European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Myriam Goinard and Marc Jütten.

This paper is one of 10 policy responses set out in a new EPRS study which looks first at 15 risks facing the European Union, in the changed context of a world coming out of the coronavirus crisis, but one in which a war is raging just beyond the Union’s borders. The study then looks in greater detail at 10 policy responses available to the EU to address the risks outlined and to strengthen the Union’s resilience to them. It continues a series launched in spring 2020, which sought to identify means to strengthen the European Union’s long-term resilience in the context of recovery from the coronavirus crisis. Read the full study here. The issue(s) in short: The challenge and the existing gaps

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is not only reshaping the security architecture of Europe, but is also influencing the EU’s position as a global actor. Moreover, with rising tensions between the US and China, the EU will find itself in an increasingly bipolar world. The multilateral rules-based global order is being challenged and strategic relations around the world redefined. Key states from the so-called ‘Global South’, which some experts have defined as the ‘swing states‘, are becoming more important for the West in order to isolate Russia and to address global challenges. This chapter looks at options for the EU to deal with such a new situation, and especially at potential new or upgraded partnerships with countries and regions, particularly in the Global South.

The external challenges for the EU are manifold and the issues at stake will dominate the geopolitical landscape in the coming decades: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its implications for Europe’s security architecture, the global rules-based order and international law, China’s rise as a world power, the partnership between China and Russia, and their confrontation with the US. Moreover, the global threat of climate change is not only leading to the transformation of the European economy and lifestyle but also increasingly affects the Union’s external policy agenda. On top of that, the presidency of Donald Trump has shown that even the US can be disruptive and unpredictable, putting into question the foundation of the transatlantic alliance (NATO, multilateral trading system). The West’s determined response to the war in Ukraine has painted over frictions. However, even independently of the outcome of the 2024 US elections, it is not excluded that the US and Europe could drift further apart in the decades to come, as the most recent transatlantic trade dispute over subsidies for the green economy has shown. It is in the EU’s interest to develop its own autonomous role on the global stage and capacity to act, in order to pursue its values and objectives while maintaining or even deepening cooperation with key allies, as relevant.

Economic trends indicate that the EU has to face a new global order: by 2050, it is estimated that four (China, India, Indonesia and Brazil) of the five largest economies will come from the Global South, a term generally used to identify countries and regions in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania. However, some experts are of the opinion that this term is misleading and not useful, as it gives the impression that the Global South is a homogenous group of nations.

China identifies itself as a member of the Global South and has positioned itself over the years as its voice and defender: in the United Nations, for example, China provides support to and coordinates positions of the Group of 77, a large group of developing countries. In March this year, China brokered a much-noticed peace deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, strengthening its influence in the Middle East. Economically, China has outranked the EU in some regions of the Global South in which Europe traditionally had a dominant role: for example, in Latin America, China has overtaken the EU and is the region’s second-biggest trading partner after the US. In Africa, China is aiming to overtake the EU as Africa’s biggest trading partner by 2030.

All of this underlines how urgent it is for the EU to devise new strategies and step up efforts to engage with key emerging countries from the Global South. The EU can start this endeavour from a position of strength: it has the third-largest economy in the world and, with 440 million citizens, 23 million businesses and 15 % of global GDP, the EU is the world’s largest trading bloc. Moreover, the EU is collectively the world’s biggest donor of official development assistance (ODA) in the world, providing over €50 billion a year to help overcome poverty and advance global development.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

However, looking at the projections, the EU’s development does not look so rosy. On the contrary, demographic and economic indicators point to the EU losing importance on the world stage to the benefit of other players: the EU’s share of the world’s economy could decline from almost 15 % today to below 10 % by 2050. Europe’s share of the world population will also decrease: while the population in the EU is predicted to remain stable (around 445 million) in the next three decades, the world population is expected to grow to 9.7 billion by 2050.

In contrast, Asia will account for half of global economic output by 2050. By 2040, the economic weight of the Emerging 7 (E7: China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, Mexico and Turkey) could be double the size of that of the G7 (US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Canada and Italy). Demographic developments underscore the economic trend: already today, out of 8 billion people, 6.3 billion people live outside of the West, and for the next three decades Asia and Africa will drive the world’s population growth. Africa’s population, for example, will double by 2050 (although recent data indicate that Africa’s birth rate might be falling, which would impact Africa’s total population by 2100). More than eight in 10 people will live in Asia or Africa by the end of the century; their increasing importance manifests itself, for example, in Africa’s demand for G20 membership and its renewed call for reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC), indicating the continent’s quest for a greater say in world affairs.

An indication that the EU will have to deal with an increasingly self-confident Global South in the future is the lack of support from some countries in the Global South for declarations or resolutions condemning Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. China, India and South Africa were among the 32 countries that abstained in the latest UN resolution in February 2023 calling for an end to the war and demanding that Russia leave Ukrainian territory. Although the EU is the biggest provider of financial assistance globally, voting behaviour at the UN has shown that African countries in particular, which are by far the largest recipients of EU and US development assistance, abstained and did not join the Western alliance. In fact, the number of countries actively condemning Russia has fallen from 131 to 122, as some emerging economies have shifted to a neutral position.

Brazil, for example, an important strategic partner of the EU, condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and voted in favour of the key UN resolutions, but refuses to apply sanctions against Russia and the delivering of weapons to Ukraine. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called on the EU and the US to stop sending weapons to Ukraine and, after meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in April 2023, he even declared that the US should stop encouraging war. However, some experts discuss the possibility that a country or a group of countries from the Global South family could play an important role in pushing Ukraine and Russia into peace negotiations. There are already initiatives by African leaders to speak with Ukraine and Russia regarding food security-related issues.

Another example of the increasing political role countries from the Global South play in international fora is last year’s G20 summit in Bali: India, Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina and South Africa were decisive in overcoming differences between the traditional geopolitical players and enabling the G20 to produce the final declaration. In addition, members of the BRICS Group hold the current and next G20 presidencies (India (2023), Brazil (2024) and South Africa (2025)), which should mean that the interests of the Global South will continue to come to the fore.

Position of the European Parliament

The European Parliament adopted a resolution on 6 July 2022 on the EU and the defence of multilateralism, in which it pointed out that the EU needs to find new ways to engage with countries from the Global South and to do this on an equal footing with them, as equal partners. In its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), Parliament ‘underscores that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the need for the EU to continue building alliances and understanding among partners and to intensify cooperation with existing like-minded partners around the globe, especially with transatlantic NATO allies, while expanding its partnerships, in particular with countries in the Global South’. On the other hand, Parliament stresses in the same resolution that ‘the direct or indirect support of a third country for the illegal positions of Russia, namely by voting with Russia at the UN General Assembly on relevant resolutions or by helping it circumvent EU sanctions, should bring clear, swift and specific consequences in the EU’s political and trade relations with that country’.

In the current legislative term, Parliament has placed a strong emphasis on relations with the African continent, notably with the resolution of 25 March 2021 on a new EU-Africa Strategy – a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development; the resolution of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU-Africa trade relations; and the recommendation of 5 October 2022 on the Horn of Africa. In these resolutions, Parliament insists that the future relationship must move away from a donor-recipient dynamic and calls for stronger EU support for Africa’s integration into the global economy. Parliament also calls for the EU to support Africa’s request to expand the UN Security Council in order to include permanent representation for the continent. In addition, Parliament supports India’s bid for permanent membership of a reformed UN Security Council.

Following the adoption of a joint communication on the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in September 2021, Parliament adopted two resolutions, one on 22 March 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and one on 5 July 2022 on the Indo-Pacific strategy in the area of trade and investment.

The European Parliament has an intensive political dialogue with countries in the Global South, through its multilateral assemblies (Eurolat, Parliamentary Assembly for the Union for the Mediterranean, EU-ACP joint parliamentary assembly), its bilateral standing delegations and its frequent Committee missions to Africa, Latin America and Asia. In March 2022, Parliament launched an initiative of global interparliamentary outreach to its partners across the world to discuss Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and mobilise support for Ukraine.

Figure 33 – Pyramid of instruments at the disposal of the EU and its Member States EU policy responses (Commission and Council responses so far)

Due to the multitude and heterogeneity of the Global South countries, there is no single coherent EU strategy towards the Global South as such. The EU operates within the broader framework of CFSP, the 2016 EU global strategy, the 2021 multilateralism strategy, and the 2022 Strategic Compass, but also through tailor-made approaches to regions and countries such as the recent strategies towards the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. In addition, the EU has a series of regional and bilateral partnerships in place, such as those with the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), South Africa, India and Brazil. Moreover, the EU has concluded political, trade and economic partnership agreements with regions and countries from the Global South, such as the Economic Partnership Agreement with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement.

The current Commission and High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) have taken this regional approach further, for example with the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the joint communication ‘Towards a comprehensive strategy with Africa‘, the establishment of a strategic partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the resumed negotiations on a free trade agreement with India.

Another region from the Global South with which the EU wants to strengthen ties is Latin America. Almost eight years passed between the previous fully-fledged EU-CELAC Summit and the one held on 17-18 July 2023 under the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union – which underlines that the EU has neglected the region for too long. Latin America and the EU Member States together represent nearly a third of the UN membership. Latin America is also a region where an overwhelming majority of states are democracies and which has deep cultural and historical ties with Europe. Therefore, it is a strategic ally in the EU’s pursuit of its values and interests in multilateral fora, as the voting behaviour at the UN has shown. For example, the LAC states voted by a vast majority in favour of the 2022 and 2023 key UN resolutions on Ukraine. Against this background, the HR/VP and the European Commission adopted a joint communication setting out a new agenda for relations between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean on 7 June 2023. It aims for a stronger and modernised strategic partnership, to be achieved through reinforced political engagement, boosted trade and investment, and building more sustainable, fair and interconnected societies through Global Gateway investments. The initiative paved the way for the EU-CELAC Summit at Heads of State and Government level on 17-18 July 2023.

One area where the EU has recently taken a global rather than a continental or regional approach is in financial and development assistance. With the adoption of the NDICI/Global Europe instrument for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, the EU pulled together – in a single instrument with global scope – all previous strands of assistance, including the European Development Fund (EDF), which was until then an off-budget instrument. This was reflected in 2019 in the creation of the post of Commissioner for International Partnerships (instead of the previous post for international cooperation and development). The EU has, furthermore, launched the Global Gateway Initiative (announced in a December 2021 Communication) bringing together the EU and EU Member States with their financial and development institutions and mobilising the private sector to boost sustainable investments in low- and middle-income countries, especially in the areas of green and digital transition, but also health and education; half of the investments of up to €300 billion should be allocated to projects in Africa. The Global Gateway, which has been widely presented as the EU alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, is coordinated with similar initiatives by like-minded partners, in particular the G7, as was highlighted at the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment event at the Hiroshima G7 Summit in May 2023.

The EU is also complementing the regional approach with a global one when addressing the geopolitical consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with the adoption of the Strategic Compass (the plan of action for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy by 2030) and, in June 2022, of a dedicated action plan, putting EU and EU Member States’ resources together to increase the EU’s bilateral engagement with key partners in its immediate neighbourhood, Asia, Africa and Latin America and to help them mitigate the most immediate consequences of the war.

Figure 34 – Timeline of the EU’s new partnerships in a polarised world Obstacles to implementation of response

The ‘Global South’ concept is far from being unproblematic and is challenged by several authors and decision-makers, either because it seems to play into the Russian and Chinese narrative opposing ‘the West’ to all ‘the rest’ of the world (see here from the French and British foreign affairs ministers) or due to its overly simplistic, undifferentiated approach to very diverse countries (see here, for example, Timothy Garton Ash’s position). As HR/VP Josep Borrell put it, ‘the use of ‘Global South’ projects a degree of unity on what is in reality a very diverse group with huge differences in conditions, aspirations and alignments. [….] We have every interest in using language that promotes the search for common ground and avoids bloc-to-bloc thinking.’ This makes it conceptually difficult and political sensitive to think of a comprehensive EU approach to these countries and the type of new or upgraded partnership that could be needed.

A concrete example of how complex the shaping of relations with the Global South can be is the EU’s attempt to strengthen its relations with Brazil, a member of the G20, BRICS, Mercosur and a key state in Latin America given its territory, population and GDP. The EU has a longstanding partnership with Brazil based on shared fundamental values and principles, on a strategic partnership and on a number of additional agreements such as a framework cooperation agreement, a science and technology cooperation agreement and the EU-Mercosur framework cooperation agreement. This is one of many reasons why it makes sense for the EU to further strengthen relations with Mercosur and apply the association agreement for which an ‘agreement in principle’ was reached (on the trade pillar in 2019 and on the political dialogue and cooperation part in 2018). However, the agreement has met resistance within the EU, in particular because of the deforestation in the Amazon: Member States, national parliaments and also the European Parliament have raised concerns, the latter emphasised in a resolution of 7 October 2020 that the EU-Mercosur agreement cannot be ratified as it stands. Since then, the Commission and the EEAS have been working on an additional instrument to accompany the agreement, aimed at addressing concerns about sustainability and the potential environmental effects of the agreement, notably on deforestation. Brazil’s President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, said that he was in favour of the agreement but that he wanted to renegotiate some areas of the deal in favour of Brazil’s industrial development. The reopening of negotiations could be time-consuming and jeopardise the entire agreement. If the deal fails, China would likely be the beneficiary, as the country stands ready to further deepen its trade relations with Mercosur. Already today, China is the region’s top trading partner.

The long-awaited conclusion of the ‘Post-Cotonou’ Agreement between ACP countries and the EU is also delayed due to the opposition of some EU Member States – first Hungary and then Poland – to giving their green light to the final text, straining relations with key partners in the South.

Moreover, the mushrooming of sectoral agreements proposed by the EU on top of broader, mostly regional agreements, such as green partnerships, partnerships on critical raw materials, or the voluntary partnership agreements under the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative, makes the EU approach more difficult to grasp and appreciate, especially by the local population concerned.

Another key obstacle to the development of new partnerships in the South is the anti-EU rhetoric fuelled especially by Russia’s and China’s manipulation of discourse and of information, be it in Asia, Latin America or Africa. EU programmes and offers are often portrayed as neo-colonial and hegemonic, serving EU interests only, and the EU’s action in rallying support for Ukraine as a ‘double standard’ contrasting with an alleged lack of EU engagement in the conflicts of the South.

While colonial history is an important component in relations between the Global South and the EU and should not be neglected, accusations of post-colonialism are part of a broader strategy of authoritarian regimes to counter EU policies towards the Global South, including its support for democracy.

Policy gaps and pathway proposals

The lack of consensus on the clear condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine by a significant number of countries from the Global South and the flourishing aggressive anti-Western rhetoric call for renewed efforts, from the EU side, to understand the positions of these countries and their perception of the EU and its policies, however diverse they are, and to clarify the terms and content of the partnership.

A ‘listening and understanding’ exercise should take into consideration elements such as the legacy of the past, including colonialism and historical ties, and tackle in a frank way the irritants in the relations between these countries and the EU like the rejection of the universal character of human rights, the slow finalisation of bilateral or regional agreements, accusations linked to so-called ‘double standards‘, or allegations of ‘green protectionism‘. To achieve this, the EU could:

• review existing fora for political dialogue with authorities and outreach to civil societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America, modernise them or introduce new formats, in particular with young people, where needed, to allow for more interactive and issue-based discussions, address criticism and embrace a deeper understanding of societal dynamics;
• put a stronger focus in the impact assessment of EU legislation on its impact for stakeholders outside the EU, including small producers, and involve the European External Action Service (EEAS) in this exercise. The Better Regulation Toolbox highlights that ‘the assessment of potential impacts of internal EU policies and initiatives on third countries is crucial’ and that ‘if impacts are significant, a thorough assessment is essential to ensure that the external dimension of the EU initiative is considered from the very start’. However, this assessment is not yet done systematically, or not to the required extent (see, for example, the EPRS initial appraisal of the impact assessment accompanying the corporate sustainability due diligence proposal);
• use evidence related to the impact of EU policies and legislation on third countries when discussing upcoming EU programmes under the NDICI-Global Europe and other instruments, in order to accompany the necessary transition/adjustments where appropriate;
• step up efforts to join forces with countries or organisations from the Global South to reform the multilateral framework and to facilitate their greater inclusion in multilateral fora – for example, to enlarge the G20 to include the African Union as a fully-fledged member.

On the other hand, the EU should promote its positive agenda in different areas (top aid provider, leader in the green and digital transition, etc.) and:

• give more visibility to and clarify the EU offer and concrete actions, including EU assistance and the EU’s contribution to peace and security across the world, and counter narratives of double standards. To facilitate this, there could, for each country, be a clear and comprehensive overview of the framework for bilateral engagement between the EU and third countries, including all sectoral partnerships, financial support, CSDP missions, etc.;
• invest more in communication on the ground (including framing of the EU’s policies and offer) and public diplomacy in partner countries, and address misrepresentations, manipulation of public opinion and propaganda about EU action; equip relevant EU delegations with the tools to increase public diplomacy activities and to develop their strategic communication capabilities (as highlighted in Parliament’s recommendation of 15 March 2023 on the functioning of the EEAS and for a stronger EU in the world). This will require an increased budget for selected EU delegations;
• further develop the Global Gateway initiative in partnership with the beneficiary countries, focusing on producing added value in these countries and helping them move up the value chains while achieving joint objectives (such as the green transition);
• beyond communicating on the existing offer, the EU could develop a new generation of partnerships of equals to be discussed with countries of the Global South, especially democracies, to bring all strands of political, economic, financial and sectoral assistance and cooperation under a single framework, and agree on priorities to be jointly defended in multilateral fora. This could replace the concept of ‘EU strategic partners‘ and factor in the mushrooming sectoral agreements on issues such as critical raw materials and hydrogen, as well as new challenges such as space, data, biodiversity, etc.;
• this approach could be reflected in an updated EU global strategy, the review of which is a longstanding request by the European Parliament.

The European Parliament has a key role to play in driving the discussion on these questions and implementing such policy options, either through its distinct parliamentary diplomacy or through its scrutiny, budgetary and legislative role.

Possible action

Written by Suzana Anghel.

This paper is one of 10 policy responses set out in a new EPRS study which looks first at 15 risks facing the European Union, in the changed context of a world coming out of the coronavirus crisis, but one in which a war is raging just beyond the Union’s borders. The study then looks in greater detail at 10 policy responses available to the EU to address the risks outlined and to strengthen the Union’s resilience to them. It continues a series launched in spring 2020, which sought to identify means to strengthen the European Union’s long-term resilience in the context of recovery from the coronavirus crisis. Read the full study here. The issue(s) in short: The challenge and the existing gaps

The European security landscape has changed profoundly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the blink of an eye, on 24 February 2022 the (post) Cold War European security architecture, with the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe as its pillars, was nearly swept away, while the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) saw its capacity to act paralysed. The reality of the war has rapidly transformed a hypothetical risk dreaded by some and denied by many into a multi-faceted – conventional and non-conventional – threat requiring immediate, medium- and long-term crosscutting policy responses from the EU and its Member States. Coordination with allies in NATO and with like-minded partners around the world became of paramount importance, particularly with respect to establishing and enforcing sanctions but also with respect to the multifaceted, including military, support provided to Ukraine. The EU and NATO have jointly condemned Russia’s ‘unprovoked and unjustified attack’ against Ukraine. Ukraine showed courage, strength and commitment to democratic principles and values, as well as resilience. Contrary to Russia’s expectations, Euro-Atlantic unity was not broken but strengthened, with the Alliance reinforcing and expanding its eastern flank. NATO’s new 2022 Strategic Concept identified Russia as ‘the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area’, and it has reconfirmed the Alliance’s attachment to the ‘open door policy’, including the 2008 Bucharest summit decision recognising ‘Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership’. In parallel, the EU Strategic Compass, endorsed by the European Council, outlined NATO’s and the EU’s complementarity, recognising ‘how essential NATO is for the collective defence of its members’ and acknowledging ‘the important role the EU plays in today’s complex security and defence environment’. The new (in)security reality on the European continent offers momentum to bolster European defence cooperation. The joint development and purchasing of military capabilities useable in the national, EU and/or NATO framework is hence key. The argument often advanced – ensuring better value for money – remains valid, but the main question the EU and the Member States still need to answer is what kind of defence capabilities they need and for what purpose. This requires, inter alia, learning from the lessons of the Ukraine war, restrategising, in-depth transformation of Member States’ armed forces, and using the EU’s knowhow – building a common market and conducting voluntary joint procurement – to strengthen EU-NATO complementarity. Moving in this direction could arguably bring the EU closer to sharing the transatlantic burden, achieving strategic autonomy, and building a European defence union.

EU policy responses (Commission and Council responses so far)

A month into the war, the EU leaders endorsed the Strategic Compass, a document providing a ‘shared assessment of the [Union’s] strategic environment’. The Strategic Compass points to growing strategic competition, underlines ongoing geopolitical shifts, which are likely to be accelerated by Russia’s war on Ukraine, and stresses that the EU and the Member States need to jointly tackle the common multiple threats to their security. In addition, the Strategic Compass outlines a set of policy responses, some with clear-cut deadlines for fulfilment by 2030, in four main areas, which require action at EU level, national level and jointly with like-minded partners. These areas cover the EU’s ability to ‘act’ when a crisis emerges, to ‘secure’ and build resilience, to ‘invest’ in capabilities and to cooperate with like-minded partners, including NATO.

EU action

At a meeting held in Versailles within weeks of the outbreak of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, the EU leaders confirmed that defence cooperation efforts should focus on the bolstering of defence capabilities and on strengthening the European defence industry, recalling the importance of the transatlantic relationship as well as EU-NATO cooperation and complementarity. They asked the European Commission to present, jointly with the European Defence Agency (EDA), ‘an analysis of the defence investment gaps’. The Commission presented its analysis in May 2022, pointing to the negative effect of ‘years of defence underspending, which has led to an accumulation of gaps and shortfalls in the collective military inventories as well as reduced industrial production capacity’, while welcoming the decisions of several Member States to increase defence spending. The Commission underlined that, in the short term, it was urgent to ‘replenish, replace and reinforce capabilities’, and stressed that, in the long run, a new generation of weaponry covering the entire spectrum of capabilities – land, air, maritime, space, cyber – was needed to ensure that the Member States are well equipped to address common threats to their security, in cooperation with partners in NATO. Figure 30 gives a timeline of ongoing and future initiatives in the area of security and defence.

Figure 31 – Timeline of selected security and defence initiatives

Based on the defence investments gaps analysis, the Commission presented the European defence industry though common procurement act (EDIRPA) in July 2022. EDIRPA is a short-term instrument, subject to ongoing interinstitutional negotiations, intended to boost joint procurement and worth €500 million for the period 2022-2025. EDIRPA’s transformative capacity does not rest on its current budgetary allocation, which remains rather modest in comparison to the needs, but on the principle it sets, namely that common procurement of defence equipment can be funded from the EU budget. A longer-term instrument, the European defence investment programme (EDIP), is expected to be presented in 2023, with the aim of facilitating the formation of European defence capabilities consortia (EDCC) that would allow Member States to jointly procure defence capabilities developed collaboratively. In the long run, EDIP will be a complementary tool to the European Defence Fund (EDF), an instrument benefiting from an €8 billion envelope for the duration of the 2021-2027 multi-annual financial framework (MFF). The EDF has two windows, research and capabilities; the EU budget fully funds the research window, while the capabilities window draws on a mix of the EU budget and Member State funding. The costs of developing prototypes are shared by the EU (20 %) and the Member States (80 %), while procurement costs are, for now, supported by the Member States. Figure 31 gives an overview of the existing instruments, those about to be adopted, and those planned in the area of defence.

Figure 32 – Pyramid of instruments at the disposal of the EU and its Member States

In May 2023, the Commission presented the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), an instrument intended to facilitate ‘the timely availability and supply of relevant defence products in the Union’. ASAP aims to help the European defence industry ramp up its research and manufacturing capacity to meet the needs of the EU Member States as they replenish their stocks and continue to support Ukraine, and will receive funding of up to €500 million from the EU budget. The legislative financial framework provided by the Commission indicated that ASAP could be funded from EDIRPA (€240 million), the EDF capability window (€174 million) and the EDF research window (€86 million). On 1 June 2023, the Parliament completed the first reading of the legislative procedure, voting in favour of ASAP and opening the way for interinstitutional negotiations. However, upcoming negotiations with the Council will most probably focus on the question of funding, as MEPs regretted that ASAP was relying on funding allocated to other defence instruments and not on dedicated funding.

Prior to the outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the EU was already exploring ways to bolster defence capabilities and strengthen the European defence industry, with the EDF, preceded by a preparatory action on defence research, as a dedicated instrument. In addition to the EDF, two other interlinked mechanisms were either created, the coordinated annual reviews on defence (CARD), or activated, permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) (Articles 42.6 and 46 TEU and Protocol 10), at the time.

EU Member States, with support from the EDA, have conducted two CARD exercises thus far. A first CARD report, issued in 2020, considered ‘defence spending, defence planning and defence cooperation’ to be the optimal way of addressing fragmentation and duplication of capabilities. More recently, the 2022 CARD report recalled the defence investment gaps analysis conducted in the early months of the war and stressed that an increase in defence spending could ‘improve readiness and close long-standing capability gaps’.

PESCO is a treaty-based mechanism allowing for differentiated integration in defence. With Denmark giving up its longstanding opt-out in defence, the number of Member States participating in PESCO rose to 26, Malta being the only EU Member State outside of PESCO. There are currently 68 PESCO projects, with military mobility – a project allowing the transfer of personnel and equipment from one end of the European continent to the other – as a flagship. In parallel, the Commission presented a joint communication on improving military mobility and an action plan, a dual-use initiative funded under the Connecting Europe Facility for €1.5 billion in the period 2021-2027. The concept of military mobility originates in NATO and the EU’s complementary efforts can only boost the Union’s cooperation with the Alliance.

In focus: EU military support to Ukraine
Ukraine receives multifaceted – political, financial, economic, humanitarian and military – support from the EU and its Member States. The EU Member States use the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off EU-budget instrument adopted in 2021, to provide Ukraine with military support. Prior to the outbreak of the war, in December 2021, the EU pledged €31 million under the EPF in non-lethal military assistance to support the Ukrainian armed forces in strengthening their logistics, cyber defence and medical capacity. After the outbreak of the war, the EU supported Ukraine with both lethal and non-lethal military assistance through the EPF. This was the first time that the Union was providing lethal military assistance to a country, a rapid U-shift in policy permitted by the EPF framework.
Eight successive tranches have progressively increased the amounts pledged under the EPF from €500 million to €5.6 billion. The last tranche, of €2 billion, was agreed politically in the Council in March 2023, a decision subsequently endorsed by the European Council. Half of this amount, €1 billion, would go to reimbursing Member States for the ammunition provided to Ukraine from their own stocks/pending orders, while the other half will support joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine. In order to cope with Ukraine’s increasing needs for military assistance and, at the same time, continue to provide support to other parts of the world, the overall financial envelope of the EPF was increased progressively from €5.9 billion to €12 billion (current prices) for the period 2021-2027; further revisions of the EPF budget could still be needed. The European Council President, Charles Michel, stressed that the EU will support Ukraine ‘for as long as it takes’.
Another form of military support is the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM Ukraine), agreed in the Council in November 2022. For the first time in the two-decade history of the Union’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations, the mission will take place in the EU and not in the country, Ukraine – for security reasons.
A number of individual EU Member States have provided bilateral military assistance to Ukraine in the form of lethal and/or non-lethal military assistance. The Kiel Institute for World Economy lists Germany (€3.57 billion), Poland (€2.42 billion) and the Netherlands (€2.36 billion) as the top three EU countries in terms of military assistance pledged during the first year of the war. The European Council recognised that the EU and its Member States have contributed ‘nearly €12 billion’ in military assistance during the first year of the war.
The European Parliament expressed its support for Ukraine and called on the EU Member States and like- minded partners ‘to massively increase their military assistance’, ‘to build long-lasting unity’ in support of Ukraine and ‘to fully and unconditionally support Ukraine against the Russian war of aggression’. Addressing the European Council in the weeks after the outbreak of the war, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola called for unity and resilience, while in February 2023 she warned the EU leaders against ‘war fatigue’, calling for increased support for Ukraine.

National-level initiatives

The European Council has, on several occasions, called on Member States to increase defence spending. The 2022 CARD report stressed that the recommendation made in the 2020 report ‘to increase defence expenditure … was largely followed’ by the Member States. A similar pledge to increase defence expenditure was made within the NATO framework back in 2014, when the Allies agreed to dedicate a minimum of 2 % of their gross domestic product (GDP) to defence spending by 2024. Prior to the outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the EU and NATO shared 21 members; this number has since increased by one with the accession of Finland to NATO in April 2023, while Sweden is expected to join the Alliance in the near future. A few EU Member States – Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Greece, Poland and Romania – were meeting the criterion of 2 % of GDP for defence spending prior to the outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine in 2022. In the interim, two countries, France and Romania, have fallen below the threshold, while none of the other EU Member States who are also members of the Alliance have risen above it. Poland increased its defence spending from 2.10 % of GDP in 2021 to 2.42 % of GDP in 2022 and announced its intention to reach 3 % of GDP in 2023. Germany continues to spend around 1.5 % of its GDP on defence, while the defence ‘Zeitenwende’ announced by Chancellor Olaf Scholz is still awaited as most of the special defence fund (€100 billion) agreed in the aftermath of the outbreak of the war is yet to be allocated.

In addition to increasing national defence spending, it is important to work towards meeting the benchmarks agreed in the EDA framework for collective procurement of defence equipment and for collaborative defence research and technology (R&T). Back in 2007, the EU Member States agreed on a non-binding 35 % benchmark for joint defence equipment procurement and a 20 % benchmark for European collaborative defence R&T. In 2021, the Member States procured collaboratively only 18 % of their purchased defence equipment and 7 % of their defence R&T. The EU may boost collaborative procurement though the newly created instruments funded from the Union’s budget – EDF, EDIRPA and ASAP. However, their rather low financial envelopes do not allow them, for now, to act as game changers in enabling the Member States to meet their self-imposed benchmarks.

Defence spending decisions are national decisions. However, it is important that EU Member States coordinate defence spending in order to reduce duplication, ensure better value for money and foster interoperability among their armed forces and with Allies in NATO.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content EU-NATO cooperation

In January 2023, the EU and NATO signed a new declaration of cooperation, the third since 2016. They outlined their ‘determination to tackle common challenges’ jointly, expressed their commitment to preserving transatlantic security, and stressed that ‘conflict, fragility and instability’ in the EU’s neighbourhood could ‘provide fertile ground for strategic competitors, as well as terrorist groups, to gain influence, destabilise societies and pose a threat to our security’. They further recognised that the two organisations ‘play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security’. The notion of complementarity is central to both NATO’s Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass, which recognise NATO’s key deterrence and defence role and the EU’s ability to help strengthen interoperability, reduce duplication and streamline spending by jointly developing and procuring capabilities.

The EU and NATO maintain close cooperation at the political level. This allows the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, to attend the meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, to engage in an exchange of views with the European Council. At the technical level, cooperation focuses on the implementation of the seven priorities identified in the 2016 and 2018 joint declarations with NATO: hybrid threats, cybersecurity, operational cooperation, capacity building, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, and training. Intelligence sharing is still not optimal and a further normalisation of relations in this area depends on a ‘durable solution’ to the Cyprus problem.

Member States have a single set of forces they can commit to the EU, NATO, or coalitions of the willing. Efforts undertaken in the EU to strengthen and develop defence capabilities benefit the Union and NATO and could result in a robust European pillar within NATO, allowing European allies’ to act autonomously when needed and jointly with partners when required. A robust European pillar within NATO would allow Europeans to operate in a more autonomous way when and if needed. The EU is the key to this development; it can sharpen and build tools facilitating voluntary joint procurement of interoperable defence capabilities, and has the expertise to build a genuine defence market, if its Member States so wish. The Union can also bolster the defence industry in Europe by investing in research and development.

Position of the European Parliament

In February 2022, the European Parliament stressed that ‘the Strategic Compass was a starting point for implementing a common European defence in line with the provisions laid out in Article 42(2)TEU’ and ‘should constitute a major step towards a genuine European defence union’, which is part of the EU’s ‘objective of achieving strategic autonomy’. In January 2023, the Parliament adopted a resolution where it recalled the illegal and unprovoked character of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and urged Member States to use the momentum to enhance European defence cooperation by, inter alia, ‘joint and smarter spending’ on capabilities and by strengthened partnerships with like-minded partners.

The Parliament welcomed ongoing efforts to bolster joint procurement through EDIRPA and the EDF that are intended to ‘close critical gaps’. It urged Member States ‘to commit to a significant increase in funding for the envisaged joint EU procurement mechanisms, such as the EDIRPA and the EDIP, by providing adequate funding and to take swift and thorough action in this crucial field while ensuring interoperability with NATO’. To this end, the Parliament stressed the importance of establishing ‘a truly European defence equipment market’ and revising the MFF to ensure that funding meets requirements. It recalled the importance of cooperating with partners, in particular NATO, welcoming the third EU-NATO Joint Declaration while urging a deepening of cooperation, including on the Alliance’s eastern flank. The Parliament was also of the view that European NATO members needed ‘to take on more burden-sharing responsibilities in protecting the transatlantic space and respond to new hybrid threats’.

All the mechanisms the EU has developed prior to and after the outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine – CARD, PESCO, EDF, EDIRPA and ASAP – contribute to the progressive framing of a European defence union, a development the European Parliament has called for in its successive resolutions. Addressing the EU leaders, President Metsola stressed that an EU ‘capable of countering new threats’ needs smart defence spending and would require PESCO to be reformed. She also stressed that the EU ‘must go beyond the European Defence Fund and make the EU budget work for our security and defence policy whenever it adds value’.

The Parliament has also called on the EU institutions to ‘unleash the full potential of the provisions of the Treaty relating to CSDP’. It has proposed ‘that changes to the Treaties be considered in the case of the CSDP, to be discussed and decided upon within a convention following up on the Conference on the Future of Europe’. In the Parliament’s view, Treaty change in CSDP should lead to reducing the scope of unanimity and expanding Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council for ‘decisions with military implications’, while maintaining, inter alia, CSDP military missions with an executive mandate and the activation of Article 42(7)TEU, the mutual assistance clause, as exceptions from QMV. The Parliament is also calling for Articles 42 and 46 TEU as well as Article 346 TFEU to be amended in order to codify EU budget spending for defence, to limit Member State’s possibilities to continue to circumvent joint procurement rules, and to allow for the establishment of ‘joined and permanently stationed multinational military units including command structures’.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content Obstacles to implementation of response

The existing policy responses – CARD, PESCO, EDF, EDIRPA and ASAP – are a set of instruments that help to develop European defence capabilities, boost voluntary joint procurement, foster economies of scale, avoid duplication and strengthen the European defence industry. Their successful implementation depends on the Member States’ willingness to change existing defence procurement patterns, which continue to favour national acquisitions rather than collaborative procurement. By creating or activating some of these instruments, the EU broke the long-lasting taboo of an EU budget that cannot be used for defence purposes. In the years to come, it is important to maximise the output that the EU budget can offer in support of security and defence by increasing the financial means allocated to the different instruments. Political will remains key to ensuring a leap forward in security and defence. Article 42(2) TEU allows the boundary between defence cooperation and integration to be pushed further by moving towards ‘common defence’. This development depends entirely on the European Council, but the Strategic Compass remains silent on the matter, a sign that there is, as yet, no political consensus among the EU Member States on this issue. An intermediate step would be the creation of a European defence union, a proposal the Parliament and the Commission have supported.

Possible action

Written by Eric Pichon.

On 26 July 2023, part of the Nigerien presidential guard removed President Bazoum from office. The coup was later supported by the army’s chief of staff Abdou Sidikou Issa. On 28 July, the head of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tiani, declared himself president of the ‘National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland’ (CNSP, the military grouping that took over the power). This risks further destabilising the country, on top of existing issues such as regional instability, the proliferation of violent jihadist groups, a surge in refugees and internally displaced people, and the already dire effects of climate change on access to resources, a further trigger for conflict.

Source: Normandy Index, 2023 (forthcoming)

Before the July 2023 coup, Niger ranked 119th of 137 economies in the Normandy Index (which measures resilience to threats to peace and democracy) and 189th of 191 countries in the UN Human Development Index. It is the third most vulnerable country to climate change in the ND-GAIN index. The country’s riches (5 % of the world’s uranium resources) still overwhelmingly benefit foreign mining interests. Climate change and poorly adapted agricultural practices, combined with rapid population growth, have contributed to scarcity and unequal sharing of natural resources in Niger. In contrast with its neighbours, Niger experienced a relatively peaceful transition in 2021, with the election of Mohamed Bazoum, former Minister of the Interior, as President of the Republic. However, the opposition challenged the results of the election and an attempted coup was reportedly thwarted on 31 March 2021, two days before the new president took office. Two years later, the new coup has overthrown President Bazoum.

New threats for the country and its partners Source: Normandy Index, 2023 (forthcoming)

The July 2023 coup further destabilises the Sahel and questions the EU and Western partners’ strategy to invest Niger as the main security hub in the region. President Bazoum had continued Niger’s military cooperation with Russia – although it opposed any presence on its soil or propaganda by the Russian Wagner paramilitary group. The coup, hailed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of Wagner, might increase Russia’s influence on the country. Food insecurity, aggravated by the pandemic and the Russian war against Ukraine, as well as population displacement across the country, exacerbate tensions between communities and grievances against the government. Violent extremist groups (including Boko Haram, the Islamic State in the Sahel, ISIL/Da’esh West Africa, and Al-Qaeda) exploit these tensions, especially in the border areas with Chad and Nigeria (Lake Chad) and with Mali and Burkina Faso (Liptako-Gourma). Niger reportedly devotes more than 17 % of its budget to the security and defence sector, which has allowed it to prevent too wide control of its territory by non-state armed groups.

EU involvement

The EU ‘condemn[ed] the coup in the strongest possible terms’ and supports the efforts of the African Union and West-African regional organisation ECOWAS for the return to constitutional order in Niger. The EU, which adopted a new strategy for the Sahel in April 2021, has suspended security cooperation and budgetary aid after the coup. Niger is the most populous country in the Sahel and has been a key partner for EU policy in the region. Its role in regional security cooperation was strengthened in 2022, as Mali left the G5 Sahel regional group and France’s Barkhane and Euro-Canadian Takuba forces withdrew from Mali. The European and Canadian military anti-terrorist support effort in the Sahel then shifted to Niger and the Gulf of Guinea. A new CSDP mission, the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger funded by the European Peace Facility, was launched in December 2022 to provide expert advice and training to the Nigerien armed forces. The EU and Member States together are the main ODA donor to Niger and its second main trading partner after China. At the crossroads of several migration routes, Niger has strengthened its policy to combat irregular migration with EU support, as part of the EU’s new partnership with third countries (2016).

Written by Marc Jütten.

The long-awaited summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) took place in Brussels on 17-18 July 2023, under the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU. Expectations were high in the run-up to the summit, the first one in 8 years. Negotiations on the wording to use in the final declaration as regards Russia’s war against Ukraine, colonial history, economic exploitation and slavery, overshadowed the meeting. The declaration– highlighting a series of issues on which the two regions agreed to cooperate – was endorsed by all countries except Nicaragua, which did not agree with the paragraph on Ukraine. No substantial progress was made on the envisaged association agreements with Chile, Mercosur and Mexico.

Background

Against the background of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, China’s emergence as a key player in Latin America, the EU’s quest for fresh suppliers of resources, such as lithium and green hydrogen, and its attempt to foster alliances in a polarised world, this year’s summit was a window of opportunity to relaunch the EU-CELAC strategic partnership. Preparations for the summit were well underway in 2022: the EU-CELAC Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers in Buenos Aires relaunched on 27 October 2022 the high-level political dialogue between the two regions and endorsed a bi-regional roadmap as a tangible sign of a forward-looking and positive agenda. HR/VP Borrell and the European Commission adopted a joint communication on 7 June 2023 setting out a new agenda for EU-CELAC relations. The aim was to strengthen the two parties’ strategic partnership through reinforced political engagement, increased trade and more sustainable investment through the Global Gateway connectivity strategy. CELAC and the EU are considered to be in principle two broadly compatible partners – in particular as regards their shared ambition for a green energy transition. However, their relations face a number of challenges, among them CELAC countries’ predominantly neutral position on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as concerns i) regarding the possible impact of the EU’s Green Deal legislation on, for instance, CELAC exports to the EU; and ii) the EU’s sustainability and human rights approach. Moreover, many CELAC countries consider China a reliable partner, while the EU sees it as a partner, economic competitor and a systemic rival.

Outcome of the summit

Key topics discussed at the summit included enhanced cooperation in multilateral fora, global peace and stability, trade and investment, economic recovery, efforts to combat climate change, research and innovation, and justice and security for citizens. The EU unveiled its Global Gateway Investment Agenda for Latin America and the Caribbean and pledged to invest €45 billion, until 2027, in the delivery of projects in the LAC region in four key areas: a fair green transition, an inclusive digital transformation, human development and health resilience and vaccines. Other deliverables included:

• a pledge to hold an EU-CELAC summit every 2 years, with the next summit scheduled for 2025 as outlined in the EU-CELAC Roadmap 2023 to 2025;
• a pledge to step up clean and renewable energy cooperation with Argentina and Uruguay, sealed with the signing of two memoranda of understanding (MoUs);
• the signing of a MoU with Chile to strengthen cooperation on sustainable critical raw materials supply chains;
• a pledge to release €10 million to tackle the unprecedented humanitarian crisis in Haiti;
• signed MoUs with Honduras, El Salvador and Ecuador on bilateral relations focussing on climate change and the digital agenda;
• an agreement between the EU Member States to sign the Post-Cotonou Agreement (which also covers the Caribbean states);
• a pledge for an EIB loan of €300 million to Banco Santander Brasil for small-scale solar energy investment;
• a pledge for EIB financing for climate action projects in Chile worth over €300 million, including a first-ever green mortgage loan outside Europe.

The drafting of the joint declaration for the summit reportedly produced considerable unease between the two sides. The CELAC countries insisted on toning down or even removing all references to the war in Ukraine, as well as demanding reparations over colonial occupation. Finally, all leaders– except Nicaragua– agreed on a declaration expressing deep concern over the ongoing war against Ukraine, without mentioning Russia. A 41-paragraphs-long communiqué touched on a broad variety of issues such as climate change, reform of the international financial architecture, and the need for action towards achieving inclusive sustainable development.

Leaders recognised parliamentary diplomacy as an important dimension of EU-CELAC relations and commended the constructive role played by the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat) and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. They furthermore welcomed the progress being made towards the signing of the modernised EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement and the EU-Mexico Global Agreement while taking note of the ongoing work between the EU and Mercosur. On the margins of the summit, the foreign affairs ministers of the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), and European Commission Executive Vice-President, Valdis Dombrovskis, met and reaffirmed their determination to work towards the conclusion of the EU-Mercosur agreement by the end of 2023. However, except for the political declarations of intent no concrete progress was made. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said that the EU would soon receive a counter-proposal to its proposal for an additional instrument to address environmental concerns.

In a meeting held on 17 July on the sidelines of the summit, the presidents of France, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, the EU’s HR/VP Borrell and envoys representing both the government and the opposition in Venezuela discussed the political crisis in the country. The four presidents together with HR/VP Borrell urged the Venezuelan government and opposition to agree on a common approach for holding free elections recognised by the international community. HR/VP Borrell renewed his offer to send an EU electoral observation mission (EOM).

In the words of the European Council President, Charles Michel, the summit was a ‘political success’, while the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, called it ‘a new beginning for old friends’. St Vincent and the Grenadines Prime Minister and CELAC pro tempore President, Ralph Gonsalves, described it as a ‘historic gathering’ and stressed that there were many actions to follow up. Some experts saw the resumption of EU-CELAC summits as a promising step towards a strengthened dialogue, but criticised the lack of concrete agreements and projects. A litmus test for the EU-CELAC relations will be whether the partners manage to finalise the three pending key international agreements (Mercosur, Mexico and Chile) soon.

European Parliament’s position

The Eurolat Bureau agreed at its meeting of 3 July 2023 on a joint statement by the Eurolat Co-Chairs, Javi López and Oscar Dário Pérez, to address the summit. Amongst others, the statement focused on the importance of concluding pending bilateral trade and association agreements and on revitalising multilateralism.

Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, attended the EU-CELAC Summit, stressing on behalf of the Parliament the importance of making constructive improvements to the trade deals with Chile, Mexico and Mercosur, while also underlining the need to address sustainability and environmental concerns at all stages of this process. Moreover, President Metsola announced that the Parliament had taken the decision to open an antenna office in the LAC region to further invigorate an already active parliamentary democracy debate and inter-parliamentary EU-CELAC exchanges. Finally, she informed that the Parliament was expecting that the summit participants would condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, recalling in particular that no discussions on Ukraine should take place in Ukraine’s absence, and that peace in Ukraine needs to come with territorial integrity. On the margins of the summit, President Metsola held meetings with Brazil’s President Lula da Silva, Ecuador’s President Guillermo Lasso, and Uruguay’s President Luis Lacalle Pou. At the time of writing, the 15th plenary session of the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat) is taking place in Madrid from 24 to 27 July.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Written by Gabija Leclerc.

The environmental impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine has been rapidly growing with every month of full-fledged invasion. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam further increased the harm inflicted on nature, while bringing international attention to the environmental dimension of the war. Together with its international partners, Ukraine is now looking into the legal options to hold Russia accountable for the environmental damage it has caused, which many refer to as ‘ecocide’. However, the potential legal pathways are all but straightforward.

Estimating the impact of the war on the environment

Since the 2014 hostilities and especially since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the war has not only caused thousands of casualties, a refugee crisis and an economic shock but it has also been highly detrimental to the environment. Thousands of instances of air, water, land and soil pollution, as well as damage to ecosystems, have been identified, including hazards to neighbouring countries. The war has also had a negative impact on Ukraine’s rich biodiversity. Forest fires and acts of deforestation, explosions, the building of fortifications, and the poisoning of the soil and water all impact wildlife and destroy natural habitats, including those protected in the biosphere reserves and national parks, many of which are also a part of the pan-European Emerald Network. In July 2022, to record the environmental crimes committed by Russia, Ukraine’s Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources launched EcoZagroza – a website developed with support from ‘Apena 2’, a project funded by the European Union (EU). According to EcoZagroza, as of 18 July 2023, there have been 2 450 reports (2 317 verified) of military actions with a direct environmental effect. Estimates based on Ukraine’s environmental inspections show that Russia’s invasion has inflicted roughly €52.4 billion (UAH2 071 billion) in environmental damage. This includes €27 billion in damage to air, €23.6 billion in damage from waste pollution, €1.5 billion in damage to water, and €0.3 billion in damage to soils. According to the preliminary monitoring of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which, at the request of the Ukrainian government, has been assessing the environmental impacts of the war, Ukraine faces ‘a compounded, multi-dimensional environmental crisis that has either exacerbated existing issues or added new ones’. UNEP stresses the presence of ‘multiple crises associated with chemicals, munitions and military equipment, the presence of a range of pollutants … damage inflicted to fuel storage facilities, industrial infrastructure, key infrastructure such as water, energy and waste management systems, urban areas, agricultural and natural areas’. It concludes that ‘the country and the region risk being burdened with a toxic legacy long after the conflict ends’.

The war has compromised Ukraine’s agricultural production, which is vital for the country’s economy and global food security. Three major types of damage – physical degradation, widespread chemical pollution from mines and affected industries, as well as exploded ammunition – have severely impacted millions of hectares of Ukrainian farmland. In particular, as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes, contamination caused by weapons poses a long-term problem, addressing which requires significant resources, takes a long time and involves risk. Before this happens though, a significant part of arable land would be unusable for years. Attack on the Kakhovka Dam

The destruction by Russian forces, as suggested by evidence, of Ukraine’s largest dam – Kakhovka – on 6 June 2022, will have long-term environmental and health impacts. Many, including the EU and its institutions, condemned the destruction, qualifying it as ecocide and the worst environmental disaster in Europe since Chernobyl. The event resulted in a catastrophic flooding submerging thousands of hectares of land, claiming dozens of human lives and displacing thousands, and prevented normal access to drinking water and irrigation systems. Many pets, farm animals and wildlife perished in the flood, and numerous, often protected, natural habitats were destroyed. Some 150 tonnes of toxic industrial lubricants were reportedly released alongside contaminants from sewage pits, petrol stations, and agrochemical and pesticide stores, as well as dislodged landmines. The Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine, Ruslan Strilets, has warned that these contaminants are drifting down the Dnipro River into the Black Sea, which washes the shores of six countries, including Romania and Bulgaria, and is connected to the Mediterranean Sea. This could affect the marine ecosystem in the region and other countries as well. The destruction has also heightened safety concerns for the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, as the dam was the primary source for its supply of cooling water, although alternative water sources do exist.

Holding Russia accountable for the environmental damage

Ukraine has stated its determination to make Russia pay reparations, including for environmental damage. Together with its international partners, it has been exploring ways to ensure that Russia is held accountable. While ecocide has been on the Ukrainian Criminal Code list of crimes since 2001, many argue that the case should be brought at international level to ensure an adequate level of accountability and compensation. However, none of the avenues for reparations is without challenges. The task of collecting evidence and quantifying damage is problematic, especially amidst the ongoing war. In parallel, while there could be some possible legal procedures to obtain compensation for the environmental harm caused (as outlined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN Compensation Commission and others), the process is complicated and all but straightforward, with very few existing precedents of such reparations (e.g. Iraq’s reparations to Kuwait). As for accountability for the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, in addition to the general rules governing the conduct of hostilities, three special provisions are codified in Articles 54 (objects indispensable to survival), 35 and 55 (natural environment), and 56 (dams) of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, to which both Ukraine and Russia are parties. According to several experts, even if the dam’s destruction was not deliberate, any neglect that led to its destruction would likely be a breach of Russia’s positive duty to ensure the protection of civilian infrastructure. If the destruction was deliberate, it would likely qualify as an act of indiscriminate violence against the civilian population and a violation of international law prohibiting intentional and wilful destruction of the natural environment.

There is currently no global legal instrument on ecocide, but along with the core principles of international humanitarian law (distinction, military necessity and proportionality), several international law provisions address environmental protection in wartime. For instance, while the International Criminal Court (ICC) does not recognise ecocide as a ‘core crime’ – the gravest type of crime – Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of its Rome Statute lists acts of ‘intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause … widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’ as war crimes. Articles 35 and 55 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions prohibit both deliberate and unintentional widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment, but their cumulative standard is difficult to achieve. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques requires its states parties (including Russia and Ukraine) not to engage in any hostile use of environmental modification techniques ‘having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party’. These criteria are easier to meet owing to their alternative nature and lower thresholds, but they still lack specificity and require deliberate action. It is thus challenging to build cases based on them. Some therefore advocate for i) strengthening current provisions on environmental protection in war; ii) making ecocide the fifth international crime under the ICC list; or iii) drafting a new convention on ecocide. Position of the European Parliament

On 19 January 2023, the Parliament adopted a resolution on the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine (2022/3017(RSP)), which recognises the link between war and long-term damage to the natural environment and climate, and supports the UN General Assembly’s recommendation on the creation of an international register of damage ‘to serve as a record for future reparations for … widespread and severe damage to the natural environment and the climate’. Its resolution (2023/2739(RSP)) of 15 June 2023 on the sustainable reconstruction and integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community condemned ‘the destruction by Russia of the Kakhovka dam’, underlining that it caused ecocide and constitutes a war crime. Parliament also welcomed the activation of the EU civil protection mechanism and voiced support for the ICC investigation into the destruction of the dam.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: High environmental toll‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

In December 2022, the European Commission proposed a revision of the Regulation on the classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, one of the two cornerstones of the EU’s framework regulating chemicals. The revision, announced in the EU chemicals strategy for sustainability, notably seeks to identify and classify hazardous chemicals more comprehensively; improve communication on chemical hazards and the notification of relevant information to poison centres for emergency health response; and address online sales more effectively.

Industry has expressed particular concern about the proposed rules for classifying multi-constituent substances, grouping substances for harmonised classification and labelling, and label formatting. Non-governmental organisations, mainly supportive of the revision, stress the need to set deadlines, cover further hazards and nanoforms of substances, and do more to limit animal testing.

The co-legislators are considering the text. Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, responsible for the file, is planning to vote on its legislative report in September 2023. The Council adopted its general approach on 30 June 2023.

Versions

• July 2023: Classification, labelling and packaging of chemical substances and mixtures (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixturesCommittee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 748 final
19.12.2022Rapporteur:Maria Spyraki (EPP, Greece)2022/0432(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:João Albuquerque (S&D, Portugal)
Martin Hojsík (Renew, Slovakia)
Jutta Paulus (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Pietro Fiocchi (ECR, Italy)
Danilo Oscar Lancini (ID, Italy)
Anja Hazekamp (The Left, the Netherlands)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Elena Lazarou and Eric Pichon, with contributions from Bruno Bilquin, Anna Caprile, Sebastian Clapp, Angelos Delivorias, Beatrix Immenkamp, Rosamund Shreeves and Branislav Stanicek.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has shattered assumptions and expectations about protracted peace in the wider European space. It has stimulated serious reflection about the instruments and tools available to restore peace in times of contestation between great powers and of weakened multilateral institutions, phenomena that have been observed consistently throughout the past decade.

At the same time, the promotion of global peace and security continues to be a fundamental goal and central pillar of European Union (EU) external action, following the model of its own peace project. Both within and beyond the EU, there is a widespread expectation among citizens that the Union will deliver results in this crucial area. Nevertheless, as the security environment poses what could be the most significant challenge to security in the post-Cold War period, the EU is urgently intensifying its work for peace and security in a number of key policy areas.

According to the Global Peace Index (GPI) 2023, the state of peace in the world again deteriorated in 2022, continuing a long-running trend. In addition, multilateralism, a core element of EU foreign policy and identity, and a cornerstone of its approach to peace and security, is under increasing pressure from alternative value systems and ideologies; a situation that has been dramatically exacerbated by the launch of Russia’s war on Ukraine and the subsequent geopolitical polarisation.

Take a look at our interactive infographic on Peace and Security

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and the parallel weaponisation of energy, food supplies, migration and information, have inflamed and exploited pre-existing fractious trends evidenced by the coronavirus crisis, and signal the advent of a more ‘competitive and less secure international geopolitical environment. In response to these trends, the European Commission under President Ursula von der Leyen, with the support of the European Parliament, committed to reinforcing the EU as an external actor, able to act more strategically and autonomously, while fully upholding the fundamental values stipulated in the founding Treaties, including the achievement of peace. To this day, the over-arching values and objectives of the EU guide all facets of its external action, including common foreign and security policy (CFSP); democracy support; development cooperation; economic, financial and technical cooperation; humanitarian aid; trade; and neighbourhood policy.

While the promotion of peace remains the objective of EU foreign policy, achieving it is also linked to understanding peace and its components. Thus, measuring peace and the threats that challenge it is becoming an increasingly relevant exercise. In that context, the Normandy Index attempts to measure threats to peace based on variables identified in the EU Global Strategy. The EU Member States, supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS), conducted a comprehensive threat analysis in 2020, as part of the development of the EU Strategic Compass, which was adopted by the Council and endorsed by the European Council in March 2022.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

The EU’s contribution to countering threats to peace, security and democracy globally has grown significantly through legislation, financing and the creation of new structures and initiatives. A significant share of EU aid goes to fragile states and to issues related to securing peace. The EU’s ‘new consensus on development’ emphasises the role of development cooperation in preventing violent conflicts, mitigating their consequences and aiding recovery from them. On the ground, the EU has been able to strengthen the nexus between security, development and humanitarian aid through the implementation of comprehensive strategies, for example in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel. Through its common security and defence policy (CSDP), the EU runs several missions and operations in third countries, making it one of the United Nations’ main partners in peacekeeping. To help partners withstand sometimes violent attacks on their democratic structures by domestic illiberal forces and external authoritarian powers, the EU has been strengthening its tools to support democracy all over the world.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

In 2022, the EU continued to advance its work on countering new threats to peace, such as disinformation, cyber-attacks and climate change. New elements strengthening EU security and defence capabilities were implemented with the aim of boosting EU strategic autonomy, including its capacity to work for peace and security. These elements of ‘hard power’, together with the EU’s long-standing experience in the practice of soft power, form the backbone of its action for peace and security.

The EU also continues to be a staunch promoter of multilateralism at global and regional levels to counter global threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and global food and health crises. The EU’s immediate neighbourhood is a consistent focus in its work, with the aim of building resilience and upholding peace and democracy – both now seriously challenged at the EU’s eastern border by Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Looking to the future, peace and security are increasing in complexity. Even in Europe, the war in Ukraine has shown that the assumption of sustained peace can no longer be taken for granted. The effects of the war on Ukraine reverberate around the world in the form of diminishing food and energy security, inflationary pressures, economic crises and global polarisation. New types of threats and destabilising factors such as pandemics, climate change, foreign interference in democracy, cyber-attacks and bio-terrorism, as well as various types of hybrid warfare, call for innovative thinking and new types of resources and solutions. While the EU has made significant progress in furthering its aim of strengthening its presence and efficiency in the area of peace and security, more remains to be done. The 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), although focused on streamlining the EU’s programmes and instruments to allow for flexibility and on using innovative financial instruments to address unforeseen threats, is already at risk of being depleted by January 2024. This urgent budgetary constraint, largely caused by the pandemic and the Russian war of aggression, led the Commission to propose an urgent legislative budgetary and financial package on 20 June 2023.

While the EU’s quest for flexibility, efficiency and innovation in recent years has been underpinned by the strategic goal of empowering the EU in its global role as a promoter of peace and security, no event has made this challenge as urgent as Russia’s war on Ukraine. While adapting to the new realities of the international order and the rapid technological, environmental and societal changes of our times, the war has also precipitated bold and rapid change in the EU’s capacity to act for peace and security, such as unprecedented sanctions on Russia and support for substantial arms deliveries to Ukraine. Adapting to the rapidly transforming world has meant that the EU has to become a more autonomous, strategic and holistic actor for peace and security by bringing together elements of normative, soft and hard power with steadfastness and resilience.

Read this study on ‘Peace and Security in 2023: Overview of EU action and outlook for the future‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Threats to peace and security in the current global environment

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

As Ukraine continues its counter-offensive against the Russian invaders, the NATO summit in Vilnius vowed unwavering support for the country, and took decisions to simplify its path towards membership of the Western military alliance. NATO leaders said they would be able to invite Ukraine to join the Alliance once the country meets certain conditions.

They declared continued support for Ukraine’s deterrence and defence in the short, medium, and long term, as well as for turning the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) into a multi-year programme for Ukraine. This assistance will help rebuild the Ukrainian security and defence sector and move Ukraine towards full interoperability with NATO.

The NATO summit declarations fell short of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s expectations for receiving a clearer path to enter the Alliance. However, he praised NATO’s decision to scrap the need for Kyiv to complete a preparatory Membership Action Plan to join NATO. The Alliance and Ukraine also held the inaugural meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council to manage the relationship, which reaffirmed that ‘Ukraine’s future is in NATO’.

On the summit’s side-lines, Group of Seven (G7) developed countries unveiled an international framework to boost Ukraine’s long-term security against Russia. A number of other military packages were announced at bilateral meetings between Zelenskyy and individual NATO leaders.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses on the war can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’. Publications on NATO released ahead of its July summit can be found in another item in the series.

Ukraine’s defense doctrine will define country’s future
Atlantic Council, July 2023

Ukraine needs NATO membership, not an ‘Israel model’
Atlantic Council, July 2023

Western Europe is still falling short in NATO’s east
Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, July 2023

Ukraine takes its place in the European security system while Russia fades
Wilson Center, July 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds
Atlantic Council, June 2023

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is a key moment but long-term resolve remains crucial
Atlantic Council, June 2023

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the day after the war: A view from southern Europe
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, June 2023

Between a rock and a hard place: The EU response to national import bans on Ukrainian grain
Bruegel, June 2023

European public opinion remains supportive of Ukraine
Bruegel, June 2023

The resilience and trauma of Ukraine’s civil society
Carnegie Europe, June 2023

Ukrainian oligarchs and their businesses: their fading importance Centre for Eastern Studies, June 2023

Ukraine’s progress towards NATO membership: Going from Bucharest to Vilnius without moving?
Centre for European Reform, June 2023

Demining Ukraine: An urgent but under-resourced priority
Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2023

The impact of the Kakhovka dam breach on the new Ukrainian counteroffensive
Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2023

Tsar Nicholas I’s Crimean War and Putin’s in Ukraine: Plus ça change
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2023

Ukraine’s recovery depends on security guarantees
Chatham House, June 2023

Ukrainians demand more inclusion in post-war recovery
Chatham House, June 2023

How much aid has the U.S. sent Ukraine?
Council on Foreign Relations, July 2023

China and Ukraine: The Chinese debate about Russia’s war and its meaning for the world
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2023

How bad is Ukraine’s humanitarian crisis a year later?
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2023

How should NATO think about Ukrainian membership after Russia’s coup attempt?
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2023

European defence in a new geopolitical environment
Egmont, June 2023

War for Ukraine and the rediscovery of geopolitics: Must the EU draw new battlelines or keep an open door?
Egmont, June 2023

On the outside looking in: Why NATO should invite Ukraine to join the alliance at the Vilnius summit
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2023

Mobilising investments for Ukraine reconstruction: Strengthening the Team Europe approach
European Centre for Development Policy Management, June 2023

A compromise to support Ukraine’s exports
European Policy Centre, June 2023

Dogs of war: Russia’s corporate warriors in armed conflicts
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2023

Gendering Europe’s security and recovery responses to Ukraine
EUROPEUM, June 2023

Pursuing justice for international crimes in Ukraine: A patchwork of multi-level and long-running efforts
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2023

After the war: How to keep Europe safe
Friends of Europe, June 2023

Ukraine’s anti-corruption front
German Marshal Fund, June 2023

The war in Ukraine and Europe’s geopolitical awakening
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, June 2023

The EU and the transformed nuclear context since the war in Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2023

Reconstructing Ukraine: Creating a freer, more prosperous, and secure future
Rand Corporation, June 2023

Public expenditure and tax policy for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine
Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, June 2023

The Russian invasion and the risks to global financial stability
Vox Ukraine, June 2023

Foreign support to Ukraine: Evidence from a database of military, financial, and humanitarian aid
Vox Ukraine, June 2023

Ukraine’s demography in the second year of the full-fledged war
Wilson Center, June 2023

Ukraine’s growing defense tech prowess can help defeat Russia
Atlantic Council, May 2023

Exploring the secrets of Ukraine’s successful wartime diplomacy
Atlantic Council, May 2023

Backstopping Ukraine’s long-term security: Toward an Atlantic-Asian security community
Brookings Institution, May 2023

Ukraine: Perception shapes victory and defeat
Egmont, May 2023

Uncovering uncomfortable truths: The geopolitics of EU gas imports in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine
Egmont, May 2023

The Ukraine war and European identity
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2023

The Ukraine war and its implications for European security
Wilfried Martens Centre, May 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Latest on Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Members focused on a wide range of legislative files during the July plenary session, in particular on environmental policy, the European chips act, and on journalists’ freedom. Parliament debated the conclusions of the European Council meeting held on 29‑30 June 2023, and the recent developments in the war against Ukraine and in Russia in particular. Members also debated Council and Commission statements on the greening transport package, the state of the SME Union, the need to adopt the ‘unshell’ directive, and global convergence on generative AI. The President made a statement commemorating the victims of the Srebrenica genocide.

Nature restoration

Parliament debated and (narrowly) adopted its negotiating position following a long voting session on amendments to the proposed nature restoration regulation, which would establish a legal obligation on Member States to restore degraded ecosystems. The text has now been referred back to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), so that trilogue negotiations can begin between Parliament, the Council and the Commission.

European chips act

Integrated circuits or ‘chips’ are fundamental to virtually every aspect of modern life, but Europe has become reliant on chips made elsewhere in the world. The EU chips act would strengthen the semiconductor ecosystem in Europe, bolstering Europe’s capacity to design and produce chips, and giving the Commission powers to implement emergency measures on the chips market if needed in crisis situations. Members debated and adopted the text agreed in trilogue with the Council.

Fit for 55 and industrial emissions

The ‘fit for 55’ package aims to adapt EU law and policies to meet the European Climate Law target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % (from 1990 levels) by 2030. Members formally adopted three proposals, agreed between Parliament and Council negotiators. The regulation on deployment of alternative fuels aims to speed up the installation of infrastructure and take-up of vehicles running on alternative fuels, such as electric and hydrogen power, with targets for equipment to be installed at minimum intervals along main roads. FuelEU Maritime seeks to push the uptake of cleaner fuels for ships and gradually reduce carbon emissions from seaborne transport to reach an 80 % cut by 2050. The revision of the Energy Efficiency Directive aims at speeding up implementation of energy savings and promoting renewable energy sources, setting a binding target of an 11.7 % reduction in final energy consumption by 2030. In addition, the linked proposals on the revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive seek to expand existing rules applying to large agro-industrial installations, to cover a broader range of such installations, as well as promoting faster adoption of new less-polluting techniques to reduce emissions. Members’ vote to adopt ENVI committee reports sets the Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council.

Ecodesign and construction products regulations

Votes set Parliament’s position for trilogue on two further environmental files. An ENVI committee report on the proposed regulation on ecodesign requirements for sustainable products seeks to make products on the internal market more durable, reusable, reparable, upgradable, recyclable, and generally less harmful to the environment. From the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), Members adopted a report on the proposed revision of the Construction Products Regulation, which seeks to boost circular business models and make sustainable products the norm in the building sector.

Protection of journalists and human rights defenders

Media freedom and pluralism have come under growing threat, through increasing harassment of journalists, as well as human rights defenders and activists, including through groundless or abusive lawsuits. Such lawsuits seek to silence those speaking out on legitimate matters of public interest, landing them with high costs for defending their freedom of expression. Parliament debated a report from the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) on the proposed directive on protection of journalists and human rights defenders from unfounded court cases, setting Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations.

Amending budget No 2/2023 – Surplus of the financial year 2022

Every year, after closing the financial year, the EU budget generally has a surplus, due to higher than expected revenue and underspending. Members adopted amending budget No 2/2023, allowing the surplus from 2022, amounting to €2.5 billion, to be entered as revenue in the 2023 budget.

COVID-19 pandemic: Lessons learned and recommendations for the future

While the threats to European society from the coronavirus pandemic have now largely passed, the Special Committee set up to evaluate the experiences of the crisis has aimed to ensure the EU is better prepared for any future major health threat. Parliament debated the COVI committee report on the lessons learned from COVID-19 and recommendations for the future, which calls for action in four areas: a health union, democracy and fundamental rights, addressing social and economic impact, and global action.

Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption

Recent events have highlighted potential vulnerabilities to foreign interference and undue influence of Members of the European Parliament. The mandate of Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference and Disinformation (ING2) was extended to investigate shortcomings in Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption measures. Members debated and adopted its recommendations on reforming the rules to protect Parliament’s integrity.

2022 reports on Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Members debated and adopted reports from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on the Commission’s latest annual enlargement reports on progress in candidate countries, covering Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In both cases, the committee underlines the importance of continuing progress towards accession, and emphasises areas where the country concerned needs to step up its efforts. In the latter case, AFET denounces the recent increased inflammatory actions by the Republika Srpska leadership.

Relations with the Palestinian Authority

Parliament also debated and adopted recommendations drafted by the AFET committee on EU relations with the Palestinian Authority. The committee expresses concern at the mounting violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent months, and calls for an immediate end to all violence. Members also urge the Palestinian leadership to organise free and fair elections.

Question time (VPC/HR) – EU-Africa Strategy

The regular question time session with the Commission this month focused on EU-Africa strategy, with Members having the opportunity to pose questions to Commissioner Jutta Urpilainen, especially in the context of the impact in Africa of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

ECI ‘Save Cruelty Free Cosmetics – Commit to a Europe without animal testing’

A European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) enables citizens to call for the Union to act in a given area, and once 1 million people (from at least 7 EU countries) sign up, the European Commission must respond. The ‘Save Cruelty Free Cosmetics – Commit to a Europe without animal testing‘ ECI has gained the required signatures, and its organisers presented their case in a hearing before the ENVI committee in May 2023. The ECI was debated in plenary in advance of the Commission presenting its formal response.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Three decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations were approved: on the proposal on combating violence against women and domestic violence; on a regulation on instant credit transfers; and on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – July 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Philippe Perchoc.

The treaty of the Rome Statute, signed on 17 July 1998 by 120 countries, gave birth to a permanent international body: the International Criminal Court (ICC). To commemorate the Court’s coming into existence in 2002, each year (following a decision at the first review conference of the Rome Statue in 2010), the World Day for International Justice is marked on that day.

Background

After World War II, the international community – for the first time in history – took steps towards recognising two international crimes: the crime against humanity (at the Nuremberg trials) and the crime of genocide (at the Tokyo trials; to bolster these efforts, in 1948 the United Nations (UN) adopted its Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide). While the idea of a permanent court was discussed during the Cold War, it only became possible after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In the 1990s, the UN established specialised courts to address crimes in former Yugoslavia (1993-2017), Rwanda (1995-2015) and Sierra Leone (2002-2013). On 17 July 1998, 120 states adopted the Statute of Rome, which gave birth to the International Criminal Court. Of the 160 states that took part in the negotiations, 120 voted in favour, 7 against and the rest abstained (secret vote). Unlike special tribunals created by the UN, the International Criminal Court is not a UN body but a permanent international court. After a long ratification process, the court started work in 2002 and established its seat in The Hague. Today, 123 states are parties to the ICC, but some prominent countries – such as China, India, Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia and the United States – remain outside this body. All EU Member States and all EU candidates (except Ukraine and Turkey) are parties to the Rome Statute. The latter grants the ICC jurisdiction over four main crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes committed after 1 July 2002, and the crime of aggression (as of 17 July 2018). To date, 31 cases have been brought before the ICC. The EU supported the ICC from the start, through a Council common position of 2003 and an EU-ICC cooperation agreement of 2005. In 2011, the EU agreed to promote the ratification of the Rome Statute worldwide and to cooperate with the ICC Prosecutor by helping the ICC to access documents and witnesses useful for its work. The EU has a long tradition of cooperating with the ICC and other specialised courts, especially the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. As regards some Western Balkan countries, the EU has made full cooperation with the international courts a condition for their EU accession prospects.

Recent developments in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine

Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU has been supporting the ICC in investigating crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine. On 1 and 2 March 2022, 39 states party to the Rome Statute, including all EU Member States, made a referral to the ICC, asking its Prosecutor to investigate the situation in Ukraine, even though the country is not yet a party to the Rome Statute. Under current rules, the ICC can investigate a series of crimes but has no jurisdiction for the crime of aggression in this case, as both countries involved need to be ICC parties and to have ratified a specific amendment enabling the launch of an investigation into such a crime. The ICC Prosecutor announced that he had opened an investigation based on the referral. The EU Justice and Home Affairs Council confirmed the importance of fighting impunity and pledged support to the ICC. EU ministers of justice also encouraged Eurojust, the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, ‘to fully exercise its coordinating role and to make itself available as required to the Prosecutor of the ICC in connection with the exercise of his duties’. On 18 April, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, reaffirmed the EU’s support for the work of the ICC and further stressed that: ‘There can be no impunity for war crimes’. A few days later, it was announced that, for the first time ever, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC would take part in the joint investigation team, launched with Eurojust support on 25 March by Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, on alleged international crimes in Ukraine. On 8 June, the European Commission launched a €7.25 million project to support the investigation capacities of the ICC. On 21 September, Eurojust and the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC published guidelines to assist civil society organisations in recording information relating to international crimes. On 22 December 2022, the HR/VP announced the setting up of the EU Global Observatory on the Fight against Impunity, with a budget of €20 million. This new body would collect information and share knowledge about ‘genocide, crimes against humanity and other serious human rights violations’. On 17 March 2023, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issued an arrest warrant (Article 58 of the Rome Statute) for Vladimir Putin (who is also commander-in-chief of the Russian armed forces) and Maria Lvova-Belova, Russian presidential commissioner for children’s rights. The court had ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that both of the accused were responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation and transfer of members of the population, children in particular, since February 2022 (war crimes as defined in Article 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute. The news of the arrest warrant gained immediate international attention. On the EU side, the HR/VP welcomed the ICC decision and recalled the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2022, stressing the need to ensure full accountability for those accused of having committed, inter alia, war crimes in connection with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Under Article 89(1) of the Rome Statute, all of its states parties are obliged to comply with an ICC request for the arrest and surrender of a person. That said, South Africa is set to host the BRICS summit in August 2023, and is considering a change in national law as well as a waiver under Article 98 of the Rome Statute, to free it from the obligation to arrest the Russian president.

European Parliament position

In its resolution of 1 March 2022, the Parliament strongly condemned ‘the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine’, noting that ‘attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure as well as indiscriminate attacks are prohibited under international humanitarian law and therefore constitute war crimes’. Parliament referred to the numerous reports of ‘violations of international humanitarian law committed by Russian troops, including indiscriminate shelling of living areas, hospitals and kindergartens’. Moreover, Parliament called ‘for the EU and its Member States to work with international bodies to collect evidence and to support and promote the ICC’s jurisdiction and investigation of any war crime committed within the territory of Ukraine since 20 February 2014 onwards’. On 5 May, a Parliament resolution condemned the use of sexual and gender-based violence (GBV) as a weapon of war, insisting that it be prosecuted according to international law and the Rome Statute. On 19 May 2022, Parliament called for the establishment of a ‘special international tribunal for the punishment of the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by the political leaders and military commanders of Russia and its allies’. On 23 November, Parliament recognised Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and reiterated its firm demand that ‘all persons responsible for committing, assisting or organising human rights violations, atrocities or war crimes in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine must be identified as swiftly as possible, prosecuted and held to account’. It reiterated its support to the ICC and called on the EU and its Member States to support the establishment of a special tribunal. On 16 February 2023, to mark the one-year anniversary since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Parliament recalled that thousands of civilians and hundreds of children had been forcibly displaced. In particular, it stressed that the forcible displacement of children constitutes the crime of genocide, according to Article II-e of the UN Genocide Convention. Parliament reiterated once again ‘its full support for the work of the International Criminal Court in helping to end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘The International Criminal Court’s 25th anniversary and World International Justice Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

Mental health has become a major issue of public health, and economic and social concern across the whole of the EU. Collecting data is crucial for monitoring mental health, developing effective policies and addressing the growing mental health challenges. It is estimated that more than 84 million people in the EU are struggling with mental health problems.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent economic crisis have placed a huge strain on everyone’s mental health. The restrictive measures taken by governments during the pandemic had a severe impact on people, with inequalities in mental health, both within the population and between social groups. Young people, the elderly and people in vulnerable situations suffered more than others.

Mental health is also an issue at work. Poor working environments, including excessive workloads, job insecurity, harassment and discrimination, pose a risk to the mental health of workers.

Policies and services addressing mental health are the individual EU Member States’ responsibility. The EU work on mental health, part of its activities on non-communicable diseases, aims to complement Member States’ policies, supporting real action on the ground and the exchange of best practice and knowledge. On 7 June 2023, addressing calls from the European Parliament and from citizens in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe, the European Commission adopted a communication on a new comprehensive approach to mental health, adding another pillar to the architecture of the European Health Union. EU action on mental health will focus on three guiding principles: access to adequate and effective prevention; access to high quality and affordable mental healthcare and treatment; and reintegration into society after recovery.

The European Parliament has always been a supporter of the promotion of good mental health and putting mental health at the heart of EU policymaking. Its Subcommittee on Public Health (SANT) is currently preparing an own-initiative report on mental health.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Mental health in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir (1st edition).

Several EU directives dealing with equality require EU Member States to establish equality bodies with a focus on assisting victims of discrimination and preventing and fighting discrimination on the grounds listed under the directives. However, their rules are too general and have no precise definition of these bodies’ duties and manner of operation, thus leading to disparities among the Member States’ bodies. Additionally, the work of some Member States’ bodies has been hampered by lack of resources, insufficient independence or a narrow remit.

In 2018, the European Commission adopted a recommendation on standards for equality bodies. Later, after assessing its implementation, it decided to shift to binding legislation. In a package of legislative measures on equality, in December 2022 it published a proposal setting standards for equality bodies fighting discrimination on several grounds. A second proposal, under the ordinary legislative procedure, focuses specifically on equality between men and women in the employment field. The proposal reinforces the equality bodies’ independence, resources and mandate. While generally welcoming the proposal, stakeholders have suggested specific changes to its provisions

Versions

• July 2023: Standards for equality bodies: Discrimination under Article 19 TFEU grounds (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council directive on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment between persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation between persons irrespective of their religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, equal treatment between women and men in matters of social security and in the access to and supply of goods and services, and deleting Article 13 of Directive 2000/43/EC and Article 12 of Directive 2004/113/ECCommittee responsible:Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM)COM(2022) 689
7.12.2022Rapporteur:Sirpa Pietikäinen (EPP, Finland)2022/0401(APP)Shadow rapporteurs:Carina Ohlsson (S&D, Sweden)
Irène Tolleret (Renew, France)
Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Greens/EFA, Denmark)
Eugenia Rodríguez Palop (The Left, Spain)Consent procedure (APP)
(Unanimity in the Council,
consent in Parliament)Next steps expected: Drafting of committee report

Written by Ivana Katsarova (1st edition).

The European Union (EU) has established over 40 regimes of sanctions against third countries, entities, and legal and natural persons. These restrictive measures include arms embargoes, import and export bans, freezing of funds and economic resources, and travel bans. Whereas the adoption of EU sanctions is centralised at EU level, their implementation and enforcement lies with the Member States. The significant differences between national systems, particularly in terms of offences and penalties for breaches of EU sanctions, are thought to weaken their efficacy and the EU’s credibility.

Following the Council’s decision to add the violation of EU sanctions to the areas of ‘particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension’, the European Commission issued, in December 2022, a proposal for a directive to harmonise criminal offences and penalties for such violations.

On 9 June, the Council adopted its general approach. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs adopted its report on the proposal on 6 July 2023, along with a decision to enter into trilogue negotiations.

Versions

• July 2023: Revision of EU marketing standards for certain ‘breakfast’ directives (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending Council Directives 2001/110/EC relating to honey, 2001/112/EC relating to fruit juices and certain similar products intended for human consumption, 2001/113/EC relating to fruit jams, jellies and marmalades and sweetened chestnut purée intended for human consumption, and 2001/114/EC relating to certain partly or wholly dehydrated preserved milk for human consumptionCommittee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2023) 0201
21.04.2023Rapporteur:Alexander BERNHUBER (EPP-AU)2023/0105(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Draft report Honey, beehives and beekeepers in the EU

Written by Rafał Mańko.

Sovereign states, as the primary subjects of public international law, voluntarily enter into treaties (international agreements) creating international organisations, as the secondary subjects of public international law. According to a long-standing and well-established principle of public international law, known by the Latin maxim of pacta sunt servanda, states are obliged to abide by the agreements to which they commit. This principle is enshrined in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’). It also applies, as a matter of course, to the multilateral treaties establishing international organisations. Such treaties may specify duties incumbent upon state parties, such as periodic payment of membership fees or agreement to abide by the decisions of organs of the organisation, as well as a set of values or principles to which state parties to the founding treaties have voluntarily committed, as in Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe.

If a state violates a provision of a multilateral treaty that is essential to the accomplishment of its object or purpose, under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention, such breach is considered material. In such case, the other parties may, by unanimous agreement, suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part, or terminate it either in the relations between themselves and the defaulting state, or between all the parties to the treaty. Some experts claim that Article 60 of the Vienna Convention could be invoked to terminate a treaty establishing an international organisation, and thereby serve as a means for suspension or expulsion of a recalcitrant member.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Suspension and expulsion of states from international organisations: Analysis of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and of the practice at the United Nations and the Council of Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Monika Dulian with Oleksandra Klochko.

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU took immediate action to stem rising energy prices and secure energy supply to its Member States. In its communication on the REPowerEU plan from March 2022, the European Commission proposed that the Member States use joint purchasing, collecting of orders and matching of supply and demand to support gas storage refilling operations. The Commission also proposed a ‘joint European platform’ to lead bilateral negotiations with major gas producers. Accordingly, the EU Energy Platform was established on 7 April 2022, initially on the basis of a European Council mandate. The legal basis for the platform is Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 of December 2022, which lays down the rules for the joint purchasing mechanism. The latter is to remain in operation for 1 year as of the moment the document enters into force and the service provider in charge of the joint purchasing mechanism is selected.

The EU Energy Platform aims to ensure security of supply by purchasing natural gas, LNG and hydrogen for the Member States jointly and at affordable prices, after aggregating their demand (at least 15 % of the Member States’ storage filling obligations are subject to demand aggregation). Once a Member State submits a demand, it is under no obligation to actually purchase gas; from that moment on it is for energy companies – from within the EU and the EU Energy Community – to negotiate and make business decisions. Natural gas and LNG demand from these companies is aggregated and then matched with reliable EU or non-EU sellers. This happens through AggregateEU – a demand aggregation and joint purchasing service operated by a service provider chosen by the Commission based on predefined criteria. The EU Energy Platform is also in charge of the outreach to international suppliers with a view to diversifying gas supplies.

The evolution of the platform will depend on the political will and readiness of the Member States to pool a larger part of EU gas demand. Major gas-consuming countries in particular would have to be convinced to give away their privileged market access in order to build a common and effective mechanism. In the long run, the platform could shift its focus towards hydrogen procurement and distribution to accelerate the energy transition towards renewable sources.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU Energy Platform: Facilitating joint purchases of gas‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig (1st edition).

The European Union (EU) has established over 40 regimes of sanctions against third countries, entities, and legal and natural persons. These restrictive measures include arms embargoes, import and export bans, freezing of funds and economic resources, and travel bans. Whereas the adoption of EU sanctions is centralised at EU level, their implementation and enforcement lies with the Member States. The significant differences between national systems, particularly in terms of offences and penalties for breaches of EU sanctions, are thought to weaken their efficacy and the EU’s credibility.

Following the Council’s decision to add the violation of EU sanctions to the areas of ‘particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension’, the European Commission issued, in December 2022, a proposal for a directive to harmonise criminal offences and penalties for such violations.

On 9 June, the Council adopted its general approach. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs adopted its report on the proposal on 6 July 2023, along with a decision to enter into trilogue negotiations.

Versions

• July 2023: Proposal for a directive on the violation of Union restrictive measures (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measuresCommittee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2022) 684
2.12.2022Rapporteur:Sophia In’t Veld (Renew, the Netherlands)2022/0398(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Leopoldo López Gil (EPP, Spain)
Thijs Reuten (S&D, the Netherlands)
Saskia Bricmont (Greens/EFA, Belgium)
Patryk Jaki (ECR, Poland)
Anders Vistisen (ID, Denmark)
Clare Daly (The Left, Ireland)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Trilogue negotiations

Written by Maria Niestadt.

The EU has started reflecting on its vision for emerging virtual worlds (metaverses) and providing funding opportunities to develop these worlds. The aim is to ensure that people are protected in virtual worlds and that EU businesses, in particular SMEs, are not driven out of competition.

Introduction

Boosted by technological advances, virtual worlds (also referred to as metaverses) are becoming more prominent globally as well as in the EU. These worlds (which are in different stages of maturity) offer real-time, immersive and persistent environments that blend physical and virtual elements in various areas like manufacturing, medicine, education, entertainment, commerce, and the public and military sectors. Virtual worlds have the potential to change the way we work, shop, learn, engage and entertain on the internet. There is no uniform definition of ‘virtual worlds’ or ‘metaverse(s)’. Both terms are still in use (in the singular and the plural), often interchangeably, although the European Commission seems to use the term ‘virtual worlds’ more often. In an earlier briefing, the European Parliamentary Research Service described a metaverse as ‘an immersive and constant virtual 3D world where people interact by means of an avatar to carry out a wide range of activities’. In July 2023, the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) provided an overview of existing definitions and suggested their own definition of a virtual world: ‘an immersive, synchronous, persistent and unified 3D user experience that might enable mass content creation’. A 2023 study published by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre considered that ‘next generation virtual worlds’ are ‘experiences that incorporate varying degrees of virtual and real information, which users can access with different levels of immersiveness and interaction’.

Supporting technologies

Virtual worlds are supported by various extended reality (XR) technologies, such as virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), mixed reality (MR) and augmented virtuality (AV). XR is an umbrella term that covers all kinds of technologies that alter reality by adding digital elements to the real world. While in the VR environment the person is fully immersed (with a dedicated headset) in the 3D virtual environment, in the AR environment the person still sees the outside world (AR simply adds virtual content to a real world). MR also augments the real world for users, but the virtual world becomes so realistic that users cannot distinguish virtual content from physical objects, while AV adds items of the real world to the virtual world. Sometimes the boundaries between these technologies are not clear, and the same headset can use multiple technologies. Virtual worlds are also supported by other technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT), 5G, blockchain and artificial intelligence (AI). These technologies facilitate various actions in virtual worlds. For example, blockchain technology allows users to buy and sell virtual assets without going through a centralised platform. IoT helps to transfer information between the real and virtual world through objects, and AI helps to analyse user interactions and data, and create personalised experiences. The EU is currently working on a first-ever attempt to enact a horizontal regulation for AI and recently adopted a regulation on markets in crypto-assets. Other horizontal regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation, Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act (which will also apply to virtual worlds) aim to protect users and ensure that EU SMEs are not driven out of the market.

Applications

Virtual worlds can change the way we connect, perceive and experience the world, opening up numerous opportunities but also bringing a number of challenges. They can be used in almost all areas, such as:

• education: virtual worlds enable users to visit places and times (such as Ancient Greece, or other planets) that are otherwise impossible to visit;
• manufacturing: companies can test prototypes of production lines or entire factories using a digital twin to detect potential errors and minimise costs;
• healthcare: virtual worlds can help doctors to diagnose more accurately and more quickly and to improve performance during and when preparing for surgery. Patients can benefit from immersive experiences to alleviate pain and anxiety, or to consult doctors on the other side of the world;
• public sector: virtual worlds can be used, for example, for consultations with citizens, city planning, visualisation of future development projects or training of employees;
• art and design: when visiting virtual worlds of museums, galleries and archives, users can almost experience how it is to be in an actual museum. Virtual 3D buildings enable architects to gain a realistic impression of their structure, furniture and decorations;
• entertainment: users of virtual worlds can attend various virtual events (such as concerts, movies, parties, and sports events);
• online shopping: customers can explore virtual stores and try on virtual clothes, while brands can host virtual events and advertise their products in virtual worlds;
• tourism: virtual worlds enable travellers to plan their trip by exploring virtual representations of destinations and hotels.

What is the EU doing? European Commission

The European Commission has started to reflect on its vision of virtual worlds and how the EU could support the EU VR/AR sector. As announced in its 2020 communication on ‘Europe’s Media in the Digital Decade: An Action Plan to Support Recovery and Transformation’, the Commission has launched a European Virtual and Augmented Reality (VR/AR) Industrial Coalition. This coalition brings together the VR/AR industry and policymakers to inform policymaking, encourage investment, facilitate dialogue and identify key challenges and opportunities. It has organised a series of workshops and drafted a strategic paper as well as a roadmap outlining the next steps for the VR/AR sector. The Commission is also offering funding opportunities under programmes such as Horizon Europe and Digital Europe. For example, in April 2023 the Commission published a call for proposals for EU action grants, which covered topics such as developing the CitiVerse (a virtual world for citizens); in May 2023, the Commission organised an info day on ‘Developing CitiVerse’. Furthermore, the Commission has launched the VR Media Lab through Horizon Europe, which supports immersive VR/AR media products. In July 2023, the Commission is expected to publish an initiative on virtual worlds, which would describe the Commission’s vision for virtual worlds, address opportunities and societal challenges, and announce upcoming implementation measures. It will be based on various consultations that the Commission has carried out recently.

European Parliament

The Parliament has also begun considering the implications of virtual worlds. The Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) and the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) are preparing own-initiative reports on virtual worlds. The JURI report (rapporteurs Axel Voss, EPP, Germany, and Iban García del Blanco, S&D, Spain) will focus more on civil, company, commercial and intellectual property law issues, and the IMCO report (rapporteur: Pablo Arias Echeverría, EPP, Spain) on internal market issues. On 24 April 2023, JURI held a hearing on regulatory challenges of the metaverse. As mentioned in a recent study requested by the JURI committee, the Parliament has also been exploring how to apply various XR technologies to its own work.

Advisory committees

On 26 April 2023, the European Economic and Social Committee adopted an opinion regarding an initiative on virtual worlds, such as the metaverse. This opinion highlights the importance of continually analysing ‘whether the legislation currently in force is sufficient to regulate virtual worlds’ and collaborating with various stakeholders to ensure that society benefits from these worlds.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Virtual worlds (metaverses)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

NATO’s next summit, to take place from 11 to 12 July 2023, is being hosted by Lithuania, in Vilnius. Among the items topping the agenda will be support for Ukraine – including its eventual accession to the Alliance and security guarantees, NATO’s defence plans and budgets, and Sweden’s accession. The summit comes amid Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and a fundamental overhaul of NATO’s defence and deterrence framework.

Ukraine and NATO EU-NATO cooperation:
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept states that the EU is a ‘unique and essential partner for NATO’. The two organisations share 22 Member States in common. EU-NATO cooperation focuses on issues of common interest such as crisis management and military mobility. Since the war in Ukraine began, the two organisations have sought to ensure that their responses to the invasion are aligned and have, for instance, coordinated weapons deliveries. Benedetta Berti of the European Policy Centre argues that stronger EU-NATO cooperation should stay at the top of the agenda for NATO leaders, and both organisations ‘would benefit from jointly defining a roadmap for enhancing cooperation with practical steps and milestones’.

Ukraine’s defence minister has noted that he ‘expects a guarantee that his country will be invited to join the military alliance at the conclusion of the war with Russia’. Allies have repeated the commitments they made at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 that Ukraine would become a NATO member at an unspecified time in the future, and reiterated their support for NATO’s open door policy. Since Ukraine’s bid for fast-track membership, made in September 2022, NATO Allies have been unable to agree on whether that membership ‘should be full or partial; immediate; gradual, or once again postponed; unconditional or linked to the outcome of the war’. While, NATO may not be ready to offer Ukraine a concrete timeline for membership, Allies may offer security guarantees to Ukraine outside the formal NATO structures. What form they will take is unclear however, as the ‘Western alliance is still divided over nearly every element of how to respond to the request’. According to former NATO Assistant Secretary-General Camille Grand, security guarantees can range from full-NATO membership to ‘paper guarantees’ such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, while in between there are ‘many variants – from bilateral treaties to de facto political commitments – and the challenge is to find the right spot’. One proposal is the Kyiv security compact, which would commit the West to provide political, financial, military and diplomatic support over decades, to increase Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

NATO Allies have been supporting Ukraine with military equipment and aid since before the start of the Russian invasion. These deliveries have been coordinated, inter alia, by the EU and the Ukraine Contact Group, which includes 54 countries. The summit is likely to result in a NATO plan to enhance interoperability with Ukraine, and further commitments to provide Ukraine with weapons and ammunition, and training. NATO also plans to invite Ukraine to a NATO-Ukraine defence council as an equal member. More details of this are to be announced at the summit. This will be an upgrade from the current NATO-Ukraine Commission, opening the door to a wide range of new areas of cooperation, such as joint exercises.

NATO’s defence plans and budgets

At the Madrid Summit in 2022, the Allies agreed on a ‘fundamental shift’ in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, a new NATO force model (NFM), and a boost to NATO’s enhanced forward presence (eFP) on the eastern flank. Concrete progress on these measures will be an essential determinant of success at this summit. The NFM is a significant expansion of NATO’s readiness posture, calling for several hundred thousand troops at different readiness levels. There is doubt, however, about the Allies’ ability to fulfil this vision. Important for this purpose will be to endorse updated defence plans – the centrepiece of which are three regional plans – but also to endorse the agreed expansion of the eight existing battlegroups to brigades. In a positive sign, Germany recently committed to permanently stationing a brigade in Lithuania within the eFP framework. The nuclear dimension of defence is also becoming increasingly important, given Russia’s constant nuclear-sabre rattling, the suspension of its participation in the New Start Treaty, the expansion of its nuclear arsenal and the recent announcement that Russia has deployed nuclear warheads to Belarus. Some analysts argue that NATO must commit to enhancing its nuclear deterrence faced with these new threats, and increase its overall nuclear credibility.

Sweden’s accession to NATO

Hungary and Turkey have yet to ratify the accession to NATO of Sweden, which together with Finland (which became a member in April 2023) applied for membership following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Sweden is one of NATO’s closest partners, with the status of an ‘enhanced opportunity partner‘. Ankara accuses Stockholm of harbouring Kurdish groups that Turkey considers terrorists and is demanding their extradition. It also wants an arms embargo on the country lifted. The newly elected government in Sweden lifted the arms embargo in September 2022 and toughened its anti-terrorism laws. The Swedish prime minister even wrote a letter to the Turkish president noting that Sweden is ready to meet Turkey’s demands. However, Sweden has an independent judiciary and the extraditions Turkey is requesting are not for the government to decide. Turkey also hopes to gain US Congressional approval of a major defence package to modernise Turkey’s air force, which the US president has linked to Swedish NATO accession. Hungary is holding up ‘NATO expansion…[as a] trump card’, as it seeks to unlock billions of euros of EU funding that have been frozen due to concerns about judicial independence. Hungary is also expecting Sweden to cease its criticism of Hungary’s rule of law and lack of adherence to LGBTQI rights. Hungary has hinted repeatedly, however, that it will not block Sweden’s NATO accession on its own. Many experts believe that the Turkish president, having recently won his re-election bid, will give the green light prior to or shortly after the Vilnius Summit, but this is far from certain. Erdogan dealt a blow to Sweden’s hopes in the run up to the summit when he said that Turkey would not change its attitude unless Sweden prevented anti-Turkey protests by ‘terrorists’.

Defence budgets
Boosting defence spending will also be top of the agenda at the summit, as Allies will discuss a possible new defence investment pledge. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO allies committed to a 2 % of GDP defence spending guideline within a decade. However, in 2022, only 7 (Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the UK and the US) out of 30 NATO members met the 2 % of GDP spending guideline. The NATO Secretary-General has called for 2 % to be seen as the absolute minimum rather than a ceiling, and noted that he will ‘advocate for a more ambitious pledge than the one made in 2014’ at the Vilnius Summit. Multiple NATO members have already announced significant increases in defence spending. However it remains to be seen whether these will ever be implemented, with a looming possible recession. Allies may be reluctant to commit publicly to higher defence budget targets. Atlantic Council pundits note however, ‘that success at Vilnius will require a commitment to increase defence spending’. NATO Secretary-General

In recent months ‘Europe has been locked in an endless parlour game over who might replace Jens Stoltenberg’, who has led the alliance since October 2014. The NATO secretary-general, who is ‘responsible for steering the process of consultation and decision-making in the Alliance and ensuring that decisions are implemented’ is selected for renewable 4-year terms – or shorter – based on a unanimous vote by member states. The secretary-general is traditionally a senior European political figure. Many capitals called for the first female secretary-general or a nominee from eastern Europe, while others advocated continuity through extension of Stoltenberg’s term. On 4 July, the North Atlantic Council extended Stoltenberg’s mandate for a year, until 1 October 2024, to be endorsed by NATO leaders at the summit.

European Parliament position

In several resolutions, Parliament has recognised NATO’s role as the cornerstone of collective security for those Member States that are also NATO members. It has stressed the importance of enhancing and deepening the EU’s strategic partnership with NATO. Parliament has a delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (DNAT) for cooperation on common challenges. In a June 2023 resolution, Parliament called on NATO to invite Ukraine into NATO after the war is over and, in the meantime, to develop a temporary security guarantee framework, to be implemented immediately after the war.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Towards NATO’s 2023 Vilnius Summit‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Antonio Vale with Clemens Weichert.

If it is to achieve the Paris Agreement objective of keeping the rise in global temperature well below 2° C, the EU must consider every possible technology to decarbonise energy production. Nuclear fusion is the process that powers the sun and it can be reproduced on Earth. However, even once the considerable engineering challenges of designing a fusion power plant are overcome, there are major constraints inherent in upscaling fusion power.

The basic function of a nuclear fusion reactor is to combine two hydrogen nuclei into a single helium nucleus with slightly less mass then the sum of the two original nuclei. The lost mass is converted into energy. This process is the power source behind both the sun and the hydrogen bomb.

The physics are known and the fuel is readily available. When harnessed in a controlled reaction, fusion power can provide low‑carbon electricity. Research into such civilian use cases has been ongoing since the 1950s. In facilities like the Joint European Torus (JET) near Oxford, scientists are able to heat up plasma to the necessary temperatures, 10 times as hot as the core of the sun. However, heating the plasma and keeping it confined in the reactor requires energy-intensive magnets, or lasers, that use a great deal more energy than the fusion reaction generated. This is a major engineering challenge.

While most approaches use magnetic confinement and a mixture of two fuels – deuterium and tritium – there are numerous variations in fuels and confinement methods. US researchers at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) use inertial confinement, and in 2022, for the first time, they achieved ignition: a net energy gain from a fusion reaction, though not nearly enough to account for the electricity demand of operating their equipment.

Nuclear fusion research has so far relied on purpose-built, state-funded research facilities such as JET and NIF. A next generation facility – the result of an international cooperation project called ITER – is being built in southern France. The EU is funding 45 % of the project, which is set to produce its first plasma in 2025 and start full operation in 2035. Once results are in, ITER is to be followed by a prototype plant with a capacity of 1 GW – powerful enough to cover half of Berlin’s electricity consumption in 2022 – to demonstrate operational viability. However, according to the generally accepted timetable for this pathway, fusion energy will not be on the grid until long after 2050, too late for the green transition.

Nevertheless, some private companies, such as Commonwealth Fusion Systems, are promising a working power plant before 2040. Although the probability of these companies meeting their ambitious goals should not be overstated, they are using the insights generated by JET to improve on the formula in a number of ways, such as using high-end magnets. Should one of them achieve a breakthrough – that is, a self-sustaining fusion reaction with a significant net energy gain – a fusion power plant might be able to feed electricity into the electricity grid much sooner than currently predicted.

Potential impacts and developments

Once the scientific and engineering challenges are overcome, the construction of the first fusion power plants can start. In this scenario, the availability of raw materials, fuels, and qualified workers would represent hard constraints on scaling up the technology. Capital costs and regulations pose soft constraints. Building a fusion reactor requires rare earth elements such as neodymium for the magnets. These are already at a very high supply risk because of their use in wind turbines and electric vehicles, as well as the dominant role China plays in their extraction and processing. For fuel, ITER-style reactors require tritium, which is only commercially produced by nuclear power plants of the CANDU type, all of which will retire in the coming decades. In theory, fusion power plants should be able to ‘breed’ their own fuel supply, but this has not yet been achieved. Securing the initial amount to start the reaction will prove to be a ‘make or break’ criterion for the industry. While some approaches circumvent this problem by using a different fuel mix, most public and private funding goes to start-ups using deuterium and tritium, as the most efficient mix.

Building and operating a fusion power plant would require a large workforce of nuclear engineers, metal‑workers, and electricians. While these are well-paid jobs, the difficulty currently being experienced in France with staffing new conventional nuclear plants gives an idea of some of the problems a fusion power project would run into. Just like nuclear fission plants, which gain energy from splitting atoms, nuclear fusion plants will take a long time to plan and build. For a fission plant, construction normally takes 5 to 10 years; similar timeframes would apply to fusion plants. Depending on the tritium breeding rate of a future power plant, scaling up could take decades. On top of these hard constraints, soft constraints come into play. More specifically, the upfront capital costs of construction will presumably be very high. By way of comparison, recent fission plants have cost over €10 billion to build.

However, the rewards of achieving fusion power would be considerable. Proponents highlight the low carbon emissions, the availability of deuterium fuel extracted from sea water, and the small land-use footprint as advantages of fusion power. Though some radioactive waste is produced, it poses little danger given the small quantities and short half-life. The main promise is that fusion power will produce a constant supply of cheap electricity for the decarbonisation of industry, transport and heating. Furthermore, falling electricity prices might also enable other future technologies such as vertical agriculture, desalination – an energy intensive technology to provide water for agriculture and utilities – or even direct carbon capture and storage from the atmosphere. Although fusion power plants could provide a constant baseload of electricity, they would not be able to adjust quickly to fluctuating supply and demand.

Anticipatory policy-making

The EU has two major programmes in place in the field of fusion energy. One is its contribution to ITER, the other is the Euratom research and training programme. ITER, meaning ‘the way’ in Latin, will be the largest fusion reactor of its kind upon completion. The EU contribution to ITER is managed by Fusion for Energy, which is responsible to Euratom and its Member States. Over the 2014-2027 period, the EU will spend €8 billion on the project. The 2016 roadmap schedules the beginning of operations for 2025. In the same timeframe, €1.5 billion – close to half of Euratom’s research and training budget – will go to fusion research. These funds go to organisations such as Eurofusion, a consortium that works within the official fusion roadmap towards the success of fusion energy, for example by funding young researchers in fusion training and education. In this way, the EU is already addressing the workforce challenges that a commercial fusion project will bring. The Union is therefore taking a leading role in fusion research worldwide.

Implementing the proposed EU regulation on critical raw materials would significantly improve the security of supply of some elements that are crucial for any fusion reactor, such as rare earths and lithium. Appropriate safety regulations should take into account the far lower risks compared with fission plants. With regard to the high capital costs of a fusion power plant, some degree of state funding might be considered, since even scientists who are convinced of the feasibility of building a fusion power plant have been voicing concern about their profitability since the 1970s.

Even under the most optimistic scenario for developments in fusion energy research and development and in a favourable political environment, the hard constraints of tritium supply, construction times, and workforce availability make fusion energy a long-term prospect. Entering a future electricity market dominated by renewables, fusion plants will not be able to provide flexible electricity at times of peak demand. Their production costs will therefore be the decisive factor in market entry, determining whether they can provide baseline power to the grid at a price that can compete with renewables-charged energy storage options. Nevertheless, with a variety of actors pursuing a wide range of approaches to fusion, one of them might just find a solution to these problems.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we could make nuclear fusion work?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if we could make nuclear fusion work?’ on YouTube.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Written by Aidan Christie.

Members head to Strasbourg for the last plenary session before the summer break, with a packed agenda. With just nine months left before the Parliament goes into electoral recess, ahead of the elections on 6-9 June next year, the urgency of business is stepping up, given the limited time left to find agreement on – often complex – legislative files.

On Monday afternoon, Members will launch the week’s deliberations with a joint debate covering a number of proposals from the ‘fit for 55’ package, along with two linked proposals on industrial emissions. The ‘fit for 55’ package is all about adapting EU law and policies in order to meet the legally binding target, set in the European Climate Law, of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % (from 1990 levels) by 2030. The Parliament and Council have been making steady progress in negotiating the various proposals since the package was launched in July 2021.

Three of the proposals to be debated have been agreed between Parliament and Council negotiators, and now need to be formally adopted. The proposed regulation on deployment of alternative fuels aims to speed up the installation of infrastructure and take-up of vehicles running on alternative fuels, such as electric and hydrogen-power, with targets for equipment to be installed at minimum intervals along main roads. The FuelEU Maritime proposal seeks to push the uptake of cleaner fuels for ships and reduce carbon emissions from seaborne transport – reducing gradually in coming to years to reach an 80 % cut by 2050. In addition, to using cleaner fuels en route, ships in port would have to connect to on-shore electrical power. The proposed revision of the Energy Efficiency Directive aims to speed up implementation of energy savings and promote renewable energy sources. The agreement would set a binding target of an 11.7 % reduction in final energy consumption by 2030. The public sector will have a specific target for reducing energy consumption, as well as the target of renovating 3 % of public buildings per year.

The linked proposals on the revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive seek to expand existing rules applying to large agro-industrial installations, to cover a broader range of installations, as well as promoting faster adoption of new less-polluting techniques to reduce emissions. Members will vote on the reports from the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) with a view to setting the Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Staying on the environmental theme, on Tuesday morning, Members are due to debate the proposed nature restoration regulation, which would establish a legal obligation on Member States to restore degraded ecosystems. During two voting sessions in the ENVI committee, Members took positions on hundreds of proposed amendments, but a tied vote meant that there was ultimately no majority in favour of the proposal as amended. Formally therefore, the committee is recommending that plenary reject the Commission’s proposal, but it is anticipated that large numbers of amendments will be tabled in plenary and the voting may again be very close.

Less controversially, on Tuesday, Members are due to vote on two other reports in the environmental field, with a view to setting Parliament’s position for trilogue talks. Again from ENVI, the report on the proposed regulation on ecodesign requirements for sustainable products aims at making products on the internal market more durable, reusable, reparable, upgradable, recyclable, and generally less harmful to the environment. From the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), the report on the proposed revision of the Construction Products Regulation seeks to boost circular business models and make sustainable products the norm in the building sector.

Integrated circuits or ‘chips’ are fundamental to virtually every aspect of modern life, but Europe has become reliant on chips made elsewhere in the world. The EU chips act would strengthen the semiconductor ecosystem in Europe, bolstering Europe’s capacity to design and produce chips, and giving the Commission powers to implement emergency measures on the chips market if needed in crisis situations. On Tuesday morning, Members are due to consider final adoption of the text agreed in trilogue with the Council.

In the external relations field, on Tuesday afternoon, Members are scheduled to debate reports from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on the Commission’s latest annual enlargement reports on progress in candidate countries, with Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the agenda this month. In both cases, the committee underlines the importance of continuing progress towards accession, and emphasises areas where the country concerned needs to step up its efforts. In the latter case, AFET denounces the recent increased inflammatory actions of the Republika Srpska leadership. Also on Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is due to debate recommendations drafted by the AFET committee on EU relations with the Palestinian Authority. The committee expresses concern at the mounting violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent months, and calls for an immediate end to all violence. Members also urge the Palestinian leadership to organise free and fair elections.

Media freedom and pluralism have come under growing threat in recent years, through increasing harassment of journalists, as well as human rights defenders and activists, with groundless or abusive lawsuits. Such lawsuits seek to silence those speaking out on legitimate matters of public interest, landing them with high costs for defending their freedom of expression. On Monday evening, Parliament is set to debate the report from the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) on the proposed directive on protection of journalists and human rights defenders from unfounded court cases with a view to setting its position for trilogue negotiations.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Threats to freedom of speech come in various forms, and recent events have highlighted potential vulnerabilities to foreign interference and undue influence of Members of the European Parliament. The Special Committee on Foreign Interference and Disinformation (ING2) had its mandate extended to investigate shortcomings in Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption measures. Its recommendations on reforming the rules to protect Parliament’s integrity are set for debate on Wednesday afternoon.

The threats to European society from the coronavirus pandemic have now largely passed, but the Special Committee set up to evaluate the experiences of the crisis has aimed to ensure the EU is better prepared for any future major health threat. Parliament is due to debate the lessons learned from COVID-19 and recommendations for the future on Tuesday afternoon, with the COVI committee calling for action in four areas: a health union, democracy and fundamental rights, addressing social and economic impact, and global action.

A European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) enables citizens to call for the Union to act in a given area, and once 1 million people, from at least 7 EU countries, sign up, the European Commission must respond. The ‘Save Cruelty Free Cosmetics – Commit to a Europe without animal testing‘ ECI has gained the required signatures, and its organisers presented their case in a hearing before the ENVI committee in May. The ECI is scheduled for debate in plenary on Monday evening, before the Commission presents its formal response.

Every year, after closing the financial year, the EU budget generally has a surplus, due to higher than expected revenue and underspending. Amending budget No 2/2023 will enter the surplus from 2022, amounting to €2.5 billion, as revenue in the 2023 budget, and Parliament is expected to vote on Tuesday to confirm this move.

The regular question time session with the Commission will focus this month on EU-Africa strategy, with Members having the opportunity to pose questions to the Commission on Tuesday afternoon on its plans for developing relations with African countries.

Finally, on Wednesday morning, Parliament is scheduled to debate the outcome of the European Council meeting of 29‑30 June 2023, where recent developments in the war against Ukraine and in Russia were discussed.

Agenda

• Ecodesign for sustainable products
• Revision of the Construction Products Regulation
• Revision of the Energy Efficiency Directive
• Alternative fuels infrastructure
• FuelEU Maritime – Sustainable maritime fuels
• Nature restoration regulation
• Revision of the industrial emissions directive
• Protection of journalists and human rights defenders from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (SLAPPs)
• Reforming rules to protect Parliament’s integrity
• 2022 report on Albania
• 2022 report on Bosnia and Herzegovina
• EU relations with the Palestinian Authority
• Amending budget No 2/2023: 2022 surplus
• Lessons learned from COVID-19 and recommendations for the future
• EU chips act
• Citizens’ initiative on animal testing