European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Martin Russell.

The OSCE’s origins go back to 1975, when the countries in the two opposing blocs in the Cold War signed the Helsinki Final Act, enshrining principles such as territorial integrity and respect for human rights. The act was followed by a series of follow-up meetings to monitor implementation, in a process known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Following the adoption of the 1990 Paris Charter envisaging a new post-Cold War European order, in 1995 the CSCE was put on a more permanent, institutional basis and renamed the OSCE.

The OSCE, like the CSCE before it, is based on a vision of ‘comprehensive security’ that encompasses human rights and economic cooperation, as well as traditional ‘hard’ security. However, hopes that the OSCE could become the central pillar of a new post-Cold War order faded as divisions re-emerged, between an enlarged EU and NATO on the one hand, and Russia on the other.

The OSCE lacks the legal powers and the resources needed to live up to its ambition of becoming a platform for pan-European/trans-Atlantic cooperation. With decisions taken by consensus, disagreements between participating states hamper decision-making and prevent the organisation from becoming more effective.

The OSCE plays a useful though limited role in several areas. The organisation has been powerless to resolve conflicts in the post-Soviet region, but its observers are the main source of detailed and reliable information on the situation in eastern Ukraine. OSCE agreements, such as the Vienna Document, help to promote military transparency, and election observation missions have advanced democratic reforms in several countries.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): A pillar of the European security order‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Protecting pollinators in the EU’ on YouTube.

• Current OSCE field missions
• OSCE structure
• OSCE participating states and partners for cooperation

Written by Vivienne Halleux.

Europe hosts a rich diversity of wild pollinators, including over 2 000 species of bees, more than 480 species of butterflies, almost 1 000 species of hoverflies and thousands of other insect species. In the European Union (EU), 78 % of native flora and 84 % of crops are either partially or fully dependent on insects for pollination. Significant pollinator loss has been documented over time across the EU. According to the European Red List of Bees, around 9 % of all bee species are threatened in the EU. The EU grassland butterfly indicator has recorded a 39 % decline in grassland butterfly abundance since 1990. Studies in selected European countries have provided further examples of pollinator declines. Such loss entails risks for both societies and ecosystems.

EU legislation relevant to pollinator protection includes the Habitats Directive; the regulatory framework on pesticides; and the common agricultural policy (CAP). The EU rules governing the approval of pesticides require consideration of pesticide effects on honeybees. The European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) is currently reviewing its 2013 guidance on the risk assessment of pesticides on bees, which was never formally adopted due to insufficient support from Member States. One key aspect of the review process is the setting of specific protection goals, defining the maximum acceptable level of harm to bees, on which EU ministers have recently agreed.

Assessments of action at EU level identified gaps in the key EU policies addressing the main threats to wild pollinators. Although progress has been made in the implementation of the EU pollinators initiative (EPI), adopted in 2018 to tackle the decline of wild pollinators, more needs to be done, in particular to address the loss of habitats in farming landscapes and the impacts of pesticides. The EU Biodiversity and the Farm to Fork strategies set out specific targets that can help advance pollinator conservation. Integrating them into the new CAP however remains a major challenge.

Pollinator protection is a key issue for the European Parliament, which made clear that the revision of the EFSA bee guidance document should ensure a level of protection at least equivalent to that laid down in 2013. Parliament also called for an urgent revision of the EU pollinators initiative, a ban on all neonicotinoid-based pesticides and the inclusion of EU-wide binding pesticide reduction targets in the upcoming revision of the directive on the sustainable use of pesticides.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Protecting pollinators in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Protecting pollinators in the EU’ on YouTube.

Written by Marcin Szczepanski.

In December 2020, the European Commission proposed the creation of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC), to facilitate trade, expand investment, develop compatible standards, boost innovation and strengthen the partners’ technological and industrial leadership. The TTC also aims to ‘lead values-based digital transformation’. Meanwhile, trade between the EU and US continues and is as important as ever, manifested in the fact that, together, they form the largest bilateral economic relationship in the world, with the largest global data flows across the Atlantic. However, in recent years, transatlantic trade and technology policy relations have been marked by low levels of cooperation and a number of sources of tension. The 2021 change of administration in Washington nevertheless reinvigorated the relationship between the two.

The TTC was formally launched during the EU-US Summit on 15 June 2021. High-level politicians will guide the Council, while the groundwork will be carried out in ten working groups, comprised of experts from both partners. They will cover issues such as common standards, resilient supply chains, tech regulation, global trade challenges, climate and green tech as well as investment screening and export controls. The establishment of the TTC has been widely welcomed by stakeholders and the think-tank community as an important step towards bridging existing gaps and moving on with a forward-looking agenda, focused on strategic areas and new ways of cooperation. While there is a genuine will to work together on common challenges, some difficult issues such as unresolved issues from the past and different approaches to regulating digital markets persist, and it remains to be seen whether the TTC will lead to the creation of an ambitious joint policy that influences trade and technology worldwide. The first meeting is due to take place on 29 September 2021 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-US Trade and Technology Council: New forum for transatlantic cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Total trade in goods and services between the EU, US and China (in € bn)
• EU-US goods trade value (€ bn)
• Importance of transatlantic economy on global stage: Selected indicators

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Carl Pierer.

Since the 1960s, when work on its development began, internet infrastructure has become almost as important as the electricity and transport infrastructure in modern societies. More and more key services, such as banking, food retail and health care, rely on internet connections. Despite the internet’s original resilient decentralised design, the increasing importance of a few central players and the shift towards greater centralisation have made the internet more susceptible to failure. This would have severe repercussions: people would not be able to withdraw cash or pay by card, supermarkets and large retailers would not be able to bill and sell products, and managing digital certificates (such as the Covid-19 vaccination certificate) would no longer be possible.

Internet-dependent solutions promise greater efficiency and ease of use as well as enhanced control and communication. On a European level, such solutions concern, for instance, the establishment of a European health data space and the European data infrastructure initiative, Gaia-X. All EU Member States increasingly rely on internet-based solutions for many aspects of government, such as taxation, managing citizens’ official documents and registering their personal information. The internet is already integral to the functioning of some of the most important sectors of the European economy, such as financial services, transport and tourism, but also to security and border management. The role the internet plays is likely to further increase in significance, especially in the context of the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent lasting transformations of work and consumption.

The internet has been designed for extraordinary resilience. Its decentralised structure as a network of networks is meant to ensure that, should one or multiple nodes fail, information could still be transmitted, even in the event of a nuclear war. However, with the widespread adoption of the internet and its increased importance in all areas of social life, economic dynamics that incentivise centralisation have become more important. This development implies that the failure of nodes that are more centralised will have more severe, more likely, and more wide-ranging impacts.

There are several ways in which the internet could fail. There could be physical disruption to the connections making up the internet or the crucial nodes in the network where most of the data are exchanged, for instance, through the destruction of cables. Such physical disruption occasionally occurs by accident, but the impact is usually limited. To significantly affect the network, one would have to mount a large-scale, coordinated attack on a high number of nodes. Some natural phenomena, such as solar storms, may cause more severe physical damage. More important are the non-physical disruptions, as they can relatively easily affect larger parts of the network. These include distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks or the rerouting of traffic through the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), both explained below. Depending on the scale and target of these attacks, they can lead to important internet outages. Due to the increasingly centralised structure of the internet, even single end-user errors may have significant effects. This was the case in June 2021, when a customer of cloud computing company Fastly, while changing his settings, inadvertently forced several major websites offline as a result of a bug in the company software.

DDoS attacks attempt to overload a service by sending a large number of requests from many different devices, often infected with malware, simultaneously. The targets of these attacks can range from individual websites, which are frequently forced offline as a result of the attack, to more central parts of the internet’s infrastructure. In 2016, a large-scale DDoS attack forced Dyn, which at the time was managing significant parts of the domain name system (DNS) infrastructure, offline. This caused disruption to services for many large websites, such as the BBC, and to websites related to the Swedish government. In May 2021, a similar attack targeted Belnet, a Belgian internet service provider on which much of the Belgian government institutions rely for internet connectivity. This attack caused important services to be inaccessible for universities, hospitals, and even the federal parliament. The advent of the internet of things will likely trigger a drastic surge in the number of devices capable of connecting to the internet, often with poor security standards, which would increase the vulnerability to and the severity of DDoS attacks.

‘BGP hijacking’ refers to the illegitimate corruption of internet routing tables and the subsequent redirection of traffic. In 2008, a Pakistani telecommunications company, in an effort to block the country’s access to YouTube, changed the routing tables and accidentally claimed to be the legitimate address for YouTube. Global traffic was thereby rerouted from YouTube to Pakistan, causing internet failure in the country and rendering YouTube inaccessible. This vulnerability touches upon a key element in the functioning of the internet, namely, the way traffic is directed, and has been known for more than a decade. Despite increased efforts by the private sector to remedy this problem, it has continued to lead to important security breaches and has been recognised by ENISA.

Potential impacts and developments

In societies that increasingly rely on internet-based services, disruptions to the internet can have many severe consequences. They would likely affect many more domains than can be covered here.

At a more general level, any data stored off-site (in the cloud) may become inaccessible. More importantly, this data may well be difficult to recover: cloud service providers may struggle to identify the exact server on which the data is physically stored. Without this kind of traceability, it might be impossible to physically recover the data for the duration of the internet outage. This is particularly meaningful for data that are time-sensitive, as is the case with health data kept by hospitals, which are increasingly reliant on cloud solutions (in the EU, Sweden‘s hospitals are at the forefront of this trend).

Importantly, a general internet outage would severely affect monetary transactions. Payments by card would no longer be possible, and cash machines, unable to connect to central banking servers, would not dispense any cash. Without access to cash, individuals would not be able to perform even their most basic daily activities such as buying a cup of coffee or food. Many ticketing services for events, travel or transport connect to the internet to authorise the purchase or verify the authenticity of a ticket. Without such a connection, these tickets could neither be bought nor validated. More topically, app-based solutions for controlling the digital Covid certificate are functional as long as they have an operational internet connection. Severing it could endanger the strategies for containing the coronavirus pandemic.

Software providers today increasingly rely on the software-as-a-service (SaaS) business model, where clients acquire access to centrally hosted software on a subscription basis, while the software is owned, managed and delivered remotely. For their correct functioning and/or maintenance, such services rely on an internet connection. Consequently, disruption to this connection will severely impact businesses and industries relying on such software. The SaaS-model has been widely adopted in many business applications.

Finally, the internet also plays a crucial role in cloud-based solutions in the domains of logistics, inventory and supply-chain. If this means of communication is disrupted, retailers would struggle to fill their shelves and know when to order what product. Without the possibility of billing, consumers would not be able to buy any groceries or other products from supermarkets and large retailers.

Anticipatory policy-making

While many services have only recently adopted or are currently switching to internet-based solutions, the impacts of internet failure, whenever it occurs, are exacerbated by the fact that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to simply go back to the old ways of doing things. Moreover, efforts to correctly and precisely assess and increase the resilience of the internet are currently hampered by a lack of knowledge about the exact configuration, key players and the very structure of the internet.

The European Parliament (EP) is in a position to address these issues by means of a three-pronged approach. First, in a general vein, it can work towards counteracting the centralisation of internet infrastructure, especially in forthcoming discussions on the Digital Markets Act. In these discussions, it can push for more stringent implementation of the EU’s competition legislation, and at the same time emphasise the importance of distributed internet infrastructure, for instance by repatriating systems, servers, and storage to the EU, and urging the EU and Member States to invest in such infrastructure. It can furthermore support greater diversity of platforms and operating systems. In the meantime, the EP can mandate the monitoring, by the relevant bodies at EU and Member State level, of existing back-up solutions for sensitive systems, such as law enforcement, to constantly evaluate the feasibility of offline back-up solutions for essential services. Second, as the ongoing trend of centralisation of the internet increases its vulnerability, deepened awareness of the potential failures of any internet-based solution is required, for example, when making risk assessments. It is in this context that ongoing efforts to establish a common European security certificate have to be understood. The EP could call for this certificate to be required for any device destined for sale in the single market and capable of connecting to the internet. Third, the EP could support a coordinated effort to research and map the information lacking about what economic practices and developments may negatively affect the resilient structure of the internet, and what alternatives are available to prevent this.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if the internet failed?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Some 7 000 languages are spoken globally today. However, half of the world’s population shares just six native languages, and some 90 % of all languages could be replaced by dominant ones by the end of the century.

Following the success of the European Year of Languages (2001), the Council of Europe designated 26 September as the European Day of Languages.

National languages are a fundamental feature of a country’s cultural identity and an important element of its sovereignty. The European Union (EU) operates as a ‘family’, whose members preserve their cultural identity, a principle that is reflected in the EU motto ‘United in diversity’. When acceding to the EU, new Member States declare which of their languages will become an official EU language. Currently, the EU has three alphabets (Cyrillic, Greek and Latin) and 24 official languages, which are listed in the Treaties (Article 55(1) TEU). Alongside official EU languages, national sign languages and the languages spoken by the immigrant or refugee populations complete the linguistic picture of the EU.

EU countries are also committed to the preservation of regional or minority languages. The critical threshold for the survival of a language is estimated at 300 000 speakers. According to Unesco, there are 221 endangered regional and minority languages in the EU, which are not necessarily spoken within one and the same state. Their protection and promotion is ensured by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1992, and ratified by 16 EU countries.

Multilingualism is not only an expression of the EU countries’ cultural identities but it also helps preserve democracy, transparency and accountability. No legislation can enter into force until it has been translated into all official languages and published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Crucially, the provisions relating to the EU language regime can only be changed by a unanimous vote in the Council of the EU.

Looked at from the supranational perspective of the EU, effective multilingualism can only be achieved if ways are found for citizens and bodies to communicate with each other – either by using a language other than their native one, or by setting up a comprehensive translation system. The EU has sought to facilitate both modes of communication, by supporting language learning in the Member States and by creating, maintaining and expanding a complex set of interpretation and translation services.

The EU promotes language learning but has limited influence over educational and language policies, as these are the responsibility of the individual EU countries. Statistics show that in 2016, over one third (35.4%) of the working-age adults in the EU-28 reported that they did not know any foreign languages. A similar proportion (35.2 %) declared that they knew one foreign language, while just over one fifth (21 %) said they knew two foreign languages. Younger people – 73.3 % of the EU’s population aged 25-34, and those holding university degrees (83 %) – reported that they knew at least one foreign language.

The European Parliament is committed to ensuring the highest possible degree of multilingualism in its work. Based on the 24 official languages, the total number of linguistic combinations rises to 552, since each language can be translated into the 23 others. Currently, over 1 000 translators and over 500 interpreters offer their services to the 705 Members of the European Parliament. Internally, the EU institutions mostly use just three working languages: English, French and German.

The overall cost for delivering translation and interpretation services in the EU institutions is around €1 billion per year, which represents less than 1 % of the EU budget or just over €2 per citizen.

Adoption of a single EU language has sometimes been considered, but democracy, transparency and accountability require that all EU citizens understand clearly what is being done in their name, yet as shown previously, over 35 % of all adults in the EU do not know any foreign languages. Moreover, respect for linguistic diversity is enshrined in the Treaties (Article 3(3) TEU) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Article 22).

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘European Day of Languages: Multilingualism as a cornerstone of better communication‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Carl Pierer.

Earlier this year, STOA published a study on the future of crop protection. This study was carried out in the context of a growing world population and the resulting need to improve food productivity per hectare. The overall objective was to present an overview of crop protection options for European farmers, which might enable them to work sustainably while securing food production, preserving biodiversity and supporting their incomes.

As a follow-up to this study, STOA commissioned an analysis of the cost of alternative crop protection practices for the major field and garden crops in the EU‑27, including cereals, vegetables, grapes, olives and citrus fruits. The Lead Panel Member for the initial study, as well as for the follow-up, was Herbert Dorfmann (EPP, Italy), a STOA Panel member.

No one size-fits-all

The study aimed at providing a clear picture of which practices are economically most attractive in the different EU Member States. To do so, it identified four clusters of Member States as a function of both average crop protection cost and dominant type of plant production:

• Consisting predominantly of central European countries, this cluster has average crop protection costs and general field cropping (arable crops other than cereals, oilseed and protein crops, e.g. potato, sugar beet, onion, vegetables), as the dominant type of plant production.
• Consisting mainly of southern European countries, this cluster shares the characteristics of the first, but in addition olives and wine also figure prominently in their plant production.
• Consisting of mostly northern and eastern European countries, this cluster has low crop protection costs and an important production of cereals, oilseed and protein crops.
• The final cluster of largely north-western European countries has high crop protection costs and general field cropping.

While the EU’s agricultural sector is very diverse in crop specialisation, farm size distribution, labour availability and cost of operation, the members of each of these clusters have comparable agricultural characteristics and are likely to experience comparable effects when adopting and implementing alternative crop protection strategies.

Alternative practices in focus

The costs were estimated for the following seven alternative practices, drawn from the previous study:

1. Mechanical techniques

Mechanical techniques refer to replacing (part of the) chemical weed control by mechanical weed control. The cost varies from crop to crop and the differences between Member States are large. Because mechanical weeding cannot remove all the weeds, some crops require up to 150 hours of additional manual labour per hectare. Between Member States, the costs vary, because of differences in the cost of labour. Innovative methods with sensors allow for more precise weeding and could, in time, reduce the number of hours of manual weeding required.

2. Plant breeding

Disease and crop pest resistance can be improved through plant breeding, which decreases the need to apply plant protection products (PPPs) against specific diseases or pests. The cost is low for the farmer, with potential economic benefits if new varieties are used correctly. However, in crops such as olives, grapes and citrus fruit, it takes a long time for new varieties to become widely effective, as replanting cycles last between 25 and 40 years.

3. Biocontrol

An example of biocontrol is using natural predators to control insects that threaten a crop. These measures are standard in greenhouse horticulture. In uncontrolled outdoor settings this is more complex and costly.

4. Induced resistance

Costs for this type of practice are particularly hard to estimate, as the vast majority of the products have no proven efficacy. Experts indicate that in balanced systems, where all aspects are under control, they will likely have limited effects.

5. Applying ecological principles to increase biodiversity

Biodiversity can be increased in many ways. The study estimates the cost for several options. However, for whole systems that increase biodiversity, such as strip cropping and agroforestry, little data is available about the cost and benefits.

6. Precision agriculture

Precision agriculture ranges from simple measures – using global navigation satellite systems, such as the EU’s Galileo, for steering guidance – to using sensors to identify diseases. The cost and benefits vary widely and the benefits do not always outweigh the cost for the farmer.

7. Green PPPs

The cost of green PPPs depends on their efficacy. Many products have proven to be effective, but the costs are determined by the number of applications required. Some green PPPs are already widely used and have proven to be a good alternative.

Challenges to implementation

A specific challenge for farmers is to integrate several alternative practices in order to reduce their synthetic pesticide use as much as possible. Most individual practices require training and that is even more the case for combining different practices. Practices such as plant breeding and mechanical weeding require little to no training. Biocontrol, induced resistance and green pesticides require a minimum of training in the field. The application of ecological principles also requires knowledge and repeated field sessions for demonstration and advice. Precision agriculture requires a broad availability and knowledge of machinery and information technology, besides agronomy and soil science. EU facilities such as the Farm Advisory System (FAS) and the European Innovation Partnership (EIP-AGRI) could support training, especially for small and family farms.

Finally, given the large diversity of the EU’s agricultural sector, a future challenge could be to put forward policy options for the clusters of Member States identified, and even within the clusters, as to what combination of practices would be most effective for reduction in use of PPPs, while at the same time being economically promising.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Nikolina Šajn (1st edition).

On 30 June 2021, the Commission adopted a proposal for a general product safety regulation, which would replace the current General Product Safety Directive, as part of the regulatory fitness-check programme (REFIT). The proposal seeks to address the challenges of product safety of emerging technologies, including use of artificial intelligence (AI) and connected devices, and to establish clear obligations for online marketplaces, which consumers increasingly use for their online purchases. The proposal would create a single set of market surveillance rules for both harmonised and non-harmonised products, including by aligning the provisions with the Market Surveillance Regulation, and would improve the effectiveness of product recalls. For non-harmonised products where neither manufacturers nor distributors are established in the European Union, it would introduce a requirement for a person to be responsible for the product in the Union. The proposal would clarify consumer remedies and harmonise maximum penalties for infringements. In the European Parliament, the file has been provisionally referred to the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection.

Versions

• General product safety regulation (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on general product safety, amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Council Directive 87/357/EEC and Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2021) 346
30.6.2021Rapporteur:Dita Charanzová (Renew, Czechia)2021/0170 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Marion Walsmann (EPP, Germany)
Evelyne Gebhardt (S&D, Germany)
Kim Van Sparrentak (Greens/EFA, The Netherlands)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Joanna Apap.

‘What is the future of sovereignty and of European sovereignty?’ The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) put forward this very topical question to participants in the first of a series of forward-looking events devoted to ‘Thinking about the Future’. On 7 September, the participants in this online roundtable, organised in partnership with the Groupe d’études géopolitiques research centre, assessed the contemporary meaning of sovereignty and its potential evolution in the coming years. Anthony Teasdale, Director General of EPRS, welcomed a panel of academics and commentators: Sebastian Lumet, Director of the Brussels office of Le Grand Continent; Luiza Bialasiewicz, Political Geographer and Professor of European Governance at the University of Amsterdam; Quentin Peel, Associate Fellow, Chatham House and former Europe and foreign editor for the Financial Times; and Céline Spector Professor in Philosophy at the Sorbonne University, Paris.

Sebastian Lumet presented the work of his research centre on sovereignty, as well as links to the work of the other participating speakers.

Sketching out the vast territory for this debate, moderator Franck Debié, Director of the European Parliament’s Library within EPRS, pointed out that although European integration involves the pooling of national sovereignty, it is only recently that the idea of a free-standing ‘European sovereignty’ has entered mainstream debate. Questions to be answered include: What is European sovereignty? How does it apply to the European debate? Where is the locus of power? To what extent is sovereignty to remain within national or geographical confines, or can we look beyond borders through a global conceptual lens particularly in this digital age? How far is it a legal concept and how far about maximising practical influence in the world? How might it and national sovereignty evolve in the future? Could the panel answer some or all of the above questions by looking at the past, present, as well as, future perspectives of sovereignty in Europe?

Franck Debié and Céline Spector began with an exploration of the historical background of sovereignty, looking back to France in the16th century where Jean Bodin used the new concept of sovereignty to bolster the power of the French king over the rebellious feudal lords, facilitating the transition from feudalism to nationalism. Their conversation ranged from the foundational ideas of English philosopher Thomas Hobbes – that in every true state some person or body of persons must have the ultimate and absolute authority to declare the law, which paved the way for our modern concept of sovereignty – to John Locke and Jean‑Jacques Rousseau’s theories that the state is based upon a formal or informal social contract, entrusting power in return for common protection. Such theories led to the development of the doctrine of popular sovereignty that found expression in the American Declaration of Independence in 1776. The origin of checks and balances, like the separation of powers itself, is specifically credited to Montesquieu. Thus, the idea of popular sovereignty exercised primarily by the people became combined with the idea of national sovereignty exercised not by an unorganised people in the ‘state of nature’, but by a nation embodied in an organised state. In the 19th century, English legal theorist John Austin concluded that sovereignty is vested in a nation’s parliament.

Looking at sovereignty in Europe today and what the future may hold, Luiza Bialasiewicz and Quentin Peel noted an evolution both in Europe and internationally. The growth of democracy imposed important limitations upon the power of the sovereign and of the ruling classes. Increased state interdependence restricted the principle that ‘might is right’ in international affairs. Citizens and policy-makers generally recognised that there can be no peace without law and that there can be no law without some limitations on sovereignty. They started, therefore, to pool their sovereignties to the extent needed to maintain peace and prosperity. The European Union is a salient example of such division of powers and pooling of sovereignty. Quentin Peel noted that ‘sovereignty’ remains contested, however, and pointed to the term’s misuse during the Brexit campaign. The pooling of sovereignty at European level, on migration, the rule of law, the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction, and its consequences for national parliamentary sovereignty, all proved to be issues that motivated people in the United Kingdom to vote to leave the Union.

The panellists argued that, to define the concept of European sovereignty, the term needs to be decoupled from its traditional meaning. Digital technologies and the transformations brought about by Covid‑19, have led to geopolitical developments in sovereignty that surpasses national confines, giving birth to a European Sovereignty. Technological warfare, as well as global competition in addressing the pandemic, demonstrated the new sovereignty and pooling of power that played a key role in the recovery process. Conversely, ‘anti-vaxxers’ and anti-lockdown campaigners demonstrated a desire for self-determination or ‘individual sovereignty’, while the EU digital Covid‑19 certificate brought new meaning to sovereignty for citizens. The introduction of the euro had already brought shared financial sovereignty for a group of EU Member States. Now, when dealing with great powers, the EU has started to develop its strategic autonomy, which in turn, reinforces European sovereignty. The building of European sovereignty is an incremental process, which reinforces the European Union, without striving to building a super-state.

To watch the event, please click here.

Relevant links for further information on this theme:

• Le Grand Continent
• Briser l’idole. Sur la souveraineté européenne, Le Grand Continent, 5 Novembre 2020
• European Strategic Autonomy in 2020, Groupe d’études géopolitiques
• European Strategic Autonomy and the Biden Presidency, Groupe d’études géopolitiques

You can find the next coming EPRS online events here.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

This year, the seventh edition of the European Week of Sport (23-30 September) will kick off again in unusual circumstances. The official opening will take place on 23 September at Lake Bled (Slovenia) and will be centred around three core themes – joy, resilience and inter-generations – thus bringing the Week to life through inspirational and real-life stories. The lockdown measures put in place to curb the coronavirus pandemic have made the initiative more necessary than ever. Indeed, while pre-pandemic levels of physical activity were generally low, lockdown has had the unintended consequence of reducing this activity even further.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Remaining active in spite of the pandemic‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by James McEldowney.

In June 2021, the European Commission published a communication setting out a long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas. The range of challenges facing such areas is acknowledged. They include issues relating to demographic change, such as the loss of population from remote rural areas, lower levels of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, poor access to services, and issues concerning connectivity. A lower proportion of households in rural regions have access to next generation broadband compared to the EU average. Tertiary education and basic digital skill levels are lower in rural areas and a significant gap exists between male and female employment rates. The share of young people aged 15 to 29 years neither in employment nor in education or training is higher in rural areas.

The response set out in the Commission’s communication includes proposals for a rural pact engaging actors at EU, national, regional and local levels to support the vision and an action plan to support stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas. A rural observatory will be established to improve data collection and analysis on the situation of rural areas. In support of its proposals, the Commission will put in place a rural proofing mechanism to assess the anticipated impact of major EU legislative initiatives on rural areas.

Offering an initial analysis of the communication and its implications for future policy for rural areas, this briefing examines the challenges and opportunities these areas face. It summarises the views and responses of stakeholders regarding the Commission’s long-term vision and the findings of the public consultation launched by the Commission in September 2020. Evidence is also presented on the levels of trust rural dwellers have in the different levels of governance. The key drivers that will shape rural areas between now and 2040 are identified from the findings of a foresight analysis undertaken by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), which is included in the communication. Lastly, consideration is given to the experience of applying the rural proofing mechanism, including perspectives on its utility and application in practice.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Long-term vision for rural areas: European Commission communication‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

What sort of European Union do we want to see in the future? What is working well in the EU and what could be improved? These are just two examples of the kind of questions that the European citizens’ panels, part of the Conference on the Future of Europe, will have to answer. The Conference on the Future of Europe marks the first time in the history of the EU that citizens have been included in a consultative process in such a structural and innovative manner. The conference, first announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2019, is now entering its key phase, with the first European citizens’ panel meeting taking place on 17 September 2021.

The widening gap between citizens and institutions is a known pattern, not only at EU level but also at national level in many countries. Against this backdrop, some forms of participatory democracy – such as citizens’ assemblies – already successful in Ireland and elsewhere in recent years, promise to provide a format that allows an open exchange of views in a collaborative environment.

The citizens’ panels were proposed and designed to give a voice to citizens in the most inclusive way possible. As such, the panels’ key requirement is that they represent the EU population faithfully. The result is that 800 EU citizens, equally distributed into four citizens’ panels, will be called upon to discuss issues and concerns that they may themselves identify. The debate is supported by a multilingual digital platform, the main hub of the conference. The citizens’ panels are not meant to replace representative democracy however, but rather to complement it.

The Conference on the Future of Europe is a complex democratic exercise in which the multilingual digital platform gathers ideas from citizens and civil society, citizens’ panels give recommendations, and the conference plenary makes proposals on the basis of which the executive board of the Conference will draft the final report. The contribution of the citizens’ panels will feed into the proposals of the conference plenary and, ultimately, into the final report of the conference that the executive board will present at the end of the conference for the institutions to follow up.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Citizens’ engagement and expectations of the Conference on the Future of Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

See selection of our material for all CoFoE topics

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

During the September 2021 plenary session in Strasbourg, Parliament held a number of debates, including on legislative proposals for health and disease prevention, and the Brexit Adjustment Reserve; as well as on natural disasters in Europe; the Pegasus spyware scandal; media freedom; and on further deterioration of the rule of law in Poland. Members debated Commission and Council statements on the July 2021 ‘Fit for 55′ package of legislative proposals, in the light of the latest IPCC report. Council presented its position on the draft general EU budget for 2022, ahead of the Parliament voting its position during the October II session. Parliament also debated statements from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borell, on the situation in Afghanistan and in Lebanon. A number of other resolutions and legislative acts were adopted, inter alia on: the instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA III); a new EU-China strategy; fair working conditions, rights and social protection for platform workers; and on guidelines for Member States’ employment policies.

State of the Union

The highlight of this session was European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union address – an important moment to take stock of the year’s achievements and present the priorities for the coming 12 months. The coronavirus is still far from conquered, and life – from everyday routines at individual level to global trends affecting the whole world – has entered a phase of profound change. The six political priorities outlined in this Commission’s original mandate have therefore been recalibrated to deliver on promises to tackle climate change, economic challenges, health threats and migration.

Health and disease prevention

Parliament held a joint debate on health and disease prevention. Following the coronavirus pandemic and its effects, efforts continue to strengthen the EU’s response to health threats. These include legislative proposals to boost EU defences against cross-border health threats, and to strengthen the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Although responsibility for health policy remains with the Member States, the pandemic has highlighted areas where stronger preparedness measures could better protect EU citizens and address cross-border health threats in future. Parliament debated a Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) report that supports increased consideration of all environmental, animal or human factors with an impact on health, as well as promoting cooperation and transparency – which could lead to smoother joint procurement for items such as personal protection equipment, should that be necessary in future. A further ENVI committee report on strengthening the ECDC was also debated. The committee proposes to extend the ECDC’s mandate beyond communicable diseases to cover those that have a wide impact, including cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, cancer, diabetes, and mental illness. Both reports were referred back to the committee, and trilogue negotiations on the two proposals can now begin.

Brexit Adjustment Reserve

Members debated, and later formally adopted, the text agreed following interinstitutional negotiations, on the planned Brexit Adjustment Reserve. Parliament has succeeded in modifying the proposals to ensure support for EU businesses – particularly fisheries and those in close proximity to the United Kingdom – against the additional costs ensuing from the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. A €5 billion budget will be made available over the period to December 2023, with funds distributed using an allocation method taking account of each country’s trade with the UK, its fisheries in UK waters, and the population size in maritime border regions neighbouring the UK. Members also adopted measures to adapt the current year’s EU budget to cover €1.6 billion in pre-financing for the ‘Brexit Adjustment Reserve’, under amending budget No 1/2021.

Blue Card Directive

With an ageing population and an increasing need for skilled workers to sustain economic growth, the EU has to compete with other regions to attract highly qualified immigrants. Members debated and adopted a final text resulting from interinstitutional negotiations on the proposed revision of the EU Blue Card Directive. Parliament has long called for the revision of this legislation, which provides a legal route for migration to the bloc, not least in the face of considerable recent refugee movements. Following Parliament’s vote on the new rules, skilled applicants will be admitted to remain on EU territory for at least two years if they are able to present a minimum six-month work contract or a binding job offer. Admission to the EU Blue Card scheme should also become more inclusive, with reduced salary thresholds.

EU-Russia political relations

While the 1994 EU‑Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement remains in force today, relations have deteriorated since 2000. An already strained situation has worsened in the face of aggressive Russian foreign policy in Ukraine and Syria, as well as its repression of domestic dissent. Parliament held a debate on political relations between the EU and Russia, following which Parliament adopted a recommendation to Council, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The recommendations drafted by the Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee call for a revision of the current stance, which combines pushing back with constraint and engagement, and proposes to base future relations on six principles. These include activating deterrence against security and hybrid threats alongside dialogue and engagement that offers incentives, such as trade and visas, in support of Russian democratic transformation.

Gender-based violence as a new area of crime

Members adopted an own-initiative legislative report setting out proposals to add gender-based violence to the list of serious crimes at EU level to enable the adoption of EU legislation in this area. Despite the extent of gender-based violence and the harm it causes, the EU currently has no specific legal instrument to address the issue, and the Member States take different approaches to criminalisation. This means that legal definitions and the level of protection for victims vary across the EU. Adding gender-based violence to the list of particularly serious crimes set out in Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) would establish a stronger legal basis for the Council and Parliament to adopt a comprehensive directive establishing common legal definitions and common minimum rules for sanctions. Article 83(1) TFEU provides for the list to be extended to new areas of crime that have a ‘cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of the offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis’.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed three mandates for negotiations: from the Industry Research and Energy (ITRE) Committee on the proposal for a decision on the participation of the Union in the European Partnership on Metrology, jointly undertaken by several Member States, and on the proposal for a regulation on European data governance; as well as from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee on the proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for market infrastructure based on distributed ledger technology.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – September 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

As things stand, the gender pay gap persists globally and in the European Union, and progress in reducing it is slow. The coronavirus pandemic is a further brake on gender equality. To accelerate the realisation of the principle of ‘Equal pay for work of equal value’, the United Nations marked the first International Day for Equal Pay on 18 September 2020. This year, for its second edition, the debate will focus on ensuring that equal pay remains at the centre of the response to the pandemic and recognition of women’s major contribution to economic recovery.

A persisting gender pay gap The gender pay gap by Member State. Source: Eurostat, Gender pay gap statistics.

The ‘gender pay gap’ is a measurable indicator of inequality between women and men. It generally refers to the average difference between the remuneration of employed women and male workers.

Although the gender pay gap is measured by different methods and indicators, data clearly show that women around the world still earn less when compared to men. According to the Global Wage Report 2018/2019 – What lies behind gender pay gaps, produced by the International Labour Organization (ILO), on average, women earn around 20 % less than men. Despite the increase in women’s educational attainment and participation in the labour market over the years, the gender pay gap remains a persistent and multi-dimensional issue in all countries and across all economic sectors. For women with children, women of colour, migrant women, and women with disabilities, the discrepancy is even larger. In 2019, women’s gross hourly earnings were on average 14.1 % below those of men in the European Union (Eurostat, EU-27). Across Member States, the gender pay gap varied widely, ranging from 1.3 % in Luxembourg to 21.7 % in Estonia.

The coronavirus pandemic has disproportionately affected women in the economic sphere. It is likely to have long-term adverse effects on gender equality. Research already suggests that the gender pay gap will widen because of the pandemic. 

International Equal Pay Day The United Nations’ commitment

Mainstreaming the gender perspective is key to the implementation of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Since 2015, the ‘Equal pay for work of equal value’ principle has been recognised as one of the priority areas of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs), as mentioned in target 8.5: ‘By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value’.

In 2017, under the leadership of the ILO, the UN entity for gender equality and the empowerment of women (UN Women) and the Gender Initiative of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and together with governments, labour organisations (e.g. ITUC), employers’ organisations (e.g. IOE) and other dedicated agencies, the Equal Pay International Coalition (EPIC) was launched for the effective and swift achievement of the principle.

On 15 November 2019, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution proclaiming 18 September as International Equal Pay Day. The resolution was introduced by the Equal Pay International Coalition (EPIC) with the support of Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Panama, South Africa and Switzerland. The day is intended to promote further action towards the achievement of equal pay for work of equal value.

The first International Equal Pay Day – 18 September 2020

On 18 September 2020, the first International Equal Pay Day, international leaders committed to taking affirmative action to narrow the gender pay gap. EPIC called on participants to put pay equity at the heart of Covid-19 recovery efforts by introducing integrated policy responses aimed at mitigating job and income losses resulting from the pandemic and ensuring that women do not end up disproportionately shouldering these job losses and reductions in incomes.

The 2021 Equal Pay Day

This year’s celebration will focus on the efforts of key labour market actors to ensure that equal pay remains central to pandemic responses worldwide and to fully recognise the contributions of women to coronavirus pandemic economic recovery. The event aims to strengthen commitments to closing the gender pay gap across regions and sectors.

European Union initiatives

Equal pay for equal work is one of the EU’s founding principles, enshrined in Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. However, the implementation and enforcement of this principle remain a challenge. Since then, there have been initiatives to address the gender pay gap both at EU and Member State levels. Although some reduction of the gender pay gap has been recorded in most EU Member States, the challenge persists.

In her political guidelines, the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, announced that she would introduce a proposal on binding pay transparency measures in order to address the gender pay gap and ensure application of the principle of equal pay for equal work. The Commission’s legislative proposal was adopted on 4 March 2021. It is one of the key priorities in the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025. The proposed directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms would focus on two aspects of equal pay: measures to ensure pay transparency and better access to justice for victims of pay discrimination.

European Parliament position

Parliament has been calling for stronger measures on pay transparency and equal pay for a number of years. In its resolution of 8 October 2015 on ‘Equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation’, Parliament asked the Commission to draw up a legislative proposal on equal pay, incorporating measures on strengthening pay transparency, together with effective means of enforcement, such as mandatory pay audits for large companies. Parliament’s resolution of 30 January 2020 on the ‘Gender pay gap‘ urged the Commission to ensure that the forthcoming pay transparency legislation applies to both the public and private sectors, promotes the role of the social partners and collective bargaining, and includes strong enforcement policies for those failing to comply. Parliament also asked for the proposal to incorporate a number of concrete measures.

Parliament’s resolution of 21 January 2021 on the new ‘EU Gender Equality Strategy’ stresses that binding measures are necessary to close the gender pay gap.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘International Equal Pay Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tambiama Madiega and Hendrik Mildebrath.

Artificial intelligence (AI) powers the use of biometric technologies, including facial recognition applications, which are used for verification, identification and categorisation purposes by private or public actors. While facial recognition markets are poised to grow substantially in the coming years, the increasing use of facial recognition technologies (FRTs) has emerged as a salient issue in the worldwide public debate on biometric surveillance.

While there are real benefits to using facial recognition systems for public safety and security, their pervasiveness and intrusiveness, as well as their susceptibility to error, give rise to a number of fundamental rights concerns with regard, for instance, to discrimination against certain segments of the population and violations of the right to data protection and privacy. To address such effects, the EU has already put strict rules in place under the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the General Data Protection Regulation, the Law Enforcement Directive and the EU framework on non-discrimination, which also apply to FRT-related processes and activities. However, various actors question the effectiveness of the current EU framework in adequately addressing the FRT-induced fundamental rights concerns. Even if courts attempted to close gaps in protection through an extensive interpretation of the pre-existing legal framework, legal uncertainties and complexities would remain.

Against this backdrop, the draft EU artificial intelligence (AI) act, unveiled in April 2021, aims to limit the use of biometric identification systems including facial recognition that could lead to ubiquitous surveillance. In addition to the existing applicable legislation (e.g. data protection and non-discrimination), the draft AI act proposes to introduce new rules governing the use of FRTs in the EU and to differentiate them according to their ‘high-risk’ or ‘low-risk’ usage characteristics. A large number of FRTs would be considered ‘high risk’ systems which would be prohibited or need to comply with strict requirements. The use of real-time facial recognition systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement would be prohibited, unless Member States choose to authorise them for important public security reasons, and the appropriate judicial or administrative authorisations are granted. A wide range of facial recognition technologies used for purposes other than law enforcement (e.g. border control, market places, public transport and even schools) could be permitted subject to a conformity assessment and compliance with some safety requirements before entering the EU market. Conversely, facial recognition systems used for categorisation purposes would be considered ‘low risk’ systems and only subject to limited transparency and information requirements. While stakeholders, researchers and regulators seem to agree on a need for regulation, some critics question the proposed distinction between low-risk and high-risk biometric systems, and warn that the proposed legislation would enable a system of standardisation and self-regulation without proper public oversight. They call for amendments to the draft text, including with regard to the Member States’ leeway in implementing the new rules. Some strongly support stricter rules – including an outright ban on such technologies.

Looking beyond the EU, there is a global surge in use of facial recognition technologies, whilst concerns about state surveillance are mounting and amplified by the fact that there are, so far, very limited legally binding rules applicable to FRTs even in major jurisdictions such as the United States of America (USA) and China. Policy- and law-makers around the globe have the opportunity to discuss – in a multilateral and possibly in a bilateral context – how to put in place adequate controls on the use of facial recognition systems.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Regulating facial recognition in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp.

The departure of United States (US) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops from Afghanistan marks the end of a 20-year military campaign that was launched in 2001 to eliminate the Taliban’s ability to provide sanctuary for international terrorists, especially al-Qaeda, and stabilise the country with the help of a democratically elected government. However, as the last US soldier boarded a US military aeroplane on 31 August 2021, terrorists were firing rockets at Kabul airport, members of the democratically elected government, including the president, had either fled abroad or were in hiding, and the Taliban had taken back control of most of Afghanistan. On 7 September 2021, the Taliban announced an all-male caretaker government drawn entirely from the Taliban movement, contrary to earlier promises that the new government would be ‘inclusive’. So far, no country has recognised the interim government. There have been reports of reprisals against security personnel, individuals with links to the previous administration and foreign forces, journalists and minorities, in particular. The rights to education and employment that women have enjoyed for the past 20 years are meanwhile being curtailed.

In the meantime, the humanitarian situation in the country is increasingly desperate. The country relies extensively on foreign aid, most of which is currently suspended, while foreign assets have been frozen. Many Afghans have fled to neighbouring countries, joining the estimated 3-4 million Afghan refugees already living there, mainly in Iran and Pakistan. The EU has expressed concerns over the composition of the interim government, noting that an inclusive and representative government – which the interim government is not – is an essential benchmark for EU engagement. The EU has made available large amounts of humanitarian and development aid and is hoping to establish a diplomatic presence on the ground in Kabul. The EU is also planning to set up a regional platform for cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbours on issues including population flows from Afghanistan, terrorism, organised crime and drugs.

This Briefing expands and updates an ‘At a glance’ note published on 2 September 2021.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The situation in Afghanistan: Essential benchmarks for EU engagement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Further reading:

• Peace and Security, Animated infographic
• Afghanistan once more under Taliban rule, At a glance, 02 September 2021
• US and NATO leave Afghanistan: What next?, At a glance, 14 July 2021

Written by Magdalena Sapała with Nina Thomassen.

Since the beginning of 2021, Member States and EU institutions have been preparing intensively to launch the recovery instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU). In order to make this unique financial stimulus package fully operational, many conditions have needed to be met and preparatory steps completed.

First, preparations have been ongoing for the spending of the biggest part of NGEU (90 %) under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). This process includes the drawing up of national recovery and resilience plans by the Member States, their evaluation by the European Commission, and approval by the Council of the EU. Up to 15 September 2021, most of the national plans submitted have been positively assessed by the Commission and approved by the Council (18). Based on this, the Commission concluded agreements with those Member States on a legal commitment authorising the financial contribution to be made, and the first transfers of EU aid (pre-financing) were made on 3 August. In the case of some countries, however, the assessment procedure has been delayed.   

In parallel, the system for financing NGEU had to be created almost from scratch. It is based on borrowing operations carried out by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union. These operations could start only once all Member States had ratified the Own Resources Decision (ORD), which was done by the end of May 2021. In the meantime, the Commission was preparing for its role of borrower on an unprecedented scale. At the beginning of the summer, it started implementing its diversified funding strategy for the financing of NGEU. In three issuances successfully conducted so far, the Commission has raised €45 billion in total out of the €80 billion planned for 2021.

This is an update of a Briefing of 7 June 2021.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Recovery plan for Europe: State of play, September 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Structure of the recovery and resilience facility (current prices)
• Timeline and main steps in the procedure
• NGEU resources pre-allocated to Member States (RRF, REACT-EU, JTF and rural development) by Member State and per capita (€, current prices)
• Overview of the recovery plan for Europe, € billion, current prices

Written by Giulio Sabbati.

Why do figures matter in today’s world? How do we build and maintain trust in data and statistics? In an era which has seen such an explosion of data, should we not talk about data communication rather than dissemination? What does good data mean? How can data influence policy-makers? Are data literacy and ethics related to each other?

These and other topics were raised during the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) roundtable on ‘Statistics, Data and Trust: Why figures matter in today’s world’, held on 8 September 2021.

Vice-President of the European Parliament, Othmar Karas Introduced the event, which was moderated by Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service. The speakers were Mariana Kotzeva, Director General of EUROSTAT, Stefan Schweinfest, Director of the United Nations Statistics Division UNSTATS; Gaby Umbach, Director of GlobalStat and part-time Professor at the European University Institute (EUI); and Giulio Sabbati, Head of the Statistical and Data Visualisation Support Office, EPRS.

The composition of the roundtable could be compared to a statistical family. On one side were the data producers, represented by the UN and Eurostat, and on the other side data users in the shape of Globalstat and the EPRS Data Viz Office. And as a family, the participants all spoke the same language; that of statistics. In his introductory remarks, Mr Karas highlighted the importance of the UN fundamental principles of statistics and the European statistics code of practice. These are the global standards that statisticians need: to understand and to talk each other, and to learn from each other.

All the participants responded to the question in the roundtable’s title: why figures matter in today’s world? Being aware that figures are part of everyday life, as we often need to measure something to take actions, statistics are fundamental for making better informed decisions; official statistics are the foundation of any international information system;  data are essential for collective political action; the use of statistics has become a political power resource, and access to and understanding of data is becoming more and more important.

Historically, statistics started with surveys, then that expanded to public administrative sources and now in today’s world we face an explosion of data. The data ecosystem is much broader now – not only with official and non-official statistics, but also for instance with big data, digital data and geospatial data.

It is true that more data means more information; but it also means attempts at disinformation, raises questions such as over respecting privacy, and also means there is much data which are not good. But what is good data? It could refer to objectivity, accuracy, relevance, transparency or timeliness. Good data are based on scientific solid production processes. Ultimately a good data item is one that is responsibly and effectively used.

Mr Karas insisted in his message on how data and statistics are nothing if we cannot trust them. But how do we gain trust? First of all, using data that come from institutes with the highest international and European principles and standards. Official statistics in the EU and in the world are based on principles. And in the EU they are also based on a legal framework.

As a good product needs a good marketing campaign, so do official statistics. They need communication to build trust. Presenting statistics and data in an understandable and exciting way. Trust comes also with small actions when communicating: data properly ordered; clear labels; consistency in colours; texts to help understand a graph and to explain the data. It is also important to tell the story of where the data come from.

And what about data literacy, the ability to read data, to get data, to understand the meaning, what to do with them? Certainly, ethics plays an important role. It put limits on data use: what cannot be said with data and which questions need to be raised to understand.

What if we started teaching data literacy at school? How could we encourage this type of career path? Perhaps by quoting the article of the New York Times which said that ‘statistician is among the top ten sexy professions’.

The message from the roundtable could perhaps best be summarised with a quote form Hans Rosling, a Swedish doctor and statistician, who used the power of statistics to promote sustainable global development and to fight misinformation and misconceptions.

“The world cannot be understood without numbers. And it cannot be understood with numbers alone.”

Video recording of the event Further reading:

• Eurostat: European Statistics Code of practice
• Eurostat: European Statistical System (ESS) handbook for quality and metadata reports
• UN: Fundamental Principles of National Official Statistics
• Umbach, Gaby  (2020): Of Numbers, Narratives and Challenges: Data as Evidence in 21st Century Policy-Making, Statistical Journal of the IAOS (SJIAOS), Special Feature on Governing by the Numbers – Statistical Governance, Walter Radermacher (lead) December 2020, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 1043-1055
• Latest EPRS publication: ‘Ten composite indices for policymaking

Written by Gyorgyi Macsai (Members’ Research Service) with Igor Tkalec (GlobalStat, EUI).

Graphics: Giulio Sabbati.

The Covid-19 pandemic contributed to the continuous slowdown of China’s economy, from two-digit growth rates witnessed in the past to a ‘new normal’ growth rate of ‘only’ 5.7% on average under the current five-year plan (2016-2020). To what extent does this slowdown affect China’s public finances and other macroeconomic indicators? How has EU trade with China developed during the last decade? How important is the EU for China in terms of trade? And what about China’s trade relevance for the EU? Has the huge trade imbalance in goods trade between China and the EU narrowed in recent years? How intensive is trade in services between the EU and China? What are the EU’s main export items to China? How does China’s export basket look like? You can find the answers to these and other questions in our EPRS publication on China produced in collaboration with the European University Institute’s GlobalStat on the world’s main economies. This is an updated edition of an ‘At a Glance’ note published in December 2019.

Read this infographic on ‘China: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Main trade partners (2020)
• EU trade with China
• Public finances, monetary and financial data
• Total unemployment rate (% of total labour force) – Female labour force participation rate
• GDP per capita – Annual GDP growth
• EU exports of services to China – EU imports of services from China (2020)
• EU imports of goods from China (2020)
• Top EU partners (2020)

Written by Clare Ferguson.

An important moment in Parliament’s oversight of the EU executive takes place during the September plenary session, as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attends Parliament on Wednesday morning to make her second State of the Union address. With a difficult year behind it, issues such as the coronavirus pandemic, the effects of climate change and increasing digitalisation continue to present the Commission with both challenges and opportunities. While the new multiannual financial framework allows financing for the recovery plan for Europe and Next Generation EU, Members will expect to hear how the Commission intends to address the challenges that remain to achieve its stated six priorities, including on the continuing issue of adherence to EU values.

The coronavirus pandemic and its effects nevertheless remain a priority issue, and the session commences on Thursday afternoon with a joint debate on health and disease prevention. As life has returned to something approaching normal during the summer, wider health issues remain a legislative priority, and efforts continue to strengthen the EU’s response to health threats. These include proposals to boost EU defences against cross-border health threats, and to strengthen the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Although responsibility for health policy remains with the Member States, the pandemic has highlighted areas where stronger preparedness measures could better protect EU citizens and address cross-border health threats in future. Parliament will debate a Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) report that supports increased consideration of all environmental, animal or human factors with an impact on health, as well as promoting cooperation and transparency – which could lead to smoother joint procurement for items such as personal protection equipment, should that be necessary in future. A further ENVI committee report on strengthening the ECDC is also due for debate. The committee proposes enlarging the ECDC’s mandate beyond communicable diseases to cover those that have a wide impact, including cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, cancer, diabetes, and mental illness. Once Parliament’s position is agreed on these two legislative proposals, interinstitutional negotiations can begin.

With an ageing population and an increasing need for skilled workers to sustain economic growth, the EU has to compete with other regions to attract highly qualified immigrants. On Tuesday evening, Parliament will debate a final text resulting from interinstitutional negotiations on the proposed revision of the EU Blue Card Directive. Parliament has long called for the revision of this legislation, which provides a legal route for migration to the bloc, not least in the face of considerable recent refugee movements. Should Parliament agree the new rules, skilled applicants will be admitted to remain on EU territory for at least two years if they are able to present a minimum six-month work contract or binding job offer. Admission to the EU Blue Card scheme should also become more inclusive, with reduced salary thresholds.

Later on Tuesday evening, Members are expected to take part in a joint debate on formal adoption, following interinstitutional negotiations, of the text setting out Parliament’s position at first reading on the Brexit Adjustment Reserve. Parliament has succeeded in modifying the proposals to ensure support for EU businesses – particularly fisheries and those in close proximity to the United Kingdom – against the additional costs ensuing from the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. A €5 billion budget will be made available over the period to December 2023, with funds distributed using an allocation method taking account of each country’s trade with the UK, its fisheries in UK waters, and the population size in maritime border regions neighbouring the UK. Members are also expected to debate measures to adapt the current EU budget to cover €4 billion in pre-financing for the ‘Brexit Adjustment Reserve’, under amending budget No 1/2021.

While the 1994 EU‑Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement remains in force today, relations have deteriorated since 2000. An already strained situation has worsened in the face of aggressive Russian foreign policy in Ukraine and Syria, as well as its repression of domestic dissent. Parliament is scheduled to debate political relations between the EU and Russia on Tuesday afternoon, following which Parliament is also expected to vote on a draft recommendation to Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee’s draft recommendations call for a revision of the current stance, which combines pushing back with constraint and engagement, and proposes to base future relations on six principles. These include activating deterrence against security and hybrid threats alongside dialogue and engagement that offers incentives, such as trade and visas, in support of Russian democratic transformation. Members also expect to hear a statement by the High Representative on the situation in Afghanistan.

When the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, takes the floor in Strasbourg before the European Parliament to deliver her 2021 State of the Union address, she will report to Members of the European Parliament and, beyond them, to European citizens, after what has been the second summer of the Covid-19 pandemic. The coronavirus is still far from being tamed, and life – from everyday routine at individual level to global trends affecting the whole world – has entered a phase of profound change. Yet, as summer 2021 comes to a close, one of the leading impressions for many Europeans is of slowly recovering one of the freedoms at the heart of European Union, the freedom of movement they had been deprived of for public health reasons.

Mass travel in Europe became possible again during summer 2021, with 70 % of the adult population in Europe fully vaccinated and able to prove it thanks to the ‘Covid passport’ adopted by the European Union (EU) just before the summer. This legislative success reached in record time is illustrated by the cover photograph, where the presidents of the three institutions involved in its adoption (from left to right: António Costa, for the EU Council, Ursula von der Leyen, for the European Commission, and David Maria Sassoli, for the European Parliament) hold copies of the Regulation on the EU Digital Covid Certificate signed on 14 June. The certificate with a QR code is free of charge, available on paper or on a smartphone, and valid throughout the EU. For European citizens who could at last visit their loved ones, spend their summer break in another EU Member State, after many months of often highly restrictive measures, or simply get access to bars and restaurants in their home region, this initiative has shown the positive benefit of the EU, and is all the more noteworthy as it comes in a field – public health – that is not one of the core EU competences.

However, summer 2021 has left other lasting impressions that are more negative. Many are still shaken by the photographs – never mind those that experienced them directly – of mega-fires, unprecedented heatwaves, and deadly floods in various parts of the EU. Just one extreme rain episode caused a heavy toll of more than 200 deaths in Belgium and Germany, underlining once again the need to address climate change urgently. Combined with longer-term data confirming global warming and loss of biodiversity, this experience supports the priority given by the Commission to the European Green Deal. Even more, it confirms that Parliament has been right to be ambitious on climate, for example when it pushed for a higher target for the reduction of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 (60 % for the Parliament instead of 55 % in the Commission’s proposal, with the latter target later endorsed by the Council). On climate and environmental issues, including the principle of climate mainstreaming in the EU budget, the Parliament has repeatedly called for higher ambition – and often secured it, as with the 30 % of the overall resources from the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the Next Generation EU recovery instrument which will go to measures contributing to the fight against climate change.

As part of the European Green Deal, the European Commission tabled a ‘Fit for 55’ package in mid-July, including legislative proposals on climate, energy, land use, transport and taxation. The number of proposals foreshadowed (90) indeed makes the European Green Deal the Commission’s first priority in terms of announcements, although not in terms of proposals tabled (two-thirds (58) are yet to be submitted), let alone legislation adopted (only one sixth (15) so far).

Another dreadful event of summer 2021 has been the situation unfolding in Afghanistan. It calls for immediate humanitarian aid measures and visa solutions, but also brings asylum and migration issues to the forefront. This comes one year after the Commission’s proposal of the long-awaited new pact on migration and asylum, initially announced for the beginning of 2020 but postponed due to the pandemic (see fifth section below). This pact was supposed to bring new momentum to negotiations stalled for years. The number of legislative proposals under this priority should not disguise the difficulties in finding compromise and adopting legislation in this area, however urgent and dramatic the situation in Afghanistan, the Mediterranean and even on the shores facing the United Kingdom, may be.

Alongside these headline issues, the von der Leyen Commission is expecting progress on long-term files too: helping the EU recover from the coronavirus-crisis (see third section below), turning the EU into a digital continent (see second section below), becoming the ‘geopolitical Commission’ President von der Leyen claimed she would run when she took office (see fourth section below), and paving the way for the future of Europe, notably with the eponymous conference (see sixth section below).

This paper monitors all six priorities. It combines a two-page presentation for each priority and an infographic illustrating, in condensed form, on just one page (page 3), the degree of progress so far made – both overall and under each of the six priorities.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘The von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities: State of play in Autumn 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities: Legislative delivery to 31 August 2021
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