Diplomacy & Crisis News

The United States should help its Latin American ally become a member of the OECD.

A force de cadeaux fiscaux, d'absence de régulation et de laxisme environnemental, les conservateurs au pouvoir en Alberta ont transformé le nord de la province canadienne en un supermarché du pétrole sale. / Canada, Aborigènes, Entreprise, Amérindiens, Industrie, Pétrole, Santé, Environnement, (...) / Canada, Aborigènes, Entreprise, Amérindiens, Industrie, Pétrole, Santé, Environnement, Pollution - 2010/04

They're young, untested — and, if they play their cards right, they can transform the EU.

With a tight vote looming, lawmakers hope to extract the outgoing CIA chief’s pledge to restore a damaged State Department.

The annual full session of the National People’s Congress, which began on 5 March, sees President Xi Jinping on the way to becoming China’s “Emperor” for life.

Following the party’s Central Committee proposal of eliminating the limits for the country’s president from the constitution – currently set at a maximum of two consecutive terms – Xi is likely to remain China’s leader and rule well beyond 2023, when his five-year mandate would previously ahve come to an end.

A one-man show

In last year’s party congress, it became clear that a new era was born under Xi Jinping and he has no intention of stepping down in the future. His name and political thought theory, Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, were added to the party constitution.

“Xi Jinping has finally achieved his ultimate goal when he first embarked on Chinese politics – that is to be the Mao Zedong of the 21st century.”

– Willy Lam, political analyst at the Chinese University in Hong Kong

Xi’s presidency has been marked by an increasingly powerful cult of personality, along with a dangerous lack of political opposition and a dismal human rights record. In fact, other than being President of the People’s Republic of China, he also serves as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and as Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

As Xi holds the top offices of the party, the state, and the military, and with the previous party congress ending without appointing a clear eventual successor, it is not difficult to see why some describe him as “China’s most authoritarian leader since Mao”.

Since Xi became president of China in 2012, his strongman image has played a key role in determining China’s domestic and foreign policies. At the domestic level, his ruthless anti-corruption campaign has become a stronghold of his consolidation of power. Used to intimidate or eliminate cadres and party members who disagree with him or represent a threat to his political ambitions, Xi Jinping’s campaign has been leading him to finally achieve his sought after one-man show.

Xi’s assertiveness is also evident at the foreign policy level. From showing off China’s hard power in the South China Sea, to its increasingly strong soft power projections in the form of billions of dollars invested in Asia and Africa, Xi Jinping’s China is more powerful and influential than before.

Emperor for life

The 64-year-old leader could now be only one step away from tightening his grip on China and stay in office indefinitely. News regarding the presidency term limits broke in a two-sentence article on 25 March, as reported by Xinhua, China’s official newswire:

“The Communist Party of China Central Committee proposed to remove the expression that the President and Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China ‘shall serve no more than two consecutive terms’ from the country’s Constitution”.

If this reform proposal encounters zero opposition at the National People’s Congress, it is fair to accept that China will continue to move forward according to Xi’s thoughts, economic reforms and political strategy. Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of the party-run tabloid, Global Times, tweeted that the “removal of the two-term limit of the president of PRC doesn’t mean China will restore life-long tenure for state leader”. However, this unexpected announcement is likely only the beginning of an even more prominent crackdown that will affect China’s standing in the international community.

The state propaganda machine, which was immediately put in motion after the announcement to respond to the social media backlash, has not been able to mitigate the concerns of the economic and social risks linked to this reform. Given Xi’s already heavy-handed approach on China’s economy and his government’s clampdowns on freedoms – such as online censorship and human rights abuses – his “emperor for life” status doesn’t come without risks.

Heading towards a “One China, One System”?

The next challenge for Beijing will be the aftermath of the Hong Kong elections from March 11th. In the crossfire of criticism for the disqualification of activist Agnes Chow – representative of the pro-democracy party Demosisto, Xi Jinping’s government is accused of infringing the “One China, Two Systems” model that allows Hong Kong to hold a certain degree of political autonomy.

Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, Patrick Nip, agreed to review Hong Kong’s electoral laws in the wake of a recent court ruling that granted officials’ power to ban candidates because of their political views. Beijing’s increasing assertiveness in Hong Kong is undeniable.

During the Party Congress held in October 2017, Xi Jinping reaffirmed Beijing would not allow anyone to “separate any part of the Chinese territory from China”. Fast forward to today, his statement can be interpreted as a constitutional reform by extending Xi’s mandate and, therefore imply a much-feared transformation towards a “One China, One System” model.

The post Xi Jinping: China’s Emperor for life? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In its attempts to control Uighurs abroad, the Chinese government is holding families hostage.

En 1968, quatre ans après le déclenchement de l'escalade américaine au Vietnam, de grandes manifestations antiguerre parcouraient les Etats-Unis, servant à cristalliser toutes les révoltes progressistes de l'époque. Les rassemblements pacifistes devinrent alors tellement massifs qu'ils obligèrent le (...) / États-Unis, Irak, Iran, Israël, Guerre du Vietnam 1959-1975, Mouvement de contestation, Pacifisme, Salvador, Nicaragua - 2007/07

Without territory, the Islamic State has quickly reverted back to its origins as a terrorist group.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2018). Zéphyr Dessus propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Anne Bazin et Charles Tenenbaum, L’Union européenne et la paix (Presses de Sciences Po, 2017, 240 pages).

Quel rôle l’Union européenne (UE) peut-elle jouer dans la gestion de conflits, la médiation, et in fine le maintien de la paix dans le monde ? C’est à cette question qu’une équipe de dix chercheurs internationaux dirigée par Anne Bazin et Charles Tenenbaum, deux maîtres de conférences distingués, essaie de répondre. Depuis Jérusalem, Amsterdam ou bien encore Cardiff, les contributeurs apportent leur expertise à cet ouvrage ambitieux et détaillé. C’est bien l’approche interdisciplinaire de ce travail ainsi que la variété des thématiques abordées qui font sa richesse.

L’ouvrage débute par une analyse des relations entre la Commission européenne et les organisations non gouvernementales, se focalise ensuite sur le développement des outils de médiation européens, avant de présenter un état des lieux des capacités militaires de l’UE. Les chapitres suivants abordent la question d’un peacebuilding européen et du tournant stratégique enclenché ces dernières années par les traités de Maastricht et Lisbonne. Les chercheurs s’appuient enfin sur trois études de cas (le processus de paix israélo-palestinien, l’instabilité somalienne, et la pacification du Caucase) pour présenter une évaluation concrète de l’action européenne sur le terrain.

De manière générale, l’ouvrage fait un bilan mitigé de la capacité de l’UE à promouvoir la paix dans le monde. En dépit de progrès considérables, notamment en termes de prérogatives politiques et juridiques – la création du Service européen pour l’action extérieure (SEAE), le développement d’outils militaires, ou encore l’établissement d’une politique coordonnée d’aide au développement –, les lacunes militaires et les paralysies internes à l’Union l’empêchent de s’imposer comme un acteur crédible face aux grandes puissances.

L’exemple des battlegroups est frappant. Alors que l’Union s’est dotée en 2007 de bataillons prêts à intervenir à tout moment aux quatre coins du globe, ceux-ci n’ont jamais été déployés. Un manque de volonté politique des États membres, des financements collectifs trop maigres, et la primauté des intérêts nationaux ont immobilisé ce mécanisme. On constate de fait que durant les grandes crises – guerres de Yougoslavie, Afghanistan ou Libye par exemple – l’UE s’efface derrière les États et l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique nord (OTAN).

Mais l’Union garde une influence majeure sur la scène internationale. Sa force actuelle réside principalement dans sa capacité à agir en amont et en aval des conflits. Impuissante durant les guerres des Balkans, elle a maintenant pris le relais en déployant des opérations qui contribuent à stabiliser la région. Absente durant l’intervention en Libye, l’UE s’est réinvestie dans la gestion post-conflit à travers de nombreuses aides financières et une mission d’assistance. Spectatrice en Ukraine et en Syrie, on peut néanmoins imaginer qu’elle aura un rôle fondamental à jouer dans leur reconstruction. Son rôle de médiateur s’étant graduellement institutionnalisé au sein du SEAE, l’UE dispose maintenant d’un véritable service permanent de médiation. La politique européenne de développement reste également un atout majeur pour atteindre ses ambitions.

Cet ouvrage se présente donc comme une véritable grille de lecture permettant de comprendre comment l’Union européenne œuvre pour la paix dans le monde, et quels sont les instruments variés dont elle dispose pour tendre vers cet objectif.

Zéphyr Dessus

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Having won the war, will the United States end up yet again squandering the peace?

A brief checklist to know whether Trump is getting serious about attacking another country.

Trump’s surprise White House invitation to Putin could undermine his administration’s tougher stance on Moscow.

United Kingdom Prime Minister Theresa May switches on No10 Downing Street Lights for visits Brussels, Belgium to meet with Jean-Claude Juncker the President of the European Commission.

The transition agreement between the UK and EU means that although the UK will officially leave the EU in March 2019, it will still remain in the customs union and single market for another 21 months. The deal was struck after several concessions by the UK, indicating the government’s willingness to sacrifice regaining full sovereignty in order to reach a trade agreement at the end of the negotiating period.

The UK’s concessions are indicative of the government’s broader negotiating strategy with the EU. While Theresa May has often claimed that no deal would be better than a bad deal and that she is prepared to walk away from negotiations, in practice, she has been very keen to compromise in order to reach an agreement. The transition agreement was struck almost completely on the EU’s terms.

Negotiations over the transition demonstrate the UK’s desire for reaching a wider withdrawal agreement even if that may mean making concessions on their part. The transition agreement thus increases the likelihood of an orderly withdrawal which would entail at least a limited free-trade agreement. During the transition, EU migrants arriving into the UK will continue to be granted permanent residency and the EU will continue to set fishing quotas. These terms violate May’s red lines of taking back control of borders and laws immediately after Brexit, and reflect a realization that despite May’s rhetoric, the UK would bear the brunt of the economic costs that a no-deal Brexit would bring about.

Muted political backlash from Brexiteers
Given the concessions over EU citizenship rights and fishing, the backlash from the Brexiteers in the Conservative party has been subdued. Jacob Rees Mogg, the head of the pro-Brexit European Research Group (ERG) faction of the Conservative Party previously warned that a transition deal would make the UK a “vassal state,” but now argues that he could live with the transition arrangement as long as the final withdrawal arrangement is satisfactory. There has been no serious threat to rebel against the government or the Prime Minister even though she has violated most of her previous “red lines.”

There are two reasons why Conservative Eurosceptics are still overtly supporting the Prime Minister. First, any attempt to vote against the government in October on the EU Withdrawal Bill might lead to fresh elections. Polls are currently neck and neck, which means that the Labour party has a non-trivial probability of winning. Labour is committed to striking a customs arrangement with the EU, which is anathema to many Conservative Brexiteers. Therefore, this option is highly risky for them.

Second, while the ERG could try to trigger an internal Conservative Party leadership election by instigating a vote of confidence in the Prime Minister, party rules state that a majority of Tory MP’s have to vote against the incumbent leader. This is unlikely to happen because there is no credible alternative candidate who can unite the party’s Remain and Leave camps. Moreover, there is simply no appetite for a leadership election at such a critical stage in the negotiations.

Therefore, Tory Brexiteers are unable to turn their displeasure over the transition deal into concrete action. Their lukewarm opposition to the concessions to secure the transition agreement demonstrates that the Prime Minister is not as beholden to the group of hard-line Brexiteers as previously thought, which makes it more likely that a final agreement with the EU will be reached.

Updated probabilities of final outcomes
Given Theresa May’s greater latitude for action, it is worth reevaluating the likelihood and impact of three of the most probably Brexit scenarios. The most likely of these is the signing of a limited free trade agreement in goods. As the EU runs a trade deficit with the UK of around £95 billion, it would be in its interest to strike a tariff-free goods agreement. The UK, despite demanding the full restoration of its sovereignty while maintaining full access to the single market, has demonstrated an increasing willingness to compromise in these negotiations so far. The Government’s official policy that no deal is better than a bad deal does not have much credibility at the moment.

A comprehensive deal would involve facilitating trade in services, however, trade in services is usually more complex to negotiate. Negotiations are set to complete in October 2018, and there simply might not be enough time to negotiate such a comprehensive deal. Importantly, this means UK financial services will likely lose their “passporting” rights to sell their products across the EU. Given the centrality to financial services to UK’s economy, a limited free trade agreement would entail significant economic costs to the UK. However, it would be preferable to a no-deal scenario under which the UK would fall back on WTO rules.

An obstacle to this outcome is the problem of the border in Northern Ireland. Leaving the customs union would risk creating a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland which would threaten the Good Friday Agreement. The UK government is committed to preventing a hard border, but has not yet laid out how it would achieve this objective if it leaves the customs union.

Alternatively, to solve the Irish border conundrum, the UK could try to strike a new customs arrangement with the rest of the EU. Although the government has ruled out a customs arrangement, there is a pro-customs union majority in Parliament at the moment. If the government does not come up with a solution of its own, it might have to soften its position and aim to strike a customs arrangement, meaning this scenario remains a real possibility.

Finally, if there is no withdrawal agreement, economic risk will be significantly heightened. Trade flows and air traffic will be significantly disrupted and the legal status of EU citizens in the UK and British citizens in the EU would be unclear, while a hard border in Ireland would be likely. However, the recent negotiations over the transition process makes this outcome highly improbable. The UK’s negotiating strategy has followed a clear trend – the further the negotiations go, the more willing the UK has become to compromise to strike an agreement. The domestic political response to the transition has exposed the limited ability of the hard-line backbench Brexiteers to force the government’s hand. Moreover, the transition agreement has also engendered a mood of cautious optimism that a deal can be reached decreasing the chances of this worst case, “no-deal” scenario.

 

This article first ran on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Aman Navani

The post Theresa May’s evolving Brexit strategy appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

"We've had weapons brought to this headquarters and given to us by Afghan leaders and [they] said, this was given by the Russians to the Taliban."

State Department officials with special needs children face a byzantine bureaucracy that often denies them critical care.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2018). Clément Steuer propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Steven A. Cook , False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2017, 360 pages).

Ce livre tente d’expliquer comment l’espoir des printemps arabes a laissé si rapidement place à une régression violente et autoritaire au Moyen-Orient. L’auteur étudie principalement quatre pays de la région : la Tunisie, l’Égypte, la Libye et la Turquie. Selon lui, trois facteurs sont à prendre en considération pour comprendre cet échec : le caractère en dernière analyse non révolutionnaire des soulèvements, la capacité des dirigeants à manipuler à leur avantage les institutions, et l’importance des questions identitaires.

Travaillant au Council on Foreign Relations, l’auteur entend jouer un rôle de prescripteur auprès de l’administration américaine. Dès le premier chapitre, il illustre la manière dont cette dernière a été prise de court par les événements, et rappelle l’engagement de l’administration Bush en faveur de la démocratie dans la région au cours de la précédente décennie, même s’il conteste le discours des néo-conservateurs prétendant que le désir de démocratie serait né de l’invasion de l’Irak. Le cinquième chapitre, qui précède immédiatement la conclusion de l’ouvrage, est d’ailleurs entièrement consacré à l’impuissance des États-Unis au Moyen-Orient, et plaide pour une plus grande fermeté de Washington sur les principes, ce qui, à défaut d’influer sur le déroulement des événements, pourrait au moins éviter d’alimenter l’anti-­américanisme de tous les camps en présence, encouragé par l’illisibilité de la politique de Washington.

Le cœur de l’ouvrage est, lui, consacré à l’évolution politique interne des quatre pays, avec une solide discussion de la littérature scientifique sur les notions de révolution et de démocratisation. Dans le premier chapitre, l’auteur rappelle les espoirs de la période 2011-2013, au cours de laquelle la Turquie faisait figure pour le monde arabe de modèle précurseur d’une intégration des islamistes au jeu politique, par la grâce des procédures démocratiques. Dans le deuxième chapitre, l’auteur se penche sur le contexte économique et social des soulèvements : une croissance économique soutenue et des différences de revenus somme toute modestes, mais un taux de chômage élevé, notamment chez les plus jeunes. Les revendications économiques, confuses, auraient été liées aux aspirations à la démocratie par le biais de la notion de dignité (Karâma). Le troisième chapitre décrit la transmutation des espoirs en angoisses dans les quatre pays, cherchant à identifier dans chaque cas le point de bascule.

Enfin, le quatrième chapitre revient sur les trois facteurs définis en introduction. Chacun d’eux mériterait une discussion : le premier a tout d’un argument circulaire (l’absence de transformations politiques s’expliquerait par le fait que les soulèvements n’étaient pas révolutionnaires, puisqu’ils n’ont pas apporté de transformations), et les deux autres ne sont pas spécifiques au Moyen-Orient, et n’expliquent donc pas pourquoi la démocratisation a échoué ici quand elle a réussi ailleurs. De ce fait, l’on n’est pas forcé de partager le pessimisme de l’auteur quant à l’avenir de la région, promise selon lui à de longues années de violence et d’autoritarisme.

Ces réserves mises à part, le constat selon lequel les printemps arabes auraient échoué en même temps que leur modèle turc s’abîmait est pertinent, et constitue sans conteste une grille de lecture intéressante de la dynamique des dernières années.

Clément Steuer

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

In 2001, the reality was that there was really no better alternative than to let China join the WTO.

What does it mean for an African nation to lead the global future?

A once-steady U.S. ally in Eastern — or possibly Central — Europe moves toward Beijing’s grip.

For the world’s premier superpowers to better confront new international threats, fresh strategic initiatives are needed in a challenging era.