Diplomacy & Crisis News

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has called for an independent and transparent investigation into clashes at the Gaza fence on Friday between Palestinians participating in the ‘Great Return March’ and Israeli security forces which resulted in at least 15 deaths and a large number of injured.

« Défendre les services publics » : le mot d'ordre comporte une ambiguïté mortelle quand la main droite de l'État s'acharne à les rendre détestables à ceux-là mêmes qui les produisent comme à leurs usagers. Lutter avec quelque chance de succès pour « le » service public d'intérêt général suppose de sortir (...) / France, Mouvement de contestation, Services, Transports, Santé, Société, Service public, État, Stratégie - 2018/04

Secretary-General António Guterres has welcomed the successful conclusion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which officially closed its doors on Friday, and congratulated the West African country’s people and Government for turning the page on crisis and conflict.

Les élections législatives du 4 mars ont plongé l'Italie dans une période d'incertitude. Deux formations autoproclamées « antisystème » sont sorties en tête des urnes et revendiquent le pouvoir, mais aucune ne dispose d'une majorité pour gouverner. Devenu en quelques années le premier parti du pays, le (...) / Italie, Politique, Parti politique, Élections, Idéologie, Mutation - 2018/04

Créée en 1936, Politique étrangère est la plus ancienne revue française dans le domaine des relations internationales. Chaque vendredi, découvrez désormais « l’archive de la semaine ».

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L’article « La situation militaire d’Israël » a été écrit par l’historien et journaliste Paul Giniewski, et publié dans le numéro 1/1962 de Politique étrangère.

Si les problèmes d’Israël, après le coup d’État syrien de septembre 1961, avaient paru, du jour au lendemain, allégés de la menace redoutable que présentait l’union des puissantes armées syrienne et égyptienne, ils se compliquaient bientôt par un accroissement spectaculaire de la puissance égyptienne. On apprenait en effet la création de trois brigades nouvelles et d’une garde nationale, l’arrivée dans les ports égyptiens de nouvelles unités navales fournies par l’U.R.S.S., l’équipement de ports égyptiens (avec l’aide probable de techniciens soviétiques) pour l’approvisionnement d’une flotte puissante, comme la flotte soviétique, l’ouverture de négociations pour l’équipement en MIG 19 de trois nouvelles escadrilles égyptiennes, le séjour, enfin, d’une mission soviétique au Caire, dirigée par le ministre des centrales électriques de l’U.R.S.S., dont les conversations, a-t-il été précisé officiellement, « déborderont le cadre de la question des travaux du barrage d’Assouan et envisageront l’extension des relations économiques entre l’U.R.S.S. et la R.A.U., avec la possibilité d’une assistance économique nouvelle de l’Union Soviétique sous forme d’un prêt consenti, pour permettre l’exécution des nouveaux plans de développement économique du pays ».

Ce palier spectaculaire du réarmement de l’Égypte représente certainement une menace supplémentaire et grave pour la sécurité d’Israël, et, par la remise en train de la guerre froide au Moyen-Orient, un motif d’inquiétude sérieux pour l’Occident.

Les nouvelles fournitures grossissent démesurément une flotte qui comptait déjà 10 destroyers, 12 sous-marins, 48 vedettes lance-torpilles, des dragueurs, des péniches de débarquement, et qui doit recevoir prochainement, selon l’organe de la flotte britannique, deux croiseurs ! Les bases navales, quelle que soit leur destination théorique, dans le cadre de la stratégie globale de l’État-major soviétique, serviront en pratique, comme jadis les bases britanniques de la région de Suez, cédées en fin de compte à l’Égypte, comme les bases installées en 1955 et 1956 dans le Sinaï, à faire pression sur le seul Israël.

« Grâce aux nouvelles acquisitions », a déclaré un porte-parole égyptien, « les forces navales égyptiennes constituent aujourd’hui la flotte la plus puissante dans le Moyen-Orient ».

« Et nos forces sont maintenant capables d’asséner un coup mortel à Israël », ajoutait le maréchal Amer, ministre de la guerre d’Égypte.

Nous nous proposons d’analyser ici la nature exacte du péril, tel qu’il se présente pour Israël après la rupture de la RAU et les nouvelles fournitures soviétiques à l’Égypte, et les conséquences politiques et militaires qu’il peut entraîner dans le proche avenir.

Le faux retour du « père prodigue »

En octobre 1961, peu après la rupture de la RAU, paraissait dans la presse israélienne une caricature de Dosh, le plus mordant de ses satiristes, intitulée « le retour du père prodigue». On y voyait un Nasser contusionné, le bras en écharpe, revenant penaud à la maison, après aventures, bordées et déboires, et attendu sur le seuil de sa hutte délabrée par une marmaille en guenilles et une épouse résignée qui lui tend les bras, et dont l’œil s’allume d’une lueur d’espoir. Et la légende de ce « cartoon » qui s’en serait même passé, tant il est parlant et éloquent, fait dire au peuple d’Égypte : « il paraît que tu vas t’occuper de nous »…

La caricature traduisait bien les idées que l’on se faisait, il y a quatre mois, sur la leçon qu’aurait tirée Nasser de l’écroulement de la RAU.

« La libération de la Syrie du joug égyptien, écrivait David Siton, a mis un terme au rêve du dictateur du Caire de régner sur le monde arabe. Elle a aussi dégrisé les meneurs du mouvement pan-arabe et l’on est fondé d’espérer que dorénavant ils seront plus réalistes à l’égard d’Israël et renonceront à une politique d’hostilité aveugle que seule explique une émotivité passionnelle sans justification. »

Les déclarations mêmes du raïs avaient servi à créer l’illusion. Il avait promis de se consacrer à l’établissement du socialisme dans son pays ; à remettre en état les structures intérieures. On n’avait pas compris alors que le « front intérieur » ne désignait nullement la misère à enrayer, la corruption à déraciner, le mécontentement croissant à apaiser par des réalisations positives, mais une nouvelle opération d’escamotage politique des problèmes, et qu’au lieu de bâtir, on jetterait à la populace les instituteurs et diplomates français, les Juifs étrangers, qu’on nationaliserait des terres, qu’on confisquerait de nouveaux biens. En un mot, qu’il s’agissait, quand Nasser donnait l’impression qu’il allait s’occuper des siens, d’un tour de vis supplémentaire, et non pas d’un desserrement de l’étau. Il n’en était pas autrement sur le front politique israélien, où Nasser réattaquait presque immédiatement. « Le soulagement que nous avons éprouvé en Israël, me disait un colonel des blindés, a été de courte durée, et basé sur une illusion. Il me rappelle l’anecdote de la chèvre et du rabbin. »

« Un pauvre berger était allé trouver le rabbin pour se plaindre de l’étroitesse de sa cabane. Je ne peux plus y tenir, lui disait-il, avec ma femme et mes trois enfants. »

« Pour tout remède, le sage rabbin lui avait enjoint d’ajouter » chaque matin, une chèvre de son troupeau à la hutte déjà surpeuplée, et de venir le revoir quinze jours après. Le berger, simplet, confiant dans la sagesse du rabbin, avait obéi à la lettre, et s’était retrouvé quinze jours plus tard, avec femme, enfants et 15 chèvres dans sa hutte. Alors le rabbin lui avait dit : maintenant, retourne chez toi, et fais sortir les chèvres. » « Ce que fit notre berger, et il eut soudain l’impression de vivre dans un palais spacieux. C’est exactement ce qu’a éprouvé Israël quand les Syriens se sont révoltés : un soulagement formidable, causé par une illusion. »

La réalité militaire

Quels sont, en effet, les facteurs réels de la réalité militaire ? Nous avons posé la question, tout d’abord, au général Tsvi Tsour, chef d’État-major de l’armée d’Israël. C’est, comme la plupart des généraux d’Israël, un homme jeune : 38 ans. Il avait commandé, pendant la guerre d’indépendance, les « renards de Chimchon », une unité de jeeps qui avait réalisé dans le Neguev, contre les Égyptiens, des pénétrations foudroyantes et des gains sans rapport avec ses moyens.

Stratégiquement, nous dit Tsvi Tsour, la situation d’Israël s’est améliorée après la rupture de la RAU. Avant la rupture, nous avions en face de nous les deux armées syrienne et égyptienne, mais sous un commandement unifié. Or, la force d’une armée dépend avant tout de la manière dont l’utilise le commandement. Il y avait aussi le danger de voir l’armée jordanienne passer dans les mêmes mains. Pour le moment, cette unité de commandement n’existe plus. »

« Mais il y a un mais — et un mais important. » […]

Lisez la suite de l’article ici.

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After nearly six years as the United Nations political chief, Jeffrey Feltman on Thursday spoke to the press for the last time as the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, spotlighting the importance of multilateralism and the support of UN Member countries for the Organization’s vital work.

 

John Bolton speaks at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Oxon Hill, Maryland, U.S. February 24, 2017. REUTERS/Joshua Roberts/File Photo

John Bolton’s alarming return to a position of power, as top aide to the United States’ President, is cause for worry. A die-hard self-described Americanist, Bolton sees the world in black and white. In his thesis, “Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?”, published in 2000, Bolton outlined an America divided between “Globalists,” a small coterie of highly educated academic intellectuals, and “Americanists,” virtually everyone else. In a wide-ranging career in public office, Bolton has un-diplomatically torn into the United Nations, criticized international treaties, backed conspiracy theorists, supported military wars as primary solution to dictate foreign policy, and scoffed at non-governmental agendas like human rights.

Bolton’s resistance to the United Nations, the poster-organization of multilateral decision-making, underlies his studied indifference to international treaties, per se. As recently as last year, Bolton penned an essay, titled “How to Defund the UN”, in the Wall Street Journal. A graduate and undergraduate student of law from Yale University, Bolton disavows the basic tenets of international law. Most lawyers generally agree that international treaties derive their power, or legitimacy, not because they are legally binding by definition, but because they are unequivocally accepted as a legal concept and widely treated as such. For Bolton, however, adherence to international treaties maybe prompted by political or moral motivations, but never by course of legal obligations. More than that, Bolton believes that international treaties constrain the United States from acting in its own best interests.

The United States government, however, has frequently treated international treaties as legally binding for all decades in history. As far back as 1946, when France breached the Air Service Agreement, the United States asserted transgression of an international obligation and applied countermeasures. The countermeasures were upheld by an international arbitral tribunal.

Let’s consider a more recent example. In 1996, Bill Clinton became the first leader to sign onto a pact, called the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, that aimed to curb nuclear proliferation in the world. However, according to a constitutionally directed process, in which all treaties have to abide “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,” the nuclear arms treaty fell into the pits of political decay. Nearly two years later, in 1999, the Senate reviewed and rejected it. Clinton, who saw the decision as a severe setback to his administration, assured allies that he would, according to the Vienna Convention of 1969, which, too, the Senate never signed as party, uphold the intent of the treaty still.

Even though the Senate’s decisions should have been to Bolton’s liking, he was infuriated. In Bolton’s eyes, Clinton should have asserted constitutional supremacy instead of cleaving unnecessarily to external constraints.

When the same treaty banning nuclear arms was revived for discussion in the Senate in 2001, Bolton, then acting as George Bush’s Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, asked the State Department’s legal office if the President could unilaterally withdraw a treaty from the Senate. The lawyers responded, and said—“no.”

In a 1997 testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Bolton claimed that the United States did not have to pay dues “decided by the General Assembly or other governing bodies”; that is, according to the United Nations Charter. Seen in this context, it is hardly surprising that the United States’ invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, in circumvention of the UN Security Council’s authorization, were seen by Bolton as a triumph for the nation.

Now, Trump has appointed Bolton to advise him as his National Security Advisor from April. The increasing “presidentialization” of the position, or the role of an individual alone to exercise influence in politics, and the marginalization of other key positions, like the Secretary of State, is not lost on those working in the administration. Aligned with plenty of ideas consistent with the President’s “America First” vision, Bolton has called for tearing up the Iran nuclear deal, and for preemptively striking North Korea. In the past, Bolton has also floated the idea that Israel should strike Iranian nuclear facilities. Judging by the options that have been floated so far, there is only one question left to be asked—is Bolton’s influence going to remain implicit or made explicit by the administration? 

The post John Bolton’s Unrestored Mind appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Climate change “is still moving much faster than we are,” United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned on Thursday, calling for the political will, innovation and financing to cut global emissions by at least 25 per cent over the next two years.

With relief agencies in Bangladesh struggling to assist more than a million vulnerable Rohingya refugees crowded into makeshift camps along the country’s south-east coast, the World Health Organization (WHO) on Thursday appealed for international support to help the cash strapped health sector scale up its response.   

Sunset in Siberia, 2018. J.Quirk

Reports from Russian announced that Vladimir Putin won over 76% of the votes in his reelection bid March 18, with turnout over 67%.

The view from Siberia was a little different.

OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, sent nearly 600 short-term, long-term, and other election observers to Russia.  In its next-day report, OSCE noted that in an environment of state-owned television networks, “television coverage was characterized by extensive and unchallenged reporting of the incumbent’s official activities.” More curiously, OSCE described election day itself as technically competent but ultimately spoiled. “Overall,” it judged, “election day was conducted in an orderly manner despite shortcomings related to vote secrecy and transparency of counting.”  The election was run well, it seemed to judge, except for the voting and the counting.

OSCE dispatched more than 200 pairs of short-term observers, each with a local driver and interpreter, all over the country.  Some observers had done this many times across the Balkans and post-Soviet space, while for others it was their first mission. Observers included chief elections administrators from cities across the U.S., EU “Former Ministers of Something,” and at least one former member of the U.S. Congress.

A voter in Siberia, March 18, 2018. J.Quirk

My partner and I joined four other teams on an overnight flight to a mid-sized Siberian city; from there we drove four hours to smaller communities.  The flat, snowy landscape was broken up only by lines of birch trees and the occasional petrol station. We benefited from the beginning of spring weather and reliable roads. Other teams enjoyed 15⁰C resort-living in the south or the chance for a bit of tourism in St. Petersburg, while some endured flying ten or more hours east, or driving off the road in a snowstorm.

After two days of briefings in Moscow, the short-term observers’ work begins the day before the election. Our responsible driver and informative polyglot kept us safe and on course. We located and inspected the polling stations in a hospital, at a football stadium, at a coal mining company HQ, and in several schools.  People were generally finishing or finished with preparations for the next day. Across the towns, there were a few posters and billboards for candidates. Most, though, were targeting turnout with patriotic white, blue, and red calls to vote for “Our country, our president, our choice.”

Voting was brisk in the morning, but we had a question about mobile voting. Large percentages of voters in some polling stations were scheduled to be individually visited, handed a ballot, and have their vote collected in a mobile ballot box. These visits are a nice service for homebound voters, but they are not followed by international or local observers. In cases where mobile voting was intended to serve 20 or 30 percent of the polling station’s list of voters, we were told it was because there were many older voters. But the challenge to visit 200 or 300 voters in a few hours seemed substantial.

“Our country, our president, our choice.” J.Quirk

The counting itself gave us as much pause. It was at the individual polling stations, not regional or central locations, where the actual counting was done. In theory, a ballot box would be emptied on a large table. One by one, each and every ballot would be displayed to the polling station workers and to any observers. (There were observers from several candidates or parties at most polling stations.)  “A vote for Candidate X,” and anyone could question it. It would make for a long but accurate count. Instead, the big pile of ballots was divided by four or five poll workers into new piles, one for each candidate. Observers watched from a distance and could see some accuracy but not each ballot.  Each poll worker counted her pile (poll workers were overwhelmingly women in our area), and in turn announced simply, “Zhirinovsky, 22”, “Sobchak, 44,” “Putin, 701,” etc.  There was no recounting of someone else’s pile, and no obvious reconciliation among the number of the day’s voters and the total of the candidates’ piles. (The next-day OSCE report noted that many observation teams reported this same practice.) These tallies were recorded, entered into a computer, and sent. The ballots themselves were sealed in bags and delivered to the regional center, where we were told they would be locked in a room for a year. There seemed to be no built-in sampling of the bags of ballots, for example – “this one says Yavlinsky, 18 votes, let’s check it for accuracy.”

This doesn’t mean there was fraud at this stage: I watched one woman count her Grudinin pile. I was several feet away, but she seemed to be counting earnestly, flicking the top right corner of each ballot in her pile with her right index finger. She and I got the same number, but she went through the whole pile only one time.

At least one more difference between this election observation mission and others on which I served was the motivation of the host country.  In Albania’s 2011 local elections, for example, they needed to demonstrate that they had the technical capacity and political commitment to hold free and fair elections, as one small step on the long road to the EU.  Instead, the race for Tirana mayor was extremely close, the national election commission overruled the local ones in some key ways, and Edi Rama launched a series of controversial appeals before officially losing by just 81 votes.

Russia and President Putin didn’t seem to have to appease international observers, only national public opinion.  Live Internet webcams inside polling stations across the country captured a number of apparent irregularities, including ballot-box stuffing, that were shown on foreign newscasts around the world. But it seemed to some of us that an inspiring turnout to match the candidate-choice results was a higher priority than impressing temporary guests.

A final note: in some ways, these are not just technical, legal administrative matters, but foreign exchange programs. We met dozens of people working the polls, but also on airplanes, in hotels, in shops and cafes, and elsewhere. Most Russians were met were friendly, cooperative, and interested in doing their work while we did ours. The political atmosphere prevented more opportunities for rich, personal exchanges, but I hope my partner and I were as effective unofficial ambassadors for our countries as so many of the Russians we met were for theirs.

The post Russia’s Elections: The View from Siberia appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Propageant la plus grande confusion entre rentabilité à des fins particulières et efficacité au bénéfice de tous, le gouvernement français veut délégitimer un peu plus l'État social, qui fut pourtant gage d'émancipation pour de nombreuses générations. Après avoir multiplié les cadeaux fiscaux aux vrais (...) / France, Fonction publique, État, Histoire, Syndicalisme, Société civile, Travail - 2018/04

The United Nations peacekeeping mission in Liberia will formally cease operations on Friday after aiding the West African nation’s transition from ravaging civil war to a hopeful era of peace.

Entre pic à glace et thé au polonium, entre Léon Trotski (assassiné au Mexique) et Alexandre Litvinenko (empoisonné à Londres), les services de sécurité russes ont assurément liquidé nombre d'opposants vivant à l'étranger. Sans que cela suscite le même hourvari diplomatique, d'autres gouvernements ont (...) / Russie, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Services secrets, Violence, Israël, France, Royaume-Uni, Chili, Géopolitique - 2018/04

Reiterating the need for warring parties in Yemen to resume dialogue, the Security Council has condemned the latest missile attacks by the Houthi rebels targeting several cities of Saudi Arabia, including its capital, Riyadh.

À l’issue du scrutin des élections présidentielles en Égypte qui se sont déroulées du 26 au 28 mars, Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi a été réélu sans grande surprise.

À cette occasion, nous vous invitons à relire l’article de Chloé Berger, « L’Égypte du général Sissi, entre réaction et aspirations révolutionnaires » (publié dans Politique étrangère n°1/2018), ainsi que son interview publiée le 20 mars dernier sur notre blog.

Internet user growth is booming and with more people than ever purchasing goods and services online, protecting their privacy must be a top priority, the United Nations has said.

The United Nations has reset its action plan to address the root causes of the complex crisis in Africa’s Sahel, a region now home to one out of five people worldwide requiring humanitarian assistance, the UN deputy chief said Wednesday.

Children are suffering significant trauma and stress one month after a series of major earthquakes hit Papua New Guinea, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) said on Wednesday, warning about the possible long-term negative consequences.

The Horn of Africa is among the most congested, eventful, and most volatile geopolitical intersections on earth. It is where the West meets the East in a highly competitive game of strategic positioning for economic or hegemonic advantage.

China and Turkey who, more or less, employ similar soft-power strategies have tangible investments in various countries in the region, including Ethiopia. However, the widespread discontent with Ethiopia’s repressive impulses and its ethnic favoritism that led to a particular ethnic minority (Tigray) to exclusively operate the state apparatus has inspired Arab Spring-like mass protests. These protests have caused serious rancor within the ruling party. It is only a matter of time before this haemorrhaging government might collapse.

So, who is likely to gain or lose from this imminent shockwave in the region’s balance of power?

The Nile Tsunami

Ethiopia — a country previously considered as a stable regional hegemon, a robust emerging market, and a reliable counter-terrorism partner — is on the verge of meltdown, if not long-term civil strife.

Today, the Ethiopian government is caught between two serious challenges of domestic and foreign nature: the Oromo/Amhara mass protests tacitly supported by the West, and the water rights conflict with Egypt, Sudan and Somalia.

Ethiopia is claiming the lion’s share on the Nile that runs through it and other rivers that flow from its highlands for the Grand Renaissance Dam – thus presenting existential threats to the connected nations.

For the third time in three years, the Shabelle River has dried up, putting millions of Somalis at risk of starvation.

But the current government is not ready for a substantive change of guard. The longer the mass protests continue and the minority-led government continues to offer artificial or symbolic gestures of prisoner releases — while declaring a second ‘state of emergency’ in two years— the faster Ethiopia will become destabilised and the faster foreign investments will fizzle away.

Worse — though seemingly unthinkable — the ‘favorite nation’ status granted to Ethiopia after becoming the US’ main partner in the global ‘War on Terroris’ is slowly corroding.

Despite this week’s visit from US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the US State Department is gradually turning its back on Ethiopia for a number of reasons; chief among them, is its double-dealings on the South Sudan issue.

Despite the facade of US/China collaboration to end the South Sudan civil war, the geopolitical rivalry between these two giants has been pressuring Ethiopia to pledge exclusive allegiance to one over the other.

With China’s huge investments on Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan’s oil fields – making a choice won’t be too difficult.

The Kenya Factor

Several years ago I wrote an article arguing that the two most stable nations in the Horn (Kenya and Ethiopia) will become more unstable as Somalia becomes more stable.

Today, the Ethiopian government is facing the most serious threat since it took power by the barrel of the gun, and Kenya has a highly polarised population and two presidents ‘elected’ along clan lines.

Kenya — the nerve center of the international humanitarian industry — could just be one major incident away from inter-clan combustion.

The Somalia Factor

The Ethiopian government has launched a clandestine campaign of strategic disinformation intended to fracture or breakup opposition coalitions and recruit or lure potential comrades.

Ethiopian intelligence officers and members of the diplomatic corps together with some ethnic-Somali Ethiopians have been recruiting naive Somali government officials, intellectuals and activists with a Machiavellian disinformation campaign.

Meanwhile, IGAD — Ethiopia’s regional camouflage — calls for an open-borders agreement between member states. Despite broad-based public perception that for a fragile state like Somalia, such an agreement would be tantamount to annexation, some Somali politicians are eagerly carrying its banner.

These kinds of desperate campaigns and the abrupt resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn only underscore the fact that the government’s days are numbered.

The Sudan Factor

Sudan is caught in a loyalty triangle (Ethiopia, Egypt and Turkey) with competing powers. Sudan needs Egypt to address threats faced by the two nations regarding the diminishing access to the Nile by reasserting rights granted through the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

It needs Ethiopia to protect China’s economic partnership and to shield President Omar al Bashir from Western harassment through IGAD.

It also needs Turkey for development and for a long-term strategic partnership. Sudan has become the second country in Africa to grant Turkey a military base, with Somalia being the first.

The Eritrea Factor

When neocons dominated US foreign policy and the global ‘War on Terror’ was the order of all orders, Eritrea was slapped with sanctions. It was accused of being the primary funder and weapons supplier to al Shabab.

Today, though neither the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia or Eritrea nor any expert free from Ethiopian influence holds such a view, yet the sanctions have not been lifted.

The Ethiopian lobby and certain influential elements within US foreign policy-making circles continue to label Eritrea as a Marxist rogue state that undermines regional institutions such as IGAD and international ones like the UN Security Council; a closed society that espouses a deep rooted hatred towards the West.

Against that backdrop, the UAE has been investing heavily in Eritrea since 2015 or the beginning of the Yemen war that has created one of the the worst humanitarian disasters. The Emirati military (and its Academi/Blackwater shadow) now operates from a military base in Assab. Whether that’s a Trojan Horse or not, is a different discussion altogether.

Ins And Outs

The current wave of discontent against the Ethiopian government is likely to continue. But, considering how the Tigray has a total control on all levers of power, a transition of power will not be an easy process.

Ethiopia has also created an ethnically Somali counterinsurgency force in the Liyu Police. This ruthless force has already been used against the Oromos as they were used against Somalis of various regions that share a border with Ethiopia.

The extrajudicial killings and human rights violations are well documented. Despite all this, the Oromo and Amhara are set to reach their objectives albeit with bruised and bloody faces.

Will their coalition remain or, due to their historical distrust, will each eventually invoke its constitutional right to secede?

Whatever the outcome, any scenario of civil war or chaos in Ethiopia could put the entire Horn in danger and create a potential humanitarian catastrophe, especially in Somalia.

Meanwhile South Sudan is a lightyear away from sustainable political reconciliation especially since the foreign elements fueling the fire are not likely to stop any time soon. Djibouti remains the host of the most intriguing geopolitical circus. So, that leaves Eritrea as an island of stability in the region.

In the foreseeable future, Turkey could divest her investment out of Ethiopia into Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea. China will diversify her portfolio to include Eritrea. And the US — with no new policy — will continue droning her way through geopolitical schizophrenia.

** This article was first published by TRT World

** On Twitter:@Abukar_Arman

The post Regional and Geopolitical Impact of Ethiopia Meltdown appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2018). Philippe Contamine propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Jean-Marie Moeglin et Stéphane Péquignot , Diplomatie et « relations internationales » au Moyen Âge (IXe-XVe siècle) (PUF, 2017, 1 112 pages).

Si l’on s’arrête à la seule histoire européenne, l’opinion commune voudrait que la diplomatie, dans ses formes actuelles, n’ait réellement pris naissance qu’au XVIIe siècle, les traités de Westphalie (1648) jouant un rôle de référence. Le premier mérite des auteurs est ici de montrer que la période médiévale, depuis le démembrement de l’empire carolingien et l’émergence consécutive des royaumes, des principautés et des cités-États, a connu d’authentiques « relations internationales », dans la guerre comme dans la paix. Autrement dit, en dépit de l’enchevêtrement des vassalités et des fidélités, des rapports existaient de puissance à puissance ne ressortissant pas aux affaires intérieures. Ainsi, il fallut longtemps aux rois de France pour imposer dans l’étendue de leur royaume le monopole de la diplomatie légitime, complémentaire du monopole de la violence légitime. Quant au pape et à l’empereur, ils furent toujours incapables, malgré leurs prétentions, d’être des juges suprêmes au sein de la chrétienté. À des degrés divers, celle-ci fut toujours politiquement divisée.

Pendant tout un temps, médiévistes et modernistes français ont délaissé l’histoire diplomatique, l’« histoire-traité » ayant subi le même sort que l’« histoire-bataille » : trop événementielle, trop élitiste, et d’ailleurs écrite depuis longtemps. Le réveil s’est fait lentement, à partir des années 1980. Le livre de Moeglin et Péquignot, imposant et rigoureux, maîtrisé et novateur, adossé de surcroît à une immense bibliographie, donne une impulsion décisive à cette démarche. Il est appelé à faire date.

À l’évidence, il n’était pas question d’évoquer, même sommairement, les principales négociations qui scandèrent alors l’action politique. L’option a été de retenir les thèmes essentiels, quitte à y introduire la chronologie. Tour à tour sont passés en revue les acteurs des relations internationales (en droit comme en fait, qui à l’époque féodale pouvait mener une « politique extérieure » ?), les conditions pratiques des échanges (les langues utilisées, le rôle de l’oral et de l’écrit, l’archivage des traités), le statut des ambassadeurs, l’esprit qui présidait aux négociations, la formulation d’un premier droit public international, etc.

L’idée maîtresse est que, même au XVe siècle, les relations extérieures se nouaient non entre des États mais entre des hommes – avec leurs passions –, détenteurs à titre personnel et en général héréditaire de droits et de prérogatives. Ceux-ci leur procurant profit et honneur, il leur revenait de les maintenir et de les accroître par conquête, alliance ou mariage. Le rôle de l’amicitia et de l’inimicitia est ici fortement souligné. Cela dit, on voit ces princes – au sens que le droit romain donne à ce terme – s’identifier de plus en plus à leur pays : d’où ­l’introduction de la notion de bien commun.

Les auteurs sont loin d’admettre la radicale nouveauté de la Renaissance italienne : au-delà de la rhétorique qu’y maîtrisent les oratores, au point qu’ils font de la diplomatie une branche des belles-lettres, les ambassadeurs de Charles VII et de Louis XI, confrontés par exemple à l’Angleterre et à la Bourgogne, soutiennent la comparaison avec leurs contemporains de Florence, de Milan ou de Venise.

Philippe Contamine

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