À la suite des attentats du vendredi 13 novembre 2015, nous vous invitons à relire l’article de Myriam Benraad, « Défaire Daech : une guerre tant financière que militaire », publié dans le numéro d’été 2015 (2/2015) de Politique étrangère.
Organisation terroriste la plus médiatisée et la plus redoutée de la nébuleuse djihadiste mondiale, l’État islamique a largement bâti sa puissance militaire et politique sur le développement d’une véritable économie de guerre, à cheval entre l’Irak et la Syrie, passé graduellement d’activités de contrebande et d’extorsion diverses à un système dont chaque aspect a été méticuleusement pensé par ses concepteurs[1]. De par sa volonté de fonder un « État », qui confère tout son sens à son action au-delà des multiples débats sémantiques qui l’ont entouré, « Daech »[2] s’est doté de ressources qui, en 2015, en font toujours le groupe armé le plus fortuné au monde, avec près de deux milliards de dollars à son actif. Cette richesse se combine à un fonctionnement interne reposant sur une gestion millimétrée de revenus démultipliés à la faveur de l’absence de développement socioéconomique et de la déliquescence des institutions dans les territoires conquis ; revenus qui rendent compte de l’essor du djihad et de l’autonomisation de ses représentants par rapport à leurs promoteurs passés[3].
Cette sombre réalité et la résilience de l’État islamique en dépit des frappes aériennes de ces derniers mois rappellent, s’il en était besoin, l’urgence d’une compréhension plus aboutie de la machine de guerre qui sous-tend la survie même de l’organisation. Les djihadistes ont, en effet, su parfaire des méthodes de levée et de transfert de fonds extrêmement sophistiquées, qui fondent leur faculté à donner corps à l’État dont ils se prévalent. À ce titre, l’État islamique constitue une nouvelle forme de terrorisme pour laquelle conserver une activité financière pérenne est essentiel à la réalisation de ses ambitions. Or, si elles sont partiellement connues, les sources de financement de l’organisation appellent une documentation plus minutieuse, essentielle à l’adoption de mesures appropriées pour empêcher l’État islamique de faire usage de sa richesse, et pour tarir les ressources dont il pourrait s’emparer. Le caractère changeant des fonds en cause rend l’exercice périlleux, mais non moins décisif pour la réussite de la lutte anti-djihadiste.
On éclairera ici tout d’abord les rouages économiques et financiers de l’État islamique qui lui ont permis, dès son émergence sur la scène irakienne à l’automne 2006, de conquérir un vaste territoire à travers le Moyen-Orient, niant les frontières contemporaines de la région, et qui s’étend désormais à l’Égypte, à la Libye et, dans une moindre mesure, au Yémen. Quoiqu’une typologie exhaustive des sources de financement soit difficile à dresser, la richesse de l’État islamique provient principalement de ses extorsions et trafics divers – dont celui des populations fragilisées qui subissent son chantage –, de même que des ressources naturelles qu’il maîtrise et exploite au sein de son « califat » autoproclamé. Les revenus de Daech servent une stratégie qui vise par le biais de divers mécanismes de terrain et le recours aux technologies et aux derniers moyens de communication, à façonner un projet sociopolitique à double vocation régionale et globale[4].
On soulignera ensuite que les besoins financiers croissants de l’État islamique pour réaliser ses ambitions et consolider ses structures internes l’ont aussi très tôt placé dans une posture de vulnérabilité. Comme en témoigne son expansion hors d’Irak et de Syrie vers d’autres théâtres de conflit comme la Libye, l’organisation terroriste est contrainte de prendre de nouveaux territoires et de nouvelles ressources pour maintenir un flux constant de revenus et financer ses opérations. Depuis l’été 2014, la réponse militaire vise particulièrement l’économie de l’État islamique pour assécher ses revenus et le mettre en déroute au plan militaire. Le groupe djihadiste est aujourd’hui confronté à un défi : pérenniser sa richesse pour pouvoir subsister.
La communauté internationale continue quant à elle de se mobiliser, concentrant ses efforts pour entraver l’essor de la contrebande et des autres activités illicites aux mains des djihadistes. L’identification des acteurs, intermédiaires, transporteurs, acheteurs, reste toutefois ardue ; de même que le contrôle du secteur financier et des subventions extérieures. Quelles politiques peuvent être adoptées ou développées pour mettre fin au financement de l’État islamique ? Outre la poursuite des frappes sur ses infrastructures matérielles, une coopération internationale renforcée s’impose, de toute évidence. Mais selon quels dispositifs, eu égard à la capacité des djihadistes à déjouer les mesures traditionnellement prises contre les entreprises terroristes ? »
[…]
Et Myriam Benraad de conclure :
« Aucune victoire décisive contre l’État islamique ne pourra advenir sans une contre-offensive économique et financière qui requiert la mobilisation du plus grand nombre et la criminalisation de tout financement à destination du groupe et d’autres formations djihadistes actives. À l’heure actuelle, l’imposition de sanctions adéquates et la création de dispositifs judiciaires et institutionnels susceptibles de prévenir ces flux financiers butent sur des dissensions d’ordre géopolitique, notamment entre acteurs régionaux (Arabie Saoudite et Iran en tête) qui n’ont pas été directement frappés par l’onde de choc djihadiste, et restent par conséquent plus préoccupés par l’extension de leur influence. Vus du terrain, l’entremêlement sans fin des dynamiques conflictuelles et la primauté des réseaux économiques et circuits financiers informels n’est pas sans compliquer la donne. »
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[1]. On peut évoquer ici une économie politique. Voir à ce sujet : M. Batal Al-Shishani, « The Political Economy of the Islamic State », Terrorism Monitor, vol. 12, n° 24, The Jamestown Foundation, décembre 2014.
[2]. Ironiquement, l’usage du terme « Daech » ne retire rien à la prétention étatisante de ses membres. Il ne s’agit, en effet, que de l’acronyme arabe de Dawla islamiyya fi al-‘Iraq wa al-Cham, qui signifie « État islamique en Irak et au Levant ».
[3]. Sur le rôle joué par certains régimes sunnites du Golfe, au premier plan desquels l’Arabie Saoudite, dans l’essor continu du djihadisme et de l’État islamique en particulier, voir l’excellent essai de P. Cockburn, Le Retour des djihadistes. Aux racines de l’État islamique, Paris, Éditions des Équateurs, 2014.
[4]. Sur la stratégie de l’État islamique et ses multiples dimensions, voir l’essai remarquable de P.-J. Luizard, Le Piège Daech. L’État islamique ou le retour de l’Histoire, Paris, La Découverte, 2015.
Photo from the deleted Weibo posts, via Quartz
The coordinated series of bombings and shootings by the Islamic State (IS) on Friday the 13th which killed 129 people in Paris and 43 people in Beirut the day before, will have long-reaching repercussions on the domestic and foreign policies of many nations. Already, talk is growing of closing borders across Europe and 19 U.S. governors have indicated they will refuse any Syrians planning to seek refuge in their states. France reacted militarily by launching punitive airstrikes against IS in Syria on Sunday night, and the U.S. conducted airstrikes against IS and its oil smuggling network. Numerous raids on suspected Islamic terrorists were conducted across France and are also underway in Brussels.
Over in China’s far western autonomous province of Xinjiang, the attacks in Paris and Beirut will probably result in a green light from Beijing for local officials to step up their crackdown against the Islamic militant threat. Following the attacks, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly called for Xinjiang to become an “important part” of the world’s war on terror, calling for a “united front to combat terrorism.” Minister Wang was also reported saying, “China is also a victim of terrorism. The fight against the ‘East Turkestan Islamic Movement’… should become an important part of the international fight against terrorism.”
The momentum for increased counterinsurgency efforts in China is clearly building, and efforts to get the Chinese public on board, using propaganda, in the fight against terrorism will increase. On the day following the Paris attacks, the state-owned People’s Daily ran an article (since removed) covering a counterinsurgency effort to combat terrorist militants in Xinjiang. The article was accompanied by several pictures of armed police in mountainous areas, some preparing to raid a rural home (as shown above).
Xinjiang is the Chinese province which has witnessed the greatest number of terrorist actions, with hundreds killed, although recent attacks have spread across China to include Beijing, Kunming and Guangzhou. Beijing blames these attacks on Islamic terrorists, often pointing the finger at the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a group it claims has links with al Qaeda.
Beijing claims ETIM is fighting for an independent state called “East Turkestan,” or “Uyghuristan” modeled after neighboring Central Asian nations. Two “Eastern Turkestan Republics” survived between 1931-1934 and 1944-1949 before Mao Zedong took control and eventually conceded the title “Xinjiang Autonomous Region” in 1955, partly to win over Turkic speakers in the territory. Beijing also asserts some 300 of Xinjiang’s ethnic Uighur population have traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight alongside IS.
Despite ETIM having been placed by the U.N. and Washington on a list of terror organizations in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, many foreign experts doubt the portrayal by Beijing of ETIM as a formidable force. Rather, human rights organizations and the exile community argue the violence can be traced to the widespread resentment among Uighurs to strict controls on the practice of their religion and efforts to eradicate their culture.
These efforts have included the banning of veils for women, imposing restrictions on Uighur travel rights, banning students from fasting during Ramadan, restricting religious teaching for children, and putting limits on Uighur-language education. Analysts also point to widespread discrimination against Uighurs in hiring and other economic opportunities.
Back in September 2014, China’s highest court, highest prosecution office and the Ministry of Public Security jointly issued detailed instructions on dealing with terrorism and religious extremism. The instructions urged court officials, prosecutors and police to distinguish between the illegal acts of religious extremists and ordinary religious activities, urging officials to avoid discriminating against any religion or ethnic minority, and to avoid interfering with citizens’ freedom to practice their religion.
In the aftermath of the attacks in Paris, government officials in Xinjiang will be tempted to put aside these restraints on their policing, and any excessive actions against the Uighur population will likely be overlooked by Beijing. The rhetoric coming from China’s top police chief, Public Security Minister Guo Shengkun, “to smash violent terrorism before it occurs,” sets a dangerous precedent. Beijing is certainly justified in stepping up efforts to counter any real terrorist threats in the aftermath of the Paris and Beirut attacks, as many nations are doing. Yet greater efforts will need to be undertaken to promote smarter policing in Xinjiang, as also advocated by Guo, lest the rights of the innocent be further infringed upon in the name of expediency.
Photos from The Liberation of Christian and Yazidi Children of Iraq – CYCI has now made insulated warm jackets for men, women, and children after several of our liberations and spending time on the ground, our team realized that these individuals were not equipped for the cold temperatures.
A heated debate has emerged regarding the Syrian refugee crisis and security in Europe and the rest of the Western world. It was found that at least one of the Paris attackers was found to have come with a wave of refugees from Syria or another country outside of the EU in October 2015. With the mass migration of Syrians and other refugees to Europe, the monitoring and identifying of refugee claimants has been overwhelmed or simply ignored. The security risk was always present even before direct threats from terrorist groups, but with the latest attacks in Paris, there has to be accountability by governments to monitor who they allow into their countries.
After the recent attack, the two month old policy put forth by the new Canadian government to accept 25,000 Syrian refugees before Christmas 2015 was said to continue, despite new security concerns. Critics of the plan cite security reasons, referring to the incident in France as a realistic scenario. Additional concerns are the short time frame to monitor and register the refugees. Despite the fact that all the refugees to be taken are already located in safe countries, the commitment seems to give little benefit with many costs. Despite the new minister of Public Safety assuring Canadians that there will be no major security concerns, the approach the new government has taken seems to neglect some appropriate criticisms of the plan.
The acceptance of refugees should account for some factors that may have been ignored in the European example. Most, if not all of the refugees that are being accepted by European countries as well as the Canada 25,000 are already located in safe countries. While they are legally defined as refugees in those countries, the obligation for 3rd party countries to take in refugees from the host countries is not a matter of direct urgency. It would help Syria’s refugees if Western nations would take those directly from Syria who are in immediate danger. This does not mean that relieving Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon of the overwhelming amount of refugees is not a priority, but help should be given to those who are in immediate danger first.
Such groups inside or outside of Syria should be considered as those at greatest risk of threat, notably children, women, disabled and elderly people. Ethnic and religious minorities in the region that are the subject of repression by both sides of the conflict should be given special consideration as host countries may not treat them equally due to historical prejudices. Ethnic and religious minorities have their problems compounded as they may not have a safe place to go even if they are able to get out of Syria and Iraq. They are the ones who are directly affected by ISIS, and should be focused on if the refugee policy claimed by the EU and Western nations is one that claims to directly protect those refugees fleeing ISIS.
I have discussed the issue of the refugee crisis with friends from Syria, and tackling any issues there must consider the reality that there are thousands of different interest groups fighting to take over the government in Syria. Many of the refugees in Jordan came from escaping conflict with the government, and were in Jordan before ISIS became a major player in the conflict. The assumption that all refugees from Syria were created by fleeing from ISIS ignores the reality and factionalism that has fueled the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015.
As a touchstone of experience in the matter, I used to work defending the rights of refugee claimants in Canada directly, including many Syrians and Iraqis. During a normal period of refugee re-settlement, our efforts in Toronto, Canada with a normal level of staff found it difficult to keep up with the number of claimants at the time. To bring in 25,000 in a period of a month and a half in the middle of a Canadian winter is simply irresponsible. We also would never have an individual inserted into Canadian society without ensuring their identity. Rarely we would fail in this objective, as even in countries with conflicts taking place, there are always ways to find identity documents for individuals. In the event we could not prove their identity for release, they would remain in a detention facility until their identity documents were obtained, or they were sent to a hearing where the merits of their case and situation in their country of origin were measured.
It was well known that identifying someone was the only way to have them gain access to the general society, and it was a fair and responsible process that took time, skill and trained individuals to accomplish. This was, and should be the bare minimum a government owes to the people who elected them. While it is not a guarantee that such a process did not take place in France, nor could have stopped an attack, assuming responsibility for safety and security is an obligation no government should be allowed to disengage themselves from at any point for any reason. This is to the benefit of the general public, refugee claimants and those vulnerable groups that find they no longer have a place for a peaceful life in their traditional lands.