Diplomacy & Crisis News

An unidentified hacker compromised the email of a Bill Clinton staffer.

Following a meeting of its Emergency Committee on Zika yesterday, the United Nations health agency said today that the infectious disease, and its associated congenital and other neurological disorders, continues to be an international public health emergency due to continuing geographic expansion and considerable gaps in understanding of the virus and its consequences.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is saddened to learn of the death of President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, according to the UN chief’s spokesperson.

In his first visit to Sri Lanka since the end of its civil war seven years ago, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon praised the country’s steps towards peace and reconciliation, while also highlighting the importance of and need for more progress with human rights and sustainable development for that progress.

The best stories from around the world.

A delegation from the United Nations Security Council today arrived in South Sudan, where it will reinforce recent messages made to the authorities as well as discuss how the UN peacekeeping mission there can help them improve the security and humanitarian situation in the wake of recent violence.

Conciliation, contradiction, reality checks, and why they matter — or don’t — for 2016.

Whether it’s an Arab Spring-style uprising that gets him or simply old age — Zimbabwe’s firebrand autocrat is on his way out.

Hopes for a brighter future will be more realistic if the captain can run an effective ship of state.

Le Daily Telegraph l'a traité de « morveux » (16 septembre 2015) ; le journal du soir de la BBC l'a assimilé à un camion-poubelle en route vers la décharge des « losers » (27 juin 2016). The Economist voit en cet opposant à l'austérité et à la guerre un « saboteur » (10 juin 2016). Le Sun l'a qualifié de « (...) / Royaume-Uni, Audiovisuel, Médias, Personnalités, Presse - 2016/09

« Les villes modernes ont partout cette propriété secrète d'aspirer en le canalisant le flux des vagabonds qui cherchent du travail, mais disons qu'à Amagasaki le secret est mis à nu. Et j'étais arrivé ici comme les autres, tous réduits à la dernière extrémité. » Double suicide manqué aux 48 cascades (...) / Asie, Japon, Criminalité, Littérature, Travail, Ville - 2016/09

The Good Old Days of Michel Platini (1986 World Cup in Mexico)

Astronomical amounts of money are being spent on soccer (football) transfers. These days, no one is shocked at news of multi-million dollar signings.

When he was the president of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), Michel Platini stood by his view that the record €94 million which Real Madrid paid to sign Cristiano Ronaldo was “a serious challenge to the idea of fair play.” “Players are not free and they don’t even belong to clubs… they belong to financial holdings, companies, or people,” describing transfer amounts in a media conference a “form of robbery.”

Current transfer fees definitely dwarf those of older generations. In 1938, when Bryn Jones left Wolverhampton Wanderers for £14,000 (about £7 million in today’s money), politicians were outraged by the money spent and the subject was debated in the House of Commons.

Sports like soccer can be seen as miniature economies.Europe is considered the largest transfer market in the world: it has the most successful, well-known clubs and the best players are attracted to its national leagues. Its transfer environment is subject to different layers of rules and regulations established by sports governing bodies. Yet, ever since oil money arrived in the soccer world, the game has gone money mad. Following Paul Pogba’s reported world record transfer from Juventus to Manchester United for US$115.90 million on August 2nd, it is worthwhile to get a feel for soccer inflation with relation to the evolution of world record transfers since 1893.

Speaking of soccer inflation, have you ever wondered how much, for instance, David Beckham’s 2003 move to Real Madrid would cost in modern-day cash? When the transfer was unveiled, the global superstar described the €35.9 million move as a “dream.” In today’s money, adjusted for inflation, it is more than €43 million. Take another example: Cristiano Ronaldo’s €94 million move in 2009 would be of an adjusted fee of €102.4 million. The Bleacher Report has compiled a list of the top hundred most expensive transfers in history with inflation in mind.

I wonder how much a legend like Diego Maradona would cost in modern day soccer. Maradona was bought by Napoli from Barcelona for US$6.5 million in 1984, which is the equivalent of the Italian side paying him almost US$19.5 million today. Comparing Maradona’s adjusted fees with those of the other super-stars of today proves that soccer inflation is running wild.  And taking into account the inflationary trend of transfer fees, we will not be surprised to see signings approaching US$250 million, or even more, in the coming decades.

It is also interesting to look more closely at how this transfer expenditure is spread throughout the big five league clubs which shows that a process of concentration of investments is taking place. While clubs that invested the most in transfer fees are logically among the wealthiest (Real Madrid, Barcelona, Manchester United, Manchester City, Chelsea, and Paris St-Germain), teams having benefited from the ten most expensive football transfers in history of soccer also belong to the small circle of financially dominant teams.

This reinforces the increasing correlation between financial resources available and results, meaning that European soccer suffers from an important economic polarization: a limited number of clubs (those with the largest incomes and/or supported by economically powerful investors) makes the most important part of transfer expenditures.

Unlike the traditional way of thinking, the soccer industry is not simply a market of pure and perfect competition. In essence, Europe is slowly embracing a system of closed leagues (at the elite level) which is also reflected in the results of UEFA competitions year after year. We should consequently consider amendments to the regulatory framework governing transfers to achieve the policy objectives of a fair play, notably with regard to contract stability, which shall have a positive effect to fight against soccer inflation.

Analyzing the workings of competition within well-defined rules (just as we see in our economy) would also make it easier to effectively combat speculation and third-parties’ involvement in soccer in so far as the sums of all transfer payments must be spread over the entire chain of clubs having contributed to the sporting development of players.

The bottom line is: rather than merely looking at soccer transfers as monetary figures, UEFA and the national governing bodies should start studying any possible factors behind the existence of monopolistic structures in the soccer industry, both at the local and continental levels.

The post Soccer Inflation and the Transfer Market appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Associated Press)

When the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague announced the result of the arbitration on the South China Sea dispute case, the Chinese government and the public reacted strongly. The People’s Daily proclaimed: “Sovereign territory can in no way be less, even by a little bit,” while nationalism filled the Chinese microblogging platform Weibo.

The Global Times condemned it in writings, with articles suggesting China to consider leaving the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a fightback to its injustice, citing that if the U.S. could do so, why not China? Yet, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China stated firmly at the press conference on July 12 that China would uphold the Convention. In fact, there will be more harm than good if China indiscreetly denounces UNCLOS.

Before discussing if China should leave the UNCLOS due to the dispute in the South China Sea, we need to recall how the Convention was created and its nature. The concepts that are well-known today like ‘territorial waters’ and ‘exclusive economic zone’, which are related to national maritime sovereignty and interest, were not formed in the 17th or 18th century. The understanding towards maritime rights was not unified among the coastal countries in Europe at the time. For instance, the Dutch International Law expert Hugo Grotius once advocated to define the limit of waters which a country could exercise sovereignty by the limit of coastal defense artillery range. Today, such a definition seems inconceivable. As for the Eastern World, the International Law is such a modern concept to this region that even until this day, there is limited understanding of it. Without the convention, pure law of the jungle would return.

After World War II, each maritime country declared their territorial waters ranging from 12 miles to 200 miles, yet the operation was very confusing. In order to reach a consensus and to avoid unnecessary conflicts, the negotiation lasted for more than 30 years involving 168 countries. Eventually, delimitation of ‘territorial waters’, ‘exclusive economic zones’ and ‘international waters’, regulations on resources rights within the boundary, dispute resolving mechanism and so on were drawn. This is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it is hence called by many legal experts as the ‘Constitution for the Oceans’.

Of course, just like other international treaties, there had been compromises and fierce debates during the process of negotiations of the convention. The final product is not perfect, and each country is still questioning the convention due to possible interest conflicts. The U.S., one of the earliest advocate of this convention, has yet to obtain an approval from her congress to join the convention. Many congressmen were concerned that it may harm U.S. maritime interests because the convention classifies resources in the international waters as ‘common heritage of mankind’. There are also concerns that this would be exploited by the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. The attitude of the U.S. has been widely criticized by the international community, especially when she remained stubborn after the Cold War. This might be one of the reasons why China finds this convention contemptible.

Yet, the consequence of U.S. not joining the UNCLOS (and leaving some international institutions) serves as a positive reference for China. For example, in the level of international law, the U.S. accusation against China in the South China Sea ‘default’ loses its power due to its identity, and the U.S. loses many opportunities to act in the name of international law. Once China took the initiative to leave the UNCLOS, it would completely lose the moral high ground and the pivoting point for Beijing to wrestle with Washington, making it harder for China to avoid the U.S. military presence in the region.

Even worse, the withdrawal would be compared to the withdrawal of the ‘Axis powers’ from the League of Nations, which eventually leads to World War II. This definitely brings no benefit to China. Asia-Pacific countries would strengthen the promotion of “China threat theory” because of this. Other regional powerful nation who are willing to respect international law would cooperate with ASEAN countries, forcing China to adopt a passive diplomacy strategy.

Another school of thought views the contemporary international law as rules imposed by the previous winners of international politics onto everyone else. As China becomes more powerful, it can selectively obey favorable treaties and ignore the unfavorable ones. Such attitude is the basic logic of ‘status quo challenger’, which is a label China has tried to avoid being tagged. The consequence of China’s quitting UNCLOS would be worse than the consequence of U.S.’ absence from the convention as it means a denial of the international order when the UNCLOS was signed.

The international community is indeed actively avoiding any notion that indicates a sense of hitting the “restart button”. Although some countries are not happy with some terms, the current mechanism provides a lot of rooms for reservations and exemptions without getting the whole body moved. China understands this very well and has made good use of this sentiment upon joining the convention by submitting a written statement to the United Nations a decade ago stating that it would refuse to accept arbitrations for any dispute and advocated a negotiated settlement.

More importantly, the same convention brings China many significant maritime rights and interests, as well as related institutional protection. For instance, the UNCLOS provides the right of common development of resources in international waters, which protects those countries that possess relatively backward ocean mining technology, such as China. According to the convention, International Seabed Authority, which is one of the United Nations branches, is in charge of the coordination of resources development outside the exclusive economic zones. In 1991, as a signatory state of the International Seabed Authority, China was allocated 150,000 square kilometers of areas of exploration. 75,000 square kilometers of the said area’s exclusive rights of exploration and commercial exploitation priority rights was granted to China. This area, which was carefully selected by China, is a ‘treasure’ full of metal mineral resources.

China’s related rights are also protected by the convention. In 2011, China signed a contract with the International Seabed Authority and gained exclusive rights of exploration in 10,000 square kilometers seabed in the Western Indian Ocean. This has triggered India’s dissatisfaction, but China used the rights protection mechanism of the UNCLOS as a reason to refute India ‘s position. With the progress of China’s technology in offshore exploration and deep-sea mining, the maritime rights and interests gained and protected because of her membership in the UNCLOS will be fully utilized in the future. If China denounces the convention, the loss in the future deep waters mining rights would be inestimable.

In fact, even in the face of the current situation in the South China Sea, China can still make a case as a signatory state of the UNCLOS. This is exactly Chinese government’s recent official position: although the Chinese government can question the legitimacy of the arbitration result, it would be driven by ‘the maintenance of the dignity of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ other than denying it. In return, this might help China regain the moral high ground of the international community so as to hedge the negative impact caused by the arbitration. In the early days, China condemned western concepts like ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’, yet in recent years she knows how to ‘respect’ those words but emptying their meanings and interpret them in her own way in order to speak louder in the international community. This strategy also applies to the attitude of how China sees international law.

If China is determined to play the game by training a large number of professionals like what Japan did a hundred years ago, who handled international law with absolute academic attitude (for example, Japan’s arguments in the defense of her sovereignty on ‘Senkaku Islands ‘ were tailored with reference to international law), China would soon discover loopholes in the current system and could make good use of them for her national interests.

This is how a rising power could play the game: fairly, lawfully, reasonable, and serves the country’s interests. Perhaps the sheer force admirer might look down on this, but today’s international community is no longer in the era of muscle-power diplomacy. The so-called ‘international law’ and ‘diplomacy’ should be used at the right time and in the right context, or else they might mean very different things. These terms are indeed ingenious in its ambiguity. The commentaries that suggest China to leave the UNCLOS are doing more harm than good.

That is why even the Tai Kung Pao, a leading pro-China newspaper in Hong Kong, has published a signed article to alert relevant proposals like this. The seriousness of such irresponsible comments is apparent.

The post The South China Sea Dispute: Should China denounce the UNCLOS? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Le 8 septembre arrive en kiosques le « Manuel d'économie critique ». Sa vocation est d'éclairer les bases et les enjeux d'une discipline de pouvoir, l'économie, dont les principes gouvernent maints aspects de nos vies. Cet ouvrage vise à faire comprendre pour faire agir : la bataille des idées (...) / Grèce, Banque, Économie, Éducation, Finance, Fiscalité, Idéologie, Médias, Monnaie, Multinationales, Politique, Presse, Commerce, Crise financière, Néolibéralisme - 2016/09

En dépit de la crise économique et des sanctions occidentales, le président russe Vladimir Poutine peut envisager sereinement les élections législatives du 18 septembre 2016. Outre la popularité de son discours nationaliste et le contrôle des médias, il peut aussi compter sur les divisions de (...) / Russie, Démocratie, Économie, Élections, Libéralisme, Parti politique, Politique - 2016/09

On July 15th, the world saw the consequences of the long-lasting struggle between religious forces and the secular military contending for control of the Turkish state. In the aftermath of the failed coup, the government in Ankara reacted with a series of purges unseen in Turkey’s recent history. Initially limited to the military, the punitive measures have now reached all corners of Turkish society. So far, more than 18,000 people have been reported detained, with another 60,000 suspended from office. Judges, journalists, academics, and civil servants have been among the victims of what some describe as the “biggest witch-hunt in the history of the [Turkish] republic.”

But the upheaval has not only highlighted the fragility of Turkey’s democracy; it has also revealed how little liberal democratic countries can interfere. The declaration of the state of emergency and the escalating number of arrests and suspensions has been deplored by civil society groups across the world. Outraged academics have denounced the arrests and suspensions of their peers. Journalists have decried the fate their Turkish confreres are facing. Many expected a firm condemnation of the illiberal actions the Erdogan administration orchestrated in the aftermath of the failed coup by their governments.

Much to their disappointment, most political leaders have limited their initial comments to carefully worded, deliberately vague reminders on the importance of the rule of law and the right of due process for the culprits of the coup. The gap between the normative expectations of how much foreign governments should be opposing the Erdogan administration versus what external actors actually can achieve through diplomatic means leads to a situation where public opinion is more outspoken than their respective governments in criticizing the actions of another state.

Those outside Turkey who demand more proactive checks on Erdogan’s expanding power base tend to disregard the limits imposed upon political leaders by the single most important ordering principle of the international system: state sovereignty. State sovereignty continues to govern our world and explains why leaders in democratic countries have exercised cautious restraint when commenting on the recent events in Turkey. This oft-overlooked but fundamental principle has both internal and external dimensions, both of which constrain a larger international response.

Internally, sovereignty defines “the highest authority within the state”.[1] In Turkey, the constituted power and hence the national sovereignty lie with President Erdogan and the elected government, who enjoy the authority to enact punitive policies against the alleged plotters and to restore order within the boundaries of the Turkish state. Of course, sovereign power does not automatically legitimize any measure taken by a state. Under international law, violations of peremptory norms— including the prohibition of genocide, slavery and torture—transcend inculpability, making the allegations of torture in Turkey especially serious. However, even if these allegations turned out to be true, external actors could only challenge the means but not the ends of Erdogan’s retaliatory policy.

External sovereignty applies more broadly to Turkey’s rights as an independent state. It is defined as a form of recognition that guarantees a state’s existence in an anarchic international society. In simple terms, states act according to a principle of equality where “none is entitled to command; none is required to obey”.[2]

The UN Charter explicitly prohibits intervention “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (Art. 2.7 UN Charter) unless these matters pose a direct threat to international peace and stability. This provision mandates international actors to acknowledge the Turkish government to handle the situation at its own discretion.

Moreover, whether or not a state is pilloried for its domestic politics by the international community not only depends on the acts and violations it committed, but also on the role and position it holds in the international system. Turkey remains one of the foremost allies and strategic partners of the Western world. Be it in the fight against global terrorism, as a valuable NATO member, or as key to Europe’s migration and asylum policy, Turkey is a much need ally. Member of the Group of 20, Turkey also offers a huge consumer market for outside goods and services. These factors taken together are shielding the Turkish government from any hasty and overzealous moral condemnations of their domestic policy-making.

Lastly, any effective condemnation of the Turkish government would necessitate agreement amongst the remaining actors. History has shown that in matters of state sovereignty, the international community agrees to disagree. Already, Erdogan has reached out to Putin in an attempt to improve their bilateral relationship in case relations with the West should turn sour.

It is true that the classical definition of sovereignty with its absolute claim for sovereign equality has been increasingly challenged. In a globalized world where market economies co-exist within a complex net of interdependencies and where policies, capital, and people cross borders more easily than ever before in human history, sovereignty appears to be an anachronism from another age. Yet rather than bidding farewell to the concept as such, sovereignty should be understood as a subliminal force—always somewhere in the room, but usually covered underneath alternative ordering principles. It remains largely invisible to the eye as long as politics follow a steady path and the ship sails in calm waters. Yet, once a major crisis breaks out, sovereignty comes back in the limelight to define the rules of the game.

The storm in Turkey is taking place now. Many advocates had hoped that the successive accession rounds between Turkey and the EU would help bind the Turkish state within the European value system. However, neither long-lasting negotiations nor the fact that the EU being among Turkey’s most important trading partners has prevented the Erdogan administration from unilaterally suspending the European Convention on Human Rights and announcing the planned reintroduction of the death penalty. The principle of sovereignty, which Thomas Hobbes equated with “an artificial soul … giving life and motion to the whole body”,  provided the power to ignite nationalist feelings and undo concerted action in a blink of an eye.

If there is anything to take away from the post-coup purges in Turkey, it is the inability of the international community to effectively halt an alarming process that has not yet evolved into a full-blown tragedy. Therefore, any attempt to overcome the present crisis needs to recognize Turkey as an equal and sovereign partner and should refrain from stigmatizing President Erdogan as the villain of the Bosporus.

 

[1] Lake, David. 2003. “The New Sovereignty in International Relations”. International Studies Review 2003 (5): 305.

[2] Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theories of international politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 88.

The post Sovereignty Strikes Back: Turkey’s Purge and International Silence appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Les centres commerciaux font-ils encore rêver l'Amérique ? S'inspirant de Walter Benjamin, le sociologue Marc Berdet présentait les malls comme les exemples les plus frappants des « fantasmagories, lieux clos saturés d'imaginaires, rêvoirs collectifs » que le capitalisme façonne « en vue de canaliser (...) / Capitalisme, Idées, Urbanisme, Architecture - 2016/09

Parfois, un détail suffit pour saisir un tableau idéologique. Le 13 août dernier, le décès de Georges Séguy fut expédié en quelques secondes, ou en quelques lignes, par des médias français alors enrôlés dans la guerre contre le burkini. / États-Unis, France, Idéologie, Médias, Politique, Syndicalisme - (...) / États-Unis, France, Idéologie, Médias, Politique, Syndicalisme - 2016/09

Le blog Reflets du Temps, qui consacre une large place aux questions internationales et des recensions de qualité, a publié le 27 août dernier un article mettant à l’honneur le Contrechamps du numéro d’été (2/2016) de Politique étrangère : L’Europe au défi des populismes.

« Le dossier principal de la Revue, cet été, s’annonçait de toute première importance, et fera du reste l’objet d’un prochain article (Moyen Orient, le nouveau « Grand Jeu »), mais notre propre Une de fin d’été, par sa composition et ses préoccupations se devait de cibler le sujet de Contrechamps : L’Europe au défi des populismes.

Deux forts articles dressent remarquablement l’état des lieux en ce domaine charriant les peurs de tout démocrate. Jean-Dominique Giuliani examine l’Union face à ces menaces, tandis que Georges Mink s’arrête sur le cas de l’Europe centrale, particulièrement la Hongrie et la Pologne.

[…]

« Extrémismes, populismes et nationalismes à l’assaut de l’Europe » : Leçon en tous points limpide et brillante, de Jean-Dominique Giuliani, président de l’institut Robert Schuman et Européen convaincu, à l’optimisme non moins ardent. Le paradoxe est posé d’emblée : « L’Europe reste un modèle pour le reste du monde… et les sociétés européennes sont en proie à des doutes profonds ». C’est par ces failles, à l’œuvre depuis longtemps, que s’infiltrent les menaces actuellement affichées des populismes (opposant systématiquement le peuple aux élites, aux dirigeants et aux partis de gouvernement) et autres nationalismes (subordonnant tous les problèmes à la domination hégémonique de la nation). […] Giuliani semble penser que ce ciel noir des populismes – la renaissance des nationalismes paraissant l’inquiéter davantage à long terme – pourrait garder un côté conjoncturel à régler au coup par coup, par des états qui conservent des défenses ; la résilience de l’UE lui semblant bien réelle, appuyée sur une image forte dans le monde… Puisse-t-il avoir raison.

[…]

Georges Mink est spécialiste de l’Europe centrale, notamment polonaise, de ces endroits de l’UE, où le ciel se couvre… « L’Europe centrale à l’épreuve de l’autoritarisme » met l’accent sur la Hongrie – notamment celle d’Orbán et la Pologne actuelle. Deux pays, sortis du Communisme en mettant en place des démocraties à l’occidentale, dont on a oublié la phrase prophétique de Geremek en 1990 : « la voie de la liberté est ouverte, celle de la démocratie reste incertaine ». Démocraties pourtant retravaillées et non simples copiés-collés, entraînant par exemple un communisme de libertés dans leur sillage. Échecs et déceptions, pour autant, accélérés par le monde ouvert des déplacements et du Net. Aussi, un Orbán en Hongrie se fit-il dès les années 2010 le propagandiste de cette « démocratie illibérale », qui fit émules en Europe centrale.

[…]

La conclusion de Georges Mink – alarmante au bon niveau – vaut pour l’ensemble du dossier : « L’épuisement idéologique des acteurs politiques traditionnels, mettant en avant la valeur absolutisée de la démocratie (joue à l’avantage de ce genre d’expérience), face à une jeunesse tentée par des idéologies d’apparence nouvelle, installant en leur centre la violence et la xénophobie ».

Valable seulement pour l’Europe centrale ? Croyez-vous… »

Pour lire l’article dans son intégralité, cliquez ici.

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

 

(Own report) - The German Bundeswehr's new "White Paper" is conceived as just a milestone in the ongoing development of German global policy and its instruments, according to an article published by Germany's leading foreign policy periodical. According to the article's two authors, who had been in charge of elaborating the "White Paper" for the German Defense Ministry, the White Paper's explicit claim to shape global policy and policy for outer space must be implemented and "brought to life" in the near future. While the German government is initiating new projects for upgrading military and "civil defense" measures, the EU is boosting its militarization: A growing number of government leaders of EU member states are supporting the creation of an EU army under openly proclaimed German leadership. According to a leading German daily, the balance sheet of recent German military involvements is "not exactly positive," but this should not discourage future military interventions. One should, however, not expect too much and harbor "illusions about rapid successes."