Union européenne

La Serbie et le Kosovo se réarment dans le contexte d'un changement plus général de la politique européenne en matière de défense.

The post Le réarmement de l’UE met à l’épreuve la stabilité et la confiance dans les Balkans occidentaux appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Également dans l'édition de lundi : l'ambassadeur israélien, Chypre, les discours de von der Leyen, les hubs de retour.

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Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Member States’ defence budgets

The 23 EU Member States that are also NATO members have long been guided by NATO’s 2 % of GDP defence spending commitment formalised at the 2014 Wales Summit. Allies agreed to ‘move towards’ the 2 % ‘guideline within a decade’, but in 2021 only seven of the 21 Member States that were then NATO members spent 2 % of GDP on defence. EU Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation (PESCO – all except Malta) also agreed to ‘regularly increase defence budgets in real terms’ under their PESCO commitments.

While defence budgets have increased in real terms since 2018/2019 (previously they had not even reached pre-2008 financial crisis levels), this follows years of chronic under-investment in defence in most Member States. In 2021, their combined defence budgets stood at €218 billion. Meanwhile, strategic rivals such as Russia and China increased their defence budgets by 300 % and 600 % respectively over the last decade, compared to a collective 20 % increase in EU countries (to 2022). The European Commission notes that, if all Member States had spent 2 % of GDP on defence from 2006 to 2020, this would have amounted to an extra €1.1 trillion for defence spending.

Defence budget definition

The EU uses the Classification of Functions of Government (COFOG) definition of defence spending, which includes ‘Military defence; civil defence; foreign military aid, R&D related to defence; defence not elsewhere classified’. NATO’s definition of defence spending is broader, as it includes military pensions, military healthcare (COFOG includes salaries but not healthcare) and, in some cases, spending on forces such as police or coast guards, but excludes civil defence, which COFOG includes. Moreover, discrepancies may arise from the timing of expenditure recording, particularly for military equipment, since NATO reporting does not adhere to national accounts rules on when such expenditure is recorded. Significant differences exist at national level: e.g. Spain wants to include investment in cyber security, counterterrorism and curbing climate change in its definition.

Russia’s war on Ukraine was a wake-up call for the EU. At the March 2022 Versailles Summit, EU leaders agreed to spend ‘more and better’ on defence. The Strategic Compass, a concrete plan of action for EU security and defence to 2030, reaffirmed this. The second von der Leyen Commission (2024-2029) has made defence a key EU priority. The first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space was appointed and the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence was elevated to a full standing committee. The Commission also pledged to advance the European Defence Union, launched significant initiatives to boost the European defence industry (such as the first-ever European defence industrial strategy, EDIS), and a European defence industry programme (EDIP). The EU also legislated to boost ammunition production and incentivise joint procurement of urgent defence equipment. On 4 March 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the ReArm Europe plan/ Readiness 2030. This aims to leverage €800 billion in defence spending to 2029, including a €150 billion EU-backed loan through the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and measures to encourage national defence spending by activating the National Escape Clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for an additional 1.5 % of GDP spending on defence, redeployment of EU cohesion funds, European Investment Bank support and private capital mobilisation. On 19 March 2025, the Commission presented its white paper for European defence, outlining a strategic plan to close critical capability gaps, strengthen the defence industry and readiness, support Ukraine, and boost innovation and partnerships to ensure the continent’s long-term security. On 16 October 2025, the Commission and High Representative put forward the European defence readiness roadmap, which sets out clear objectives and milestones to achieve defence readiness by 2030. At the NATO Summit held in The Hague, NATO Allies endorsed a revised defence spending commitment, setting a target of allocating 5 % of GDP to defence by 2035 (3.5 % for core defence expenditure and 1.5 % for broader defence-related expenditure). All Allies, except Spain, have pledged to meet the 5 % defence spending benchmark by 2035. According to the EDA, meeting the 3.5 % of GDP would oblige many Member States to significantly increase spending, amounting to roughly €254 billion and lifting aggregate defence spending to about €635 billion in 2025 and€807 billion in 2035. This does not take into account that 3.5 % does not apply to non-NATO EU Member States. However, a clear distinction exists between political commitments and concrete budgetary planning (see Annex).

Defence spending increases

In 2022, collective annual EU defence budgets had already increased to €240 billion. In 2023, Member States reached a combined €279 billion (1.6 % of GDP) and €343 billion in 2024 (1.9 % of GDP). In 2025, Member States reached an estimated €381 billion (2.1 % of GDP). All EU NATO Allies now spend more than the 2 % defence expenditure benchmark agreed at the 2014 NATO Summit. The four non-NATO EU Member States (Ireland, Malta, Austria and Cyprus) do not. EU defence investment reached €106 billion in 2024 and was set to approach €130 billion in 2025.

Figure 1 – EU Member State defence expenditure, 2025, in % of GDP

Data Source: NATO and IISS, 2025.

However, there are significant regional differences in the EU. Germany’s defence spending rose by 23 % in real terms in 2024 and 18 % in 2025, bringing the 2025 budget to €95 billion, double its 2021 level. Spending increased from 1.27 % of GDP in 2021 to 2.14 % in 2025. Following reform of the constitutional debt brake, Berlin has committed to further increases, with funding projected to reach €117.2 billion in 2026 and €162 billion by 2029, equivalent to 3.2 % of GDP, or 3.5 % when broader defence-related items are included. Northern Europe has also recorded sustained growth. Sweden has enacted major uplifts under its Total Defence 2025 to 2030 framework, prioritising air defence, long range weapons, naval assets and research. Denmark established a DKK50 billion acceleration fund, raising spending to 2.65 % of GDP. Finland has maintained levels above 2 % of GDP and plans to reach 3 % by 2029. The Netherlands has more than doubled its defence budget since 2021, reaching €25.8 billion in 2025, around 2.2 % of GDP. In fiscally constrained states, growth is more calibrated. France increased its 2026 defence allocation to €68.5 billion, or 2.25 % of GDP, despite wider deficit pressures. Spain and Italy have also raised spending to 2 %, though in part by reclassifying security expenditures. Poland and the Baltic States top the ranking in relative terms: Poland records 4.48 %, Lithuania 4.00 %, Latvia 3.73 % and Estonia 3.38 %. According to NATO projections, all EU NATO members reached at least 2 % of GDP on defence spending in 2025 (see Figure 1). By comparison, US defence expenditure (NATO definition) has consistently stayed over 3 %; it was US$935 billion (3.19 % of GDP) in 2024 (≈€868 billion) and an estimated US$980 billion (≈3.2 % of GDP) in 2025 (≈€910 billion).

In aggregate terms, EU defence expenditure exceeds the declared budgets of Russia and China respectively, although both figures warrant caution given limited transparency. Despite lower headline spending, Moscow and Beijing are likely to generate higher cost effectiveness due to lower domestic price levels, integrated planning structures and reduced organisational overhead. Measured in purchasing power parity, Russia’s defence expenditure in 2024 is estimated at €234 billion, around twice the level indicated by market exchange rates, with a similar distortion likely in China. Over the past two decades, defence spending in Russia and China has more than doubled in real terms; Member States’ expenditure has risen by just over 50 % since 2008.

European Parliament position

Parliament has consistently called for an increase in defence spending. In its annual report on the implementation of the common security and defence policy 2025, MEPs welcome rising national defence spending but urge deeper European cooperation to prevent market fragmentation. They warn of persistent deterrence gaps and call for doctrinal adaptation, expanded industrial output and greater interoperability.

Read the complete At a glace note on ‘EU Member States’ defence budgets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

À travers l’Europe, les autorités ont relevé le niveau d’alerte face au risque terroriste depuis le début de la guerre menée par les États-Unis et Israël contre l’Iran. Si aucune action n’a pour l’instant été identifiée, le continent est habitué aux pressions exercées par le régime de Téhéran.

Le président français Emmanuel Macron se rend ce lundi 9 mars 2026 à Chypre, État membre de l’Union européenne frappé la semaine dernière par des drones iraniens et des tirs de missiles dans le contexte de la guerre américano-israélienne contre l'Iran. Une semaine après le début de l’offensive militaire des États-Unis et d'Israël, le chef de l’État français, qui a multiplié les prises de position et les entretiens avec les différentes parties, monte d’un cran dans son implication diplomatique.

Une longue année électorale a commencé, dimanche 8 mars, en Allemagne. Le premier scrutin était très attendu car le Bade-Wurtemberg, région prospère du sud-ouest, est dirigée depuis 15 ans par un écologiste qui ne se représentait pas. Les chrétiens-démocrates du chancelier Friedrich Merz espéraient reprendre enfin ce fief traditionnel des conservateurs. Mais les écologistes l'ont emporté. La coalition au pouvoir dans la région entre Verts et chrétiens-démocrates devrait être reconduite.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

The EU has made closing the gender gap in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) a priority in its education, research and employment policies. This answers to legal requirements to pursue gender equality through any EU action, as well as to practical imperatives to address a shortage of specialists that limits the EU’s ability to compete in the global technological race. Moreover, existing data show that many young women today have strong maths and science skills but are still largely absent from careers in engineering and information and communications technology (ICT).

Research shows that the under-representation of women in STEM has many causes, including: unwelcoming work environments in STEM jobs, family caring responsibilities, and social norms that discourage girls from pursuing these fields. Tackling these issues requires a combined approach including: challenging rigid gender stereotypes, using gender-sensitive teaching methods in schools, encouraging girls to choose STEM careers, and removing barriers to employment.

The EU pursues gender equality as a cross-cutting priority in various policies that cover STEM, and has adopted specific initiatives to promote women in STEM. In education, it uses a range of measures to support women at all levels, from schools to universities. In research, EU funding now depends on programmes promoting gender equality. In employment, EU laws help remove obstacles that might put women off STEM careers.

The EU also funds projects that support women’s innovation, entrepreneurship, networking and mentoring. The European Parliament strongly backs these efforts, and has called for wider action by the EU and its Member States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in STEM in the EU: How to close the gender gap‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Un troisième vol de rapatriement de Français du Moyen-Orient devait arriver ce dimanche matin à 5h à Paris. Comme beaucoup de pays européens, la Belgique s'organise pour rapatrier ses citoyens bloqués au Moyen-Orient, plus d'une semaine après le début de la guerre et des bombardements israélo-américains sur l'Iran. Le royaume doit gérer plus de 900 demandes de rapatriement dans un contexte sécuritaire très difficile sur place, rendant la mise en place et le décollage des vols complexe, provoquant même parfois la colère de ceux restant bloqués sur place.

En Autriche, les « Omas gegen Rechts », les mamies contre la droitisation, est un mouvement lancé fin 2017, lorsque l’extrême droite est arrivée au pouvoir. Ce mouvement rassemble des femmes âgées de plus de 60 ans et même de plus de 70 ans pour la plupart. Elles revendiquent leur engagement, descendent dans la rue et donnent de la voix dans l’espoir de laisser un monde meilleur aux jeunes générations. Elles sont devenues des icônes en Autriche et ont même fait des émules dans d’autres pays. 

Les Suisses se rendent aux urnes ce dimanche 8 mars. Alors que cet hiver s’annonce comme l’un des plus chauds jamais enregistrés, les Suisses doivent décider s’ils acceptent de consacrer quasiment 1% de leur PIB à la transition énergétique. Un passage obligé pour respecter les engagements de neutralité carbone. Mais en plein conflit ukrainien et maintenant au Moyen-Orient, le texte a très peu de chances de passer. 

Le racisme touche tous les secteurs et tous les pays. En Catalogne, en Espagne, alors que la crise du logement fait rage plusieurs associations dénoncent un racisme presque systématique dans le secteur de l’immobilier et pour la première fois en Catalogne une agence immobilière vient d’être condamnée par le gouvernement à une amende.

La guerre russe à grande échelle contre l’Ukraine entre dans sa cinquième année et l'Estonie, la Lettonie ainsi que la Lituanie, pays limitrophes de la Russie, ne relâchent en rien leur vigilance face à un voisin menaçant. Que représente justement cette menace en 2026 ? Le général de division Ivan Martin, ancien attaché militaire français en Russie et en Ukraine, désormais à la tête de la cellule Anticipation, Stratégie, Orientation à l’état-major des armées, répond aux questions de RFI*.

Az olasz haditengerészet fő támaszpontja elleni légitámadás gondolata egyáltalán nem volt új keletű. Az angol oldalon már az etióp válság idején, 1935-ben felmerült az ötlet, hogy az olasz flottát torpedóvető repülőgépek Taranto elleni légitámadásával kellene semlegesíteni, ha háborúra kerülne sor Olaszországgal. (Az elképzelés eredete talán még ennél is régebbre nyúlik vissza, 1918-ra, amikor az angolok a német kikötők ellen terveztek hasonló, anyahajókról indított légitámadásokat.) A háború első hónapjaiban az Egyiptomban állomásozó angol légierő egy sor eredményes támadást intézett a líbiai olasz kikötők ellen, és alighanem ezek sikerét látva jutott eszébe ismét valakinek a Taranto elleni légitámadás ötlete. A helyzet különösen kedvező volt, hiszen ekkortájt érkezett meg Alexandriába az Illustrious, tehát Cunningham-nek egy ideig egyszerre két anyahajó is rendelkezésére állt. A pilóták már szeptembertől gyakorolni kezdték a sekély vízben végrehajtott torpedóvetést. A támadás eredetileg tervezett időpontja október 21-e volt, Trafalgar napja. Az Illustrious fedélzetén kitört tűz miatt azonban az akciót el kellett napolni, majd meg kellett várni a következő holdtöltét, miután az éjjeli támadást teliholdnál, jó látási viszonyok között akarták lebonyolítani. Nem sokkal indulás előtt aztán az Eagle sérült meg egy közelben becsapódó bombától, ám az angolok már nem akartak tovább várni, és megindították a hadműveletet, bár Cunningham is kételkedett benne, egyetlen anyahajóval képesek lesznek e elérni a várt eredményeket.

[...] Bővebben!

Written by Sarah Sheil.

More than one year into the second von der Leyen Commission and six months after her first State of the Union address in this mandate, the Members’ Research Service of the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) presents its twice-yearly monitoring of the Commission’s delivery. This paper analyses in which areas the Commission has focused its efforts, how much it has achieved against its commitments – primarily set out in the State of the Union address and the 2026 Commission work programme – and how its priorities are articulated.

In terms of announcements, initiatives tabled, and texts adopted, the Commission’s main focus has been on competitiveness. To meet the objectives of the Letta and Draghi reports – quoted as the foundations of this policy – much effort will still be needed, as was confirmed by Mario Draghi soon after the 2025 State of the Union address. This priority underpinned the European Council’s 12 February 2026 competitiveness retreat.

The ‘new era for European defence and security‘ comes next. The mainly non-legislative nature of the second Commission priority translates differently, with initiatives far fewer in number but of high political prominence. This policy area is at the forefront in the interinstitutional joint declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2026.

Read the complete Study on ‘The policy priorities of the von der Leyen II Commission: State of play in March 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Au moins douze personnes ont été tuées, dans la nuit du vendredi 6 au samedi 7 mars, en Ukraine, dont plusieurs régions ont été ciblées par des frappes russes, selon les autorités.

Cette semaine, nous recevons Arancha González Laya, ancienne ministre des Affaires étrangères espagnole et actuelle doyenne de la Paris School of International Affairs à Sciences Po. Elle revient sur le conflit au Moyen-Orient et le risque d’embrasement de la région ainsi que sur la brouille diplomatique entre les États-Unis et l’Espagne, seul pays européen à avoir ouvertement condamné les frappes américaines et israéliennes comme une violation du droit international.

Une revue de presse préparée en partenariat avec Le Courrier des Balkans. 

Le gouvernement islandais a annoncé vendredi 6 mars qu'il proposait d'organiser le 29 août un référendum sur la reprise des négociations d'adhésion à l'Union européenne, officiellement interrompues depuis 2015.

Les différends autour du projet d'avion de combat SCAF de nouvelle génération ont tendu les relations franco-allemandes.

The post La Bavière soutient Airbus dans sa volonté de proposer deux solutions SCAF pour les avions de combat appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Les eurodéputés ont également convenu de restreindre l'utilisation des termes liés à la viande pour les aliments cultivés en laboratoire.

The post L’UE conclut un accord sur la dénomination des aliments à base végétale appeared first on Euractiv FR.