European Union

"In the context of the exponential growth of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), the President of the European Parliament has announced a number of measures to contain the spread of epidemic and to safeguard Parliament's core activities.

On 2 April, the Conference of Presidents updated the EP's calendar of activities to introduce an extraordinary plenary session on Thursday 16 and Friday 17 April in Brussels, and additional dates for remote meetings for EP governing bodies, committees and political groups.

The current precautionary measures adopted by the European Parliament to contain the spread of COVID-19 do not affect work on legislative priorities. Core activities are reduced, but maintained to ensure that the institution's legislative, budgetary, scrutiny functions are maintained.

Following these decisions, the next AFET Committee meeting will take place on 1 September (via videoconference).

New Calendar 2020
Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

The EU is currently working towards updating its Arctic policy. It needs to respond to two major changes that affect the region and pose challenges to the role of the EU in the Arctic; accelerated climate change and increased geoeconomic and geopolitical competition. The EU finds itself in a rather unique position. As a supranational institution with competences in parts of the Arctic, and with Member States having territories in the region, as well as institutionalised linkages with Arctic countries Iceland and Norway — with whom the EU shares the European Economic Area (EEA) — it needs to balance sectoral policies, priority areas and addressing different Arctics. The EU should therefore create ‘more EU in the Arctic’ by broadening the scope of its existing Arctic policy, as well as incorporating ‘more Arctic in the EU’ by stipulating that the Arctic becomes a cross-cutting consideration in other relevant EU policies. In addition, the EU will need to address hard and soft security issues within existing functional, regional and global frameworks and continue engaging in dialogue and confidence-building measures with Russia. Finally, a revised EU Arctic policy needs to be proactive and ambitious, based on existing strengths and expertise within the EU. At the same time, in an Arctic that witnesses the return of geopolitics, the ‘civilian power’ EU will encounter challenges assuming its role in the region. How it narrates its future position in the Arctic will play a tangible role in negotiating this position politically.
Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

The coronavirus measures implemented by the EU and member states have had differentiating effects, which ultimately may lead to further fragmentation of the European political system, argues EU3D researcher Filippa Chatzistavrou.

The banner ‘Recovery Plan for Europe’ on the front of the Berlaymont building (Photo: European Commission)

The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a global health and economic crisis. According to the World Bank, it has caused the worst economic recession with the highest drop in GDP since 1871. Besides the common features of the pandemic and the striking similarities in the tools chosen by EU member states for tackling the coronavirus, new patterns of differentiation are emerging. These differentiating effects are associated with member states’ systemic resilience and structural ability to tackle the health crisis and its socio-economic effects; and with member states’ capacity to benefit from EU measures to mitigate the social and economic impact of COVID-19.

Differing capacities and resources

The first trend of (internal) territorial differentiation refers to the COVID-19 measures taken by individual countries in relation to their differing capacities and resources. The socio-economic impact on economies and societies varies across European countries depending on the harshness and extent of government containment measures. In the old West, countries with strong public finances and solid health care systems, (more or less) sufficient capacity for vital medical supplies and equipment, and good level of public health emergency preparedness, had to choose between two alternatives. Either adopt strict emergency lock-down measures to contain the spread of COVID-19 while offering generous economic compensations, thus succeeding in keeping the number of deaths down (Denmark, Finland), or adopt milder lock-down measures while experiencing low or quite low death rates (Germany, Austria, Netherlands). Countries with vulnerable or weak public finances and health care systems, low capacity for vital medical supplies and equipment and low level of public health emergency preparedness, due at least partly to austerity policies, were forced to impose severe quarantine measures (Italy, Greece, France, Spain) while experiencing (except Greece) high death rates.

The socio-economic impact on economies and societies varies across European countries depending on the harshness and extent of government containment measures.

While economic compensatory measures varies from one country to another, their distributive effects risk accentuating existing disparities within Southern European countries. As a result, these countries now face a far worse economic downturn and deep social changes. Unless this is resolved, the lock-down generation will be condemned to youth unemployment and salary dumping. The dramatic increase of temporary, part-time or short-term jobs could further worsen working conditions, especially in countries whose economies depends on a product or resource for economic growth (mono-cultural economies) – and/or their industrial development depends on other EU and non-EU countries. In Southern Europe, deindustrialisation processes has made some countries highly dependent on their tourism sector, which has been heavily affected by the COVID-19 outbreak.

Differing effects of EU measures

The second trend of differentiating effects is associated with the (temporary) derogations from monetary, fiscal policy and single market rules initiated by the EU (i.e. the lifting of the 33% threshold for the purchase of government bonds, the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact terms, and the relaxation of cohesion programmes and state aid rules). The EU initiated these measures in order to mitigate the economic impacts of the COVID-19 measures and to provide flexibility to member states. The EU’s most competitive and dynamic economies benefited to a much greater extent from these measures than the more vulnerable and/or (heavily) indebted economies. Germany granted four times as many state aids as France and even more compared with other EU member states. Corporate bailouts are being discussed without calling into question the problems of corporate governance (e.g. unfair ‘competition’ practices, paying dividends during the pandemic crisis as well as dividend policy in general, casino economy etc.). At EU level, the European Central Bank (ECB) has asked banks not to pay dividends. At national level, however, whether to freeze the payment of dividends has largely been left up to the discretion of companies. Following the EU framework for the screening of foreign direct investments that officially entered into force on April 2019, protectionist government measures are also high on the post-COVID agenda in many EU member states. France announced a public investment program of 1.2 billion euros in order to prevent high-tech start-ups acquisition by US and Chinese companies. Τhere is now increased pressure to develop policies of ‘préférence nationale’ in order to maintain employment in the national territory. Furthermore, 18 EU countries are part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and the pandemic crisis has reinforced Serbia’s ties with China. Belgrade could become a key country in China’s regional plans.

Possible fragmentation of the European political system

Corona differentiation reveals how the politics of ‘clubs’ – the proliferation of competitive coalitions of EU member states becoming more diverse in their preferences – may further nurture forms of politico-economic dominance as well as cultivate oppressive forms of corporate power-lobbies and consequently further accelerate the fragmentation of the political order at the EU level. In the post-COVID-19 age, we have already witnessed examples of the fragmentation of the European system of rule. Faced with a serious post-corona labour market crisis, some member states will be able to provide social safety net measures against labour market dislocation and social dumping, while others, like Southern countries struggling with indebtedness, will not. The EU made efforts to mobilise public funds through complementary financial instruments in order to protect employment during the COVID-19 period, such as European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative (CRII), the SURE instrument, while the European Investment Bank provided a financing package for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

A new dividing line is emerging between the countries that state their intent to boost their national ‘industrial sovereignty’, according to Macron’s terms, through public investment, and the countries that will continue to pursue radical restrictive fiscal policies.

However, there is a risk of misappropriation of these funds by some member states, thus increasing their margins of administrative and political discretion. The implementation of the SURE instrument in Greece has raised a lot of concern about the risk of misusing these loans in order to cut wages in the private sector and/or to proceed in contractual hiring in the public sector with lower wages. Therefore, a new dividing line is emerging between the countries that state their intent to boost their national ‘industrial sovereignty’, according to Macron’s terms, through public investment, and the countries that will continue to pursue radical restrictive fiscal policies through non-redistributive forms of taxation and privatisations.

Recent debates on the COVID-19 rescue deal remind us of the extent of political-economic distortions between EU member states. Northern countries that benefited the most from the single market are strongly opposed to debt mutualisation (i.e. the equal share of costs and profits among EU member states). The example of the Netherlands as a free rider is notable since the country can promise capital and higher profits by initiating fiscal dumping practices while showing aversion for effective European tax instruments.

The proposal for the next generation EU recovery plan, despite its ‘all EU member states inclusive’ nature, may also produce asymmetric effects in the member states, as was the case with EU policy responses to the previous economic and financial crisis, thus creating new dependencies and new channels of intrusion. The bail out policies of the single market come in various forms, i.e. medium-term softening of fiscal rules as well as temporary grants and loans through joint borrowing without debt mutualisation. This rescue scheme could enable non-Eurozone member states to benefit from the rate and credibility of the euro. But Eurozone member states, especially those who are faced with an emergency and need to inject resources, will have to accept top-down allocation of financial aid based on conditionality and top-down structural reforms.

A new constitutional moment?

This could be a new ‘constitutional moment’, which is about deciding who gets funding, and which enterprises are going to fall. This is the reason why, among other agenda items, current discussions focus on the crucial question of surveillance. In order to channel money to where the needs are, regulatory surveillance could be established ex ante so that funds will be allocated after national reform programmes are approved at the EU level. In such a case, other member states via the European Council or the European Parliament could have a right of veto and suspend the funding if a reform programme is considered not to have been properly implemented at the national level. In such a context, the issue of the role of the European Parliament and of national parliaments is central, as, from a surveillance perspective, there is an increased risk of diversion from the parliamentary function. Instead of exercising oversight over other European institutions/national governments and looking into violations of EU/national law, parliamentary actors risk becoming evaluators of the progress of structural reforms, thus being co-opted to support the European Council and Commission rather than holding them accountable.

If the modus operandi of the EU continues to be based on the politics of ‘clubs’, differentiation policies will reinforce the idea of multiple Europe(s) perpetuating the role of supranational institutions as (regulatory) facilitators of the European integration process.

The post The differentiating effects of COVID-19 in Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

David Sassoli told EU leaders recovery plans must meet ambitions and warned against taking Parliament’s consent on the new EU budget for granted.

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

David Sassoli told EU leaders recovery plans must meet ambitions and warned against taking Parliament’s consent on the new EU budget for granted.

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

An opinion by Jolyon Gumbrell

Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have so far been successful in getting their message across, when it comes to fighting Covid-19. Each of the three devolved nations of the United Kingdom has its own spokesperson to update the public on measures that need to be followed to stop the spread of the virus, while England the fourth nation of the United Kingdom is left to be told what to do by a spokesperson from the UK Government. This situation illustrates the problem that devolution was never completed by Tony Blair’s government between 1997 and 2007, meaning England was deprived of its own dedicated assembly or parliament and government separate from Westminster and Whitehall.

If the constitutional situation in the United Kingdom is to be tidied up, then the Westminster Parliament in London should become the federal parliament for the whole of the United Kingdom and nothing else, while England should be allowed and required to form its own parliament preferably outside of London in a geographically central city such as Birmingham. Likewise the UK Government would become the federal government of the United Kingdom, while England like the other nations of the Union would have its own government formed by members of its own dedicated parliament. This would alleviate the inbalance and democratic deficit of the English not having their own parliament.

A future historian may one day write that if the English had been allowed their own parliament within the United Kingdom, then Brexit would not have happened. Although such an argument would not explain Welsh support for leaving the European Union in the referendum of 2016, it would help explain the direction English nationalism had taken at the time of the EU referendum.

Fintan O’Toole, the author of ‘Heroic Failure Brexit and the politics of pain’ used the term “sublimation of Englishness into Britishness” to explain how at one time the English dominated the other nations of the British Isles, by the imposition of an English cultural identity on all parts of the Union. This may explain why politicians behind devolution in the late 1990s never planned for England to be devolved from the United Kingdom unlike the other three nations, because England had always been the most powerful nation of the Union. However without English devolution the situation has reversed itself, turning England into a zone more subordinate to Westminster and Whitehall than the other three nations of the United Kingdom. At the time of the referendum many people in England already felt disenfranchised, and this anger was easily directed against the European Union instead of the failed constitutional framework of the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom left the European Union on 31st January 2020, but the public have been distracted away from Brexit by the consequences of Covid-19. However, once the transition period ends on 31st December 2020 the United Kingdom will no longer have access to European markets unless a trade agreement can be arranged. The UK’s negotiating position would be stronger, if the EU negotiators could be confident that British standards matched those of the EU, in areas such as consumer and environmental protection and workers rights. The problem for the UK is it does not have a written constitution which recognises human rights and the rule of law. A written constitution would also clearly state that all four nations of the United Kingdom are equal and recognise all of the democratically elected parliaments and assemblies. But without an English assembly or parliament separate from Westminster this is not possible.

Sources

O’Toole, Fintan; (2019) Heroic Failure Brexit and the politics of pain, Head of Zeus Ltd., London.

Bryant, Chris (ed.) (2007) Towards a new constitutional settlement, The Smith Institute, London.

©Jolyon Gumbrell 2020

The post Could an English Parliament and a written constitution help relieve the pain of Covid-19 and Brexit? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Wagenknecht v European Council
Own resources of the Communities
The General Court dismisses an action seeking a declaration that the European Council unlawfully refused to exclude the Czech Prime Minister, on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest, from the meetings of that institution concerning the adoption of the Multiannual Financial Framework of the European Union 2021/2027

When: Friday 17 July at 11:00 - Where: Anna Politkovskaya pressroom and via Skype

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

When: Friday 17 July at 11:00 - Where: Anna Politkovskaya pressroom and via Skype

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

The Civil Liberties Committee sees “overwhelming evidence” of rule of law breaches in Poland and asks Council and Commission to also keep an eye on fundamental rights.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

The Civil Liberties Committee sees “overwhelming evidence” of rule of law breaches in Poland and asks Council and Commission to also keep an eye on fundamental rights.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission
Agriculture and fisheries
Advocate General Bobek argues in favour of a more open interpretation of the criteria of direct concern

YouTube
Freedom of establishment
According to Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe, as EU law currently stands, online platform operators, such as YouTube and Uploaded, are not directly liable for the illegal uploading of protected works by the users of those platforms

Find out why there is a shortage of medicines, the impact of the coronavirus pandemic and how Parliament wants to improve the situation.

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

Find out why there is a shortage of medicines, the impact of the coronavirus pandemic and how Parliament wants to improve the situation.

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

Belgian State (Regroupement familial - Enfant mineur)
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
The date to be taken into account, in order to determine whether a family member of a sponsor is a ‘minor child’ is the date of submission of the application for entry and residence

Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Member States must grant compensation to all victims of violent intentional crime, including to those victims residing in their own territory

AFMB and Others
Social security for migrant workers
The employer of drivers of heavy goods vehicles employed in international longdistance transport is the transport undertaking that has actual authority over those drivers, that bears, in reality, the cost of their wages and that has actual power to dismiss them

Commission v Romania (Lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux)
Own resources of the Communities
Romania and Ireland are ordered to pay the Commission a lump sum of €3,000,000 and €2,000,000 respectively

Facebook Ireland and Schrems
Approximation of laws
The Court of Justice invalidates Decision 2016/1250 on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-US Data Protection Shield