By Matthew Barbari
With Ban Ki-Moon’s term as Secretary-General (SG) ending this year, many candidates have been put forward to replace him. Due to the tradition of rotating the region from which the SG is selected, this year the spotlight has been placed on Eastern Europe. There are also calls for a woman SG—the first since the organization’s creation in 1945.
As stated by UN General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft, this election will be the most transparent to date. In the past, the election process was conducted behind closed doors and under the watchful eyes of the UN Security Council. While this election has already had public nominations as well as informal discussions between the General Assembly and each of the candidates, it is still ultimately the responsibility of the Security Council to select the SG.
Irina Bokova of Bulgaria is a popular choice to replace Ban Ki-Moon as she fills three essential requirements: she is from the region whose “turn” it is to hold the position, she has experience working in the system—going into her sixth year as the Director-General of UNESCO—and is one of the leading women in the UN. She is also the most favored candidate by Russia, who holds sway due to its veto power in the Security Council.
The prime minister of Moldova, Natalia Gherman, is also a popular candidate as she is both a woman and from Eastern Europe. However, her inexperience within the UN makes her bid less likely, despite the support she receives from Western countries such as the UK and U.S.
While Vuk Jeremic would continue the trend of having a man at the organization’s highest office, he does have years of relevant experience working as the President of the UN General Assembly and as Serbia’s minister of foreign affairs.
Many General Assembly members have voiced their dissatisfaction toward the current crop of Eastern European nominees. As a result, this has led to growing support for two candidates from outside the region, claiming that geography should not play a role in the selection process—especially if it leads to a subpar candidate.
Helen Clark, the current Administrator for the United Nations Development Programme and former Prime Minister of New Zealand, is a name that has been floated around. She has strong connections to the U.S. and UK, as well as China. In addition, she has years of experience at the UN, with many seeing her as a more qualified leader than other candidates.
Another “outside candidate” is Antonio Guterres who served as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and is a former Prime Minister of Portugal. Guterres has an impressive resume, and is the most well equipped candidate to face the current refugee crises, which are a main concern for Europe and the Middle East.
The major roadblock to him or Clark is the UN tradition of selecting an SG from a certain region, as well as a possible veto from Russia, which wants to see an SG that is amenable to its interests. While Moscow has publically stated that it would not veto a candidate selection solely on the geographical criteria, this strategy was previously employed by Beijing, helping Ban Ki-Moon back in 2007, when China threatened to veto any candidate who was not from Asia. The Security Council is expected to select its nominee in July with the election in the General Assembly happening in September.
Recommended Readings
Somini Sengupta, “At U.N., Ambassadors Hold Auditions for Next Secretary General,” The New York Times (Apr. 15, 2016).
Reid Standish, “Will the Next U.N. Secretary-General Be From Eastern Europe?” Foreign Policy (Apr. 29, 2016).
“Selecting a new UN Secretary-General: a job interview in front of the whole world,” UN News Centre (Apr. 8, 2016).
The post The UN Post-2015: Great Decisions Spring Updates appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
The recent U.S. decision to fully lift its arms embargo against Vietnam is a victory for both countries as they seek to balance China in the region. However, the U.S. must also realize that the decision will be measured against already-strong Russian-Vietnamese strategic and defense ties. Therefore, the embargo decision is a maneuver to not only counter Chinese influence in the area, but Russian power as well.
Embargo Lift Strengthens Re-Balance
As the U.S. continues its “re-balancing” efforts to counter China in Asia, it has strengthened military ties with allies in the region, most notably Japan and the Philippines. However, the U.S. has also realized that in order to maximize its impact, it needs to reach beyond formal treaty allies. Even though some of these states may not have had the best relations with the U.S. in the past, they now realize that increased U.S. ties are in their own long-term self-interest if they desire to balance China as well.
India is currently being wooed by the U.S.—Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s recently visited the country to shore up defense ties. Vietnam also falls in the camp of non-allied states currently being courted by the U.S. Unlike with India, the legacy of the Vietnam War still runs deep in many quarters within Washington. However, despite past and current concerns with respect to Vietnam’s human rights policies, it would seem that realism based on mutual interests eventually prevailed and resulted in the decision to lift the embargo.
Even more crucially, the U.S. must realize that it is not the only one of several regional powers vying for Vietnam’s affections. Japan and India have both increased their own outreach efforts to Vietnam in order to balance Chinese influence. They have done this both from a military perspective as well as an economic one, as Vietnam has several blocks of offshore oil in need of investment and development. The U.S., at this point, finds no fault in these efforts as they complement its own “re-balance”.
Russian Rivalry and Economic Factors
Russia, however, may prove to be a formidable obstacle to the U.S.’ charm offensive. Because of the Soviet Union’s support of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, Russian-Vietnamese strategic ties are still quite abundant. Vietnam also plays a role in Russia’s “Asian pivot” as it seeks to both reduce its dependence on Western economic ties post-Ukraine and to simultaneously balance China itself, its erstwhile strategic partner, in Asia. Strong ties to Vietnam serve to actually put teeth behind Russian rhetoric of diversifying its Asian strategic portfolio beyond China.
Even though these strong ties have led to many past Vietnamese purchases of Russian armaments such as ships and aircraft, all parties must realize that Vietnam is not going to be exclusively in any one’s camp, save its own, for the foreseeable future. Vietnam, similar to India, realizes that the best way to maintain strategic autonomy is to pursue a truly multi-vectored foreign policy strategy.
If strengthened ties with the U.S. improves its own position based on its own interests, those ties will indeed be pursued. The same is true with respect to Russia, India, and Japan. Simply put, all of these powers must realize that they will always be only suitors and any feelings of actually consummating something more substantial will remain exactly that, a feeling.
The real front on which both the U.S. and Russia must compete for Vietnamese attention, however, is the economic one. This stems from the realization that it is China’s economic power, symbolized by its leading trading partner status with most southeast Asian states, which serves as the foundation for its growing military and diplomatic power. Chinese South China Sea maneuvers and the formation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) symbolize these, respectively. This realization was also behind the recent ASEAN leaders’ summit held in Sunnylands, California, the first ever hosted by the U.S.
Not to be outdone, Russia recently hosted its own ASEAN summit, held in Sochi. This summit, similar to Sunnylands, promoted increased economic and technological ties with southeast Asian states as the foundation for further strengthened political ties. The case may be made that the Russian economic presence in ASEAN, apart from Vietnam, is scant. In the past, this has been due to the relatively low importance assigned to southeast Asia within Russian foreign policy objectives due to the region’s remoteness, as well as previous ASEAN skepticism with respect to Russia’s minimal economic footprint within the region.
On the economic front, the U.S. would appear to be in the lead in the race against Russia, given Vietnam’s accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). However, it can ill-afford to rest on its laurels as one of the Russian proposals highlighted at Sochi was to gradually integrate ASEAN economically with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Because of all these factors, the U.S. must always keep in mind that its Vietnamese courtship will inevitably go against Russian strategic machinations in Vietnam, as well as both Russian and Chinese economic endeavors in the region as a whole.
The post U.S. Must Still Compete with Russia for Vietnam’s Affections appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Written by Miles Kopley
Since it was wrestled away from Iraqi forces in a startling June 2014 offensive, the ancient city of Mosul has been crucial for the Islamic State. It remains the largest city held by the group in Iraq, even as other cities such as Tikrit and Ramadi have been liberated by the Iraqi Army, backed by coalition forces. In recent months, Mosul has become increasingly vital to the military presence and economic viability of the group in the region. A lone defensive bastion in the Nineveh Governorate amidst a series of ISIS military losses, Mosul suffers from meager supply lines and the city’s crumbling infrastructure.
Although it’s a tall order, one that has already proven to be a challenge for an anti-ISIS coalition skeptical of itself, the retaking of Mosul would spell the beginning of the end for the Islamic State presence in Iraq. The defensive and economic benefits of capturing Mosul have been apparent since the Islamic State first began operations against Iraqi troops in 2014.
Shortly after taking the city, ISIS looted approximately $480 million in banknotes from financial institutions, providing an important funding boost to the expanding organization. It established extensive convoy routes spanning from the city to its self-proclaimed capital of Raqqa in Syria, providing economic and military relief to the insurgents and remaining civilians. It maintain Mosul’s local oil industry, pumping it from nearby wells and shipping it to destinations all over the region. The roughly half-million citizens who remained within the city faced increased taxes on agricultural land and additional duties on imports.
The defensive capabilities Mosul offers to the surrounding territory compounds the economic assets the city grants the Islamic State. Indeed, the Islamic State has extensive forward positions nestled in villages, valleys, and open fields surrounding the city, a system of fortifications that gives it added strength in holding the city.
In the past few months, however, the accomplishments of the Islamic State in Mosul have been largely dashed by coalition efforts. Oil revenue across the Islamic State has been halved by airstrikes targeting critical infrastructure. Mosul’s main supply route to Raqqa was severed last November, putting increased pressure on the city’s residents and forcing them to face frequent fuel shortages and electricity blackouts. Banks were extensively bombed in January, resulting in monetary losses ranging into the millions. The group has already lost approximately 45 percent of its territory in Iraq since the height of its power, and Mosul seems to be the next target in line for coalition efforts.
Yet, while coalition airstrikes have made significant headway, forces on the ground have had mixed results. Currently, the United States only has two hundred Special Forces troops dedicated to the ground offensive in Mosul, leaving most of the large-scale operations to the Iraqi Army.
Skirmishes between Peshmerga and Iraqi Sh’ia forces threaten the alliance they have built against the Islamic State, and complicated their plans to advance on the city. Splintering of troops along ethnic and communal lines has also led to miscommunication and mistrust among individual units, further damaging relationships. The Iraqi Army has also stated that it would need a force five to six times their current size in order to mount an effective attack on the Islamic State.
If the Iraqi Army and coalition forces are capable of freeing the city, however, a drastic chain of events could follow. Virtually all of Iraq’s oil fields are located in the Nineveh Governorate, where Mosul lies. If lost, the few convoy routes the group has would be severed, impacting the oil trade within the group’s territory and on the black market, and permanently reducing their financing capabilities. Losing the city would also mean the loss of the largest defendable position in the region, as well as any military support it could offer to combatants on other front lines.
With so much at stake for the Islamic State in Mosul, there has never been a better time—or chance—for coalition forces wrestle it back. Taking back Mosul would mean the recovery of one of the country’s largest economic centers: a key victory for Iraq and coalition forces and a disastrous defeat for the Islamic State.
The post The Fall of ISIS Begins with Mosul appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.