Diplomacy & Crisis News

(Pete Souza / White House)

In June, Senator John McCain made a bold claim regarding the consequences of President Obama’s foreign policy decisions. He asserted that Obama’s policy on Iraq—specifically, his decision to remove U.S. troops at the end of 2011—was “directly responsible” for the carnage in Orlando, Florida.

McCain told reporters: “Barack Obama is directly responsible for it because when he pulled everybody out of Iraq, al-Qaeda went to Syria, became ISIS, and ISIS is what it is today thanks to Barack Obama’s failures—utter failures, by pulling everybody out of Iraq, thinking that conflicts end just because you leave. So the responsibility for it lies with President Barack Obama and his failed policies.

He repeated the charge several times at the behest of surprised reporters, who evidently wanted to give him a chance to moderate the claim. Soon afterward, he issued a statement that appeared to be moderated (changing his terminology from ISIS to ISIL in the process).

The new statement read: “I misspoke. I did not mean to imply that the President was personally responsible. I was referring to President Obama’s national security decisions, not the President himself. As I have said, President Obama’s decision to completely withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011 led to the rise of ISIL.”

It went on, arguing that “I and others have long warned that the failure of the President’s policy to deny ISIL safe haven would allow the terrorist organization to inspire, plan, direct or conduct attacks on the United States and Europe as they have done in Paris, Brussels, San Bernardino and now Orlando.”

How this differs in any meaningful way from the original statement frankly escapes me, but apparently both McCain and the White House were uninterested in pursuing the issue further and let it drop. Perhaps I am less forgiving than either of them, but the statement has stuck with me. I would like to examine this claim further. For one thing, I suspect that a lot of people will agree with it without devoting a much thought to the matter, so I think it is a mistake to let that slip by.

First of all, whatever one thinks of the link between Obama’s withdrawal order and the creation of ISIS, it is important to notice that the Islamic State had no direct contact with the Orlando attacker. The only connection is that the shooter appears to have been inspired by ISIS. The group does not need to control any territory  for that to happen. The shooter could as easily have said that he was inspired by the 19th-century abolitionist John Brown, and the fact that Brown has been dead for 157 years would not have prevented it. The efforts needed to counter shooting incidents like that in Orlando (or the one in Aurora, Colorado, for that matter) are unrelated to conflicts in the Middle East.

Second, McCain’s brief sequence of events stands out. That is, “…he pulled everybody out of Iraq, al-Qaeda [in Iraq] went to Syria, became ISIS, and ISIS is what it is today…” Is this the causal argument that McCain meant to present? Obama pulled the troops out of Iraq, so the enemy went to chaotic, war-torn Syria, where they became ISIS?

If we accept that going to Syria was a key element in the transformation of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) into ISIS, how was that caused by Obama pulling troops out of Iraq? Did the creation of a vacuum in Iraq somehow blow them in the opposite direction? If U.S. troops had stayed in Iraq, would AQI then have been unable to go to Syria? If U.S. troops were still fighting them in Iraq, would that not have given them an even greater incentive to go to Syria? The causal relationship here is a bit confusing.

Finally, it is also necessary to mention—as many commentators already have—that the decision for the withdrawal was made by the Bush administration in 2008, in agreement with the Iraqi government. Of course, Condoleezza Rice stated subsequently that the Bush administration did not really mean it, which at first glance seems a curious kind of boast.

What she had in mind, naturally, was that the administration had hoped to negotiate some sort of small-scale, long-term U.S. military presence—short of war fighting—that might have bolstered the Iraqi military and perhaps served as a sort of deterrent. (We shall leave aside for now the fact that the introduction of a large-scale war-fighting force in 2003 did not deter a fight, but rather started one.) The fact is that the Obama administration was aware of this intention and attempted to do just that, but they and the Iraqis could not come to agreement.

The official reason for the failure to come to an agreement had to do with a technical issue: Which country would have legal jurisdiction over crimes committed by U.S. personnel in Iraq? Traditionally, U.S. agreements with host countries permit the United States to prosecute such crimes, but Iraq said no.

Although I cannot prove it, my suspicion is that the two sides could have overcome this impasse if they had really wanted to do so. It is quite possible that Obama was not interested in pressing hard for the privilege of staying in Iraq, but I believe the real obstacle was on the other side. After eight years of war, the U.S. military presence had become so toxic that no Iraqi politician wanted to be seen as favoring its continuation.

There were, to be sure, some Iraqi leaders who quietly confessed that a continued U.S. military presence would be useful, or even necessary, but they could not be brought to say so in public, much less vote for it in Parliament. Some American commentators have criticized the Obama administration for insisting on a public vote instead of simply doing what was necessary behind the scenes. But what would have happened in that case? The Iraqi public was not going to overlook that fact that troops were still there. The first time that something went wrong—and it would not take long for that to happen—the people who were unable to endorse a U.S. presence in public would start making statements like, “I didn’t ask them to stay. They just wouldn’t go.” Eventually the situation would be much as it is today, with two significant exceptions:

1. We would be in the middle of it.

2. The Shi’a would be shooting at us, too, because we wouldn’t leave

It is worth noting that even now, despite all the problems Iraq has had with ISIS over the past two years, no Iraqi leader has asked us to come back in with a full military presence.

What McCain has done is not unusual. Whenever a government chooses between two paths and the outcome is negative, people are quick to assume that the opposite choice would have brought complete success. Nonetheless, there is no sure way to know whether the opposite choice would have created a situation that was better, basically the same in all but the details, or even substantially worse.

The post John McCain Blames ISIS on Obama appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The United Nations human rights chief today deplored the terrorist bombing in Baghdad on Sunday that reportedly killed more than 150 people, calling on Iraqi authorities to do more to protect civilians as well as halt uncontrolled militias from continuing to take revenge on civilians fleeing towns recaptured from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da&#39esh).

Après un an de déconfiture, les dirigeants ukrainiens ont dû accepter de nouveaux accords à Minsk. Mais la perspective d'une solution politique durable, s'appuyant sur le respect des minorités et un dialogue avec Moscou, semble lointaine. / Europe, Russie, Ukraine, Conflit, Économie, Géopolitique, (...) / Europe, Russie, Ukraine, Conflit, Économie, Géopolitique, Politique, Relations internationales, Violence, Stratégie militaire - 2015/03

Karl Kraus (1874-1936) a laissé derrière lui une œuvre considérable, dont « Les Derniers Jours de l'humanité » constitue l'élément central. Consacrée aux horreurs de la première guerre mondiale, cette pièce frappe aujourd'hui par ses accents prophétiques. / Allemagne, Art, Conflit, Culture, Histoire, (...) / Allemagne, Art, Conflit, Culture, Histoire, Idées, Idéologie, Intellectuels, Littérature, Presse, Théâtre, Violence, Infoguerre, Corruption - 2014/11

Joost Hiltermann, Middle East & North Africa Program Director, discusses with Australia's ABC the difficulties that the Kurds will face if they pursue independence, starting with their divergent views on the creation of a Kurdish state.

Il 4 giugno scorso, capi di Stato e di governo della Comunità economica degli Stati dell’Africa occidentale (Ecowas) si sono riuniti a Dakar. In conformità con le attuali evoluzioni, l’ordine del giorno della 49esima conferenza dell’organizzazione si è caratterizzato per l’ampia presenza di questioni politiche, piuttosto che di problematiche legate allo sviluppo economico. Inoltre, più che sull’esame di situazioni nazionali di Paesi come il Burkina Faso, il Mali o la Guinea Bissau, le discussioni si sono concentrate su temi transnazionali come la lotta al terrorismo o ai conflitti tra gli allevatori, che costituiscono ormai delle nuove minacce per la sicurezza dell’Africa occidentale. Affrontare queste nuove sfide richiede una riforma radicale da parte dell’Ecowas.

The United Nations today condemned Israel for demolishing Palestinians&#39 homes and advancing plans to build new houses for Israeli settlers, amid the prospect of the two-state solution to the Middle East conflict already &#8220slipping away.&#8221

A United Nations-mandated human rights inquiry panel today welcomed a resolution that brings justice for the people of Eritrea who have suffered gross human rights violations over the past 25 years &#8220a step closer&#8221 to being realized.

The United Nations human rights chief today warned that the security and human rights situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) may be starting to deteriorate again, after a series a major incidents in the capital of Bangui and rural areas.

The head of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) today hailed as &#8220a major breakthrough&#8221 a recent announcement by Canada, Mexico and the United States that they will take sweeping action to achieve 50 per cent clean power generation by 2025 and cooperate on reducing disaster risk.

A United Nations human rights expert today urged the international community rushing to forge or strengthen political or economic ties with Myanmar not to undermine the country&#39s rights priorities.

(Own report) - The German Chancellery is looking for options that can annul the British referendum's decision to withdraw from the EU. According to reports in the media, Chancellor Angela Merkel has discussed repeating Britain's referendum with her closest entourage. However, "external advice" should be avoided, because this probably would be rejected in Great Britain, according to Chancellery Minister Peter Altmaier. The German media, on the other hand, is busy inciting the EU-oriented British establishment majority with concrete proposals of how the referendum results could be subverted, for example, it would be risky, if the government simply refuses to initiate the withdrawal process or if the parliament forbid the Brexit. However, it is conceivable that the withdrawal negotiations end with a miserable result, and is, then, submitted to the British population for approval - in the expectation that it will be rejected. SPD Chair, Sigmar Gabriel also intensifies pressure by calling for young EU-oriented Britons to be granted German citizenship. The appropriation of foreign citizens as Germans is nothing new; it had previously been restricted to Eastern Europeans with German ancestry. That one state arrogates the right to claim sovereignty over citizens of another country on the basis of political orientation - (being "pro-EU") - is unprecedented.

Cette infographie sur la presse française est une refonte de la carte du Parti de la presse et de l'argent (PPA) réalisée pour Le Plan B en 2007 et mise à jour à l'occasion de la sortie du documentaire Les Nouveau Chiens de garde en 2012. Plutôt que l'exhaustivité, nous avons fait le choix de la (...) / France, Audiovisuel, Capitalisme, Entreprise, Internet, Médias, Multinationales, Presse, Technologies de l'information - Médias

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has said he was &#8220deeply saddened&#8221 to learn the passing yesterday of Elie Wiesel, 87, a Holocaust survivor, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and long-standing UN Messenger of Peace.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has condemned the terrorist bombing in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad today that reportedly killed more than 100 people in a busy shopping street &#8211 an attack which the top UN official in that country described as an &#8220avenge by the terrorists of Da&#39esh who have suffered defeats at the battlefront.&#8221

Chaque président français promet, en début de mandat, d'en finir avec la « Françafrique »… puis passe à autre chose. Dans leur vaste enquête , Pascal Airault, ancien journaliste à Jeune Afrique, et Jean-Pierre Bat, responsable du fonds Jacques-Foccart aux Archives nationales, relèvent qu'au relatif (...) / Afrique, Angola, Cameroun, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Nucléaire civil, Niger, Matières premières, Guinée, Diplomatie, Relations bilatérales, Coopération bilatérale - 2016/07

Une guerre de cent ans L'auguste Revue des deux mondes se lance dans la bataille pour flétrir l'extrémisme contestataire : « La CGT, qui représente 2,6 % des salariés, peut-elle imposer à tout un pays un bras de fer jusqu'au-boutiste ? » (30 mai 2016). Plus d'un siècle auparavant, après la grande (...) / Idéologie, Médias, Mouvement de contestation, Presse, Syndicalisme - 2016/07

Турецкие СМИ сообщают со ссылкой на свои источники в спецслужбах о том, что теракт в стамбульском аэропорту имени Ататюрка был предположительно организован Ахмедом Чатаевым (Ахмад Шишани), известным чеченским джихадистом, примкнувшим к ИГ (организация, запрещенная в России), а его исполнителями стали двое граждан России. Происхождение третьего смертника устанавливается. К такой информации стоит относиться осторожно и воспринимать ее как предварительную: очень часто в аналогичных ситуациях в первые дни после трагедии озвучиваются версии, которые впоследствии не подтверждаются. Тем не менее, в Турции проходят аресты представителей северокавказской общины и проверки в районах их компактного проживания. Имеют ли нападавшие какое-либо отношение к этой общине, пока неизвестно. Попробуем разобраться в том, что мы о ней знаем, и зачем русскоязычные джихадисты в ИГ могли взорвать турецкий аэропорт.

The rolling up of a major ivory smuggling network in Tanzania by police last year, and the ongoing trial of alleged ringleader Yang Fenglan, also known as the “Ivory Queen” and her accomplices, demonstrates once again the continued profitability of the illegal wildlife trade that is destroying East African biodiversity, as well that of other ecosystems in southern and central Africa.

The illegal networks compete with conservation efforts that, while trying to breed sustainable populations for endangered animals, also allow for legal hunting of these same animals to help finance those projects. The poaching, being totally unregulated and driven by far-removed foreign demand, threatens such efforts. And the poachers themselves are well-equipped to defend their kills by force: at least 27 park rangers died guarding African wildlife preserves.

It is significant that Yang, a Chinese national who described herself as a networker for local and foreign businesses, made use of the wider Chinese economic community to bring the ivory out of the country. A similar network—but even larger than this one—was exposed in Kenya in 2013, smuggling ivory out of the country by land, sea, and air. According to Kenya’s The Standard, “the dealers conceal their identities through layers of non-existent companies using fake identity cards” and “there is always a collision between airline staff, Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) officials, KWS [Kenya Wildlife Service] staff stationed at the airport, and police,” with low- to mid-range employees of airports and marine terminals taking bribes to let the ivory out of the country.

Far from being a world of doctored shipping manifests and container units full of tusks, though, the goods come out in dribs and drabs hidden among cheap foodstuffs and consumer goods. Yet these drops in the bucket add up—in 2011, for instance, a whopping 40 tons of ivory was interdicted as part of the enforcement of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) treaty.

Though China maintains an anti-poaching force in Zimbabwe, is party to international accords, and has advanced legislation domestically to cut back on wildlife farming, the prevailing stereotype is one of ravenous Chinese consumers and lackluster enforcement by China hardly helps this image. Yet the United States and European Union are not all that far behind the PRC.

The Chinese market is mainly for luxury goods such as decorative furnishings, gourmet delicacies, or traditional medicine. These are major draws in Western nations as well, but also common is the acquisition of live endangered species for private collections. That such corruption for the movement of illegal wildlife products could be so institutionalized within the border control system has national security implications as well—the ease with which staff can be plied with money to look the other way on contraband is of immense value to criminal organizations, intelligence services, and armed non-state actors.

Poaching is a source of revenue for some of the latter, such as al-Shabaab in Somalia. Using the country’s charcoal exports (which themselves are of questionable legality) to the Gulf States as cover, elephant ivory and rhino horn poached in Central and East Africa makes its way through Somali brokers to points further east. The amount of money the group earns from its role as a middleman is not entirely clear—perhaps several hundred thousand dollars a month—but the profits probably go to the upkeep of its military forces.

This trade exacts a brutal toll across the continent: in Mozambique, for instance, the rhinoceros is as of 2013 extinct and elephant populations have been halved since 2010. Even South Africa, where conservation efforts are relatively well-funded, poaching of rhino horn has exploded since 2008 and park rangers are playing catch-up to stem the tide.

Somalia’s role in this supply chain stems from its “lawlessness”—though it would be more accurate to say its multiple legal systems, in the absence of a national government, that are critically lax when there is a profit to be made. This makes it an attractive clearinghouse for certain dealers, but also a very unpredictable one given the security situation.

Hence much of the multimillion dollar trade going out through more stable routes in countries where there are functioning national institutions and expatriate communities to co-opt—as even al-Shabaab makes use of the Somalia diaspora in Kenya to ensure a smooth flow of operations. The lack of common enforcement protocols also enables the trade, as some nations are much less punitive towards traffickers—though hard jail time or threat of death at the hands of wildlife sanctuary guards or militaries seems to have little effect on the smugglers’ morale.

Border controls in some of the less-settled areas are effectively nonexistent—and it would be hard to enforce them, not least because the people who do live there have livelihoods depending on free movement. Acquisition of live animals or hides, eggs, horn, and tusk, is not simply the province of well-armed mercenaries. Poaching is also a former of substance in some of the least-governed and most-ignored reaches of the Congo River Basin or on the borders of the Central African Republic, and, more recently, organized raids coming out of war-torn South Sudan.

The post Security Context of Illegal Wildlife Trade in East Africa appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The flag of Rojava (Source: http://ariarzen.deviantart.com/)

Elegantly summarizing the spirit of decentralism, economist E. F. Schumacher declared in 1973, “small is beautiful.” British writer G. K. Chesterton noted in his novel The Napoleon of Notting Hill that a true patriot “never under any circumstances boasts of the largeness of his country, but always, and of necessity, boasts of the smallness of it.”

On the Kurdish question, scholarly work and media coverage have mainly focused on the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, sidelining the Kurdish issue in Syria. But understanding the rapidly changing developments in Syria has become a strategic necessity. Other than inflicting a series of defeats on ISIS, what has been noteworthy is the speed with which the Kurds have emerged from obscurity to become a major force in Syria.

Thomas Jefferson was regarded as the founding father of “American decentralism.” Sketching his ideal in a letter from Monticello in 1824, Jefferson favored the creation of smaller “wards.” In Jefferson’s description, each ward would thus be a small republic within itself, and every man in the state would thus become an acting member of the common government, subordinate indeed, yet important, and entirely within his competence.

It turned out that such “wards” have also been formulating through the locals of “Western Kurdistan,” this time under the name of “cantons.” By the summer of 2012, as Syria collapsed into fighting factions, the Syrian Democratic Forces (PYD) moved decisively to assert control over three pockets of territory with majority Kurdish populations in the north of Syria: Jazira, Kobane, and Afrin. By early 2014, the PYD had styled these as “cantons” of local administration under the collective name Rojava (‘West’) to represent Western Kurdistan, and had held elections to local assemblies.

Rojava’s model aims to be inclusive, and people from a range of different backgrounds are encouraged to be involved (including Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, Syrian Turkmen, and Yazidis). A decision was even made to introduce affirmative action for ethnic minorities. There is also a quota for women’s participation in government, as well as for youth.

Many analysts look at Rojava’s decentralism model to be influenced by a type of “libertarian socialism,” under which states become less relevant and people govern through councils, in contrast to national sovereignty, which places the power in the hands of government. “Libertarian socialism” is a fairly recently coined term for a fairly old idea: socialists who embrace the view that individuals should be free. However, they differ from what we generally understand by the term ‘libertarian’ in denying the right to private property. Thus, “left libertarians” embrace the view that natural resources, land, trees, and so on should be held collectively. But libertarian socialism is unable to explain to us how such a system is more efficient in the creation and distribution of wealth.

Predictions about Rojava’s performance may remain speculative. Profoundly isolated from mainstream economics, left-wing anarchists rarely explained how their preferred society would function. Although economic development is an incremental process (investing in physical and human capital, and making marginal improvements in the rule of law), the doorstep conditions toward development mean that the process is not easy to engineer.

As it exists today, the autonomous region of Rojava is one of the few bright spots to emerge from the tragedy of the Syrian crisis. Despite the hostility of almost all of its neighbors, it has not only maintained its independence, but also followed a remarkable democratic experiment that has the most progressive women’s rights record and a multi-ethnic, multi-religious model for the region. Rojava has also armed forces that are effectively fighting ISIS.

By recognizing Rojava’s potential, the U.S. would gain a viable democratic partner in the fight against ISIS. It would be a strategic mistake to confine America’s foreign relations to nation-states alone, which are rapidly losing their exclusive claim in representing the peoples of the Middle East.

The post The Rojava Model appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.