The National Interest

What You Need to Know: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has faced considerable scrutiny, with critics citing high costs, maintenance dependencies, and limited survivability. Notably, some early models have already been decommissioned, despite originally intended 25-year service lives.

-However, recent reports suggest improvements in reliability, with Independence-class ships achieving a 96% operational efficiency. Advocates argue that LCS vessels should be judged as part of a broader joint force, not in isolation.

-Despite setbacks, the jury remains out on the LCS's ultimate value, with current performance improvements offering potential for fulfilling niche roles within the U.S. Navy’s fleet.

Look up the word “failure” in the dictionary, chances are you’ll see one of the definitions listed as “See Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).”

Okay, not really, but the U.S. Navy’s once much-ballyhooed LCS is now being almost universally derided as an expensive military boondoggle (even more so than the F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter and the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft). For example, one professional acquaintance of mine, a U.S. Coast Guard officer, told me on condition of anonymity that “They’re worthless.” And to think, when I was a Strategy & Policy Analyst with Navy Warfare Group/OPNAV N5I6 under the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations at the Pentagon five years ago, the LCS was being trumpeted as the next big thing in naval technology.

However, for the sake of fairness & balance, we should ask ourselves: Was the LCS truly a complete & utter failure, or is there more to it than meets the eye?

There are two classes of LCS in the U.S. Navy arsenal, namely the Freedom class and the Independence class; sixteen of the former and nineteen of the latter have been completed. USS Freedom (LCS-1) was the lead ship of the first class, built by Fincantieri Marine Group, laid down on June 2, 2005, launched on September 23, 2006, and commissioned on November 8, 2008. The Freedom and her sister ships bear the following specifications and vital stats:

Displacement: 3.450 tons fully laden

Hull length: 387.6 ft (118.1 m)

Beam Width: 57.7 ft (17.6 m)

Draft: 14.1 ft (4.3 m)

Propulsion: four Rolls-Royce waterjets

Max speed: 47 knots (87 km/h; 54 mph)

Crew Complement: fifty core crew of commissioned officers and enlisted sailors; ninety-eight or more with mission package and air detachment crew.

Armament:    

-one × BAE Systems Mk 110 57 mm (2.2 in) gun.

-four × .50 caliber (12.7 mm) machine guns

-two × Mk44 Bushmaster II 30 mm (1.2 in) guns

-twenty-one × RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile surface-to-air Missiles (SAMs)

As for the Independence class, that one kicked off (appropriately enough) with the USS Independence (LCS-2), built by Austal USA, laid down 19 January 2006, launched 26 April 2008, and commissioned on 16 January 2010.

Displacement: 3.422 tons fully laden

Hull length: 418 ft (127 m)

Beam Width: 104 ft (32 m)

Draft: 14 ft (4.3 m)

Propulsion:   

-two × American Vulkan light weight multiple-section carbon fiber propulsion shaftlines

-four × Wartsila waterjets

Max speed: 44 knots (51 mph; 81 km/h))

Crew Complement: forty core crew (eight commissioned officers, thirty-two enlisted seamen) plus up to thirty-five mission crew

Armament:    

-one × BAE Systems Mk 110 57 mm gun

-one × Raytheon SeaRAM Close-In Weapon System (CIWS)

-four × .50-cal guns (2 aft, 2 forward)

-two × 30 mm Mk44 Bushmaster II guns

-eight × RGM-184A Naval Strike Missiles

-twenty-four × AGM-114L Hellfire missiles

In a nutshell, the LCS was afflicted by:

-Propulsion system failures

-Contractor-dependent maintenance

-Difficulties in swapping mission configurations

-(Allegedly) under-armed and unable to survive in hostile combat environments

Accordingly, several of the LCS warships—including LCS-1 and LCS-2 no less—have already been decommissioned, which is rather embarrassing when you consider that these vessels were originally slated to have a shelf life of twenty-five years … and even more embarrassing when you consider that the USS Independence alone has a total projected cost of $704 million … damn near triple the original projected cost of $220 million.

Moreover, the originally planned fleet of 55 LCSs was pared down to 35.

But before one writes off the Littoral Combat Ship, consider this from James Holmes of Real Clear Defense regarding the allegations of the platform lacking sufficient armament and survivability:

“One, as a general rule ships do not fight alone. They fight as part of a fleet and, assuming the battle takes place within reach of shore-based assets, as part of a joint force vying for command of the sea. Joint forces fight joint forces. And yet oftentimes the commentary over this or that platform seems to assume it will be thrown into the teeth of enemy firepower without support from the rest of the composite force. The idea seems to be that matching an individual platform’s capabilities against the worst an opponent can hurl against it lets you render a sound judgment of its fitness.”

Meanwhile, as Laura Heckmann points out in a March 26, 2024, article for National Defense, the remaining LCS ships have made remarkable strides in reliability:

“Capt. Marc Crawford, commodore of Littoral Combat Ship Squadron One, said as recently as 2020, 95 percent of maintenance checks were being handled by contractors, with maintenance execution teams handling 5 to 10 percent. So far in 2024, maintenance teams have taken over about 70 percent. ‘That in and of itself is a tremendous feat,’ he added … The latest triumph was an ‘unprecedented’’ 26-month deployment of the Independence-class USS Charleston to the Western Pacific, Crawford said … Four other Independence-class ships currently deployed to Seventh Fleet — Gabrielle Giffords, Manchester, Oakland and Mobile — are operating at a .73 materiel availability, “which means they’re operating at a 96 percent efficiency rate, which is fantastic,”[Cmdr. James] Hoey said.”

Long story short, the jury is still out on the Littoral Combat Ship. Time will tell.

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch , The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Escalatory Choices and Regime Strength: The Sources and Consequences of North Korean Deployments in the Ukraine War -  North Korean military presence on Russia’s front lines with Ukraine is increasingly aimed at active combat roles. Initially, Moscow and Pyongyang may have planned to keep this deniable due to uncertainties about the value of deploying a small number of non-Russian-speaking foreign military personnel and potential diplomatic repercussions. Once these deployments were revealed, Russia and North Korea faced a choice: deny the reports as they likely planned, considering the issuance of Russian identity documents to North Korean military personnel, or acknowledge them.

Opting for denial would have required keeping the North Korean deployment limited and wrapping up operations before irrefutable evidence emerged. However, the revelation seemed to empower elements in both Moscow and Pyongyang that favored escalation. 

The two emerging allies decided that the reasons to keep the deployments limited had vanished and chose to admit their actions. They have since doubled down on the deployments, leaking more confirmations to the media. Now, North Korean leadership refers to Russia’s war against Ukraine as a “sacred war” that must be won, resonating with Russia’s persistent semi-official nuclear apocalypse rhetoric. Russia is encouraging Europeans, Americans, South Koreans, and others to step into the fray, which would support the Kremlin’s claim that it is fighting a powerful multinational coalition in Ukraine.

The increasing numbers of North Korean military personnel and their growing involvement in combat operations serve the interests of both nations. Initially cautious, Moscow may now sense an opportunity: if North Korean combat forces can be expanded to meaningful levels in the foreseeable future, it could eliminate the need to call up more Russian civilians to fight against Ukraine and signal to adversaries that Russia has access to an almost bottomless source of fighters. 

Moreover, if Moscow and Pyongyang can project the image of a successful offensive alliance, they may attract currently reluctant followers, such as Iran, not only to the front lines in Ukraine but also to projects like the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Alliance (BRICS), aimed at demonstrating alternatives to the West and a resolve to protect dictators’ interests.

For its part, North Korea has found a new source of cash and combat experience for its elite military units. Its armed forces can now identify the fittest and brightest combat survivors to place in command positions. Both Pyongyang and Moscow may have reasons to be upset with Beijing’s posture: North Korea resents China's lack of deference to its quest for status and autonomy, and Russia is frustrated with Beijing's limited willingness to defy Western pressure and unequivocally back its war effort. North Korean fighters in Ukraine represent a setback for China, which seemingly wants to keep its junior partners under close tutelage.

Most importantly, over the past year or so, North Korea has been shifting to a more intransigent posture. It has rhetorically abandoned the goal of Korean unity on Pyongyang’s terms, deployed new weapon systems, resumed ballistic missile launches, and considered fresh nuclear tests. 

On this path, overtly aggressive actions in Northeast Asia are too risky for Kim Jong Un due to the preparedness of the United States and its regional allies. This makes Europe an ideal place to test the resolve of North Korea’s adversaries, first and foremost, South Korea and the United States.

Kim Jong Un may also be testing the impact of participating in a shooting war on his regime’s strength. He is vacillating between commitment to the status quo and expansionist actions to raise the stakes. While it may be too risky to attack South Korea or destabilize East Asia, a gambit in Europe appears to be a safer experiment. Domestically, it can be spun as Kim defeating Western imperialists shoulder-to-shoulder with a great-power ally, Russia.

All of this is happening against the backdrop of mounting challenges faced by Ukraine in defending against advancing Russian troops. This is why concern is rising in the West about the possibility of the war becoming further internationalized. 

The pressure on Ukraine’s Western partners and U.S. allies in Asia to respond is increasing, making verbal pushback insufficient. Some form of escalatory response may be inevitable if North Korea is not convinced by China to roll back its new battlefield partnership with Russia. We may witness the inauguration of a Poland–South Korea security partnership, unfathomable several months ago. 

In any case, the gap between the two theaters, Asia and Europe, is being bridged, especially as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea become increasingly interested in a show of U.S. resolve in Ukraine.

The readiness to acknowledge North Korean deployments instead of backtracking on a risky operation may indicate Russia's unwillingness to seek negotiated solutions, contrary to the Kremlin’s claims of being open to ending the war through negotiations. In the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow faced a similar dilemma of denying or accepting the evidence presented by Washington of Soviet missile deployments in Cuba. 

Once the die was cast and brinkmanship chosen as a response, runaway escalation scenarios were avoided only at the last minute. Moscow may soon realize again the difficulty of reversing escalatory choices that involve smaller allies and considerations of status and prestige.

Mikhail Troitskiy is a visiting scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, and a visiting professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. 

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The Zhuhai Airshow, China’s premier aerospace trade expo, will commence on November 12 and may see the official debut of the Shenyang J-35A, a carrier-based variant of the FC-31, showcasing China's growing fifth-generation aircraft capabilities.

Expected to operate from the PLA Navy’s Type 003 Fujian carrier, the J-35 lacks the VTOL capability of the U.S. F-35, though it will likely benefit from the Fujian’s electromagnetic catapult system. Equipped to handle an 18,000-pound payload, the J-35’s armaments include PL-10 and PL-12 missiles.

Russia’s Su-57 is also set to appear, underscoring China’s advancements in stealth aviation.

The 15th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition – commonly known as the Zhuhai Airshow as it takes place in the prefecture-level city in the Guangdong province – will kick off on November 12. The biennial event, which began in 1996, has become the largest airshow and aerospace trade expo held in China.

There is already speculation that the event could be used to officially introduce the Shenyang J-35A, the carrier-based variant of the Shenyang FC-31. It was on Monday that China military aviation researcher Rupprecht Denio shared a photo on X.com of the tail section of a J-35A with the number "75" to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).

The J-35A won't be the only fifth-generation aircraft that could take flight at the Zhuhai Airshow, as a Russian Sukhoi Su-57 (NATO reporting name Felon) also arrived in the coastal city on Sunday and is expected to take part in a flight demonstration. It marks the first appearance of Russia's multirole stealth fighter at the Chinese airshow.

Beijing has kept its cards close to the chest when it comes to the J-35, but it is believed that the aircraft will operate from the Type 003 Fujian, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) aircraft carrier, which has been undergoing sea trials this year.

"The J-35 is considered to be China's answer to America's F-35 Lightning II warplane. The J-35 is China's other fifth-generation warplane (the more well-known Chinese fifth-generation warplane is the Chengdu J-20 'Mighty Dragon,' which is more analogous to the Air Force's F-22A Raptor). Unlike the American F-35, China’s J-35 lacks the vertical, takeoff, and landing (VTOL) capability that the F-35s possess," wrote Brandon J. Weichert for The National Interest. "The VTOL feature comes in handy for F-35 warplanes operating aboard aircraft carriers."

That latter fact is notable as the Type 003 Fujian is the first PLAN carrier to be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, but as previously reported the J-35 has been tested aboard the older Type 001 Liaoning and Type 002 Shandong, which each employ a ski jump ramp for launching aircraft. Whether the J-35 will operate from those carriers isn't known.

The FC-31/J-35 prototypes are believed to employ the RD-93 engines, while China is also understood to be working on an improved engine, the WS-13E, which is expected to offer 22,000 pounds of thrust and the WS-13 could possibly replace the RD-93 on the FC-31.

Currently, the J-35 is expected to be able to handle a payload of 18,000 pounds. Internally, the carrier-based fighter can handle four munitions weighing a total of 4,400 pounds. Externally, the FC-31 has six hardpoints, capable of carrying 13,000 pounds. The jet's main armaments include the PL-10 short-range missile and the PL-12 medium-range air-to-air missile.

Hopefully, more details about the fighter will come into focus during the upcoming airshow.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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What You Need to Know: Australia’s Collins-class submarines face significant setbacks due to widespread hull corrosion, with only one currently operational as the remaining five await urgent repairs or upgrades.

-Maintenance delays, partly from labor strikes, compound the challenges for Australia’s diesel-electric subs, underscoring the urgent need for new capabilities through the AUKUS pact’s nuclear-powered submarines planned for the mid-2030s.

-Despite current woes, the Collins class was once a technological leap, with advanced stealth, automation, and endurance, adapted for Australia’s vast and varied waters. The subs remain essential for intelligence and defense, with future operations extending potentially to Eastern Australia.

Australia is a key partner in the AUKUS program with the United Kingdom and the United States, and its first pillar calls for the building of a new class of nuclear-powered submarines that could be operated by the Royal Australian Navy beginning in the mid-2030s. That can't soon enough, as Australia's fleet of six Collins-class diesel-electric submarines has been mostly sidelined due to "unprecedented hull corrosion," the Australian Broadcast Corporation first reported.

Currently, just one is fully operational as the others are undergoing "urgent" repairs or are set to complete planned upgrades. Two of the boats are now at the Osborne shipyard in Adelaide on Australia's southern coast awaiting maintenance – which has been delayed due to an ongoing labor strike – while three other subs are at Western Australia's Garden Island naval base.

ABC reported that if necessary one of those boats could be returned to service but only if absolutely required as the subs haven't received certification.

"Defence continues to meet government-directed levels of operational availability for the Collins-class submarines. Defence has more than one boat available for operations if required," a spokesperson with the Australian Ministry of Defence told the ABC, adding, "Owing to operational security reasons, defence does not confirm precise locations and availabilities of specific platforms."

Though the Collins class is now in the headlines for its maintenance woes, it should be remembered that it was a major technical leap in submarine technology. The Collins class was one of the first submarines to be completely designed by computers, incorporating elements from five generations of submarines designed and built by the Swedish Navy. The boats feature a high-performance hull form, highly automated controls, low indiscretion rates, high shock resistance, optimal noise suppression, and an efficient weapons handling and discharge system.

In addition, the diesel-electric boats were the first to be constructed in Australia, prompting widespread improvements in Australian industry. The class of submarines was developed from the Type 471 subs designed and built by the Swedish Navy, and the lead boat was launched in August 1993 and commissioned in Adelaide in July 1996.

The submarines were developed to travel distances while also being able to operate in varying environments from cool southern oceans to warm, shallow tropical waters. As a key component of the Australian Defence Force, the six submarines are capable of serving as an intelligence-gathering platform in peacetime while being employed as a forceful opponent in wartime.

Each of the subs is powered by three Hedemora/Garden Island Type V18B/14 diesel engines, three Jeumont Schneider 1,400kW 440V DC generators, and one MacTaggart Scott DM 43006 hydraulic motor for emergency propulsion. Submerged, the boats can move silently on electric power supplied by banks of specially developed lead-acid batteries, which can be charged by three onboard diesel generator sets. The Collins class can also travel at speeds greater than twenty knots submerged and ten knots surfaced.

The submarines are currently based at Fleet Base West in Western Australia, and it is unclear if any will operate from the announced facility in Eastern Australia.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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What You Need to Know: Russia’s Su-57, its fifth-generation stealth fighter, made a notable entry into China, landing at Taiyuan airport for the 15th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition. While Moscow may use the airshow to promote the Su-57’s capabilities to potential foreign buyers, it is unlikely China will become a customer, as it focuses on its domestically-produced J-20.

-The Su-57E export variant will be showcased in hopes of attracting buyers like Algeria, India, and Turkey, though confirmed deals remain elusive.

-Interestingly, Russia’s absence of the Su-75 Checkmate at this and other recent events suggests its indefinite postponement.

Russia's fifth-generation stealth fighter hasn't been seen over the skies of Ukraine, but the Sukhoi Su-57 (NATO reporting name Felon) did cross over Chinese airspace and according to a report from that state-run China Daily, landed at Taiyuan airport on Sunday. The Su-57 is just one of several Russian-made aircraft that are expected to be exhibited at the upcoming 15th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition, which will begin on November 12 outside the city of Zhuhai in the Guangdong province.

The biennial event has become the People's Republic of China's largest international airshow, and in recent years has been used to showcase Beijing's great leap forward in military aviation.

This will be the first time that the Sukhoi Su-57 has been presented at the airshow, as well as the first time the fighter has even landed in China. That fact has led to conjecture that Moscow could grant Beijing a much closer look at the fifth-generation fighter. The Kremlin has sought to find foreign buyers as well as partners for the multirole fighter, and while China and Russia have forged closer ties, it would seem a serious reach to believe that Moscow would look to Beijing as either a customer or even joint producer of the aircraft.

China has a tendency to copy Russian designs, but there is also the fact that Beijing may not want to be tied to Moscow with the aircraft. Though such a deal would enable China to hedge its bets, it is likely still looking to go all in with its domestically-developed Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon.

A more likely explanation for the Su-57's presence at the China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition is to highlight the Su-57's capabilities in a relatively friendly yet still foreign environment.

There has been speculation that the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), a subsidiary of the state-owned Rostec military conglomerate, will present a mock-up of the Su-57E, the export variant of the fifth-generation fighter. It was in September that the export model was presented at the inaugural Egypt International Airshow.

Rosoboronexport has continued to court foreign buyers for the Su-57E, but without much interest although Moscow has claimed to have received requests from potential client states including Algeria, India, Malaysia, and Turkey. Sales have remained in stealth mode, as in unseen, although Algeria has been rumored to operate one Su-57.

The Su-57E made its debut at the Aero India Show in Bangalore in 2023, and it reportedly is equipped with Russia's most advanced avionics. Other details surrounding the new prototype remain sparse, and production and sale of these fighters are very unlikely – at least in the near future.

As this is now the second major international airshow to see the Su-57 present, but without any mention of the Su-75 Checkmate, we can assume that aircraft isn't even vaporware anymore. It has simply faded away.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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What You Need to Know: The U.S. Navy’s Zumwalt-class destroyers, initially praised for their stealth and advanced technology, have become an expensive misstep. Despite their $24.5 billion cost, these ships face persistent functionality and performance issues, leading the Pentagon to consider adding hypersonic weapons and lasers to salvage the platform.

-Critics argue this approach follows the “sunk cost fallacy”—continuing investment in a failed program.

-Instead, focusing on long-range hypersonics deployed via submarines would better address evolving threats in contested waters. Some experts recommend retiring the Zumwalts, emphasizing taxpayer value and prioritizing effective defense solutions.

The United States Navy’s Zumwalt-class destroyers were touted as the next evolution in destroyer technology. These otherworldly-looking warships, thin with angled hulls to enhance stealth, have turned out to be little more than a boondoggle. Ironically, the destroyers are named after U.S. Navy Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, probably one of the greatest and most innovative leaders of the postwar Navy. 

But the ship that is named after him is a floating disaster. It’s as bad as the Navy’s other modern boondoggle, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

But there might be a new lease on life for this massively expensive platform. Recently, the Pentagon has publicly ruminated about the prospects of installing hypersonic missile launchers, and possibly lasers, on the Zumwalt-class destroyers. Certainly, this would make these otherwise pathetic warships relevant. At the same time, though, one is entrusting highly experimental weapons systems being installed upon an unreliable platform, like the Zumwalt-class. 

It’s not a good idea. It’s one of those ideas that sounds great on paper until it’s tried. Like the entire concept of a stealth destroyer in the first place.

The fact of the matter is that the Zumwalt-class is a failed program that was allowed to continue far longer than it ever should have been because of the sunk cost fallacy that dominates the minds of the Pentagon’s program managers and Congress. A sunk cost fallacy is a cognitive bias that occurs when an individual continues investing money, time, and effort into a project or program long after it has any benefit to that individual or group engaged in the sunk cost fallacy. 

America needs a robust hypersonic weapons capability. It needs directed energy weapons (DEW), too. However, these systems need not be tied to a failed platform. 

What the Pentagon is doing is no different than what the Russians are doing with their running joke of an aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. 

They view these platforms as an investment that has not yet fully realized its potential and, if only a little bit more time, effort, and money were spent on the program, it’d eventually correct itself. This has been the mindset of the Russian Navy with the Admiral Kuznetsov.

Economists call it a “sunk cost fallacy” for a reason. It is truly a mistake, faulty logic, that the U.S. taxpayers have already been asked to spend $24.5 billion on three warships, costing around $8 billion per unit, that doesn’t work. After twenty years of trying to make these systems work, the Navy cannot. 

One report has determined that the warships have underperforming engines, their weapons don’t function, which is why the Pentagon is talking about replacing them with experimental hypersonic and laser weapons, and those much-ballyhooed stealth capabilities do not live up to the hype, or the cost.

In other words, you can put lipstick on a pig, but it will still be swine. 

At a time when American taxpayers are struggling to pay for their most basic needs, Washington needs to do its best to properly manage the tax dollars they are taking from those hard-working taxpayers. Striving to keep the Zumwalts operational, despite all the data proving how bad of a program this has been, is an insult to every single taxpayer who could have used that money far better than the Navy has, or will.

What’s more, the United States is facing increasingly contested environments wherein its surface warship fleet will be made essentially obsolete. Thus, the Navy needs to develop longer-range hypersonic weapons that allow for the surface warship fleet to stay safely out of the range of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) defenses that will ultimately sink their warships. Especially if the stealth capabilities on the Zumwalt-class destroyers are not all they’re cracked up to be. 

The Navy should focus on building hypersonic cruise missiles that can be launched from their guided-missile submarines, in much the same way the Russians have done with their Yasen-class submarines. If the Americans are serious about hypersonic weapons for the Navy, placing them on any surface warship is a mistake. It is a massive error to place them on the failed Zumwalt-class destroyer. 

In my humble opinion, just mothball these floating mess-heaps before something truly catastrophic befalls these warships.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon

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The Ukraine War: A New Battleground for Two Koreas: North Korea’s decision to send troops to Russia represents a significant shift in the regional and global geopolitical landscape, with consequences that extend far beyond the Ukraine conflict. While many may focus on the immediate effects in Europe, the true stakes lie in the impact on security in Northeast Asia, particularly the Korean Peninsula. 

In exchange for its military support, North Korea stands to gain several benefits that could reshape its economic and military capabilities. Key among these is hard currency, with reports suggesting that North Korean soldiers are being paid around $2,000 each per month. This financial boost, combined with potential economic aid from Russia in the form of food and energy, will allow Kim Jong Un to advance his domestic agenda, particularly his ambitious 10x20 rural development plan. Crucially, it enables the regime to mitigate the harsh effects of international sanctions, bolstering Kim’s domestic leadership. 

However, the most consequential gain for North Korea may come in the form of advanced Russian military technology. Access to improved intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), hypersonic weapons, nuclear submarines, and space weapons could significantly enhance Pyongyang’s military capabilities. This bolstered deterrent could embolden North Korea in its military activities against South Korea and the United States, potentially destabilizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia as a whole. 

Perhaps most alarming is the possibility that this deployment reflects a deeper commitment under the military treaty signed between Pyongyang and Moscow in June 2024. This agreement could allow North Korea to dispatch its soldiers four months after signing, while also opening the door for Russia to send troops or military equipment to the Korean Peninsula. 

Such a move would escalate tensions further, potentially drawing both U.S. and Russian forces into a direct standoff on the Korean Peninsula, with dire implications for global security. 

South Korea views North Korea’s involvement in Russia as a direct and escalating threat. Seoul's National Intelligence Service (NIS) has publicly disclosed details about North Korean troop deployments in Russia, highlighting the gravity of the situation and attracting global attention. Seizing this opportunity, Seoul is now pursuing enhanced military cooperation with NATO and the United States, particularly as the U.S. approaches its presidential election. There are concerns that a post-election shift in U.S. foreign policy could leave South Korea vulnerable, especially if the incoming administration seeks engagement with North Korea. 

One of the emerging strategic options for South Korea may involve direct military support for Ukraine. While the idea of sending troops or weapons to Ukraine was once unthinkable, it is becoming a viable option as Seoul looks to counterbalance the growing North Korea-Russia axis. 

Fighting North Korea in a third country may offer South Korea a way to avoid direct conflict on the peninsula, reducing the risk of catastrophic damage at home. South Korea's decision could ignite debates in Europe and the U.S. about the potential deployment of troops to Ukraine, potentially reshaping their military strategies toward Russia. Meanwhile, the long-standing debate over whether South Korea should develop its nuclear weapons is gaining momentum, driven by North Korea's advancement of nuclear technologies with Russia's support.  

For North Korea, its involvement in the Ukraine war has become a matter of regime survival. Pyongyang is betting heavily on a Russian victory, but if Russia loses, North Korea’s vulnerability would increase significantly due to the loss of a crucial economic and military ally. 

For South Korea, the Yoon administration faces high-stakes challenges. With President Yoon Suk-yeol’s approval ratings languishing at around 22-24%, North Korea’s actions could offer an opportunity to rally conservative support. By emphasizing the growing threat posed by North Korea’s alliance with Russia, Yoon could bolster his image as a strong defender of both global and national security against Pyongyang and Moscow. 

The war in Ukraine has now drawn the Korean Peninsula into its orbit, and the implications are far-reaching. Both North and South Korea are positioning themselves within a broader great power competition that is reshaping global security dynamics. 

Sangsoo Lee is an Associated Fellow at the European Center for North Korea Studies at the University of Vienna and a founder of Strategic Linkages (SL. Dr. Lee was the Deputy Director and head of the Stockholm Korea Center at the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP). His areas of interest are Security and Conflict issues in Northeast Asia, with a focus on the North Korean nuclear crisis and inter-Korean relations. Dr. Lee holds a PhD in Northeast Asian Studies from Peking University and has been a Visiting Researcher at the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) (2007) and at the London School of Economics (LSE) (2011).

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Homeless: The historic USS Texas (BB-35), the only surviving battleship from both World Wars, faces a pressing issue despite extensive restoration. After $60 million in repairs and over 300,000 man-hours to replace steel and refurbish its guns, the ship still lacks a permanent home.

-Originally housed at the San Jacinto battleground, bureaucratic and financial challenges prevent its return. Proposals to move the ship to Seawolf Park or Corpus Christi have been scuttled over logistical and funding issues.

-With local opposition in Galveston and no clear solution, the USS Texas remains afloat but without a viable future location.

Great effort has gone into preserving and restoring the former USS Texas (BB-35), the only surviving battleship to see service in both World Wars.

Launched in 1912, the warship became a museum ship after the end of the Second World War and for decades called the Houston Ship Channel near the San Jacinto Monument home. All the years in the water and exposure to the elements took a toll on the battle wagon, and leaks were so bad at one point in 2017 that emergency repairs were required just to keep the warship afloat.

In August 2022, USS Texas was towed to Galveston where it has been undergoing a massive restoration effort. While at Gulf Copper Dry Dock & Rig Repair in Galveston, more than 700 tons of steel was replaced and the ship's anti-aircraft guns were refurbished. Since 2022, nearly 300,000 man-hours have already gone into the battleship's restoration efforts. Millions have also been spent to preserve the warship for at least another generation.

But there is now a very serious problem.

As previously reported, the ship can't find a home. To suggest the matter is "complicated" is a vast understatement. There has been an ongoing battle over the home for the battleship in Galveston. Instead of a fight to be the future home for the famed warship, there has been pushback from businesses due to fears that its location would impact views of the harbor. Over the summer Katie's Seafood House, a Galveston restaurant and wholesale market, even started an online petition to keep the battleship from being moored along Pier 19-20.

So why not move it elsewhere? That is simply a matter of economics, logistics, and past agreements.

USS Texas can't return to the site of the San Jacinto battleground – which would seem a fitting choice, and which had been its home since 1947 (apart from a past restoration effort). This is due to several factors, including a matter of ownership.

"Control of the USS Texas was transferred to the foundation from Texas Parks and Wildlife in 2019 after state officials mandated the ship be 'permanently removed' from the battleground," Chron.com explained. Though it would be conceivable that the warship could be returned to the state, as a floating museum, she wasn't raising enough revenue to fund her upkeep.

Other potential homes for the battleship face similar issues – namely a lack of tourist traffic to "keep the Battleship Texas financially afloat."

One plan that was put forth had called for bringing BB-35 to Seawolf Park, which would seem the ideal location. It is home to the Galveston Naval Museum, as well as the Gato-class submarine USS Cavalla (SS-244), which had the distinction of sinking the Japanese aircraft carrier Shkaku during World War II, and the Edsall-class destroyer escort USS Stewart (DE-238). In addition, Seawolf Park maintains the remains of the World War I tanker SS Selma – one of the twelve experimental concrete ships constructed. Unfortunately, it was scuttled after the foundation deemed the move simply too expensive, as it would have required dredging the channel.

State officials, who still have a say in where the ship can go, also nixed a plan to move the ship to Corpus Christi, where it could be moored near USS Lexington (CV-16), the Essex-class aircraft carrier that is also preserved as a floating museum.

It would very much seem that the latter two options need to be seriously reconsidered. But for now, with $60 million already spent, USS Texas is simply a hole in the water. There are hopes that a home can be found for this homeless battleship, but it isn't looking good.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

This piece has been updated since publication. 

What You Need to Know: Reports suggest that a Ukrainian-operated F-16 has downed a second Russian Sukhoi Su-34, also known as the “Fullback.” Though Russia has not officially confirmed the loss, posts from Russian military bloggers indicate the downing, with messages honoring the deceased crew and photos of a black-painted Su-34.

-The Su-34, a twin-engine, twin-seat strike aircraft, is among Russia’s most valued military assets, making this loss significant amid production struggles.

-The F-16’s success in downing Russian fighters signals the effectiveness of Western-supplied aircraft in Ukraine, underscoring the continued difficulty Russia faces in securing air superiority.

The F-16 may be living up to its name "Fighting Falcon," but the multirole aircraft could earn another name "Fullback Killer" after reports circulated this month that a Ukrainian-piloted F-16 downed a second Russian Sukhoi Su-34 (NATO reporting name Fullback).

It was less than a month ago that an F-16 was widely credited with downing a Russian fighter over eastern Ukraine, and all about confirmed by pro-Putin Russian milbloggers including the infamous Fighterbomber (aka Ilya Tumanov), who regularly posts on the Telegram social messaging app. According to a report from the Kyiv Post, messages including "Eternal memory, brothers" made the rounds along with photos of a "black painted Su-34," which was believed to be "the actual aircraft that had gone down."

The Kremlin has not confirmed the loss of the Su-34 this month, but it also never acknowledged that one was likely lost to an F-16 in October.

"The lack of comment from the Russian side reflects the Kremlin?s sensitivities about admitting to the loss of yet another of its advanced aircraft," the Kyiv Post added.

The Sukhoi Su-34 multirole strike aircraft is a twin-engine, twin-seat, all-weather supersonic medium-range fighter-bomber, initially developed for the Soviet Air Forces in the 1980s. It was one of the Kremlin's many programs that were forced on the backburner following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis that followed.

The program was later revived and the Su-34 formally entered service in 2014. It has been considered one of the Kremlin's most capable warbirds, and the loss would be significant as Moscow struggles to keep up production of new aircraft.

Since it first entered service in 1979, the F-16 Fighting Falcon has engaged in more than 400,000 combat sorties and has more than a combined 19 million flight hours. Moreover, the F-16 has been adapted to complete several missions, including air-to-air fighting, ground attack, and electronic warfare.

It remains the world's most successful, combat-proven multi-role jet fighter ever produced.

Yet, questions have been repeatedly raised as to whether the aircraft provided by the West would make any significant difference in the ongoing conflict. Though the downing of two Su-34 aircraft may not seem like a huge deal, it does serve as a reminder that the Kremlin hasn't been able to achieve anything close to air superiority.

The F-16 was originally designed to counter Soviet aircraft, and by all accounts, it is living up to that role. As Ukraine receives more aircraft and its pilots are trained, it will likely help tilt the balance for Kyiv. It may not be enough to help Ukraine achieve victory, but the Fighting Falcon will allow it to remain in the fight.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

What You Need to Know: France's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle, is preparing for a significant Indo-Pacific mission, dubbed "Clemenceau 25." Following the Italian carrier ITS Cavour's recent deployment, Charles de Gaulle could strengthen NATO's presence in the region, potentially making port calls in Japan and the Philippines.

-Supported by the new Jacques Chevallier replenishment ship, the mission underscores France's global reach and commitment to regional stability.

-With a catapult launch system similar to U.S. carriers, Charles de Gaulle brings unique capabilities, showcasing NATO’s resolve to maintain a strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific amid rising tensions.

Even as the United States Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers has been spread thin this year, leaving a gap at times in the Indo-Pacific, America's NATO allies have helped fill the void. The Italian Navy's ITS Cavour is now on the return leg of a multi-month-long deployment that saw the flagship aircraft carrier visit Japan, followed by joint exercises with the Royal Australian Navy.

The Maritime Nationale (French Navy) is now preparing for its own mission to the Indo-Pacific. Dubbed "Clemenceau 25," it could see the French Navy's flagship Charles de Gaulle travel to the Indian Ocean next year and possibly even to the Pacific. According to a report from Naval News, while the planning is still underway, the French carrier strike group (CSG) may possibly make port visits to Japan and the Philippines.

"The aircraft carrier happens to have a window of opportunity this year, so the preparation work [for the deployment] is starting to come together," a senior officer told Naval News while noting that there are hurdles that will need to be overcome – notably the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. The French CSG could certainly support the U.S. Navy and other partners in the region, but the primary mission is to show the flag not to take part in major combat operations.

Should the Clemenceau 25 carrier deployment to the Indo-Pacific take place, it would be an opportunity for Paris to put the capabilities of the LSS Jacques Chevallier to the test. The supply ship, which was developed as part of a joint Franco-Italian program, entered service last year.

The lead vessel of its class of replenishment ships was "named for the French engineer who pioneered the nation’s naval nuclear propulsion development and served as chief of the French military procurement office Délégation Générale de l'Armement (DGA) in the late 1980s," Defense News reported.
 
Though such vessels don't receive the fanfare of carriers and other surface combatants, the Jacques Chevallier class will enable the French Navy to carry out globetrotting deployments.

The Charles de Gaulle is the only nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in service today that is not operated by the United States. It replaced the conventionally-powered Clemenceau in 2001, only entering service after what was seen as a troubled fifteen-year construction period. It is likely to remain in service until at least 2038.

The French flagship displaces just 40,000 tons and is similar in size to the U.S. Navy's Wasp- Class amphibious assault ships. Unlike China's People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Type 003 Fujian enters service, the Charles de Gaulle also remains the only non-American carrier-vessel to utilize a catapult launch system, which has allowed the vessel to operate with F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and C-2 Greyhound aircraft.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Will Russia be a great power in decline or does Putin still have something up his sleeve in store for the Atlantic Alliance? 

The short answer is both. 

Russia is sliding ever further downhill but it still can fatally damage the security of NATO. 

Russia has been a state in decline since the USSR collapsed, absolute decline in the 1990s especially. Despite the attempts to signal its influence at the recent BRICS summit, it continues to suffer the consequences of Putin’s catastrophic decision to invade Ukraine in 2022, including the rapid acceleration of dependence on China. A state that is an economic and diplomatic junior partner of Beijing and militarily reliant on Iran and North Korea is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a great power. 

And yet, despite this, Russia retains the will and the capabilities to inflict lasting, maybe fatal damage on NATO. Two policies have proved particularly successful so far; neither requires Russia to be a great power for them to work. 

The first is a set of approaches designed to both test and demonstrate NATO’s lack of resolve. Moscow’s signaling seems to have persuaded the Biden administration that it is too dangerous for the U.S. to enable, or allow its allies to enable, Ukraine to take the steps needed to defeat Russia. 

While committing to this, it appears to have transformed nuclear deterrence into a one-way process, deterring NATO but allowing Russia to escalate without consequences. Having pushed open this door, Putin is unlikely to close it again voluntarily. As a result, we can expect more nuclear blackmail to pressure alliance decision-making in the future, and probably not from Russia alone. 

At the same time, Moscow is testing the boundaries of NATO in Europe with rapidly escalating attacks on critical infrastructure including transport and energy networks. Affected states and NATO collectively have not, so far, decided that they crossed the threshold for a military response, and the attacks are continuing. Like the nuclear threats, they signal NATO's vulnerability and reluctance to act against its adversaries and competitors around the world.  

The ability to push boundaries with few significant consequences has been made easier by another successful Russian method for undermining NATO: domestic interference. 

Disinformation, election interference, and the use of what increasingly look like client parties inside member states such as Hungary, Austria, Germany, and, it must be said, the United States, are undermining the prospects for a coherent response to the threats from Russia. They are also widening splits inside the alliance, increasing the chances that it will either fracture or continue a formal existence but be paralyzed; either would suit Russia. 

The disastrous decision to invade Ukraine has accelerated Russia’s long fall from great power status, but NATO’s uncertain response has also created new opportunities for Putin, or whoever eventually succeeds him, to weaken and humiliate the alliance. Unless Russia is denied the kind of peace that it would take as a victory over both Ukraine and the West, the kind of frozen conflict in which it has specialized for the last thirty years, it will pose an ongoing threat to the U.S. and its European allies, inviting other, more powerful states to do the same. 

Dr. Ruth Deyermond is a Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Post-Soviet Security at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Her primary research expertise is in Russian foreign and security policy, particularly about the West and the states of the former Soviet Union, and US policy towards Russia. She has been a frequent media contributor on the issue of the current war in Ukraine and has given evidence on the war to the UK Parliament’s National Security Strategy Joint Committee.  

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

How concerned should the United States be with the latest developments in the Ukrainian conflict, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific? 

Quite concerned, according to the top U.S. military officer in the Indo-Pacific.  

Over the past few weeks, we have seen North Korean troops deploying in Russia and Ukraine to support Moscow’s war of aggression in Ukraine. We have also seen Russia providing intelligence and targeting data to the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen to facilitate their attacks against commercial shipping and Western warships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. We have seen Iran and Israel attacking one another with direct military strikes. And finally, we have seen China using a record number of combat aircraft and warships to conduct a simulated blockade of Taiwan.  

In a recent discussion, U.S. Navy Admiral Sam Paparo, the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (PACOM), talked about the ongoing threats to the U.S. military and how global adversaries are directly or indirectly working together to undermine world order.  

“The security environment that we’re living in right now is incredibly challenging, but you should be confident that we’re going to prevail,” Adm. Sam Paparo said in a speech last week in Honolulu. 

Paparo made a point about potential U.S. adversaries, such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, working together in, “symbiotic, no-limits relationships.” 

“So, you see the PRC, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are collaborating and cooperating to oppose the United States, our allies, and our partners, like-minded democracies, every single day,” he said. 

Although there is no official alliance, there is a certain alignment on policies that often counter those of the U.S. and the West.  

“Threats are increasingly connected. The technology is demonstrating greater speed and greater effects,” the PACOM chief added. “Given the security mission, the security environment, the PRC’s increasingly aggressive behavior, more than any other time in recent history our ability to deter the PRC may have never been more urgent, nor more critical.” 

China has been undergoing the largest military modernization and expansion since World War II, according to Paparo. Although officially the Chinese Communist Party claims to have spent around $230 billion in 2024, the actual numbers vary and range between $474 to $700 billion according to the source. The fact is that Beijing is spending a lot of on modernizing and building up its forces in the Indo-Pacific with an aim at regional superiority, and later global superiority.  

Taiwan remains Beijing’s priority, and the Chinese Communist Party will likely try to force a reunification with the island nation through an invasion in the immediate future. Everyone hopes that it doesn’t because if it does, and the U.S. decides to come to Taipei’s aid, a wider conflict will erupt, a conflict that no one wants.  

“The PRC’s coercive campaign of pressure against Taiwan continues, and the PRC’s revanchist, revisionist, and expansionist claims in the South China Sea could very well be the next flash point,” the admiral concluded.  

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

 Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Total Disaster: The U.S. Navy’s Zumwalt-class destroyers, initially hailed as cutting-edge stealth warships, have faced severe operational issues and budget overruns, exemplifying flawed strategic priorities.

-With only three built out of an intended 32, these ships are plagued by exorbitant costs, broken armaments, and ineffective systems, underscoring the need for the Navy to refocus on practical assets like hypersonic weapons or expanding its submarine fleet.

-Critics argue that maintaining the Zumwalts in an age of budget constraints and global threats from China, Russia, and others is a wasteful choice, diverting resources from more relevant and reliable defense investments.

The Zumwalt-class destroyer, designed to revolutionize naval warfare with stealth capabilities and advanced armaments, has instead become a symbol of strategic misjudgment and wasteful spending. Initially envisioned as a fleet of 32, only three Zumwalts were built, each plagued by exorbitant costs and functionality issues. The main gun remains broken, and attempts to retrofit the destroyers with hypersonic weapons have proved equally problematic. Critics argue that funds spent on Zumwalt should have been directed toward more practical and reliable systems, such as expanding the Seawolf-class submarine fleet or advancing hypersonic weaponry earlier.

The US Navy’s refusal to innovate and rethink its long-time assumptions about what constitutes its power has been evident for decades since the Cold War ended. It was evident in the decision by Navy planners to not only continue building expensive aircraft carriers, but to build newer models of aircraft carriers that were far more expensive than the previous set. The Navy’s shortsightedness was apparent when it opted to build only three (out of a planned 30) of its Seawolf-class attack submarines. But nothing screams strategic ignorance and cultural decadence like Navy’s commitment to building the Zumwalt-class destroyer.

America’s first Zumwalt-class destroyer, the U.S.S. Zumwalt, was the costliest destroyer it had ever built—far surpassing the cost of the magnificent Arleigh Burke-class destroyer which still protects US Navy aircraft carrier battle groups. Three units of the Zumwalt were built, a small class of warships for sure. 

They are also the largest destroyers in the world. Their distinctive hull design that makes them look like something from Babylon 5 and less like a US Navy warship is because they are the world’s first true stealth warships. These destroyers were so next-generation technologically that General Dynamics, the company that built the Zumwalt-class, had to spend $40 million just to build a special facility for these next-generation warships.

The Zumwalts were meant to be a complete break from the way things had been done by the US Navy. The warship produces the same amount of power as an aircraft carrier. It possesses 80 vertical launchers for various types of missiles. A key part of the Zumwalt’s mission was to be able to conduct deep-ranging sea-to-shore strikes. Remember, the Zumwalts were designed back when the United States was the undisputed unipolar power. 

At that time, America was more concerned with rogue states, transnational terrorist groups, and the scourge of ethno-religious sectarian conflicts abroad. The Navy was constantly trying to keep itself relevant at that time and having a “multi-mission” stealth warship seemed like a worthwhile investment.

There was just one problem: the Zumwalt-class destroyer didn’t work as advertised. It took years longer to build and was around 50 percent more expensive than what the defense contractors had sold to Congress. Initially planned to have a fleet of 32 Zumwalts, today, the Navy has just three. 

And they’re constantly needing repairs. 

The armaments alone are egregiously expensive, partly because the supply chain was designed to provide cheaper armaments once the Zumwalt fleet reached its 32-unit goal. Since that goal will now never be met, the costs for the unique armaments for these warships will remain exorbitant. In the age of constrained budgets, this is not a worthwhile investment. 

Besides, as it turns out, the main gun on the Zumwalt is broken and cannot be repaired. Rather than cut its losses, though, the Navy is insistent on trying to make the Zumwalt work. It’s getting rid of the 155-milimeter non-working Advanced Gun Systems (with its $800,000 per round ammunition). Instead, the Zumwalts will be fitted with the equally expensive, non-functional hypersonic weapons platform that the US Navy has been desperately trying to build. To be clear, investing in hypersonic weapons is a good move. 

Unfortunately, these systems are clearly not ready for showtime (whereas Russia’s, sadly, are ready and China’s hypersonic weapons are right behind Russia’s). And deploying these boondoggles—which, according to some assessments, are not as stealthy as they were designed to be—is absurdly wasteful.

But the Zumwalt-class is another example of the kind of decadence at the Department of Defense and from Congress that I’ve been railing about. These warships were designed and deployed at a time when America could afford to indulge its wildest strategic fantasies. It was still basking in its Cold War victory, there were no serious challengers to American global primacy, and things at home were going well. 

Those days are gone.

With China on the rise, Russia pushing hard against US-backed NATO, Iran agitating for a great regional war against American allies in Israel and the Sunni Arab states, and North Korea poised to go nuclear at any moment, the last thing the Navy should be doing is continuing to support the wasteful Zumwalt.

Just imagine if, instead of trying to reinvent the wheel, the Navy planners simply stuck to the basics. Instead of blowing the $22.4 billion on researching and developing the Zumwalts, just imagine what would have been if the Navy invested in building up its unbelievably tiny fleet of Seawolf-class attack submarines. 

Or if the Navy had invested in getting its hypersonic weapons ready for deployment years before they started taking the concept seriously. This isn’t hindsight, many were skeptical, for example, that the Navy’s investment into the Zumwalt-class was going to pay off.

Now the Navy is stuck with a sunk cost. It should cut its losses now. Instead, it seems to be doubling-down on failure. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is out now from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

North Korea’s Bet on a New International Order Using Russia: With the news that Russia-North Korea security cooperation is more than just arms deal and technology transfer or sharing but involves North Korean troop deployment and participation, what does it tell us about North Korea’s intentions, and what should be the U.S.’s response going forward?    

Contrary to some claims, the budding North Korea-Russia relations will likely endure as North Korea makes long-term strategic changes that will outlast the Ukraine War because North Korea sees fundamental shifts in the international order that it’s betting on. It may gain materially from its newfound partnership with Russia, but Pyongyang’s recent moves suggest that it is going all out to bet on the emergence of a new multipolar order in which the U.S. and the West will no longer exert hegemonic influence on conflicts and issues that are perceived to have little bearing on them.  

Pyongyang’s firm belief in its foresight is suggested by its recent actions that are aimed at demonstrating a commitment to its mutual defense treaty with Russia and stonewalling not just the U.S. and South Korea but also China. While many have been skeptical about the strength and depth of Moscow-Pyongyang cooperation, North Korea seems genuinely committed. 

The lavish treatment it afforded to Putin earlier this year in June as part of elevating the bilateral ties was also a promulgation for the North Korean public, a sign that Pyongyang is serious about making deepening bilateral relations the new norm in its domestic discourse.  

A diplomatic treatment of a similar scale that involved the North Korean public was last observed in September 2018 when the then South Korean President Moon Jae-in visited Pyongyang and became the first South Korean leader to give a speech to the North Korean public in May Stadium that included calling for unification and denuclearization. 

North Korea not only committed to the military agreement signed during this summit but also its subsequent talks with the U.S. While this rapprochement did not last, it demonstrates that North Korea, at least for now, is dedicated to its elevated partnership with Russia.  

The latest Moscow-Pyongyang partnership also wasn’t built overnight. North Korea invited Chinese and Russian government delegates to attend events marking the armistice of the Korean War in July 2023, the first time it has invited foreign delegates to attend its military parade since February 2018. The burgeoning cooperation elevated to leader-level correspondence in the form of a birthday letter in August, which was soon followed by face-to-face diplomacy, first in September 2023 and again in June 2024. Kim Jong Un is also slated to make a reciprocal visit to Russia next year following Putin’s invitation.   

The most significant indicator of North Korea’s resolve to stick to its gun about the emerging new order is the shift in its inter-Korea policy. First, it called for abandoning unification with South Korea not just in policy but in institutions as well by abolishing all organizations tasked with inter-Korea policies in January 2024. 

Then, it proceeded with material provocations by sending trash balloons since May 2024 in retaliation for propaganda broadcasts from the South and subsequently fortifying the border, demonstrating its willingness to escalate by retaliating, including resorting to the use of force. Most recently, it blasted the highway and railway connecting the two Koreas, giving a final blow to any remaining aspirations for unification. 

With two ongoing wars and the U.S. distracted by its domestic politics and the upcoming presidential election, the current period cannot get any better for North Korea to pivot its betting on building relations with Russia and its view of the future of the international order.  

Pyongyang has learned from the West’s lackluster responses and adherence to non-intervention in the two wars in Ukraine and Gaza that it can further push the boundaries of sanctions. With Russia’s backing via its veto in the UN Security Council, it has also found itself a sanctions haven so that it can focus on its weapons development and evade additional sanctions, at least for as long as the war in Ukraine persists.  

Unfortunately, time is on North Korea’s side. As the war in Ukraine drags on as it has been for almost three years, it buys North Korea time to perfect its satellite technology with Russia’s help. 

A fallout between Moscow and Pyongyang is always possible, but North Korea stands to benefit at the end of the day even if Russia loses the war. China has been following a hands-off approach and will remain ambivalent towards Pyongyang, while Kim knows that South Korea will remain eager to restore inter-Korea communication on any given day. 

With the U.S., Pyongyang will use whatever it has gained materially or not from its new alliance with Russia as leverage for talks with the U.S. Having learned from the 2018 to 2019 talks that the U.S. simply refuses to negotiate with Pyongyang as an equal, it will raise the bar for any communication even if Donald Trump wins the election.   

North Korea is, and has been, more resilient than assumed by many watchers and analysts in the West. Now that it has found an almost perfect partner in crime to mold an international order in its favor, a more definitive action by the U.S., whether toward the war in Ukraine or North Korea, is inevitable.  

Minseon Ku is a postdoctoral fellow with the Diplomacy Project at the Global Research Institute at William & Mary.  

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Obsolete Carrier: The Nimitz-class carriers, icons of U.S. power since the Cold War, may struggle in future conflicts dominated by anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems. Though carrying impressive weaponry, advanced sensors, and a powerful air wing, their effectiveness could be hindered if forced to remain out of A2/AD range, potentially nullifying their role as force projectors.

-As aging Nimitz-class carriers are phased out in favor of the new Ford-class, critics argue carriers are relics in an A2/AD-dominated world.

-Some believe U.S. defense priorities should shift toward more adaptable, cost-effective platforms that better address current strategic realities.

The United States has eleven nuclear-powered aircraft carriers at its disposal. Ten of them belong to the Nimitz-class. When the next great power war erupts, the advent of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems will have negated much of the operational freedom that carriers have enjoyed in the postwar era. 

Still, American flat tops are modern marvels of engineering. 

First deployed in 1972, these nuclear-powered carriers were designed to have a lifespan of roughly 50 years with one mid-life refueling. These warships were designed with achieving naval supremacy in a contested environment—and keeping it. Created with America’s Cold War antagonist, the Soviet Union, in mind, these great ships are holdovers from a bygone era. 

One might argue, however, that their true heyday came in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. These systems proved most potent when the United States stood as the unchallenged global hegemon in a unipolar world system. 

A floating airbase able to be deployed anywhere (so long as the sea-lanes are open and the waterways around a target are relatively uncontested), these behemoths stalked the deep blue seas imposing US will upon other countries for decades. They also served as vital relief ships whenever humanitarian crises hit—at great expense to the US taxpayer. 

But during the Cold War, such operations were one way the Americans bested the Soviets in the battle for the hearts-and-minds of the world’s population. 

In the post-Cold War era, such taxpayer-funded humanitarian missions had the effect of showing the flag, reminding people from around the world of America’s power and ubiquity. 

The Nimitz-class was manufactured by the Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipbuilding Company, the great ship is powered by two Westinghouse A4W nuclear reactors. She carries a crew of around 3,200 plus more than 2,000 personnel as part of the carrier’s mighty airwing. 

A Nimitz-class carrier displaces a full load of 100,000 tons.  

This boat can travel at more than 30 knots (about 34 miles per hour). While each ship of this class has variegated arsenals, generally speaking, the Nimitz-class comes armed with NATO RIM-7 Sea Sparrow Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), which are launched by two-to-three Mk29 missile launchers. If the Sea Sparrow SAMs aren’t needed, the Nimitz-class can pop off eight RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM). Along with these systems is a Mk.49 missile launching system that can deploy 21 RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM).  A Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) protects the warship.

It's real offensive capability, though, resides with her airwing. She carries around 60 aircraft (after all, you cannot have an aircraft carrier without aircraft!) Yet, in today’s era of A2/AD, there is real concern among experts that the Nimitz-class carriers would be kept out of the range of A2/AD systems. 

Therefore, her airwing would be unable to deploy into a contested environment, as they would be out of range. Of course, they could always refuel midair. The only problem with that is, if the A2/AD network they’re going up against is as comprehensive as America’s rivals—such as China—have made them, then midair refueling tankers would be easy targets, too. 

Here again, we have an example of America’s greatest surface warship to date being negated by relatively cheap A2/AD systems. 

Other systems onboard that help the ship’s warfighting abilities are magnificent sensors, such as the AN/SPS-48E electronically scanned array 3D air search radar, the AN/SPS-49 long-range 2D air search radar, AN/SPQ-9 target acquisition radar, AN/SPN-46 precision approach and landing system, as well as a multiplicity of other systems designed to help the air operations for a carrier. These carriers are loaded with electronic warfare suites along with torpedo decoys meant to stymie incoming torpedo attacks. 

The size, speed, and reach of the Nimitz-class carrier is impressive. In an uncontested domain or even a contested domain with lesser advanced systems than what most American rivals have today deployed, these carriers would continue to be the undisputed heavyweight champion of the high seas. 

The US has made a long-term investment into these carriers, and it has gotten much return on that investment. Although, as the world moves into the A2/AD era, the US Navy should be spending its limited capital developing systems that are more relevant to this new strategic era. 

Rather than focus on building relevant technologies for the future, though, the Navy has decided to go-for-broke with the new Gerald R. Ford-class carriers which are meant to slowly replace the aging Nimitz-class carrier. Here again is a great example of Washington not understanding the reality of what we are facing today globally. Much as the battleship of old, the aircraft carrier is basically useless in today’s age of A2/AD. 

When the Nimitz-class is ultimately retired, that should be the end of the carrier.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

What You Need to Know: The 16-inch/50-caliber Mark 7 gun, featured on Iowa-class battleships, became one of the U.S. Navy's most powerful and iconic weapons. Designed initially for lighter rounds, the Mark 7 was reengineered to fire a 2,700-pound Armor Piercing (AP) Mark 8 shell, rivaling the destructive capacity of larger Japanese guns.

-Mounted in turrets requiring 77 crew members, each Mark 7 could penetrate 32 feet of concrete or create massive craters with High Capacity shells.

-The Mark 7's versatility included armor-piercing, high-explosive, and even nuclear rounds, making it a formidable weapon in the Iowa class’s arsenal.

The Iowa class was the last U.S. battleship ever built, and one of the most iconic. Fittingly, the class was equipped with what might be the most iconic naval gun, the celebrated 16-inch/50-caliber Mark 7. Let’s take a look at the Mark 7 to better understand what made the gun so superlative.

In the late 1930s, the U.S. commissioned a set of studies for “fast battleship” designs. The General Board, which considered design options, initially considered using an 18-inch/47-caliber gun that had been in use since the 1920s. The 18-inch gun was massive and formidable. But accommodating the gun would have meant increasing displacement above the 45,000-ton limit that, in the late 1930s, was still treaty-enforced.

Eventually, the General Board settled on the 16-inch Mark 7. The gun was originally designed to fire a lighter, 2,240-pound Armor Piercing (AP) Mark 5 projectile. But the Mark 7’s shell handling system was redesigned to handle the heavier, 2,700-pound AP Mark 8. The Mark 7, paired with the Mark 8 projectile, allowed the guns to achieve penetrating power similar to that of Japanese 18.1-inch guns, despite weighing less.

“In 1969, Capt. Edward Snyder of the USS New Jersey (an Iowa-class battleship) reported that the armor piercing shell could penetrate 32 feet of reinforced concrete,” Tim Migaki wrote. “Reportedly, the explosion of a High Capacity shell would create a crater 50 feet wide and 20 feet deep.”

Clearly, the designers had built a gun with considerable firepower. 

The Mark 7 was built with “a liner, A tube, jacket, three hoops, two locking rings, tube and liner locking ring, yoke liner,” Migaki wrote. “Some components were autofretted. The bores were also chromium-plated to increase barrel life.”

To build the Mark 7, each piece of the gun was heated and expanded, and then slid down over the tube. As the gun part cooled, it would shrink, creating a tight unit.

On the deck of an Iowa-class ship, the Mark 7 would be mounted in turrets on individual slides, which could be elevated independently of each other. The result was, technically, a three-gun turret, rather than a triple turret.

“Each turret assembly consists of a gun house with a rotating structure, a fixed structure, a barbette, and magazines,” Migaki wrote. “The gun house is the rotating armored structure that contains the guns, sighting, and rangefinder stations. The gun pit and machinery flat extend below the shelf plate of the hun house into the upper and lower barbettes.”

Remarkably, a bare minimum of 77 sailors was needed for the operation of a single Mark 7 turret.

Of course, the Mark 7 could be loaded with different types of ammunition. These included Armor Piercing; High Capacity; High Explosive – Controlled Variable Time; Improved Conventional Munition; High Explosive – Electronic Time/Point Detonating; and later, the Nuclear Mark 23 with a 15-20-kiloton nuclear warhead.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Greatest Ever? The B-1B Lancer, initially designed during the Cold War for nuclear deterrence, became a vital asset in Afghanistan and Iraq, repurposed as a conventional bomber delivering devastating air support.

-In Afghanistan, U.S. covert forces utilized satellite radios to call in Lancers, which provided continuous, precision close air support.

-One historic deployment saw the 7th Bomb Wing execute 500 troops-in-contact responses and 700 priority air requests, delivering 400 bombs on target. Modernization efforts, like the addition of GBU-54 Laser JDAM, further enhanced its capability.

The B-1B remains one of the most effective American bombers in the Global War on Terror.

The B-1B Lancer was the undisputed workhorse in the air war over Afghanistan. 

From the first moments the CIA’s “Jawbreaker” paramilitary teams and U.S. special operations forces busted covertly into the notoriously rough land and linked up with the indigenous tribes aligned against the Taliban and al Qaeda, the Americans conducted the first phase of the war with great alacrity. 

A handful of covert warriors riding on horseback, embedded with the Northern Alliance, armed with Kalashnikovs, packing duffel bags of money to buy the loyalty of the locals, and sporting satellite radios, were the decisive element in knocking the Taliban out of Kabul and sending al Qaeda scattering for the hills. Those satellite radios were instrumental because they served as the lifeline between those handful of operators and the potent U.S. air power that blasted Taliban and al Qaeda formations in the field. 

It was the B-1B Lancer that usually answered the call of those embedded operators, circling a battlefield and delivering death and destruction to the terrorists below. These were the halcyon days, when victory seemed assured in what would become America’s longest war. The negative turn in the failed war was still months away. And even then, the Lancer would define the air war for the country. 

Not only were the Lancers highly devastating in Afghanistan, but they were used to great effect in Iraq as well. In fact, in 2008 the U.S. Air Force’s official website labeled the B-1B Lancer as one of the most important bombers in that war. The lessons learned from Afghanistan were quickly carried over to the War in Iraq in 2003, with the Lancers conducting an assortment of Close Air Support missions. 

America’s B-1B Lancer was designed during the Cold War. It was to be a long-range bomber able to counter the Soviet long-range nuclear bombers of that era. When the USSR collapsed, the Lancer suffered through a bit of an identity crisis. That all changed, however, with the Global War on Terror. 

Lancers were repurposed for carrying large amounts of conventional ordnance. They became bomb and missile trucks. These birds floated over a target and pummeled it mercilessly. 

The longer the war in Afghanistan went on, the more the Lancers were used, with massive impact for Americans trying to keep the scourge of al Qaeda and the Taliban away from parts of the country they had liberated. 

One notable instance during the War in Afghanistan occurred in 2011-2012. The Air Force’s Seventh Bomb Wing deployed to Afghanistan. As Military.com outlines, it was a “record-breaking” deployment for the B-1B. “The airmen of the 7th kept a bomber in the air over Afghanistan every moment of their deployment.” Continuing, “nine bombers, 400 airmen, and a whole litany of fun facts” erupted from that historic deployment.

Relatedly, the “airmen of the 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron and 9th Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Unit provided more than 25 percent of the total fixed-wing close-air support coverage for coalition ground forces in Afghanistan every day by launching the most B-1 sorties executed on a single deployment” in the first decade of the war, according to Military.com.

Some key points the Air Force highlighted at the time were that across the six-month-plus deployment, the group responded to “more than 500 troops-in-contact situations, with the enemy as close as 300 meters from friendly forces, and another 700 priority air requests, delivering more than 400 weapons on target.”

During this time, the Air Force completed significant modernizations to the B-1B Lancer. The Lancers would deploy the GBU-54 Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition, allowing for the Forces Air Component Commander to engage and destroy moving targets with the Lancer for the first time ever. The Lancers expanded their footprint both in Afghanistan and Iraq and enjoyed a high success rate.

The B-1B Lancer is possibly the greatest American warplane in the Afghanistan War – and quite possibly in Iraq, too. That’s quite a record, if you ask me.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

The Age of 'Cheap Tanks'?: Despite advanced anti-tank systems and drone technology redefining modern combat, the tank remains relevant on the battlefield. The Ukraine conflict has revealed the limitations of investing in expensive, high-tech main battle tanks (MBTs) like Russia's T-14 Armata or America’s AbramsX, as cheaper, older tanks are often more resilient and cost-effective in high-intensity conflict zones.

-Russia and Ukraine’s use of older Soviet-era tanks like the T-72 and T-64 highlights their durability and ease of repair.

-Going forward, militaries may benefit more from enhancing and maintaining existing tank fleets against evolving threats rather than prioritizing costly, complex new models.

Buzzing around the skies of Ukraine’s chaotic, bloody, muddy battlefields are swarms of drones (and now, the Russians are deploying ground drones). These frightening, hard-to-track battle bots strike with a ferocity that greatly outstrips their tiny size. 

Indeed, they have defined the Ukraine War and have redefined the way we outsiders to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine view warfare more generally. That’s because the drones have not only been used to annihilate soldiers belonging to the other side, but they have been used with great effect against enemy armor.

Throw in things like the NATO-provided Javelin anti-tank missiles (as well as the system that the Russians are using against Ukraine), and many have begun questioning whether the age of tanks is over. We’ve certainly heard this conversation before. Remember, in the run-up to Desert Storm, many people were questioning whether the tank was even still relevant. 

The Battle of 73 Easting is an iconic reminder of how wrong those suppositions were in the 1990s. Afterward, as the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were underway, many rightly pointed out how useless main battle tanks (MBTs) were in those environments.

Still, the world’s militaries persisted in their commitment to what were once wistfully dubbed as “land battleships.” The Russians went hard into Ukraine with a massive force of tanks. Many of which were knocked out, at first by those aforementioned Javelin anti-tank missiles. Then, however, the Ukrainians got creative. They started using increasingly sophisticated—and lethal—drones to damage or outright destroy Russian armor. 

As a result, the Russians lost a large number of tanks that they were not planning to. Things were initially so tense for the Russian tank force that Moscow chose to keep their small group of advanced T-14 Armata MBTs in reserve, allowing for their older Soviet-era tanks to take all the risks. Interestingly, those older Soviet-era tanks—notably the T-72 for the Russians and the T-64 for the Ukrainians—have had the best success rate. Even the Russian’s more advanced T-90M MBT has struggled. Dittos for all those fancy NATO-provided tanks the Ukrainians received last year.

So, what are the lessons learned from this experience? Are tanks really—finally—obsolete? 

Not quite.

What should be obvious is that newer, more sophisticated tanks might not be worth the time, effort, and money that nations have been putting into them. Whether it be America’s newest version of the Abrams MBT, the AbramsX, or Russia’s massively expensive T-14 Armata, the presence of large numbers of cheap drones as well as anti-tank missiles likely make such expenditures wasteful. Those resources should be redirected to more fruitful endeavors. 

Yet, the Russians (and Ukrainians) continue deploying their Soviet-era tanks into the crucible of combat with wanton abandon. That’s because they still have their place. Even with drone swarms and Javelins on hand, Russian tanks are more numerous than Ukrainian tanks are. 

The Russians can—and have—used their tanks to bust through concentrated defenses along the Ukrainian frontline. 

The fact that Moscow is utilizing their older, cheaper systems means that they have the ability to more reliably (and cheaply) repair those systems when they’re damaged or to replace them outright with little headache.

Again, the Ukrainians are experiencing this with their older T-64s. The older, the cheaper. The cheaper, the better. That’s because the tanks can still be used—albeit in a more limited fashion. But their loss would not be the event that broke the back of either side’s forces. If, however, the more advanced T-14s were lost in combat (especially to drones or Javelins), that might do significant damage to Russia, if only because of the damage to the prestige of Russia’s military it would do. 

What the other great powers of the world should learn is this: MBTs are here to stay. Instead of building increasingly sophisticated—expensive—platforms which are hard to mass produce (unless you have a remarkable defense industrial base as does China), simply maintain your older MBTs. If, at all possible, take those older platforms and harden them against the kinds of unorthodox attacks that drones and anti-tank systems initiate against the MBTs in your arsenal. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

What You Need to Know: The U.S. Navy announced plans to extend the service life of a dozen Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, aiming to keep these aging ships operational for up to 48 additional ship-years from 2028 to 2035.

-The decision, announced by Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro, seeks to maintain fleet numbers while newer vessels are produced, though it comes with a projected cost of $6 billion over 15 years.

-As the Navy phases out less successful programs like the littoral combat ships, these veteran destroyers will serve a critical role in global power projection and defense amid a constrained budget environment.

It wasn't meant to sound the least bit scary or ominous, but perhaps Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro should have reviewed the calendar on Thursday. Announcing that the Department of the Navy plans to operate a dozen " Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) Flight I destroyers beyond their 35-year expected service life" sounds questionable at any time, but doing so on the day of spooks and horrors almost seems like a portent for the worst to happen.

"The decision, based upon a hull-by-hull evaluation of ship material condition, combat capability, technical feasibility and lifecycle maintenance requirements, will result in an additional 48 ship-years of cumulative ship service life in the 2028 to 2035 timeframe," the U.S. Navy said in a statement while confirming this is really about keeping up the size of the fleet.

In the past year, the sea service had reportedly "conducted a thorough evaluation of each DDG-15 Flight ship," and then determined that a dozen "should remain operational," despite the ship's reaching the end of their respective planned service life. The Navy added that the selection was also based on maximizing the service life before any of the warships will require additional "extensive and costly docking availability."

The U.S. Navy is looking to keep the aging warships in service and as cost-effectively as possible, Del Toro suggested.

"Extending these highly-capable, well-maintained destroyers will further bolster our numbers as new construction warships join the Fleet," said Secretary Del Toro. "It also speaks to their enduring role in projecting power globally, and most recently in the Red Sea, their proven ability to defend themselves, as well as our allies, partners and friends from missile and drone attacks."

Yet, keeping the aging ships, which have a 35-year service life, won't be free.

"We expect a total cost estimate of $1.3 billion across the FY26 FYDP and $6 billion over 15-years," a spokesperson for Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro told USNI News. "On average, it will cost about $139.6 million per ship [per] year."

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti's NAVPLAN had called for the sea service to "get more ready players on the field," and the aging destroyers are those players in this case – but it could be seen to be more about keeping old and tired players on the field instead.

"Today's budget constrained environment requires the Navy to make prioritized investments to keep more ready players on the field," said Adm. Franchetti. "The Navy is actively pulling the right levers to maintain and grow its Battle Force Inventory to support the United States's global interests in peace and to win decisively in conflict."

USS Barry (DDG-52) USS The Sullivans (DDG-68) will see their service extended by three years; USS Gonzalez (DDG-66), USS Cole (DDG-67), USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53), USS Paul Hamilton (DDG-60), USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-54), USS Laboon (DDG-58), USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) and USS Stout (DDG-55) will each receive five-year extensions; and USS Carney (DDG-64) and USS Stethem (DDG-63) will each receive one-year extensions.

Not noted in CNO or Secretary Del Toro is how the U.S. Navy has already begun to decommission its littoral combat ships (LCS), even as new models were produced. Along with the Zumwalt-class destroyer program, the LCS has been a hole in the water that the U.S. Navy has thrown taxpayer money into, and as the service is pinching pennies to pay for its next-generation warships, today's sailors will be forced to service on vessels that are getting long in the tooth.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

What You Need to Know: The U.S. Marine Corps is adapting the FIM-92 Stinger missile, traditionally used to down aircraft, for anti-amphibious roles in preparation for a potential conflict with China.

-In recent joint drills with the Philippine military, Marines deployed Stingers from coastal positions to target landing crafts, showcasing the weapon’s versatility.

-Given the potential need to defend Taiwan against a Chinese amphibious assault, the Marines are rethinking coastal defense strategies.

-The updated Stinger, equipped with a proximity fuse for counter-drone operations, demonstrates effectiveness against amphibious targets, adding a new layer to the Marine Corps’ coastal defense capabilities.

The U.S. Marine Corps is getting ready for a war with China by testing some old weapons in new roles.

As part of this testing, Marine infantry companies are using the FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missile—the weapon responsible for Russia’s “Vietnam” in Afghanistan in the 1980s—against amphibious targets.

A war with China would most likely erupt over a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. And an invasion of Taiwan would require one of the largest amphibious operations in modern times. So, the Marine Corps is working on its anti-amphibious warfare capabilities to defend against Chinese landings.

As part of a recent counter-landing drills with the Philippine military, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) tested the FIM-92 Stinger against incoming landing crafts and amphibious infantry fighting vehicles.

The shouldered-fired FIM-92 Stinger isn’t designed to take on landing craft and boats but rather to shoot down helicopters and fighter jets.

The Marines were set up in holes close to the beach in a layout similar to those of their forefathers in World War Two. However, today’s battlefield presents more threats. A Chinese invasion force, for example, would very likely use one-way attack drones ahead of the landing forces to soften up the beach and take out threats. There are countermeasures and ways to protect against such threats, but the danger is there.

“Today, Philippine and U.S. Marines are integrating our respective emerging doctrines for coastal defense and counter-landing operations,” U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Col. Nicholas Freeman, commanding officer of Battalion Landing Team 1/5, 15th MEU, said about the counter-landing exercise.

In terms of targets, the Marines fired against dummies on the water, landing several hits, and thus showcasing that the FIM-92 Stinger can indeed be effective in a counter-landing role.

“We’re training to maneuver and mass effects to attrite, block, fix and destroy a force that attempts to land. Here, Philippine guides would bring in our forces to rapidly establish an area defense of this landing site. Our engagement area would extend from the beach's exit routes out to the launch points for enemy landing craft, with a plan for fires integrating both Philippine and U.S. Marine weapons systems,” Freeman added.

According to Raytheon, the manufacturer of the FIM-92 Stinger, the portable anti-aircraft missile has more than 270 verified kills, including fighter jets and helicopters, to its credit. As far as targets, the Russian military remains the FIM-92 Stinger’s favorite adversary, with most of the 270 kills racked up against the Soviet and Russian forces in Afghanistan and Ukraine. The Ukrainian forces are using the missile profusely to deny the Russian Aerospace Forces control of the skies over the battlefield.

The FIM-92 Stinger has been in service since the 1980s but remains a reliable anti-aircraft weapon system and quite dangerous to low-flying aircraft. Raytheon has equipped newer versions of the missile with a proximity fuse that allows the munition to explode when it is close to a target rather than when it strikes it, thus making it ideal for counter-drone operations as well.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and Shutterstock.