Diplomacy & Crisis News

La crise économique a ravivé de vieux souvenirs en Grèce, notamment celui des ingérences alliées, comme en 1944, lorsque le Royaume-Uni préféra écraser la Résistance locale et collaborer avec les milices d'extrême droite plutôt que de voir le pays échapper à sa domination. / Allemagne, Balkans, Grèce, (...) / Allemagne, Balkans, Grèce, Méditerranée, Royaume-Uni, Armée, Communisme, Extrême droite, Guérilla, Histoire, Mouvement de contestation, Parti politique, Seconde guerre mondiale 1939-1945, Fascisme, Répression - 2012/07

In "The Europeans," Orlando Figes shows how Europe’s cosmopolitan culture developed in the nineteenth century.

Les combats pour réduire les inégalités ont longtemps porté sur le partage équitable des richesses. Depuis quelques décennies s'y ajoute le respect des identités minoritaires. Peut-on penser le rapport entre ces deux conceptions, de façon à ce qu'elles se renforcent réciproquement ? / Idées, Identité (...) / Idées, Identité culturelle, Inégalités, Minorité nationale, Droits des minorités, Racisme, Santé - 2012/06

Trump tried to overturn U.S. foreign policy without offering a substitute. The result is a United States and a world that are worse off.

Dépassements d'honoraires, désert médical qui gagne du terrain dans les zones rurales et pauvres… En France, la santé est en péril. Après quarante ans d'érosion continue du système de soins, la nouvelle ministre osera-t-elle la rupture ? / France, Entreprise, État, Finance, Protection sociale, Santé, (...) / France, Entreprise, État, Finance, Protection sociale, Santé, Service public, Médecine - 2012/06

Le géant taïwanais Foxconn, premier fournisseur mondial d'électronique et premier employeur privé en Chine, est désormais à l'étroit dans son bunker géant de Shenzhen Longhua. Voyage dans le Guangdong, puis dans le Sichuan, lieu emblématique de son renouveau industriel. « C'est la première fois que je (...) / Chine, États-Unis, Taïwan, Entreprise, Femmes, Industrie, Informatique, Jeunes, Logement, Multinationales, Pauvreté, Santé, Technologies de l'information, Technologie, Télécommunications, Ville, Électronique - 2012/06

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2020).
Rémy Hémez propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Philippe Boulanger, La Géographie, reine des batailles (Ministère des Armées/Perrin, 2020, 368 pages).

« Le terrain commande » : l’expression bien connue des soldats met parfaitement en lumière le rôle clé de la topographie dans la manœuvre. Pour autant, l’apport de l’essai de Philippe Boulanger, professeur de géographie à la Sorbonne, dépasse la question du terrain. Comme le rappelle l’auteur, « nulle opération ne peut être envisagée sans compréhension du milieu physique et de la population au préalable ».

En sept chapitres, Philippe Boulanger étudie toutes les dimensions qui font de la géographie « la reine des batailles ». Il décrit d’abord l’essor de la géographie militaire à partir du XVIIe siècle dans la foulée de la naissance de la topographie, l’invention de méthodes d’analyse du facteur géographique physique et humain à des fins stratégiques et tactiques au XIXe siècle, ou encore le rôle et la place de la géographie militaire pendant les deux conflits mondiaux. Le deuxième chapitre montre comment cette science est devenue un « savoir stratégique » à haute valeur ajoutée, à travers le rôle croissant qu’elle tient dans la gestion de crise et sa place renouvelée dans des engagements de plus en plus divers, tout en expliquant la restructuration des services dédiés. Philippe Boulanger met ensuite parfaitement en lumière le fait que la pensée géographique militaire dépasse le cadre du terrain. Il revient pour cela sur les concepts de géotactique, géopérationnalité et géostratégie, soit les trois échelles du raisonnement géographique militaire.

Le quatrième chapitre détaille les liens entre milieu naturel et géographie militaire, l’approche la plus anciennement prise en compte. La connaissance de nombreux milieux – au centre desquels se trouve le désert – est de plus en plus nécessaire pour des militaires engagés sur des théâtres d’opérations variés. Toutefois, l’environnement n’est pas seulement physique, il est aussi humain, et c’est l’objet du chapitre qui suit. La nécessité de « penser l’autre » apparaît véritablement à la fin du XIXe siècle et revient sur le devant de la scène au début des années 2000, notamment pour « gagner la guerre des perceptions ». L’avant-dernier chapitre traite de façon très complète du geospatial intelligence (geoint), l’auteur en étant le grand spécialiste français. Cette « fusion de données géolocalisées et géoréférencées » a pour objectif de « réunir sur un même support visuel la représentation cartographique, l’imagerie spatiale, un ensemble d’informations géolocalisées issues de toutes les autres formes de renseignement et une analyse géopolitique ». Philippe Boulanger analyse son apparition aux États-Unis dans les années 1990, son développement en France et dans plusieurs autres pays, son utilisation opérationnelle, ou encore, les défis qui attendent cette nouvelle science d’information géospatiale. Enfin, le dernier chapitre décrit les enjeux et défis de la « révolution géographique numérique », à l’œuvre depuis les années 1990, qui engendre une véritable rupture dans la façon de penser et d’exploiter la géographie militaire.

Cet essai brillant et érudit offre une perspective inédite sur la géographie militaire, ses liens avec les opérations, ses dimensions historiques, ou encore les nombreux enjeux auxquelles elle fait face. Après sa lecture, il n’est plus possible d’en douter : les cartes sont une arme.

Rémy Hémez

>> S’abonner à Politique étrangère <<

Tandis que le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies exhortait Khartoum à retirer ses troupes du district contesté d'Abyei, le médiateur de l'Union africaine Thabo Mbeki poursuivait ses efforts en vue d'une reprise des négociations entre les deux Soudans. Une profonde méfiance oppose Khartoum et Juba, (...) / Chine, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Soudan, Conflit, Guérilla, Pétrole, Guerre civile, Soudan du Sud - 2012/06

Plus instruites que leur aînées, les jeunes générations voient leurs aspirations contrariées par la précarité qui les frappe. Au point parfois de déclencher une colère contagieuse. / Chili, Espagne, États-Unis, Royaume-Uni, Capitalisme, Démocratie, Économie, Éducation, Finance, Inégalités, Jeunes, (...) / Chili, Espagne, États-Unis, Royaume-Uni, Capitalisme, Démocratie, Économie, Éducation, Finance, Inégalités, Jeunes, Mouvement de contestation, Répression, Crise économique, Crise financière, Néolibéralisme - 2012/05

Google recrute des militants des droits humains, Hillary Clinton soutient des projets humanitaires mêlant affaires et technologie ; en Afrique, l'omniprésence du téléphone mobile, même dans les régions les plus pauvres, en fait un outil au service du développement ainsi qu'un terrain de conquête. (...) / Afrique, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Kenya, Action humanitaire, Communication, Entreprise, Finance, Information, Internet, Mutation, ONG, Pauvreté, Technologies de l'information, Technologie, Télécommunications, Diplomatie - 2012/05

La rédaction de Politique étrangère vous offre de (re)lire des textes qui ont marqué l’histoire de la revue. Nous vous proposons aujourd’hui un article de A. Suat Bilge, intitulé « Le conflit chypriote, vu de Turquie », et publié dans le numéro 4/1964.

Pour comprendre les positions et les buts des parties dans ce conflit, il est raisonnable de prendre l’année 1954 comme point de départ. Car c’est durant cette année-là que le conflit prit un caractère vraiment international. Depuis lors il a suivi un développement mouvementé au cours duquel les parties ont défendu leurs points de vue devant l’opinion publique et ont lutté pour les faire admettre.

Nous allons essayer de résumer ci-dessous le point de vue turc sur le déroulement de ces événements.

I. Les premières positions prises par les parties

L’origine du conflit chypriote et la lutte entre les communautés turque et grecque remontent à des temps très anciens. Mais pour discerner la vraie cause du conflit on peut se contenter de prendre l’année 1954 comme point de départ. Les revendications réciproques, les mésententes et même les conflits armés entre les communautés vivant dans l’île, devinrent une question internationale lorsqu’en 1954 la Grèce porta le différend devant les Nations-Unies. Pendant cette première période, le conflit chypriote était présenté au monde comme aspiration à l’ auto-détermination d’un peuple colonisé.

Profitant du courant de décolonisation, les Grecs de Chypre et la Grèce ont tout d’abord proclamé que le seul peuple européen qui vivait sous une administration coloniale était les Chypriotes grecs, qu’il fallait mettre fin à cette administration et donner la possibilité à ces Chypriotes de choisir librement le gouvernement sous lequel ils vivraient et même de réaliser l’union de l’île avec la Grèce. Ainsi les revendications des Grecs qui apparaissaient comme le prélude de la lutte d’un peuple opprimé contre une puissance coloniale, l’Angleterre, passait sous silence les aspirations de la communauté turque vivant dans l’île, ainsi que les intérêts de la Turquie.

L’île de Chypre était mise juridiquement sous une administration coloniale, mais en fait sa situation avait été différente de celle des autres colonies. Comme l’on sait, Chypre avait été conquise en 1571 par les Ottomans et administrée par eux pendant 307 ans. En 1878, l’administration de l’île de Chypre passa aux Anglais, afin de fortifier la sécurité et la défense de l’Empire, par un traité qui fixait le but et les conditions de cette administration. La Turquie et l’Angleterre ayant participé à la première guerre mondiale dans des camps opposés et la Turquie étant sortie perdante de cette guerre, elle fut obligée de renoncer en 1923 à ses droits sur l’île de Chypre par le traité de paix de Lausanne. L’île de Chypre, département de l’Empire Ottoman, était ainsi soustraite à la souveraineté turque. A cause de ce développement historique il était difficile pour la Turquie et pour les Turcs de l’île de considérer le conflit chypriote comme une question coloniale quand le sort de l’île se trouva de nouveau en jeu à la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale.

L’intérêt manifesté par les Turcs à l’égard de Chypre était en étroite relation avec leur préoccupation d’assurer la sécurité de l’Anatolie. Cette préoccupation historique n’était pas née chez les Turcs. Tous les anciens maîtres de l’Anatolie avaient témoigné des mêmes soucis. C’est pourquoi le sort de l’île avait toujours suivi celui de l’Anatolie dans le passé. Quand les Turcs établirent leur domination sur l’Anatolie, ils furent amenés à imiter leurs prédécesseurs par la nécessité stratégique devenue historique et ils firent la conquête de l’île en 1571. La cession administrative de Chypre à l’Angleterre était motivée par la même nécessité de défense. En effet, cette cession était motivée par la préoccupation des Ottomans d’assurer et de faciliter la participation de l’Angleterre à la défense de l’Empire. En 1878 il n’était pas question de renoncer à l’île de Chypre, mais bien de l’utiliser comme une base de défense. L’enlèvement de l’île à la Turquie en 1923 fut une décision imposée au peuple turc du fait de la première guerre mondiale.

Le rôle stratégique de Chypre a aujourd’hui toujours la même importance pour la défense de l’Anatolie. Une longue expérience historique ne permettait pas à la Turquie de négliger les dangers auxquels elle a dû toujours faire face. Malgré le désir des Turcs d’achever le développement économique de leur pays et de consacrer tous leurs efforts à ce but, nous étions dès la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale l’objet de menaces et même de revendications territoriales. La persistance de cette menace a obligé la Turquie à assurer sa sécurité par des alliances défensives telles que l’OTAN et le CENTO. L’île de Chypre contrôle par sa situation les routes maritimes et les ports par lesquels la Turquie espère recevoir l’aide de ses alliés. Quand il fut question d’un changement du statut international de Chypre, il était naturel que la Turquie ne le considérât pas comme une simple affaire coloniale. On nous pose souvent cette question : Pourquoi l’objection de la Turquie à l’annexion de Chypre à la Grèce puisque ces deux pays collaborent à l’intérieur de l’OTAN et sont deux pays alliés. Nous Turcs sommes alliés aux Grecs pour lutter contre les dangers communs. Mais ce fait n’empêche malheureusement pas la Grèce d’avoir des visées expansionnistes sur l’Anatolie et de revendiquer ce territoire quand il est possible, comme cela s’est produit à la fin de la première guerre mondiale. Il est donc prudent pour la Turquie d’assurer sa propre défense.

L’intérêt que porte la Turquie à Chypre ne se limite pas «exclusivement à des considérations défensives. A Chypre vivent plus de cent mille Turcs. Leur installation dans l’île remonte à la conquête. Les soldats qui avaient participé à cette conquête furent, après l’opération, démobilisés et établis dans l’île. Un noyau de trente mille anciens combattants est à l’origine de la communauté turque auquel se sont jointes des familles émigrées de l’Anatolie.

La communauté turque établie ainsi à Chypre a conservé des attaches avec les Turcs d’Anatolie sur le plan national, religieux et culturel. Elle a adopté les réformes réalisées en Anatolie et a suivi un développement social parallèle à celui des Turcs d’Anatolie. Cet attachement des Chypriotes turcs pour leurs frères d’Anatolie a aussi un aspect psychologique. Les Chypriotes turcs manifestent un intérêt continu pour les progrès réalisés en Anatolie. Les fêtes nationales turques sont toujours pour eux une occasion de manifester leur solidarité à l’égard des Turcs d’Anatolie. Actuellement, les journaux turcs paraissent avec des titres rouges selon l’habitude en Turquie et publient des articles exprimant l’attachement des Chypriotes à l’Anatolie. Un coup d’oeil aux journaux suffit pour se rendre compte que les Chypriotes turcs font partie intégrante de la population anatolienne. Les Chypriotes turcs viennent très souvent en Turquie, soit pour leurs études, soit pour y recevoir des soins médicaux, soit pour toute autre raison. Un autre lien additionnel est l’existence d’une communauté chypriote en Turquie. Celle-ci s’y est établie après l’annexion de l’île par le Royaume-Uni ; elle compte aujourd’hui plus de deux cent mille âmes. Quant il fut question du statut international de Chypre, il était donc naturel que les Turcs d’Anatolie s’y intéressent tout particulièrement et Fin tervention de la Turquie dans cette affaire était inévitable. Aucun Etat ne peut négliger la protection d’une partie de sa population.

L’interdépendance de l’Anatolie et de Chypre d’une part, la communauté turque vivant sur l’île d’autre part ne permettaient pas à la Turquie de considérer le conflit chypriote comme un problème colonial.

Les Grecs de Grèce et de Chypre voulaient par ailleurs s’appuyer sur le principe de l’autodétermination pour réaliser l’annexion de Chypre à la Grèce. Ils prétendaient que c’était une injustice de les priver de ce droit. La Turquie ne s’opposait pas à l’application du principe de l’autodétermination aux Chypriotes. Elle exigeait seulement que les particularités de la population soient prises en considération. En effet, à Chypre il n’y a pas un peuple distinct : Grecs et Turcs y vivent. Les Grecs veulent l’union avec la Grèce et les Turcs aspirent à s’unir avec la Turquie. Les Grecs demandaient avec insistance que le principe d’auto-détermination soit appliqué exclusivement en leur faveur. La Turquie exigeait que le même principe soit appliqué également aux Chypriotes turcs.

Les Chypriotes grecs refusaient de reconnaître ce droit d’autodétermination aux Turcs. Ils prétendaient que les Chypriotes turcs, moins nombreux, ne pourraient s’opposer à la volonté de la majorité. Mais la particularité de la population chypriote ne permettait pas de considérer la situation sous l’angle d’une relation entre une minorité et une majorité. En effet, les traités internationaux et les auteurs, y compris les Grecs, définissaient toujours la notion de minorité en relation avec une nation distincte. Selon la définition généralement acceptée, la minorité est un groupe moins nombreux, différent de la majorité d’une nation par le critère de la religion, de la langue, de la culture ou de la race. Cette définition ne prend pas seulement en considération la relation numérique entre deux groupes, mais elle suppose l’existence d’une nation distincte. Or, à Chypre, il n’y avait pas une nation chypriote assez distincte pour qu’on puisse parler d’une minorité différente. Il existait une communauté qui se considérait grecque et une autre qui se considérait turque. La relation entre ces deux communautés ne pourrait se définir selon le critère du nombre. Le vrai aspect de cette relation était celui qui existe entre deux groupes appartenant à deux nations différentes. Même si l’on ne va pas jusqu’à prendre la relation numérique existant entre les nations auxquelles appartiennent la communauté turque et la communauté grecque, il fallait reconnaître la particularité de la démographie de Chypre et traiter en conséquence les deux communautés. La logique exigeait que soit reconnu à ces deux communautés le même droit d’autodétermination.

Les Grecs disaient aussi que du point de vue juridique, la Turquie avait abdiqué tous ses droits sur Chypre en acceptant les dispositions du Traité de paix de Lausanne. Selon les articles 16 et 27 de ce Traité, la Turquie ne pourrait dans l’avenir revendiquer aucun droit sur Chypre. Mais la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale a confirmé dans une décision consultative que les dispositions de ces articles se limitaient aux frontières fixées par le Traité de Lausanne. Si l’on voulait changer le statut international de Chypre et par voie de conséquence l’ordre et la balance politiques établis par le Traité de Lausanne, il était naturel qu’on revienne au point de départ et que chaque partie reconsidère sa position.

En effet, dès qu’un changement dans le statut international de Chypre s’est dessiné, la Turquie a affirmé son droit comme une partie intéressée et a déclaré son intention d’intervenir dans l’affaire afin de sauvegarder les droits de la communauté turque et ses intérêts stratégiques.

La thèse de la Turquie est apparue comme un slogan en faveur du partage. Mais cette idée n’était en réalité que l’application des dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies au conflit de Chypre. Comme l’on sait, quand il est question d’accorder l’autodétermination à un territoire non autonome (ce qui était le cas pour Chypre sous la souveraineté du Royaume-Uni) la règle applicable est l’article 73 de la Charte. Selon le paragraphe b) de cet article on devait tenir compte des conditions particulières de chaque territoire et de ses populations en vue de donner le droit d’autodétermination. Or la particularité territoriale de Chypre n’était autre que sa situation géographique. Cette situation ne pourrait être dissociée de la notion bien connue de proximité. Et celle-ci amenait inévitablement à considérer Chypre sous ses rapports géographiques avec l’Anatolie.

Ces rapports supposaient certainement les besoins de défense de l’Anatolie. A cet égard il suffit de se rappeler la décision de la Société des Nations au sujet des îles Aaland. Quant à la particularité des populations de Chypre, il fallait commencer par souligner que l’article en question amenait à considérer les aspirations politiques des populations (au pluriel), c’est-à-dire de tous les habitants. Comme on vient de le dire plus haut, à Chypre il n’existe pas une population homogène, mais deux communautés. Les aspirations politiques de ces communautés ne s’accordaient pas. La communauté turque ne voulait pas vivre sous la domination des Grecs. Aucun principe ne pourrait exclure cette détermination de la communauté turque. S’il fallait donc accorder l’autodétermination à Chypre, il était nécessaire de prendre en considération ces particularités démographiques et donner à la communauté turque le droit d’exprimer elle aussi sa volonté. Ces considérations aboutissent par voie de conséquence au partage de l’île. On voit que le partage de l’île n’était que l’application à Chypre de l’article 73 de la Charte.

Il. Les premiers développements du conflit chypriote

Jusqu’à la soumission officielle du conflit chypriote à l’ONU, la Turquie a multiplié les démarches amicales afin de ne pas compromettre la paix du Proche-Orient et l’amitié turco-grecque. Malgré ces avances, la Grèce a soumis en 1954 le conflit chypriote à l’ONU. La Turquie a dû prendre position et affirmer ses droits et ses intérêts vitaux. Durant les discussions à l’O.N.U. sur Chypre, les représentants turcs ont souligné les liens juridiques, historiques, économiques et défensifs entre la Turquie et Chypre et ont déclaré que la Turquie ne pourrait rester spectatrice devant le changement du statut de Chypre. En 1954, l’O.N.U. n’a pris aucune décision sur le conflit chypriote. D’autre part, la communauté turque de Chypre avait commencé à réaffirmer son existence et à résister aux pressions des Grecs. Le conflit armé entre les communautés turque et grecque était évité grâce au sang- froid de la première.

Au mois de septembre 1955, une conférence s’est tenue à Londres efttre le Royaume-Uni, la Turquie et la Grèce sur le conflit chypriote. Mais les parties restèrent sur leurs positions. D’autre part, l’apparition du terrorisme à Chypre a détérioré les relations entre les deux communautés.

En 1956, le terrorisme à Chypre est arrivé au stade du conflit armé entre les deux communautés. Les efforts de conciliation ont échoué. À cet égard il faut mentionner le rejet du projet constitutionnel de lord Radcliffe par les Grecs de l’île et par la Grèce.

En 1957, les Nations Unies ont discuté deux fois le conflit chypriote, sur l’insistance de la Grèce. Les Nations Unies ont recommandé aux parties intéressées de trouver par les voies pacifiques une solution conforme à la Charte des Nations Unies. La Grèce a également rejeté, au mois de mars, l’offre de conciliation du Secrétaire Général de l’O.T.A.N. Le terrorisme a, cette année, continué à Chypre en augmentant le nombre des victimes.

Le conflit armé entre les deux communautés à Chypre mettait en danger les rapports entre la Turquie et la Grèce. Ainsi la collaboration entre les deux pays dans les alliances de l’OTAN et du Pacte Balkanique a souffert de cet état de choses pour aboutir à une paralysie complète en 1958. Pour améliorer cette situation, le Conseil de l’OTAN a renouvelé deux fois ses offres de conciliation. Le conflit de Chypre fut discuté dans le Conseil sans arriver à une solution. Entre- temps, le plan de MacMillan fut rejeté de nouveau par les Grecs. […]

>> Lire la suite de l’article sur Persée <<

History is everywhere in India, deployed to enrage and incite.

What’s becoming apparent to anybody without some form of clinical myopia is that American liberalism is struggling to deal with certain broad political developments. Consider societal virtues characteristically American—public, often free form political discussion; individualism; egoism; checks-on-power; short-lasting and directly-elected representatives—these things are not conducive to a fast-acting political system and consequently make our “American Experiment” not particularly well equipped to handle recent forces such as the biblical COVID-19. The real problem, though, is that other systems of government are well equipped.

For instance, lacking certain (in this case) restrictive American principles, China was able to effectively control the virus through a combination of mass surveillance and quarantine measures implemented quickly from the top-down. China behaves very much like an animal, willing to self-amputate limbs if caught in a bear trap. There are no questions of principle in the liberal sense, no considerations of rights, and any “communistic” principles espoused by the government are spurious. Cold, systemic efficiency—this is what the Chinese government advertises with its authoritarianism, this is what it believes in, and it’s already using this efficiency to gain clout on the world stage by mass producing medical equipment.

China is emblematic of a phenomenon Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek characterizes as the end of the marriage between democracy and capitalism. China exhibits in idiosyncratic ways forms of capitalism —whether it be Chinese billionaires or venture capitalists—unmarred by authoritarianism. How can liberal capitalist nations respond to Zizek’s “problems of the commons” such as COVID, or ecological destruction? It’s clear that individual-oriented responses to these issues are specious—most fossil fuel emissions are the product of merely 100 companies, who remain entrenched in the legislative system, and a hands-off approach to the pandemic is currently failing in several states. Illiberal capitalist countries can always point to their aforementioned animal efficiency. What will liberal countries do when, facing imminent ecological destruction, Chinese-style authoritarianism is seen as the only viable method of fast action?

Smug, turgid defenses of liberal values which idealize theoretical virtues but mask an underbelly of elitism and hypocrisy do no good. Reflect on arguments given by Steven Pinker, and Adam Gopnik. Where do they leave us? All they do is laud liberal values of tolerance and enterprise, forever looking back on “’formal’ victories of liberal democracies” as opposed to “the lived experience” of many people. Where is the urgency to acknowledge the failure of liberal countries regarding, say, the devastation in Yemen? Or to acknowledge the United States’ complicity? Where is the addressal of arguments which fueled right-wing momentum in 2016? The most recent American reactionary movement and its subsequent mainstream manifestations (Bannon et al.) are reactions to real problems—the withering of the American rust belt as a result of globalization, America’s perceived failure to maintain a hegemonic position, the failures of liberalism with respect to social mobility, etc.—that offer false solutions. Trade wars and performative, petulant diplomatic shenanigans are not going to re-establish American liberalism as hegemonic. But the points outlined by many liberal apologists are trite.

A detractor may claim that here I’m just stating problems without providing solutions. This is unequivocally correct. The analysis is descriptive, not prescriptive. I’m writing this piece as all politically plausible (meaning election-winnable) solutions to these problems, both internal and external to liberalism, fail to hit the mark, opting for either lip service or suicidal death-drive nihilism. Members of the younger generation are scared—it’s an abstract yet ambient terror that people my age feel talking about the state of the art so to speak with respect to liberalism and the sustainability of capitalist democracy.

When forced, however, by circumstance to engage with these problems prescriptively, the correct response is not to advocate for knee-jerk reaction or to settle for apologetic self-assurance. It is not immediately obvious that there are quick solutions, and I advocate for a brand of armchair theorizing which may be derided as unpragmatic by some in support of the aforementioned clinically myopic positions. But this piece is highly interrogative because asking questions is important. Simply identifying the problems, taking them seriously, and engaging with them theoretically is a step above-and-beyond a large number of both those championing liberalism regardless of its faults and those offering regressive solutions via nativism and blatant ignorance.

If liberal capitalism is to survive the century then it must confront itself, expand its imagination, and most importantly stop being overconfident and cavalier about its ability to self-correct in dire straits. Because with daunting alternatives clambering up over the horizon and making jarring amounts of headway, even after the triumphant and meant-to-be-epochal victory of western liberalism at the end of the Cold War, certainty is an intellectual sin.

The post Liberalism Going Forward appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

There has been some discussion comparing modern times to that of the pre-First World War period. While that era was characterized by the social and economic effects of industrialization with little labour protections and the struggle of people living under colonial rule, the comparisons could likely be made to any era that suffered from conflict. What characterizes today’s era in relation to that period is how actions against minority groups were often ignored, even if they were done en masse and in a brutal fashion. The most stark example from that period in human history is the human rights atrocities taken against the Armenian people, actions that are often still ignored to this day and that have scarred their community indefinitely.

When looking back on our generation, it will likely be the case that those in the future will see that a lot of symbolic acts were committed to, while actual torture and human rights atrocities were almost wholly ignored. People that have suffered some of the worst treatment in modern human history, especially against women, has occurred under our watch. Minorities like the Yazidi women and girls have been brutalized to such a degree that it rivals tortures done during the Holocaust. Movements to acknowledge and help them have been more or less muted with the exception of a few small aid groups and those who are aware, committed to, and have sacrificed to save Yazidis, especially to help those women and girls who are the targets of sexual violence and torture. Many groups in the same region are some of the oldest living communities in human history, and many of those are in the process of being wiped out because they are a minority group. Human rights need to apply to everyone, even if it is not politically expedient. Consciously not doing so could be considered a criminal act.

The manner in which media and some governments have muted the actions taking place in Hong Kong is also quite surprising. For many countries there is a significant community of people from Hong Kong living there, along with historic ties to the British Commonwealth where a similar system of government and democracy exists. For those that are democratic cousins with the people of Hong Kong it might be the case in the future that we will look back at our era and ask why so little was done to assist people who share our values and commitment to a democratic system. While some countries have opened up their immigration and refugee systems to those who wish to leave Hong Kong, there is little discussion and understanding as to why the dismantling of a democratic country is so troubling, and how the value of such a society and culture would be an eternal loss to the world community. The acceptance of the loss of Hong Kong’s democracy is a reflection on how those who live in democracies view their own freedoms and rights. When democracy is devalued by those that oppose it, it is common place, when it is discarded by those who are free under it, it will be seen as absurdity by future generations.

The post Our Lost Generation appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, director-general of the World Health Organization (right), with Houlin Zhao (Zhao Houlin), secretary-general of the International Telecommunications Union, in 2017. (Photo: M. Jacobson-Gonzalez, ITU Pictures)

President Trump has clearly decided to deflect blame for the disastrous impact of the COVID-19* pandemic in the United States by attacking China and the World Health Organization (WHO). Of the two, the one that is likely to suffer more, with more consequences for the United States and the rest of the world, is WHO.

Trump has ratcheted up his attacks at an accelerating pace. He first teased at withholding funds from the organization on April 7 but then backtracked only minutes later. Then a week after that, on April 15, he announced that he was suspending U.S. funding for WHO “until its mismanagement, cover-ups, and failures can be investigated.” By the end of April, he had ordered the intelligence community to investigate whether China and WHO had conspired to conceal information about the virus and its origins.

On May 18 Trump sent a letter to, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the WHO director-general, giving him 30 days to commit to “major substantive improvements” (otherwise unspecified) or the United States would end its funding permanently and reconsider its membership in the organization. Other members, including U.S. allies, voiced their opposition to this and support for the agency. Then, on May 29—just 11 days after his 30-day ultimatum and apparently without consulting his advisers or other relevant officials—Trump inserted into a policy statement on China that he was “terminating our relationship with the World Health Organization” and redirecting funds to other global health needs.

Despite the dramatic charges of mismanagement, cover-ups, and failures, an official fact sheet made only two specific complaints. The first is what David Fidler, a former legal consultant to WHO, interprets as a “failure to provide urgent information.” The charge required interpretation because the official White House document buries it in anti-Chinese rhetoric, such as “the WHO has shown a dangerous bias towards the Chinese government,” and assertions that “the WHO repeatedly parroted the Chinese government’s claims” about the disease and its characteristics. The wording would suggest that Trump is most bothered by the fact that WHO to deferring to China rather than to him. The second specific complaint is that WHO disagreed with the administration regarding the value of travel restrictions, or, as the fact sheet put it, “put political correctness over life-saving measures by opposing travel restrictions.”

These are not justifications for cutting off funding for WHO. As Fidler points out, the administration did not have to struggle with WHO to impose its travel restrictions. WHO is required to make recommendations; it generally makes the same one when it comes to travel restrictions in a health emergency; and the administration is not obliged to comply with it. As for information, the administration has multiple sources, including its own intelligence services. (At one time it actually had specialists on this very issue stationed in Wuhan, China, but it closed that program down.) If the administration had information from an alternative source telling it that China was misinforming WHO about what was happening, then it should have shared that information with WHO. In any event, if WHO was delayed in distributing important information, it was not as delayed as the Trump administration’s responses.

Let us quickly review the sequence of events. WHO received word of an outbreak of an “atypical pneumonia” on December 31, 2019, apparently from sources other than China, and then solicited a confirmation from the Chinese government. China verified the report via Twitter on January 4. (Presumably as a favor to China, WHO used the passive voice in reporting its first information, allowing people to assume that China had officially notified it as it was required to do under the International Health Regulations.) Chinese scientists published the coronavirus genome on January 12. On January 13 a COVID-19 case appeared in Thailand; at this point COVD-19 became a potential matter of international concern rather than a matter solely internal to China and its jurisdiction. WHO tasked a German group to develop a test for it, which was made available to countries on January 16. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) declined to adopt it and then botched its own test, delaying the onset of testing in the United States. China announced on January 20 that the coronavirus was a serious threat and that local authorities had suppressed the information. (Whether true or not in this instance, that is actually a major problem in countries like China, where local authorities face multiple, conflicting demands from the capital and are held responsible for anything that goes wrong, often without regard to actual responsibility.) A WHO delegation visited Wuhan briefly for the first time, on January 20–21, and stated that there was evidence of human-to-human transmission but that more analysis was needed. On January 22, Dr. Tedros, WHO’s director-general, began giving daily press briefings, encouraging countries to engage in testing, contact tracing, and the isolation of infected persons. WHO declared COVID-19 a “public health emergency of international concern” (PHEIC) on January 30. On that day Trump announced the formation of a coronavirus task force under Secretary Alex Azar of the Department of Health and Human Services, and he imposed partial restrictions on travel from China the following day, January 31. In mid-February, Dr. Anthony Fauci of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases said that it could have the makings of a global pandemic. A more substantial WHO visit to Beijing and Wuhan came on February 16–24. On February 25, Dr. Nancy Messonnier, director of the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, said, “Ultimately, we expect we will see community spread in the United States. It’s not a question of if this will happen, but when this will happen, and how many people in this country will have severe illnesses.” She added, “Disruptions to everyday life may be severe, but people might want to start thinking about that now.” Rather than heed the warning, Trump put Vice President Mike Pence in charge of the coronavirus task force on February 26 and instructed him to tamp down the alarmist talk before it spooked the stock market. Following the lead of his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, Trump’s primary concern was that any acknowledgment of a potential crisis—or any overt effort to counter it—might roil the markets and hurt his reelection chances. It was March 15, after the markets had already begun to tank, when the Trump administration recommended social distancing and locking down the economy in the United States.

Some have complained that after its January 30 PHEIC declaration, it took WHO until March 11 to declare a pandemic. But officially, a PHEIC declaration is all there is, and the authority to declare a PHEIC has existed only since 2005; there is no such thing as an official WHO pandemic declaration. It seems that Tedros started using the scarier term pandemic to attract the attention of countries that were still not taking the issue seriously enough. (As an official WHO timeline describes the March 11 statement, “Deeply concerned both by the alarming levels of spread and severity, and by the alarming levels of inaction, WHO made the assessment that COVID-19 can be characterized as a pandemic.” [Emphasis added.]) Trump’s social-distancing decision came six weeks after the PHEIC declaration and weeks after warnings from his own public-health officials. How much did the delay matter? Researchers at Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health looked into that question and came up with the following estimates:

In a retrospective analysis, the researchers find that, nationwide, 703,975 confirmed cases (62%) and 35,927 deaths (55%) of reported deaths up to May 3 would have been avoided if observed control measures had been adopted one week earlier—on March 8 instead of March 15. In the New York metropolitan area, 209,987 (80%) of confirmed cases and 17,514 (80%) of deaths would have been avoided if the same sequence of interventions had been applied one week earlier. Had the sequence of control measures occurred two weeks earlier, the nation would have seen a reduction of 960,937 (84%) cases and 53,990 (83%) deaths, and a reduction of 246,082 cases (94%) and 20,427 deaths (94%) in the New York metropolitan area.

Are Travel Restrictions “Life-Saving Measures”?

A major shortcoming in the administration’s argument is a fundamental failure to understand—or even to try to understand—the issues at hand. Take, for example, this statement: “The WHO put political correctness over life-saving measures by opposing travel restrictions.” Trump, it appears, simply assumes that travel restrictions are life-saving measures. It is indeed possible for travel restrictions to slow the spread of contagions. WHO itself said that restrictions, when imposed early and of limited duration, can give countries time to prepare for the arrival of the contagion (which Trump failed to do, evidently believing that the travel restrictions were sufficient in and of themselves). On the other hand, travel restrictions do not stop the spread of contagions and they cause problems of their own. Apart from the general social and economic disruption, travel restrictions make it harder to get emergency personnel into the affected area in order to combat the outbreak or slow or prevent the spread of the disease to other areas. Additionally, fear of eliciting travel and trade restrictions can lead some countries to cover up their disease outbreaks, producing worse outcomes overall. Also the announcement of imminent travel restrictions can cause panic-driven movement by people who fear being caught in a containment area. Trump did this three times in announcing restrictions related to China, then Iran, then Europe. The Europe-related announcement, in particular, led to a flood of people overwhelming airports—creating large, packed crowds, mixing virus carriers with susceptible subjects—and may well have contributed to the massive outbreak in metropolitan New York. WHO has also stated that travel restrictions can produce a “stigma,” which may be the root of Trump’s reference to “political correctness,” but that is hardly the core of the argument. For these reasons WHO generally advises against restrictions, as do other public-health authorities.

That’s Not How Any of This Works!

More generally, the administration’s arguments betray a basic misunderstanding of the nature of international organizations. They are rarely independent actors on the global stage. Rather, they are membership associations. WHO serves as a forum for debate among its members—that is, 194 separate countries that are represented in its governing body, the World Health Assembly—on issues of global health, as a vehicle for sharing information, as a pool of technical expertise, as a helper in policy coordination, and as an agent for its members in seeking to achieve common goals related to global health. In doing so, it performs an extremely useful function. But, to put it bluntly, WHO is not in a position to boss China around. It is not a supranational authority (nor, for that matter, is it an instrument of U.S. policy). The only international organization with the capacity to boss member states around is the UN Security Council, which can do so when passing resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”). And even in that case—if this had involved a threat to the peace and were being decided by the UN Security Council—China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, could veto any action directed against it. In any event, China, which held the rotating Security Council chairmanship in March, managed to keep the pandemic entirely off the agenda throughout that month. In April, when the Security Council finally did attempt to address the issue, it was stymied both by China’s singular focus on avoiding blame and by the United States’ singular focus on blaming China (and WHO). Thus, nothing of significance was achieved.

Of course, not all of WHO’s 194 bosses have an equal say in what it does, but enough of them do to complicate any controversial decision it has to make. That is especially true when members disagree or fight each other. In this case, the repeated efforts of U.S. representatives to condemn WHO’s pro-Chinese rhetoric, highlight the Chinese origins of the pandemic, and press for Taiwan’s last-minute addition to the World Health Assembly have served no purpose but to rile the Chinese leadership and obstruct progress in dealing with the disease. WHO is a repository for information filed by member states, and thus it is highly dependent on the member states’ willingness to issue reports. It was not in a position to force China to allow its inspectors into Wuhan, and China did not allow it to do so for several weeks. If WHO was unseemly in its praise of China, then presumably Tedros believed, rightly or wrongly, that doing so was necessary to elicit China’s cooperation. Naming-and-shaming, WHO’s one other alternative, can be counterproductive when dealing with thin-skinned governments. (An administration in which cabinet meetings begin with secretaries singing the praises of the president ought to understand this.) The political situation in the United States being what it is, we have grown accustomed to focusing on the rhetoric instead of the substance—such as Tedros’s admonitions to engage in testing, contact tracing, and quarantines—and have come to view the expression of outrage as an end in itself. We thus denounce Tedros for not wasting his time in counterproductive denunciations. In any event, it was WHO that successfully solicited China’s acknowledgment of the outbreak in the first place, provided the first COVID-19 tests, and declared the PHEIC. It does not deserve to be treated so harshly.

Deflecting Blame, Undermining the U.S. and Health

Trump’s response to the pandemic—which he seems to view primarily as a political problem—was twofold: (1) Hope the pandemic works itself out, and (2) Deflect the blame onto someone else. With regard to the domestic response to the pandemic, he has shifted the blame to the state governors, who he insists are responsible for such things. With regard to the causes of the pandemic, he has shifted the blame to China and WHO. The information failures for which Trump holds WHO responsible are primarily the fault of Chinese leaders who delayed and deceived, and even that was valid for only a few weeks.

Trump’s answer to this situation—rather than cooperate to deal with the pandemic—was to punish and defund WHO in the midst of the ongoing crisis. This does not further any positive goal. The possible consequences of this are also twofold. First, the real target of the punishment will be world health. Many countries do not have the wherewithal to fight a pandemic (and innumerable other health issues) on their own and rely on assistance from WHO. They will suffer and also serve as sources of disease for others. Americans will also suffer if the world’s unified response to infectious disease is undermined. Moreover, the United States will lose WHO’s vantage point with regard to looming health threats, which ironically is especially important in China. China’s combination of diverse live animals in close proximity to large numbers of people along with modern transportation infrastructure makes it a prolific source of infectious disease. (Ironically, China’s role as a source of disease increases the importance to WHO of its cooperation.)

Second, it could result in the United States ceding its place of leadership to China, a process already under way. The fact that China has recently pledged an additional $2 billion to WHO—nearly equivalent to the agency’s entire budget in a normal year—suggests that this is likely. If Trump was serious about his complaint that China had too much influence in the organization, this is hardly the way to resolve the issue.

Of course, WHO and international organizations in general are of secondary interest to Trump, well behind his interest in personal loyalty and his own political future, as indicated by some of his personnel decisions. His first Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and a senior adviser in that bureau were the subjects of a devastating inspector general’s report in August 2019 in which they were accused of mistreatment and harassment of staffers and retaliation against those deemed insufficiently loyal to President Trump. (The adviser had already left the department; the assistant secretary retired on his own terms in November; the inspector general who wrote the report was fired in May 2020.) As acting assistant secretary, Trump then appointed a former Sarah Palin associate known primarily for her ties to evangelical Christians and opposition to abortion. A Trump loyalist from the Presidential Personnel Office, with a reputation for assessing the loyalties of applicants for apolitical government positions, was then named Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management Issues with responsibilities for budgets, senior appointments to international organizations, and UN elections. As for WHO, the United States did not even have a representative on the agency’s rotating executive board until May 7, 2020, although the U.S. term on the board had begun in 2018 and expires in 2021. The administration nominated an Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services, a Trump appointee who was previously best known for being fired as the head of vaccine development at Texas A&M University in 2015. In fact, the administration nominated him three times—in November 2018, January 2019, and March 2020—before the Republican-led Senate took any action toward confirmation, suggesting a lack of confidence in the choice. With regard to the WHO budget, the United States was already in arrears on its dues for 2019, and Trump’s budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2021 had called for cutting the contribution to WHO by 53 percent even before the COVID-19 issue had arisen. 

In the meantime, China has taken advantage of U.S. disinterest in international organizations and increased its influence within the UN and its allied agencies. Chinese officials now run four UN agencies, and Tedros, an Ethiopian, was promoted for the WHO position by China as well as the African bloc. In response to China’s growing influence, instead of showing leadership and engaging more energetically in multilateral diplomacy, the Trump administration has taken the adversarial approach of naming a special envoy for countering Chinese influence at the UN (formally, special envoy for multilateral integrity). This approach is likely to divert attention from the actual tasks of the UN’s specialized agencies and alienate other countries. If the United States wants to keep WHO “honest” and balance the influence of China, then it must be active within the agency, act as a counterweight, and stop emulating China’s practice of prioritizing the protection of its own image. What Trump is doing merely cedes further influence to China.

As for the fate of WHO, much will depend on whether the United States actually leaves. Under U.S. law, withdrawal from WHO requires a year’s notice and full payment of all arrears, so things could still change. There will be calls for reforms either way, and there will certainly be room for reform. But we should keep in mind that even after reforms, WHO will not boss China around. That’s just not how it works.

*Multiple terms have been used to identify the category of virus, the specific virus, and the disease it causes. The category is coronavirus. The specific coronavirus, first encountered in Wuhan, China, in 2019, was temporarily labeled Novel Coronavirus 2019, or nCoV-19; then it was officially named Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2, or SARS-CoV-2. The disease it causes is Coronavirus Disease 2019, or COVID-19.

The post Trump and the Pandemic: WHO’s to Blame? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Peter Suciu

History,

It survived torpedoes, bombs, shells, and two atomic blasts.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The Nevada is an unambiguous reminder of our Navy's heritage of resilience.

To say that the USS Nevada (BB-36) was "tough" would be a colossal understatement.

The warship was rushed into service during the First World War, survived Pearl Harbor, and during the Second World War supported the D-Day landings in Normandy and then the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. After the war, she served as a target during the July 1946 atomic bomb tests at Bikini in the Marshall Islands – but even that wasn't enough to sink her. Finally, off the Hawaiian Islands the U.S. Navy sunk the tough old warship with gunfire and torpedoes.

Now after more than 70 years researchers have discovered the wreck of the USS Nevada located 65 nautical miles southwest of Pearl Harbor. The ship is lying at a depth of 15,400 feet, and was found by underwater archeology specialists SEARCH and marine robotics company Ocean Infinity. The mission to find the famed U.S. Navy battleship was jointly coordinated between SEARCH's operations center and one of Ocean Infinity's vessels, Pacific Constructor.

The Ocean Infinity ship had set sail for a range of commercial tasks in the Pacific earlier this year before the outbreak of the novel coronavirus. As a result of the global pandemic the ship has remained at sea, and apparently used its time wisely!

"We are greatly appreciative to Ocean Infinity and SEARCH Inc. in relocating and providing information on an extremely historic vestige of our nation's past," said Rear Admiral Samuel Cox, U.S. Navy (Retired), director of the Naval History and Heritage Command.

"Nevada is an unambiguous reminder of our Navy's heritage of resilience," Cox added. "Nevada has a proud place in Navy's history – commissioned in 1916, she served in both World Wars, and was present at the Pearl Harbor attacks in 1941; the only battleship to get underway after the attack. During the attack, the ship and crew sustained at least six, and possibly, as many as 10 bomb hits and one torpedo hit, but remained in the fight. With our sailors' quick thinking, the crew grounded the ship, preventing her from sinking. The ship was repaired and immediately returned to the fight, proving the resiliency and toughness of our sailors then, as are today."

The USS Nevada had a long and distinguished career. The ship provided escort duties to convoys heading "over there" during the First World, and was then among the escort ships that sailed with the ocean liner George Washington, which carried U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference.

During the attack on Pearl Harbor, she had been stationed next to the famous USS Arizona but was the only battleship to get underway. A total of 60 of its 1,500-member crew were killed in the attack, while more than 100 more were wounded, but the crew was able to ground the vessel, which prevented it from completely sinking. Nevada was repaired and was the only battleship to be present at both Pearl Harbor and at Normandy for the D-Day landings.

The Nevada then played a key role in the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa and survived a Japanese kamikaze attack on March 27, 1945, that left 11 of her crew dead and 41 wounded. A shell attack during the invasion also killed two of the crew and further damaged the ship.

As an aging warship, the Navy decided to use Nevada, along with about 100 other veteran vessels for target practice at the Bikini Atoll. On July 1, 1946, a 23-kiloton bomb dropped by a B-29 left the vessel seriously damaged and scorched by fire but still floating! A follow up underwater detonation sank other warships, but not Nevada. It was only on July 31, 1948, that the damaged vessel was finally sunk after being used in a Navy gunfire exercise.

"Nevada is an iconic ship that speaks to American resilience and stubbornness," said Dr. James Delgado, senior vice president, and lead maritime archeologist for SEARCH.

"Rising from its watery grave after being sunk at Pearl Harbor, it survived torpedoes, bombs, shells, and two atomic blasts," added Delgado. "The physical reality of the ship, resting in the darkness of the great museum of the sea, reminds us not only of past events but of those who took up the challenge of defending the United States in two global wars. This is why we do ocean exploration to seek out these powerful connections to the past."

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

This article first appeared on May 14, 2020 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikimedia

Mark Episkopos

Security,

Russian Ministry of Defense released brief promotional footage to show off development of ambitious weapons projects.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The Kremlin can be expected to ramp up their ongoing strategic weapons projects in a bid to diversify both their nuclear and conventional deterrent over the coming years. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February Address to the Federal Assembly made waves for its international political implications, and rightly so. But less covered, though arguably no less important, were Putin’s updates on several of Russia’s most ambitious weapons projects: Poseidon and Tsirkon.

As previously covered by The National Interest, Poseidon is a nuclear-powered underwater drone armed with a 2-megaton atomic payload. Its explosion is meant to generate a radioactive tsunami, capable of destroying coastal cities and other infrastructure several kilometers inland.

Poseidon is “successfully undergoing tests,” Putin announced last week. Later that day, the Russian Ministry of Defense released brief promotional footage to drive the point home. The video, entitled “proving grounds testing of the Poseidon system,” shows little of the Poseidon system in action. Instead, it depicts Russian sailors hustling about what appears to be the Sarov test submarine, before cutting to several green-tinted, above-surface shots of the submarine. Nonetheless, Defense Minister Shoigu declared the tests a success and the system is reportedly on track for its anticipated 2019 launch.

Putin added that Poseidon boasts an “unlimited range.” Presumably, this means that the underwater drone can traverse virtually infinite distances before reaching its target. With a maximum speed of 200 kilometers and effective depth of “thousands of feet” below the surface, the Kremlin believes that Poseidon travels too fast and too deep underwater to be reliably intercepted. While impressive on paper, it remains to be seen to what extent traveling at such breakneck speeds compromises Poseidon’s detectability as it enters within detonation range of its coastal target.

While others have expressed skepticism concerning Poseidon’s supposed invincibility and even its military value, what makes it such a potent addition to Russia’s nuclear arsenal is precisely that it can succeed strategically even if it fails tactically. Poseidon’s mere deployment off hostile coasts is almost guaranteed to cause mass political confusion, thereby serving as a cover for a different military or political operation even if it is ultimately intercepted.

Putin went on to highlight another “promising innovation”: “Tsirkon, a hypersonic missile that can reach speeds of approximately Mach 9 and strike a target more than 1,000 km away both underwater and on the ground. It can be launched from water, from surface vessels and from submarines, including those that were developed and built for carrying Kalibr high-precision missiles, which means it comes at no additional cost for us.”

This is more or less a condensed summary of what is already known about 3M22 Tsirkon, with one notable exception. Past reports have pegged Tsirkon’s speed at around Mach 6 with one CNBC source alleging Mach 8, but Putin is now publicly stating a speed of “approximately Mach 9” or around 6,900 miles per hour. There are a few factors that may account for this discrepancy: “approximately Mach 9” may be a generous way to describe the high end of Mach 8, Tsirkon’s speed may have increased from developmental progress made over the years, or there may be more than one version of Tsirkon. 

Meanwhile, Putin’s emphasis on cost-effectiveness reflects one of Tsirkon’s guiding design principles as a versatile, multi-purpose weapon that seamlessly integrates with a wide range of existing delivery systems including even certain bomber aircraft.

Unlike with Poseidon, Russian officials have not offered a concrete timetable on Tsirkon’s development. But as Cold-War era arms control regimes continue to disintegrate, the Kremlin can be expected to ramp up their ongoing strategic weapons projects in a bid to diversify both their nuclear and conventional deterrent over the coming years. 

Mark Episkopos is a frequent contributor to The National Interest and serves as research assistant at the Center for the National Interest. Mark is also a PhD student in History at American University.

This article first appeared in 2019 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

Security,

These upgrades will ensure the ability to pack a heavy punch. 

Here's What You Need To Remember: A volley of the YJ-12s could pose a significant threat to even the most sophisticated air defense system. 

The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has increased the potency of its Luhai-class Type 051B destroyer, Shenzhen (DD 167), with 16 container launchers for YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missile. The warship, the only one of its class, first entered service in 1999 and was commissioned by the PLAN Navy South Sea Fleet as its flagship. It was originally armed with the YJ-83 subsonic sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), which have been described as being comparable to the U.S. Navy's Harpoon.

The YJ-83 boasted an impressive range, but it lacked the strategic impact of the YJ-12 – which has both speed and range. Forbes noted that a volley of the YJ-12s could pose a significant threat to even the most sophisticated air defense system. It also has a large warhead that could make it potentially quite devastating even to capital warships such as aircraft carriers.

Also known as the CM-302 in its export name, the YJ-12 employs a ramjet engine that allows it to cruise at supersonic speed Mach 2 to 3, or a maximum range of 280 to 400 kilometers per hour. The missile reportedly utilizes an inertial guidance system that is coupled with a global navigation satellite system (GNSS). The new missiles are also reportedly being refitted to the PLAN's Sovremenny-class destroyers, which are based on Russian designs from when China upgraded its defense capabilities with Russian technology.

At the time of its introduction of the Shenzhen, it was the largest surface combatant vessel ever commissioned by the PLAN, but despite its increased size and displacement, the destroyer did not feature any significant improvements in weapons systems and sensors and was largely seen to be deployed with rather "meager armament," which include a single HHQ-7 short-range anti-aircraft missile launch, just four twin 76mm guns, and the eight YJ-83 anti-ship missiles.

All this explains the efforts of the Chinese to refit and upgrade the warship. It had been spotted undergoing a modernization refit at the Zhanjiang Naval Base in 2015, which included some significant improvements in its weapons and sensors. In recent years the warship's Type 381A radar was upgraded to the Type 382 and additional Type 364 radar systems.

Last November the Shenzhen returned from its most recent major refit, which included the installation of an HHQ-16 vertical launch system consisting of four sets of eight units and allows it to host 32 ship-to-air missiles to shoot down incoming hostile aircraft and missiles. This replaced the single HHQ-7 SAM launch on the bow deck.

Forbes noted that China's first-generation of modern warships, including the Shenzhen, are unlikely to be as capable as newer and larger types, these upgrades will ensure the ability to pack a heavy punch. 

The Shenzhen has participated in numerous military operations, but it also worth noting that it has made port calls to numerous countries, making it a star in naval diplomacy. It now has even more to show off.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

This article first appeared last month and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikimedia

Kris Osborn

Security,

The US Army wants the F-35 to support its ground troops, but Congress loves the A-10.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Regardless of the conclusions arrived upon by the ongoing assessment, it is likely both the A-10 and F-35 will perform CAS missions in the immediate years ahead.

The US Army wants the F-35 to support its ground troops.

It’s that simple. We hear volumes of information about the Marine Corps vertical-take-off-and-landing F-35B, Navy carrier-launched F-35C and Air Force F-35A - but what does the Army think of the emerging Joint Strike Fighter?

Does the Army think the 5th-Gen stealth fighter would bring substantial value to targeting and attacking enemy ground forces in close proximity to advancing infantry? What kind of Close Air Support could it bring to high-risk, high-casualty ground war?

“When you are in a firefight, the first thing infantry wants to do it get on that radio to adjust fire for mortars and locate targets with close air support with planes or helicopters. You want fires. The F-35 has increased survivability and it will play a decisive role in the support of ground combat,” Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley told reporters at the Association of the United States Army Annual Symposium.

Gen. Milley’s comments are quite significant, given the historic value of close air support when it comes to ground war. His remarks also bear great relevance regarding the ongoing Pentagon evaluation assessing the F-35 and A-10 Warthog in close air support scenarios.

Over the years, close-air-support to Army ground war has of course often made the difference between life and death - victory or defeat. The Army, Milley said, wants next-generation close-air-support for potential future warfare.

“We fight with the Navy, Marines and Air Force. Our soldiers have never heard an Air Force pilot say ‘I can’t fly into that low-altitude area,’ These guys take incredible risk. If there are troops on the ground, they are rolling in hot,” Milley said.

While Milley of course did not specifically compare the A-10 to the F-35 or say the Army prefers one aircraft over another, he did say the F-35 would be of great value in a high-stakes, force-on-force ground war.

Long-revered by ground troops as a “flying-tank,” the combat proven A-10 has been indispensable to ground-war victory. Its titanium hull, 30mm cannon, durability, built-in redundancy and weapons range has enabled the aircraft to sustain large amounts of small arms fire and combat damage - and keep flying.

At the same time, as newer threats emerge and the high-tech F-35 matures into combat, many US military weapons developers and combatant commanders believe the JSF can bring an improved, new-generation of CAS support to ground troops. Thus - the ongoing Office of the Secretary of Defense comparison.

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Accordingly, the Pentagon-led F-35/A-10 assessment is nearing its next phase of evaluation, following an initial “first wave” of tests in July of this year, Vice Adm. Mat Winter, Program Executive Officer, F-35 program, recently told a group of reporters.

“Mission performance is under evaluation,” Winter said.

Pre- Initial Operational Test & Evaluation test phases, are currently underway at Edwards AFB and Naval Air Station China Lake, officials said.

“Mission performance is being evaluated in the presence of a robust set of ground threats and, to ensure a fair and comparable evaluation of each system’s performance, both aircraft are allowed to configure their best weapons loadouts and employ their best tactics for the mission scenario” a statement from the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation said.

Upon initial examination, some might regard a stealthy, 5th-Gen F-35 as ill-equipped or at least not-suited for close air support. However, a closer look does seem to uncover a handful of advantages - speaking to the point Milley mentioned about survivability.

Long-range, computer-enabled F-35 sensors could enable the aircraft to see and destroy enemy ground targets with precision from much higher altitudes and much farther ranges than an A-10 could; the speed of an F-35, when compared to an A-10, would potentially make it better able to maneuver, elude enemy fire and get into position for attack; like the A-10s 30mm gun, the F-35 has its own 25mm cannon mounted on its left wing which could attack ground forces; given its sensor configuration, with things like a 360-degree Distributed Aperture System with cameras, the F-35 brings a drone-like ISR component to air-ground war. This could help targeting, terrain analysis and much-needed precision attacks as US soldiers fight up close with maneuvering enemy ground forces.

An F-35 might be better positioned to respond quickly to enemy force movement; in the event that enemy air threats emerge in a firefight, an F-35 could address them in a way an A-10 could not, obviously; an F-35 would be much better positioned to locate enemy long-range fires points of combat significance and destroy hostile artillery, mortar or long-range-fires launching points. Finally, while the A-10 has a surprising wide envelope of weapons, an F-35 could travel with a wider range of air-ground attack weapons - armed with advanced targeting technology.

Also, fighter-jet close air support is by no means unprecedented. F-22s were used against ISIS, F-15s were used against insurgents in Iraq - and the F-35 recently had its combat debut in Afghanistan.

There are, however, some unknowns likely to be informing the current analysis. How much small arms fire could an F-35 withstand? Could it draw upon its “hovering” technology to loiter near high-value target areas? To what extent could it keep flying in the event that major components, such as engines or fuselage components, were destroyed in war? How much could A-10 weapons and targeting technology be upgraded?

Regardless of the conclusions arrived upon by the ongoing assessment, it is likely both the A-10 and F-35 will perform CAS missions in the immediate years ahead.

When it comes to the Army and the F-35, one can clearly envision warfare scenarios wherein Army soldiers could be supported by the Marine Corps F-35B, Navy F-35C or Air Force F-35A.

“We don’t fight as an Army - we fight as a joint force. What makes us different is the synergistic effect we get from combining various forces in time and space,” Milley said.

Kris Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army - Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at CNN and CNN Headline News.

This first appeared in Warrior Maven here.

This article first appeared earlier this year and is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Wikimedia

 

Charlie Gao

Security,

The PKM replaced the lighter RPK-74 as the standard squad automatic weapon of the Russian Army in the 2000s and has only received a few modifications to the design in almost fifty years.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The PKM is sometimes described as “an AK flipped upside down and made in a different caliber,” which is not totally incorrect. Both weapons use the long-stroke gas piston operation, where gas is tapped from the barrel to drive a piston that actuates the action. On the AK, the gas tube that houses this piston is above the barrel. On the PKM, it is below the barrel.

Mikhail Kalashnikov is known for creating the AK rifle, but his contributions to Soviet firearms design didn’t end there. In 1961 he designed the PK machine gun, which was modernized into the PKM in 1969. Like the AK, this machine gun serves on to the current day. However, in many ways, it can be considered a better design than his rifle, despite it serving a different role.

The PKM is sometimes described as “an AK flipped upside down and made in a different caliber,” which is not totally incorrect. Both weapons use the long-stroke gas piston operation, where gas is tapped from the barrel to drive a piston that actuates the action. On the AK, the gas tube that houses this piston is above the barrel. On the PKM, it is below the barrel.

However, the PKM features a gas regulator to adjust the amount of gas being tapped off from the barrel to drive the action. Normally the regulator is placed on the “1” setting, with “2” and “3” providing more gas to cycle the action when conditions are rough. This allows it to have a gentler recoil impulse, unlike the AK which is slightly overgassed to be reliable in all conditions without adjustment.

While the reason for this design choice may be simplicity, presumably a machine gunner would have more time to train on their weapon than a rifleman, western rifles contemporary to the AK such as the FN FAL featured a gas regulator as well. We also see the move from a standard single overgassed setting to a gas regulator within the HK416 series, from the original HK416 to the HK416A5 and A7. This all suggests that a quickly adjustable gas regulator is the way to go to lower recoil on a firearm.

The safety design of the PKM is also far more ergonomic than the AK. The AK safety is often considered to be an inferior design as it requires the shooter to take their firing hand off the grip of the weapon to activate and deactivate it (though this can be partially remedied with extended surfaces). The PKM safety, on the other hand, is a well-positioned thumb safety, similar to those found on the M16 that can be easily flicked by the firing hand without shifting the grip much.

The PKM also shines in how lightweight it is. While the AK was lighter than the FN FAL and G3 rifles that came out around the same time it did, the American M16 was far lighter than the AK. On the other hand, the PKM is one of the lightest full-caliber machine guns in the world. It weighs 7.5 kg to the FN MAGs 11 kg. It’s even lighter than the recent FN Minimi 7.62 Mk3 and M60E6, which weight 8.8 kg and 9.3 kg respectively. Despite it being lightweight, the PKM is practically as effective as the heavier guns.

The PKM replaced the lighter RPK-74 as the standard squad automatic weapon of the Russian Army in the 2000s and has only received a few modifications to the design in almost fifty years. One of them is the evolution to the slightly heavier PKP which ditches the quick change barrels of the PKM for a heavier, forced-air-cooled fixed barrel. The tank version of the PKM, the PKT has armed every Russian tank from the T-62 to the latest T-14 Armata as well as countless IFVs and APCs.

PKMs still arm many western-aligned nations as well. Finland issues PKMs as the standard squad machine gun. Poland has created a 7.62x51mm NATO version of the PKM in the UKM-2000, which arms their infantry alongside the standard PKM.

While the AK is Kalashnikov’s most famous design, the PKM is definitely his best.

Charlie Gao studied Political and Computer Science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national security issues. This first appeared last year.

Image: Wikipedia.