European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Naja Bentzen,

How should democracies respond to disinformation, without compromising freedom of expression? This question preoccupied policy-makers in and beyond Europe in the previous policy cycle and will continue to dominate the debate in Brussels in the new legislature.

Against this backdrop, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) invited Peter Pomerantsev – a renowned, seasoned expert on information disruption; Director of the Arena Initiative; Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics; and Research Fellow at Johns Hopkins University – to speak about disinformation at the EPRS Reading Room on Thursday, 23 January 2020. Pomerantsev’s first book, ‘Nothing is true and everything is possible‘, was published in 2014, at the beginning of the Parliament’s 8th legislature. His most recent work, ‘This is not propaganda – adventures in the war against reality‘, was published in 2019, just ahead of the new legislature.

This first EPRS event on disinformation of the 9th legislature was an excellent opportunity to take stock of the EU’s response to online disinformation so far and at the same time to hear about Pomerantsev’s new book. Philipp Schulmeister, Head of the European Parliament’s Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, opened the event with a reminder that the war against reality, the undermining of trust in facts and in democracy itself – concerns the future of democracy and thus of the European Parliament itself.

Monika Nogaj, Head of the EPRS External Policies Unit who moderated the event, asked Pomerantsev to elaborate on the seemingly surrealist title of the new book ‘This is not propaganda’. Indeed, Pomerantsev explained that the title is a reference to Magritte’s painting ‘This is not a pipe’. The surrealist gap between word and meaning seems to have returned: in a world of ‘influence campaigns on steroids’, the words ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom of expression’ are increasingly used in a way that is detached from their meaning.

Pomerantsev explained that the attempt to manipulate reality and make truth unknowable (which he experienced himself when he was working in Russia as a reality TV producer in 2001-2010 and captivatingly analysed in ‘Nothing is true and everything is possible’), has now spread to the rest of the world. In ‘This is not propaganda’, Pomerantsev analyses the different manifestations of emotional influence, disinformation and coercion in the rest of the world: the Philippines, Mexico and the Balkans. These frontlines involve technological and ideological players, as well as a change in culture: when nostalgia is more important than the future, when emotions trump facts – partly because they bring more revenue for online platforms – real information becomes secondary.

Building a bridge between the hotspots in Pomerantsev’s book and the political reality in Brussels, Naja Bentzen of EPRS pointed out that the awareness of disinformation in Brussels has increased significantly since Pomerantsev’s first book was published, coinciding with Russia’s hybrid war and information attacks against Ukraine in the wake of the pro-democratic and pro-EU Maidan revolution. The US Presidential elections and the Brexit referendum in 2016 increased the sense of urgency in Brussels, further exacerbated by the 2018 revelations that Cambridge Analytica had harvested the personal data of millions of people’s Facebook profiles without their consent and used it for political advertising purposes. The EU’s response to disinformation has evolved accordingly. The first key milestone, the establishment of the East StratCom Task Force in 2015, consistently supported by the European Parliament, was followed by the launch of the EU’s European approach to online disinformation, which included a Code of Practice signed by the major online platforms in 2018. The European Commission’s final response to the behaviour of online platforms ahead of the European elections in May 2019 is expected this spring.

EPRS Book talk – ‘ This is not propaganda, adventures in the war against reality ‘

Against this backdrop, Pomerantsev elaborated on his expectations for the EU’s final response, on the likely ‘Brussels effect‘. Although Pomerantsev indicated that we cannot trust platforms to regulate themselves, banning microtargeting, as some suggest should be part of the response, is hardly feasible or practical, as we cannot sufficiently define the terms. Instead of focusing on content, Pomerantsev suggests focusing on behaviour and, more generally, increasing transparency. In addition, he proposes that a non-commercial public service internet, that rewards collaboration instead of attention-seeking behaviour, should be created.

The phrase ‘knowledge is power’ can mean very different things. In authoritarian systems, ‘knowledge is power’ means controlling access to information and suppressing public debate. For the tech industry, ‘knowledge is power’ can mean controlling access to our data and monetising the public debate. In an open democracy, we multiply power by sharing knowledge; this is the key mission of the European Parliamentary Research Service.

Pomerantsev’s first book was a source of inspiration in the debate in Brussels during the previous legislature. In sharing his knowledge and reports (with a spellbound audience), Pomerantsev has already enlightened the disinformation-related debate in the new policy cycle: empowering his audience of experts from EU institutions, as well as Members of the European Parliament such as Markéta Gregorová (Pirates, Czechia) and Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia), to empower others to survive the war against reality.

Further reading:

• The sharp power of knowledge: Foreign authoritarian meddling in academia, EPRS, European Parliament, December 2019
• Ukraine: Religion and (geo-)politics: Orthodox split weakens Russia’s influence, EPRS, European Parliament, February 2019
• From post-truth to post-trust?, EPRS, European Parliament, October 2018
• Foreign influence operations in the EU, EPRS, European Parliament, July 2018
• Multimedia: 3 questions on disinformation and democracy, EPRS, European Parliament

Written by Agnieszka Widuto,

© Marcin Kadziolka / Shutterstock.com

The EU plans to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50 % by 2030, and to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. This will require a socio-economic transformation in regions relying on fossil fuels and carbon-intensive industries. As part of the European Green Deal, the new Commission has announced a ‘Just Transition Mechanism’ of €100 billion to support the territories most affected by the transition towards climate neutrality.

Background

In December 2019, the European Commission published a communication presenting the European Green Deal. Further details on financing followed in January 2020 in the communication on the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan (European Green Deal Investment Plan), including the ‘Just Transition Mechanism’. On 14 January 2020, the Commission also published the legislative proposal on the ‘Just Transition Fund’ (JTF), which specified its scope of support. The establishment of the Fund entailed amendments to the proposal on the Common Provisions Regulation governing cohesion policy funds, which are expected to complement the resources of the JTF. These steps come in response to the need for finance for the transformation towards climate neutrality and investment in restructuring of regional economies, to mitigate the social impacts and expand activities supporting the green transition.

Just Transition Mechanism

The mechanism will consist of three pillars: the Just Transition Fund, a just transition scheme under InvestEU and a loan facility with the European Investment Bank (EIB). Taken together, it is expected to mobilise at least €100 billion for just transition in EU regions.

The Just Transition Fund will have its own budget of €7.5 billion, complemented by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), as well as national co-financing. With these additional resources, it is expected to generate €30-50 billion in total. Support will be available to all Member States, while focusing on the regions most affected by climate transition. It will be allocated on the basis of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of industrial facilities in NUTS2 regions with high carbon intensity, employment in industry in these regions, employment in coal and lignite mining, production of peat and production of oil shale. The allocation method will also take into account the country’s level of economic development (gross national income (GNI) per capita). Eligible territories will correspond to NUTS3 regions or parts thereof. The activities supported will include investments in SMEs, clean technologies, renewable energy, energy efficiency, and reskilling of workers. Territorial just transition plans will be prepared, and a set of indicators used to monitor progress.

Source: European Commission, 2020.

The dedicated just transition scheme under InvestEU is expected to mobilise up to €45 billion, mostly of private investments. The target of generating this amount corresponds to a provision of around €1.8 billion from the EU budget under the InvestEU programme. Its scope will be broader than the Just Transition Fund, financing projects not only in just transition territories, but also outside (if these projects are key to the transition within the just transition territories). It will fund renewable energy investments, energy efficiency schemes, and energy and transport infrastructure, including gas infrastructure and district heating, as well as decarbonisation projects, economic diversification of the regions and social infrastructure.

The public-sector loan facility with the European Investment Bank, backed by the EU budget, will provide subsidised financing to local authorities in the regions concerned. It is expected to leverage public funding and mobilise €25-30 billion in investments. The loan facility will rely on a contribution of €1.5 billion from the EU budget and EIB lending of €10 billion at its own risk. Support may take the form of an interest rate subsidy or an investment grant (financed from the EU budget), blended with loans provided by the EIB to municipal, regional or other public authorities. It will finance energy and transport infrastructure, district heating networks, energy efficiency measures including renovation of buildings, and social infrastructure. Similar to InvestEU funding, its scope will go beyond the transition territories to include other regions, if the projects are key to transition within the just transition territories. This may be the case for instance for transport or energy infrastructure projects that improve the connectivity of the just transition territories.

Advisory support and technical assistance

In addition to funding and technical assistance available under the Just Transition Mechanism, the communication on the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan also lists a number of supporting measures. The InvestEU Advisory Hub will offer tailored advisory services on sustainable projects, including just transition. The Structural Reform Support Programme (and its successor, the Reform Support Programme) will provide technical support to public authorities on reforms to achieve climate transition, including preparation of territorial just transition plans. Moreover, assistance will be available through a new Just Transition Platform, managed by the Commission and building on the existing Platform for Coal Regions in Transition.

Links with cohesion policy

The Just Transition Fund will be implemented under cohesion policy and complemented by its resources. Its delivery will be governed by the amended Common Provisions Regulation and included in partnership agreements and programmes. According to the proposal on the JTF, the Fund will be a key tool to prevent regional disparities from growing as a result of the transition towards climate neutrality. Thus, it will contribute to strengthening economic, social and territorial cohesion. In terms of funding, the Fund will have its own resources of €7.5 billion. The proposed amendments to the CPR also introduce a new article 21a stipulating that JTF resources will be complemented from ERDF, ESF+ or a combination of these two funds. The total of ERDF and ESF+ resources transferred to the JTF will be between 1.5 and 3 times the amount of JTF support. In order to ensure continued impact of cohesion policy, the resources transferred from either the ERDF or the ESF+ cannot exceed 20 % of the respective ERDF and ESF+ allocation to the Member State concerned. Member States are also expected to provide national resources, with levels of EU co-financing set according to the categories of regions in which the territories concerned are located.

European Parliament position

Parliament called for the establishment of a Just Energy Transition Fund of €4.8 billion in its November 2018 resolution on the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework. The call for the establishment of the Fund was echoed by the European Committee of the Regions in its opinion on ‘The socio-economic structural change in Europe’s coal regions’ of October 2019. In its resolution of January 2020 on the European Green Deal, Parliament stressed that just transition is about more than just a fund, but a whole-policy approach underpinned by investment, which must ensure that no one is left behind. In a debate during the January 2020 plenary session with the Commission, some MEPs expressed scepticism about the complementary transfer of funds from cohesion policy to JTF. The work on the Just Transition Fund proposal is currently in preparatory phase. The European Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development (REGI) is expected to take the lead (publication of the rapporteur’s draft report will be the next step). While revisiting the proposal on InvestEU is not envisaged, a new legislative proposal to set up the EIB loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism is expected in March 2020.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Just transition in EU regions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Etienne Bassot,

EP Plenary session – Implementing and monitoring the provisions on citizens’ rights in the Withdrawal Agreement

In her statements to the European Parliament in July and November 2019, as candidate for European Commission President and President-elect respectively, Ursula von der Leyen outlined the six political priorities that would shape the working programme of the European Commission over the next five years. While the former Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, had claimed to lead a ‘political Commission‘, his successor, Ursula von der Leyen, has pledged to lead a ‘geopolitical Commission‘. Such a Commission will have a political agenda in which reinforcing the EU’s role as a relevant international actor, and trying to shape a better global order through reinforcing multilateralism, is to become a key priority (‘A stronger Europe in the world’). The other main political priorities of the Commission are brought together under five broad headings: ‘A European Green Deal’, ‘A Europe fit for the digital age’, ‘An economy that works for people’, ‘A new push for European democracy’, and ‘Promoting the European way of life’. Together they define the framework within which the Commission will act in the coming five years. The structure and working methods announced by von der Leyen show that her Commission will differ from its predecessors in a number of ways.

What is new in the ‘geopolitical Commission’ New structure

Concerned about the coordination and coherence of the College’s activities and decisions, von der Leyen has decided to structure the Commission around three executive vice‑presidents (Frans Timmermans, Margrethe Vestager, and Valdis Dombrovskis) and five vice‑presidents (Josep Borrell Fontelles, Maroš Šefčovič, Věra Jourová, Dubravka Šuica, and Margaritis Schinas). The executive vice-presidents are to assume a dual role as commissioners dealing both with a specific portfolio and as coordinators responsible for one of the core topics of the political agenda, while the five remaining vice-presidents will assume a single coordinating role for specific policy priorities.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Borrell), who also has the role of Vice-President (HR/VP, Article 18(4) TEU), coordinates the external aspects of the work of all Commissioners, in addition to being responsible for the European External Action Service (EEAS). The importance attached to the EU’s external action under von der Leyen’s political priorities explains why external policy will be systematically discussed and decided upon by the College. A specific Group for external coordination (EXCO) has been created to prepare the external aspects of College meetings on a weekly basis and to enhance coordination between the Commission and the EEAS. It remains to be seen how this new approach and emphasis will fit with the dual character of the mandate of the HR/VP and the prevalence of the Council in every decision taken under the common foreign and security policy.

The Commission President had originally assembled a gender-balanced College, although this balance was lost with the new candidates replacing those who failed to pass the parliamentary hearings process. But von der Leyen has sought to favour gender equality with new rules for the composition Commissioners’ cabinets (private offices), requiring Commissioners to include 50 % of women among their administrator staff. She has also pledged to work towards gender equality among the Commission’s senior management.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The von der Leyen Commission’s priorities for 2019-2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Union, EP

The agenda for the European Parliament Plenary Session of 29 and 30 January 2020 is a sombre one, featuring a solemn ceremony in remembrance of the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, and a vote on the Withdrawal Agreement of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU).

The European Parliament has been warning against the rise of neo-fascist violence and particularly the increase in violence against Jews for some time, calling for EU countries to take action to counter revisionist narratives that aim at denying or trivialising the mass murder of 6 million European Jews. Jewish communities in the EU have consequently been shrinking recently, in reaction to the increase in acts of anti-Semitism. Holocaust education is vital to keeping the memory of victims alive and learning from past mistakes. Holocaust remembrance in the EU takes place around International Holocaust Remembrance Day on 27 January, the date on which the Auschwitz Birkenau extermination camp in Poland was liberated. The commemoration provides an ideal opportunity to promote public discourse on the facts of the Holocaust. It is also an occasion in many EU Member States, as in Parliament itself, to honour the victims of the less well known Roma and Sinti Holocaust.

Later on Wednesday evening, Members will approve or deny consent in a single vote (with no amendments possible), to the conclusion, by the Council on behalf of the EU, of the treaty on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The text of the treaty was agreed between EU leaders and the UK Prime Minister in October 2019. The product of a rather tortured process, the Withdrawal Agreement includes provisions covering citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, rules on the transition period, governance, protocols and annexes. A separate Political Declaration provides the basis for future EU-UK economic and security cooperation. Should Members concur with the Constitutional Affairs Committee recommendation to give their consent to the agreement, it should enter into force at the end of January, whereupon the United Kingdom will become a third country, ending 47 years of EU membership. With the departure of 73 British Members, the Parliament itself will consequently change. Twenty-seven seats will be redistributed among 14 Member States, with the remaining 46 seats held in reserve for future EU enlargements and/or the possible creation of a transnational constituency.

Looking to the future, Members will hear a statement on the Commission’s Work Programme for 2020 on Thursday morning. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has announced considerable changes in the focus and scope of the Commission’s work for the next few years. President von der Leyen’s ambitions include forging a stronger partnership between the Commission and Parliament by, among other things, providing greater support for Parliament’s right of legislative initiative, prioritising dialogue between the institutions during international negotiations, and submitting legislative proposals in response to Parliament resolutions adopted by a majority (in line with Article 225 TFEU).

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig,

© designer491 / Shutterstock.com

On 29 January 2020, the European Parliament is set to vote on the recommendation to give consent to the treaty on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU), endorsed in its current version by EU leaders and the UK Prime Minister in October 2019. Parliament’s consent, following the completion of the UK’s domestic procedures for ratifying the agreement, will allow its entry into force on 1 February 2020. The UK will then cease its 47-year membership of the EU, although EU law will remain applicable to the UK during an 11‑month transition period ending on 31 December 2020. If however Parliament were to deny consent, the UK would leave the EU without a deal on 1 February 2020, absent another extension of the Article 50 period.

The EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement

After 40 months of negotiations, three extensions to the Article 50 TEU negotiating period and two draft agreements endorsed by the EU-27 leaders and the UK Prime Minister, the approval of the treaty setting out the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU is now close to completion. Initiated in June 2017, the negotiations focused in a first phase on three key issues: protecting UK and EU citizens’ rights, agreeing a financial settlement, and ensuring the absence of a hard border on the island of Ireland. In the second phase of talks, from December 2017 on, the framework for the future EU-UK relationship and transitional arrangements were discussed. On 14 November 2018, negotiators agreed a draft withdrawal treaty and a political declaration setting out the framework for the future EU-UK relationship, both promptly endorsed by then UK Prime Minister Theresa May and EU-27 leaders. However, the UK House of Commons voted repeatedly to reject the withdrawal deal; and after taking office in July 2019, the new UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson set out to renegotiate the ‘backstop’ solution for Northern Ireland. On 17 October 2019, the European Council endorsed a revised withdrawal agreement, in which the main changes related to Northern Ireland, and revised political declaration. Subsequently, the EU-27 granted a further Article 50 extension to the UK until 31 January 2020 to allow the ratification process to be completed.

The withdrawal agreement is an extensive legal document comprising: common and final provisions, citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, rules on the transition period, other separation issues (rules on concluding ongoing processes at the end of the transition period, e.g. ongoing judicial procedures) and governance of the agreement. It also includes three Protocols (on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Gibraltar, and the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus) and annexes. The Political Declaration is a non-binding text, providing the basis for future EU-UK economic and security cooperation. The few changes in October 2019 reflect the UK government’s ‘different level of ambition’ with respect to the future EU-UK relationship.

The transition (or implementation) period is to last until 31 December 2020, during which time the UK, although a third country, is treated as a Member State (with the exceptions set out in the withdrawal treaty), but without any EU decision-making or representation rights. This period is extendable once (before 1 July 2020) for up to one or two years. The transition period was meant to allow time for negotiations on the future partnership, however experts consider that 11 months is insufficient to reach a comprehensive agreement in all relevant areas (the trade relationship, security cooperation, immigration, data-sharing, fisheries, etc.), all the more so if the UK wishes to diverge significantly from EU standards after the transition.

As regards the border issue, the revised agreement reverts from the previous UK-wide backstop option to a Northern Ireland-only solution, whereby once the transition period ends, Northern Ireland will apply EU customs and tariffs legislation, as well as the relevant EU single market rules needed to avoid any regulatory or customs border on the island of Ireland. A consent mechanism for Northern Irish authorities is also included. However many of the detailed rules necessary for the operation of this Protocol have still to be established by the parties.

In terms of governance, a Joint Committee made up of EU and UK representatives will be responsible for the implementation and application of the agreement. The treaty also includes a mechanism for dispute settlement, based on arbitration (with the role of the Court of Justice of the EU preserved if the dispute relates to a question of interpretation of EU law), and compliance provisions.

Ratification procedure In the United Kingdom

The general election in the UK in December 2019 delivered a clear majority to the Conservative party of Prime Minister Boris Johnson, thus facilitating the adoption of the necessary legislation for ratifying and implementing the Withdrawal Agreement. On 19 December 2019, the government introduced the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill 2019-2020, which fulfils two roles: 1) it gives effect domestically to the withdrawal treaty (the UK being a dualist state); and 2) it fulfils provisions of the previous EU Withdrawal Act 2018 which requires an Act of Parliament before the UK can ratify the treaty.

A previous version of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill was introduced by the UK government on 21 October 2019. While the House of Commons voted to allow the bill to proceed to the next stage, it rejected the timetable proposed by the government for its adoption.

The bill repeals previous domestic requirements related to the ratification of the withdrawal agreement; implements the transition period; delegates a range of powers to the government for the implementation of the citizens’ rights provisions, the Protocol on Northern Ireland and the separation issues; and, importantly, it confers direct effect to the relevant provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement, after the transition, and foresees that incompatible or inconsistent domestic legislation must be disapplied. In terms of changes from the October version, the bill does not include powers for the UK parliament relating to the future relationship negotiations and agreements, and blocks the possibility of the government asking for an extension to the transition period. The bill completed its passage through the UK Parliament on 22 January, with the House of Lords choosing not to insist on its earlier amendments, and received Royal Assent on 23 January 2020.

In the European Union

In December 2018, the European Commission adopted two proposals on the signing and conclusion of the withdrawal agreement. On 11 January 2019, the Council (Article 50) adopted a decision on signing the agreement and approved a draft decision to conclude the agreement. Both the decision to sign and to conclude the agreement were subsequently amended in light of the Article 50 extensions and the revised deal in October 2019. The draft Council decision to conclude the agreement was sent to Parliament for consent in October 2019. According to Rule 88 of its Rules of Procedure, Parliament gives its consent to a withdrawal agreement by a majority of votes cast (i.e. simple majority of Members present). Members elected in the UK have the right to vote. If Parliament gives consent, the Council can adopt the decision to conclude the agreement with a ‘super qualified majority’, following the treaty’s signature by both parties. Ratification by Member States is not required. For the agreement to enter into force, the parties must provide written notification that their internal ratification procedures are completed.

European Parliament position

Throughout the negotiations, Parliament has made its views heard through various resolutions and through its Brexit Steering Group has cooperated closely with the other EU institutions, in particular the Commission’s Task Force in charge of the EU-UK talks. On 15 January 2020, the EP adopted a new resolution on implementing and monitoring provisions on citizens’ rights in the Withdrawal Agreement.

The recommendation on consent was drawn up by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO), rapporteur Guy Verhofstadt (Renew Europe, Belgium). Ten other Committees adopted opinions in the form of letters from their respective chairs to the AFCO Chair. On 23 January 2020, AFCO voted to recommend giving consent to the agreement by 23 votes, with 3 against, and no abstentions. In plenary, on 29 January 2020, there will be a single vote, to approve or deny consent, no amendments being possible.

Recommendation on consent to Council conclusion of the UK withdrawal agreement: 2018/0427(NLE);
Committee responsible: AFCO; Rapporteur: Guy Verhofstadt (Renew Europe, Belgium). Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Agreement on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Delphotostock / Fotolia

It is now clear that the United Kingdom will leave the European Union on 31 January 2020. It will do so on the basis of the revised Withdrawal Agreement negotiated between the EU-27 and the UK by Boris Johnson after he became Prime Minister last year. Both sides will then start negotiations on future relations, including on trade, which will run during the transitional period, currently due to end on 31 December 2020. The UK government has said it will set out its hopes for the future partnership after Brexit has happened.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on numerous challenges facing the UK, EU and their future ties after their divorce.

Brexit: Getting it done
European Policy Centre, January 2020

Flexibility does not come for free
Centre for European Reform, January 2020

Devolution restored in Northern Ireland as the British and Irish Governments prepare for the next phase of Brexit
Open Europe, January 2020

Scotland’s European choices as UK exits the EU
Scottish Institute for European Relations, January 2020

The Irish 2020 election and Brexit
The UK in a Changing Europe, January 2020

The UK seeks its own ‘phase one’ deal on Brexit
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2020

Britain voted for independence, but it has achieved isolation
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2020

Brexit’s finish line is only the ‘end of the beginning’ for Britain and the European Union
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2020

Getting Brexit done: What happens now?
Institute for Government, January 2020

Attention turns to the structure of next phase Brexit talks
Open Europe, January 2020

A bumpy level playing field awaits the next round of Brexit talks
Institute for Government, January 2020

The North-East of England after Brexit
The UK in a Changing Europe, January 2020

Post-Brexit trade deals: What do the public think?
The UK in a Changing Europe, January 2020

Brexit endgame: Brexit nears, Northern Ireland assembly reconvenes, and Megxit distracts
Brookings Institution, January 2020

The Border into Brexit: Perspectives from local communities in the central border region of Ireland/Northern Ireland
The UK in a Changing Europe, December 2019

A post-Brexit Europe in a new decade
Carnegie Europe, December 2019

Britain must balance a transatlantic heart with a European head
Chatham House, December 2019

A Brexit trade deal by December 2020 won’t be much of a deal at all
The UK in a Changing Europe, December 2019

What Boris Johnson’s big win means for Brexit and Scotland
Chatham House, December 2019

Getting the UK ready for the next phase of Brexit negotiations
Institute for Government, December 2019

Will Boris Johnson go full speed ahead or wobbly on Brexit?
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2019

The end of twentieth-century Labour
Carnegie Europe, December 2019

How much will the UK contribute to the next seven-year EU budget?
Bruegel, December 2019

A very different Brexit year lies ahead
Open Europe, December 2019

A second independence referendum: When and how could Scotland vote again?
Institute for Government, December 2019

Post-election: Where next for a divided, diminished UK?
Scottish Institute for European Relations, November 2019

Independence, Scotland and EU accession: Challenges ahead
Scottish Institute for European Relations, November 2019

How economically damaging will Brexit be?
Centre for European Reform, November 2019

Brexit: Research and analyses
House of Commons Library, 2020

Latest thinking and research about Brexit from LSE
LSE Brexit blog, 2020

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass and Philippe Perchoc,

© cge2010 / Fotolia

The term Holocaust refers to the mass murder of 6 million European Jews, Roma and other persecuted groups, whom the Nazi regime and its collaborators sought to annihilate.

The expropriation, state-sponsored discrimination and persecution of the Jews by the Nazi regime began in 1933, followed by pogroms and their mass incarceration in concentration camps. Ultimately, this policy was extended to all Nazi-controlled European territories and countries during World War II, culminating in mass summary executions (‘Holocaust by Bullets’) and extermination in death camps. The perpetrators were prosecuted at the Nuremberg trials in 1945-1946; however, the tribunal preferred to indict them on charges of crimes against humanity rather than genocide.

It was not until 2005, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz that a United Nations resolution designated 27 January the day for international commemoration of the Holocaust, to be known as ‘International Holocaust Remembrance Day’.

In the European Union, numerous programmes seek to preserve the memory of these tragic events in the history of the continent. Since 1995, the European Parliament has adopted resolutions drawing attention to the obligation to remember not only through commemorations but also through education. In November 2018, the EU became a permanent international partner of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Union and Holocaust remembrance‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Frederik Scholaert (1st edition),

© Hans Christiansson / Shutterstock

Eastern Baltic cod has long supported the livelihoods of many Baltic fishermen, but stocks of this valuable fish have been declining sharply in recent years. Every year since 2014, total allowable catches have been reduced accordingly. Recent scientific advice, published in May 2019, reinforced concerns regarding eastern Baltic cod, showing an even steeper decline and estimating the stock to be below safe biological limits for the past two years. Scientists point to high natural mortality resulting from various environmental pressures, including a lack of salinity, little oxygen, pollution, high water temperatures and parasite infestation. On 22 July 2019, as an emergency measure, the Commission imposed an immediate closure of the fishery for six months, with the exception of a limited amount arising from the unavoidable by-catch. Subsequently, fishing opportunities for 2020 were cut by 92 %. As recovery of the stock is not expected before 2024, on 31 October 2019 the Commission issued a proposal amending the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund Regulation in order to allow support for permanent cessation and introducing parallel changes to the Baltic multiannual plan by setting capacity limits for the fishing segments concerned and by including additional control and data collection measures.

Versions

• January 2020:  ‘European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT): Regulation and new strategic innovation agenda‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1139 as regards the introduction of capacity limits for Eastern Baltic cod, data collection and control measures in the Baltic Sea, and Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 as regards permanent cessation for fleets fishing for Eastern Baltic cod Committee responsible: Fisheries (PECH) COM(2019) 564
31.10.2019 Rapporteur: Niclas Herbst (EPP, Germany) 2019/0246(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Ivo Hristov (S&D, Bulgaria)
Søren Gade (Renew, Denmark)
Ska Keller (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Ruža Tomašić (ECR, Croatia) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Consideration of draft report

 

 

Written by Gianluca Sgueo,

© Ico Maker / Shutterstock.com

What will European Union (EU) decision-making look like in the next decade and beyond? Is technological progress promoting more transparent, inclusive and participatory decision-making at EU level?

Technology has dramatically changed both the number and quality of connections between citizens and public administrations. With technological progress, citizens have gained improved access to public authorities through new digital communication channels. Innovative, tech-based, approaches to policy-making have become the subject of a growing debate between academics and politicians. Theoretical approaches such as ‘CrowdLaw’, ‘Policy-Making 3.0’, ‘liquid’, ‘do-it-yourself’ or ‘technical’ democracy and ‘democratic innovations’ share the positive outlook towards technology; and technology is seen as the medium through which policies can be ‘co-created’ by decision-makers and stakeholders. Co-creation is mutually beneficial. Decision-makers gain legitimacy by incorporating the skills, knowledge and expertise of citizens, who in turn have the opportunity to shape new policies according to their needs and expectations.

EU institutions are at the forefront of experimentation with technologically innovative approaches to make decision-making more transparent and accessible to stakeholders. Efforts in modernising EU participatory channels through technology have evolved over time: from redressing criticism on democratic deficits, through fostering digital interactions with stakeholders, up to current attempts at designing policy-making in a friendly and participative manner.

While technological innovation holds the promise of making EU policy-making even more participatory, it is not without challenges. To begin with, technology is resource consuming. There are legal challenges associated with both over- and under-regulation of the use of technology in policy-making. Furthermore, technological innovation raises ethical concerns. It may increase inequality, for instance, or infringe personal privacy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Using technology to ‘co-create’ EU policies‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochaka,

© European Union 2020 – Source : EP/Christian CREUTZ

January highlights included statements on ongoing hearings on the rule of law under Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union (EU) regarding Hungary and Poland; bushfires in Australia and climate change consequences; cross-border organised crime and its impact on free movement; a common charger for mobile radio equipment; the gender pay gap; and the ‘Housing First’ approach to address homelessness. Parliament also debated statements on the situation in Iran and Iraq, in Libya, and in Venezuela following the illegal election of the new National Assembly Presidency and Bureau. Members voted on annual reports on implementation of the common foreign and security, and foreign and defence policies. Members debated citizens’ rights provisions in the UK Withdrawal Agreement. They also voted on a resolution on the European Green Deal, following their debate in December’s special session – on the day on which the Commission had itself adopted and presented its plans. In addition, His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan addressed a formal sitting of Parliament.

Presentation of the programme of activities of the Croatian Presidency

Members debated Council and European Commission statements presenting the programme of the new (and first) Croatian Council Presidency. The priorities for the six-month tenure include developing European economic and social cohesion and convergence; making stronger connections between European citizens, focusing on infrastructure for smooth mobility of people and goods; boosting internal security to protect citizens and tackling migration issues; and strengthening multilateralism and Europe’s influence in the world.

Conference on the Future of Europe

Members adopted, by a large majority, Parliament’s position on arrangements for the Conference on the Future of Europe, which closely follows the text agreed by Parliament’s Conference of Political Group Presidents. Parliament has high expectations for the conference, and is eager to contribute to a design that affords maximum opportunities for citizen contribution, while avoiding the pitfalls inherent in any selection. A Parliament working group is reflecting on ensuring that the conference structure, aims and scope are realistic and result in meaningful outcomes.

COP15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Kunming 2020)

Parliament debated a Commission statement on the COP15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and adopted a resolution in view of the 15th meeting of the parties to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity in Kunming, China in October 2020. The EU post-2020 biodiversity framework (to 2030) needs to be in place in time for this meeting. However, Parliament is asking how the Commission proposes to strengthen implementation of biodiversity-protection measures, given the failure to achieve 2020 targets.

2018 Annual report on human rights and democracy in the world

Members debated and adopted Parliament’s position on the 2018 Annual report on the human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter. The report takes stock of all EU action in human rights and democracy, and Parliament takes the opportunity to review EU action and make recommendations for the future, in an annual resolution adopted in response to the report.

Negotiations ahead of Council’s first reading

The President announced five Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, in accordance with Rule 72. Parliament’s positions adopted earlier at first reading will provide the mandates for these negotiations.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – Strasbourg, January I 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© luzitanija / Fotolia

The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) aims to ensure an appropriate role for the Union in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of international security. It is an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets. Now its importance is rising because of the increasingly uncertain strategic environment. For years, the EU has been considered as an economic powerhouse but militarily weak, and it is currently debating whether and how to enhance its defence capabilities, notably because of the growing complexity of transatlantic security relations. The new European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, is determined to expand the EU’s international role, calling her Commission ‘geopolitical’.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the state of the future of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy.

What EU geopolitical power will cost
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2019

The EU as a maritime security provider
European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2019

Differentiated integration within PESCO: Clusters and convergence in EU defence
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2019

On European power
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2019

From global strategy to strategic compass: Where is the EU heading?
Egmont, December 2019

Strategic investment: Making geopolitical sense of the EU’s defence industrial policy
European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2019

How can the EU learn the language of power?
Chatham House, December 2019

Europe’s coherence gap in external crisis and conflict management
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2019

Putting the core at the centre: The crisis response operation core (CROC) and the future of PESCO
Egmont, December 2019

Europe´s coherence gap in external crisis and conflict management: The EU’s integrated approach between political rhetoric and institutional practice
Bertelsmann Stiftung, November 2019

Towards a European Security Council?
Centre for European Reform, November 2019

EU-NATO cooperation in an era of great power competition
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, November 2019

Towards a more capable European Union civilian CSDP
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 2019
Towards a more gender-balanced European Union CSDP
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 2019

EU-U.S. consensus and NATO-EU cooperation
Egmont, November 2019

Gaming the new security nexus
Clingendael, November 2019

Transatlantic relations: Past, present and future
College of Europe, November 2019

EU defense cooperation: Progress amid transatlantic concerns
Carnegie Europe, November 2019

Trump, NATO leaders converge in London: What to watch
German Marshall Fund, November 2019

Can the European Commission develop Europe’s defence industry?
Centre for European Reform, November 2019

New perspectives on shared security: NATO’s next 70 years
Carnegie Europe, November 2019

The militarization of US foreign policy: Engagement with Europe increasingly about defense
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, November 2019

What does it mean to be a European defence company today?
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2019

Rethinking European security
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, October 2019

Mutual reinforcement: CSDP and NATO in the face of rising challenges
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2019

Der vernetzte Krieg. Warum moderne Streitkräfte von elektronischer Kampfführung abhängen
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, October 2019

The first year of the compact: How the review process can make civilian CSDP more capable
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, October 2019

NATO’s futures through Russian and Chinese beholders’ eyes
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, October 2019

EU watch list 2019: Third update
International Crisis Group, October 2019

Articulating the logic of nuclear-sharing
Institute for European Studies, October 2019

The European intervention initiative: Developing a shared strategic culture for European defence
Clingendael, September 2019

Democratization first: The community method in CFSP as a precondition for a European defence policy
Institut français des relations internationales, September 2019

New beginnings: Bolstering EU Foreign and Security Policy in times of contestation
Notre Europe, September 2019

European security 2030
LSE Ideas, Dahrendorf Forum, Mercator Stiftung, September 2019

Up in arms: Warring over Europe´s arms export regime
Centre for European Reform, September 2019

Give the people what they want: Popular demand for a strong European foreign policy
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2019

European security in crisis: What to expect if the US withdraws from NATO
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Körber Stiftung, September 2019

The EU and NATO
European Union Institute for Security Studies, August 2019

An attack against them all? Drivers of decisions to contribute to NATO collective defense
Rand Corporation, August 2019

From plaything to player: How Europe can stand up for itself in the next five years
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2019

Military mobility and the EU-NATO conundrum
Clingendael, July 2019

Strategic autonomy for European choices: The key to Europe’s shaping power
European Policy Centre, July 2019

The end of the INF-Treaty: Context and consequences
Egmont, July 2019

Strategic sovereignty: How Europe can regain the capacity to act
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019

Towards an EU security community? Public opinion and the EU’s role as a security actor
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2019

The EU’s security Union: A bill of health
Centre for European Reform, June 2019
Moving PeSCo forward: What are the next steps?
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, May 2019

The future of EU civilian crisis management: Finding a niche
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, May 2019

Together forever? Alliances in times of foreign policy uncertainty
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, May 2919

NATO at seventy: Filling NATO’s critical defence-capability gaps
Atlantic Council, April 2019

NATO at 70: From triumph to tumult?
German Marshal Fund, April 2019

Open door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic security after the cold war
Center for trans-Atlantic Relations, April 2019

Europe in the midst of China-US strategic competition: What are the European Union’s options?
Bruegel, April 2019

Russian ground forces posture towards the West
Chatham House, April 2019

NATO anniversary: Will there be another 70 years?
Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, March 2019

The European Defense Fund: Key issues and controversies
Carnegie Europe, March 2019

A more strategic approach towards CSDP partnerships
Jacques Delors Institute, March 2019

EU it yourself: A blueprint for a European Security Council
Wilfried Martens Centre, March 2019

Digital infantry battlefield solution. Research and innovation
Latvian Institute for International Affairs, March 2019

Allein oder im Verbund? Allianzen in Zeiten außenpolitischer Unsicherheit
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, March 2019

Interregnum
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, March 2019

Joining forces: The way towards the European Defence Union
European Political Strategy Centre, February 2019

Security radar 2019: Wake-up call for Europe!
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, February 2019

Are PESCO projects fit for purpose?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, European Leadership Network, February 2019

Strategische Autonomie Europas
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2019

The Aachen mutual defence clause: A closer look at the Franco-German treaty
Egmont, February 2019

What’s in the CARDs?
Egmont, February 2019

Hybrid conflicts: The new normal?
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, January 2019

Fighting for Europe: European strategic autonomy and the use of force
Egmont, January 2019

A European Security Council: Added value for EU foreign and security policy?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2019

Opportunities for European collaboration in armoured vehicles
Rand Europe, January 2019

‘Fort Trump’ or bust? Poland and the future of European defence
Friends of Europe, January 2019

Read this briefing on ‘Future of European Security and Defence Policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp,

© andriano.cz / Shutterstock.com

On 3 January 2020, a United States (US) strike outside Baghdad killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, the leader of the al-Qods force within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IGRC), and arguably the second most important man in Iran after Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The assassination was a reaction to an escalation in the growing conflict between the USA and Iran. Iran retaliated on 8 January 2020, by attacking two US bases in Iraq with missiles; luckily – or intentionally – without casualties. Although both the USA and Iran have refrained from any further action, few expect this to mark the end of tensions between the USA and Iran in the region. The EU reaction to the assassination has been to try to de-escalate the situation to prevent all-out war, to focus on stabilising Iraq, and to limit damage to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

What led to the assassination of Qasem Soleimani?

US-Iran relations have been strained since 1979, when the Islamic Revolution removed the US-backed government of the Shah. Since then, US administrations have largely treated Iranian policies in the Middle East as a threat to US interests. As part of international efforts to curtail Iran’s nuclear programme, former US President Barack Obama signed a nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2015. However, current President Donald Trump, a strident opponent of the JCPOA, withdrew the USA from the agreement in May 2018, and re-imposed sanctions that had been lifted as part of the nuclear deal. Tensions between the USA and Iran have been rising ever since. Tehran responded to each new round of US sanctions with increasingly bold attacks, on ships in the Gulf of Hormuz and oil installations in Saudi Arabia. Over several months, the theatre of conflict moved to Iraq, leading to growing clashes between US forces and Iranian-backed paramilitary Popular Mobilisation Units (PMF) in Iraq, and culminating in attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad, and the death and wounding of American and Iraqi personnel. The USA initially claimed that Soleimani, who the USA holds personally responsible for the deaths of hundreds of US service members in Iraq, posed an imminent threat to US interests in the region. According to later statements, his assassination was part of a ‘broader strategy of deterrence’, or, simply, Soleimani’s ‘horrible past‘.

Oil prices
Following an initial surge in oil prices immediately after the Soleimani assassination, prices have since receded to 2019 levels. However, even in 2019, oil prices were nearly 25 % higher, due partly to rising tensions in the Middle East region. The dangers for Iraq

On 5 January 2020, in protest against the killing of Soleimani and a close associate, Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the Iraqi parliament voted to seek the removal of foreign military troops from the country. The parliament also called for the cancellation of an agreement under which US forces are stationed in Iraq to help fight the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIL/Da’esh). In the meantime, the international coalition against ISIL/Da’esh has suspended operations. Any weakening of the international coalition against ISIL/Da’esh could lead to the resurgence of ISIL/Da’esh in Iraq, where the terrorist organisation is still present, with potentially grave humanitarian consequences. Moreover, there is growing concern about increasing instability in Iraq, which has experienced decades of violence and armed conflict, and which has seen large-scale anti-government protests in recent months.

The EU is particularly concerned that any further military escalation could undo many years of international effort to stabilise the country and divert attention from necessary political reforms, the tackling of urgent social challenges, and the fight against corruption. Since 2014, the EU has made €1.2 billion available to support Iraq, in the form of humanitarian aid, support for internally displaced persons, and stabilisation of liberated areas. The EU has also supported civilian security sector reform, including through the common security and defence policy (CSDP) EU Advisory Mission Iraq, since October 2017, and has worked with the Iraqi authorities to improve Iraq’s counter-terrorism efforts. In response to the specific challenges Iraq faces following the territorial defeat of ISIL/Da’esh, the EU adopted an EU strategy for Iraq on 22 January 2018.

Developments in Iran

Soleimani’s death led to an outpouring of grief in Iran, with millions reported to have taken to the streets. However, the mood turned rapidly, when it was revealed that, shortly after the Iranian missile attack on US military bases in Iraq on 8 January 2020, the Iranian military accidentally shot down a Ukrainian civilian aeroplane leaving Tehran airport, killing all 176 people on board. Iranians took to the streets in large numbers to protest against the country’s rulers, who took three days to admit responsibility for the crash.

EU terrorist list
In 2011, the EU added Qasem Soleimani to the EU terrorist list. The list sets out persons, groups and entities subject to restrictive measures with a view to combating terrorism. Persons, groups and entities on the list are subject to the freezing of their funds and other financial assets in the EU. EU operators are also forbidden to make funds and economic resources available to them. EU reactions to the assassination

The Trump Administration’s approach to Iran has strained EU-US relations in recent years. The EU ‘deeply regretted‘ the US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and reintroduce sanctions on Iran. While the EU and the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK)) have worked with the other signatories (China, Iran and Russia) to save the JCPOA, the USA has repeatedly called on Europeans to abandon the nuclear agreement and has threatened to undermine the EU’s main initiative to maintain trade with Iran – the INSTEX special purpose vehicle. At the same time, the EU shares US concerns over Iran’s missile programme, especially after the 8 January 2020 attack on US air bases in Iraq, and Iran’s activities in the region, especially in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. Senior US officials complained that European allies have not shown sufficient support for the US, following the Trump ordered assassination of Soleimani. However, neither the EU nor the E3 have condemned the killing of General Soleimani. Instead, EU leaders have called for urgent de-escalation on both sides, for stabilising Iraq and maintaining the coalition against ISIL/Da’esh, and for preserving the JCPOA.

In a joint statement issued on 6 January 2020, France, Germany and the UK condemned Iran for escalating the situation in Iraq prior to Soleimani’s assassination. The statement also highlighted the negative role Iran had played in the region, ‘including through the IRGC and the Al-Qods force under the command of General Soleimani’. The E3 ‘specifically called on Iran to refrain from further violent action or proliferation’.

At an extraordinary meeting on 10 January 2020, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg joined EU Foreign Affairs Ministers to discuss the implications of the latest developments in Iraq, including on the international coalition engaged in the fight against ISIL/Da’esh. The Council called for urgent de-escalation and maximum restraint, condemned the attacks on coalition forces and restated that the fight against ISIL/Da’esh remained an EU priority. The EU ministers reiterated their support for Iraq’s stability and reconstruction, and for the JCPOA.

Activating the dispute resolution mechanism

In a separate development on 14 January 2020, following Iran’s 5 January 2020 announcement that the country was taking a fifth step away from compliance, the E3 group announced they were triggering the dispute resolution mechanism under JCPOA, paragraph 36, and once again expressed their commitment to the JCPOA, stating that the overarching objective remained to preserve the JCPOA. EU High Representative Josep Borrell reinforced this message during a statement delivered to the European Parliament on 14 January 2020. The dispute resolution process will begin with a meeting of all parties to the JCPOA within 15 days.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Escalating US-Iran conflict: The EU’s priorities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

© Kostagr / Shutterstock

Throughout 2019, people from across the EU and the world addressed the European Parliament to request information, express opinions or suggest ideas on a wide range of topics. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) provides them with clear answers on the issues they raise.

People posed more than 68 000 questions, comments and suggestions to the European Parliament or its President in 2019.

It was a special year for the European Parliament, as the European elections took place in May 2019, and the new European Parliament elected the President of the European Commission in July 2019. Following hearings and a vote in Parliament, the new European Commission took office in December 2019. People showed an interest in these events and a wide range of topics.

Main topics of the year

The European Parliament received many comments on a resolution it adopted in March 2019 on the fundamental rights of people of African descent in Europe. Citizens criticised the European Parliament, considering the resolution as containing discriminatory elements. The video of the debate in plenary that led to the resolution, of 26 March 2019 is available online.

Following the European elections of May 2019, the question of status of Members of the European Parliament elected in Catalonia, Spain and the subsequent court cases, elicited a number of reactions from citizens.

A third important topic raised was the issue of a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) proposing an ‘anti-extremism Directive’. In response to those correspondents who believed that this initiative was actually a European Commission proposal, the Citizens Enquires Unit (Ask EP) pointed out that the ‘draft act’ available on the European Commission website was not an official proposal for a directive. In general, ECIs are a way to help shape the EU, by allowing citizens the opportunity to call on the European Commission to propose new laws. Once an initiative has reached one million signatures, the Commission decides on what action to take.

Among other key topics were a request for action to observe a Europe-wide moratorium on the use of animals in scientific research.

Parliament also received a large number of criticisms of the idea of an ‘EU army‘. While there is certainly no EU army, the EU has recently taken steps to boost defence cooperation.

Improved transparency rules for Members of the European Parliament also raised a number of comments from citizens, following changes to the EP Rules of Procedure agreed in January 2019. The key actors in the legislative process – Members steering legislation through parliament, known as rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs and committee chairs – will be required to publish all scheduled meetings with interest representatives named on the Transparency Register online.

The European Parliament received many letters regarding pollution from maritime transport, calling for a tax on fossil fuels and reinforced maritime transport regulations.

Frequent themes

As in previous years, the functioning and activities of the European Parliament continued to raise interest. Many people wanted to know about Members of the European Parliament’s activities, and how to contact them, as well as how to exercise their right of petition, how to visit the institution, and how to apply for a job or a traineeship in the EU institutions. Citizens continued to write to the European Parliament to comment on and ask questions about the Brexit process.

Naturally, Parliament also received a broad range of questions and comments on the European elections and comments on the newly elected European Commission.

Citizens also wrote to the European Parliament to comment and ask questions on migration and refugee policies, and to comment and request action on the political situation in some EU countries.

The European Commission’s plans to end seasonal clock changes in the European Union (EU) generated a significant share of mail from citizens in 2019. Members voted to end the practice of adjusting clocks by an hour in spring and autumn from 2021. However, the Council is still to finalise its position on the matter and a final decision has not yet been taken.

The Ask EP service received a large amount of correspondence on the new Copyright Directive. In February 2019, after more than two years of protracted negotiations, the co-legislators agreed on a new set of copyright rules.

Citizens also turned to the European Parliament for answers on the political situation outside the EU, for instance in Venezuela, and on Turkish intervention in Syria and Algeria.

Another fundamental area of direct concern frequently shared by people writing to our service relates to employment and social affairs, in particular pension schemes, employment policy and working conditions. Citizens also contacted the European Parliament for comments and queries on climate change and deforestation.

In 2020, continue to put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Kristina Grosek and Giulio Sabbati,

Once the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU becomes legally effective, 73 EP seats will become vacant. Twenty-seven of these seats will be re-distributed among 14 Member States. The remaining 46 seats would be available for potential EU enlargements and/or for the possible future creation of a transnational constituency.

 

Allocation of seats in the European Parliament

European Council Decision (EU) 2018/937 of 28 June 2018 establishes the composition of the European Parliament (EP) for the 2019-2024 parliamentary term, taking into account the United Kingdom’s expected withdrawal from the EU. However, as the UK was still a Member State at the time of the European elections in May 2019, and thus participated, the June 2018 decision provided that Article 3 of the previous (2013) European Council decision applied (so the EP’s composition remained unchanged from the 2014-2019 term).
After the UK leaves the EU, rendering 73 seats vacant, 27 of these will be re-distributed among 14 Member States, thereby re-balancing the current imperfect application of the principle of degressive proportionality. The remaining 46 seats would remain available for possible future enlargements and/or the possible future creation of a transnational constituency. Although the overall number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) will be reduced from 751 to 705, no Member State will lose seats in this redistribution.
After Brexit, the 27 seats will be re-distributed among the following 14 Member States: France (+5), Spain (+5), Italy (+3), the Netherlands (+3), Ireland (+2), Sweden (+1), Austria (+1), Denmark (+1), Finland (+1), Slovakia (+1), Croatia (+1), Estonia (+1), Poland (+1) and Romania (+1).

Election of the additional Members after Brexit

In 10 Member States, the Members who will take the additional seats once the UK’s withdrawal becomes legally effective have either already been formally elected or are already known, while not yet formally designated. This is the case in France, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia, Estonia, Poland and Romania. In Spain, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark, only the lists from which the additional Members will come have been officially announced. In order to ensure the election of additional MEPs in May 2019, and avoid organising additional elections following Brexit, some Member States needed to amend national electoral law, to enact new legislation, or to issue an administrative decree. Consequently, no Member State receiving additional seats will need to hold a new election after Brexit.

Re-distribution of seats among the EP’s political groups after Brexit

MEPs sit in political groups, organised by political orientation and not by nationality. In the current parliamentary term, there are seven political groups. Some MEPs do not belong to any political group (non-attached Members).
As of 13 January there are 27 non-attached UK MEPs, while the rest belong to one of five political groups (S&D, Renew Europe, Greens/EFA, ECR, GUE/NGL). After Brexit, some changes to the EP’s political landscape can be expected.

Projections

Immediately following the 2019 EU elections, it was clear from which national political parties the 27 new MEPs would come. In the majority of cases, EP political groups already include Members from those national parties in the current parliamentary term.1 Based on the current state of play, and the election results, we can thus associate the 27 new MEPs with EP political groups. However, although both their national political party affiliation and the link between national party and EP political group are well known, there is no guarantee that elected Members will choose to affiliate to a particular political group. Members may also change political affiliation. The projections in this paper thus remain provisional, pending the arrival of the additional Members.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘The European Parliament after Brexit‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nicole Scholz,

© science photo / Shutterstock

Serious threats to health – such as those due to infectious disease outbreaks or environmental factors – do not respect borders. They do, however, require cross-border cooperation and a coordinated response.

Decision No 1082/2013/EU is the framework for European Union action on health emergencies. It provides for information exchange, risk assessment and joint procurement, among other mechanisms. The EU-level response is coordinated by the Health Security Committee. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control meanwhile plays a crucial role in identifying, assessing and communicating threats to health from communicable diseases. Parliament has adopted own-initiative and legislative resolutions focusing both on the general and more specific aspects of cross-border threats to health.

At global level, all EU Member States are party to the legally binding International Health Regulations that require them to develop, strengthen and maintain core public health capacities for surveillance and response. Implementation is coordinated by the World Health Organization.

Going forward, Member States have expressed interest in exploiting the potential of joint procurement beyond pandemic influenza vaccines. Moreover, a joint action on strengthened International Health Regulations and preparedness in the EU has recently been launched, focusing, in particular, on countering biological and chemical terror attacks in Europe across the health, security and civil protection sectors.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Cross-border threats to health: EU action on preparedness and response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘How well prepared is the EU for serious health emergencies?‘ on YouTube.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

The European Union is envisaged as an area of growing stability, security and prosperity, with integration allowing it to boost citizens’ living standards and to enhance its influence globally. Generous cohesion and regional development funds are meant to limit wealth disparities among the various EU regions and countries. However, frequent difficulties in forging common foreign and economic policies, due to national differences, can diminish the EU’s domestic effectiveness and international leverage, while inequalities in income have been widening, especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008.

This note brings together commentaries, analyses and studies by international think tanks and research institutes from the last year on EU cohesiveness and cohesion.

A new look at net balances in the European Union’s next multiannual budget
Bruegel, December 2019

Europe’s coherence gap in external crisis and conflict management
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2019

Don’t be afraid of political fragmentation
Chatham House, December 2019

EU circular economy and trade: Improving policy coherence for sustainable development
Institute for European Environmental Policy, November 2019

Europe’s coherence gap in external crisis and conflict management: The EU’s integrated approach between political rhetoric and institutional practice
Bertelsmann Stiftung, November 2019

Unequal Germany: Socioeconomic disparities report 2019
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2019

States of change: Attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall
Open Society Foundation, November 2019

The Balkan model and the balkanization of East Central Europe
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute of World Economics, November 2019

The drafting of a European business code
Fondation Robert Schuman, November 2019

One trillion euros for Europe: How to finance a European silkroad with the help of a European silk road trust, backed by a European sovereign wealth fund and other financing instruments
Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, November 2019

Reducing health inequalities: The role of civil society
Fondation Européenne d’Etudes Progressistes, November 2019

Articulating the logic of nuclear-sharing
Institute for European Studies, October 2019F

A geographically fair EU industrial strategy
European Policy Centre, October 2019

With or without you: Are central European countries ready for the euro?
Bruegel, October 2019

Structural change, institutions and the dynamicsof labor productivity in Europe
German Marshall Fund, October 2019

A fresh look at the health-wealth correlation: A case study of European countries
Central European Union Institute, October 2019

All at sea: Europe’s crisis of solidarity on migration
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2019

Holding together what belongs together: A strategy to counteract economic polarisation in Europe
Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, September 2019

Hidden treasures: Mapping Europe’s sources of competitive advantage in doing business
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2019

Give the people what they want: Popular demand for a strong European foreign policy
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2019

Wirtschaftliche Polarisierung in Europa: Ursachen und Handlungsoptionen
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, August 2019

EU cohesion policy: A suitable tool to foster regional innovation?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, August 2019

European cohesion: Progress at a snail’s pace
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, August 2019

Trying times: Rethinking social cohesion
Bertelsmann Stiftung, August 2019

Osteuropa trotzt dem globalen Gegenwindby
Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, July 2019

Fixing the European social malaise: Understanding and addressing the grievances of European workers
Instituto Affari Internazionali, German Marshall Fund, Mercator, July 2019

Cross border services in the internal market: An important contribution to economic and social cohesion
Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, June 2019

Effectiveness of cohesion policy: Learning from the project characteristics that produce the best results
Bruegel, June 2019

Ein neuer Haushalt für die EU: Die Verhandlungen über den mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen 2021–2027
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2019

From enlargement to the unification of Europe
Open Society Foundations, June 2019

Convergence to fair wage growth? Evidence from European countries on the link between productivity and real compensation growth, 1970–2017
European Trade Union Institute, June 2019

The opportunities of the modernisation fund for the energy transition in Central and Eastern Europe
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2019

How to improve European Union cohesion policy for the next decade
Bruegel, May 2019

Migration et cohésion en Europe: Un défi, pas une contradiction
Institut français des relations internationales, May 2019

Promoting sustainable and inclusive growth and convergence in the European Union
Bruegel, April 2019

Posted workers regulations as a cohesion test in the enlarged EU
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, April 2019

Europe’s East-West divide: Myth or reality?
Carnegie Europe, April 2019

Heterogeneity within the euro area: New insights into an old story
Centre d’études prospectives et d’informations internationales, March 2019

Revisiting the euro’s trade cost and welfare effects
Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel, March 2019

Gender equality in Europe: What progress in 2019?
Fondation Robert Schuman, March 2019

How are you doing, Europe? Mapping social imbalances in the EU
Jacques Delors Institute, Bertelsmann Stiftung, February 2019

Une assurance-chômage européenne : Ce qu’en pensent vraiment les citoyens
Notre Europe, February 2019

Finding a Visegrad added value in the new cohesion policy, 2021-2027
EUROPEUM, January 2019

Read this briefing on ‘EU cohesiveness and cohesion‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pernilla Jourde,

© pixbul / Fotolia

Launched in January 2016, the European Union strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP) is the fourth and most recent macro-regional strategy to be set up by the European Union. One of the biggest challenges facing the seven countries and 48 regions involved in the EUSALP is that of securing sustainable development in the macro-region, especially in its resource-rich, but highly vulnerable core mountain area. The Alps are home to a vast array of animal and plant species and constitute a major water reservoir for Europe. At the same time, they are one of Europe’s prime tourist destinations, and are crossed by busy European transport routes. Both tourism and transport play a key role in climate change, which is putting Alpine natural resources at risk.

The European Parliament considers that the experience of the EUSALP to date proves that the macro-regional concept can be successfully applied to more developed regions. The Alpine strategy provides a good example of a template strategy for territorial cohesion; as it simultaneously incorporates productive areas, mountainous and rural areas, and some of the most important and highly developed cities in the EU.

Although there is a marked gap between urban and rural mountainous areas, the macro-region shows a high level of socio-economic interdependence, confirmed by recent research. Disparities (in terms of funding and capacity) between participating countries, a feature that has caused challenges for other EU macro-regional strategies, are less of an issue in the Alpine region, but improvements are needed and efforts should be made in view of the new 2021-2027 programming period. Furthermore, the strong bottom-up approach behind the development of the EUSALP ensures local ownership of the strategy, a key element for success.

This is an update of a Briefing by Vivienne Halleux, from August 2016.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU strategy for the Alpine region‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Securing sustainable development in the Alpine Region‘ on YouTube.

Written by Marcin Szczepański,

© Feodora / Shutterstock.com

The global debate on the extent to which current competition policy rules are sufficient to deal with the fast-moving digital economy has never been more pertinent. An important part of this debate concerns the market power of large high-tech companies that dominate many online markets. The main factors behind these developments are economies of scale and scope, network externalities, and the rising economic significance of data, which are a highly valuable commodity in an online economy. While being indispensable to the development of potential game changers – such as artificial intelligence – data are also a crucial input to many online services, production processes, and logistics – making it a critical element in the value chain of many different industries.

Data-dependent markets are also characterised by a high level of concentration and, according to many experts, high entry barriers relating to access to and ownership of data – which make it difficult to challenge the incumbent companies. On the other hand, the large players are generally considered to be very productive and innovative. Some studies, however, show that the diffusion of know-how and innovation between the market leaders and the rest of the economy may be affecting competiveness in general.

One possible way to correct these shortcomings is to regulate the sharing of data. While the risks of policy-making in this field are generally well-known and centre around the need to protect privacy – particularly where personal data are involved – and to prevent the collusive aspects of data sharing, there is currently no global model to follow. The European Union has taken multiple initiatives to unlock data markets through modern, user-centred laws such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the regulation on the reuse of public sector information. The global thinking seems to gradually favour more prudent oversight of the market, considering its economic heft.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Is data the new oil? Competition issues in the digital economy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Is data the new oil? Competition issues in the digital economy’ on YouTube.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

© European Union – European Parliament

Parliament returns to work for this first plenary session of 2020 with considerable plans for the year ahead (although two major issues remain to be settled: the future multiannual financial framework and the withdrawal of the United Kingdom). While there will be no review of the outgoing Presidency, Council and European Commission statements presenting the programme of activities of the new (and first) Croatian Council Presidency are expected on Tuesday morning, and will give an indication of the main issues to be tackled in the first half of the year ahead. The priorities for the Presidency’s six-month tenure include developing European economic and social cohesion and convergence; making stronger connections between European citizens, focusing on the infrastructure that allows smooth mobility of people and goods; boosting internal security to protect citizens and tackling migration issues; and strengthening multilateralism and Europe’s influence in the world.

Included in the first of these priorities is the von der Leyen Commission’s new European Green Deal. Following the extraordinary debate held on 11 December 2019 (in a new format of ‘scrutiny session’ that Parliament may repeat in future), Members will vote on a motion for resolution on Wednesday lunchtime. The Green Deal encompasses a number of initiatives, such as legislative proposals on a European climate law, extension of the EU emissions trading system, a carbon border tax and a review of energy taxation. Among the new strategies planned on issues such as industry, sustainable foods, biodiversity and new funding plans, is an ambition to ‘lead the world’ at the 2020 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Accordingly, Members will hear a Commission statement on the COP15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity on Wednesday afternoon. The EU post-2020 biodiversity framework to 2030 needs to be in place in time for the 15th meeting of the parties (COP15) to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in Kunming, China in October 2020. Parliament, however, is already asking questions about the – as yet unachieved – 2020 biodiversity targets, and how the Commission proposes to strengthen implementation of measures to protect biodiversity, notably by moving away from voluntary commitments and towards legally binding measures to conserve and protect nature.

The Commission has also planned for a major new initiative to build stronger connections between European citizens and the EU. Parliament has already been preparing for the planned Conference on the Future of Europe, and will set out its position following a debate on Wednesday morning. Parliament has high expectations for the conference and is eager to contribute to its conception, which requires careful design to afford maximum opportunities for citizens to contribute to the future direction of the European Union, while avoiding the pitfalls inherent in any selection. Already in late 2019, Parliament set up a working group to reflect on the structure of the proposed Conference, seeking to ensure that the aims and scope of the conference remain realistic and result in meaningful outcomes.

Returning to the final priority on the Presidency’s list, to strengthen Europe’s influence in the world, Members will debate the 2018 Annual report on the human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter on Tuesday afternoon. This comprehensive exercise takes stock of all EU actions in the area of human rights and democracy. Its publication provides Parliament with an opportunity to review EU action and make recommendations for the future, in an annual resolution adopted in response to the report. The 2018 EU report underlines the importance of the EU taking a leading global role in defence of democracy and human rights, particularly in the face of rising authoritarianism and shrinking space for democracy worldwide – a view Parliament is expected to share.

 

Written by Etienne Bassot,

© kojihirano, Eugenio Marongiu, Alfa Photo, Fotosr52, View Apart, Nicolas Economou, Angurt, FooTToo, vchal, Maridav / Shutterstock.com.

A new European Parliament and new European Commission, a new decade, and a new financial framework to adopt for the next seven years – 2020 would seem to be a year full of new beginnings. But 2020 does not start with a blank page: next to the political commitments already made and work programmes already adopted, a range of issues are already on the table, some recent, some less so, but all requiring our understanding, and each calling for action.

To help us to see where we need to focus and take action, the European Parliamentary Research Service has asked a dozen of its policy analysts to select, from myriad interesting topics, ten issues to watch in 2020. These issues concern all aspects of European policies: economic and social, European citizens and migrants, the most advanced technologies and most affected regions, budget and finances, as well as trends within our European borders and across the oceans or at the pole. Some of these issues follow directly from previous editions of this publication – such as the multiannual financial framework, migration, and the impact of US politics on transatlantic relations. Others are assessed in a new light, for example climate action and energy transition. And still others are brand new in this series of publications, such as the ‘gamification’ of EU democracy, and the Arctic.

Behind this diversity, two main themes emerge: climate and solidarity. These two themes will not come as a surprise: they were at the heart of campaigns for the European elections last year, and continue to make the headlines at both European and national levels. The December 2019 Parlemeter – the Eurobarometer survey for the European Parliament – confirms that, first and foremost, European citizens demand a greener and fairer Europe. Climate change, poverty and social exclusion are citizens’ key priorities for the European Parliament to address.

Climate and solidarity have therefore logically inspired the written contributions as well as the visual representation of the ten issues and their interaction, represented on the cover of this publication. In 2020, no issue can be presented, let alone understood, in isolation, detached from its interactions with others. As one example among many, biodiversity calls for climate action, which will affect the adoption of the multiannual financial framework, which will define the Just Transition Fund, which will influence the fight against poverty and exclusion that affect children, who interact via 5G, which enables more on-line involvement of citizens, who coordinate support to migrants using new technologies or express their concerns for the Arctic on line, and so on.

In a world in which all issues are directly or indirectly related to the others, the thinking follows this pattern. It follows that, with this publication as increasingly elsewhere, you can choose to read these issues in any order you wish. Cross-referencing will make the connections and guide you from one subject to the other.

We hope that you will enjoy reading this latest edition of ‘Ten Issues to Watch’ and that it will stimulate your reflections and ignite your curiosity as you explore the challenges and opportunities of 2020.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.