European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Wouter van Ballegooij and Katharina Eisele,

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Fast-tracking procedures at European Union external borders for determining whether individuals are entitled to international protection is a priority in the proposed Pact on Migration and Asylum. Asylum procedures at the border are in fact not new in European Union policy.

What are the rules for asylum and international protection in the EU? EU Member States have committed to offering protection to those who have to leave their home country to seek safety from persecution or serious harm. Through the ‘Common European Asylum System’ (CEAS), the EU has developed legal and policy instruments for the management of asylum in the EU that apply from the moment someone has lodged an asylum application until the moment the application has been recognised or rejected upon appeal.

The CEAS includes common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, laid down in the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD). Article 43 of the APD allows for border procedures: When applications for international protection are made at the border or in a transit zone of a Member State prior to a decision on the entry of the applicant, Member States can provide for admissibility and/or substantive examination procedures at these locations. Furthermore, the directive allows the possibility to apply border procedures in transit zones or in proximity of borders in the event of large numbers of arrivals.

Key findings of the EPRS European Implementation Assessment

A European Implementation Assessment, based on two external studies, concludes that uniform and fair asylum procedures at the European Union border have not been achieved to date. Why is this? While the failure is due to patchy implementation of EU law, it is also caused by lack of clarity in the underlying EU legal framework.

In terms of effectiveness, important differences remain between Member States with regard to the concept and scope of the EU border procedure, notably on restrictions of liberty and procedural guarantees. Furthermore, implementation is not properly monitored and enforced.

The systematic and extended use of (de facto) detention in the context of border procedures is not in line with the right to liberty. Procedural guarantees provided for in the APD are not, or only restrictively, applied in practice. Vulnerable applicants, including unaccompanied minors, continue to be subject to border procedures and held in detention facilities, raising questions as regards compliance with the rights of the child.

Short time limits to lodge and decide on appeals and the lack of suspensive effect of appeals in certain countries, raise concerns as to whether effective remedies are provided. The costs of border procedures are significant and probably disproportionate under the current circumstances, given that their objectives are not being achieved. Beyond administrative costs, border procedures entail significant human cost for the individuals affected by their application. In terms of coherence, the framework for border procedures under the APD is complex and unclear, in part due to the various cross-references to other provisions of the APD and the application of other CEAS instruments.

The way forward: recommendations

The European Implementation Assessment makes a number of recommendations to address these shortcomings in future legal and practical arrangements for border procedures:

• Importantly, access to asylum procedures should be ensured at all times and at all external borders of the European Union. EU law should further limit the applicability of the border procedure. The border procedure should only be used following an individual assessment of the circumstances of the case, including an examination of potential special reception and procedural needs.
• The asylum applications of (unaccompanied) children and asylum applicants with special (reception and/or procedural) needs should not be processed in a border procedure. Where EU authorities seek to return an individual to a non-EU country, the safety of such return is to be ensured.
• Adequate funding and training of border guards and appropriate time limits are needed, to ensure that the determining authority is able to gather all necessary information and can take a careful asylum decision. Member States need to collect and transmit statistics on the scope of their border procedure. Independent monitoring, through the creation of an EU asylum monitoring mechanism, should verify the quality of the decision-making process and its outcome, as well as detention conditions and compliance with procedural safeguards.
• Any use of detention, as well as restrictions of free movement, should be mandated by domestic law in compliance with EU legislation on reception conditions for asylum-seekers, and subjected to proportionality assessment in each case, taking alternatives into account. Border detention facilities must be adequate and ensure a dignified standard of living that guarantees subsistence and protects physical and mental health. A decision to detain an applicant or restrict her/his free movement should be subject to a speedy judicial review.
• During a border procedure, applicants for international protection should be entitled to free legal and linguistic assistance by qualified legal advisers and interpreters. Applicants should also be able to communicate with the outside world, in order to gather information about the asylum procedure and, to gather and submit evidence in support of their asylum claim.
• Finally, the time frame allowed should be sufficient to enable applicants to prepare and substantiate their asylum application and to make effective use of all procedural rights granted to them, including those during appeal.

Written by Ivana Katsarova,

The only parliament in the world to award a film prize, the European Parliament has been shining a spotlight on European cinema every year since 2007. This year the prize is gearing up to become a European Audience Film Award. Over the past 12 years, the LUX Film Prize has helped promote over 100 films, supporting the dissemination of European (co-)productions in a bid to overcome the language and distribution barriers faced by the European film industry. Prize-winners have gone on to be highly successful in the EU and beyond, making the LUX Film Prize a synonym for quality film-making.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘LUX Prize 2.0: Pan-European Audience Film Award‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

 

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

Copyright © European Union 2020 – Source : EP/DAINA LE LARDIC

During the first November 2020 plenary session, the main debate followed Council and Commission statements on the multiannual financial framework (including own resources), on a rule of law conditionality mechanism and the recovery fund for Europe, subsequent to the agreements recently reached by Parliament’s negotiators in trilogue negotiations. Members also discussed the outcome of the United States presidential elections, and condemned recent terror attacks following Council and Commission statements on fighting terrorism and the right to freedom of expression and education. Members also held debates on access to Covid‑19 vaccination and the impact of Covid‑19 emergency measures on democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law.

EU general budget for 2021

Members discussed next year’s spending plans in anticipation of the formal adoption of the final agreement on the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF). Members debated and adopted, by large majority, amendments to the Commission’s proposed EU general budget for 2021, focusing on the effects of the coronavirus pandemic. Among other priorities for Europe’s recovery, Parliament voted to increase funding (by €15 billion compared to the Commission proposal) for 15 flagship programmes to support young people, the health sector and the European Green Deal. The 21-day conciliation period, during which Parliament and Council seek to reconcile their positions, now starts, with the aim of reaching agreement in time for Parliament to adopt the 2021 budget during the December plenary session.

EU4Health

Members debated the establishment of an important programme of EU health policy actions, known as EU4Health. Funded under Next Generation EU, the new programme should strengthen EU coordination on health matters, in line with Parliament’s position to place stronger focus on preventing disease, promoting health measures and reducing health inequality throughout the EU. Trilogue negotiations on the programme can now begin, as Members adopted Parliament’s position on the basis of the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee report on financing the EU4Health programme 2021‑2027, by a significant majority.

Sustainable Europe Investment Plan

Members debated and adopted, by large majority, a joint Budget (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee report, welcoming the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan and supporting the mix of public and private funding, but also questioning whether the promised €1 trillion can indeed be mobilised by 2030, given the negative economic outlook. Parliament proposes changes to the current plans to take account of the role of trade policy, to measure the impacts of the support effectively, and to ensure that the ‘do no harm’ principle is respected.

EU-China Geographical Agreement

Members approved the EU-China agreement on cooperation on and protection of geographical indications by a significant majority. The agreement, protecting geographical indications for 100 products each from the EU and China, with a further 175 products to be protected within 4 years, can now be formally concluded by the Council. Parliament’s International Trade (INTA) Committee calls for strong implementation of the measures in the agreement, including deeper customs cooperation.

European network of public employment services

Members adopted, by a large majority, a report on revision of the European Network of Public Employment Services that would extend the agreement on cooperation among organisations supporting job-seekers to 31 December 2027. The report by Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) highlights the benefits reaped by these organisations working together and proposes a revised focus for the network – to work towards preventing unemployment and increasing employability.

Baltic cod fisheries

Members approved proposals to support permanent cessation of fishing by fishermen affected by the closing of the eastern and western Baltic cod fisheries owing to the poor health of fish stocks in the Baltic Sea, as well as the related western Baltic herring fisheries. Under the agreement, financial support will be made available for crews and communities to remove fishing capacity permanently.

Senegal and Seychelles fisheries agreements

Parliament gave its consent to two EU fisheries agreements with Senegal and Seychelles. The first ever EU bilateral fisheries agreement, signed with Senegal in 1979, allows EU vessels to fish in Senegalese waters while also helping to support the development of a sustainable fisheries policy in the region. Members voted to consent to a new protocol to implement the agreement. Members also approved a new agreement with the Seychelles, the EU’s most financially significant tuna agreement, giving EU vessels access to fishing grounds in the western Indian Ocean, and confirming cooperation on sustainable fishing in the region.

Election of a Vice-President of the European Parliament

Members elected Roberta Metsola (EPP, Malta) as first Vice‑President, following Mairead McGuinness’s nomination as Commissioner for Financial Services, Financial Stability and Capital Markets Union. Replacing the President in the chamber, Vice-Presidents are responsible, as members of the Bureau, for financial, organisational and administrative decisions on Parliament’s functioning, and interinstitutional relations.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed four mandates for negotiations: from the Culture and Education (CULT) Committee on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council for the European Capitals of Culture for 2020‑2033; from the ECON committee on the proposal for a regulation laying down a general framework for securitisation and creating a specific framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation to help the recovery from the Covid‑19 pandemic, and on the proposal for a regulation as regards adjustments to the securitisation framework to support the economic recovery in response to the Covid‑19 pandemic; and jointly from BUDG and ECON committees on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Recovery and Resilience Facility.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – November I 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on the Parliament to condemn the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in September 2020, when violent clashes between both countries resumed over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. In October, citizens renewed their call in reaction to the strikes on the Azerbaijani city of Ganja, and more broadly in view of the escalation of the conflict.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English, German and Italian).

Main points made in the reply in English

The European Parliament and the Head of EU diplomacy, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission Josep Borrell held a plenary debate on the European Union reactions to the renewed escalation in violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region on 7 October 2020.You can watch the video recording of the debate on the Multimedia Website (starting from 9:16:30 minutes).

In his statement, HR/VP Josep Borrell indicated that the current military confrontation along the line of contact in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone was of utmost concern for the EU. He also said: ‘Our position is clear: the fighting must stop. Both sides need to re-engage in meaningful negotiations (..). There can be no military solution to the conflict, nor external interference. This position was reinforced by the European Council held on the 1st and 2nd of October’.

Leading Members of the European Parliament have issued a joint statement on the military clashes in which they express great concern about the renewed escalation of violence on the line of contact and call on the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan to observe the ceasefire strictly.

The European Union has welcomed the humanitarian ceasefire agreement reached on 10 October between Armenia and Azerbaijan. HR/VP Josep Borrell deplored the strikes on the Azerbaijani city of Ganja resulting in civilian loss of life and serious injury.

HR/VP Josep Borrell has contacted the ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan and stressed the necessity to fully respect the agreed ceasefire without delay and to stop targeting of civilians. He confirmed that the EU remained ready to support the parties in a long-term solution to the conflict and will continue to monitor the situation.

The European Parliament has also held debates and adopted resolutions on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh region in previous years.

In a 2018 recommendation on the negotiations on the EU-Azerbaijan Comprehensive Agreement, Parliament recommended, ‘to ensure that high priority is given to dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan and to enhanced EU participation in peacefully solving the Nagorno-Karabakh’.

In addition, Members of the European Parliament have addressed parliamentary questions on various issues concerning the situation in the region to the European Commission. In an answer of 31 August 2020 to a parliamentary question regarding the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, HR/VP Josep Borrell indicated on behalf of the European Commission: ‘The EU has urged both sides to stop the armed confrontation, refrain from action and rhetoric that provoke tension, and undertake immediate measures to prevent further escalation. (..) both sides should make use of their mechanism for direct communication. (..) The EU has encouraged all regional actors to support efforts toward de-escalation’.

Furthermore, we would like to draw your attention also to the efforts made by the European Parliament’s Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus, the homepage of which also contains numerous communications from the delegation and its chairs on recent developments in these countries.

Main points made in the reply in German

Das Plenum des Europäischen Parlaments und der Hohe Vertreter der Union und Vizepräsident der Kommission Josep Borrell debattierten am 7. Oktober 2020 über den Umgang der Europäischen Union mit der erneuten Eskalation des gewaltsamen Konflikts zwischen Armenien und Aserbaidschan um die umstrittene Region Bergkarabach. Die Videoaufzeichnung der Debatte finden Sie auf der Multimedia-Website des Parlaments (ab Minute 09:16:30).

In seiner Erklärung wies Josep Borrell darauf hin, dass die militärischen Auseinandersetzungen an der Kontaktlinie im Konfliktgebiet Bergkarabach der EU große Sorge bereiten. Er ließ auch wissen: „Unser Standpunkt ist klar: Die Kämpfe müssen aufhören. Beide Seiten müssen sich wieder an sinnvollen Verhandlungen beteiligen […]. Der Konflikt kann weder militärisch noch durch Einflussnahme von außen gelöst werden. Der Europäische Rat bestätigte diesen Standpunkt auf seiner Tagung vom 1. und 2. Oktober.“

In einer gemeinsamen Erklärung zu den militärischen Auseinandersetzungen äußern hochrangige Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments ihre große Besorgnis über die erneute Eskalation der Gewalt an der Kontaktlinie. Sie fordern Armenien und Aserbaidschan auf, die Waffenruhe strikt einzuhalten.

Zur Lage in Bergkarabach hat das Europäische Parlament auch in den vergangenen Jahren bereits Debatten geführt und Entschließungen angenommen.

In einer Empfehlung aus dem Jahr 2018 zu den Verhandlungen über das umfassende Abkommen zwischen der EU und Aserbaidschan trat das Parlament dafür ein, „dem Dialog zwischen Aserbaidschan und Armenien und der stärkeren Mitwirkung der EU an der friedlichen Beilegung des Konflikts um Bergkarabach […] oberste Priorität“ einzuräumen.

Darüber hinaus haben Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments parlamentarische Anfragen zu verschiedenen Aspekten der Lage in der Region an die Europäische Kommission gerichtet. In seiner Antwort vom 31. August 2020 auf eine parlamentarische Anfrage zum Konflikt zwischen Armenien und Aserbaidschan um Bergkarabach erklärte Josep Borrell im Namen der Europäischen Kommission: „Die EU hat beide Seiten nachdrücklich aufgefordert, die bewaffnete Auseinandersetzung zu beenden, von Handlungen und Worten abzusehen, die weitere Spannungen hervorrufen können, und umgehend Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, damit die Lage nicht weiter eskaliert.“ Beide Seiten sollten außerdem direkten Kontakt miteinander aufnehmen, und die EU habe „alle regionalen Akteure ermuntert, die Bemühungen um eine Deeskalation zu unterstützen.“

Hinweisen möchten wir Sie auch auf die Bemühungen der Delegation des Europäischen Parlaments für die Beziehungen zum Südkaukasus. Auf ihrer Website finden Sie zahlreiche Mitteilungen der Delegation und ihrer Vorsitzenden zu den aktuellsten Entwicklungen in den betroffenen Ländern.

Main points made in the reply in Italian

Il 7 ottobre 2020 il Parlamento europeo e l’Alto rappresentante/Vicepresidente Josep Borrell hanno tenuto un dibattito in plenaria sulle reazioni dell’Unione europea alla nuova escalation di violenza tra Armenia e Azerbaigian nella regione contesa del Nagorno-Karabakh. È possibile guardare la videoregistrazione del dibattito sul sito Multimedia Centre del Parlamento (a partire dal munito 9:16:30).

Nella sua dichiarazione, Josep Borrell ha affermato che l’attuale scontro militare lungo la linea di contatto nella zona di conflitto del Nagorno Karabakh è causa di profonda preoccupazione per l’UE. Ha inoltre aggiunto: “La nostra posizione è chiara: i combattimenti devono fermarsi. Entrambe le parti devono riprendere negoziati significativi (…). Non ci può essere alcuna soluzione militare al conflitto né alcuna interferenza esterna. Questa posizione è stata rafforzata dal Consiglio europeo del 1° e del 2 ottobre”.

Alcuni deputati di spicco al Parlamento europeo hanno rilasciato una dichiarazione congiunta sugli scontri armati, in cui esprimono grande preoccupazione per la rinnovata escalation di violenza sulla linea di contatto e invitano le autorità di Armenia e Azerbaigian a rispettare rigorosamente il cessate il fuoco.

Negli anni scorsi il Parlamento europeo ha inoltre tenuto dibattiti e approvato risoluzioni sulla situazione nella regione del Nagorno-Karabakh.

In una raccomandazione del 2018 sui negoziati relativi all’accordo globale tra l’UE e l’Azerbaigian, il Parlamento ha raccomandato “di garantire che sia attribuita un’elevata priorità al dialogo tra l’Azerbaigian e l’Armenia e alla partecipazione rafforzata dell’UE alla risoluzione pacifica del conflitto del Nagorno-Karabakh”.

I deputati al Parlamento europeo hanno inoltre rivolto alla Commissione europea interrogazioni parlamentari riguardanti varie questioni relative alla situazione nella regione. Nella risposta del 31 agosto 2020 a un’interrogazione parlamentare sul conflitto tra l’Armenia e l’Azerbaigian nel Nagorno-Karabakh, l’Alto rappresentante/Vicepresidente Josep Borrell ha dichiarato a nome della Commissione europea: “L’UE ha esortato entrambe le parti a porre fine allo scontro armato, ad astenersi da azioni o retorica che provochino tensione e ad adottare misure immediate per evitare un’ulteriore escalation. (…) entrambe le parti dovrebbero utilizzare il meccanismo di comunicazione diretta. (…) L’UE invita tutti gli attori della regione a sostenere gli sforzi a favore della distensione”.

Inoltre, desideriamo richiamare la Sua attenzione anche sugli sforzi realizzati dalla delegazione per le relazioni con il Caucaso meridionale del Parlamento europeo, la cui pagina iniziale contiene anche numerose comunicazioni elaborate dalla delegazione e dai suoi presidenti sui recenti sviluppi nei paesi interessati.

Written by Danièle Réchard,

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The European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) – the strategic foresight network of the European Union institutions – offers a valuable ‘free space’ in which to conduct a genuine continental, and potentially global, conversation about where the world is heading over the medium to long run. It was initiated by the European Parliament almost a decade ago in order to help promote a serious discussion of this kind.

The third ESPAS Global Trends Report, Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe, as published in April 2019. Transposing into the European context the kind of strategic foresight analysis undertaken in the United States by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) on global trends since the end of the 1990s, it aims to sketch the global and longer-term backdrop against which Europeans will seek to shape their future. The coronavirus pandemic broke out less than a year later.

At the moment, as Bruno Tertrais has put it, ‘we’re still at the stage in which everyone sees their views and assumptions as being confirmed by the corona crisis. This is true in the West and East, on the left and on the right’. This is understandable and projections based on reliable data are still scarce. The time-horizon of analysis generally does not go beyond 2022-23 (for example, the IMF and OECD Economic Outlooks). So the starting-point of any reflection is uncertain: What is the true death toll of the pandemic? How serious will the second wave be, and will there be a third? Which of the (possibly already) observable economic, societal, political and geopolitical consequences of the crisis will have a serious and long-lasting impact? Many strategic foresight teams, for example at the Atlantic Council, have nevertheless started to draw up ‘post Covid-19 scenarios’, which have been usefully listed by the OECD.

This paper aims to help distinguish the ‘signal’ from the ‘noise’. It provides a rolling review of the ‘inflections’ to the mega-trends – or at least of their perception among a wide array of global thinkers – that were identified in the 2019 ESPAS Global Trends Report. It follows the distinction used in the ESPAS report between ‘mega-trends’, ‘catalysts’ and ‘game-changers’ and stresses their inter-linkages.

Once we have taken enough steps back and gathered solid data and expertise, we will possibly be able to produce a new narrative about our future. This will most likely involve a ‘reshuffling’ of the trends. In particular, two ‘meta-trends’ might be singled out that transversally permeate all other trends and indeed all aspects of human life: technological innovation and inequality.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Global mega-trends: Scanning the post-coronavirus horizon‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Krisztina Binder,

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In 2017, the European Union–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) dialogue partnership celebrated its 40th anniversary. The same year saw the 50th anniversary of the founding of ASEAN. The ASEAN region is currently the world’s fifth largest economy, a dynamic economic area home to more than 660 million consumers.

To ensure better access to opportunities in the region’s market, the European Union (EU) started negotiations with ASEAN for a region-to-region free trade agreement (FTA) in 2007. After negotiations were suspended in 2009, the EU decided to pursue bilateral trade agreements with the individual ASEAN member states. To date, six have begun talks on bilateral FTAs with the EU: Singapore and Malaysia in 2010; Vietnam in 2012; Thailand in 2013; the Philippines in 2015; and Indonesia in 2016. Negotiations have already been concluded and FTAs entered into force with two of these countries, Singapore and Vietnam, in November 2019 and August 2020, respectively. Negotiations are under way with Indonesia, while talks are currently on hold with Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.

In the longer term, these bilateral FTAs would allow the establishment of a region-to-region FTA, which remains the EU’s ultimate ambition. By bringing together two of the world’s largest economic areas, the agreement would establish a free trade area with a combined market of more than 1 billion people.

It is in the EU’s interest to strengthen its economic cooperation with ASEAN, in order to maintain its competitive position in this dynamically developing region. Closer trade and investment relations could also pave the way towards the EU’s goal of a strategic partnership between the two regional blocs, encompassing political as well as economic cooperation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Trade negotiations between the EU and ASEAN member states‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Christiaan Van Lierop,

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Established in 1990, the first European territorial cooperation initiative, Interreg I, focused on cross-border cooperation. Action in this area has expanded over the years to cover broader initiatives such as trans-national cooperation, involving countries from wider geographical areas, and inter-regional cooperation, which brings together regions from across the whole EU. These three strands together make up European territorial cooperation (ETC), which is one of the two main goals of cohesion policy today and which is celebrating its 30th anniversary this year.

With the removal of many of Europe’s frontier posts, travelling freely across borders has become second nature for millions of EU citizens. European territorial cooperation has brought Europeans closer together, strengthened connectivity and improved the natural environment, supported by EU mechanisms such as the European groupings of territorial cooperation, and macro-regional strategies. Yet despite these achievements, numerous obstacles to closer cooperation still remain, such as divergent national rules in the areas of employment, healthcare and social security. Recent years have witnessed increased calls to address these hurdles, with the 2015 Luxembourg EU Presidency launching discussions on a new instrument for cross-border projects, leading to the 2018 European Commission proposal for a cross-border mechanism, and the Commission rolling out initiatives such as the cross-border review and the b-solutions project, which aims to identify and find solutions to remaining bottlenecks, helping to boost growth and cohesion in EU border regions.

With negotiations under way on post-2020 cohesion policy, there is broad agreement among many stakeholders on the importance of strengthening Interreg beyond 2020. Yet the budget for ETC has been significantly reduced under the current Interreg proposals despite the many achievements of this policy, not least in recent months during which cross-border cooperation has provided a lifeline for many border regions. The coronavirus pandemic has revealed that territorial cooperation arguably needs protecting more than ever, with the sudden closure of EU internal borders a stark reminder that European territorial cooperation cannot be taken for granted.

This is a further updated edition of a briefing from March 2018.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Thirty years of European territorial cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański,

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Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for the possibility of approving state aid for ‘important projects of common European interest’ (IPCEIs). These provisions have been used very rarely until recently. A specific framework enabling the creation of IPCEIs, originally only in the areas of research, development and innovation, and environmental protection has been in place for 15 years, yet only four such projects have been notified to and assessed by the Commission so far. The first two – in the area of infrastructure – were partially annulled by the Court of Justice, and the Commission opened in-depth investigations to examine their compatibility with State aid. One of those concluded that the aid was legal, the other is ongoing.

The next two were launched successfully in the areas of strategic value chains for microelectronics and batteries. After this rather modest start, there seems to be strong momentum to create more IPCEIs, including in the context of the debate on how to foster the emergence of ‘European champions’. The marked political shift towards greater technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy within the EU has been given further impetus with the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, which disrupted global value chains and highlighted the case for a more self-sufficient EU model. IPCEIs may be useful tools for creating complex new value chains that have the potential to ensure the EU’s long-term competitiveness and economic growth.

A growing number of governments, experts and organisations have been calling for the simplification of current rules to make IPCEIs more frequently and widely used. The European Parliament would also like to see the requirements for the IPCEIs streamlined to allow smaller industrial research projects also to acquire IPCEI status. In its 2021 work programme, the European Commission announced the revision of the current IPCEI framework planned for the fourth quarter of the year.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Important projects of common European interest: Boosting EU strategic value chains‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Stefano Spinaci (1st edition),

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On 28 May 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation on a Technical Support Instrument that would provide Member States with technical support to strengthen their institutional and administrative capacity in designing and implementing reforms. In the context of the ‘Next Generation EU’ recovery plan, it would support them to prepare and implement recovery and resilience plans, and make reforms and investments related to the green and digital transitions.

Modelled on an instrument proposed by the Commission in 2018, the Technical Support Instrument would replace the Structural Reform Support Programme that has helped implement over 1 000 reform projects in the Member States since 2017. Under the current Commission proposal, a budget of €864.4 million has been set aside for the instrument over the 2021-2027 period (by contrast, the Structural Reform Support Programme has a budget of €222.8 million for 2017-2020).

The Council of the EU agreed its position on 22 July 2020. At the European Parliament, the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) are working jointly on this file under Rule 58 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. On 1 October 2020, the joint committee adopted its final report and decided to enter into interinstitutional negotiations. The Parliament confirmed the decision in its first October plenary session.

Versions

• November 2020:  ‘Technical Support Instrument‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Technical Support Instrument Committee responsible:

Budgets (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) (jointly under Rule 58)

COM(2020) 409
28.5.2020 2020/0103(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Othmar Karas (EPP, Austria)

Dragoș Pîslaru (RE, Romania)

Alexandra Geese (Greens/EFA, Germany) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Trilogue negotiations

Written by Martin Russell,

Economical and versatile, palm oil has become the world’s most widely used vegetable oil. Although palm oil can be produced sustainably, rising consumption increases the risk of tropical rainforests being cut down to make way for plantations. Deforestation threatens biodiversity and causes greenhouse gas emissions. In view of this, the EU has revised its biofuels policy to phase out palm oil-based biodiesel by 2030.

Palm oil: A vital commodity

© photomagically / Fotolia

Oil palm trees are native to West Africa, but were introduced to tropical regions of south-east Asia and Latin America in the late 19th century. Oil extracted from the fruit was traditionally used in Africa for cooking, but has now found a wider range of uses: as a substitute for animal fats such as butter in baked products, soaps and cosmetics, or as a feedstock for biodiesel. Around half of packaged products in supermarkets contain palm oil. Although not particularly healthy (it contains higher levels of saturated fats than most other vegetable oils), palm oil has many advantages. Compared to soybean, it requires only one-tenth as much land, one-seventh as much fertiliser, one-fourteenth as much pesticide and one-sixth of the energy to produce the same quantity of oil, and is therefore very cheap. In addition, palm oil is highly resistant to oxidation, making it suitable for frying and giving it a long shelf life. As a result, consumption of palm oil has doubled over the past 15 years to nearly 8 kg per inhabitant of the globe, and shows no signs of slowing down. Until the 1960s, oil palms were mainly grown in Africa, but since then production has shifted to south-east Asia: according to FAO statistics, Indonesia (42 % of global output) and Malaysia (36 %) are the leading producers, followed by Thailand (5.6 %), Nigeria (2.9 %), Colombia (2.2 %) and Ecuador (1 %).

The economic and social impact of palm oil

Palm oil is the main agricultural export of Indonesia and Malaysia, generating 8.8 % and 3.4 % respectively of their exports in 2019. It is claimed that the sector provides direct employment for nearly 1 million in Malaysia and 4 million in Indonesia, often in remote rural areas where alternative employment is scarce. However, not all have benefited; in Indonesia, indigenous communities often lack legal documents certifying their ownership of land, and there are many legal conflicts between oil palm companies granted government concessions in forested areas, and the people who have used the land for centuries. In some cases, this has led to local people losing access to land and resources. As a result of such problems, one survey found that many villages in Indonesian Borneo were strongly opposed to palm oil companies. There are also serious concerns about abusive labour conditions on some plantations.

The environmental impact of palm oil

Deforestation is the main reason why palm oil is controversial. Booming production means that more land is needed for new plantations. This does not necessarily result in forest-clearing, as oil palms can be planted on degraded land or land previously used for other crops. However, scientific studies cited by the European Commission in 2019 suggest that 45 % of the land area covered by new plantations is on formerly forested land, a much higher share than for other oilseed crops such as soybean (8 %), and that between 2008 and 2011 palm oil caused 4 300 km2 of deforestation worldwide. A second study from 2019 points to oil palm plantations as the single biggest cause of deforestation in Indonesia, accounting for nearly a quarter of permanent forest-clearing in the country between 2001 and 2016.

Deforestation is a major concern for several reasons. Compared to rainforests, oil palm plantations support only one quarter as many animal species. By eating into the habitats of the orang-utan and Sumatran tiger (both critically endangered species) as well as numerous smaller animals, they threaten biodiversity. At the same time, oil palms have less than 20 % as much above-ground biomass as rainforest trees, and a correspondingly lower capacity to absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.

This is an update of an ‘At a glance’ note of February 2018.

Greenhouse gas emissions go up when oil palms are planted on carbon-rich peaty soil – which is the case for around one-fifth of new plantations. Draining such soils, which is necessary for the oil palms to grow, exposes the peat to oxygen, causing it to decompose and release huge quantities of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere over many years. Peat drainage in south-east Asia is estimated to cause the equivalent of 2 % of global fossil fuel CO2 emissions. Fires on dried-out peat, which are very hard to put out, release thick clouds of choking smoke in the atmosphere. In Indonesia, around one-fifth of such fires are directly linked to palm oil.

Some of Indonesia’s worst fires to date were in 2015. For several weeks, Indonesia became the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitter, as fires destroyed an area almost the size of Belgium. Choking haze spread as far as Singapore, costing the Indonesian economy at least US$16 billion and causing up to 100 000 premature deaths.

Efforts by producers to make palm oil more sustainable

As the world’s largest producer of palm oil and one of the countries worst affected by deforestation, Indonesia has taken several steps to make palm oil more sustainable. Since 2011, Jakarta has stopped issuing new concessions for clearing forests in primary (i.e. old-growth) forests and on peatland; moreover, since the peak fire year of 2015, concession-holders are required to protect and rehabilitate peatland areas. Despite this, the country lost over 10 000 km2 of forests a year between 2017 and 2019, partly due to oil palm cultivation. The good news is that this is still less than half the record deforestation rate of 24 000 km2 in 2016. Deforestation has also slowed down in neighbouring Malaysia, the other main producer, which has a long-standing commitment to keep at least half of its land area under natural forest cover.

Several certification schemes for sustainable palm oil exist, of which the most widely used is that of the international Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). To be RSPO-certified, palm oil must not come from land that has been cleared by fire or by destroying primary forest. Moreover, since November 2018, the scheme excludes new plantations on peat soil. Opinions on the RSPO are divided: the World Wildlife Fund sees the scheme as an ‘essential tool’ in the drive to ensure that palm oil does not cause deforestation; on the other hand, Greenpeace claims that RSPO standards are not strict enough and that in any case not all participants in the scheme meet their commitments. Besides, less than one-fifth (19 %) of global palm oil production is certified by the RSPO as sustainable.

The EU and palm oil

Several European countries (including France, Germany, Italy and Norway), as well as numerous multinational companies, have already committed to only buying sustainably produced palm oil. In 2016, 69 % of EU palm oil imports were RSPO-certified. At present, there is no EU-level requirement for sustainability, but this could change soon; as part of its ‘Green Deal’, the EU is planning an impact assessment of regulatory and non-regulatory options to promote deforestation-free imports of commodities such as palm oil.

In a bid to curb greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels, in 2009 the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive set a target of 10 % of transport fuels in Member States to come from renewable sources by 2020. To help meet this goal, nearly two-thirds of the EU palm oil imports are used as biodiesel feedstock. However, studies show that when forests are cleared for plantations, palm oil-based biodiesel actually causes more greenhouse gas emissions than fossil fuels. In response to such concerns, the EU amended its Renewable Energy Directive in 2018. As a result, though biofuels from crops such as palm oil that carry a high risk of deforestation will not be banned, they will no longer count towards the 10 % target from 2030 on.

Apart from these sustainability concerns, the EU also complains that subsidies and tax breaks give Indonesian producers of palm oil-based biodiesel an unfair advantage over their European competitors. To compensate for this, in 2019 the EU imposed countervailing duties on Indonesian biodiesel.

Indonesia and Malaysia have responded sharply to what they see as unfair EU restrictions. In December 2019, Indonesia filed a dispute with the World Trade Organization, arguing that the amended Renewable Energy Directive is discriminatory, and Malaysia plans to do likewise. Palm oil-related tensions stand in the way of an EU-Malaysia trade deal, perhaps also of closer EU relations with south-east Asia as a whole.

The European Parliament has expressed concerns about palm oil as a cause of deforestation, for example in its resolutions of April 2017 on palm oil and deforestation, and of September 2020 on the EU’s role in protecting the world’s forests. The latter calls for a binding ‘legal framework based on due diligence, in order to ensure sustainable and deforestation-free supply chains for products … on the EU market’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Palm oil: Economic and environmental impacts‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

The first item on Parliament’s agenda for the November I session, now that the outcome of the US presidential elections is clear, is to take stock of the results, which are likely to have considerable impact on political and trade relations worldwide.

However, before turning to external policy, and in anticipation of a final agreement on the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), Members will discuss next year’s spending plans in anticipation of the overall framework being formally adopted. On Wednesday afternoon, therefore, Members will debate amendments to the Commission’s proposed EU general budget for 2021, with particular focus on the effects of the coronavirus pandemic. While Council has proposed considerable reductions, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) has tabled a report which reverses many of the cuts and proposes increased spending on programmes linked to Next Generation EU (NGEU) funding, the European Green Deal, and education and employment, among other priorities for Europe’s recovery.

However, the coronavirus crisis has also had an effect on NGEU itself, with doubts raised that the funding available under the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan is sufficient to successfully execute the European Green Deal under current conditions. The need to improve climate-related aspects of the agreement on future EU spending is an important aspect of Parliament’s criticism of the European Council’s agreement on the next MFF. Specifically, Members will debate a report on Wednesday afternoon, adopted jointly by the BUDG and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committees that, although welcoming the plan and supporting the mix of public and private funding, questions whether the promised €1 trillion can indeed be mobilised by 2030, given the negative economic outlook. Parliament’s committees propose changes to the current plans to take account of the role of trade policy, to measure the impacts effectively, and to ensure that the ‘do no harm’ principle is respected.

The Covid‑19 pandemic has also highlighted that disease recognises no borders, and led to calls for greater coordination of health matters in the EU. On Thursday morning, Members will debate the establishment of an important programme of EU health policy actions, known as EU4Health. With funding proposed under NGEU, the new programme would strengthen EU coordination on health matters, in line with Parliament’s position to place stronger focus on preventing disease, promoting health measures and reducing health inequality throughout the EU. Parliament’s Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee has put forward a report that supports the proposed EU measures, particularly to fight cancer, as well as suggesting that an EU-wide steering group of public health experts is set up to oversee implementation.

A crucial part of the economic recovery will involve getting people back into work. On Wednesday evening, Members will vote on formal adoption of a decision on the way forward for the EU network of Public Employment Services (the organisations that support job-seekers) in the EU. The report by Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) highlights the benefits reaped by these organisations working together to improve support for those searching for employment. The report proposes a revised focus for the network – to work towards preventing unemployment and increasing employability, especially by encouraging the improvement of digital skills in the EU workforce.

Maintaining a level playing field in trade relations is important to securing employment levels in an economy. In a joint debate on Thursday afternoon, Members will discuss an International Trade (INTA) Committee report on the EU-China agreement on cooperation on and protection of geographical indications. These quality denominations are an important aspect of trade agreements, protecting producers against counterfeiting. The proposed agreement protects geographical indications for 100 products each from the EU and China. The INTA committee report calls for strong implementation of the measures agreed, including deeper customs cooperation.

Turning to a key EU environmental policy, Members consider several issues regarding prudent management of fishing stocks during this session. On Wednesday evening, Members will vote on formal adoption of a provisional agreement to provide financial support for the crew and communities affected by the poor health of cod stocks in the Baltic Sea, including over 300 fishing vessels in Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, Denmark and Germany. As the fisheries will have to close permanently, and there is no capacity for vessels to convert to target other under-pressure species, financial support under the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) will be necessary to cope with the major reduction in fishing opportunities. Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) has approved the proposal to close the eastern and western Baltic cod fisheries as well as western Baltic herring fisheries.

The first ever EU bilateral fisheries agreement, signed with Senegal in 1979, has allowed EU vessels to fish in Senegalese waters while also helping to support the development of a sustainable fisheries policy in the region. Following a joint debate on Thursday morning, Members will vote on consent to a new protocol to implement the agreement. Parliament’s PECH committee has recommended that consent be granted, and indicates some priorities for modernising fishing control, to help Senegal fight illegal fishing. In the case of the Seychelles, the EU’s most financially significant tuna agreement, Parliament will also consider on Thursday morning, whether to consent to a new agreement providing access to fishing grounds in the western Indian Ocean, and cementing cooperation on sustainable fishing in the region. Parliament’s PECH committee calls for better implementation of sustainability measures, particularly in view of the overfishing of yellowfin tuna in the region. More generally, the PECH committee criticises the provisional application of international agreements prior to Parliament giving its consent.

Parliament stands by its long-term commitment to a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East, including a negotiated and viable two-state solution to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU has recently welcomed the normalising of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan, known as the ‘Abraham Accords’. Brokered by the United States, the Palestinian Authority and all Palestinian factions have nevertheless denounced the agreements. On Wednesday afternoon, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will make a statement before Parliament on the geopolitical implications of the Abraham Accords in the region.

Finally, following Mairead McGuinness’s nomination as Commissioner for Financial Services, Financial Stability and Capital Markets Union, Members will take part in the election of her replacement as first Vice-President of the European Parliament on Thursday morning. The Vice-Presidents replace the President in the chamber and are responsible, as members of the Bureau, for financial, organisational and administrative decisions on Parliament’s functioning, as well as interinstitutional relations.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© ronniechua / Adobe Stock

As the United States has been choosing its President, an explosion of cases in a second wave of the coronavirus pandemic has forced many governments in Europe to reintroduce strict confinement measures, including new lockdowns, curfews, bans on meetings and the closure of many businesses, notably in the hospitality and tourism sectors. The moves are meant to act as a firebreak on the exponential growth in Covid-19 infections and prevent health sectors in many countries from becoming overloaded. Whatever happens next, economies will contract this year in the great majority of countries around the world, even if in varying degrees, with significant social and political implications.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on pandemic related issues. Earlier think tank studies on the issue can be found in the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ of 23 October.

Preserving development cooperation during Covid-19 times
Friends of Europe, October 2020

Pandemic is a wake-up call for mental healthcare reform in Europe
Friends of Europe, October 2020

The pandemic and the economic crisis: What lies ahead for the Western model?
Friends of Europe, November 2020

The challenge for Spain to use the EU’s pandemic recovery fund wisely
Centre international de formation européenne, November 2020

Crise du covid et lutte contre le changement climatique
Centre international de formation européenne, November 2020

Tracking the mounting challenges among those who have lost their jobs
Brookings Institution, November 2020

As the pandemic rages on, it’s time for NATO to step up
German Marshall Fund, November 2020

As Covid-19 cases surge, the country’s economic recovery is losing steam
Brookings Institution, October 2020

Will Americans trust a Covid-19 vaccine? Not if politicians tell them to
Brookings Institution, October 2020

What Covid-19 has cost the climate
Brookings Institution, October 2020

Can public education return to normal after the Covid-19 pandemic?
Brookings Institution, October 2020

NATO’s response to Covid-19: Lessons for resilience and readiness
Brookings Institution, October 2020

Fighting Covid misinformation
German Marshall Fund, October 2020

European Union recovery funds: Strings attached, but not tied up in knots
Bruegel, October 2020

The pandemic will structurally change the global economy more than we think
Bruegel, October 2020

What role for the European Semester in the recovery plan?
Bruegel, October 2020

Crise du Covid et lutte contre le changement climatique
Centre international de formation européenne, October 2020

Brexit and Covid-19 are a toxic mix
Centre for European Reform, October 2020

Will the Coronavirus pandemic deliver a coup de grâce to Schengen?
Centre for European Reform, October 2020

War and Covid-19 in Yemen
Istituto Affari Internazionali, October 2020

Schengen under pressure: Differentiation or disintegration?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, October 2020

Governments take steps to save tourism from Covid-19
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2020

Southern Europe will regret not taking EU loans now
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2020

Europa krisenfest machen: Europäische Mindeststandards für die nationale Grundsicherung
Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2020

The Corona crisis and the stability of the European banking sector: A repeat of the Great Financial Crisis?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2020

After the pandemic: Global overheating to take centre stage at T20 and G20
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2020

Crisis presidency: How Portuguese leadership can guide the EU into the post-Covid era
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

The world is woefully unprepared for climate-driven natural disasters
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Inconfinables ? Les sans-abri face au coronavirus
Fondation Jean Jaurès, October 2020

High hopes, low expectations: Brussels’ perspective on the future of Europe after Covid-19
European Policy Centre, October 2020

The European Parliament’s involvement in the EU response to the corona pandemic
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2020

Covid: Faute d’avoir mis à profit les six derniers mois, l’État sacrifie nos libertés
Institut Thomas More, October 2020

Coronavirus tracking apps: Normalizing surveillance during states of emergency
Carnegie Europe, October 2020

Covid-19: Une bataille stratégique entre la Chine et les États-Unis en Amérique latine
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2020

Upholding the World Health Organization
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2020

The re-shaping of the political discourse in times of crises
Fondation Européenne d’Etudes Progressistes, October 2020

The Covid crisis, an opportunity for a ‘new multilateralism’?
Confrontations Europe, October 2020

Covid-19 and the legal impact on the shipping industry and the case of Cyprus
Cyprus Centre for European and International Affairs, October 2020

L’Europe, le monde et la crise du Covid-19
Terra Nova, October 2020

Global trade today: Five basic facts about global trade
European Centre for International Political Economy, October 2020

Corona politics: The cost of mismanaging pandemics
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, September 2020

28 semaines plus tard: Y aura-t-il un monde d’après?
Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, September 2020

Covid-19 pandemic: Insights from RAND
Rand Corporation, September 2020

The Covid-19 gender gap: How women’s experience and expertise will drive economic recovery
Chatham House, September 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: Europe confronts the second wave‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi,

© Aurielaki / Adobe Stock

Farm structure refers to the composition and organisation of an agricultural productive unit, typically for growing crops and rearing farm animals. Farm structure data allow analysis of the functioning of farms and their responses to events and agricultural policies. While basic statistics are key for capturing the essentials of the EU farming sector, understanding the various elements of farm structure implies more thorough analysis of the data.

Measuring farm structure

Farm structure defines an agricultural productive unit in terms of sizes of the land area and livestock herds, the labour force working on the farm and its main characteristics (such as age or working time), the means of production, and legal and organisational aspects of land tenure, farm management and market access. It is a key aspect of an agricultural system, along with agro-ecological (farming system, soil, altitude, climate, etc.) and economic factors (farm resources and inputs, product diversity, integration in the food chain, etc.).

In the past century, the development of agricultural policies prompted the need for information on farm structure, with the objective of understanding how agriculture was changing, what elements were triggering such change and what future direction it might take. On the basis of farm structure statistics, it is possible, for example, to build up typologies of farm types, analyse the drivers of farm structural change, and evaluate the interaction between agricultural policy and structural change in agriculture.

In the EU, the Farm Structure Survey (FSS) has delivered a continuous record of harmonised data on the structure of European farms since 1966, providing a picture of the situation every third year, on average. Although the topics covered have remained significantly stable, some changes have been introduced to reflect changing realities over the years. The legislation adopted in 2018 introduced a new approach to collecting data as from the Agricultural Census 2020, with the objectives of both preserving the continuity of the survey’s core elements and introducing flexibility in data collection to better address data needs.

EU farm structure in basic figures

The FSS includes information on land use, livestock numbers, labour input, etc. These can be aggregated by dimension such as geographic level, time and farm type. Therefore, there are countless ways to analyse and present the data on farm structure, depending on the information need to be addressed.

Farm and farm workforce size

Distribution of EU farms by land area (hectares)

A common indicator to describe farm structure is the farm size, though it can refer to various measures, such as land area, economic outcomes, or farm labour. The FSS data indicate that two thirds of the 10 million EU farms have less than five hectares of land and the majority of these farms do not exceed two hectares (see figure to the right). Also, more than two thirds of EU farms have a total standard output (i.e. an estimate of the average farm output based on standard values) of below €8 000 a year. EU farms count on average less than one annual work unit (i.e. the equivalent of a full-time job). Indeed, while about 20 million people work on EU farms, this figure includes full- and part-time farm managers and workers, seasonal labour, and farmer’s family members providing help (often free labour) when needed.

Land use and livestock

Crops and animals are vital elements of the farm structure. The average EU farm has 16 hectares of agricultural land, compared to averages of 180 hectares in the United States, 315 hectares in Canada, and 4 331 hectares in Australia. Altogether, EU farms utilise roughly 157 million hectares of land, of which about one third for growing cereals, slightly less than one third for permanent grassland, and the remaining area for other crops (with industrial crops, permanent crops, and temporary grass and grazing occupying the largest surfaces). Moreover, 5.6 million EU farms with livestock count millions of farm animals – with pigs being the largest group followed by bovines, sheep and goats – plus countless poultry birds as well as other types of animals (e.g. rabbits and horses). On average, they have 21 livestock units (i.e. a reference unit to calculate livestock as the equivalent of one dairy cow). The distribution of land and livestock varies a lot across EU farms, with the smallest farms showing the greatest diversity in terms of on-farm activities.

Beyond the main figures

Basic indicators such as farm distribution by size class or average size are invaluable tools to get a glimpse on the predominant characteristics of farm structure. These are very much revealing of an EU farming sector largely made up of small-sized farms. However, these figures do not embrace the extreme diversity in the EU farming sector (disclosed in Eurostat’s agriculture regional statistics). Therefore, more details are needed for planning adequate farm policies or drawing conclusions on farm economics, including on the methodology behind available data.

Need to dig into the data

Average livestock units per farm with pigs and/or poultry

Understanding how farm structure affects the functioning of the farm involves information on such issues as farming specialisations, agricultural practices, agronomic and environmental conditions, and the degree of local development. Therefore, going beyond the main indicators may reveal whether a given farm structure is just right or not adequate at all for a viable farming activity. For example, it may help to explain whether a significant farm workforce is an appropriate labour input or if it stems from a low level of mechanisation or a lack of alternative job opportunities. Also, farms may have large or small acreage, or no land at all, without this accounting, on its own, for strong or weak economic performance. Indeed, farms may have large surfaces because they keep land under cereal production or breed animals on extensive grazing areas. On the other hand, fruit groves or the use of common land (especially for sheep and goat farms) often relate to farms with small land area. The table to the right shows a relevant example of farms with no land area rearing pigs and/or poultry indoors. Although they are not counted as large farms based on hectares of land, these are certainly very large farms based on their high animal numbers compared to the average pig and poultry farm.

Methodological caveats

The European Union’s farm statistics legislation allows national authorities a certain degree of autonomy in defining the scope of the survey, while respecting minimum coverage requirements which ensure appropriate representation of the farming sector. Hence, each country defines the set of thresholds above which an agricultural activity is in the scope of the survey. This limits the survey’s cost and burden by focussing on the farms targeted by agricultural policies and excluding very small units. Therefore, a given farm would be below the survey’s thresholds in a country where agricultural production takes place mostly in medium-sized to large farms, but be included in the scope of the survey in a country where semi-subsistence or small farms are the backbone of agriculture. As a result, the high share of small farms at EU level overall originates from a small group of countries (largely from Romania). However, this should not result in over- or under-representation of any agricultural sectors or farming types. The national methodological reports detail the diverse approaches, where the scope of the survey varies from the absence of any thresholds (such as in Malta and Romania, where all entities in the administrative farm register are included) to relatively high thresholds (such as in Germany and Sweden, where farms are included only with a larger number of farm animals or cultivated hectares compared to other countries).

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Understanding farm structure‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Damiano Scordamaglia,

© clin0000 / Adobe Stock

Every year since 1983, the EU has chosen a special annual theme to celebrate and to bring to public attention. The idea is to raise awareness on the issue, encourage public debate on it across the EU and underline its political importance. The process can lead to new EU initiatives or legislation. 2021 has been designated European Year of Rail, to stir debate on railways’ contribution to the European Green Deal and the environment. A wide range of events are planned, reaching out to the general public, to demonstrate the challenges and opportunities offered by rail, and promote it as a sustainable, innovative and safe mode of transport.

Background

In December 2019, the European Commission adopted a new development strategy, the Green Deal, to address environmental challenges and climate change. To contribute to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, this new strategy centres on achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and a more resource-efficient economy. For this to happen, as transport accounts for a quarter of EU greenhouse gas emissions, a 90 % reduction in transport emissions is necessary by 2050 and an important share of the 75 % of inland freight currently carried by road will have to shift to rail or inland waterway transport. Rail’s green credentials speak for themselves: in 2016, rail represented 0.5 % of the CO2 emissions from all transport modes. Railways are also energy-efficient: while they account for roughly 2 % of energy consumption in EU transport, in 2018, they transported 12.6 % of freight and 6.9 % of passengers. Despite this, the share of freight transported by rail has been decreasing continuously since the mid-1990s and passenger traffic has stagnated. Rail has played an important role during the pandemic, ensuring the circulation of people and essential goods, and it will support the post Covid-19 economic recovery. If the EU wants railways to become more attractive to passengers and businesses and help to improve traffic congestion and air pollution, it needs to give this sector additional support.

European Commission proposal

On 4 March 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal to designate 2021 European Year of Rail (EYR) and promote the use of rail for passengers, companies and public authorities. This specific year was chosen in part because it will coincide with the first full year of the implementation of the new rules on governance and domestic passenger market opening, agreed under the fourth railway package. In addition, the international arts festival Europalia will devote its 2021 edition to the influence of railways on arts and their contribution to social, economic and industrial change. The overarching aim of the EYR is to raise awareness of the challenges and opportunities offered by rail, and support the efforts made by the EU, Member States, regional and local authorities to expand the market share of this transport mode.

EYR: organisation and objectives
With its initiatives, debates, dedicated events, exhibitions and promotional campaigns, the EYR will reach out to the wider public, in particular young people, to promote rail as a sustainable, innovative and safe mode of transport. The EYR is also designed to underline the cross-border dimension of rail and its contribution to relations with neighbouring countries and to EU cohesion, economy, industry and society at large. It will cover aspects relating to regional development, industrial competitiveness, sustainable tourism, employment, innovation, education, youth and culture, while focusing on improving accessibility for disabled people and people with reduced mobility (DPRMs).
In order to tailor the EYR to the needs of EU countries, each Member State will appoint a national coordinator and the EU will set up a steering group. The financial allocation for the EYR is estimated at €8 million; the final envelope will be decided in accordance with the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027. European Parliament position

In a resolution of 15 January 2020, the European Parliament welcomed the European Green Deal, underlining the need for all transport modes to contribute to the decarbonisation of transport and calling for enhanced investment in EU rail connectivity. Parliament expressed its first opinion on the EYR proposal in June 2020, when the rapporteur (Anna Deparnay-Grunenberg (Greens/EFA, DE)) presented her draft report to the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), responsible for this file. The rapporteur noted that the EYR would give visibility to rail as an attractive transport mode and highlighted the importance of digitalisation and, more specifically, further development of the European rail traffic management system (ERTMS). Shadow rapporteurs insisted on the need to focus on enhancing train accessibility for DPRMs and supporting rail in the urban context. On 12 October 2020, with very broad support (45 votes in favour, none against and two abstentions), the TRAN committee adopted its report along with 15 compromise amendments and the decision to start interinstitutional negotiations. In order to create a truly European rail network, the TRAN committee called for support for regional cross-border rail connections and action to promote completion of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T). The report invited the Commission to study setting up a rail connectivity index to identify areas where investment is especially necessary. It also advocated for EYR activities to inform citizens better of their rights as rail passengers. The Committee report also endorsed some recommendations from two other parliamentary committees. In particular, TRAN supported the call to improve train accessibility for the elderly, disabled and persons of reduced mobility, and other measures put forward by the Committee on Regional Development, such as efforts to promote the EU’s night train networks and develop rail networks and infrastructure in regional and border areas. Finally, the TRAN Committee supported the idea of the Committee on Culture and Education to promote better geographical coverage of rail services, considering their impact on the uptake of certain EU programmes, such as Erasmus + and DiscoverEU. On 24 June 2020, Council agreed a common position for a negotiating mandate on the proposal. It added some themes such as rail for end-to-end mobility and better distribution of information on passengers’ rights. It also proposed that the Commission launch a feasibility study during the EYR on the creation of an EU label to promote goods transported by rail. Interinstitutional negotiations began on 27 October 2020.

Advisory committee and stakeholder views

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) adopted its opinion on the legislative proposal on 15 July 2020. Supporting the EYR, the EESC considered that this initiative should be an opportunity to communicate on rail’s safety record, sustainability and on EU rail investment policies. It also underlined that the EYR should be promoted to regain consumers’ trust in rail, contribute to sustainable tourism and give new momentum to DiscoverEU. The European Committee of the Regions (CoR) adopted its opinion on the EYR on 14 October 2020. It called for the EYR to be used to highlight rail’s contribution to the EU economy and completion of the single market, and to offer solutions to urbanisation issues. The CoR was of the view that the EYR should also underline the attractiveness of employment in the rail sector and recommended increasing the EYR budget to €12 million. In March 2020, the Shift2Rail joint undertaking welcomed the EYR and declared that it was a very timely opportunity to raise awareness of rail’s potential to become the backbone of a future sustainable, climate-neutral transport system. In April 2020, the European associations representing infrastructure managers, railway operators, intermodal companies, wagon keepers and the rail supply industry welcomed the European Parliament resolution on Covid-19 and the recovery and reconstruction plan. In their statement they called for support for rail beyond the pandemic, to enable this sector to make a substantial contribution to cleaner mobility and the development of multimodality. UIC, the worldwide railway organisation, also welcomed the initiative and underlined the role rail has to play in decarbonising transport, due to its energy efficiency, long life cycles and frugality in public space occupation. In a letter sent to EU Commissioner for Transport Adina Vălean, and signed jointly by the European Passengers’ Federation (EPF), the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) and the network of non-profit organisation AGE Platform Europe, the European Disability Forum (EDF) insisted on the necessity for the EYR to focus on rail passengers’ rights and how to promote them to make rail a truly convenient choice for all citizens, including disabled people and people with reduced mobility. BEUC, meanwhile, published its proposal for the EYR in May 2020, observing that the ongoing reform of rail passengers’ rights should send a strong political signal to EU passengers and that the EYR should focus on making rail travel more convenient and affordable and on increasing the quality of services.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘2021: European Year of Rail‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Niestadt,

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The coronavirus pandemic has had an unprecedented impact on air transport in the European Union and the rest of the world. During the first wave, most Member States imposed entry or flight bans and other travel restrictions, bringing passenger flights almost to a standstill. However, many airports serving major cities stayed open for limited scheduled, humanitarian, repatriation, and cargo flights, and for aircraft parking. The drop in passenger flights has meant that the air freight sector has had to adjust to the situation by occasionally carrying cargo in passenger compartments. As the industry looks for ways to cut costs, it has announced job cuts and/or reduced work patterns, wage reductions and hiring freezes. A number of airlines have already declared bankruptcy.

With the public health situation improving in the EU by the summer of 2020, Member States started to lift some travel restrictions, allowing airlines to slowly resume operations while leaving in place numerous inconsistent and constantly changing travel rules and guidelines, limiting air travel significantly. In addition, airlines and airports apply strict health and sanitary measures that entail higher costs both for the industry and passengers. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) forecasts that airlines would lose about 66 % of their passengers and see total revenues drop by US$419 (€357) billion in 2020. The final impact of the crisis on air transport will depend on factors such as its duration and magnitude, the level of consumer confidence, and the stringency of the containment measures. In all likelihood, the sector will feel the effects well beyond 2020.

The EU has worked on several levels to help the sector meet the challenge, whether by publishing guidelines (e.g. on passenger rights) and recommendations, or by legislative work. One of the first measures it took was to change EU rules on the allocation of airport slots, so as to help airlines avoid flights with very low load factors. However, a lot of work still lies ahead, in particular regarding the coordination of travel restrictions. The European Commission has also authorised several national aid schemes for airlines and airports. However, this raises questions about fair competition and whether the aid should be linked to environmental considerations.

Read this complete briefing on ‘Air transport survival during the pandemic‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel,

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In the context of a major spike in coronavirus infections across all EU Member States, Heads of State or Government met by video-conference on 29 October 2020 in a bid to strengthen collective EU efforts to defeat the pandemic. Placing testing, tracing and vaccines at the centre of their strategy, EU leaders stressed the urgent need to ensure the mutual recognition of rapid testing − to support the free movement of people and keep the EU’s internal borders open − as key to preserving a functioning internal market. The informal format of the meeting was conducive to information exchange and coordination and did not require binding decisions. EU leaders also adopted a joint declaration condemning the recent terrorist attacks in France and expressing full solidarity with France and the French people at this difficult time. They also raised the issue of the relationship with Turkey and condemned the mounting tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Video-conference of the members of the European Council

At their video-conference meeting on 29 October 2020, focusing on the fight against the coronavirus pandemic, EU leaders considered short-term containment measures with a view to stemming the second wave of coronavirus infections (such as for example, common recognition of rapid testing). They also discussed longer-term measures, notably economic recovery and the preservation of the single market. In line with past meetings, they stressed the importance of maintaining unity and of acting in a coordinated manner.

This was the seventh meeting of the European Council to be held by video-conference since March 2020. Six of these meetings have focused on tackling the coronavirus but this was the first such meeting since the beginning of the second wave of the pandemic. The European Council President announced that this meeting was one of a series, signalling that the European Council was re-entering the active crisis monitoring mode that had shaped its agenda during the spring of 2020. In this respect, the fact that the new Leaders’ Agenda presented in early October did not mention the pandemic specifically among the topics to be addressed by the EU leaders in the coming months provides confirmation of its adaptability.

As the meeting was considered to be an informal one, European Council President Charles Michel sent no formal invitation to EU leaders, and no conclusions were issued. However, prior to the meeting, Michel used a recently introduced tool – a newsletter – to communicate on the pandemic. Although primarily addressed to EU citizens, when issued just days ahead of a meeting of the Heads of State or Government, the European Council President’s newsletters appear to provide him with a means to set the agenda and steer the process. In his 27 October newsletter, Michel outlined most of the points that were subsequently considered by the EU leaders; namely: testing and tracing, a common approach to quarantine, and vaccine distribution. The informal nature of the meeting also meant that the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, was not invited to present Parliament’s view.

Coronavirus pandemic second wave: state of play in the EU

In the weeks preceding the EU leaders’ meeting, a number of Member States’ intensive care capacities were approaching saturation, resulting in new national measures to counter the spread of the virus. Health policy is a national competence, however, in contrast with the situation this spring, containment measures are now being introduced in a relatively coordinated manner. As stressed by President Emmanuel Macron, EU leaders spoke to one another before the video-meeting and before setting measures at national level. However, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, pointed to the ‘failure of leaders to act quickly enough to stop the second wave of infections’.

National level containment measures range from the introduction of curfews to nationwide lockdowns. Notably, they include the closure of restaurants and/or non-essential shops in several countries, including Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Nevertheless, analysts point to distortions in competition resulting from the closure of small shops while major supermarket chains (which sell a mix of essential and non-essential goods) and on-line platforms are able to continue with their business. While education remains a national competence, the political will to preserve the economy and the single market is visible through decisions to maintain schools open in several Member States, including France, Germany and the Netherlands. Other Member States, given their specific epidemiological situations, have chosen to prolong the autumn holiday (Belgium), opted for a ‘hybrid’ system where full on-line learning can be triggered at any time if needed (Romania), or chosen to temporarily close schools (Czech Republic). It remains to be seen if these measures will be sufficient to tackle the second wave or if more robust measures, including school closures, might be needed to limit the spread of the virus.

Prior to the summit, Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen made an assessment of the medical situation, stressing its gravity and urging fellow EU citizens to wear masks, observe strict hand hygiene and avoid the ‘three Cs’: crowds, contacts and closed spaces with poor ventilation. She underlined the risk of fatigue and called for patience and determination.

European Council’s coronavirus crisis response

The European Council entered crisis mode in March 2020. A series of crisis meetings was held by video-conference in March 2020, allowing the European Council to formulate a short-term response to the crisis (see Figure 1). By 23 April 2020, EU leaders had articulated a long-term response based on two pillars: 1) the recovery roadmap and 2) the financial package linking the Next Generation EU (NGEU) to the upcoming multiannual financial framework (MFF). As for October 2020, the European Council has once again entered crisis management monitoring mode, focusing this time on both the short- and long-term responses to the crisis. Two main messages appear to be key, namely, the need to maintain unity and the need to coordinate responses at EU and national levels.

Figure 1 – Key topics in the European Council on the coronavirus pandemic

Maintaining unity

In contrast to the situation in March 2020, when the European Council first worked to achieve unity and overcome Member States’ individualism, this time around, EU leaders have shown a more united front in tackling both the health and the economic dimensions of the coronavirus crisis. At the press conference following the meeting, Charles Michel stressed that the EU was united in fighting the common challenge of the pandemic but also spoke of a ‘severe crisis’, pointing to the battle facing citizens and EU Member States currently confronted by a massive second wave of infections.

Coordinating responses

Faced with a shortage of protective medical equipment back in spring 2020, Member States were tempted to look for individual solutions, but rapidly realised that the challenges posed by the pandemic could only be tackled through solidarity and cooperation. This led to increased coordination and cooperation efforts at EU level, for instance with the creation of the European reserve of emergency medical equipment (rescEU stockpile). It is now expected that the role of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) will be expanded. While the lockdowns of spring 2020 were largely uncoordinated, there was greater coordination on lockdown-exiting strategies, although Ursula Von der Leyen has stressed that ‘measures were relaxed too soon’.

Health policy is a national prerogative, but Member States seem to have learned from the first wave that a coordinated response is key. The reflex to coordinate action has gradually gained traction since the spring, as expressed at the European Council meetings of 1-2 October, 15-16 October and 29 October, and as reflected at national level in the close bilateral and multilateral coordination of the new lockdowns. Following the recent meeting, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, stressed that, for as much as health policy is a national competence, ‘exchange of knowledge, distribution of medicines and vaccines’ are areas where coordination and cooperation are needed.

Main results of the EU leaders’ video-conference

The meeting featured an exchange of views on ways to limit the spread of the virus, vaccines and economic recovery, but given its informal nature, no binding decisions were taken.

Limiting the spread of the virus

As shown in Figure 1, limiting the spread of the virus was a central concern in the European Council discussions both on 29 October and during the first wave of the pandemic in the spring of 2020. This time, EU leaders discussed a series of measures, including data sharing and common recognition of testing and tracing, as part of their strategy to limit the spread of the virus.

Data and knowledge sharing

The Commission President stressed the crucial importance of sharing data on the epidemic ‘in real time’ with the ECDC platform, not only to secure accurate situation awareness, but also to provide indicators for anticipation and coordinated responses, including the planning of patient transfers between Member States. The Commission has unblocked €220 million for the specific purpose of cross-border medical assistance, while a network of national government health advisors and EU health advisors is to be established to facilitate knowledge sharing among Member States.

Test and trace policies

Limiting the spread of the virus relies in part on extensive testing. There was agreement on the need for common recognition of existing polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests and their results, and for validation of the new rapid antigen tests. These tests are complementary, both to ascertain the spread of the virus and to preserve the internal market. The tracing strategy, meanwhile, relies on two pillars: 1) interactive apps connected through the European Interoperability Gateway; and 2) a passenger locator form. Twenty-two Member States have developed tracing apps, downloaded by 50 million European citizens. The European Interoperability Gateway is designed to facilitate inter-operability between the different national apps. The Commission aims to have the passenger locator form in place by the end of 2020. Nine Member States have already developed their own passenger locator forms, collecting differing data, hence the need for harmonisation.

Vaccines

Ursula von der Leyen stressed the need for ‘accuracy and speed’ in the validation of vaccines. She underlined that, exceptionally, the European Medicines Agency would proceed on a ‘rolling basis’ to evaluate incoming data. Vaccines would be distributed fairly and simultaneously among the EU Member States, in proportion to their share of the EU’s population, as soon as one or more became available. Coordination would still be needed on three points: 1) defining priority target groups (who would receive the vaccine first, in particular the elderly, the chronically ill, medical staff); 2) the logistical preparation of the vaccination campaign, tackling all aspects linked to the transport, storage and conservation of vaccines at an early stage; and 3) communication campaigns aimed at raising EU citizens’ awareness of the vaccination process. In this respect, EU leaders agreed on the need to coordinate communication on future vaccination campaigns and to counter disinformation.

Economic recovery

EU leaders stressed the importance of preserving the internal market and of enabling economic recovery, including by keeping borders open and refraining from the national reflexes that had led to the closure of borders during the spring of 2020. Furthermore, Charles Michel stressed the urgency of reaching an agreement between Council and Parliament on the financial package – NGEU and the MFF – agreed by the EU leaders in July 2020.

Other items Terrorist attacks in France

EU leaders adopted a joint declaration condemning the terrorist attacks recently perpetrated in France and calling on other international leaders to promote dialogue, not division. Charles Michel expressed solidarity with France and condolences for the victims’ families. He emphasised that ‘we stand together: the European family united for our democratic values and freedoms’. Von der Leyen stressed that Europe stood ‘united and determined against fanaticism’.

Turkey

As confirmed by Charles Michel, EU leaders discussed the relationship with Turkey, asking ‘to be respected’ and condemning the multiplication of provocations in the Eastern Mediterranean. He recalled the European Council’s offer to Turkey proposing to work jointly on a positive agenda, and confirmed the intention of EU leaders’ to return to this topic in December 2020, when, depending on developments, both a positive agenda and a less bright scenario could be examined.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council video-conference of 29 October 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages on the current situation of the rule of law in Spain. Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in October 2020 calling on the Parliament to intervene in favour of the rule of law in Spain, which the Spanish government is allegedly not respecting. With regard to the rule of law in the European Union, the European Parliament has called for an EU mechanism to protect and strengthen democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. In October 2020, the European Parliament warned that the Union is facing an unprecedented and escalating crisis of its founding values.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English and in Spanish).

Main points made in the reply in English

With regard to the rule of law, we would like to inform you that on 7 October 2020, the European Parliament adopted, by 521 votes in favour, 152 against and 21 abstentions, a resolution proposing the creation of an EU mechanism to protect and strengthen democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.

The European Parliament ’emphasises the urgent need for the Union to develop a robust, comprehensive and positive agenda for effectively protecting and reinforcing democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights for all its citizens; insists that the Union must remain a champion of freedom and justice in Europe and the world; warns that the Union is facing an unprecedented and escalating crisis of its founding values, which threatens its long-term survival as a democratic peace project’.

The European Commission published the 2020 Rule of Law Report on 30 September 2020. The report includes a chapter on Spain.

Regarding the allocation of EU funds, the European Parliament ‘reiterates its call to ensure that systematic violations of the values referred to in

Finally, we take this opportunity to inform you that the European Commission is the institution responsible for ensuring the application of EU law in the Member States, managing European policies and allocating EU funds.

Main points made in the reply in Spanish

Con respecto al Estado de Derecho, le informamos de que el Parlamento Europeo ha aprobado el 7 de octubre de 2020, por 521 votos a favor, 152 en contra y 21 abstenciones, una resolución en la que plantea la creación de un mecanismo de la Unión que permita proteger y reforzar la democracia, el Estado de derecho y los derechos fundamentales.

El Parlamento europeo “hace hincapié en la necesidad urgente de que la Unión desarrolle una agenda sólida y positiva para proteger y reforzar la democracia, el Estado de Derecho y los derechos fundamentales de todos sus ciudadanos; insiste en que la Unión debe seguir siendo una defensora de la libertad y la justicia en Europa y en el mundo; advierte que la Unión se enfrenta a una crisis sin precedentes y creciente de sus valores fundacionales que amenaza su supervivencia a largo plazo como proyecto de paz democrático”.

La Comisión Europea ha publicado el 30 de septiembre de 2020 el Informe sobre el Estado de Derecho 2020. El informe incluye un capítulo sobre España.

Con respecto a la asignación de fundos, el Parlamento Europeo “reitera su petición de que se garantice la incompatibilidad de las violaciones sistemáticas de los valores a que se refiere el artículo 2 del TUE con la financiación de la Unión” blindando así el presupuesto de la Unión cuando un Estado miembro no respeta el Estado de derecho de forma sistemática.

Por último, permítanos hacerle saber que la Comisión Europea es la institución encargada de garantizar la aplicación del Derecho de la Unión Europea en los países de la UE, gestionar las políticas europeas y asignar los fondos de la Unión Europea.

 

Written by Anja Radjenovic (1st edition),

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In September 2020, the European Commission submitted a proposal on asylum and migration management, to replace the 2013 Dublin Regulation that determines the EU Member State responsible for examining asylum applications. While the proposal ‘essentially preserves’ the current criteria for determining this responsibility, it would also make changes and additions to the regulation, especially on solidarity and responsibility-sharing for asylum-seekers among Member States.

The proposal comes after a failed attempt to reform EU asylum policy following the 2015 migration crisis. While the migratory context has changed since, both in terms of arrivals and the composition of flows, the migration situation remains fragile, as evidenced by pressures on national asylum systems and continual disembarkations after search and rescue operations. According to the Commission, addressing this situation requires a relaunch of the reform of the common European asylum system to achieve a more efficient, fair and harmonised framework that is more resistant to future migratory pressures. The new system would ensure international protection to those who need it and be effective and humane towards those who have to be returned.

Versions

• Reforming asylum and migration management: A shift towards greater solidarity? (1st edition)

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on asylum and migration management and amending Council Directive (EC) 2003/109 and the proposed Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Asylum and Migration Fund] Committee responsible: Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) COM(2020) 610
23.9.2020 Rapporteur: To be appointed 2020/0279 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Initial discussions in committee

Written by Nicole Scholz (1st edition),

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The European Commission has proposed to amend Directive 2004/37/EC, by expanding its scope and by including and/or revising occupational exposure limit values for a number of cancer- or mutation-causing chemical agents. The initiative is proceeding in steps and has now become a continuous process. Following on from three previous legislative amendments, which covered a total of 26 priority chemical agents, the present (fourth) proposal addresses an additional three.

The proposal was announced as one of the first measures of the Commission’s commitment to fight cancer under the forthcoming Europe’s Beating Cancer plan.

Broad discussions with scientists and social partners fed into all four proposals. The Commission’s feedback period on the proposal will run until 20 November 2020. While broadly welcoming the proposal, professional organisations, trade unions and patient groups would like carcinogenic and mutagenic hazardous medicines as well as substances toxic for reproduction to be brought within the scope of the current proposal.

The legislative process is in its early stages. In Parliament, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs is in charge of the file. The working party on social questions is dealing with it in the Council.

Versions

• Fourth revision of the Carcinogens and Mutagens Directive (CMD) (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2004/37/EC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work Committee responsible: Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) COM(2020) 571
22.9.2020 Rapporteur: To be appointed 2020/0262 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Initial discussions in committee

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

The European Union faces multifaceted foreign security and defence policy challenges. First and foremost, it awaits the outcome of the US Presidential election, which is set to determine in significant part global economic and political developments to in the short to mid term. The Union also faces a tough choice about how to treat China: more as a rival or as a partner, and in which areas? An increasingly assertive Russia represents yet another challenge. The EU’s stance on climate, migration, Africa, terrorism and developments in its near neighbourhood policy add to this complex scene.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on EU foreign, security and defence policies.

Europe’s pivot to Africa: Shaping the future of the strategic partnership
European Policy Centre, October 2020

An election of stark choices for Americans, but also for Europe
European Policy Centre, October 2020

Europe as a global standard-setter: The strategic importance of European standardisation
European Policy Centre, October 2020

What should Europe expect from American trade policy after the election?
Bruegel, October 2020

China’s carbon neutrality goal spells competition for the EU in the market for low-carbon technology
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2020

EU trade and investment policy since the Treaty of Lisbon
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2020`

Geopolitical ambitions in the Black Sea and Caspian region
Bertelsmann Stiftung, October 2020

L’éviction de l’Europe du Moyen-Orient
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2020

Battalions to brigades: The future of European defence
Egmont, October 2020

Talking to the Houthis: How Europeans can promote peace in Yemen
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

A balance of values and interests: Germany, realpolitik, and Russia policy
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Trump or Biden: Three ways to make Europe matter in the Middle East
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

The Caucasus burns while Europe struggles
Carnegie Europe, October 2020

Lessons from Belarus: How the EU can support clean elections in Moldova and Georgia
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

How the EU became marginalised in Nagorno-Karabakh
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Security realities
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Europe must grow up and stop moaning about Trump
Carnegie Europe, October 2020

How China could push Europe and India closer together
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Three dangers Trump’s Covid poses for the world
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Resilient Ukraine is solution to aggressive Russia
Chatham House, October 2020

Europe, the U.S.s and China: A love-hate triangle?
Centre for European Reform, September 2020

Non-summit shows EU-China ties at new low
Bruegel, September 2020

Diversification and the world trading system
Bruegel, September 2020

European foreign policy is drowning in the Mediterranean
Carnegie Europe, September 2020

The future of the Transatlantic Alliance: Not without the European Union
Egmont, September 2020

Use connectivity to strengthen multilateral cooperation in the EU’s neighbourhood
Egmont, September 2020

An alliance of democracies: With the US or for the US?
Egmont, September 2020

The Corona transformation: How the pandemic slows globalization and accelerates digitalization
Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2020

An appropriate European Union response to tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean
Bruegel, August 2020

Unboxing the future: Finding the futures hidden in plain sight
EU Institute for Security Studies, August 2020

Disorder from chaos: Why Europeans fail to promote stability in the Sahel
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2020

Differentiated cooperation in European foreign policy: The challenge of coherence
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, August 2020

What future for a ‘geopolitical’ Europe?
Centre for European Reform, July 2020

The challenges of the post-pandemic agenda
Bruegel, July 2020

A challenging agenda for the new Trade Commissioner
European Policy Centre, July 2020

Rethinking the EU’s approach towards its southern neighbours
Centre for European Reform, July 2020

Trump sounds the retreat: Can European defence advance?
Centre for European Reform, July 2020

The future of the E3: Post-Brexit cooperation between the UK, France and Germany
Chatham House, July 2020

The big engine that might: How France and Germany can build a geopolitical Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2020

Religion and forced displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World
Foreign Policy Centre, Aston University, July 2020

Uncharted territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a strategic compass for EU security and defence
EU Institute for Security Studies, July 2020

The EU’s strategic compass for security and defence: Just another paper?
Jacques Delors Centre, July 2020

Ensuring cyber resilience in NATO’s command, control and communication systems
Chatham House, July 2020

Europe in a multipolar world
LSE Ideas, June 2020

An initiative to end the standstill: Desirable security policy objectives of a united EU
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2020

The weaponisation of the US financial system: how can Europe respond?
Jacques Delors Centre, June 2020

European defence in the post-Covid world
Instituto Affari Internatzionali, June 2020

EU ‘sanctions’ and Russian manoeuvring: Why Brussels needs to stay its course while shifting gears
Instituto Affari Internatzionali, June 2020

Protracted conflicts in the EU’s neighbourhood: Does resilience apply?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, June 2020

Rethinking EU crisis management: From battlegroups to a European legion?
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, June 2020

The EU’s external action on counter-terrorism development, structures and actions
Finnish Institute for International Affairs, June 2020

Has CovidD-19 dented the EU’s credibility in the Balkans?
Bruegel, June 2020

Sharpening EU sanctions policy: Challenges and responses in a geopolitical era
Finnish Institute for International Affairs, May 2020

European defence and PESCO: Don’t waste the chance
Instituto Affari Internationali, May 2020

EU foreign policy needs ’embedded’ differentiation
European Policy Centre, May 2020

Challenges and constraints facing a ‘Geopolitical Commission’ in the achievement of European sovereignty
Robert Schuman Foundation, May 2020

Who’s first wins: International crisis response to Covid-19
EU Institute for Security Studies, May 2020

The impact of sanctions imposed by the European Union against Iran on their bilateral trade: General versus targeted sanctions
Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, May 2020

Read this briefing on ‘EU foreign, security and defence policies‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.