Diplomacy & Crisis News

The effects of Covid will likely been seen in the economic collapse of many businesses in the autumn. While most societies have organised themselves to some degree to handle any future waves of the virus, the commercial effect will likely start to show signs of a deteriorating economy over the fall and winter months. Smaller and medium sized businesses may bare the brunt of the losses as they often have less of a cushion, still are dedicated to cover the costs of rent and utilities towards governments that have surprisingly given little breaks to those companies and smaller property owners, and are often working using credit through their banks or other means. Since the 2008 economic crisis little had been done in the banking industry to ween smaller companies off lines of credit coming from banks and financial institutions, and when that dependency turns into an immediate recall of operating funds, many businesses folded in 2008. It will certainly occur again in 2020.

When asked, many people say that their first act after any lock-down will be to take a vacation. Many in country or regional trips have taken place as it is less risk to individuals healthwise and to their funds if a trip is cancelled due to an outbreak. Many who had trips planned before Covid have been unable to get their funds back from their airline, as consumer protection laws were rapidly adjusted so that airlines did not have to refund postponed or delayed flights. This left consumers who normally had protections on their payments without recourse, as when the governments adjusted the laws in favour of the companies, consumers suffered. The logic behind not having an airliner or other large business refund all of the customers at once is to keep those companies solvent to perhaps apply the service or refund at a later date, and preserve the company and the jobs of their employees.

While smaller businesses are often dependent on credit from banks in order to operate, larger companies often have the pull and can hire dedicated people to improve their financial standing in a country. While the travel industry is aching to return, the airliners themselves may hinder further growth. Airlines often operate with little profit margins, as leasing aircraft, changes in international fuel prices, insurance and little profit from the fare on each seat eats greatly into their industry’s gains. Like many smaller businesses, credit has been used extensively in the airline industry to keep them afloat. With the effects of Covid, the airline industry has really be put on a leash as losses very rapidly took over profits in a very short time. Due to the amount of credit depended upon and small profit margins, even national carriers are hanging by a thread. For years, each time I would enter the court house in my country, our national carrier was in bankruptcy hearings constantly, and this was the case on every occasion. This was the best case scenario, in the best of times. It is likely the case that the longer effects of Covid on the economy will open any cracks in our systems and it is important that time and money are not wasted if jobs will be available in the future. Most of these positions will not return if the opportunity is squandered.

C'est une des dates les plus noires de l'histoire de la gauche au XXe siècle : il y a trente ans, le 11 septembre 1973, le putsch de la junte présidée par le général Augusto Pinochet mettait un terme, dans un bain de sang, à trois années d'une expérience sans précédent. Pour la bourgeoisie chilienne (...) / Chili, Amérique latine, Socialisme, Coup d'État, Histoire, Politique - 2003/09

En 2050, le nombre de Japonais devrait avoir diminué de plus de trente et un millions par rapport à l'an 2000. Du jamais-vu dans un pays développé. Classiquement, l'Archipel choisit de retarder les départs à la retraite tout en misant sur la consommation. / Japon, Démographie, Économie, Entreprise, (...) / Japon, Démographie, Économie, Entreprise, Finance, Logement, Protection sociale, Santé, Société, Technologies de l'information, Technologie, Travail, Retraites - 2013/06

Si les Etats-Unis sont les premiers à dénoncer la corruption et l'argent sale quand ils veulent clouer au pilori un gouvernement qui ne leur plaît pas, ils restent très discrets quand il s'agit d'un pouvoir ami ou d'un Etat assurant leur approvisionnement énergétique. C'est ainsi que la banque (...) / Afrique, Amérique latine, Chili, États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Criminalité financière, Banque, Finance, Guinée-Équatoriale, Dictature, Corruption - 2005/08 Le temps des utopistes

Decoupling from China would scotch the best hope for preventing environmental disaster.

Le Kenya est parsemé de réserves et de parcs nationaux destinés à protéger la nature et les animaux sauvages. Dans la région de Mara, au sud du pays, les populations masaïs sont confrontées à un double défi : cohabiter avec la faune, garante du tourisme, et maîtriser les revenus tirés de la terre. (...) / Kenya, Agriculture, Écologie, Tourisme - 2000/11

Le 1er septembre, Guillaume Erner a consacré son émission « L’invité(e) des matins » sur France Culture à la crise sanitaire et aux enjeux que cela représentait pour l’Europe. Son invité était Clément Beaune, secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes, qui a notamment écrit dans le numéro de Politique étrangère qui vient de paraître (n° 3/2020) un article intitulé « L’Europe, par-delà le COVID-19 ».

Il y a cinq ans, l’Europe était frappée par une crise migratoire qui l’avait divisée. Aujourd’hui, la liste des dossiers qui attendent le secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes, fraîchement nominé, est toujours aussi ambitieuse. Au programme, l’harmonisation de la gestion de la crise sanitaire, les négociations sur le Brexit, mais encore la mise en œuvre du plan de relance. Mais dans cette succession de difficultés, les 27 ont aussi réussi à s’entendre de façon inédite, en créant pour la première fois un endettement commun européen pour financer la relance des économies. Et si les épreuves étaient une opportunité pour l’Union Européenne ? 

Pour en parler nous recevons Clément Beaune, secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes, nominé le le 26 juillet dernier. Il est auteur de l’article “L’Europe, par-delà le COVID” à paraître dans la revue Politique étrangère de l’Ifri, en ligne le 3 septembre, en librairie le 7 septembre.

Sur les velléités de la Turquie

Il y a une stratégie de provocation de la part du président turc. Ce n’est pas pour rien qu’il a ciblé la Grèce et la France. La Grèce est l’ennemi historique et la France est le pays de l’UE est au rendez-vous de cette solidarité indispensable face a des actions de la part de la Turquie qui se multiplient en Méditerranée orientale pour aller envoyer des bateaux dans les eaux de Chypre, mener des actions contraires au droit international en Libye qui menace aussi la sécurité européenne. 

Emmanuel Macron est arrivé lundi 31 août à Beyrouth pour sa deuxième visite après la double explosion qui a détruit le port de la capitale libanaise le 4 août dernier

« On ne choisit pas le Liban face à la Turquie. C’est un ensemble géopolitique important pour la sécurité de l’Europe. La France doit être active. Il faut reconnaître qu’on n’a pas les moyens de la Chine ou des États-Unis, mais il ne faut pas minimiser nos forces. C’est par l’Europe, en matière diplomatique, géopolitique et de sécurité, nous devons aller vers une défense européenne, qui nous relèverons le défi ».

Un plan de relance deux fois inférieur à celui des États-Unis ? 

Le plan de relance européen est un élément d’un plan plus large. Il faut additionner les plans de relance nationaux et ceux à venir. 

Le Brexit, où en est-on ? 

« Les choses n’avancent pas beaucoup. Le Royaume-Uni souhaite sortir de l’Union Européenne et ne doit donc plus avoir accès au marché européen. On ne peut pas avoir accès au marché européen sans respecter les règles sanitaires, environnementales… de la communauté. Le no deal est un risque. Cela n’empêche pas de commercer, mais il y a un certain nombre de barrières, comme les droits de douane. Nous avons intérêt à limiter les frictions mais on ne le fera pas au prix du non respect des règles ».

Réécoutez le podcast de l’émission ici.

Le phénomène religieux fait irruption sur la scène internationale. Parallèlement nous assistons à une montée générale de l'intolérance, et à de multiples demandes d'interdit. Cela inquiète les laïcs, tentés, à leur tour, de nier le monde religieux qualifié d'obscurantisme. Ainsi réapparaissent les vieilles (...) / Laïcité, Religion, Fondamentalisme - 1989/06

Le nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2020) vient de paraître ! Il consacre un dossier spécial aux conséquences du COVID-19 sur la mondialisation, avec notamment en exclusivité un article de Clément Beaune, secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes, et de Didier Houssin, président du comité d’urgence de l’OMS. Un second dossier sur l’urbanisation et ses évolutions à l’heure de la technologie font de ce numéro un incontournable de la rentrée.  Et comme à chaque nouveau numéro, de nombreux autres articles viennent éclairer l’actualité : la relation transatlantique, la démocratie israélienne…

Au-delà des systèmes de santé nationaux, le COVID-19 interroge les grands équilibres mondiaux, et souvent les modes de coopération qui les organisent. Politique étrangère parcourt les questions qui s’imposent à la réflexion post-crise.

L’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) a-t-elle failli ? La phase de mondialisation libérale est-elle close ? Les États sont-ils condamnés à récupérer leurs souverainetés ? Comment le secteur financier « encaisse-t-il » la crise ? Et en quoi la crise elle-même est-elle particulière – d’ailleurs, qu’apprenons-nous des crises qui se succèdent ?

Dans un texte de référence, Clément Beaune – secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes – expose comment les responsables français voient dans le temps troublé de la crise la chance d’un nouveau départ vers une Union européenne remodelée : les décisions de crise pourraient préluder à une mutation politique essentielle.

Les concentrations urbaines ont été au premier chef victimes et acteurs de la crise. Au-delà, que dit la dynamique d’urbanisation du monde des grands équilibres démographiques ? L’urbanisation est-elle une fatalité ? Modifie-t-elle les équilibres politiques internationaux ? Les villes sont-elles le nouvel espace des guerres ? Et les contrôles technologiques qui s’y imposent annoncent-ils notre avenir : de la smart city à la smart society ? Enfin, à la veille de l’élection présidentielle américaine, peut-on imaginer que les rapports euro-américains de sécurité évoluent, pour aller vers une Alliance atlantique rééquilibrée ? Et qu’Israël s’affranchisse enfin de la profonde crise de son système politique ?

Découvrez le sommaire complet ici.

Lisez gratuitement :

• l’article de Clément Beaune, « L’Europe, par-delà le COVID-19 » ;
• l’article de Didier Houssin, « La coopération sanitaire internationale à l’épreuve du COVID-19 ».

 > > Suivez-nous sur Twitter : @Pol_Etrangere ! < <

-Protecting the rights of the most vulnerable ethnic minorities is the future of unified Korea’s inescapable fate-

“Korean Dream” stories of first-generation Vietnamese policewomen reveal that South Korea is indeed a mature democracy that cherishes multiculturalism and aims to protect the most vulnerable ethnic minorities. In South Korea, multiculturalism is not merely a symbolic recognition of the resource-abundant and high-status middle class immigrants’ bourgeois glory. Its “true guardians” defend it by realistically accounting for the blood, sweat, and tears of the most vulnerable ethnic minorities, thus transforming BTS’s fanciful teenage romanticism to a righteous pluralistic reality.

Across South Korea, there are currently seven first-generation Vietnamese policewomen on active duty to protect their community from domestic violence and school violence. The policewomen’s language and intercultural skills are indispensable community assets cementing the South Korea-Vietnam relations as the bridge between the community and new-comer ethnic compatriots, especially immigrant Vietnamese wives suffering the consequences of homicides committed by their Korean husbands. Immigrant Vietnamese wives are one of the truly vulnerable ethnic minority groups of the South Korean society; the language barrier and lack of knowledge in the South Korean legal system hinder them not only from protecting themselves from crimes but also from properly exercising their rights.

The Korean Dream story of Nguyen Hong Mihn, who now works for the Jangseong County Police Department in South Jeolla Province, showcases how the seven Vietnamese policewomen have walked an arduous life path to achieve their goals. After graduating from Chosun University with a degree in economics, Mihn started her career as a part-time court translator that inspired her to later apply for her current position. For a self-determined woman like Mihn, being a mother of three children was not an impediment to achieving the goal at all. She successfully persevered in the ten months of dieting and physical training by managing to lose 40 kg of her postpartum weight gain. Such perseverance enabled her to endure three months of fitness and technical knowledge tests, six months of professional training, and another two months of internship. “Most Vietnamese brides don’t know much about Korean language and culture. The husbands force their wives to study their native language and culture, but they themselves are not willing to learn the mother tongue and culture of their wives, so it leads to misunderstanding and then comes violence;” Minh identifies the mopish compulsions of the South Korean husbands as the root of intercultural conflict from her onsite mediation experience. The real-life insights of Mihn and other Vietnamese policewomen will turn South Korea’s multicultural future to a glorious direction.

Nowadays, multicultural skills in protecting the rights of vulnerable ethnic minorities, as described above, are increasingly in demand in South Korean public services. Over the last decade, the country’s foreign resident population has doubled to nearly two million (approximately 4% of the total) in 2019 from one million in 2008. Among various ethnic groups that have transformed South Korea’s multicultural landscape, the Vietnamese form the most strongly bonded family ties with South Korean people. This is largely because the Vietnamese brides in South Korea make up the largest ethnic group of foreign brides with an annual influx of approximately 6000 women. Despite their continuous contribution to strengthening the bond between South Korea and Vietnam, the human rights situation of the Vietnamese brides’ is rather gloomy. According to the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, nearly 40% of them have been exposed to sexual abuse, verbal abuse, and coercion by their husbands who are obsessed with the “you are not in Vietnam” mentality. Unfortunately, the victims’ communities have been lenient in terms of punishing the megalomaniac criminals, with arrests accounting for 13%, indictment, 8.5%, and prison sentence, only 0.9% of the reported cases. 

 

In recent weeks the confluence of many issues and events of different shades and dangers made Somalia’s political situation more complicated. This being the last year of the current administration, challenges of that nature are not entirely new, but the intensity and volatility of these developments are.

However, this piece is not an attempt to chronicle each one of said challenges and lay the blame on one political actor or another, but to illustrate how the dirty and notoriously impulsive local politics that dominate the discourse has been turning the attention away from Somalia’s national interest and international predators that are elbowing each other for zero-sum booty control.  

The most critical being the American guerilla diplomats’ covert coup against their British counterparts that has been protecting Soma Oil and Gas’ exclusive interests. These diplomats adhere to no international laws and often employ shady tactics that neither the U.K. Foreign Office nor the US State Department would be willing to acknowledge.

Who Didn’t Start The Fire?

On Saturday July 25, the Lower House of the Somali parliament has held an extraordinary session passed a vote of no-confidence motion to oust Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire amidst electoral rancor that kept the federal states drifting away from the center.

Interestingly, the ousting came only a few days after he successfully orchestrated Dhusamareeb Agreement signed by President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo and the federal states and when there was less than six months remaining from the current government’s term.

After the election related items on the agenda were discussed, the Speaker of the Parliament, Mursal Mohamed Abdurahman, literally rammed in a no-confidence motion that was not even part of the agenda, ignored the ‘point of order’ raised by some MPs, and continued the hand counting. Within an hour or so, the surgical removal was complete: 170 ‘yes’ & 8 ‘no’. After ensuing commotion by the objecting MPs, the Speaker gaveled out of the session. Mission accomplished.

 Cold War Beween Partners 

Despite the popular perception that this was solely driven by that all too familiar ‘xilligii kala guurka’ (time to part ways) politics, this was the last phase of the diplomatic cleansing of the U.K. influence- Khaire. He was Soma Oil and Gas’ East Africa man whose initial appointment this analyst has vehemently opposed.

It was the culmination of a systematic, delicately executed overthrow to end UK’s dominance of the Somalia affairs. It started with the recruitment of Qatar to directly counter-balance against UAE and bankroll Farmajo’s election. It was not a hard sell under since Qatar was under a long simmering UAE/Saudi Arabia led aggression since the Arab Spring. Moreover, it may be worth noting that Qatar already had on the ground a network of brokers who in the past provided dark money to former President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration for other projects.

Once Farmajo became the president, the systematic process to cut off all advisors, technocrats, security experts, and members of the Council of Ministers who were from or were associated with UK began. In a parallel process, the relationship with UAE had to be suspended. This was critical for mainly two reasons: One, it would get rid of UK’s cash cow of corruption. “Let me call our friends” was the notorious code of reassurance used by British diplomates that UAE embassy will be delivering the cash. This under the radar process kept their hands clean. Two—perhaps more important than the former—it would pull the plug off on the (UAE-funded) ICJ maritime case.

Though locally it is considered a patriotic initiative taken by former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, this was a Soma Oil and Gas project. ICJ rule in favor of Somalia meant another corrupt giveaway to this shady company that illegally owns Somalia’s natural resources. Farmajo is on board with a behind the curtain deal to pull the case out of ICJ and settle for a ‘negotiated’ deal with Kenya that brings in new partners. This may explain why there were multiple postponements of public hearings- something that, contrary to the Somali government’s claim, could not have been unilaterally done by the court. Hence, an official announcement after the extension is secured should shock no one.

Prez Farmaajo & US Commander

Going back to the first major step; it was followed by the takeover of the command center- UNSOM. Merely two months into his new position, the former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Nicholas Haysom, was accused of interfering in a sovereign state’s internal affairs. Tough I was never a big fan of the dubious role that the British diplomatic team and their field commanders at UNSOM played before Haysom, I was critical of the persona non grata charade and I suspected it being a “a cover up”. So Ambassador Haysom was shortly replaced by an American, Ambassador James Swan.

This was followed by pressuring Qatar to drop Prime Minister Khaire from the recipients of the electoral facilitation cash that brought him and President Farmajo to power. Khaire and his network of predatory capitalists spent two weeks in and around Doha meeting with certain elements in the (useful) king-making business. The answer was simple: the game has changed and you are on your own, old partner.

As soon as it became clear to Khaire that he could neither be part of any extension that may be granted to his partner (Farmajo) nor could he expect cash-loads coming from Qatar, he had to resort to a political kamikaze operation labled as a peace process. He reached out to the federal-states, especially Puntland and Jubbaland that lost trust on the central government, as his most viable partners; hence the Dhusamareeb Conference.

Dominance and Its Risks

Farmajo went to participate in the Dhusamareeb conference with his own uncompromising agenda: grant me a term extension of two years so I could marshal the nation to ‘one-person-one-vote electoral system’.  After Dhusamareeb One and Two, the federal-states and the central government reached an agreement: Farmajo will get no extension and a technical committee made of all stakeholders would determine the kind of election and it would be unveiled and ratified at Dhusamareeb Three.     

On Aug 13, with Khaire out of the way and Farmajo seeming to have gained a momentum for his term-extension agenda, Ambassador Donald Yamamoto’s office tweeted this:

“@US2Somalia is eagerly waiting for #Dhusamareb 3 Mtg results. The need for wide spread consultations & genuine compromise is key. The election model needs broad based support from FGS, FMS, Parliament, & other stakeholders. Timely elections, no mandate extensions. #Somalia.”

And on Aug 20, as soon one-sided Dhusamareeb Three shenanigan to ensure the extension concluded, the same office tweeted:

“@US2SOMALIA has worked for inclusion of all views at the table in #Dhusamareb3, but can’t help those absent. Spoilers withholding participation sacrifice democracy for own ambitions. Parties will need to move forward with timely model agreed.”

Though these statements are reminiscent of a bygone era known as the ‘transitional period’ it supports my last article that Somalia is under a dysfunctional trusteeship, I venture say it was intended to serve, on the one hand, as a reassurance for UK and other donor nations that US is not supporting an extension; on the other hand, to put a thumb on the scale and coerce the federal-states to march behind Farmajo. It is the only way to harvest what was sowed a few years earlier. But, since the term extension appears to be like striking a matchstick over a pool of kerosene, it must be done through a legitimate process- the federal parliament.

Execution Express

Meanwhile, following Trump‘s patented method of appointing care-takers to a number key posts to avoid congressional scrutiny, Farmajo appoints a Care-taker Prime Minister with a free-hand to exercise full authority over the Council of Ministers. This flies in the face of the very constitution that Farmajo often references to underscore the power vested in the federal parliament. So exercise and expedite to the max is what the care-taker did.

Immediately upon assuming his new post, the care-taker Prime Minister, Mahdi Guled, dashed through the approval of a few international projects and appointed the Somali Petroleum Authority without any transparency, without capacity and integrity review of the members of this highly critical body of trustees. This same questionable authority is all of sudden set to make a critical decision that could haunt Somalia for generations. The method, the timing, and the haste should raise a red flag. 

 Who Owns It?

These controversial events of the past three plus years that shook the foundation of Somalia’s political structure confirm a looming danger that some analysts were warning against- a perfect storm emanating from resource curse, geographical curse, and clannism curse.

There are two things that one must keep in mind when conducting any political affairs or developing any strategies for domestic or international end:

One, there is no such thing as ‘spontaneous combustion’ because all things political are driven by an overt or a covert objective, or both. Two, if you are not interested or are not able to assess behavioral patterns or connect the dots, you are better off finding another career to pursue.

2021 is here and not much has changed since the last election. The political situation is in total disarray, drone attacks reached the danger zone and security continues to worsen, corruption still remains a skill in high demand, sovereignty still remains a pie in the sky, and many hands continue to operate inside the cookie jar of resources. So long as the dominant political discourse remains on clans, personality politics, and methods of transitioning power, expect the wheel of exploitation to gain more ground and the predators to get more emboldened.   

Somalia still remains a political prospect that is between a romantic ideal and corrosive reality; between conformity with clannism and the reformation toward statehood; between a living idea and a dying potential; between yearning for liberty and enabling the subjugators; between individual interest and collective benefit.

An enlightened intergenerational movement to reclaim Somalia is needed more than ever; also, leaders with vision and strategy that transcend the clan mentality in order to reimagine a new nation and put the common good and national interest before all others.

Suite au sondage réalisé sur ce blog, nous avons le plaisir de vous offrir en avant-première l’article du numéro d’automne 2020 de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2020) – disponible dès lundi 7 septembre – que vous avez choisi d'(é)lire : « La coopération sanitaire internationale à l’épreuve du COVID-19 », écrit par Didier Houssin, président du Comité d’urgence de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) dans le cadre de l’épidémie du COVID-19.

Au cours des derniers mois, l’espèce humaine a été confrontée à un nouveau et dangereux membre de la famille des virus à couronne : après le coronavirus SARS-CoV-1, responsable de l’épidémie de Syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère (SRAS) qui a débuté en Chine en 2003, puis le MERS CoV apparu en 2012 en Arabie Saoudite, le SARS-CoV-2 est responsable de la pandémie de COVID-19 dont les premières manifestations ont été identifiées fin 2019 en Chine.

Après environ six mois de transmission d’un virus dont le tropisme est l’appareil respiratoire des êtres humains, le bilan au 8 juin 2020 fait état de près de 7 millions de cas recensés et de plus de 400 000 décès, principalement dans les zones Europe et Amériques de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS).

La pandémie est encore en cours. La trajectoire et l’intensité de la transmission du virus peuvent réserver des surprises. Toutefois, il est possible de faire quelques premiers constats sur la gestion de cette épidémie. Le moins que l’on puisse dire est qu’elle s’est d’emblée révélée peu propice à la coopération internationale en matière sanitaire.

L’internationalisation de l’épidémie liée au virus SARS-CoV-2

L’épidémie due au virus SARS-CoV-2, qui s’est déclenchée en Chine dans les dernières semaines de 2019, n’est pas apparue comme une totale surprise. Les risques zoonotiques afférents à la mise en contact de populations humaines denses avec de nombreuses espèces de la faune domestique et sauvage, en particulier dans les marchés d’animaux vivants, sont connus. Les précédentes épidémies à coronavirus en ont déjà été l’expression.

Le premier signalement de cas groupés de pneumonies de cause inconnue à Wuhan, dans la province chinoise du Hubei, a été fait à l’OMS le 31 décembre 2019. Un nouveau coronavirus a vite été mis en cause. Son génome a rapidement été séquencé à partir de plusieurs prélèvements faits en Chine chez des malades, en particulier dans le Hubei.

Dès le 12 janvier 2020, les autorités sanitaires chinoises ont rendu publique la séquence génétique de ce nouveau coronavirus, en introduisant cette séquence dans la base de données GISAID qui recueille les séquences génétiques des virus influenza. Cette rapidité traduit, à la fois, les progrès faits en matière de génétique moléculaire virale, et la volonté de partager des informations génétiques utiles à la compréhension de ce virus. Les connaissances progressent aujourd’hui plus vite sur la nature d’un virus émergent que sur les effets de celui-ci sur la population, ou sur ses modes de transmission.

Dès le 13 janvier 2020, la portée internationale de l’épidémie liée au virus SARS-CoV-2 est apparue avec un premier cas signalé en Thaïlande. La dimension internationale de l’épidémie était sans doute plus précoce, mais cela reste encore à bien documenter à l’heure où sont écrites ces lignes.

Face à un risque sanitaire nouveau susceptible de concerner le monde entier, l’OMS devait avoir un rôle de chef de file. Cette agence de l’Organisation des Nations unies (ONU) est à la fois un organisme muni de compétences techniques en matière de santé, et un organisme politique composé de la quasi-totalité des États existant dans le monde. Sa gouvernance s’appuie sur l’Assemblée mondiale de la santé, qui réunit l’ensemble des 193 États membres de l’Organisation, et un Conseil exécutif composé de 34 membres. Face au risque de diffusion internationale d’une maladie, l’action de l’OMS et des États membres s’appuie sur un instrument juridique international essentiel : le Règlement sanitaire international (RSI), dont la dernière version a été adoptée en 2005. Quand point un risque nouveau, le directeur général de l’OMS doit, selon le RSI, convoquer un Comité d’urgence ad hoc, composé de scientifiques, et dont le rôle est, avant tout, de donner un avis au directeur général : l’événement en cours doit-il être qualifié d’« urgence de santé publique de portée internationale », ce qui, selon le RSI, renvoie alors à des droits et devoirs spécifiques pour l’OMS et ses États membres ?

Aucun pays ne souhaite être la source d’une urgence de santé publique de portée internationale, en raison notamment des effets qui en résultent, en termes d’image et sur le plan économique. À l’inverse, l’image de ce même pays sera fortement dégradée s’il apparaît que l’OMS a été prévenue avec retard d’un événement sanitaire de ce type. En 2003, cette critique justifiée avait été faite à la Chine lors de l’épidémie de SRAS.

Lisez le texte dans son intégralité ici.

Source: ASEAN

ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations)’s long-term susceptibility to the multidimensional Thucydides Trap between Washington and Beijing has turned the region into a theater of (soft power) competition between the two superpowers. Reflecting the many-faceted volatility of the region’s geostrategic landscape, the fundamentals of the U.S.’ strategic approach to ASEAN should gravitate more towards cultural initiatives that comprehensively sustain liberal resiliency in the region. Realizing ASEAN’s potential as a (technologically) competitive hub of cultural pluralism would not only benefit the U.S. in weaving the universal notion of the “Pacific community” with ASEAN, it is also key to defining future liberal narratives of regional governance.

Strategic Importance of ASEAN to the U.S.

As the host of the Malacca Strait, the bottleneck of the South China Sea trade route, and the world’s second-busiest energy transport route, ASEAN has been geostrategically crucial to the political and economic interests of stakeholders worldwide. Such significance continues to render the region economically prosperous. Over the last five decades, ASEAN doubled its global GDP share from 3.2% in 1967 to 6.2% in 2017. With twice the population of the U.S., the ten natural resource-abundant ASEAN member states are projected to become the fourth-largest trading bloc in the world by 2050. For the U.S.–ASEAN relations, these rosy prospects precipitate a favorable economic climate between the two. ASEAN has become the number one investment destination in the region and the fourth-largest trading partner with a trade size of $263 billion, accounting for 5.2% of U.S. total exports. Like the ever-more prosperous economic relations, the U.S.–ASEAN cooperation has also reached its apex in its 40-year diplomatic history. The first ASEAN–U.S. Maritime Exercise kicked off last year as part of ASEAN’s four-year (2016–2020) plan of action. This year, the collective’s concerted support for U.S.-led freedom of navigation exercises was reaffirmed when Cobra Gold—the annual military drill the U.S. has held with its oldest Asian ally, Thailand, since 1982—was extended to 27 countries. Security experts see ASEAN’s increasing ties with the U.S. as the archipelagic power bloc (essentially, Indonesia and the Philippines) hedging efforts against Beijing-dominated expansionist endeavors in the South China Sea. Despite the emerging consensus on deploying a hedging strategy against China and on recognizing the U.S.’ indispensability in assuring regional security and prosperity, ASEAN chronically faces the dilemma of tight-roping between the U.S. and China to defend the value of ASEAN centrality.

U.S. Engagement in ASEAN

ASEAN’s high strategic importance to the U.S. over the last few decades has revamped the U.S.’ understanding of it beyond it being a mere subset of East Asian policy. The U.S. became the first nation to appoint an ambassador to ASEAN in 2011, two years after joining the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009; the U.S.–ASEAN relationship was promoted to the level of strategic partnership in 2015.

The U.S.’ initiatives for earning the hearts of the ASEAN people have so far focused on boosting economic and policy connectivity that leverages Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)’s three-pillared agenda of trade liberalization, business facilitation, and technological transfer. Notably, the Obama Administration’s 2016 U.S.–ASEAN initiative takes a “whole of America” multi-stakeholder approach to strengthen U.S.–ASEAN connectivity in the fields of business, energy, innovation, and policy. Recent developments in the Trump administration, however, have created abysmal policy inconsistencies that have caused previous engagement efforts to deteriorate. Particularly, the Trump administration’s fiasco of withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017 triggered a political and economic vacuum that left ASEAN with no choice but to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Pundits often view the RCEP as the relatively less stringent and less costly TPP alternative that functions as the software of China’s regional economic influence.

To cope with this woeful new normal, the U.S. now needs new and restructured ASEAN strategies. Fortunately, the future of the Trump administration’s three new ASEAN initiatives in cyber-connectivity networks, supply chain networks, and certification networks give an inkling about where these new and restructured strategies should stand.

First, the U.S.–ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership (UASCP) is an initiative that provides ASEAN with a $10 million investment in innovating smart city and cybersecurity solutions for the 26 member cities in the ASEAN Smart City Network (ASCN). In theory, UASCP should aim to technologically equip ASEAN citizens with tools to help them live sustainable, productive, and possibly liberal lifestyles, as well as with the democratic capability to free themselves from any repressive power constraints, such as the Orwellian “big brother” type of 5G censorship. Second, the Blue Dot Network (BDN), which is seen by many as a U.S. countermove against China’s Belt and Road Initiative, is a multi-stakeholder initiative to establish pan-Pacific certification schemes that voluntarily regulate sustainability standards in the region. Instead of dividing the Pacific region into “us” the liberals and “them” the commies (although anti-China rhetoric is often strategically necessary to consolidate “us” the liberals in saving the cost of performing our democratic rituals), BDN should focus on harnessing its comparative advantage in raising environmental and labor standards in the region. Third, the Economic Prosperity Network (EPN) governs pan-Pacific supply chain mechanisms by linking like-minded economies. In part, the EPN should function as a catalyst to boost ASEAN’s manufacturing advantage against China. UASCN, BDN, and EPN, though at the rudimentary phase of development, should set policy cornerstones for the future direction of the U.S.–ASEAN strategy.

However, discourses on policies integrating these cornerstones to define the liberal future of regional governance—which regulates manufacturing, product, and consumption standards—are missing. This policy rupture leads intellectuals like Amy Searight to stress the importance of architecting the universal notion of the “Pacific community,” which not only legitimatizes the institution but also establishes a fundamentally shared identity between ASEAN, the U.S., and the Pacific Islands.

Raising Standards in the Indo-Pacific: the CaliSEAN style

Unique cultural pluralism in ASEAN distinguishes the community’s identity from that of other Asian groups, particularly from the relatively homogenous East Asian identity. The U.S. needs theoretical grounds to co-innovate and co-transcend the pluralistic ASEAN identity, which seems to have some underlying commonalities with Californian cultural pluralism, into the communal Pacific identity that politically leverages ASEAN’s aspirations for democracy and good governance. In this way, ASEAN can better navigate their central “values-competition,” especially with China, which raises product, manufacturing, and consumption standards in the region and, in return, could invigorate U.S. liberal leadership in the region. The “California Effect”—a term first coined by American political scientist David Vogel to describe regulatory competition-based harmonization of environmental standards—could probably be the best starting point for designing a sustainable, resilient, and liberal Pacific community. For instance, the fallouts of the California Effect extend to the socio-cultural aspect of ASEAN governance (e.g., holographic promotion of the CaliSEAN-style AI pop artist/tourism among young generations and other out-of-the-box ideas).

It is now in the hands of the next generation of American internationalists to conceptualize pluralistic and competent CaliSEAN identity and values. When this centrality of cultural pluralism can indeed reassure America’s progressive leadership in the region, ASEAN and the U.S.’ Indo-Pacific allies will better hedge the governance risk arising from future cross-cultural inequalities.

La rédaction a le plaisir de vous offrir à lire en exclusivité l’article de Clément Beaune, secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes, « L’Europe, par-delà le COVID-19 », publié dans le nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2020), à paraître le 7 septembre. Dans cet article, Clément Beaune pose un diagnostic précis des défauts de l’Europe et indique la marche à suivre afin de redonner du souffle au projet européen.

« Quelques semaines après un accord budgétaire d’une ambition inédite, acté par le Conseil européen le 21 juillet 2020, il serait tentant de dire que le COVID-19 a tout changé dans l’Union européenne (UE), selon le principe savamment répété : « L’Europe n’avance que dans les crises. » Comme tout cliché, cette simplification a du vrai. Le saut d’intégration réalisé avec l’endettement commun de l’Union est l’étape d’intégration européenne la plus importante depuis l’euro ; elle aurait été impossible sans cette crise. Mais il est vrai, surtout, et moins visible, que cette avancée majeure doit beaucoup au retour d’un triangle d’or qui n’avait plus connu pareille vigueur depuis le début des années 1990 : le couple franco-allemand, étroitement associé à une Commission européenne ambitieuse.

Élément de continuité sous-estimé et combiné à une réelle nouveauté, elle aussi minimisée : les attentes des citoyens à l’égard de l’Europe ont augmenté. Ils ne la critiquent pas tant pour son intrusion dans les compétences nationales que pour son inaction face aux défis communs : hier les migrations, aujourd’hui la santé, du manque d’harmonisation des mesures de quarantaine à la recherche commune d’un vaccin. Aujourd’hui, on s’attend à ce que l’Europe agisse, on la critique quand elle ne le fait pas, ou peu, ou tard.

La crise a d’ailleurs montré que son efficacité semblait corrélée à ses compétences : réactive dans le champ économique (suspension des règles budgétaires ou d’aides d’État, soutien monétaire massif), en large partie impuissante pour la coordination des restrictions aux frontières et presque inexistante dans le cœur sanitaire de la crise. Enfin, il n’est pas anodin de noter, avec la nécessaire prudence liée à toute fiction politique, que si le Royaume-Uni était encore membre de l’Union, l’accord sur le budget et un tel plan de relance aurait certainement été inaccessible.

Ces trois éléments – la nécessité d’un logiciel européen commun, les attentes croissantes des citoyens et la pertinence renouvelée du moteur franco-allemand – dessinent la matrice d’un projet européen qui doit revoir ses méthodes comme sa substance pour incarner une puissance ferme, rapide et audible dans un monde brutal que les Européens redécouvrent, tel l’empereur de Chine des Nouvelles orientales de Marguerite Yourcenar s’apercevant avec rage que le monde réel n’est pas celui des toiles superbes que son vieux peintre Wang-Fô lui avait idéalement décrit.

Quel projet européen pour Emmanuel Macron ?

Commençons par la méthode européenne du président de la République, non seulement car elle dit beaucoup du fond, mais aussi car elle marque la nouveauté la plus importante dans l’action européenne des présidents français depuis François Mitterrand. Cette rupture méthodologique a été encore peu perçue ou commentée. Elle repose sur la combinaison permanente de trois éléments. […] »

Lisez l’article dans son intégralité ici.

There are few regions that share the same mix of familiar cultures, language, food and media like Spain and Latin America and separately so, the Middle East. While regions that share their heritage in the Anglo-sphere often dominate world culture and politics, the combined efforts and collective policy approaches of Spain and Latin America as well as the Middle East influence their neighbours, cousins and allies. Policy approaches, like those in tackling Covid or addressing larger international issues often come with a combined response. In this manner, groups of smaller nations can push for their own collective interests, even against larger and influential powers.

The ability to handle international topics to the benefit of their own regions may come from how countries in these regions had to respond to influence from abroad. A very recent example of Middle Eastern countries positioning themselves against regional and international foreign influence has come about this week with the peace agreement with the UAE and Israel, likely soon to be followed by other countries in the region. Latin America has created organised mechanisms like the OAS as well as MERCOSUR to name a few, in order to find a place for their region and neighbours in the larger international economy. While internal issues are always paramount, the flow of political and cultural movements within Latin America has had a great deal of push between countries and even in Spain.

A shared heritage in culture and language has also lead to a great deal of cross cultural influence in each region. While larger nations in the Russo-sphere and Scandinavia often dominate smaller nations, the large number of countries and power structures in places like Latin America and the Middle East make for a more interesting and less burdened dynamic when approaching policy or struggles between neighbours. More often than not, many families share relatives across borders and have done so for decades, so when there is strife in Beirut, it is felt by the same family is Damascus or Amman. When a conflict challenging narco-violence occurs in Mexico, often solutions and physical assistance comes from Colombia against the network of cartels in the greater region.

Nations without regional or cultural cousins often are weakened in their policy approaches towards larger powers. Forming bonds with treaties can often become just a function of interests, without any long term ties or application to policy, reducing the benefit of the nation acting as a lonely child on the world stage. The original concept of the EU, to form a type of family ties between European nations that have been at war for centuries, was based in a similar idea. Often Federated states were once a collection of smaller powers with similar heritage and interests, forming countries like the United States itself. With the economic and health crisis facing everyone in 2020, the future approaches of united countries may serve to maintain a stronger recovery than those countries working on their own.

Interfaces With The Global Commons

An odd policy problem arises out of the Covid pandemic, in the interface (pun noted) between private rights, i.e. not to wear a facemask, and public mandates to wear them.  The collision of particular rights with needs of the commons arises in many global issues.  Henry Kissinger points toward it in the international relations context, noting how “the pandemic has prompted an anachronism, a revival of the walled city in an age when prosperity depends on global trade and movement of people.”

The same collision occurs in issues of climate change, use of electromagnetic spectrum, open sea fisheries, and a host of other matters.  The question of particular rights versus commons raises a problem for America, and American leaders need to start crafting a durable approach.

The traditional Liberal approach to questions of commons rests on an extended idea of reciprocity.  If all benefit from some common need, then each party benefits individually, and a contractual process or protocol can be constructed.  Under the 1987 Montreal Protocol a consensus of nations agreed to limit ozone-depleting emissions, and appear to have plugged a hole in the atmosphere’s ozone layer.  In the old practice of eminent domain a duly ascertained public interest allows the taking of private property, with compensation.  This has worked to the point that it raises public controversy only in exceptional cases.

Under the World Trade Organization, countries voluntarily accept regulation of their sovereign power to tax and control imports and exports.  The common benefit is global growth, which for many countries took the form of normalized trade with the United States.  The payoff may have had a less-idealistic reality to it, and in practice the rules were relatively soft, which helped the Liberal approach work.

But such solutions haunt Liberal conscience, which needs to be assuaged by the elaborate due process protocols.  These processes require, at some level, a high degree of underlying consensus that the common good to be gained justifies the overriding of a person’s or country’s rights.  The instant that the community has its consensus shaken, the question of particular rights versus commons becomes a political battle.

The non-liberal approach to the commons says simply that common good comes first.  A number of socio-political doctrines support this approach.  It is the essence of socialism; it fits Confucian premises of harmony and order; and the anthropological concept of collective identity backs those doctrines.  This approach supports measures such as China’ one-child policy, high taxes in many social democratic states, and Soviet collectivization.  It was a norm in pre-modern times, when rights were privileges granted by rulers rather than unalienable attributes of all persons.  The last American traces of those times are found in the vestigial ‘common’ found at the center of many old New England towns.

The problem for America runs deep.  The nation created itself in a rejection of traditional government – not just of a British government perceived as abusive, but of the very idea that government could override a person’s rights.  No other definition of American nationality has been given; the nation is committed to the truths of unalienable rights, and government tasked to secure those rights.  Hence the pangs over practices like eminent domain.  Hence the defiance of those who will not wear face masks during the pandemic.  Hence, in part, opposition to greenhouse gas related regulations and to the environmental movement.  And now that these issues have become issues rather than matters of quiet consensus, any other matter that pits individual rights against needs of the commons will also become politicized.

How America engages the world on climate policy, pandemics, use of electro-magnetic spectrum, maritime boundaries and protocols, and standards in social media, will be subject to our ability to reconcile  the needs, however urgent, of the commons with the rights, baked into our national definition, to live by my own chosen lights. Only in national consensus will we make this reconciliation.  At home or in the world, American leaders cannot enforce the needs of the commons, we have to sell them, which requires national consensus on those benefits.  American consensus is also needed to inspire people to abridge their rights, as individuals or for the nation.  Only in consensus can we address the new age’s global issues.  And only in consensus can America fulfill its commitment to rights.

The time has come for the United States to introduce a policy of strategic clarity: one that makes explicit that the United States would respond to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan.

http://www.quiz-maker.com/QQZQ5FQVT

De colloques en dîners, les « Big Pharma » abreuvent médecins et associations de discours vantant les mérites de leurs innovations. Les sources d'information indépendantes des laboratoires sont quasi inexistantes. Ce scandale écœure plus d'un observateur du monde médical. Constatant que, de plus en (...) / Industrie pharmaceutique, Propriété industrielle, Recherche, Santé - 2002/02

Le nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2020) va bientôt paraître (J-7) ! Il consacrera un dossier spécial aux conséquences du COVID-19 sur la mondialisation, avec notamment en exclusivité un article de Clément Beaune, secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes, et de Didier Houssin, président du comité d’urgence de l’OMS. Un second dossier sur l’urbanisation et ses évolutions à l’heure de la technologie font de ce numéro un incontournable de la rentrée.  Et comme à chaque nouveau numéro, de nombreux autres articles viennent éclairer l’actualité : la relation transatlantique, la démocratie israélienne…