods and state aid rules. Northern Ireland will remain part of the UK’s VAT area. The UK will charge reduced rates of VAT in Northern Ireland on products for which the Irish VAT rate is lower. Consent of Northern Ireland The Protocol is a fully legally operative solution that will continue to apply unless it fails to receive the democratic support of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Assembly will be asked to provide its consent for the Protocol four years after the end of the transition period and every eight or four years thereafter, depending on whether a cross-community majority or only a simple majority is obtained. This consent will concern issues of regulatory alignment on goods and customs, the single electricity market, VAT and state aid. Customs Northern Ireland is part of the customs territory of the United Kingdom. It will be able to benefit from participation in the UK’s independent trade policy. While Northern Ireland will leave the EU Customs Union, the Union Customs Code will continue to apply to all goods entering Northern Ireland. No checks or controls will be necessary on the island of Ireland. Customs duties EU customs duties will apply to goods entering Northern Ireland only if those goods pose a risk that they will subsequently enter the EU single market. The Joint Committee will establish, before the end of the transition period, the criteria necessary to make that determination. For goods from third countries that are not at risk of entering the EU, customs duties in Northern Ireland will be the same as in other parts of the UK. Revised political declaration Nature of future relationship The precise nature of commitments should be commensurate with the scope and depth of the future relationship and the economic connectedness of the parties.
Parties should uphold the common high standards applicable in the EU and UK at the end of the transition period in the areas of state aid, competition, social and employment standards, environment, climate change, and relevant tax matters. Level playing field The precise nature of commitments should be commensurate with the scope and depth of the future relationship and the economic connectedness of the parties.
Parties should uphold the common high standards applicable in the EU and UK at the end of the transition period in the areas of state aid, competition, social and employment standards, environment, climate change, and relevant tax matters. 2. Future relations with the UK

In the Article 50 meeting’s conclusions, the European Council reiterated its gratitude to EU Chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, ‘for his tireless efforts and for his contribution to maintaining unity among EU-27 Member States throughout the negotiations’. The European Council restated its determination to pursue as close a political partnership as possible with the UK. Nevertheless, negotiations on ‘a balanced, ambitious and wide-ranging free trade agreement’ depend on ‘sufficient guarantees for a level playing field‘, as stressed in the European Council guidelines. The EU-27 leaders committed to maintaining the future relationship with the UK as an item for discussion at each formal European Council meeting.

Regarding the content of the political declaration, the UK has indicated that it would be pursuing the negotiation of a free trade agreement, eliminating the possibility of joining the EU customs union in the future, and aiming for a higher level of regulatory divergence from the EU.

3. Procedure in the UK Parliament

In the meantime, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson put forward a motion for the House of Commons to approve the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration on Saturday 19 October. This was to comply with two key pieces of legislation: 1) the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which states that the ratification of the withdrawal agreement requires the agreement and the political declaration to be approved by a resolution in the House of Commons; and 2) the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019 (commonly known as the Benn Act). The latter states that the House of Commons must either agree to the withdrawal agreement or agree to leave the EU without a withdrawal agreement; and should the House fail to agree to either of these scenarios by 19 October, it requires the Prime Minister to request an extension, to 31 January 2020, of the negotiating period under Article 50(3).

At its sitting on 19 October, the House of Commons adopted an amendment, the ‘Letwin Amendment’ (proposed by Conservative MP, Sir Oliver Letwin). This amendment delays approval of the withdrawal agreement unless and until implementing legislation (referred to as the Withdrawal Agreement Bill) is passed. Given this delay, and to comply with the Benn Act, a letter was sent to European Council President Donald Tusk later the same day, requesting an extension of Article 50 to 31 January 2020. At the same time, Johnson sent a second letter deploring the ‘corrosive impact of the long delay on delivering on the mandate of the British people’ as expressed in the 2016 referendum. Johnson committed to put the necessary legislation forward without delay, so that a vote in the House of Commons could still take place in the week beginning 21 October. On Monday of that week, the Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow, rejected a motion by the Government aimed at holding another meaningful vote on the agreement, on the basis that the motion was of the same substance as two days earlier, and without any change in circumstances, and thus proceeding in this way ‘would be repetitive and disorderly’. Subsequently the government introduced the Withdrawal Agreement Bill on 21 October, and proposed an accelerated timetable to complete all stages of its passage in the House of Commons by the end of that week.

The current Conservative Party UK government has a minority of votes in the House of Commons. Despite the Conservative-Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) agreement under which the DUP has supported the government, the DUP has announced that its MPs will vote against the deal, expressing concerns about the negative impact of the deal on Northern Ireland’s economy and the Belfast Agreement political settlement, based on the consent principle. Close cooperation on Brexit between the DUP and the European Research Group (ERG) within the Conservative party, may lead some ERG Conservative MPs to vote against the deal. However, Johnson may be able to build a majority if a sufficient number of former Conservative MPs, other independents and some Labour MPs support the deal.

4. Procedure in the EU and consultation on a further extension

The EU-27 leaders invited the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council to take the necessary steps to ensure the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement by 1 November 2019. Following the UK request for a further extension, European Council President Donald Tusk responded that he would ‘now start consulting with EU leaders on how to react’. The previous request for an extension had generated differences in opinion among Member States, with a minority led by France calling for a short extension, and a larger number favouring a longer period.

While Johnson has offered to attend another European Council meeting to discuss the situation, EU‑27 leaders have not confirmed this. Should a consensus arise on the duration of the extension, the decision could be taken by written procedure, without convening another European Council (Article 50) meeting. Some Member States, notably Germany, have indicated openness to a short technical extension.

In the meantime, on 21 October, the Scottish and Welsh First Ministers, Nicola Sturgeon and Mark Drakeford, sent a letter to Donald Tusk calling for an extension long enough to ensure proper scrutiny of the Withdrawal Agreement by both parliaments, as well as sufficient time for a referendum, which both of the signatories favour, to be held.

The Council has given its authorisation for signature, and the agreement has been sent to the European Parliament for its consent. The European Parliament’s Brexit Steering Group, the body coordinating the Parliament’s approach in the negotiations with the UK, met to examine the deal on 21 October 2019. The rapporteur, Guy Verhofstadt, appointed by Parliaments’ Constitutional Affairs Committee (responsible for the consent procedure) will in due course draw up a recommendation for Parliament on whether to approve the withdrawal agreement.

The European Parliament’s consent is given by a simple majority vote. Following Parliament’s consent, the Council may conclude the agreement by ‘super’ qualified majority (at least 72 % of the participating Member States, comprising at least 65 % of their population).

Statement by the President of the European Parliament

At the European Council meeting on 17 October, EP President David Maria Sassoli (S&D, Italy) welcomed the agreement reached with the UK and also expressed his gratitude to the EU’s Chief Negotiator, Michel Barnier, for the results achieved. He announced that the European Parliament would immediately begin detailed examination of the terms and content of the agreement, to ensure its coherence with the EU and its citizens’ interests.

Following a meeting of the Parliament’s Conference of Presidents on 21 October, Sassoli announced that the European Parliament would only vote on giving its consent once the UK Parliament had approved the agreement. In the meantime, the Constitutional Affairs Committee would start its examination of the deal. Parliament would be ready to ‘move forward rapidly when needed’, he emphasised.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council (Article 50) meeting on 17 October 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis,

© Rawf8 / Fotolia

The European Parliament did not always enjoy the powers and democratic legitimacy it does now. This is clear from a quick glance at how Parliament has evolved. Starting life as an Assembly – a name reminiscent of institutions linked to international diplomacy – with members simply appointed by national parliaments of Member States, it grew into an institution, the European Parliament, directly elected by citizens and now the only one representing EU citizens directly. This transformation has taken several decades.

Despite Parliament’s increased role, the current electoral rules remain only partly harmonised, to the extent that there is no uniform electoral process for all Member States. The current situation is that certain fundamental principles are enshrined in the 1976 Electoral Act, but many aspects are regulated by national law. This lack of a uniform electoral process also leads to differences in treatment between EU citizens depending on their country of origin and potentially deprives European elections of a truly European dimension.

Several reforms of the EU electoral system have been attempted over the years, but not all have resulted in legislation. The introduction of a transnational constituency in particular is a perennially controversial issue. Some consider it a step towards the genuine ‘Europeanisation’ of elections, others believe that it could increase the distance between the public and elected representatives.

While the co-existence of differing electoral rules under the aegis of common European principles is probably destined to last, the latest reform – adopted in 2018 – will bring in mechanisms designed to increase public participation in the EU political debate and make the appointment of one of the top EU leadership roles, president of the European Commission, more ‘political’, by means of the Spitzenkandidaten process.

Read this briefing on ‘European Union electoral law: Current situation and historical background‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou and Nicholas Lokker,

Maximilian Schroeder, Head of Unit of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence Secretariat, and Anthony Teasdale, Director General of EPRS, welcomed a panel of six experts to a briefing seminar on ‘Understanding CSDP: EU Common Security and Defence Policy’ on 2 October 2019.

Sven Biscop of the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations focused his introductory remarks on leveraging the new common security and defence policy (CSDP) and defence industrial policy mechanisms into concrete capabilities. He stressed that instruments such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) are not ends in themselves. Real success will require an emphasis on using these frameworks to develop projects that the EU would not otherwise undertake, instead of, according to the expert, becoming stuck in procedures, as is currently the case. He added that a particularly important goal for PESCO should be the integration of, as opposed to simple cooperation between, European militaries. Without this, the EU cannot achieve a ‘comprehensive, full spectrum force package’.

The next speaker was Simona Soare of the EU Institute for Security Studies, who proposed three principal areas for the Parliament to consider. First, echoing Sven Biscop, she urged Parliament to take stock of the EU’s credible progress on the CSDP since 2016, focusing on concrete outcomes of the instruments it has designed. Second, Parliament should look ahead and prioritise emerging digital and climate issues. Specifically, how can the EU position itself to push for appropriate norms around technologies such as artificial intelligence, and how will climate change affect conflict prevention? Finally, according to the speaker, Parliament must consider how to respond to changes occurring in fundamental pillars of the transatlantic relationship such as trade, multilateralism, and security cooperation.

Defence has become a regular topic on European Council meeting agendas, the continued monitoring of which will be key to future implementation of CSDP initiatives. Suzanna Anghel Gavrilescu of the EPRS European Council Oversight Unit reminded the audience that the current discourse on defence is largely the result of consensus in the European Council since 2012-2013 that ‘defence matters’. However, she cautioned against expecting the Council to use vocabulary such as ‘European Defence Union’ or ‘strategic autonomy’ in its discourse regarding the CSDP.

Elena Lazarou of the EPRS External Policies Unit outlined a few of the largest challenges to future EU security. The increasing rate of technological change is a major concern, which will only heighten the problem of delayed EU responses to global issues. If it cannot resolve this discrepancy, the EU will fall further and further behind. Additionally, the EU lacks a clear ‘grand strategy’. To guide its actions on CSDP, the EU must formulate a coherent vision of the strategic link between its various developing capabilities, possibly in the form of a White Book, as the European Parliament has repeatedly requested.

Continuing this discussion of large-scale changes to global security, Leopold Schmertzing of the EPRS Global Trends Unit noted that we first must recognise the increasing power of information in warfare, as actors weaponise narratives to gain the upper hand in conflicts. Additionally, digitisation means that artificial intelligence will be increasingly used on the battlefield. Finally, a few entities will control a majority of the military capabilities in a multipolar world, which will add new complexity and volatility to nuclear strategy.

Wrapping up the discussion, Phillipe Perchoc of the EPRS External Policies Unit presented the new Normandy Index, developed by EPRS and the Institute for Economics and Peace, which measures threats to peace and democracy in the world. He emphasised that defence also includes peace protection, and that this index can therefore also be used as a tool for parliamentary work on the security and defence policy.

Overall, the members of the panel agreed that the new structure proposed for the European Commission suggests that there will be continuity of previous Commission efforts in this field, with an increased emphasis on industrial and technological aspects. During a Q&A session with the audience, the panel addressed cooperation efforts between the EU and NATO, approaches for investing in and retaining human capital, as well as the role of Parliament in shaping CSDP and the future of the EU defence industry.

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg,

© European Union 2019 – Source : European Council

After endorsing the revised UK withdrawal agreement, and approving a revised political declaration, in the European Council (Article 50) format, EU Heads of State or Government had to tackle a range of divisive issues at their 17-18 October meeting, including the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, enlargement, climate change and Turkey. EU leaders were not able to find common ground on key elements of the MFF, nor to reach consensus on the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. On climate, the European Council only reiterated its June 2019 conclusions considering persistent lack of agreement on raising climate targets. With respect to Turkey, EU leaders did not go beyond the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, either in the area of sanctions or in the area of arms exports control. In the presence of the European Commission President-elect, Ursula von der Leyen, EU leaders also discussed the political priorities of the EU for the coming years and the follow-up to the Strategic Agenda 2019-24.

1. European Council commitments: Implementation and new deadlines

The Prime Minister of Finland, Antti Rinne, President-in-Office of the Council, provided an overview on the progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions. In accordance with Article 235(2) TFEU, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, addressed the European Council for the first time in his mandate.

Table 1: New European Council commitments and requests with a specific time schedule

Policy area Action Actor Schedule MFF Present an updated negotiation box Council Presidency December 2019 Climate Finalise its guidance on the EUʼs long-term strategy on climate change European Council December 2019 Enlargement Revert to the issue of enlargement European Council Before May 2020 2. European Council meeting Multiannual Financial Framework

On the basis of a paper prepared by the Finnish Presidency of the Council, EU Heads of State or Government exchanged views on key issues of the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The paper outlined the ‘key issues’ for discussion: 1) the overall level of the MFF, 2) the division between the main policy areas (i.e. new challenges vs traditional policies), and 3) ‘policy coherence and conditionalities’ (i.e. the link between EU expenditure and the EU’s policies and values). Even prior to the European Council, some Member States, notably the Visegrad countries (i.e. Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) criticised the Finnish paper for being ‘vague’, and for crossing their ‘red lines’ on cohesion policy and the common agriculture policy (CAP). While no substantial conclusions indicting progress towards consensus were adopted, the Finnish Presidency was called upon to establish a ‘Negotiating Box with figures’ for the next European Council meeting on 12-13 December 2019.

Attending his final scheduled European Council meeting, the outgoing President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, reminded EU leaders of their obligation to conclude the debate quickly, because if the debate continues until next year ‘there will be two years wasted where researchers cannot research and young people cannot go on Erasmus’. Yet, he expressed doubts at the likelihood of reaching a decision even in December, stating that the European Council was thereby not living up to the objectives it had set itself in its June 2019 conclusions, namely ‘reaching an agreement in the European Council before the end of the year’.

Also attending a scheduled meeting for a final time, the European Council’s President, Donald Tusk, said that ‘this was an important discussion and will continue over the next months’.

Main messages of the EP President: The President of the Parliament, David Sassoli reiterated the EP’s view that the EU ‘need[s] an ambitious budget, equivalent to 1.3 % of gross national income’, and that ‘the decision on revenue and expenditure should be a “single package”’. The new long-term budget should be transparent, abolish the whole system of rebates and include various new own resources. Parliament is also favourable to introducing ‘a new budget protection mechanism that would penalise those who disregard the rule of law without affecting payments to final beneficiaries or recipients’. President Sassoli recalled that the EP has been ready to negotiate since November 2018, and expressed his hope that negotiations with the Council can be opened as soon as possible.

Strategic agenda and the next institutional cycle Strategic agenda

EU leaders discussed with the European Commission President-elect, Ursula von der Leyen, the Commission’s contribution to the implementation of the EU’s priorities for the next five years, and gave broad approval to her objective to form a geopolitical Commission, as well as her strategic priorities – climate change (i.e. green deal), digitalisation and competitiveness. The Finnish Council Presidency presented a report on the follow up to the Strategic Agenda 2019-24, which was adopted by the European Council on June 2019. A recent EPRS study identifies strong continuity between the new Strategic Agenda and its predecessor with regard to some policy issues (e.g. taxation, single market, employment and energy), while also noting that in other policy areas, new issues have been added (e.g. natural and man-made disasters, rule of law, functioning of Schengen).

Next institutional cycle

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook, the European Council adopted a decision appointing Christine Lagarde as President of the European Central Bank. She will take office on 1 November 2019.

Since the French, Hungarian and Romanian Commissioners-designate failed to get the European Parliament’s approval earlier in October, the calendar for the start of the new Commission’s mandate has had to be modified. Following hearings with the new candidates, the European Parliament is now expected to vote on the election of the European Commission at its November II plenary session; this would allow the Commission to start on 1 December.

Main messages of the EP President: Regarding the EU’s political priorities, David Sassoli stressed that EU citizens want a ‘new Europe, which is more attentive to their needs, is greener, is more resolute in safeguarding the rule of law, is more protective of social rights, and is more effective and transparent in its decision-making’. He underlined that the leaders’ choice ‘not to take into account the Spitzenkandidaten, although legitimate according to the Treaties, represented for the European Parliament, a wound that will have to be healed’. He pledged that the Parliament ‘intends to assert its role as one of the main actors in the European decision-making process … working side by side with the Council and Commission; but it will also stand up for itself and its prerogatives’.

Turkey

In the conclusions of the October European Council, ‘the EU condemns Turkey’s unilateral military action in North East Syria, which … threatens heavily European security’. EU leaders took note of the US-brokered five-day ceasefire, and urged Turkey to end its military operation and withdraw its forces. They endorsed the 14 October 2019 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on Turkey’s military action in north-east Syria, and recalled that Member States decided to stop arms-export licensing to Turkey. Analysts emphasised that in the absence of an ‘EU-wide arms embargo’ there is a broad palette of measures Member States may take, ranging from suspending both ongoing and forthcoming arms-export licences, to only stopping the approval of new ones.

EU Heads of State or Government also underlined the humanitarian dimension of the crisis and called on Turkey to obey international humanitarian law. They confirmed that the EU would continue its ‘efforts towards effectively addressing the serious humanitarian and refugee crisis in light of evolving needs’, reiterated solidarity with those Member States most affected by Eastern Mediterranean migratory flows, and confirmed their will to continue to monitor developments.

Illegal drilling activities

As expected, EU leaders expressed their solidarity with Cyprus, and endorsed the 14 October 2019 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus. They thus confirmed the Foreign Affairs Council’s decision to put in place a ‘framework regime of restrictive measures targeting natural and legal persons responsible for or involved in the illegal drilling activity of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean’, and tasked the High Representative, Federica Mogherini, ‘to swiftly present proposals to this effect.’

Main messages of the EP President: President Sassoli emphasised that people in Europe looked with ‘dismay and anger’ at developments in north-east Syria, and praised the role of the Kurds in the fight against ISIL/Da’esh. He condemned Turkey’s military action, qualified it as ‘an act of war’, stressed its breach of international law, underlined its capacity to destabilise the region and called for its termination.

President Sassoli welcomed the initiative to coordinate ‘national embargos on future sales of arms to Turkey’ but spoke of the need to promote ‘a joint EU embargo not just on future arms shipments, but also on those already on their way’. He considered ‘positive’ the decision to impose sanctions on Turkey in connection to its illegal drilling activities, but deplored that ‘the military aggression in north-eastern Syria’ has not ‘prompted a similar response’, including economic sanctions which would target individuals and business but without affecting civil society and the population. As regards the question of Syrian refugees in Turkey, President Sassoli rejected the Turkish authorities’ attempts to use them and their distress ‘as a bargaining chip to justify violations of international law’. In this context and on behalf of the European Parliament, President Sassoli reiterated the Parliament’s call to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey.

Enlargement

The European Council discussed the opening of accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania without reaching a decision. EU leaders committed to revert to enlargement prior to the Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb in May 2020. The Prime Minister of Belgium and President-elect of the European Council, Charles Michel, spoke of a ‘dense, an intense debate’ and pointed to the lack of unanimity on enlargement; a topic emerging as a challenge for the beginning of his term as European Council President. Member States remained divided, with France, the Netherlands and Denmark continuing to oppose the opening of accession negotiations with the two countries, pointing to their lack of preparedness. Attempts to decouple the two countries remained unsuccessful. France has been calling for procedural reforms before giving the go-ahead for the opening of new accession negotiations. The stalemate in which the European Council ended led the Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, to say that EU leaders had made a ‘historic mistake’. Commission President Juncker qualified the decision as a ‘huge historical error’ and underlined the EU’s lack of credibility with partners. Likewise, President Tusk stressed that ‘North Macedonia and Albania are not to blame for this’, acknowledging the ‘extraordinary achievement’ of the Prespa Agreement, and deploring the fact that ‘a few Member States are not ready yet’ for the opening of accession negotiations.

Main messages of the EP President: President Sassoli spoke of ‘unity and credibility’, which are critical when the EU calls ‘on neighbouring countries to make an extra effort to change’ and they comply with the request. He expressed support for opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania, and recalled the European Commission’s positive recommendations. He stressed that a negative decision would provoke disarray in public opinion in the Western Balkans and would have strategic implications for ‘Europe as a whole’.

Climate change

The heavy agenda overshadowed the debate on climate, which was seen more as a ‘stock-taking exercise’. EU leaders welcomed the result of the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit and, in line with their June 2019 conclusions and ahead of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP25) to be held in Santiago de Chile in December 2019, reaffirmed their commitment ‘to lead the way in a socially fair and just green transition in the implementation of the Paris Agreement’. Climate will once again be on the agenda of the European Council in December 2019 when the Heads of State or Government are expected to adopt the guidelines for the EU’s long-term strategy, which are to be submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in early 2020. Earlier versions of the European Council conclusions made reference to a Just Transition Fund but have been dropped in the meantime due to Member State sensitivities. This was the case with the Visegrad 4, which have also opposed increases in climate targets.

Main messages of the EP President: David Sassoli confirmed the EU’s wish to take ‘a global leadership role in safeguarding the planet through sustainable policies’. He stressed Parliament’s call to set 2050 as a target to achieve climate neutrality and regretted that the EU ‘was not able to sign up to this’ target. Speaking of the ‘Green Climate Fund’, Sassoli invited those Member States who have not yet increased their contributions to do so, and to support the creation of a European Climate Bank. He spoke of a ‘strategic choice’, which needs to be made by agreeing on an investment plan able to ‘fund the green transition’ and which would lead to industrial development and job creation.

Flight MH17

Referring to their conclusions of 20 June 2019, EU leaders reiterated their ‘full support for all efforts to establish truth, justice and accountability for the victims of the downing of MH17’, calling on all states to cooperate fully with the ongoing investigation in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2166.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council of 17-18 October 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vasileios Margaras,

To provide an opportunity for deeper reflection on the role of regions and cities in the EU in the years to come, the Committee of the Regions and the European Parliamentary Research Service organised a joint discussion on 16 October 2019, moderated by Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service, EPRS.

First Vice-President of the European Parliament, Mairead McGuinness (EPP, Ireland), welcomed the participants. She reminded them that, while many regions and cities were badly affected by the financial crisis and some regions have bounced back, others have still not returned to their pre-2008 level. Support for the regions lagging behind is important. In addition, many people feel a sense of disconnection between the ‘Brussels’ policy-making world and their daily life. It is therefore important to better engage people in EU politics, and a bottom-up dialogue with citizens should take place at local grassroots level. The quest for a more positive narrative for Europe is another important aspect.

President of the European Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development (REGI), Younous Omarjee (GUE/NGL, France), began by mentioning the many challenges (such as demography, migration, climate change, globalisation, the transition to a carbon-free economy) that European regions face. He stated that it is important for cohesion policy to have the budget allocation it deserves, so that the EU can fulfil its ambitions. Regional policy has measurable results, which are evident in all parts of Europe. However, it is very important to improve communication about this policy.

OMARJEE, Younous (GUE/NGL, FR)

Turning to the uncertainties of Brexit, not to mention the proposed cuts in resources which will have a negative impact on the EU budget, President of the European Committee of the Regions Karl-Heinz Lambertz, underlined that delayed adoption of the next long-term EU budget, will undermine the ability of EU regions and cities to realise projects on the ground. Regarding the European elections, the President stated that on one hand, the high turnout showed that citizens are greatly interested in the EU. On the other hand, there is also a high level of frustration, resulting in large support for anti-European parties and abstention. Entering into dialogue with citizens during an election period is not enough. Citizens must be actively involved in European democracy by being able to share their views through permanent channels of consultation. As part of the foundation of EU democracy, cities and regions should be recognised as crucial partners in the further development of the Future of Europe.

In her turn, Ulrike Guérot, Professor at the Danube-University Krems, Austria, author, and founder of the European Democracy Lab in Berlin, suggested that the common good, res publica, can be the guiding principle of new proposals for a future European community. The continent can transform itself into a post-national, truly democratic, just, and fair place, a European Republic. Various important projects can help towards this idea. For instance, establishing a European identity card would, apart from its functional advantages, also serve to create a common sense of identity amongst the citizens of Europe. Ulrike Guérot also spoke in favour of a bottom-up citizens’ dialogue.

A lively dialogue followed the discussion, with members of the audience posing a number of questions on topics such as the integration of migrants, cross-border cooperation and transnational voting lists.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Marcin Szczepanski with Eulalia Claros,

© mbolina / Fotolia

The financial crisis began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, starting a worldwide chain reaction. The EU economy contracted for five consecutive quarters, with growth returning only in the second half of 2009. Stimulatory and fiscal actions by national governments and the EU, and the Eurosystem’s loose monetary policy, helped achieve recovery. It was short-lived, however, as in 2010 a sovereign debt crisis resulted from a loss of financial market confidence, with soaring public debt. Yields on government bonds, particularly in the periphery countries, rose dramatically. Ad hoc rescue devices, such as the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, brought the situation under control, later supported by the pledge of European Central Bank President Mario Draghi to do ‘whatever it takes’ to save the euro. The acute phase of the crisis ended in 2014, followed by a period of extremely low inflation and weak growth. To boost inflation, facilitate bank lending and stimulate the economy, the Eurosystem relied increasingly on quantitative easing. While 2017 was the EU’s best year since the crises, with economic performance returning to pre-crisis levels, recent data suggest that the momentum is weakening, both in and outside the EU.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A decade on from the financial crisis: Key data‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepanski,

© doidam10 / Fotolia

It has been a decade since the financial crisis erupted and changed the world in 2008. Few at the time guessed what would be its magnitude and long-term consequences. The interconnectedness of the economy and the financial sector facilitated the spread of the crisis from the United States to Europe. First, the EU faced the Great Recession in the 2008-2009 period and then, after a short recovery, several Member States succumbed to the sovereign debt crisis. The combined crises had catastrophic consequences for economic growth, investment, employment and the fiscal position of many Member States. The EU engaged in short-term ‘fire-fighting’ measures such as bailouts to save banks and help stressed sovereigns, while at the same time reforming the inadequate framework. While signs of moderate recovery showed in 2014, the risk of falling into deflation or secular stagnation remained high, and it was only in 2017 that the EU economy returned to a state similar to that of before the crisis. The signs in 2019 are not so promising however.

Many efforts have been made to improve resilience in the EU and the euro area. These have included improving the stability of the financial sector, strengthening economic governance, creating a safety net for sovereigns in distress and carrying out structural reforms, particularly in the countries most affected. In addition, the European Central Bank (ECB) has taken unconventional policy measures. Nonetheless many argue that the pace of the reforms has slowed down considerably since 2013 when the economic situation began to improve.

The legacy of the crisis is still present and many challenges persist. These include the absence of a clear and agreed vision for the future of economic and monetary union (EMU), perennial macroeconomic imbalances and high public deficits in a number of Member States, and the ongoing risk of a doom loop between sovereigns and the banking sector. Post crisis vulnerabilities also include rising inequalities, youth unemployment and high in-work poverty risk levels.

See also our infographic, A decade on from the financial crisis: Key data.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A decade on from the start of the crisis: Main responses and remaining challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova,

© Ico Maker / Fotolia

Teaching – a profession that dates back through the generations – seems to have lost some of its attractiveness at present. An ageing teacher population, severe teacher shortages, difficulties with retaining younger teachers and a significant gender imbalance in staffing at different levels of education are just some of the serious challenges facing the profession. In the EU, only 7 % of all teachers are under 30 years old, while around 36 % are 50 or older. Also, 72 % of the nearly 6 million people working as school teachers are women, thus confirming the perception that teaching is a ‘woman’s world’. An extensive 2014 survey revealed that over a third of teachers in the EU work in schools with a shortage of qualified staff, and nearly half of school directors report a shortage of teachers for special needs pupils. Perhaps more worryingly, 81 % of teachers in the EU feel teaching is not valued in society. For most EU countries, raising the status and attractiveness of the teaching profession is therefore an urgent necessity. Despite the seriousness of the challenge, only 11 EU countries have taken some policy measures to make teaching more attractive.

EU education systems offer teachers various arrangements in terms of recruitment, career structure, professional development and support, and remuneration. The average starting salary in lower secondary education in the 2016-2017 period was €27 000, with top salaries peaking at €45 000. However, a strong geographical divide is noticeable, with salaries of school teachers in eastern Europe being substantially lower than those in western Europe.

Teachers have access to various mobility schemes through Erasmus, the EU’s flagship programme in the area of education. From 2014 to 2020, the programme has offered mobility opportunities to 800 000 education staff, thus confirming its growing impact and popularity. In March 2019, the European Parliament supported the tripling of the programme’s budget for 2021-2027, to make it more accessible and inclusive and enable more teachers and students to take part in it. Members of the European Parliament also proposed re-allocating the budget to different parts of the programme, as a way to offer pre-school and early education staff more possibilities to participate in mobility schemes.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Teaching careers in the EU: Why boys do not want to be teachers‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘Teaching careers in the EU: Why boys do not want to be teachers‘ on YouTube.

Written by Tarja Laaninen,

© pogonici / Fotolia

New plant genetic modification techniques, referred to as ‘gene editing’ or ‘genome editing’, have evolved rapidly in recent years, allowing much faster and more precise results than conventional plant-breeding techniques. They are seen as a promising innovative field for the agri-food industry, offering great technical potential.

There is, however, considerable debate as to how these new techniques should be regulated, and whether some or all of them should fall within the scope of EU legislation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

Those who take the view that the new techniques should be exempt from GMO legislation generally argue that the end product is very similar to products generated using conventional breeding techniques, or that similar changes could also occur naturally. Those who consider that the new techniques should fall within the scope of GMO legislation contend that the processes used mean that plants bred using the new techniques are in fact genetically modified.

In July 2018, the European Court of Justice gave a judgment ruling that genome-edited organisms fall under the scope of European GMO legislation. While welcomed by some, the judgment has also sparked criticism and calls for the new European Commission to amend EU GMO legislation.

This is an updated edition of a 2016 Briefing.

Read the complete briefing on ‘New plant-breeding techniques: Applicability of EU GMO rules‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘New plant-breeding techniques: Applicability of EU GMO rules‘ on YouTube.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© deepagopi2011 / Fotolia

The rapid development of digital technologies is posing a challenge to the European Union, spurring initiatives to catch up with the US and China in the area, notably in the context of the digital Single Market. Among the dilemmas are how to reconcile Europe’s sensitivity towards protecting private data with the need to use them in many algorithms, and ensure that automation and Artificial Intelligence strengthen rather than weaken labour market participation.

This note offers links to a series of some recent commentaries and reports from major international think tanks and research institutes on digital challenges. Many earlier papers on the issue can be found in a previous item of the series, published in July 2018. Many reports on cybersecuirty are available in a publication from October 2018

The case for intelligent industrial policy
Bruegel, October 2019

5G: What we talk about when we talk about trust, the EU risk assessment process
European Centre for International Political Economy, October 2019

Analytical report: Preparing the armed forces for disruptive technological changes
European Policy Centre, September 2019

On-location client-determined moderately skilled platform work
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2019

Banking, FinTech, Big Tech: Emerging challenges for financial policymakers
Bruegel, September 2019

Blockchain is the real thing
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2019

In an era of digitalisation, the Single Market needs a software update
Bruegel, September 2019

Jobs and robots: Europe’s debate over the destiny of the welfare state
Bruegel, September 2019

China’s digital trade success: Two different perspectives
European Centre for International Political Economy, September 2019

The end of techno-utopianism
German Marshall Fund, September 2019

Making the Single Market work: Launching a 2022 masterplan for Europe
European Policy Centre, August 2019

Artificial Intelligence prediction and counterterrorism
Chatham House, August 2019

Machine politics: Europe and the AI revolution
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2019

How to strengthen Europe’s agenda on digital connectivity
Cligendael, July 2019

Creating a digital roadmap for a circular economy
European Policy Centre, July 2019

Europas nächste Schritte für die erfolgreiche Gestaltung der Digitalisierung
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, July 2019

Digitalisation and European welfare states
Bruegel, July 2019

Europe’s 5G wake-up call
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2019

The impact of digitalisation on labour market inclusion of people with disabilities
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2019

Exploring media literacy education as a tool for mitigating truth decay
Rand Corporation, July 2019

Sustainability in the age of platforms
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2019

The EU’s security union: A bill of health
Centre for European Reform, June 2019

Harnessing artificial intelligence
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019

Zeit für ein Update: was die Menschen in Deutschland über Digitalisierung denken
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2019

Europe and the digital arms race: Is winter coming?
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2019

Digitalization and the future of work: Macroeconomic consequences
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, June 2019

Europe’s digital future: United and determined to win
Friends of Europe, June 2019

Why all the Facebook fire? Because it is the most cynical
German Marshall Fund, June 2019

Digitalsteuer in der EU – wo stehen wir?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, Jacques Delors Institute, May 2019

The future of work? Work of the future! On how artificial intelligence, robotics and automation are transforming jobs and the economy in Europe
European Political Strategy Centre, May 2019

Europe: The global centre for excellent research
Bruegel, May 2019

Norm contestation in the digital era: Campaigning for refugee rights
Chatham House, May 2019

Do data policy restrictions impact the productivity performance of firms and industries?
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, April 2019

A roadmap for a fair data economy
Lisbon Council, April 2019

Is this blog post legal (under new EU copyright law)?
Bruegel, April 2019

New digital threats to media pluralism in the information age
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, March 2019

Security first, technology second: Putin tightens his grip on Russia’s Internet, with China’s help
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik

Users, data, networks: Taxing the digital economy
Jacques Delors Institute , Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 2019

Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, governance and policy challenges
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2019

Escaping the startup trap: Can policymakers help small companies grow to major employers
Progressive Policy Institute, February 2019

5G, Huawei und die Sicherheit unserer Kommunikationsnetze
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2019

The European Digital Single Market: Delivering economic benefits for citizens and businesses
Bruegel, January 2019

Transformation numérique de l’industrie: L’enjeu franco-allemand
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2019

Four internets: The geopolitics of digital governance
Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2019

Digital Europe: Next steps, a European Agenda for the Digital-9+
Lisbon Council, November 2019

Read this briefing on ‘Digital challenges for Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Philip Boucher,

© shutterstock

Europeans are ageing. In 2016, there were 3.3 people of working-age for each citizen over 65 years. By 2070, this will fall to only two. As the population lives longer, our care needs grow, but fewer people will be available to deliver them. Could assistive technologies (ATs) help us to meet the challenges of elderly care?

It is important to recognise some key differences between age-related and sudden or lifelong impairments. First, age-related impairments of hearing, vision or mobility tend to be gradual. As such, the adjustment strategies are likely to differ from those that respond to sudden or lifelong impairments. Older individuals may be more likely to have multiple impairments – such as visual, hearing, mobility and cognitive impairments – which could affect the suitability of ATs that rely upon other sensory modalities or capabilities. Contextual differences are of crucial importance, and support for learning, employment and social inclusion may differ for sudden or lifelong and age-related impairments. There may also be differences in the experience of stigma and prejudice, and the relationship with new technologies.

It is also worth noting that all technologies are, to an extent, assistive, in the sense that they help people to achieve things more quickly, easily or effectively than would otherwise be possible. While ATs are designed specifically in response to impairments, people, impaired or not, regularly use all kinds of technologies to augment their personal abilities. As such, many insights that refer to ATs will also be relevant for mainstream technologies, and vice versa. Furthermore, technologies can be disabling in cases where new developments make services less accessible to some users, as can be the case where button-based interfaces are replaced by touchscreens that do not account for the needs of blind users.

Potential impacts and developments

In 2016, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) conducted a study of ATs for visual and hearing impairments, both of which are particularly prevalent amongst older citizens, and anticipated to increase along with the ageing European population. For visual impairments, ATs are sometimes designed to augment the affected sense, such as traditional reading glasses or screen magnifying applications, while others convey visual information via other senses, such as touch or sound. The latter include traditional low-tech devices such as white canes and Braille texts, as well as embossed or tactile maps and textured surfaces to support navigation. There are also high-tech equivalents, such as smart canes, haptic computer devices and text-to-speech converters. In the future, augmented reality spectacles may help users by magnifying images, filtering colours and providing object and facial recognition assistance by audio. One day, it may even be possible to repair or replace specific body parts, for example with ‘bionic eyes‘, which convert light to electrical impulses that are transmitted directly to the user’s nervous system. For hearing impairments, ATs can also make use of the affected sensory modality, as is the case for hearing aids, which amplify certain sound frequencies, and cochlear implants, which are surgically implanted sensors that convert sound inputs into electrical signals that are directed to the auditory nerve. Other ATs for hearing impairments make use of different senses, for example by alerting the user – via light, vibration or a combination of the two – about specific events that would usually be perceived audibly. Taking this further, text and video technologies can be used as a substitute for verbal communication. In future, advanced versions of many of these technologies, such as advanced auditory brainstem implants, could bypass the ear entirely, stimulating brainstem neurons directly. Augmented reality glasses (already mentioned in the context of visual impairments), could be used to communicate audio signals in the form of text.

Regarding mobility impairments, which are also often associated with old age, ATs such as mobility scooters and home stair lifts have been available for some time, as well as mainstream mobility technologies such as elevators. Future developments may include care robots that help users to move from their bed to their wheelchair and bathtub, and a proliferation of ATs to assist with the independent performance of daily tasks such as personal care, timekeeping, shopping, appliance use, and food preparation and consumption. While many of these ATs may be used by people with disabilities of all ages, other ATs are designed specifically for elderly users. For example the robot seal designed for dementia sufferers as well as other elderly people at risk of social, cognitive or emotional isolation.

Depending upon their implementation, such ATs might support and augment human care and companionship. Perhaps taking care of some of the more difficult tasks would enable elderly people to live with greater autonomy and independence for longer, and free up resources which could be used to enable other meaningful human interactions. However, there are also potential ethical risks. If ATs were to replace human contact, this would carry risks of isolation and alienation. In this sense, the aspiration for independence and autonomy in old age may conflict with the value of social inclusion and integration of elderly citizens. Some vulnerable people may experience illusory relationships with technical artefacts that could never reciprocate their feelings. In extreme cases, reliance on ATs for elderly care could leave vulnerable people with less regular human-to-human contact, which may also have health implications.

Anticipatory policy-making

While future ATs are promising, current ATs are not used to their full potential. A more effective promotion of the distribution and use of existing ATs could provide more immediate benefits than developing more advanced ATs. In this sense, social and regulatory action may be more important than technological development. While ATs offer significant support for some aspects of people’s lives, it is also important to consider social and regulatory action for social inclusion. For example, while ATs may ensure elderly citizens’ functional capability to remain in employment for longer, social change may also be required in order to counteract stigma, as well as organisational changes such as flexitime and working from home.

‘One-size-fits-all’ approaches for technology and policy are not well suited to this domain because everyone has different abilities and individual circumstances. Many people have multiple disabilities, while further differences appear in their social and economic resources, as well as in their personal needs, desires and preferences. Others are subjected to multiple forms of stigma or discrimination, as highlighted in a recent report on the problems facing women with disabilities in the workplace. Each individual’s circumstances can be as important as their impairments, or the AT’s capabilities, in shaping the extent to which the AT can respond to their impairment. Technology development and policy development need to be nuanced and flexible enough to respond to this range of individual circumstances.

Effective change should target all social groups, and it is important that action to achieve inclusivity does not target elderly people exclusively. For example, the problems of discrimination and stigma require attitudinal and organisational change that permeates society. Wider actions are also required in the specific area of ATs. For example, many people will increasingly encounter ATs in their professional and personal lives, perhaps in the form of tools for facilitating communication with citizens with multiple impairments. Understanding how to engage with others effectively through these means is important for health professionals and public services, as well as for designers of digital services and infrastructure.

The establishment of a defined profession of experts in the application of ATs could play an important role in addressing several issues. As well as providing support for individuals in the adoption of ATs that respond to their specific needs and individual circumstances – including old age – they could also help individuals without impairments to interact more effectively and inclusively with people using ATs. Their experience would also be valuable in informing the development of new ATs, as well as mainstream technologies that will be used by people with and without impairments.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if technologies replaced humans in elderly care?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if technologies replaced humans in elderly care?‘ on YouTube.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Parliament (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

With momentous political changes occurring on the European scene, the agenda for the second plenary session of October features a number of high-profile issues, encompassing the outcome of the October European Council meeting and the Brexit negotiations, European Union (EU) enlargement, the end of the current Commission’s term, negotiations on the future EU budget and financing the fight against climate change.

A debate on Tuesday morning follows European Council and Commission statements on the outcome of the important European Council meeting of 17 and 18 October 2019. If the United Kingdom House of Commons votes in favour of the deal announced on 17 October, it is likely that Members will then debate giving consent to the Withdrawal Agreement during this session.

Another item discussed at the European Council meeting features on the agenda on Wednesday morning, when Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the situation regarding EU accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania. Declared a priority by both outgoing and incoming Commission Presidents, Parliament supports the opening of negotiations with the western Balkan countries. However, Member States have expressed reservations regarding specific issues (regarding Albania in particular), and on the enlargement process in general. At stake is striking the right balance between the EU’s ability to honour its commitments towards third countries, whilst also protecting its own geostrategic and domestic interests.

Although the renewal of the European Commission has been postponed beyond the scheduled date of 1 November, current President of the Commission Jean‑Claude Juncker is expected to present a statement on Tuesday morning, encompassing a review of the Juncker Commission. Whilst facing some challenging situations during the 2014-2019 period, including terrorist attacks and increased refugee movements, analysis of the Juncker Commission’s 10 priorities shows that some two thirds of the Commission’s proposals during the period have resulted in changes to the law. However, progress has been slower on growth, jobs, investment and trade. The vote on the von der Leyen Commission has been postponed until late November, pending the organisation of hearings for new nominees from France, Hungary and Romania.

Members are expected to debate the Council position on all sections of the general budget of the European Union for 2020 on Tuesday afternoon. Once Parliament adopts its amendments, the budget will be the subject of conciliation negotiations between the institutions. However Parliament’s Committee on Budgets proposes to reject the reductions imposed by the Council and instead to increase expenditure on priorities such as the European Pillar of Social Rights, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and, in particular, meeting EU climate targets. The topical debate for this session, on Wednesday, will see Members discuss the current climate and ecological emergency in the presence of Council and Commission. While the EU is on track to meet its 2020 greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets, with greater energy efficiency and increased use of renewables already achieved, more effort is needed. However, adapting to new climate measures, including providing mitigation, costs money, and may require a significant outlay of EU public resources.

Continuing on financial matters on Tuesday afternoon, the previous Parliament decided to postpone the decision on granting discharge for the 2017 accounts of the Council/European Council and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in March of this year. This now returns to the agenda, with Parliament expected to take a position in both cases. A Budgetary Control Committee report proposes that Parliament again refuse to grant discharge to the Council (which disputes the standing practice that Parliament grants discharge separately for each institution and body), as that institution has again failed to provide requested information, to separate the budget of the European Council from the Council’s budget, and to align with the interinstitutional transparency register. Corporate sponsorship of Council presidencies is also a sticking point. Regarding EASO, irregularities uncovered during the previous directorship led to refusal of that institution’s accounts for 2017. While the CONT committee notes that the new EASO management has committed to reforms, due to the previous problems in public procurement and recruitment procedures underlying payments, it proposes to refuse discharge for 2017.

Written by Jana Titievskaia,

© 9dreamstudio / Fotolia

The EU’s common commercial policy (CCP), or trade policy, has evolved gradually over the years to encompass a range of trade-related areas under the remit of European Union (EU) exclusive competence. The Treaty of Rome established the common market and the customs union with a focus on goods. Later treaties expanded the CCP to services and commercial aspects of intellectual property rights. Trade policy falls under the EU’s exclusive competence, meaning that the EU manages trade policy and trade negotiations on behalf of the Member States. The determination of competence is critical for the procedures needed to conclude trade agreements, as in areas falling under shared competence these need to be ratified by both the EU and Member States. This has led to trade and investment agreements being split into two parts to speed up the ratification process for the trade parts, following European Court of Justice (ECJ) Opinion 2/15 (Singapore).

Whereas trade liberalisation is generally accepted to lead to economic growth, the impact on jobs varies both between and within countries. According to the European Commission, in 2018 trade supported 36 million export-related jobs. Trade can also lead to more inequality, however, in particular by widening the gap between skilled and unskilled workers or in causing the unequal relationship between developed and developing countries to become more entrenched.

Trade liberalisation in its most basic form involves the removal of tariffs, which are taxes or duties to be paid for an import. Tariff rate quotas charge lower rates within a certain quota, jumping to a higher tariff rate after the quota is exhausted. Tariffs are cut under World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, with the most-favoured nation tariff representing the highest possible tariffs that WTO members can charge each other. In contrast, preferential tariffs are agreed to in trade agreements or customs union arrangements. Rules of origin have been developed in order to determine where goods originate from (or the ‘economic nationality’ of products). These rules are all the more important in the era of global value chains, where a significant proportion of European products’ value comes from foreign sub-components or services.

Trade liberalisation also seeks to remove non-tariff barriers (NTB) to trade, these include protectionist measures to help domestic producers, subsidies, technical barriers to trade, or stringent sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. Lower NTBs can facilitate cross-border trade in services, which play a huge role in overall EU trade. However, data collection and measurement issues complicate efforts to understand the services trade. Trade defence instruments, meanwhile, enable the EU to react, for instance, to dumping or WTO-incompatible subsidies in partner trading countries, and form the protective front of EU trade policy.

The CCP focuses on fostering fair and free trade, furthering market access and supporting the multilateral, rules-based trading system. To achieve these objectives, the EU employs a range of legislative tools and negotiates trade agreements with trade partners. More specifically, over recent decades the EU has aimed to spread open and free trade based on mandates from Member States. After the breakdown of the WTO Doha Round, the EU initiated a period of concentrated focus on free trade agreements, which tackle both tariff liberalisation and NTBs, with a wide range of partner countries from America to Asia.

The EU has concluded trade agreements on multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral bases. EU trade agreements are adopted through a lengthy procedure, which involves distinct stages, namely preparation, a mandate to open talks, negotiations, textual agreement, initialling, signature, provisional application and, finally, entry into force. The EU also offers different types of trade relationship, ranging from deep integration on both regulatory and trade fronts, to simple partnership and cooperation agreements that do not offer preferential treatment. Trade agreements are enforceable through a dedicated dispute settlement mechanism that allows parties to adopt economic remedies in the event of non-compliance. However, certain provisions in trade agreements, such as trade and sustainable development (TSD) clauses, have a different mechanism for settling disagreements that involves government consultations and recommendations issued by a panel of experts. Efforts to make trade policy ‘greener’ include TSD chapters, but also provisions to support sustainable use of natural resources, biodiversity, forestry and fisheries. Trade agreements also include human rights clauses that aim to incentivise trade partners to improve internal governance.

EU trade legislation is adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, and provides the framework for trade policy. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament has played an important role in the CCP. Parliament must give its consent to trade agreements or trade-related legislation, while it also monitors trade policy developments through resolutions, hearings and workshops. The European Commission proposes and negotiates, while the Council authorises the opening of negotiations and decides on the conclusion of trade agreements. Civil society and stakeholders are encouraged to feed into this process on a regular basis.

Where technocratic negotiations were once sufficient, trade policy has undergone intense politicisation in recent years. Where trade policy used to be characterised by material arguments based on numerical simplicity, now it features normative disagreements and regulatory politics. This makes knowledge and understanding of the complex concepts and themes of EU trade policy all the more important.

Read this ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘EU trade policy: Frequently asked questions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

 

Written by Marie Lecerf,

Over recent decades, there has been marked progress in reducing poverty worldwide. The research conducted by this year’s Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences laureates, Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer, has considerably improved the ability to fight global poverty. Nevertheless, despite this progress, the number of people living in extreme poverty remains too high, even in Europe and, in particular, amongst children.

As 2019 also marks the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC, 20 November 1989), celebration of the International Day for the Eradication of Poverty on 17 October is a great opportunity to take stock of what the European Union is doing to fight against child poverty in its own Member States.

Child poverty in the European Union

In 2017, 112.8 million people in the EU-28 lived in households at risk of poverty or social exclusion (i.e. 22.4 % EU-28, Eurostat, latest data available). With an at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate of 24.9 % in the EU-28, children were at greater risk in 2017 than the total population: almost one in four children in the European Union is at risk of poverty or social exclusion. This situation was mirrored in 19 EU Member States.

Source: Eurostat, 2019

EU contribution to the fight against child poverty

As child poverty in the European Union remains a reality, especially for certain groups (children in single parent, large or migrant families), child poverty has become a major policy concern for the European Union. Precarious living conditions during childhood have a detrimental effect, not only on attainment in school but also on health and on the ability to integrate socially during adolescence and early adulthood. The consequences of poverty experienced in childhood or adolescence can continue into later life and may be passed on from one generation to the next.

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

The European Union and its Member States are bound to comply with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 24 of which is entirely dedicated to the rights of the child: ‘1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. 2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration.’

EU policy responses to child poverty

Fighting child poverty in the EU is primarily the responsibility of the Member States. Nevertheless, at EU level, there is broad consensus that action is needed to lift children out of poverty and to promote children’s wellbeing.

One of the targets of the European 2020 strategy is to reduce the number of people living in poverty by 20 million (compared with 2008). In 2013, the European Commission adopted, and the European Council endorsed, a Recommendation ‘Investing in children – breaking the cycle of disadvantage’. Considering child poverty from a comprehensive perspective, it sets a three pillar structure: employment and adequate income, access to quality services and children’s participation.

In November 2015, Parliament adopted a resolution on reducing inequalities with a specific focus on the most vulnerable children. In 2017, Parliament went a step further, requesting that the Commission implement a preparatory action on establishing a possible child guarantee scheme. This guarantee should ensure that every child in poverty receives free access to quality early childhood education and care, education, healthcare, and access to decent housing and adequate nutrition.

The proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights in November 2017 demonstrates an increased willingness to tackle child poverty in the European Union. Article 11 explicitly reflects that the fight against child poverty is a priority under the social Europe approach, while referring to children’s right to be protected from poverty.

EU funds are key in tackling child poverty

Numerous financial instruments provide a framework for Member States to implement measures to address child poverty with the support of the European Union.

• The 2013 Recommendation calls for the opportunities provided by the European Social and Investment Funds during 2014-2020 to be used when possible to help children.
• The Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) complements EU funding to fight child poverty. Its objectives are to alleviate the worst forms of poverty by providing food and/or basic material assistance as well as social inclusion activities for the most deprived. Children represent almost one-third (30 %) of the total number of people receiving food support.
• The EU’s proposal for the upcoming 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, including the European Social Fund +, highlights the need to strengthen the fight against poverty and social exclusion. On 4 April 2019, the European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution on the European Commission’s proposal on the ESF+, proposing that Member States should allocate at least 5 % of their ESF+ resources to targeted actions aimed at implementing the European Child Guarantee. It also recommended that Member States should allocate at least 27 % of their ESF+ resources to specific objectives in the field of social inclusion, and at least 3 % of their resources to the specific objective of the social inclusion of the most deprived and/or material deprivation. On 2 October 2019, the European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs voted on the decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, so that the dossier can progress.

Despite all the actions and policies undertaken, the task ahead to eradicate child poverty in the European Union will be a daunting challenge for the next decade. Hopefully, as Esther Duflo recently said, their research could also provide a source of inspiration for the European Union.

Written by Izabela Bacian with Fernando Hortal Foronda,

© Fotolia

The October European Council meeting will represent an important point on the timeline of negotiations on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, as leaders will be taking stock of the situation heading up to the end of the extension period on 31 October 2019. This Briefing provides an overview of European Council guidelines and decisions taken to provide direction to the negotiations since the UK’s formal notification of withdrawal on 29 March 2017.

1. Background

Following a referendum on 23 June 2016, in which 51.9 per cent of participants voted to leave the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK) submitted the formal notification of its intention to leave to the European Council on 29 March 2017. According to the procedure laid out in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), this notification triggered a two-year period during which the EU and the UK were to negotiate the terms of the UK’s withdrawal. The European Council, meeting without a UK representative (termed ‘European Council (Article 50)’ meetings), outlined the general direction for the negotiations in a series of sets of guidelines.

Guidelines of 29 April 2017: In its first set of guidelines, the European Council (Article 50) decided that the negotiations would be divided into two phases. The first phase would set the terms of the withdrawal and clarify the impact of UK’s withdrawal on three critical issues: 1) citizens’ rights, 2) finances, and 3) the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The second phase would focus on negotiating the EU’s future relationship with the UK as well as agreeing any necessary transitional arrangements. Based on the European Council guidelines of 29 April, the Commission adopted a recommendation and Council (EU-27 format) a decision authorising the opening of negotiations.

Guidelines of 15 December 2017: Informed by a joint report from the EU and UK negotiators of 8 December 2017, the European Council (Article 50) decided at its December meeting that sufficient progress had been made on phase one, and adopted additional guidelines for the second phase of negotiations. All the commitments made during phase one would have to be respected and ‘translated faithfully into legal terms’. A transition period was agreed for a period of two years, during which the UK would ‘no longer participate in or nominate or elect members of the EU institutions, nor participate in the decision-making of the Union bodies, offices and agencies’. It would have to respect the whole body of EU law, including new law, budgetary commitments, and judicial oversight, including the competence of the Court of Justice of the EU. Moreover, the UK would continue to participate in the customs union and the single market (with all four freedoms) as well as comply with EU trade policy until the end of the transition period, but not beyond. The framework for the future relationship would be elaborated in a political declaration accompanying the withdrawal agreement.

On 29 January 2018, the Council (EU-27 format) adopted supplementary negotiating directives concerning a transition period, which would apply from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement, and not last beyond 31 December 2020. Commitments made by both parties in the December 2017 joint report were translated by the Commission into legal terms in a draft withdrawal agreement released on 28 February 2018. By 19 March 2018, full agreement had been reached on many issues, including citizens’ rights, the financial settlement and the transition period.

As regards the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, negotiators agreed that a solution would be found in line with the three scenarios detailed in the December 2017 joint report: 1) first, the UK commits to avoid creating a hard border on the island and proposes a solution in the context of the future EU-UK relationship; 2) if this were not possible, it would then propose a specific solution to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland; 3) in the absence of agreed solutions, the UK would continue to ‘maintain full alignment with those rules of the internal market and the customs union which support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the Good Friday Agreement of 10 April 1998’. While discussion on all options continued, scenario three, known as the ‘backstop’, was included in a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the draft agreement.

Guidelines of 23 March 2018: The European Council (Article 50) issued guidelines in March 2018 outlining the EU’s position on the future relationship with the UK. The EU-27 restated the EU’s determination to have ‘as close as possible a partnership with the UK in the future’. Regarding economic cooperation with the UK, the European Council stated its readiness to initiate work on a free trade agreement (FTA) and outlined the issues to be addressed therein. Such an agreement would have to be based on a balance of rights and obligations, ensuring a level playing field, whilst preserving the integrity of the single market. In addition, the guidelines concentrated on several areas where the EU expressed an interest in maintaining strong relations with the UK, in particular the fight against terrorism and international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign policy.

As for the implementation of the backstop, a compromise was reached based on the UK’s June 2018 proposal for a temporary customs partnership. A single customs territory would be established between the EU and the entire UK (not just Northern Ireland) covering all trade in goods except fisheries and aquaculture. While the UK would harmonise its commercial policy with the EU’s to the extent necessary for the functioning of the single customs territory, including alignment with the EU’s common external tariff, Northern Ireland would have to apply EU customs law. In addition, Northern Ireland would remain aligned with EU law related to the internal market in a number of areas, including agriculture and environmental protection and regulation, technical regulations on goods, state aid, EU VAT and excise, and other areas of North-South cooperation.

2. Ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement

On 25 November 2018, at a special meeting of the European Council (Article 50), EU leaders endorsed the withdrawal agreement and approved the political declaration, on the basis of the future relationship. Three protocols, on Ireland/Northern Ireland, on Gibraltar, and on the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, are included. The decision to sign the agreement was subsequently adopted by the Council on 11 January 2019, although the signature has not taken place. The Council in the meantime forwarded the decision on the agreement’s conclusion to the European Parliament for its consent.

In accordance with section 13 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the agreement was submitted to the House of Commons for approval. It was rejected a first time on 15 January 2019, the main concerns revolving around the nature of the backstop. This led then UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, to ask for additional clarifications. A legally binding instrument related to the withdrawal agreement, providing clarification and legal guarantees on the nature of the backstop, was agreed at a meeting in Strasbourg on 11 March 2019, between Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and May, accompanied by a joint statement supplementing the political declaration. The ‘Strasbourg package’ was approved by the March 2019 European Council. The backstop is to serve as an ‘insurance policy’, with the aim being to replace the backstop by 31 December 2020, as previously underlined by the European Council in its conclusions in December 2018. Should the backstop be triggered, this would be on a temporary basis only until such time as an alternative arrangement avoiding a hard border is put in place. The withdrawal agreement allows for a one-time extension of the transition period, for one or two years.

Despite these additional assurances from the EU, the agreement was rejected in the UK Parliament a second time, on 12 March. The House of Commons voted two days later to call for an extension of the two-year period under Article 50. A third vote, before the European Council meeting on 21 March, was not possible, since, as stated by the Speaker, John Bercow, the House of Commons could not vote again on the ‘same proposition or substantially the same proposition’. Consequently, on 20 March, May formally asked the European Council for an extension until 30 June 2019.

Responding to May’s request, the March 2019 European Council (Article 50) adopted a decision extending the period, but not to the date requested. It agreed to an extension until 22 May 2019, on the condition that the UK Parliament were to approve the withdrawal agreement by 29 March. If not, the extension would run until 12 April 2019 and the UK would have to indicate the way forward. By that date, the UK would need to announce the holding of European elections, considering its obligation to do so if it were still a Member State on 23-26 May 2019. On 29 March 2019, the UK Parliament held a third vote on the agreement along with the ‘Strasbourg package’ resulting in a third rejection. Following up on a second request by May for an extension until 30 June 2019, a special meeting of the European Council was held on 10 April 2019, at which EU leaders discussed the feasibility of granting a short or a longer extension. The compromise decision granted the UK a six-month extension of the Article 50 period until 31 October 2019 at the latest.

Following this third rejection and a breakdown in cross-party Brexit negotiations aimed at finding common ground for a deal, Theresa May announced her resignation as party leader on 24 May, with effect from 7 June 2019. On 23 July, Boris Johnson won the Conservative Party leadership, thus replacing Theresa May as Prime Minister. In his first letter to European Council President Donald Tusk, on 19 August 2019, Johnson underlined the UK’s commitment to achieve an agreement with the EU in full respect of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. However, he stressed that ‘the backstop cannot form part of an agreed Withdrawal Agreement’ given that it ‘locks the UK, potentially indefinitely, into an international treaty which will bind us into a customs union and which applies large areas of single market legislation in Northern Ireland’. He added ‘the Government will not put in place infrastructure, checks or controls at the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland’.

Following Johnson’s decision to prorogue the UK Parliament from 9 September until 14 October 2019 (later deemed unlawful by the Supreme Court), on 4 September the House of Commons approved the EU Withdrawal (No 2) Act (known as the Benn Act). This legislation requires the UK government to seek an extension of the Article 50 period until 31 January 2020, unless the House of Commons approves a deal with the EU or agrees to a no-deal Brexit by 19 October 2019.

3. Way forward

Two weeks ahead of the planned Brexit date, the 17-18 October 2019 European Council meeting is expected to be dominated by Brexit. EU-27 leaders will discuss the most recent developments, and notably Johnson’s proposal of 2 October 2019 for a new Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to replace the backstop (detailed in Table 1), as well as potentially explore the feasibility of a further extension. While the June 2019 European Council stated that the withdrawal agreement was not open for renegotiation, EU leaders remained open for talks regarding the content of the political declaration if the UK position were to evolve. The EU’s reaction to the proposal has been expressed in detailed terms by EU’s chief negotiator Michel Barnier during the European Parliament’s plenary part-session on 9 October 2019. He expressed three main concerns regarding the new proposals.

First, despite a strong commitment from the UK to avoid customs and regulatory checks as well as any physical infrastructure at the border, many questions remain as to the means of implementation, which had not been addressed in the text. Not only would this create uncertainty but would rely on technology not yet developed or tested; it would also require exemptions from the Union Customs Code and changes to the Common Transit Convention. Second, the current Protocol creates a legally operational safety net available immediately, while the new proposal, applicable only as of the transition period, would add uncertainty. In addition, as underlined by the European Parliament’s Brexit Steering Group, the Parliament’s consent would be required in a context where the full implications of the new arrangements could not be known.

The third issue concerned consent for Northern Ireland. While the current text includes a mechanism allowing for Northern Irish representation – which could still be improved – the new proposal would allow Northern Ireland institutions to decide unilaterally not to activate the agreed solution. And, were it to enter into force, it would allow them to review it every four years. As the Northern Ireland Assembly has not sat for almost three years, and its ability to reconvene is questioned, making application conditional on its consent would render an agreed solution hypothetical and provisional. Finally, Barnier added that the UK’s plan to diverge in areas such as social, environmental and tax rules, on which the current political declaration provides for a level playing field, would not be acceptable.

Table 1: Proposals from Prime Minister Boris Johnson of 2 October 2019

Issue Proposal Good Friday Agreement Commitment to uphold the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement and avoid a ‘hard border’ between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Regulatory compliance for goods Creation on the island of Ireland of a single regulatory zone. Northern Ireland maintains alignment with EU single market rules on food safety, animal and plant health as well as with rules relevant to the placing on the market of manufactured goods. Regulatory checks will be conducted on goods moving from the UK to Northern Ireland where necessary, but there would be no checks on goods entering Northern Ireland from Ireland. Consent of Northern Ireland Consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive to the all-island regulatory zone required every four years. Should consent be withheld, arrangements would default to existing rules. Customs Two differentiated UK and EU customs areas after the transition period. Northern Ireland is part of the UK’s customs territory. The border between Northern Ireland and Ireland will be a customs border, but no customs controls will be performed near or at the border. Instead, movements of goods must be declared to the relevant customs authorities, with provisions made for small traders and with no entry or exit summary declarations. The UK would no longer be subject to EU VAT and excise legislation. Arrangements for level playing field measures (state aid, taxation, social, labour and environmental standards) are no longer needed given that the UK will be leaving the customs union.

The Parliament’s Brexit Steering Group stated in early October that it did not consider the latest proposal ‘a basis for an agreement to which the EP could give consent’, as it did ‘not address the real issues, namely the all-island economy, the full respect of the Good Friday Agreement and the integrity of the Single Market’. In September, the Parliament warned that it could ‘not give consent to a Withdrawal Agreement without a backstop’.

EU-27 unity has endured throughout the three years of negotiations and this is also due in no small part to the role that the European Council President has played at critical times in finding agreement among the 27 leaders and leading the way forward. In recent statements, Donald Tusk has emphasised yet again the seriousness of the issues at stake, although in a rather straightforward manner. He welcomed the positive signals of the meeting between Taoiseach Leo Varadkar and Johnson, and emphasised that ‘a no deal Brexit will never be the choice of the EU’.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council (Article 50) meeting on 17 October 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Suzana Anghel,

© Fotolia

The meeting of Heads of State or Government on 17-18 October is expected to be dominated by Brexit. The EU-27 leaders will probably meet in a European Council (Article 50) format to discuss the most recent developments in the negotiations, and deliberate on possible consequences. At its formal meeting, the European Council will discuss the recently adopted Strategic Agenda 2019-24 and the priorities of the new Commission in the presence of the incumbents as well as the incoming Presidents of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and of the European Council, Charles Michel (current Prime Minister of Belgium). EU Heads of State or Government will also exchange views on the current state of play on the MFF negotiations in the Council, where differences in opinion remain significant on certain issues, not least on the overall size of the 2021-2027 budget. Finally, the European Council will discuss the external dimension of climate policy and consider the possibility of opening accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. The meeting could also discuss foreign policy issues, notably the evolution of the situations in Ukraine and Syria, where a Turkish military operation has commenced in the northern part of the country.

1. Implementation: Follow-up on previous European Council commitments

As announced in the June 2019 European Council conclusions, EU Heads of State or Government will return to the issues of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-27 and the Strategic Agenda 2019-24, as reflected in the annotated draft agenda.

At the start of the meeting, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, will address the European Council meeting for the first time in his mandate. Antti Rinne, Prime Minister of Finland, which currently holds the rotating six-month presidency of the Council of Ministers, will provide an overview on the progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions.

Policy area Previous commitment Occasion on which the commitment was made MFF The European Council will hold an exchange of views in October 2019, aiming for an agreement before the end of the year June 2019 Strategic Agenda The European Council will discuss the follow-up to the Strategic Agenda in October 2019 June 2019 Climate The European Council will finalise its guidance before the end of the year with a view to the adoption and submission of the EU’s long-term strategy to the UNFCCC in early 2020 June 2019 2. European Council meeting Multiannual Financial Framework

On 17 October 2019, EU Heads of State or Government will hold an exchange of views on the next MFF. The discussion will be based on a paper by the Finnish Presidency informing EU leaders on the state of play in the negotiations. The most recent exchange of views between Member States on the main elements of the MFF took place in the General Affairs Council (GAC) of 16 September. Both the GAC discussions and the content of a draft ‘Negotiating Box’ (i.e. a document indicating the progressive completion of the negotiation, used by successive GAC meetings to prepare the final deliberation in the European Council), show that the differences of opinion on many sensitive aspects remain significant (see EPRS Legislative Train Schedule: MFF – 2021-2027). Some Member States continue for instance to advocate an EU budget equivalent to 1.0 per cent of total EU GNI, while others support a higher figure. Another point of contention is the size of the allocations to the common agriculture policy and cohesion funds.

With a view to its next meeting in December, the European Council is expected to invite the Finnish Council Presidency to update, based on the results of the discussions between EU leaders, the June 2019 Negotiating Box, including numbers. Thus, in December 2019, EU leaders would only for the first time discuss concrete numbers for the MFF, making the aim of ‘reaching an agreement in the European Council before the end of the year’ difficult to achieve.

On 10 October 2019, the new European Parliament adopted a resolution on the MFF reiterating that ‘Parliament will not rubber-stamp a fait accompli from the European Council’ and calling on the European Council to refrain from adopting detailed and purportedly binding conclusions based on the MFF negotiating box, as this would amount to direct interference in the legislative sphere’.

The next institutional cycle

This meeting is the first European Council since EU Heads of State or Government agreed on a package of candidates for the EU high-level positions (see Figure 1), and the subsequent election of the new European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, on 16 July by the European Parliament. President-elect von der Leyen will outline her priorities for the new Commission, and discuss the recently adopted Strategic Agenda 2019-24 with EU Heads of State or Government.

Figure 1: Overview of high-level office-holders since the 2009 EP elections

The European Council is also expected to adopt a decision appointing Christine Lagarde as President of the European Central Bank, with her nomination part of the package agreed by the European Council on 2 July. Her appointment follows a hearing in the European Parliament and the subsequent positive recommendation. This meeting is the last scheduled European Council to be presided over by Donald Tusk, who will be replaced as European Council President by Charles Michel (currently Prime Minister of Belgium) as of 1 December.

Climate

For the third meeting in a row, the European Council will discuss climate, with a focus on its external dimension. EU leaders are expected to reiterate their support to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate change, to discuss the outcome of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Climate Action Summit held in New York in September 2019, and to prepare for the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP25) to be held in Santiago de Chile in December 2019. They could also discuss the guidelines for the EU’s long-term strategy on climate change that they had committed to finalise by the end of 2019.

A group of eight EU states has recently called ‘to increase the EU’s emissions-cut target from 40 per cent to 55 per cent by 2030’, in line with a Dutch proposal made by Prime Minister Mark Rutte as part of the Future of Europe debate in the European Parliament plenary. Earlier this year, divergent views on the way forward to a carbon-neutral EU economy were particularly noticeable. In June 2019, a group of Member States (initially eight, later expanding to 18) as well as the European Parliament have expressed support for the European Commission’s communication ‘A Clean Planet for all’, pleading for an ambitious and timely climate policy promoting EU carbon-neutrality by 2050. Due to a lack of consensus on the target date for achieving carbon neutrality, the June 2019 European Council conclusions mention the objective of a transition to carbon neutrality, but specify in a footnote that ‘For a large majority of Member States, climate neutrality must be achieved by 2050’. The countries reluctant at that time to commit to a date to achieve climate neutrality were Czechia, Estonia, Hungary and Poland.

External relations

EU leaders are expected to discuss several foreign policy issues, notably the situation in Ukraine and in Syria. As regards Syria, they will most probably consider both the in-country situation, as well as the regional situation, including the ongoing Turkish military operation in the northern part of Syria. Several Member States, including France and Germany, have already expressed their concern about Turkey’s ‘unilateral military operation’ in the northern part of Syria, warned about its possible humanitarian consequences, including a possible increasing influx of migrants on the Eastern Mediterranean route, and urged Turkey to end its offensive. The Foreign Affairs Council on 14 October noted that some Member States have decided to stop arms-exports licensing to Turkey but did not decide on ‘a formal EU-wide arms embargo’.

Enlargement

Although agreement was not reached at the General Affairs Council of 15 October 2019, the European Council will most probably consider whether or not to open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia.

Whilst the Commission had given a positive recommendation, the decision to open or not accession negotiations with the two countries was postponed from June 2019 to October 2019 at the latest, due to persisting diverging views among the Member States, including France and the Netherlands which oppose the opening of accession negotiations. A possible solution, based on a German proposal, would consist of green-lighting the opening of accession negotiations with both countries whilst only North Macedonia would be given a clear date to start negotiations.

Enlargement gained momentum following the joint letter of the leaders of the EU’s institutions – the European Council President Donald Tusk, the European Parliament President David Sassoli, the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, and the European Commission President-elect Ursula Von der Leyen. In their letter, they outlined that the EU ‘stands before a strategic choice’ on whether or not to decide to open accession negotiations with the two Western Balkan countries which have fulfilled their share of the bargain and complied with the requirements set upon them so far. Prior to this, during his September 2019 visit to Albania and North Macedonia, Donald Tusk said that he has ‘always thought that the EU should open accession talks with both Albania and North Macedonia, in line with the positive recommendations from the Commission,’ whilst a similar position was also expressed by the Visegrad Four (V4) group.

Other Items

Standing by their earlier commitment, EU leaders will most probably once again condemn Turkey’s drilling activities in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone and reaffirm their solidarity with Cyprus.

3. European Council (Article 50) meeting

On Friday 18 October 2019, EU-27 leaders will possibly also meet in a European Council (Article 50) format to discuss the latest developments in the process following the United Kingdom’s notification of its withdrawal under Article 50 TEU.

On 2 October 2019, the UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, made a new proposal, including a differentiated EU-UK customs regime with no controls at or near the border which aims to replace the current ‘backstop’. The objective of the backstop, which was agreed upon by the previous UK government, is to prevent the creation of a hard border on the island of Ireland; it envisages that the UK would leave the single market but remain in a single EU-UK customs territory. The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker confirmed ‘that while the UK has made some progress, a number of problematic points remain in the proposal, on which further work is needed by the UK’. This sentiment was also shared by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, whose message to the UK Prime Minister was that the EU ’remains open but [is] still unconvinced’. A meeting between Johnson and his Irish counterpart, Taoiseach Leo Varadkar, on 10 October concluded that both ‘could see a pathway to a possible deal’. Following a meeting between EU and UK negotiators the following day, the Commission announced that ‘the EU and the UK have agreed to intensify discussions over the coming days’.

The EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, informed the General Affairs Council (Article 50) of 15 October, preparing the European Council (Article 50), about the state of play in Brexit negotiations and assessed that an agreement before the summit would be very difficult but still possible.

It is not excluded that the UK Prime Minister could – at the European Council meeting or shortly after – request a further extension to the Article 50 negation period. The recently adopted European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019 requires the UK government to request a three-month extension, if it has not secured the approval of the House of Commons for either: 1) a withdrawal agreement, or 2) leaving the EU without a withdrawal agreement, by the end of 19 October.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders, 17-18 October 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© Mediaparts / Fotolia

The European Union (EU) has developed many legislative measures related to climate change, and is on track to meet its 2020 targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the improvement of energy efficiency and the increased use of renewables. However, analysts estimate that more demanding targets in the medium- and longer-term require significant financial investments in mitigation and adaptation measures. Public resources can play an important role in financing such investment needs, not only directly but also in attracting funding from other sources.

In the broader field of EU finances, three main categories of climate-related initiatives can be identified: relevant projects and activities across a broad range of funding instruments in the EU budget; programmes for the demonstration of innovative technologies, funded by the EU’s Emissions Trading System; and climate finance from the European Investment Bank. While the EU budget represents only 2 % of public spending in the Union, it has features that can amplify its impact and make it particularly relevant for climate-related objectives, including the greater predictability of long-term investments ensured by its Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

In the 2014-2020 MFF, the EU decided to step up the contribution that the EU budget makes to action on climate change, by committing to spending 20 % of its financial resources on relevant measures. This political objective sets the broader framework for mainstreaming of climate in the EU budget, which consists of the incorporation of climate considerations and objectives across the major EU funding instruments. Climate mainstreaming takes place at different levels: a political objective and a tracking methodology for the overall budget; the design and implementation of specific funding instruments; and monitoring, reporting and evaluation, both for the overall budget and for specific instruments. Decision-makers and actors involved differ, depending on the phase.

According to the latest data, the EU should almost be able to reach the objective of spending 20 % of its 2014-2020 resources on climate by the end of the programming period. Some of the largest EU programmes under shared management with Member States are also the largest contributors to the climate target in absolute figures: agricultural funds, the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund. However, some smaller instruments have significant climate-relevance.

Assessments of the tracking methodology and of its impact have identified both achievements and shortcomings. The creation of a broad political objective is deemed to have triggered ambitious work and a greater focus on climate. Climate spending in instruments such as the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund has increased both quantitatively and qualitatively. However, other areas such as the common agricultural policy have not shown significant progress, despite the emergence of some good practices. Criticisms have included: the absence of a common mechanism to assign sub-targets to individual instruments; some inconsistencies in the methodology with over-estimations in some areas and under-representation in others; and a performance framework more focused on outputs than on results and impact.

The adoption of an overall objective for climate expenditure in the EU budget contributes to the establishment of a general framework against which to assess progress and areas for improvement in climate-related activities. For the post-2020 MFF, the European Commission has proposed to raise the objective to 25 % of the EU budget, while the European Parliament has called for an even more ambitious approach. Elements in the MFF proposals, such as the creation of some links to National Energy and Climate Plans, could reinforce the effectiveness of climate mainstreaming. The revenue side of the EU budget also has the potential to contribute to climate objectives, but its reform is considered extremely difficult due to the requirement for unanimity in the Council.

Read this ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Mainstreaming of climate action in the EU budget: Impact of a political objective‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rafal Manko,

© sebra / Fotolia

In May 2018, the Commission put forward a proposal for amending the existing Regulation on Cross-border Service of Documents in civil proceedings. The proposal aims, above all, to replace the existing mechanisms of paper transmission with an electronic system. National information technology (IT) systems would be connected into one network, and the use of paper transmission would become an exception, available only in the event of a failure of the electronic system. Within Parliament, a draft report was prepared by the Legal Affairs Committee in October 2018, and in February 2019, the institution adopted its first-reading position on the proposal.

Within Council, following an exchange of views between delegations and work at technical level, a policy debate is envisaged. Once Council reaches a general approach, trilogue negotiations will be able to start.

Versions

• October 2019:  ‘Reform of the Service of Documents Regulation‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents) Committee responsible: Legal Affairs (JURI) COM(2018) 379, 31.5.2018. Rapporteur: Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D, Italy) 2018/0204(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Emil Radev (EPP, Bulgaria);
Angel Dzhambazki (ECR, Bulgaria);
Jean-Marie Cavada (ALDE, France);
Kostas Chrysogonos (EUL/NGL, Greece) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Adoption of general approach by Council and opening of trilogue negotiations

Written by Klemen Zumer with Paul Anton Kindermann,

Chief Economist of the World Bank (WB), Penny Goldberg, presented an exclusive snapshot of the 2020 World Development Report in the Library Reading Room at the European Parliament on 1 October 2019, discussing the economic challenges and perspectives of global value chains (GVCs) for economic development: what can policy makers do to facilitate sustainable growth through GVCs? This question is particularly pressing in the wake of continuous trade conflicts that dampen expectations for further growth. The high-level event with Penny Goldberg and EP Vice President Pedro Silva Pereira kicked off intensified EPRS cooperation with the World Bank that will spark many follow up initiatives.

GVCs constitute a central layer of today’s unprecedentedly interconnected world economy. In a GVC, countries do not simply trade products. They produce together, as different steps of a single production process are distributed to different locations around the world, and the parts produced in each place are shipped across the globe often crossing borders multiple times. GVCs extend the division of labour to an international scale. In the contemporary world economy, almost all countries participate in GVCs; at different stages of the economic chain, they export raw materials, semi-finished goods, or eventually goods ready for consumption. The steady emergence of these GVCs over four decades has powered an economic revolution that boosted economic growth.

In general, the World Bank finds comprehensive empirical evidence that GVCs facilitate major income growth in manufacturing countries. And in developing countries, GVC firms have contributed to significant poverty reductions. On the other hand, Penny Goldberg identifies two major problems that come as costs of participating in GVCs. First, the economic gains that result from GVCs are distributed unequally across and within countries: participation in GVCs disadvantages unskilled workers, and women and youth are generally placed in lower value-added segments of production. Second, the high transportation costs are a strain on the environment. Thus, policy-makers are called upon to ensure that benefits are shared and the environment protected – e.g. by a carbon tax or stronger regulations on particular industries and polluters. Only then can globalisation ‘work for everyone’.

While these policies are needed urgently, the profound potential of GVCs for further, sustainable economic growth can only be harnessed if the rule-based international trade system is maintained and strengthened. Penny Goldberg warned that the continuation of protectionist measures could push more than 30 million people into poverty and crush global income. In concert with EP Vice President Pereira, she emphasised that international cooperation on trade is critical for the sustainable growth of all countries and suggested several criteria that new deep trade agreements should fulfil – such as stronger rules on subsidies. Vice-President Silva Pereira recalled the problems of trade agreements which lacked public support and came under heavy scrutiny. Here, he said, the EP should, among other things, push for prominent placement of sustainable development chapters in new, comprehensive agreements.

Following a lively question and answer session, Penny Goldberg promised to be back at EPRS soon to discuss the report in more detail.